THE MEDIATING ROLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY, CAREER INCENTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

By

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ABSTRACT

This work aims to examine the relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance. It also aims to test the mediating role of distributive fairness in these relationships. Nigerian working class students in Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) were sampled. A total number of 140 respondents were given questionnaires to fill but 116 questionnaires were good enough for analysis. Descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and hierarchical regression analysis were used to analyze data and to test the hypotheses. The overall findings indicated that there are relationships between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance. Moreover, it was also found that distributive fairness partially mediated the relationships between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance. This study is limited in the aspect of various organizational characteristics such as type, ownership, and size and the aspects of personal characteristics such as gender, position, length of service, and qualification. Therefore, future researches should examine the various aspects of organizational characteristics and personal characteristics in relation to performance-based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits within organizations. Organizations thrive through the instrumentality of people because they possess the required skills, knowledge and competencies needed for the execution of organizational strategy and planning. Hence, organizations should entrench a competitive total remuneration package that consists of properly-handled performance-based pay system, career incentives and various organizational benefits based on the principle of distributive fairness. In addition, management should build up an effective pay design and management systems in organizations. Openness in communication and employee participation in the pay design and management help in achieving this goal.

Keywords: Performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits, Distributive fairness, employee performance, reward system.

ABSTRAK (MALAY)

Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan diantara gaji berasaskan prestasi, insentif kerjaya, faedah organisasi, dan prestasi pekerja. Kajian ini juga mengkaji kesan pengantara keadilan pengedaran. Sampel kajian ini adalah pelajar Nigeria yang mempunyai pengalaman kerja dan menuntut di Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM). Sebanyak 140 responden telah dipilih menjawab dan116 borang soalselidik yang di terima sesuai untuk di analisis. Analisis deskriptif, analisis hubungan dan analisis regresi hierarki digunakan untuk menganalisis data dan untuk menguji hipotesis. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa terdapat hubungan positif diantara gaji berasaskan prestasi, insentif kerjaya, faedah organisasi, dan prestasi pekerja. Dapatan kajian juga mendapati keadilan pengedaran memainkan peranan pengantara kepada hubungan gaji berasaskan prestasi, insentif kerjaya, faedah organisasi, dan prestasi pekerja. Kekangan kajian ini adalah dari pelbagai ciri organisasi seperti jenis, pemilikan, dan saiz, manakala kekangan ciri personal seperti jantina, kedudukan, tempoh perkhidmatan, serta kelayakan akademik. Oleh yang demikian, kajian pada masa hadapan harus memberi penekanan kepada meningkatkan pemahaman terhadap bagaimana kesamaan dan perbezaan organisasi serta individu samada mempengaruhi gaji berasaskan prestasi, insentif kerjaya dan faedah organisasi terhadap prestasi organisasi. Organisasi boleh berkembang maju melalui peningkatan kemahiran, pengetahuan dan kecekapan individu pekerja dalam melaksana strategi-strategi organisasi. Oleh itu, organisasi seharusnya mengukuhkan pakej jumlah imbuhan yang kompetitif yang merangkumi bayaran berasaskan prestasi, faedah kerjaya, dan pelbagai faedah organisasi berdasarkan kepada prinsip keadilan pengedaran. Selain daripada itu, pihak pengurusan harus mereka bentuk sistem gaji yang efektif, menambahbaik insentif kerjaya, faedah dan pengurusan di dalam organisasi. Keterbukaan dalam komunikasi dan penyertaan pekerja dalam mereka bentuk gaji boleh membantu mencapai matlamat tersebut.

Kata kunci: Gaji berasaskan prestasi, insentif kerjaya, faedah organisasi, keadilan pengedaran, prestasi pekerja, sistem ganjaran.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The organizations are now adopting the strategies that can enhance task, targets and performance base strategies. An organization that wishes to have competitive advantage over other organizations should improve its industrial competencies, enhance its productivity and performances. This chapter is an introductory aspect of the study which explained the background of the study, the problem statement, the objectives, scope and significance of the study.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Employee performance has become a source of worry to most organizations in Nigeria. Like in the construction industry, employee performance's challenge has caused a set back to the sector. This has consequently affected the organization's performance, quality of work, duration of projects and finally firm's profits (Abdullahi, Bilau, Enegbuma, Ajagbe & Ali, 2011). Many buildings' failures and collapses have been recorded in which poor workmanship by contractors is considered a factor to have been responsible for it (Ayedun, Durodola & Akinjare, 2012).

In the education sector, prevalent poor academic performance of students in Nigeria has been associated with the poor teachers' performance (Ofoegbu 2004). Teachers who were rated as ineffective actually produced students of lower academic ability. (Akiri & Ugborugbo, 2009; Adu & Olatundun, 2007).

Past studies have also pointed out that the performance-related challenges are associated with poor compensation and application of old-fashioned retention strategies (Adebayo, 2001; Ayagi, 2001); lack of employee participation in decision making (Jike, 2003); faulty employee recruitment strategies (Amadasu, 2003); poor working environment (McOliver, 2005); and failure of organizations to create and employ rational decisions (Iyayi, 2002).

Today, people are very crucial to the performance in the organization. Organizational strategy and planning cannot materialize without the input of people. Thus, organizational success is attained through the blend of people and system. Human capital possesses the required skills, knowledge and competencies to execute strategy and planning in the organization. Hence, organizations should be well-informed about how people are stimulated to achieve their full capabilities (Lawler, 2003). This is where the issue of compensation management comes in.

Compensation involves those kinds of financial proceeds and real services and benefits workers get as part of an employment relationship. Pay may be received directly in the kind of cash such as wages, merit increases, incentives, and cost of living adjustments. It may also be indirectly received through benefits and services such as pensions, health insurance, paid time off. Programs that distribute compensation to employees can be designed in many ways, and a single employer can use more than one program (Milkovich & Newman, 2008). The significance of a reward program that tackles the vision of both the company and the individual employee cannot be overemphasized. Personalized incentive programs should be continually assessed, adjusted, analyzed and

adapted to ensure top-level employees have their eyes on the same price as the business owners (Baeten, 2010).

1.1.1 NIGERIA AT A GLANCE

Nigeria turned out to be an independent State in October, 1960. The country underwent military rule for more than twenty years starting from 1966 to 1979; and from 1983 to 1999. The present democratic rule came up through successful shift to civilian rule by General Abdulsalami Abubakar's regime, which ended up in the 1999 election and started by the inauguration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the Head of State and Government on 29th May, 1999 (Asia, 2000).

Nigeria's land area is 924,000 kilometres; recent population is estimated at 170 million people, fourth largest producer of crude oil in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and seventh largest producer of crude oil in the world (ADB/OECD, 2006). Recently, Nigeria becomes the largest economy in the African continent as a result of its rebased Gross domestic product (GDP) which rose up to $509.9bn. Besides becoming Africa's largest economy, Nigeria also made a history in ranking the world's 26th largest economy (Punch, 2014).

Crude oil makes up of 36 per cent while agriculture makes up of one-third of Nigeria's GDP (ADB/OECD, 2006). The country experienced growth in the telecommunication sector in recent years. Mobile phone lines raised from 230,000 in 2001 to 8.3 million in 2004, and at the same time, fixed land lines raised up by 20 per cent yearly from 600,000 to 1.03 million. There was also development and growth in the manufacturing sector, which was 10 and 8 per cent in 2004 and 2005, respectively (ADB/OECD, 2006).

1.1.2 INDUSTRIAL SITUATION IN NIGERIA

In the industrial context, pay has been the utmost motive for seeking employment in the civil service. This has been the reason why Nigerian Government is the largest employer in the country. Ever-increasing demand for the increment in the pay has resulted to a myriad of turbulent management-labour crises in Nigerian civil service. This scenario has made some researchers in Nigeria to look into the matter and proffer solution to it (Ellis, Chinedu & Evans, 2011).

The economic situation of Nigeria has changed drastically in recent time such that cost of living has shut up drastically, cost of operation has increased and competition has become more intense. Workers are more sensitive to the value they create and the reward (wages and benefits) they get. Workers embarked on industrial strikes under aegis of their unions to agitate for better pay and incentives (Ellis, Chinedu & Evans, 2011).

It is important for the government and other employers in Nigeria to reexamine compensation system because the values and expectations of workers have changed due to the dynamism in the environment; high cost of living; high cost of operation and high level of competition, most especially in the banking sector. Nigerian workers are now thinking of good wages and benefits (Julius & Olusegun, 2012).

Claims emanating from employees in Nigerian workers are that since they are contributing to the values of organization; then they are entitled to fair reward. This has resulted in recurrent demand for increment in pay packages by the workers in all the spheres of the economy. A myriad of strikes have been experienced since long ago in both public and private sectors in Nigeria.

The first strike by the workers in Nigeria, which was led by Mr. Michael Imoudu, happened in 1945 and was followed by a myriad of strikes till date. Between April and December 1975 alone there were 203 series of strikes involving 95,823 workers (Fashoyin 1980). Recently, as reported by the Punch (The leading newspaper in Nigeria) on 17th July 2013 that the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) embarked on an industrial strike tagged "comprehensive, total and indefinite strike". Most of these strikes are majorly caused by the demand for pay increase and good working condition. The inevitable effects of these strike actions cannot be over-emphasized as it has adversely affected management-labour relations, economic sector and other spheres of life in Nigeria.

On January 25, 2014, it was reported by the Punch newspaper that Nigeria Union of Journalists through its Zone B Vice President Mr. Dele Atunbi, lamented the spate of industrial actions in the country pointing to the fact that there is need for the people at the helm of affairs to find a way of resolving the issues that give rise to the prevalent anomaly. The Union called for a summit through which the welfare of entire workforce would be re-examined in order to prevent industrial disharmony. The recurrent demands in those sectors of the economy should be critically addressed to find enduring solutions to all the pending issues relating to workers welfare (Punch, 2014).

Traditionally, workers are paid for their services based on their educational certificates and job analysis and evaluation. Ajayi's study on Motivation and Job Satisfaction in 2012 revealed the presence of employee's poor performance, general laxity, laziness, absenteeism, lateness to work, hostility to the public members, disloyalty and corruption in the civil service. Hence, there is low job satisfaction, low social relationship with co-

workers due to the lack of career opportunities for promotion and salaries and wages and some other entitlements that can enhance their living standard. The study suggested that the government should endeavour to look into how she can motivate them through salaries, bonuses and etcetera (Ajayi, 2012).

In a nutshel, things are not augur well with Nigeria Indusrial relations. This has tremendously affected a lot of things in the sector; the most paramount of which are employee perfomance and overall performances of the organizations; public and private, in the country. there is low job satisfaction, low social relationship with co-workers due to the lack of career opportunities for promotion and salaries and wages and some other entitlements that can enhance their living standard.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Good reward package has been established by many past researchers to be a factor in the organization which enhances workers performance and thus upturn the organizations productivity (Fieldwork, 2006; Gberevbie, 2010; Bamigboye & Aderibigbe, 2004; Jerez-Gomez et al., 2005). The existing global economic trend have made most employers to understand the fact that for their organizations to have competitive advantage, the performance of their employees is germane in determining the success of the organization. Employee performance does not only benefit the organization, it also benefits the workers themselves in terms of their growth.

It is no more a news that Nigerian industries are facing a number of challenges among which is employee performance. Two industries are selected for this study to establish that employee performance is really a problem in Nigeria. The Nigerian Construction

Industry which is one of the biggest industry in Nigeria is confronted with challenges of employee performance which is affecting the organization's performance, quality of work, duration of projects and finally firm's profits (Abdullahi, Bilau, Enegbuma, Ajagbe & Ali, 2011). Ayedun, Durodola and Akinjare (2012) cited poor workmanship by contractors as one of the factors responsible for the ceaseless building disaster and collapse in the previous years. This indicated that the scenario has become a source of national concern and embarrassment in Nigeria. This is because in 2006 alone, no fewer than thirteen of such cases were recorded in Lagos State alone while statistics of the previous and subsequent years were not better off either (Ayedun, Durodola & Akinjare, 2012).

In the education sector, Poor academic performance of students in Nigeria has been connected to poor teachers' performance in terms of accomplishing the teaching task, negative attitude to work and poor teaching habits which have also been attributed to poor motivation (Ofoegbu, 2004). Teachers who were rated as ineffective actually produced students of lower academic ability. (Akiri & Ugborugbo, 2009; Adu & Olatundun, 2007).

The study carried out on the Nigerian civil service indicated that poor performance, general laxity, laziness, absenteeism, lateness to work, hostility to the public members, disloyalty and corruption were prevalent among the workers. This is caused by low job satisfaction, low social relationship with co-workers due to the lack of career opportunities for promotion and salaries and wages including other entitlements that can enrich living standard (Ajayi, 2012).

Studies have shown employee performance to be related to a number of factors. Defective employee recruitment strategies can hinder employee performance (Amadasu, 2003). Employee performance can also be hampered by poor remuneration and application of traditional retention strategies (Adebayo, 2001; Ayagi, 2001). Poor working environment does not encourage enhancement of employee performance (McOliver, 2005). If employee is not given chance to participate in the decision making in the organization, this can hinder his performance (Jike, 2003). In the same vein, failure on the part of organization to formulate and implement rational decisions (Iyayi, 2002).

Extant literature have revealed a significant relationship between performance based pay and other kinds of reward packages and employee performance (Agwu, 2013; Jalaini, Latiff, Yunus, Jasney, Ali, Fadzil, Said, & Hassan, 2013; Sajuyigbe, Bosede, & Adeyemi, 2013; Ajila & Abiola, 2004; Mensah & Dogbe, 2011;), between organisational justice (one of which is distributive fairness) and employees work performance (Alder & Tompkins, 1997; Philips et al., 2001), between organisational justice and job satisfaction (Cropanzano et al., 2001), between organisational justice and performance commitment to work (Folger & Konovsky, 1989), between organisational justice and employee behaviour in organisations (Moorman, 1991). Conversely, lower levels of organisational justice leads to employee dissatisfaction, cynicism and even bitterness against the organisation (Rae & Subramaniam, 2008). This can give rise to enmity and social hate which can deteriorate into loss of confidence in the organisation and consequently resulted in workplace defiance (Dietz et al., 2003). Perceived injustices can also cause poor quality of work (Cowherd & Levine, 1992) and weak solidarity among employees (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). However, researches have established the existence of

research lacunas in the aspect of measuring career incentives; performance based pay and organizational benefits in relation to employee performance with mediating role of distributive fairness in the context of Nigeria (Baruch, Wheeler & Zaho, 2004; Mensah & Dogbe, 2011)). Suggestions made by Perry, Engbers and Jun (2009); Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, (1997); Heinrich (2007) indicate that there is a dearth of researches on factors that can stimulate employees to improve their performances.

Furthermore, the research that was carried out by Maina1, Kibet1 and Njagi1 (2013) on the effect of reward on employee performance suggested that further researches should focus on the effect of other kinds of rewards on performance. It also suggested that future studies can focus on how to identify other factors that affect performance.

Based on the above reasons, it is sufficed to examine the relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational incentives and employee performance with the mediation of distributive fairness.

Additionally, this study can also be justified by considering the issues discussed in the introductory part of this study which are summarized below:

- The need to motivate Human capital through effective reward system because it is the one that possesses the required skills, knowledge and competencies to execute strategy and planning in the organization (Lawler, 2003).
- The need to address the defective employee performance caused by incessant strikes workers in their bid to demand for pay raise. Also, the nonchalant and lackadaisical attitudes of the workers to work which were caused by poor reward system. (Atunbi, 2014; Ajayi, 2012).

- The need to look into how Government can motivate them through salaries, bonuses and other rewards as suggested by Ajayi (2012) and Atunbi (2014). Government and other employers should review the compensation system (Julius & Olusegun, 2012).

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study was poised to answer the research questions below:

1. Is there relationship between performance-based pay and employee performance among the Nigerian Working Class Students?
2. Is there relationship between career incentives and employee performance among the Nigerian Working Class Students?
3. Is there relationship between organizational benefits and employee performance among the Nigerian Working Class Students?
4. Does distributive fairness mediate the relationships between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance?

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Objectives of this study were derived from the research questions of this study. Hence, the objectives go thus:

1. To examine the relationship between performances based pay and employee performance among the Nigerian Working Class Students.

2. To investigate the relationship between career incentives and employee performance among the Nigerian Working Class Students.
3. To find out the relationship between organizational benefits and employee performance among the Nigerian Working Class Students.
4. To examine whether distributive fairness mediates the relationships between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is unique for being among the very few studies that examined the influence of performance-based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits on employee performance with the mediation of distributive fairness. In fact, it would play an important role in unravelling the secrets behind the enhancement of employee performance in the organization.

The study contributes to the present body of knowledge on how fair reward system can drive worthwhile employee performance and overall performance. It could also be used as existing scientific evidence for future and continuing studies.

In the same manner, the study could be an integral part of the academic writing as well as a policy paper for policy makers in Nigeria. The findings canl be a useful guide for the policy and decision making as well as for academic resources.

1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This study chose Nigerian Working Class Students in Universiti Utara Malaysia as its population because they came from every nooks and crannies of Nigeria and thus reflects the generalizability of the study. However, the sample may not be enough for generalization of the study's findings due to the fact that the total population is 278 but it can relatively be generalizable.

This study was conducted to assess the influence of performance-based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits on employee performance with the mediation of distributive fairness among the Nigerian working class students in Universiti Utara Malaysia. There were 116 respondents who participated in the study; these included mainly Ph.D. and Master Students who are currently working in different workplaces in Nigeria. It also includes some undergraduate students who have been working in Nigeria before coming to Malaysia.

1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The arrangement of this study was in the following format:

Abstract: This is the synopsis of the entire study which connoted the objectives of the study, the methodology, the findings, the implications and the limitations of the study.

Chapter One: This dealt on overview of the study, the problem statements; the objectives of the study and the significance of the study.

Chapter Two: This synthesized and synchronized the past studies on the subject-matter of the study. Researches lacunas were also detected using critical review of the literatures.

Chapter Three: This explained the method used to collect data, the population, sampling technique used in selecting samples of the population, unit of analysis and the tool used in eliciting information from the respondents.

Chapter Four: This was based on the analysis of data using statistical tools. As far as this study is concerned, SPSS was used to analyze the data.

Chapter Five: This comprised of summary of the whole study, the conclusion, the suggestions and recommendations. It was under this section that the limitations and suggestions for future researches were mentioned.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviewed a good number of literature on performance based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits in relation to performance be it employee or organizational performance. Previous researches on mediating role of distributive fairness was also be examined.

2.1 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

2.1.1 EMPLOYEES PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS

Boyne, Farrell, Law, Powell, & Walker (2003) observed that it is important for the organizations to have information on performance. This will enable such organization to know whether they are improving, deteriorating or stagnant. Also, it enables organizations to adjust with a view to improving on their services for survival and growth.

Performance in the business environment involves some specific domains such as shareholder return (total shareholder return, economic value added, etc.), product market performance (sales, market share, etc.), and financial performance (profits, return on assets, return on investment, etc.) as mentioned by Richard et al. (2009).



Figure 2.1
Overall Performances as a Second-Order Construct
Source: Carton, 2004

The above model which is known as second order construct depicts that the higher level constructs are measured by the lower level constructs. This means that performance will be measured against three dimensions namely; financial, operational and stakeholder's performance.

From financial perspective, performance is described as the outputs of organization that reflects in three dimensions; financial performance (i.e. profits, return on assets, return on investment, etc.), product market performance (i.e. sales, market share, etc.), and shareholder return (i.e. total shareholders' returns, economic value added, etc.) (Richard et al, 2009). According to business dictionary, Performance entails measurement of performance in the organization against the organizational goals and objectives. Performance is managed by managers by using formal, information-based routines and procedures to sustain organizational activities (Simons, 2000). The information has to do with financial and non-financial issues that affect decision making and managerial action. Both profit and non-profit organizations are increasingly adopting performance

management system. Performances are obtained through frequent use of Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Said et al., 2003; Bititci et al., 2004; Davis & Albright, 2004; Epstein et al., 2004; Marr et al., 2004; Robinson, 2004).

Measuring performance is of great significance to an incentive plan because it links the significance of recognized organizational goals. Something that can be measured and rewarded should get attention too (Bohlander Snell, & Sherman, 2001). In the field of human resource management, various researchers have recommended some pointers for measuring employee performance among which are quality that can be measured by percentage of work output that must be redone or rejected; customer satisfaction that can be measured by the number of royal customers and customer feedback. Also, timeliness evaluated based on how swift the work is performed by the worker when assigned with a certain task; truancy/tardiness observed when employees absent themselves from work; and achievement of objectives evaluated when an employee has exceeded his/her set targets, he/she is then considered to have performed well to achieve the objectives (Hakala, 2008; Armstrong, 2006).

Conventionally, performance assessment contains five dimensions of performance, viz; efficiency, effectiveness, economy, compliance and service quality. Performance is a virtual concept and therefore it is often assessed against some benchmark by looking at what has been achieved in the organizations, comparing it to the budget or compliance (Good & Carin, 2004).

There have been, in the past decades, a significant changes in the old-fashioned, post war method of performance evaluation (Kald & Nilsson, 2000). The archaic approach mainly

centralized on financial indicators, such as a sales revenue, profit, liability, and return on investment. It was also revolved around the yardsticks set up to evaluate employee performance, and looked mainly at individual performance but hardly at business performance (Kanji, 2005).

Davis and Albright (2004) concluded that, major Change that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s in the industrial arena has caused a challenging business environment, which stimulated organizations to look for better acumen into their business activities and operational performance. The ever-increasing significance of these changes further increased the need for substitute control and performance measures (Davis & Albright, 2004). This will enable the organization to have competitive advantage and profitable as well (Zeng & Zhao, 2005).

Since past years, various scholars and practitioners have been criticized both archaic management control and performance evaluation (Banker, Konstans & Mashruwala, 2000; Kald & Nilsson, 2000) and the methods through which organizations design their operations and oversee performance (Banker et. al., 2000; Kald & Nilsson, 2000).

Managing individual performance within organizations has conventionally centralized on measuring performance and allocating remuneration. Good performance is perceived to be the outcome of the collaboration between individual ability and motivation. It is gradually being recognized that planning and an enabling environment affect individual performance, with performance goals and standards, appropriate resources, guidance and support from the managers all being central (Torrington, Hall & Stephen, 2008).

Organizational performance as well as individual performance can be affected by HR policies and practices. For instance, Long ago, job satisfaction has been considered a key to affecting business performance as well as commitment. Furthermore, writers have recognized motivation as the mediating mechanism and some recognize trust and morale. In spite of more recent attention to commitment, motivation is still considered to be an important influence to performance (Torrington et al, 2008).

According to Anitha (2013), employee performance refers to employee's monetary or non-monetary result which is absolutely connected with the performance and success (p.313). Employee job performance has two characteristics; employee's abilities and skill be it natural or acquired and employee's motivation. Researchers have indicated that employee's abilities, competency, and innovation enhance organizational success (Smith, 2002).



- ***Planning*** work and setting expectations
- continually ***Monitoring*** performance
- ***Developing*** the capacity to perform
- periodically ***Rating*** performance in a summary fashion and;
- ***Rewarding*** good performance.

Figure 2.2

Employee Performance Model

Source: Noe et al, 2000.

In the Africa context, performance is hindered by the two common challenges; individual immorality and corporate immorality (Blunt & Popoola, 1998). Individual immorality is when an individual is dishonest in terms of management and accountability but organizational control measure can curtail it to the minimum level. Corporate immorality reflects untoward behavior entrenched in the organization that no individual can be

blamed for (Blunt & Popoola, 1998). In the context of Ghanaian Civil Service, Price (1995) observed that efficiency, qualification, seniority, experience and sense of responsibility are entrenched in the system and thus similar to that of scenario in the Western countries (Price, 1995).

2.1.2 PERFORMANCE-BASED REWARD SYSTEM

Performance-based pay is described as a pay to employee within a compensation range that is competitive with that paid for similar work in the community and industry. Pay is also based upon merit as empirically appraised in the Firm's performance appraisal program, with a chance to receive above market pay for employees demonstrating exceptional performance (Matsumura & Shin, 2004).

Armstrong (2005), in his definition of performance-based pay observed that it is a method through which individual, group or performance is directly and monetarily compensated. Mensah and Dogbe (2011) conceptualized it to be a scheme that aimed at compensating employee based on his/her performance. Kanji (2005) observed that performance incentive bonus scheme is that of a foundation upon individual employee and organizations rest. In as much as employee acknowledge when, why and what is expected of him in terms of tasks, then the organizational goals is attainable and employee feel being empowered.

Historically, Schiller (1996) revealed that rewarding employee in relation to performance dated back to 19th century when the piece-work system was in vogue. During this time, traditional merit program emerged from the then piece-work system. In this program, employee's performances were appraised by employer using performance appraisal to be

able to determine the pay raise for the deserving employee. This merit program cut across both the public and private organizations. As time went by, the program became obsolete in the sense that the increase in the pay given to the deserving employee was made permanent. If the performance of such employee reduced, it would be at the expense of the organization as it will be losing money as a result (MacLean, 1990). Hence, public and private sectors discovered this and realized the need to review the way performance are assessed (Brosz & Morgan, 1977). Thus, performance based rewards came into play as the traditional merit program faded away in 1990s. In the present time, numerous organizations have adopted different kinds of incentive programs which are tailored towards employee performance.

Incentive programs were also in existence since 19th century in form of rewarding of employee according to his performance which means the higher your productivity the higher your rewards. However, the scope has been widened beyond this meaning to include cost minimization for the employer without hampering employee rewards for the job well done. Performance-based pay has three parts: defining performance, measuring performance and feeding back performance evidence. Performance-based pay indicates which kind of performance are important to the organization, it evaluates those kinds of performance through performance evaluation to administer employees' performance and it gives feedback to employees through performance feedback gatherings in order to enable them to adjust their performance to the organization's goal (Noe, Hollenbeck, Gerhart, & Wright, 2000).

2.1.3 TYPES OF PERFORMANCE BASED REWARDS

Australian Primary Principals Association's issue paper (2007) made it known that there are traditional methods that were in practice before in which employee is rewarded based on the standard of his performance. The method included whole or partial pay on the basis of performance standard. Other yardsticks were objectively used for additional rewards. The performance related rewards usually were smoothly runned in the organiztions whose outputs and outcomes are easily, and objectively, quantifiable which can be monetized (APPA, 2007).

Performance-based pay is of two types: merit pay and incentive pay (Mensah & Dogbe, 2011). Merit Pay or Pay for performance or Performance pay adjusts salaries upward or offers reward for higher levels of performance. A standard for individual level of performance is established and by meeting or surpassing such standard, bonus or a salary raise will be awarded to the worker involved (Kirunda, 2004).

Merit pay is commonly adopted in the private industrial and commercial sector as a management tool to achieve organizational goals. Merit pay is mainly favoured because it can promote individual motivation by recognizing effort, achievement and rewarding it in a concrete way. (Kirunda, 2004).

Regarding the education sector of US, DEST Research Paper (2007) have shown that the United States (US) Teaching Commission signified that there is no a particular way to evaluate classroom excellence. As a result, the Commission advocates that a balanced merit pay plan relates to pay raises to some or all of the components such as student achievement gains, satisfactory evaluations by principals or peers, Additional pay for

extra responsibilities, Incentives for earning National Board Certification and Special rewards for specialists (DEST Research Paper, 2007).

Time-based pay systems are not entirely lacking a relationship between salary and performance. As a substitute, many added merit pay increase to employees. When the performance evaluation is done, workers commonly get pay rise if their performance is adjudicated laudable. Hence, merit raises are projected to encourage workers by linking at least part of their pay to their performance (Kirunda, 2004).

Grobler, Warnich, Carell, Elbert and Hatfield (2006) explicated that there are three assumptions on merit pay systems; first, The fact that workers are different when it comes to performance can be perfectly evaluated; second, workers can efficiently observe pay differences as linking to performance differences, and the third one is that employees can increase their future performance to gain more merit rises.

2.1.4 PROBLEMS WITH PERFORMANCE BASED REWARDS

Performance-based pay systems were gradually considered as less acceptable. This is due to the fact that they largely restricted to one-dimensional monetary information, lacked an equivalent between the firm's competences and its dynamic business environment, lacked a strategic focus, had a retrospective orientation and short-term vision, and had a fragile strategic content (Kald & Nilsson, 2000; Bourne, Franco, & Wilkes, 2003; Kanji, 2005).

Waal and Counet (2009) also stressed that these weaknesses attracted organizations to look for assessment systems that sustained them better in the stimulating business environment. In this case, there has been an increasing concern about transforming and refining management control systems.

Perry, Engbers and Jun (2009) in his study found that invalid contracts, distorted information about the subordinate performance, weaken capacity of interdependent coordination have bedeviled merit pay in the public sector (Perry, Engbers & Jun, 2009). The evaluation that was done on merit pay in the Public and private sector by National Research Council (NRC) panel in the United States of America revealed that employees can be motivated and their performance can boost by individual incentive pay (Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991). However, Kellough and Lu's (1993) observed, in their study that centralized on the review of empirical studies of merit pay that on the general basis, there is little positive relationship between merit pay and employee motivation and performance due to the performance assessment problems such as clemency of the rater, unavailability of fund to organize system at normal level.

Competitive advantage is enhanced by merit pay. Merit pay symbolizes financial fairness as it is also compatible with employee motivational theories. However, There are five problems that affects positive relationship between merit pay and performance: evaluation problem; feedback and acceptance of evaluation result; limited desirability of merit reward; system uproar; long delay between performance and reward, and inconsistent use of financial and non-financial rewards (Campbell & Campbell, 1998).

There are also some other demerits associated with merit pay system among which are; there is only a little relationship between performance appraisals and percentage pay increases, and employees can swiftly identify it. Also, supervisors' prejudices continue to be more essential in the appraisal process than worker's productivity. Furthermore, workers just do not understand that merit rises are connected to their performance, whether true or not. In this case, it is imperative for the organization to review the system

for these possible challenges and should not accept that it is functional. Some managers believe that linking pay rises to performance is operational because behaviors that are rewarded are more expected to be recurring and the one that are reprimanded are less probably to be recurrent. Rewards that are obtained as a result of one's performance will have a greater value than rewards that are given to everyone (Grobler et al., 2006).

Successful merit pay system rests on some dynamics (Perry et al., 2009). High level of trust, sufficient pay package, efficient performance appraisals, close geographic proximity are determinants of successful merit pay system (Brudney & Condrey, 1993). Anderson (2007) added degree of professionalism to the list. Studies on research in the regulatory and financial sectors indicated that performance-based reward system is believed to be conflict-ridden (Bertelli, 2006; Marsden, 2004; Marsden & Richardson, 1994). The study which was carried out by Andersen and Pallesen (2008) on Performance-based Pay system in the education sector revealed that there is negative relationship between performance-based pay and employee attitudes and intrinsic motivation.

Perry et al. (2009) noted that the success of Performance-based pay system is affected by its mismatch with public institutional rules, lack of ability or willingness to adjust it to these values, and its mismatch with more powerful motivations that lead many people to pursue public service in the first place.

Some other literature also criticized the assessment processes of performance-based rewards. Some literature in the education sector have claimed that objectives are difficult or impossible to launch in teaching because vital education outcomes have not been

recognized, and this certainly declines goal clarity. It is a glaring problem that the intricacy of planning a program that balances clarity of goals and diverse appraisal measures, since clear measures are required to evaluate productivity yields. This problem become bigger since the evaluation is often done through proxies, such as self-report surveys which inquire teachers about the motivational impact of the programme, which are at best indirect measures (Kirunda, 2004).

Kirunda (2004) observed that American Federation for Teachers believed that merit pay creates biased competition between teachers. Teachers who have not been rewarded can challenge the fairness of evaluation, as there are commonly no clear measures. Even if the evaluation process is completed perfectly and impartially, teachers can still feel dissatisfied if they are not considered competent (Kirunda, 2004).

Another usual criticism is that teachers are not mostly encouraged by monetary reward. Hence, they will not respond to financial incentives. If money is a relatively small motivator for teachers, efforts to focus on monetary-reward systems can have the consequence of increasing resentment towards management, and reducing employee loyalty, causing in a decline in productivity (Kirunda, 2004).

Furthermore, antagonists of pay-for-performance, claimed that it is almost impossible to justly evaluate and measure workers' performance without biases (Kirunda, 2004).

2.1.5 CAREER INCENTIVES

Incentive implies a way through which employers give out their end-product of the employment agreement which is known as reward in exchange for the work rendered by employees. Largely, incentive reward is any kind of reward patterned to acknowledge

employee accomplishments in the organization. Incentive type of reward can ignite and enhance anticipated performance. Employers do, sometimes reiterate the kind of behaviour expected to be ignited by the incentives (Hsu, Jiang, Klein, & Tang, 2002)).

Some researchers are of the view that incentives that are based on performance is a new phenomenon and has a high effect on economics, accounting and human resource management (Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987).

Hsu, et.al (2002) observed that there are five elements of incentives that entice employees which include salary, short term incentives, long term incentives, employee benefits and perquisites.

Furthermore, incentives can be in form of career anchor denotes what employee basic needs from his career. It is divided into two; one is internal while another is external career anchor. Internal anchor refers to employee perception and psychological allurement that direct his career. This can be in form of non-financial incentives like job security, location, and autonomy in the workplace. Conversely, external career anchor denotes the extent of employee perception that organization gratifies the internal anchor through incentives and benefits. Put differently, external career anchors means how well the internal career anchor are satiated as external career incentives.

Of all the components of the career incentives job security seems to be more critical. Wagner III and Hollenbeck (2010) defined job security as a need which has its origin emanated from the second level of Maslow's hierarchy of needs (i.e. safety and security).

In some organizations in Britain and United states, job security is habitually mandated under statute. Job security guarantees usually come from enterprise or establishment level

bargaining between employers and employees or their representatives (Bryson & White, 2006; White & Bryson, 2006).

Employee can leave his workplace for the sake of money but it should be pointed out that monetary incentives cannot be the only reason (Bartol & Martin, 1982). Pay and organizational benefits are not the only elements in the job offer; incentives in the form of job location, job security, balance with personal/family time, potentiality for job advancement, and work-related challenges (i.e. career incentives) form the part of incentives in the job offer (Lineberry & Trumbler, 2000). Extant literatures have indicated that researchers have been interested in studying career anchor (Kassicieh & Igbaria, 1999; Jiang & Klein, 2000). Previous researches have shown the correlation between internal career anchor and employee retention. It has been emphasized by Van and Schein (1977) that internal career anchor and organizational career incentives have impacts on career satisfaction. Employee who feels the availability of ample career opportunities in his workplace will be happy with his work in the organization According to the theory, employee who is working in a satisfying environment that harmonizes his needs will rationalize the work effort himself, their peers, and their families (Herzberg, 1987).

Hsu et.al. (2002) recommended that organizations should frequently review employee attitudes about their career incentives and take advantage of the chance to determine their job attitudes. One considerable advantage of good communication is to keep expectations of employees more manageable.

2.1.6 ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS

Researchers have been studying organizational benefit since 1980s and it has attracted different definitions and conceptualizations and empirical studies (Ashkanasy, Wilderom, & Peterson, 2000). Studies agree on the fact that organizational benefits encourage employee commitment, identity, and direction and then enhance performance.

Organizational benefits otherwise known as employee benefits refers to a part of reward system given by the organization alongside with other forms of monetary reward (Armstrong 2010). Organizational benefits impacts the attraction and retention of employee of high performance. Organizational benefits include retirement schemes, holiday, pensions, share ownership, paid leave and allowances. Chung (2006) added to the list to include subsidized meals, financial assistance, company car, clothing allowance, personal needs, mobile phone credit and petrol allowance etc.

Pension has been regarded by the employees as the most paramount of organizational benefits aside basic pay. Monetary contribution by both the employer and employee constitutes pensions. Pensions serve as a source of income for the employee after his retirement as it equally serves as deferred benefits for employees who quit job. Organizational commitment of the employer to employee welfare and concern about his long-term interests can reflect through pensions. A good pension package can entice and retain high performance employee because pension play a role in the competitive total reward system. Among the advantages of welfare benefits are that it enhances employee wellbeing at work and at home. Welfare benefits include sporting facility, stock purchase, insurance schemes and savings plans. Some welfare benefits are legally

required and binding as well. The studies carried out by Nzuve (2010) indicated that organizational benefits can improve employee commitment and productivity which is the expectation of employee in exchange for the benefits they render to the employees.

The range and scope of organizational benefits are developing swiftly and the outcome of the benefits market have the possibility to influence on almost every aspect of a worker's life. Managing the positive influence of organizational benefits, the effective delivery of benefits solutions requires a good circle. For benefits to have a positive influence on an individual, it requires individual to firstly know and understand the benefits their employer currently offers. Communicating the merits, scope and possible influence of organizational benefits successfully, there is need for organizations d to understand their employees, what they want from individual products and their motivation to acquire them (Pegg, 2009).

Successfully communicating the advantages, scope and potential impact of benefits presents a real opportunity for employers. Research undertaken by the Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development (CIPD, 2007) indicates that the better benefits are communicated, the more workers appreciate their employer and, even when employees don't take up benefits offers, engagement with the organization is increased (CIPD, 2007).

2.1.7 DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS

Long ago Jay Stacy Adams who propounded equity theory opined that workers would like to do in return; they collect a fair compensation for other colleagues to benefit from

the rewards of work (Ali & Mohsen, 2008). Perceived fairness of the outcome and consequences that individuals receive (Eric, 2003).

It should be noted that distributive fairness is not just restricted to the fairness of payments, but also a broad set of organizational outcomes, such as upgrades, rewards, punishment, work programs, benefits and performance evaluation encompasses. The basic premise is that the distribution of resources primarily on the perception of distributive fairness, fairness, trust, commitment and organizational impact. Served justice or compensation based on merit, is considered equivalent (Mehrabi, Rangriz, Darvishzadeh, & Khoshpanjeh, 2012).

Distributive fairness is an important predictor of personal outcomes such as pay and job satisfaction and organizational outcomes such as organizational commitment and supervisory assessment of the pad. Reverse distributive injustice occurs when people are expecting a reward that others may receive the fact of rewards such as new job, new responsibilities, power, rewards, promotion. (Konvsky & Cropanzano, 1993) If an outcome is unfair perception, discrimination and injustice of these personal feelings such as anger, or guilt of pride and satisfaction and recognition, such as switching inputs and outputs such as yield and composition of their behavior with others and also affects the organization and ultimately behavior (such as performance or turnover) affects (Ali & Mohsen, 2008).

Maintaining fairness in organizations has been reiterated by different researchers (Liao & Rupp, 2005; Suliman, 2007). Organization that foster organizational fairness would attain its organizational objectives. Organisational fairness can be conceptualized as the

perception of employee regarding justice and impartial treatment in an organisation. Organizational management studies have shown that impartial and fair treatment within the organization substantial impact on human resource management. Employee who believes that he is enjoying fair and impartial treatment would be dedicated to job and such employee would not quit the job (Latham & Pinder, 2005). Existing studies inform that there is a significant connection between organisational justice and employee performance (Philips, Douthitt, & Hyland, 2001). If organisational fairness is at low ebb in the organization it may demotivate employee and promote employee resentment (Rae & Subramaniam, 2008). In a situation of low level of organizational justice, enmity and social hatred can thrive and hamper employee confidence in the organisation and can consequently result to workplace defiance (Dietz et al., 2003). Cowherd and Levine (1992) postulated that if employees believe that fairness is not entrenched in the organization, their performances may be hindered. Pfeffer and Langton (1993) added that such situation can breed weak solidarity among employees.

Based on the past scholastic studies, three types of organizational justice are discernible. According to Greenberg (1987) and Greenberg (1990) organizational justice are of distributive fairness and procedural fairness while Bies (1986) and Skarlicki and Folger (1997) added interactional fairness to be the third type.

Distributive fairness is among the focus of this study; therefore, the emphasis would be much on it. Scholars like Adams (1965); Colquitt et al. (2001); Greenberg (2004) observed that distributive fairness constitutes integral part of organizational justice.

Distributive fairness, according to Janssen (2004), implies defined distributive the view of employees regarding the overall fairness between the comprehensive scope of investments made and the attached compensation. Based on the equity theory propounded by Adams (1965), it is a fact that employees would normally make a comparison between his contribution in terms of work rendered to the organization and the returns from the organization (Adams, 1965; Janssen, 2004). If employee perceives fairness in the comparison, then he will feel satisfied (Greenberg, 1990), this can lead to positive behaviors like extra role behaviors (Janssen, 2004).

2.2 OVERALL REVIEW OF VARIABLES

The quality of the workforce and proper management of employee through rewards is linked to the resounding organizational performance. (Fieldwork, 2006).

Sufficient rewards are motivating elements for employee retention and performance. Putting into consideration, the level of rewards that will motivate employees for retention and performance is vital for organizational survival and growth (Gberevbie, 2010).

Rewards can motivate and retain competent staff for performance (Bamigboye & Aderibigbe, 2004; Jerez-Gomez et al., 2005). Organization can retain its employees for performance by matching its rewards to employees' preference. The match between rewards desired by employees and offered by the organization is what leads to job satisfaction. And job satisfaction in turns guarantees employee retention (Heneman & Judge, 2003).

Generally, performance has become a source of worry to the organizations. Previous studies have proved the positive influence of incentives on the performance which

consequently resulted in the organizational profitability. An improved Performance helps organizations to gain competitive advantage among other organization. Incentive, performance based pay and organizational benefits have been regarded by the past studies to be among the factors that can enhance performance (Omaro, 2011).

Performance evaluation and control is quite challenging to be sustained. However, organizations can adopt performance based employee evaluation because it always fit best in all situations in organizations. Organizations should be cognizant of those factors that can stimulate performance, among which are employee recognition, size of pay rewards for high performance, method of motivating individual job performance (Heckman, Carolyn, & Jeffrey, 1997).

2.2.1 PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

Globler et al (2006) stressed that many companies in the present time are thinking of transformation from time to time based on pay system to a performance-based pay system. The key force of any performance based system is to relate employees' salaries directly to their performance. They also opined that workers are probably to be highly reinvigorated and intensify their efficiency if they observe that there is a straight connection between the rewards received and level of performance. Maximum performance based pay systems offers employees with a basic income and the chance to receive extra reward if their output exceeds a particular standard. Adoption of performance based systems has witnessed resurgence.

Shilongo (2013) opined that the issue of performance and compensation cannot be overlooked or separated. He noted further the effects of performance-based pay plans on

individual and organizational performance cannot be simply disjointed from the wider context of a firm's structures, management strategies, and employees systems.

Globler et al (2006) observed that the process through which workers are paid for accomplishing their jobs make up the pay system of the company. Workers are mostly rewarded for the time they spend to contribute to their jobs or the quantity of work they produce on the job.

Robbins (2005) stressed that the social sciences have propounded many theories to explicate how payment rise dependent on performance might stimulate workforce to put more effort and situate that effort on the attainment of organizational performance objectives.

Also, some reviewed literature revealed that low positive relationship exists between performance-based pay system and employee performance. However, some studies indicate success of performance-based pay system was hampered by its implementation; it is not that employees do not like the system (Egger-Peitler, Hammer, chmid & Meyer, 2007). Perry et.al (2009) added that deficient implementation and poor management practices are the common impediments to performance-based initiatives. Also, disparity in the attribution of performance hampers the flow of merit pay (Campbell & Campbell (1998).

Park and Sturman (2012) posited that the impact of pay-for-performance strategies on employee future performance can be described the by nature of relationship between pay and performance for each strategy and the financial nature of the awards from each strategy

Nyberg, Pieper and Trevor (2013) observed that merit pay, bonus and their cumulative effective overtime positively influence the employee future performance. However, bonus is more effective than merit pay.

Yuan, Le, McCaffrey, Marsh, Hamilton, Stecher and Springer (2013) observed that three incentive program examined under their studies indicated negative relationship between the incentive programs and the teachers' performance.

However, another study stated that it is the employees' perception of the financial incentives that will determine its effectiveness. If the employees find the incentive program supportive, it is likely to motivate them and thus increase performance (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008).

The problem with the implementation of merit pay has to do performance appraisal issue. This is reflected in three aspects. The first one is setting performance goals or benchmarks while the second is performance evaluation itself and the last one is how to create a connection between pay and performance (Kessler & Purcell, 1992). Mensah and Dogbe (2011) stressed that the motivational influence of merit pay on performance is hindered by unfair performance appraisal.

Beardwell and Holden (1995) explained it further by observing that the performance measures is of two kinds; input-based and output-based measures. Input-based measure involves employees' personal features, traits, competencies and skills. The output-based measure is individual performance. Managers face the challenge of how to form performance measure. To solve the problem, employees should be involved in the formation of performance objectives (Beardwell & Holden, 1995). Involvement of

workers is difficult in certain careers like teaching and the military. To solve this problem, there is need for detailed and impartial performance evaluation, training for performance evaluators as this will avoid mistakes that are common to in performance evaluation (Campbell & Campbell, 1998).

2.2.2 CAREER INCENTIVES AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

Surveys have signified that incentive is an important factor that can impact the performance. The worthiness of the pay given to employee can induce good performance (Omaro 2011). Organizations can achieve their managerial goals through giving meaningful incentives that would be based on the level performance to their employees. Incentives can be effective if it is tailored towards job criteria of individual employee and should constitute a portion of the total reward system. Compensation packages and programs should centralize on individual employee performance and competency. Performance evaluation that would determine appropriate incentive allocation has become a challenge to organization. Technique of effective performance evaluation is required (Omaro, 2011).

Mahmoud and Reisel (2014) observed that job security and satisfaction have been referred to by some scholars as the important factors that enhance employee retention among service workers which in turn can improve performance (e.g. Laine et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2002; Reisel, Probst, Swee-Lim, Maloles, & Ko¨nig., 2010). Job security and satisfaction are believed to encourage workers to perform behaviors that go beyond their job descriptions (e.g. Reisel et al., 2010; Tsai & Wu, 2010; Feather & Rauter, 2004).

It is noteworhty here that little is known about linking career incentive to employee performance.

2.2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

A study carried out by Nzuve (2010) indicated that organizational benefits can improve employee commitment and productivity which is the expectation of employee in exchange for the benefits they render to the employees.

A good pension package can entice and retain high performance employee because pension play a role in the competitive total reward system. Among the advantages of welfare benefits are that it enhances employee wellbeing at work and at home. Welfare benefits include sporting facility, stock purchase, insurance schemes and savings plans. Some welfare benefits are legally required and binding as well.

Omaro (2011) who studied the relationships between organization benefits and employee performance established the positive correlation between the two variables. However, he observed that there is no sufficient evidences found to have indicated a significant relationship between career base incentive and organizational benefit influencing employee performance.

It should therefore be noted here that little is known about linking organizational benefits to employee performance.

2.2.4 DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNES AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

Researches on compensation, most especially those from western part of the world, have given more insights in to the mediating role of distributive fairness in the pay system

models. The example of this is the researches on pay structure which were carried out by Tang and Sarsfi eld-Baldwin (1996). All were done in United States. The results of these studies indicated that there is strong connection between the properly allocation of pay structures to employees which is based on suitable distribution tenets such as seniority, length of service, merit and/or contribution and employees' perceptions of distributive fairness and this can stimulate job satisfaction and can in turn enhance

A number of theories support the concept of distributive fairness. Equity theory made it known that employees anticipate fair outcomes in terms of pay, incentives, benefits, job security, recognition perks in exchange for his contribution in terms of education, effort, time, commitment and experiences to their jobs. If employee believes that his contributions are more than what he gets as reward, he would feel cheated and it will affect his satisfaction and consequently affect his performance. However, the reverse is the case if employee perceives that his pay is fair (Adams, 1963; 1965). Cole and Flint (2004) postulated that if employee perceives fairness in the reward given to him, it can impact his personal outcomes.

Cole and Flint (2004) revealed that theories have brought up two ways in which fairness perceptions correlate to work effort and performance which include instrumental and value expressive. The instrumental aspect of it concentrates on the concern of employee regarding the end-product of the allocation of resources like equity theory (Adams 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler 1971).

Interestingly, observation have shown that this kind of relationship between the effect of pay design issues and job satisfaction is indirectly affected by perceptions of distributive

fairness (Ismail et al., 2008). Similarly, the findings of the study carried out by Ismail, Ibrahim and Girardi (2009) on the mediating effect of distributive fairness in the relationship between pay design and job satisfaction showed that distributive fairness can mediate the relationship between pay design issues and job satisfaction in the public college sector.

Strong relationships with work outcomes such as organizational citizenship behavior, organizational commitment, turnover intentions, and job performance have been established in organizational justice research (e.g. Carr, Gregory, & Harris, 2010; Van-Dierendonck & Jacobs, 2012; Whitman, Caleo, Carpenter, Horner, & Bernerth, 2012).

Abekah-Nkrumah and Atinga (2013) in their study on Ghanaian hospital opined that entrenchment of fairness and the design of a healthy work environment for the different categories of healthcare workers is vital and crucial to amplify productivity. Safeguarding fairness and equity in managing the various categories of employees in organizations can create a great challenge. It is thus not amazing that many organizational researchers have placed more emphasis on empirical work on organizational justice (Theo & Lim, 2001).

Employee's performance in the hospital is stated to have been influenced by perceived fairness. The components of organizational justice are correlated to task performance. However, the study that was carried out by Fernandes and Awamleh (2006) in UAE (which preceded the study of Abekah-Nkrumah & Atinga, 2013) indicates that none of the three dimensions of organizational justice (Distributive fairness, Procedural justice and interactional justice) significantly influenced self-perceived performance.

2.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The basis for this study is drawn on two theories; Equity Theory of motivation which was propounded by Adam Stacy and Expectancy Theory propounded by Victor Vroom. The first theory (i.e. equity theory) posits that employee anticipates fairness and equity in his reward based on the job done. The theory germinated from the Hertzberg's job satisfaction theory but Adam Stacy related it to reward system. Employer's satisfaction lies in his perception that reward system is perceived by the workers to be fair and unbiased. Equity Theory is based on the subjective and skewed judgment about fairness and equity in the reward system in relation to the inputs made by the workers. The inputs denote employee's efforts, time, education, and experience. The theory premise on the fact that people's perception and feeling regarding how they are being treated compared to others determined whether they will be happy or not (Armstrong, 2001). If employee perceives that what he is being paid commensurate with the efforts he put forth in the organization, then he will be more hardworking and diligent at work. In the same vein, Boddy, (2008) exemplified the analogy in the following formula:

Input (A) =Input (B)

Reward (A) =Reward (B)

The logic in the formula is that if one employee makes a comparison of his earning vis a vis his efforts with another employee. If he sees fairness and equity in it, he would definitely be satisfied. If otherwise is perceived by him the reverse is the case; he would be dis-satisfied. The consequence of this is that there would be tension and frustration on the part of the dis-satisfied employee. Then, the performance of such employee will get low and consequently reduce the rewards more (Boddy, 2008). Some things do influence the view of performance-based pay; political connection, heirachical position, gender issue, ethical issue, and personal subjectivity can affect employer's judgement regarding performance-based pay. For instance, if an employee is paid above his colleagues due to his affinity with CEO of the company. Two or more factors can affect employer's perception of performance-based pay.

The second theory is on the other side of coin as it is based on the premise that individual employee is made to decide on his own. The theory posits that employee's motivation is predicated on the degree at which he wants something and the level of likelihood of getting it (Boddy, 2008). Individual employee's perception serves as motivational force for him.

The framework of the theory as formulated by Vroom (1964) revealed that the combination of both motivation and effort give rise to performance and then to outcome. Motivated behaviour of employee is energized by effort to performance, expectancy which must be greater than zero and performance to outcome. Summation of the vallances for all appropriate outcomes must be greater than zero.

Availability of different kinds of rewards in the organization stimulate more effort from the employee (Boddy, 2008; Croce, 2004). Below is the model illustrating the entire theory.



Figure 2.3
The Expectancy Theory Model
Source: Croce, 2004

Organizations are now increasingly measuring pay against the performance. This scenario would attract high-performing employees as it also encourages hard working on the part of workers (Booth & Frank, 1999). Linking performance-based reward system with incentives enhancement has been the subject matter of public policy debate. However, the common compensation management practices in Africa are based on qualification and job evaluation (Mensah & Dogbe, 2011). Fosh (1998) observed that the determinant of reward differences in East African countries is paper qualification and that

the reward management practices were influenced by custom and practice, collective bargaining and labor market situation.

Mullins (2004) observed that the recent scenario now is the movement of organizations in general, and private sectors in particular towards performance-based pay package with the aim of achieving organizational objectives. Similarly, there has been a turn-back to the system that emphasizes performance-based pay system, encouraged by government (Perry, Engbers & Jun, 2009; Booth & Frank, 1999).

Compensation has a number of perspectives. There are society perspective, employee perspective and managers' perspective (Milkovich & Newman, 1996). According to them, Society perceives compensation to mean 'equal work for equal pay. This is the reason behind Society being frown at disparity in the reward system. From the perspective of employees, compensation is an entitlement of the services rendered which is possible through the use of skills, abilities, education and training knowledge.

In contrast, managers conceptualize compensation in two ways. They believe that compensation means major liability and can serve as motivational reward strategies that can influence employee attitudes and behavior. Some people are of the opinion that reward system can enhance competitive advantage if it influences worker's work attitude and behavior and the consequent organizational productivity and effectiveness (Milkovich, 1998).

2.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The literature reviewed so far have indicated the relationship between performance-based pay, career incentive, organizational benefits, distributive fairness and employee

performance. However, some researches indicated negative relationship between performance-based pay and employee performance while there is dearth of studies on career incentives and organizational performances being linked to employee performance.

Having reviewed the past studies, the next task is to describe research methodology used in this study. Research methodology involves research framework, measurement of variables, data collection and data analysis procedures. These were discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.0 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, research methodology was discussed under the headings such as research framework, hypotheses, research design, operational definition, measurement of variables, data collection, sampling, data collection procedures and techniques of data were highlighted.

3.1 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Based on the research questions of this study, the research framework is drawn below:



Figure 3.1
Research Framework

3.2 HYPOTHESES STATEMENTS

Below are the hypotheses of this study:

H1: Performance-based pay is related to employee performance among Nigerian Working class Students.

H2: Career incentives are related to employee performance among Nigerian Working class Students.

H3: Organization benefits are related to employee performance among Nigerian Working class Students.

H4: The relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance is mediated by distributive fairness.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

Cross sectional survey design as well as quantitative method is adopted for this study. The rationale behind choosing this design is that it facilitates the elicitation of information from the respondents. It is also simple and least cost if compared with longitudinal survey. It could be explanatory, exploratory as well as descriptive in nature (Neumann, 2003). It has been established that cross sectional survey can serve three different purposes. Each purpose can serve another different purposes. The three purposes are social research, exploration and description (Babbie, 2007). Hagan (2006) posited that cross sectional studies can concentrate on one group of respondents at a time. It does not require much commitment from the participant and at the same time less difficult when it comes to the issue of findings and sampling of population.

Research design in this study entails a technique through which data is collected and analyzed to be able to identify the impacts of performance-based pay, career incentives and organization benefits on employee performance with mediation of distributive fairness.

The selection of qualitative or quantitative or both should be determined by the nature of phenomenon under study, the current knowledge base of the issue at hand and the research objectives (Mwita, 2002).

Numerous definitions were given to quantitative study among which is the one provided by Wikipedia Encyclopedia (2005) which states that quantitative research is a statistical process of proving and controlling of observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the fact that those observations discloses. Sukamolson (2010) also corroborates it by positing that quantitative research collects numerical data using mathematically related method. Furthermore, Marshal (1996) posited that the objective of adopting quantitative approach is predicated on the intention to test pre-set hypothesis and produce generalizable results. Thus, the method is selected due to the fact that there is a good number of studies and theories on employee performance. Therefore, questionnaire is chosen to gather information.

3.4 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

In this section, contextual definition of the key terms were given. The key terms are employee performance, performance-based pay, reward system, career incentives, organizational benefits distributive fairness and employee performance. These key terms are the important elements in this study.

Table 3.1
Operational definition of key terms

No	Terms	Definition
1	Employee Performance	It means the employee's monetary or non-monetary result which is absolutely connected with the performance and success. Employee job performance has two characteristics; employee's abilities and skill be it natural or acquired and employee's motivation. (Anitha 2013).
2	Performance-based pay	It is a scheme that aimed at compensating employee based on his/her performance (Mensah & Dogbe, 2011).
3	Rewards system	This is the process through which employers attract, retain, motivate and satisfy employees (Rowman, 2006).
4	Career Incentives	This means the basic things that employee needs from his career. It is divided into two; one is internal career anchor while another is external career anchor. Internal anchor refers to employee perception that direct his career such as job security, location, and autonomy in the workplace. External career anchor means how well the internal career anchor are satiated as external career incentives (Hsu, Jiang, Klein & Tang, 2002).
5	Organization Benefits	Organizational benefits otherwise known as employee benefits refers to a part of reward system given by the organization alongside with other forms of monetary reward (Armstrong 2010).
6	Distributive Fairnes	This means the view of employees on the overall balance between the broad scope of investments made and rewards received at work (Janssen, 2004).

3.5 MEASUREMENT

3.5.1 SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE

This study employs self-administered questionnaires for the respondents in which they were dispatched to them in their various places. They were asked to fill it after assuring them that confidentiality of the information they give will be maintained. The instrument used for this study was employed due to the fact that it is easy to quantify and analyze. Also, the instrument is suitable for this study because it is based on eliciting the opinions, attitudes, feelings and perceptions of the respondents. It is important to assign labels to properties of variables and this is what is referred to as components of measurement and it was done in this study.

In the bid to measure the variables contained in this study, operational definitions of the variables were given as above.

3.5.2 VARIABLE MEASUREMENT

This research makes use of close-ended questionnaire to be able to measure variables which are performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits, distributive fairness and employee performance. This is analyzed in the following table:

Table 3.2
Distribution of Variables

Variables	**No of Items**	**Scales**	**Reference**
Performance-Based Pay	Six	Likert scale 1-5	Omaro (2011)
Career Incentives	Ten	Likert scale 1-5	Omaro (2011)
Organizational Benefits	Ten	Likert scale 1-5	Omaro (2011)
Distributive Fairness	Four	Likert scale 1-5	Colquitt (2001)
Employee Performance	Seven	Likert scale 1-5	Omaro (2011)

The questionnaire consists, of 42 questions. Five questions belong to demographic section. Six questions were under performance-based pay; ten questions were asked under career incentives; ten questions under organizational benefits; four questions under distributive fairness while the last seven questions were under employee performance. The answers to the questions were scaled on the five point Likert Scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree and 5 = Strongly Agree.

3.5.3 RELIABILITY TEST

The reliability of the questionnaire are usually evaluated through using Cronbach's Alpha or Alpha Coefficient to indicate the internal consistency of the questionnaire. The closer the reliability coefficient to 1.00 is the better (Sekaran, 2003). By and large, the adequate alpha coefficient should be more than 0.5. However, Sekaran (2003) posited that if the value of Cronbach Alpha is 0.6, it is acceptable but still poor.

Reliability also implies a kind of measure to examine the credibility of the interpretation of research findings as well as findings of research (Schwandt, 2001).

Pilot study was carried out to confirm whether the respondents comprehend the items in the questionnaire. If a pilot test is done and the result is good, it indicates that the measuring tools are reliable and acceptable. In this case, the likely challenges could be discerned and worked out before embarking on the real survey. The information gathered would be used to enhance the methods or instruments where applicable. This technique is of necesssity before going out to collect data. The pilot study are usually done on a small group of people in which the result would help the researcher in the removal of

questions that were considered to be vague or unclear to the participants. Hence, the researcher will realize whether the questionnaire is fully understood by the respondents.

Pilot study also ensures complete measurement of all variables in the research**.** Measurement is not error-free, it will be perceived to be a process of ascertaining consistency within repeated measures. Employing conventional data collection and data analysis enhances reliability of study. Thus, reliability of this research is enhanced because reliable measurement of the concepts is provided, variable items were derived from information retrieved from the reviewed literature and the items were measured on a likert scale. Apart from this, the result of the pilot test conducted for the variables prior to the time of data collection suggested good internal consistency reliability for the scale. The results are displayed below:

Table 3.3
Reliability Statistics

Measure	No. of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Performance-based pay	6	.789
Career Incentives	10	.800
Organizational Benefits	10	.815
Distributive Fairness	4	.882
Employee Performance	7	.759

In the table above, the Cronbach's alpha for performance-based pay is .789 and thus indicating a firm scale and a good internal consistency of the variables. Based on the fact that the Cronbach's alpha of individual items under performance-based were lower than .789, the deletion of any of the items would not make any significant difference in alpha co-efficient. Hence, no item was deleted in the questionnaire. The Cronbach's alpha for

career incentives is .800 and thus indicating a firm scale and a very good internal consistency reliability of the variables. Based on the fact that the Cronbach's alpha of individual items under career incentives were lower than .800, the deletion of any of the items would not make any significant difference in alpha co-efficient. Hence, no item was deleted in the questionnaire.

The Cronbach's alpha for organizational benefits is .815 and thus indicating a firm scale and a very good internal consistency reliability of the variables. Based on the fact that the Cronbach's alpha of individual items under organizational benefits were lower than .815, the deletion of any of the items would not make any significant difference in alpha co-efficient. Hence, no item was deleted in the questionnaire.

The Cronbach's alpha for distributive fairness is .882 and thus indicating a firm scale and a good internal consistency of the variables. Based on the fact that the Cronbach's alpha of individual items under distributive fairness were lower than .882, the deletion of any of the items would not make any significant difference in alpha co-efficient. Hence, no item was deleted in the questionnaire.

The Cronbach's alpha for employee performance is .759 and thus indicating a firm scale and a good internal consistency of the variables. Based on the fact that the Cronbach's alpha of individual items under employee performance were lower than .759, the deletion of any of the items would not make any significant difference in alpha co-efficient. Hence, no item was deleted in the questionnaire.

3.5.4 FACTOR ANALYSIS

Factor analysis implies a statistical process that is done on a large number of variables that are correlated into a smaller factor. It is done with aim of lessening the dimensions of original variables and arriving at the new variables that are used to explicate the original variables (Rietveld & Hout, 1993; Robert, 2006).

In this case, factor analysis was done to pinpoint the essential variables that explicate the model of the relationships between the five variables on the questionnaires.

Table 3.4
Factor Analysis

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.739
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	196.898
	Df	10
	Sig.	.000

Table 3.4 above indicates that the factor analysis in this study is appropriate. This is due to the fact that KMO value is .739 and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is significant (p=.000)

Table 3.5
Component Matrix

	Component
Performance-Based Pay	.820
Career Incentives	.825
Organizational Benefits	.767
Distributive Fairness	.808
Employee Performance	.446

Table 3.5 revealed that all variables appear to fit with the structure of the other variables. In this case, the reliability test, pilot test, and factor analysis signified a firm scale and a good internal consistency of the variables.

3.6 DATA COLLECTION

3.6.1 POPULATION

The population of this study comprises of the Nigerian Working Class who are currently Students of Univerisiti Utara Malaysia. The selection of this population is predicated on two reasons; One is that the students are of different backgrounds as they came from every nook and crannies of Nigeria. Hence, this would enrich the generalizability of the study's findings. The second reason is that the respondents are working in both public and private sectors which will also add to the uniqueness of the study's findings. The total population of this study is 278.

3.6.2 SAMPLING, SAMPLE SIZE AND UNIT OF STUDY

According to Czaja and Blair (2005), determination of sample is basically depends on the nature and characteristics of the population.

Probability sampling technique implies the components in the population that are of equal opportunity to be selected as subjects in the sample. This was posited by Sekaran (2007).

Sample of research constitutes a part of the population on which the research is done. Sample is selected to represent the whole population so that the result of the research can be generalized. As a result, it is important to choose the sample that will symbolize the whole population.

In this study, simple random sampling technique was chosen to select sample. Simple random sampling technique's adoption is based on the premise that the technique is the most efficient among all the probability designs and every element of the population has the equal chance of being selected and thus would enhance the objectivity of the study's findings. In this case, the respondents were classified based on their hostels. The questionnaire were distributed among them randomly.

Out of the total population of 278 Nigerian working class students in UUM 140 samples were chosen to be the respondents based on the list gotten from the Nigerian Students Community of Universiti Utara Malaysia.

As far as this study is concerned, the unit of analysis is individual worker who are currently studying in Universiti Utara Malaysia. This is because the study aims to elicit information on individual perception of performance-based pay system. The information

would be on individual's perception regarding impacts of performance-based pay, career incentive and organizational benefits on employee and whether their perceptions of distributive fairness really relates with reward system and individual performance.

3.6.3 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE

Questionnaires were distributed among the Nigerian working class students in Univeriti Utara Malaysia to elicit information on their perceptions on the impacts of perfomance based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits on the employee performance and the mediating role of distributive fairness in this relationship. The method used in sampling the population was simple random sampling to give each element of the population equal opportunity to be selected in order to add to the credibility to the findings of the study. The process of data collectionn was personally administered by the researcher with the help of three friends. A set of 140 questionnaires were dispatched to the target population (Nigerian working class students of Universiti Utara Malaysia). However, 120 questionnaires were retrieved back. Four out of 120 collected questionnaires were not fully filled by the respondents and were exempted from the analysis. This means that response level was an approximate of 83%. The details are encapsulated in the following table:

Table 3.6
Data Collection and Response Rate

Items	%
Distributed Questionnaires	140
Collected Questionnaires	120
Questionnaires used for analysis	116
Percentage of response	83%

3.7 DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

Analysis of the data obtained from the self-administered questionnaire will be done using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). To validate the collected data, data screening, factor analysis assumption test were be done. Descriptive statistic was used as the data was presented in percentages. Pearson correlation was used to examine the correlation of the employee performance with incentives, pay base performance and organizational benefits and mediating role of distributive fairness. Multiple regression was used to test the prediction and contribution of independent variables and mediator on the dependent variables.

3.7.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Descriptive analysis means the demographic report of the respondents in the form of frequency and percentage terms. Regarding this study, 5 questions were asked in section

A of the questionnaire. The questions are based on marital status, level of education, job status and years of working experience.

3.7.2 PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

Pearson coefficient involves the indication of the degree of linear relationship between independent and dependents variables. The symbol of a correlation coefficient is *r,* and its range is from -1.00 to +1.00. A correlation coefficient indicates two things about the connection between two variables; the direction of the connection and its level. The nearer the measure is to 1.00, the better the potential of the connection to be statistically significant (Muchinsky, 1993). Guilford's Rule of Thumb about the strength of correlation is explained in the following table:

Table 3.7
Interpretation of strength of correlation coefficient

Value of Coefficient	**Relation between Variables**
0.00 – 0.30	Very low relationship
0.30 – 0.50	Low relationship
0.50 – 0.70	High relationship
0.50 – 1.00	Very high relationship

3.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Being a study which adopts quantitative approach, Nigerian working class students were sampled. A total number of 140 respondents were sampled and each was given questionnaire to fill. The instruments created for this research were impeccable based on the result of the pilot test. The items in the questionnaire characterized the variables;

dependent variable, independent variables and the mediator. Factor analysis helps in choosing the appropriate dimensions for the variable while perarson correlation analysis will examine the relationship between the variables in the study. At the end of everything, data was analysed and findings were discussed in the subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 INTRODUCTION

This section presented the findings and interpretations of the data analysis. It was mentioned in chapter three of this study that the data collected from the survey would be analyzed using SPSS 21.0 version.

Data analysis in this section was done serially. The demographic data of the respondents was the first to be analyzed and interpreted. Then, reliability test, factor analysis, descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and regression analysis. Also, hypotheses of this research were examined to ensure whether the findings affirm them or not.

The findings of the analyzed data would determine the conclusion on the influence of performance-based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits on employees with the mediation of distributive fairness.

4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The table 4.1 below explained the demographic information of the respondents; the information is about the job position, nature of the job, years of working experience, educational level and marital status.

Table 4.1
Descriptive Analysis of Demographic Data

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Job Position		
Senior Staff	85	73.3
Junior Staff	31	26.7
Total	116	100.0
Nature of Job		
Permanent	99	85.3
Temporary	17	14.7
Total	116	100.0
Years of Experience		
Less than 1 year	38	32.8
2-3 years	30	25.9
4-5 years	31	26.7
More than 5years	17	14.7
Total	116	100.0
Level of Education		
Diploma	11	9.5
Degree	35	30.2
Postgraduate Degree	70	60.3
Total	116	100.0
Marital Status		
Single	41	35.3
Married	72	62.1
Divorced/Separated	2	1.7
Widowed	1	.9
Total	116	100.0

It was indicated in the above table 4.1 that the senior staffs among the respondents were 73.3% while the junior staffs were 26.7%. This reveals that over one third of the sampled respondents were senior staff in their various places of works. Also, it shows that 85.3% of the respondents were permanent staff while the temporary staffs were 14.7%. This indicates that majority of the respondents were permanent staffs in their various workplaces. In addition, 32.8% of the respondents were new employee as their years of experience was below one year, 25.9% have between 2-3 years of experience. 26.7% were of 4-5 years of experience while the most senior among them were 14.7%.

Concerning the respondents' level of education; the table signified that 9.5% held diploma while 30.2% have bagged degree in various fields of study, 60.3% held postgraduate certificates. This reveals that majority of the Nigerian working class students in Universiti Utara Malaysia were holding postgraduate certificates. Majority of the respondents were married as their percentage was 62.1%, others are either single or divorced/separated or widows; singles among them were 35.3%, divorced were 1.7% and the widows were .9%.

From the above analysis, it is discernible that 73% of the respondents were senior, while 85% were permanent. Married among them were 62%. Those that have higher level of education were 90% while 15% of the respondents have more than five years of working experience. This indicates that the findings of this research are suitable because of the fact that majority of sampled respondents are well acquainted with reward system process in their individual workplaces and able to articulate their state of mind (feelings) better during questionnaire administration.

4.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES

This section explains computation of a set of descriptive statistics. This is because it describes all the features of a set of distribution scores. It allows a researcher or the reader to examine the research quickly in order to easily get the information of the study (Salkind, 2012). In this case, descriptive analysis was used in this section to enhance easy understanding and interpretation of the information contain herein.

Below is the table displaying the summary of the descriptive statistics for independent variables; performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits, mediator; distributive fairness and dependent variable; employee performance.

Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics for the variables

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness
PBP	116	1.67	5.00	3.1897	.78786	-.155
CI	116	2.00	5.00	3.7905	.62748	-.762
OB	116	1.20	5.00	3.1129	.78514	-.415
DF	116	1.00	5.00	3.4353	.98639	-.203
EP	116	2.14	5.00	4.1342	.57739	-1.000

Note: EP = employee performance, PBP = performance based pay, C1 = career incentives, OB = organizational benefits, DF = distributive fairness.

The table 4.2 showed that mean values for the variables are from 3.1 to 4.1, signifying that the amount of performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits, as well as the levels of distributive fairness and employee performance are ranging from moderately high (3.0) to highest (7.0). It also showed that employee performance has the highest mean score which is 4.13 with the standard deviation of 0.58. This is followed by

career incentives that have the mean score of 3.79 with the standard deviation of 0.63. Distributive Fairness; the mediator has the mean score of 3.44 with the standard deviation of 0.99 while the mean score of performance-based pay is 3.19 with the standard deviation of 0.79. Organizational benefits have the least mean score of 3.11 while its standard deviation is 0.78. The scale used in measuring the questionnaire items was 1 to 5 Likert scales; strongly disagree, disagree, Neutral, agree and strongly agree.

4.3 TESTING OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

The adoption of Pearson Product-Moment correlation was informed by what researchers like Sekaeran (2000); John (2008) and Jullie (2001) posited that Pearson Product-Moment Correlation is suitable for the analysis of connections among variables.

This section of the chapter measured the intensity and direction of the linear relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits, distributive fairness (as mediator) and employee performance. The ranges of the correlation coefficient are '-1' – '+1'. '-1' denotes that there is negative relationship, '0' signifies no relationship while '+1' symbolizes positive relationship.

Table 4.3
Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5
Employee Performance	1				
Performance-Based Pay	.094				
Career Incentives	.384**	.593**			
Organizational Benefits	.244**	.537**	.532**		
Distributive Fairness	.271**	.655**	.511**	.481**	

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). N = 116.

Table 4.3 showed the relationship between the variables of this study through the use of Pearson Product-Moment Correlation. Preliminary analyses were conducted to affirm that there is no breach of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. The information from the table depicts that there was significant positive relationship (with varying degree of strength as shown in the table) between performance-based pay, career incentive, organizational benefits, distributive fairness and employee performance. The observed exemption is that the relationship between performance-based pay and employee performance is minimal and statistically insignificant.

Most of the relationships held in the expected directions. The dependent variable, employee performance, correlated with performance-based pay, $r = .09$, $p = .315$; career incentives, $r = .38$, $p < .01$; organizational benefits, $r = .24$, $p < .01$, respectively) and distributive fairness ($r = .27$, $p < .01$). Hence, this provides initial support for hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4. The mediator, distributive fairness, correlated with performance-based pay, $r = .66$, $p < .01$; career incentives, $r = .51$, $p < .01$; organizational benefits, $r = .48$, $p <$

.01, respectively). This also provides initial support for the hypothesis 4. Likewise, employee performance correlated with the mediator, distributive fairness $r = .27$, $p < .01$. Hence, it also provides initial support for hypothesis 4.

To evaluate the different effects of a range of independent variables, the model is designed in a hierarchical way. A hierarchical regression analysis permits an evaluation of the additional effects of the independent variables, which are put in each step of the analysis (Vandenabeele, 2011).

Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that a mediating variable can be accepted when it satisfies four conditions: First, the independent variables (i.e. performance-based pay, career incentive and organizational benefits) should correlate with the postulated mediator (i.e., distributive fairness); second, the independent variables must correlate with dependent variable (i.e. employee performance); third, the mediator must correlate with the dependent variable (i.e., employee performance). Fourth, a previously significant effect of predictor variables is decreased to non-significance or decreased in terms of effect size after the inclusion of mediator variables into the analysis. In this regression analysis, standardized coefficients (standardized beta) were adopted for all analyses (Jaccard et al., 1990).

Table 4.4
Hierarchical Regression Analysis

Dependent variables	**Distributive Fairness**		**Employee Performance**			
	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4
Control Variables						
Job Position	.196*	.128	-.053	-.077	-.118	-.110
Nature of job	-.067	-.116	-.393***	-.308**	-.371***	-.278**
Years of Experience	-.155	-.162*	-.134	-.144	-.083	-.103
Level of Education	-.068	.054	.145	.202*	.167	.189*
Marital Status	.156	.079	-.078	-.133	-.129	-.153*
Independent Variables						
Performance-based pay		.491***		-.093		-.219*
Career incentives		.119		.407***		.377**
Organizational benefits		.141		.087		.051
Distributive fairness					.329***	.255*
R^2	.097	.503	.160	.311	.258	.343
Adjusted R^2	.056	.466	.122	.259	.217	.287
F	2.376*	13.546***	4.191**	6.027***	6.313***	.000

Note: *N* = 116. Standardized regression coefficients are shown in columns marked Model 1, 2, 3, and 4. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

With regard to hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, there was a significant relationship between career incentives and employee performance as shown in Table 4.4 ($\beta = .41$, $p < .0001$). This indicates that career incentive made a unique contribution to employee performance. Thereby, hypothesis 2 was supported. Performance-based pay had low relationship with employee performance while the relationship is insignificant ($\beta = -.09$, $p > .05$). This indicates that performance-based pay makes an insignificant contribution to employee performance. In this case, although the relationship is low, hypothesis 1 was supported.

In the same vein, organizational benefits was insignificantly associated with employee performance (β = .08, p >.05). This indicates that organizational benefits makes an insignificant contribution to employee performance. Hence, Hypothesis 3 was also supported.

With respect to Hypotheses 4, it was postulated, in this study, that distributive fairness mediates the relationship between performance-based pay, career incentive, organizational benefits and employee performance. The models in the table 4.4 is usually used to describe how or why correlation between independent and dependent variables exist in reality. Table 4.4 presented the information on the multiple regression analysis. The first step taken is the adoption of two conditions to test the hypothesis. In the first condition, two models were tested by regression analysis where the dependent variable (distributive fairness was made a dependent variable) and the control variables were included in Model 1 and performance-based pay, career incentive and organizational benefits were then added as independent variables in Model 2.

In condition two, the dependent variable was employee performance and the control variables were added, performance-based pay, career incentive, organizational benefits, and distributive fairness were also added as independent variables in turn.

The independent variables (i.e. performance-based pay, career incentive and organizational benefits) affected the mediator (i.e., distributive fairness) (β= .49 p < .0001; β= .12 p >.05; β= .14 p >.05 respectively). Hence, the first condition suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) was fulfilled. However, this result indicates that only performance-based pay among the three independent variables of this study correlated

significantly with the mediator, distributive fairness. The other two independent variables (i.e. career incentives and organizational benefits) correlated insignificantly with the mediator.

The second condition was also fulfilled as the independent variables predicted the dependent variable (i.e. employee performance) (β= -.09 p >.05; β= .41 p < .0001; β= .08 p >.05 respectively). It should be noted here that only career incentives correlated significantly with employee performance while other two variables (i.e. performance-based pay and organizational benefits) correlated insignificantly.

The third condition was fully satisfied as the mediator (distributive fairness) correlated significantly with the dependent variable (i.e., employee performance) (β=.33 p < .0001).

The fourth condition was partially fulfilled. In the model 2 of the condition 2 of the model, before distributive fairness was added, the standardized regression coefficient of the relationship between performance-based pay and employee performance was -.09 p >.05; career incentives and employee performance was .41 (p < .0001); organizational benefits and employee performance was .08 p >.05. However, when distributive fairness was included in Model 4 as the independent variable, the coefficient between career incentives and employee performance decreased from 0.407 to 0.377 while the relationship between performance-based pay and employee performance and the relationship between organizational benefits and employee performance were insignificant. In this case, only career incentives fulfilled the fourth condition of Baron and Kenny (1986). Hence, this result provided partial support for Hypothesis 4. Thereby,

distributive fairness partially mediates the relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance.

Table 4.5
Summary of the result of hypotheses testing

No	Hypothesis	Result
1	H1: Performance-based pay is related to employee performance among Nigerian Working class Students.	**Supported**
2	H2: Career incentives are related to employee performance among Nigerian Working class Students.	**Supported**
3	H3: Organization benefits are related to employee performance among Nigerian Working class Students.	**Supported**
4	H4: The relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance is mediated by distributive fairness.	**Supported**

In this case, all the hypotheses were accepted and the research questions were answered accurately.

4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Pearson Product-Moment Correlation analysis and hierarchical regression analysis signified that there is relationship (with varying degree of strength as shown in the table) between performance-based pay, career incentive, organizational benefits, distributive fairness and employee performance.

4.4.1 PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

The primary purpose of this research was to examine the relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance. It also aimed to investigate the mediating role of distributive fairness in the relationships between these variables (i.e. performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance). Performance-based pay was found in this study to have insignificant, negative and low relationship with employee performance. This finding is consistent with the studies of Yuan, Le, McCaffrey, Marsh, Hamilton, Stecher and Springer (2013); Mensah and Dogbe (2011); Egger-Peitler, et.al (2007); Perry et.al (2009).

Logical appeal of performance-based pay as a tool in support of a meritocratic philosophy of remuneration is obvious (Armstrong, 2005). This means that individual employee contributions is important and should reflect in the pay given to individual employee. In this case, this still indicated a positive impact of performance-based pay, which is expected to reflect in enhancing employee performance. However, the empirical evidence indicated the contrary.

Literature have indicated some reasons for this. One of it is the problem encountered in the administration of performance-based pay which is linked to performance appraisal. The linkage between PRP schemes and individual appraisals should be analyzed along three dimensions: setting performance objectives or criteria, the assessment of performance and developing the link between pay and performance (Kessler & Purcell, 1992). Another reason was the difficulty of establishing realistic and challenging targets

for staff. The problem involved setting targets that were both challenging and realistic (Mensah & Dogbe, 2011).

Setting a low target would mean under-utilization of the capabilities of staff, whereas setting targets too high would potentially result in staff being penalized unnecessarily. This would eventually make the scheme counter-productive. The way out of this dilemma would be to involve employees in the setting of objectives (Beardwell & Holden, 1995). It would, thus, be important that the appraisal system be set up in an atmosphere of openness.

Lenient supervisors tend to evaluate all or most employees favorably, while severe ones tend to assess employees unfavorably. This results in producing skewed distributions to the left and right sides of the normal curve (Blunt & Popoola, 1990). The specific situation in the organization was the tendency by supervisors to overrate staff. One implication of this is that employees might be paid higher salaries than they deserved, and made no meaningful contribution towards the achievement of competitive advantage. It should be noted here that the tendency to overrate employees has cultural undertones in the African setting (Nigeria inclusive). It is the situation where people are generally unwilling to make negative assessments of others in the workplace, especially with respect to issues concerning remuneration (Blunt & Popoola, 1990). This is so because severe assessors would be accused of being the cause of low remuneration of staff in their divisions, while employees in other divisions enjoy a higher total remuneration because they have more lenient supervisors. This situation could result in inter-divisional rivalry and supervisor-employee conflicts (Margerison's, 1997).

Perry et.al (2009) added that deficient implementation and poor management practices are the common impediments to performance-based initiatives.

Furthermore, performance -based pay systems were gradually considered as less acceptable. This is due to the fact that they largely restricted to one-dimensional monetary information, lacked an equivalent between the firm's competences and its dynamic business environment, lacked a strategic focus, had a retrospective orientation and short-term vision, and had a fragile strategic content (Kald & Nilsson, 2000; Bourne et al., 2003 & Kanji, 2005).

De Waal and Counet, (2009) also stressed that these weaknesses attracted organizations to look for evaluation systems that sustained them better in the stimulating business environment. In this case, there has been an increasing concern about transforming and refining management control systems.

4.4.2 CAREER INCENTIVES AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

Furthermore, career incentives were found to have a significant and positive relationship with employee performance. The studies conducted by Omaro (2011) also found the same results as this study does. This result is also consistent with the studies of Laine et al. (2009); Lu et al. (2002); Reisel et al. (2010); Reisel et al. (2010); Tsai and Wu (2010); Feather and Rauter (2004).

This indicates that organizations can improve their employees' performance through career incentives. Employee who has the chances to reach higher position and to grow within the same capacity in the organization would be motivated and thus improve his performance. Surely, several employees may quit their jobs for better money, but the

monetary-focused incentives may not be the only, nor the most effective, method to holding desired employees and enhancing their performances (Baroudi & Igbaria, 1995). Some employees generally viewed money as a pointer of their achievements, rather than an end in itself but pay and employee benefits are two of the most important factors in a job offer, other incentives include job location, job security, balance with personal/family time, potential for job advancement, and work-based challenges should be included to enhance performance (Lineberry & Trumble, 2000). Most of the respondents in this study are in Universiti Utara Malaysia pursuing their postgraduate degrees as a result of the career opportunity and career incentives opened to them by their respective organizations. This is symbolizing that employee have more preference for their career success and they would be motivated if their organizations can avail them of it.

4.4.3 ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

In the same manner, organizational benefits also correlate with employee performance. The correlation was found to be insignificant but positive. This result was also confirmed by the studies done by Nzuve (2010) and Omaro (2011). This signifies that employee can be motivated and consequently improve his performance if the organization provides for him some benefits such as home allowance, educational allowance, transport allowance et cetera. This is evident in the fact that some of the respondents sponsored to further their education by their organizations. Therefore, organizational benefits combined with basic pay should form a competitive total remuneration package that aims to improve and enhance employee performance.

4.4.4 DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

Based on the result of the hierarchical regression analysis, it can be said that distributive fairness partially mediates the relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance as career incentives is the only variable that fulfilled the whole four conditions of the mediation. This demonstrates that employees would feel satisfied and motivated if they perceives fairness in the distribution of career incentives in their organization compared to other organizations.

This also indicates that the respondents of this study enjoys the dividends of career incentives of their respective organizations because most of them were sent to further their studies by their organizations. This motivates them and surely when they return to their respective organizations in Nigeria they would improve their performance. Also, they perceive fairness in the award of the career incentives as most of them came to UUM from different organizations but enjoying the same incentives.

Generally, the findings of this study are in consistent with some compensation theories such as equity theory and expectancy theory. Adams (1965) observed that employee will like to do in turn; if they receive a fair reward for the work they do compared to other colleagues. This is also consistent with equity theory, performance is achieved when employees feel that the inputs (efforts) to outputs (rewards) in the same ratio is equal to that of his colleagues (Ali & Mohsen, 2008).

According to Armstrong (2001), equity theory symbolizes fairness and equity in the reward system to compensate the inputs of the workers. The inputs comprise of his efforts, time, education, and experience. The perception of employee that he is being

treated fairly compared to others will make him happy but if he perceives unfair treatment, it would demotivate him. Thus this implies that if employee perceives that what he is being paid commensurate with the efforts he put forth in the organization, then he will be more hardworking and diligent at work. The implication is that employee can be encouraged to put more effort by providing a competitive reward system which include good pay, good incentives and benefits. Employees would prefer an organization that offer better reward system to other organizations which do not offer such.

In addition, Expectancy theory indicates that employee will be motivated energized to perform more if he knows that his expectation of getting career opportunities, good benefits and good pay in his organization is certain.

4.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Summarily, this research was poised to study the perception of Nigerian working class students regarding the relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, and organizational benefits and employee performance with the mediation of distributive fairness. In this chapter, the description of research results were done in order to enable better discussion of the findings in the succeeding chapter; chapter five. The analyses comprise descriptive analysis, correlation analysis. Hypotheses were tested and research questions were answered using Pearson Product-Moment Correlation and hierarchical regression analysis. It should be noted here that the preliminary analyses conducted affirmed that there is no breach of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Thus, the data collected for this study is normal.

Having analyzed the data in this chapter, conclusion and recommendation were discussed in the subsequent chapter; chapter five.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0 INTRODUCTION

This final chapter comprised implications of the findings and its limitations, the recommendations for the future studies and the recapitulation of the study.

5.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

5.1.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Empirical studies have emphasized the importance of improving employee performance. Also, numerous researchers have studied the importance of performance-based pay in improving performance while some other researches have established the negative relationship between performance-based pay and employee performance. There are few studies that linked career incentives and organizational benefits with employee performance while, according to the best knowledge of the writer of this research, this is the first research to examine the influence of performance-based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits on employee performance with the mediation of distributive fairness. Hence, this study is unique on its own.

Also, this study makes a vital contribution to the literature by creating a new direction in research on distributive fairness in relation to performance pay, career incentives and organizational benefits in organizations. It discloses a mechanism by which employee perceptions of distributive fairness in relation to career incentives can aid employee performance. Although past studies have examined the effects of performance pay, career

incentives and organizational benefits on some factors such as turnover, motivation, none had considered how distributive fairness can mediate the relationship between them. Thereby, it widen the research scope in the compensation management.

This study extends the researches on performance-based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits by indicating the importance of inclusion of career incentives package and organizational benefits package in the total reward system and how it is important to mitigate the factors that can hamper the relationship between performance-based pay and employee performance so that the former can improve the latter.

5.1.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Going by the findings of this study, organizations are implored to put in place performance-based pay program, career based incentives plan and various forms of benefits so that employee would be motivated and thus enhance their productivity. Consequent upon higher employee productivity and performance, there would be greater performance which is the sole objectives of every organization.

Organizations should also be cautious in the operationalization of these performance-based programs, specifically performance-based pay. They should ensure high level of trust, sufficient pay package and efficient and effective performance appraisals. This is because some findings that indicated the negative relationship between performance-based pay and performance cited lack of trust, insufficient pay package and biased performance appraisal. To ensure positive impact of performance-based pay on performance all these should be taken into consideration.

The overall findings of this study can serve as guide for the management to build up an effective pay design and management systems in organizations. Openness in communication and employee participation in the pay design and management help in achieving this goal. Those in the helms of affairs regarding the compensation management should be trained on inter-personal communication skills and problem solving skills in order to be able to effectively communicate the reasons and justification for compensation system in the organization. This is because of the fact that this will prevent any misunderstanding relating to the system. Hence, positive attitudinal and behavioral outcomes will be attained and this will inspire employees to support the organizational and human resource department strategies and goals in the organization.

5.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Considering the population size and sample size of this study, it can be said that this study has limitation and therefore, may not be generalized. However, the findings can be generalized because the respondents came from nooks and crannies of Nigeria.

The perception of distributive fairness measure used in this study evaluated only the fairness aspect and may not have completely portrayed the different dimensions of the construct.

Another area of limitation is the aspect of the conceptual and methodology of this study. This study did not examined various organizational characteristics such as type, ownership, and size as it also did not examined personal characteristics such as gender, position, length of service, and qualification to provide meaningful perspectives for

understanding how individual similarities and differences affect performance-based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits within organizations.

Based on the above limitations, the direction for the future researches will be discussed under recommendations; the next heading.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations of this study are grouped into two folds; one was directed to the managers and employers in Nigeria while the other was be directed to the future researchers.

Employers and managers in Nigeria should endeavor to design their reward system to include career incentives and organizational benefits in order to enhance employee performance which is very critical to the success of every organization. Employees will be favorably disposed to the performance-reward linkage if the scheme is run with objectivity and fairness. Various forms of benefits, career as well as monetary-based incentives are encouraged to be introduced. It is a common knowledge that reward system plays a vital role in the success of the organization. Talent management through attraction and retaining of talents cannot be achieved without a competitive total remuneration package that compose of career incentives and various organizational benefits. Organizations thrive through the instrumentality of people because they possess the required skills, knowledge and competencies needed for the execution of organizational strategy and planning Hence, organization should entrench competitive reward system.

The sample of this study was small. Hence, there is need for the future researches to study larger population in order to have larger sample so that the findings can be generalized further.

Future researchers should endeavor to research on the relationship and effects of career incentives and organizational benefits on employee performance in order to dig it further. Also, future researches should focus on examining the dimensionality of distributive fairness and authenticating how it should be measured.

Future studies should also be directed to examine various organizational characteristics such as type, ownership, and size as it also did not examined personal characteristics such as gender, position, length of service, and qualification to provide meaningful perspectives for understanding how individual similarities and differences affect performance-based pay, career incentives and organizational benefits within organizations.

It can also be suggested that since this research is cross sectional, future studies can use other research designs (e.g. longitudinal studies) can be used to gather data and analyze the designs of change, and the direction and level of causal relationships between variables of interest.

5.4 CONCLUSION

Conclusively, multiple regression analyses indicated that the independent variables (performance-based pay, career incentives, and organizational benefits) and the mediator (Distributive fairness) predicted (in varying degree and significance) the dependent

variable (employee performance). Career incentives made a unique and statistically significant contribution to the prediction of employee performance. With these findings, it can be established that career incentives and organizational benefits impact employee performance.

Based on the aforesaid, the overall findings of this research is that there is relationship between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance with the partial mediation of distributive fairness. By this result, it can be established that objectives of this study were attained, the research questions were answered and the entire hypotheses were all supported.

Going by the reviewed literatures in the chapter two of this study and the results of the data analyses, it can be evidently established that employee performance can be enhanced if career incentives and organizational benefits are enshrined in the reward system of the organization. Performance-based pay should be managed with fairness. It is also important to state that employees' feelings of distributive fairness is critical to the enhancement of employee performance through career incentives and organizational benefit packages.

On a final note, employers and managers are implored to introduce incentive programs that can impact their workers' performance. This study has examined the relationships between performance-based pay, career incentives, organizational benefits and employee performance with the mediation of distributive fairness. Conclusions were drawn, recommendations were made for both management and the future researchers based on

the findings. The implementation of the recommendations will be of benefit to human resource professionals, managers and the future researchers.

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REFERENCES

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Questionnaire

Universiti Utara Malaysia Sintok 06010, Kedah Malaysia

Questionnaire

I am a Postgraduate Student of School of Business Management, Universiti Utara Malaysia. This is an academic questionnaire that is intended to examine **The mediating role of distributive fairness in the relationship between Performance Based Pay, Career Incentives, Organizational Benefits and Employees' Performance: An empirical study on Nigerian working class students in UUM**. Response to these questions will be exclusively for the purpose of this study and will be treated with strictest confidence. Thanks for your cooperation.

Section 1: Demographic variables

1. Please indicate your position:

Senior Staff Junior Staff

2. Is your job permanent, temporary or for a fixed-term?

a) Permanent b) Temporary c) Fixed-term

3. How many years in total have you been working in this Nigeria civil service?

a) Less than 1 yr b) 2 to 3 yrs c) 4 to 5 yrs d) More than 5 yrs

4. What is the highest educational qualification you hold?

a) Diploma b) Degree c) Postgraduate degree

5. Which of the following describes your current status?

a) Single b) Married c) Divorced/Separated d) Widowed

Section 2

Please tick **(√)** any option among the listed options to indicate your preferred answer to the questions.

Interpretations of the scales:

Strongly Disagree **(SD)**; Disagree **(D)**; Neutral **(N)**; Agree **(A)** and Strongly Agree **(SA)**.

No	Items	SD	D	N	A	SA
1	My work has a lot of variety					

Performance-based pay

No	Items	SD	D	N	A	SA
1.	My workplace pays me more for my good performance.					
2.	My workplace appreciates my extra work through cash rewards.					
3.	My good performance gives me more chances to be promoted.					
4.	I have greater opportunities to earn more and more in my workplace if work hard.					
5.	In my workplace more work more pay.					
6.	I feel that my salary is fair for the kind of job I perform.					

Career Incentives

No.	Items	SD	D	N	A	SA
1.	I have better chances to reach higher position in my workplace.					
2.	I have good opportunities If i spend more than one year in my workplace.					
3.	I have better learning opportunities.					
4.	There are additional incentives for meeting the target.					
5.	I have better chances to learn technology.					
6.	I have better chances to learn among the professional environment.					
7.	I have better chances to grow within the same capacity in my workplace.					
8.	I have brighter future bright if I continue working in my workplace.					
9.	I see my carrier growth in the same organization.					
10.	I can achieve my carrier base vision within my workplace					

Organizational Benefits

No.	Items	SD	D	N	A	SA
1.	My workplace is paying me home allowance.					
2.	My workplace is paying me entertainment allowance.					
3.	My workplace is paying me educational allowance.					
4.	My workplace is paying me transport allowance.					
5.	My workplace is providing better opportunities for on job training.					
6.	My workplace gives me leave with pay.					
7.	In my workplace, there is off shore allowance for myself.					
8.	In my workplace, there is free insurance coverage for myself.					
9.	In my workplace, there is free insurance coverage for my family					
10.	In my workplace, there are good food facilities during job.					

Distributive Fairness

No	Items	SD	D	N	A	SA
1.	I am fairly rewarded in accordance with my tasks.					
2.	I am fairly rewarded in accordance with my completed tasks.					
3.	I am fairly rewarded in accordance with my contributions to the workplace.					
4.	I am fairly rewarded in accordance with my efforts in accomplishing my tasks.					

Employee Performance

No	Items	SD	D	N	A	SA
1.	I fulfill the established standards of output of work.					
2.	I coherently work at skill level according to knowledge, skills and ability and time in position.					
3.	I complete my duties within time limit while sustaining quality and job skill levels.					
4.	I develop and evaluate course(s) of action with realistic objectives and time frames with anticipation of disruption.					
5.	I act fiscal constraints of departmental budget accordingly.					
6.	I am regular at business hours each work day unless approved for away-from office business related work activities.					
7.	I try to improve ownpersonal level of competence, keeps abreast of new developments, and continues educational pursuits.					

Appendix B



Appendix C

Descriptive Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness		Kurtosis	
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
PRP_MEAN	116	1.67	5.00	3.1897	.78786	-.155	.225	-.330	.446
CI_MEAN	116	2.00	5.00	3.7905	.62748	-.762	.225	.545	.446
OB_MEAN	116	1.20	5.00	3.1129	.78514	-.415	.225	.131	.446
DF_MEAN	116	1.00	5.00	3.4353	.98639	-.203	.225	-.332	.446
EP_MEAN	116	2.14	5.00	4.1342	.57739	-1.000	.225	1.557	.446
Valid N (listwise)	116								

Appendix D

Correlation

Correlations

		EP_MEAN	PRP_MEAN	CI_MEAN	OB_MEAN	DF_MEAN
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	1.000	.094	.384	.244	.271
	PRP_MEAN	.094	1.000	.593	.537	.655
	CI_MEAN	.384	.593	1.000	.532	.511
	OB_MEAN	.244	.537	.532	1.000	.481
	DF_MEAN	.271	.655	.511	.481	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.	.157	.000	.004	.002
	PRP_MEAN	.157	.	.000	.000	.000
	CI_MEAN	.000	.000	.	.000	.000
	OB_MEAN	.004	.000	.000	.	.000
	DF_MEAN	.002	.000	.000	.000	.
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116	116	116
	DF_MEAN	116	116	116	116	116

Appendix E

Hierarchical Regression

Regression

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
DF_MEAN	3.4353	.98639	116
Job Position	1.2672	.44444	116
Nature of Job	1.1466	.35519	116
Years of Experience	2.2328	1.06614	116
Level of Education	2.5086	.66589	116
Marital Status	1.6810	.55324	116
PRP_MEAN	3.1897	.78786	116
CI_MEAN	3.7905	.62748	116
OB_MEAN	3.1129	.78514	116

Correlations

		DF_MEAN	Job Position	Nature of Job
Pearson Correlation	DF_MEAN	1.000	.243	.002
	Job Position	.243	1.000	.301
	Nature of Job	.002	.301	1.000
	Years of Experience	-.153	-.279	-.320
	Level of Education	-.181	-.522	.013
	Marital Status	.089	-.075	-.247
	PRP_MEAN	.655	.239	.148
	CI_MEAN	.511	.090	-.197
	OB_MEAN	.481	.072	-.022
Sig. (1-tailed)	DF_MEAN	.	.004	.490
	Job Position	.004	.	.001
	Nature of Job	.490	.001	.
	Years of Experience	.051	.001	.000
	Level of Education	.026	.000	.445
	Marital Status	.170	.213	.004
	PRP_MEAN	.000	.005	.056
	CI_MEAN	.000	.168	.017
	OB_MEAN	.000	.220	.405
N	DF_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116

Correlations

		Years of Experience	Level of Education	Marital Status
Pearson Correlation	DF_MEAN	-.153	-.181	.089
	Job Position	-.279	-.522	-.075
	Nature of Job	-.320	.013	-.247
	Years of Experience	1.000	.273	.348
	Level of Education	.273	1.000	.208
	Marital Status	.348	.208	1.000
	PRP_MEAN	-.075	-.213	.037
	CI_MEAN	.079	-.165	.174
	OB_MEAN	-.050	-.104	-.018
Sig. (1-tailed)	DF_MEAN	.051	.026	.170
	Job Position	.001	.000	.213
	Nature of Job	.000	.445	.004
	Years of Experience	.	.002	.000
	Level of Education	.002	.	.012
	Marital Status	.000	.012	.
	PRP_MEAN	.210	.011	.347
	CI_MEAN	.200	.038	.031
	OB_MEAN	.296	.133	.422
N	DF_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116

Correlations

		PRP_MEAN	CI_MEAN	OB_MEAN
Pearson Correlation	DF_MEAN	.655	.511	.481
	Job Position	.239	.090	.072
	Nature of Job	.148	-.197	-.022
	Years of Experience	-.075	.079	-.050
	Level of Education	-.213	-.165	-.104
	Marital Status	.037	.174	-.018
	PRP_MEAN	1.000	.593	.537
	CI_MEAN	.593	1.000	.532
	OB_MEAN	.537	.532	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	DF_MEAN	.000	.000	.000
	Job Position	.005	.168	.220
	Nature of Job	.056	.017	.405
	Years of Experience	.210	.200	.296
	Level of Education	.011	.038	.133
	Marital Status	.347	.031	.422
	PRP_MEAN	.	.000	.000
	CI_MEAN	.000	.	.000
	OB_MEAN	.000	.000	.
N	DF_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116

Variables Entered/Removed[a]

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education[b]	.	Enter
2	OB_MEAN, PRP_MEAN, CI_MEAN[b]	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: DF_MEAN
b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary[c]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	
					R Square Change	F Change
1	.312[a]	.097	.056	.95814	.097	2.376
2	.709[b]	.503	.466	.72079	.406	29.125

Model Summary[c]

Model	Change Statistics		
	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	5[a]	110	.043
2	3[b]	107	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education
b. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education, OB_MEAN, PRP_MEAN, CI_MEAN
c. Dependent Variable: DF_MEAN

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	10.907	5	2.181	2.376	.043[b]
	Residual	100.983	110	.918		
	Total	111.890	115			
2	Regression	56.300	8	7.038	13.546	.000[c]
	Residual	55.590	107	.520		
	Total	111.890	115			

a. Dependent Variable: DF_MEAN
b. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education
c. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education, OB_MEAN, PRP_MEAN, CI_MEAN

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.205	.686		4.670	.000
	Job Position	.435	.257	.196	1.695	.093
	Nature of Job	-.186	.289	-.067	-.642	.522
	Years of Experience	-.144	.096	-.155	-1.500	.136
	Level of Education	-.101	.169	-.068	-.598	.551
	Marital Status	.278	.179	.156	1.555	.123
2	(Constant)	.116	.693		.168	.867
	Job Position	.285	.194	.128	1.471	.144
	Nature of Job	-.321	.230	-.116	-1.397	.165
	Years of Experience	-.150	.072	-.162	-2.070	.041
	Level of Education	.080	.129	.054	.621	.536
	Marital Status	.141	.137	.079	1.033	.304
	PRP_MEAN	.615	.120	.491	5.119	.000
	CI_MEAN	.187	.151	.119	1.238	.218
	OB_MEAN	.177	.108	.141	1.636	.105

Coefficients[a]

Model		Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)					
	Job Position	.243	.159	.153	.614	1.628
	Nature of Job	.002	-.061	-.058	.755	1.324
	Years of Experience	-.153	-.142	-.136	.765	1.308
	Level of Education	-.181	-.057	-.054	.633	1.581
	Marital Status	.089	.147	.141	.818	1.223
2	(Constant)					
	Job Position	.243	.141	.100	.609	1.643
	Nature of Job	.002	-.134	-.095	.679	1.472
	Years of Experience	-.153	-.196	-.141	.761	1.314
	Level of Education	-.181	.060	.042	.614	1.628
	Marital Status	.089	.099	.070	.789	1.267
	PRP_MEAN	.655	.444	.349	.504	1.985
	CI_MEAN	.511	.119	.084	.503	1.986
	OB_MEAN	.481	.156	.112	.628	1.593

a. Dependent Variable: DF_MEAN

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics	
						Tolerance	VIF
1	PRP_MEAN	.645[b]	8.856	.000	.647	.909	1.101
	CI_MEAN	.504[b]	6.087	.000	.504	.902	1.108
	OB_MEAN	.459[b]	5.714	.000	.480	.987	1.013

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Collinearity Statistics
		Minimum Tolerance
1	PRP_MEAN	.609[b]
	CI_MEAN	.612[b]
	OB_MEAN	.614[b]

a. Dependent Variable: DF_MEAN

b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	1.9026	4.8977	3.4353	.69969	116
Std. Predicted Value	-2.191	2.090	.000	1.000	116
Standard Error of Predicted Value	.105	.323	.195	.047	116
Adjusted Predicted Value	1.8852	4.8790	3.4329	.70895	116
Residual	-1.68947	2.18836	.00000	.69526	116
Std. Residual	-2.344	3.036	.000	.965	116
Stud. Residual	-2.466	3.262	.002	1.009	116
Deleted Residual	-1.87037	2.52694	.00244	.76141	116
Stud. Deleted Residual	-2.528	3.422	.005	1.024	116
Mahal. Distance	1.439	22.053	7.931	4.148	116
Cook's Distance	.000	.183	.011	.026	116
Centered Leverage Value	.013	.192	.069	.036	116

a. Dependent Variable: DF_MEAN

Regression

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
EP_MEAN	4.1342	.57739	116
Job Position	1.2672	.44444	116
Nature of Job	1.1466	.35519	116
Years of Experience	2.2328	1.06614	116
Level of Education	2.5086	.66589	116
Marital Status	1.6810	.55324	116
PRP_MEAN	3.1897	.78786	116
CI_MEAN	3.7905	.62748	116
OB_MEAN	3.1129	.78514	116

Correlations

		EP_MEAN	Job Position	Nature of Job
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	1.000	-.204	-.345
	Job Position	-.204	1.000	.301
	Nature of Job	-.345	.301	1.000
	Years of Experience	.019	-.279	-.320
	Level of Education	.115	-.522	.013
	Marital Status	.007	-.075	-.247
	PRP_MEAN	.094	.239	.148
	CI_MEAN	.384	.090	-.197
	OB_MEAN	.244	.072	-.022
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.	.014	.000
	Job Position	.014	.	.001
	Nature of Job	.000	.001	.
	Years of Experience	.418	.001	.000
	Level of Education	.110	.000	.445
	Marital Status	.471	.213	.004
	PRP_MEAN	.157	.005	.056
	CI_MEAN	.000	.168	.017
	OB_MEAN	.004	.220	.405
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116

Correlations

		Years of Experience	Level of Education	Marital Status
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	.019	.115	.007
	Job Position	-.279	-.522	-.075
	Nature of Job	-.320	.013	-.247
	Years of Experience	1.000	.273	.348
	Level of Education	.273	1.000	.208
	Marital Status	.348	.208	1.000
	PRP_MEAN	-.075	-.213	.037
	CI_MEAN	.079	-.165	.174
	OB_MEAN	-.050	-.104	-.018
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.418	.110	.471
	Job Position	.001	.000	.213
	Nature of Job	.000	.445	.004
	Years of Experience	.	.002	.000
	Level of Education	.002	.	.012
	Marital Status	.000	.012	.
	PRP_MEAN	.210	.011	.347
	CI_MEAN	.200	.038	.031
	OB_MEAN	.296	.133	.422
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116

Correlations

		PRP_MEAN	CI_MEAN	OB_MEAN
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	.094	.384	.244
	Job Position	.239	.090	.072
	Nature of Job	.148	-.197	-.022
	Years of Experience	-.075	.079	-.050
	Level of Education	-.213	-.165	-.104
	Marital Status	.037	.174	-.018
	PRP_MEAN	1.000	.593	.537
	CI_MEAN	.593	1.000	.532
	OB_MEAN	.537	.532	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.157	.000	.004
	Job Position	.005	.168	.220
	Nature of Job	.056	.017	.405
	Years of Experience	.210	.200	.296
	Level of Education	.011	.038	.133
	Marital Status	.347	.031	.422
	PRP_MEAN	.	.000	.000
	CI_MEAN	.000	.	.000
	OB_MEAN	.000	.000	.
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116

Variables Entered/Removed[a]

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education[b]	.	Enter
2	OB_MEAN, PRP_MEAN, CI_MEAN[b]	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN
b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary[c]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	
					R Square Change	F Change
1	.400[a]	.160	.122	.54107	.160	4.191
2	.557[b]	.311	.259	.49699	.151	7.793

Model Summary[c]

Model	Change Statistics		
	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	5[a]	110	.002
2	3[b]	107	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education
b. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education, OB_MEAN, PRP_MEAN, CI_MEAN
c. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6.135	5	1.227	4.191	.002[b]
	Residual	32.203	110	.293		
	Total	38.338	115			
2	Regression	11.909	8	1.489	6.027	.000[c]
	Residual	26.429	107	.247		
	Total	38.338	115			

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN
b. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education
c. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education, OB_MEAN, PRP_MEAN, CI_MEAN

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	4.938	.387		12.743	.000
	Job Position	-.069	.145	-.053	-.479	.633
	Nature of Job	-.639	.163	-.393	-3.908	.000
	Years of Experience	-.073	.054	-.134	-1.340	.183
	Level of Education	.126	.095	.145	1.318	.190
	Marital Status	-.081	.101	-.078	-.803	.423
2	(Constant)	3.398	.478		7.111	.000
	Job Position	-.100	.134	-.077	-.747	.457
	Nature of Job	-.500	.158	-.308	-3.160	.002
	Years of Experience	-.078	.050	-.144	-1.570	.119
	Level of Education	.175	.089	.202	1.976	.051
	Marital Status	-.138	.094	-.133	-1.467	.145
	PRP_MEAN	-.068	.083	-.093	-.823	.413
	CI_MEAN	.375	.104	.407	3.602	.000
	OB_MEAN	.064	.075	.087	.862	.390

Coefficients[a]

Model		Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)					
	Job Position	-.204	-.046	-.042	.614	1.628
	Nature of Job	-.345	-.349	-.342	.755	1.324
	Years of Experience	.019	-.127	-.117	.765	1.308
	Level of Education	.115	.125	.115	.633	1.581
	Marital Status	.007	-.076	-.070	.818	1.223
2	(Constant)					
	Job Position	-.204	-.072	-.060	.609	1.643
	Nature of Job	-.345	-.292	-.254	.679	1.472
	Years of Experience	.019	-.150	-.126	.761	1.314
	Level of Education	.115	.188	.159	.614	1.628
	Marital Status	.007	-.140	-.118	.789	1.267
	PRP_MEAN	.094	-.079	-.066	.504	1.985
	CI_MEAN	.384	.329	.289	.503	1.986
	OB_MEAN	.244	.083	.069	.628	1.593

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics	
						Tolerance	VIF
1	PRP_MEAN	.208[b]	2.312	.023	.216	.909	1.101
	CI_MEAN	.399[b]	4.742	.000	.414	.902	1.108
	OB_MEAN	.249[b]	2.931	.004	.270	.987	1.013

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Collinearity Statistics
		Minimum Tolerance
1	PRP_MEAN	.609[b]
	CI_MEAN	.612[b]
	OB_MEAN	.614[b]

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	3.3261	4.7984	4.1342	.32181	116
Std. Predicted Value	-2.511	2.064	.000	1.000	116
Standard Error of Predicted Value	.072	.222	.135	.032	116
Adjusted Predicted Value	3.3714	4.7809	4.1325	.32701	116
Residual	-2.01049	.89967	.00000	.47939	116
Std. Residual	-4.045	1.810	.000	.965	116
Stud. Residual	-4.208	1.962	.002	1.009	116
Deleted Residual	-2.17502	1.05716	.00176	.52536	116
Stud. Deleted Residual	-4.584	1.989	-.002	1.030	116
Mahal. Distance	1.439	22.053	7.931	4.148	116
Cook's Distance	.000	.161	.011	.022	116
Centered Leverage Value	.013	.192	.069	.036	116

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

Regression

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
EP_MEAN	4.1342	.57739	116
Job Position	1.2672	.44444	116
Nature of Job	1.1466	.35519	116
Years of Experience	2.2328	1.06614	116
Level of Education	2.5086	.66589	116
Marital Status	1.6810	.55324	116
DF_MEAN	3.4353	.98639	116

Correlations

		EP_MEAN	Job Position	Nature of Job
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	1.000	-.204	-.345
	Job Position	-.204	1.000	.301
	Nature of Job	-.345	.301	1.000
	Years of Experience	.019	-.279	-.320
	Level of Education	.115	-.522	.013
	Marital Status	.007	-.075	-.247
	DF_MEAN	.271	.243	.002
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.	.014	.000
	Job Position	.014	.	.001
	Nature of Job	.000	.001	.
	Years of Experience	.418	.001	.000
	Level of Education	.110	.000	.445
	Marital Status	.471	.213	.004
	DF_MEAN	.002	.004	.490
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	DF_MEAN	116	116	116

Correlations

		Years of Experience	Level of Education	Marital Status
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	.019	.115	.007
	Job Position	-.279	-.522	-.075
	Nature of Job	-.320	.013	-.247
	Years of Experience	1.000	.273	.348
	Level of Education	.273	1.000	.208
	Marital Status	.348	.208	1.000
	DF_MEAN	-.153	-.181	.089
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.418	.110	.471
	Job Position	.001	.000	.213
	Nature of Job	.000	.445	.004
	Years of Experience	.	.002	.000
	Level of Education	.002	.	.012
	Marital Status	.000	.012	.
	DF_MEAN	.051	.026	.170
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	DF_MEAN	116	116	116

Correlations

		DF_MEAN
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	.271
	Job Position	.243
	Nature of Job	.002
	Years of Experience	-.153
	Level of Education	-.181
	Marital Status	.089
	DF_MEAN	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.002
	Job Position	.004
	Nature of Job	.490
	Years of Experience	.051
	Level of Education	.026
	Marital Status	.170
	DF_MEAN	.
N	EP_MEAN	116
	Job Position	116
	Nature of Job	116
	Years of Experience	116
	Level of Education	116
	Marital Status	116
	DF_MEAN	116

Variables Entered/Removed[a]

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education[b]	.	Enter
2	DF_MEAN[b]	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN
b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary[c]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	
					R Square Change	F Change
1	.400[a]	.160	.122	.54107	.160	4.191
2	.508[b]	.258	.217	.51090	.098	14.375

Model Summary[c]

Model	Change Statistics		
	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	5[a]	110	.002
2	1[b]	109	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education
b. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education, DF_MEAN
c. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6.135	5	1.227	4.191	.002[b]
	Residual	32.203	110	.293		
	Total	38.338	115			
2	Regression	9.887	6	1.648	6.313	.000[c]
	Residual	28.451	109	.261		
	Total	38.338	115			

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN
b. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education
c. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education, DF_MEAN

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	4.938	.387		12.743	.000
	Job Position	-.069	.145	-.053	-.479	.633
	Nature of Job	-.639	.163	-.393	-3.908	.000
	Years of Experience	-.073	.054	-.134	-1.340	.183
	Level of Education	.126	.095	.145	1.318	.190
	Marital Status	-.081	.101	-.078	-.803	.423
2	(Constant)	4.320	.401		10.786	.000
	Job Position	-.153	.139	-.118	-1.105	.271
	Nature of Job	-.603	.155	-.371	-3.900	.000
	Years of Experience	-.045	.052	-.083	-.868	.387
	Level of Education	.145	.090	.167	1.609	.110
	Marital Status	-.135	.096	-.129	-1.398	.165
	DF_MEAN	.193	.051	.329	3.791	.000

Coefficients[a]

Model		Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)					
	Job Position	-.204	-.046	-.042	.614	1.628
	Nature of Job	-.345	-.349	-.342	.755	1.324
	Years of Experience	.019	-.127	-.117	.765	1.308
	Level of Education	.115	.125	.115	.633	1.581
	Marital Status	.007	-.076	-.070	.818	1.223
2	(Constant)					
	Job Position	-.204	-.105	-.091	.598	1.671
	Nature of Job	-.345	-.350	-.322	.752	1.329
	Years of Experience	.019	-.083	-.072	.749	1.335
	Level of Education	.115	.152	.133	.631	1.586
	Marital Status	.007	-.133	-.115	.800	1.250
	DF_MEAN	.271	.341	.313	.903	1.108

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics	
						Tolerance	VIF
1	DF_MEAN	.329[b]	3.791	.000	.341	.903	1.108

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Collinearity Statistics
		Minimum Tolerance
1	DF_MEAN	.598[b]

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	3.0662	4.6487	4.1342	.29322	116
Std. Predicted Value	-3.642	1.755	.000	1.000	116
Standard Error of Predicted Value	.068	.212	.122	.031	116
Adjusted Predicted Value	3.1959	4.6243	4.1350	.29376	116
Residual	-2.15853	.83611	.00000	.49739	116
Std. Residual	-4.225	1.637	.000	.974	116
Stud. Residual	-4.352	1.734	-.001	1.007	116
Deleted Residual	-2.28984	.93869	-.00074	.53185	116
Stud. Deleted Residual	-4.765	1.750	-.006	1.030	116
Mahal. Distance	1.032	18.732	5.948	3.514	116
Cook's Distance	.000	.165	.010	.021	116
Centered Leverage Value	.009	.163	.052	.031	116

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

Regression

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
EP_MEAN	4.1342	.57739	116
Job Position	1.2672	.44444	116
Nature of Job	1.1466	.35519	116
Years of Experience	2.2328	1.06614	116
Level of Education	2.5086	.66589	116
Marital Status	1.6810	.55324	116
DF_MEAN	3.4353	.98639	116
PRP_MEAN	3.1897	.78786	116
CI_MEAN	3.7905	.62748	116
OB_MEAN	3.1129	.78514	116

Correlations

		EP_MEAN	Job Position	Nature of Job
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	1.000	-.204	-.345
	Job Position	-.204	1.000	.301
	Nature of Job	-.345	.301	1.000
	Years of Experience	.019	-.279	-.320
	Level of Education	.115	-.522	.013
	Marital Status	.007	-.075	-.247
	DF_MEAN	.271	.243	.002
	PRP_MEAN	.094	.239	.148
	CI_MEAN	.384	.090	-.197
	OB_MEAN	.244	.072	-.022
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.	.014	.000
	Job Position	.014	.	.001
	Nature of Job	.000	.001	.
	Years of Experience	.418	.001	.000
	Level of Education	.110	.000	.445
	Marital Status	.471	.213	.004
	DF_MEAN	.002	.004	.490
	PRP_MEAN	.157	.005	.056
	CI_MEAN	.000	.168	.017
	OB_MEAN	.004	.220	.405
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	DF_MEAN	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116

Correlations

		Years of Experience	Level of Education	Marital Status
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	.019	.115	.007
	Job Position	-.279	-.522	-.075
	Nature of Job	-.320	.013	-.247
	Years of Experience	1.000	.273	.348
	Level of Education	.273	1.000	.208
	Marital Status	.348	.208	1.000
	DF_MEAN	-.153	-.181	.089
	PRP_MEAN	-.075	-.213	.037
	CI_MEAN	.079	-.165	.174
	OB_MEAN	-.050	-.104	-.018
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.418	.110	.471
	Job Position	.001	.000	.213
	Nature of Job	.000	.445	.004
	Years of Experience	.	.002	.000
	Level of Education	.002	.	.012
	Marital Status	.000	.012	.
	DF_MEAN	.051	.026	.170
	PRP_MEAN	.210	.011	.347
	CI_MEAN	.200	.038	.031
	OB_MEAN	.296	.133	.422
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116
	DF_MEAN	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116

Correlations

		DF_MEAN	PRP_MEAN	CI_MEAN	OB_MEAN
Pearson Correlation	EP_MEAN	.271	.094	.384	.244
	Job Position	.243	.239	.090	.072
	Nature of Job	.002	.148	-.197	-.022
	Years of Experience	-.153	-.075	.079	-.050
	Level of Education	-.181	-.213	-.165	-.104
	Marital Status	.089	.037	.174	-.018
	DF_MEAN	1.000	.655	.511	.481
	PRP_MEAN	.655	1.000	.593	.537
	CI_MEAN	.511	.593	1.000	.532
	OB_MEAN	.481	.537	.532	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	EP_MEAN	.002	.157	.000	.004
	Job Position	.004	.005	.168	.220
	Nature of Job	.490	.056	.017	.405
	Years of Experience	.051	.210	.200	.296
	Level of Education	.026	.011	.038	.133
	Marital Status	.170	.347	.031	.422
	DF_MEAN	.	.000	.000	.000
	PRP_MEAN	.000	.	.000	.000
	CI_MEAN	.000	.000	.	.000
	OB_MEAN	.000	.000	.000	.
N	EP_MEAN	116	116	116	116
	Job Position	116	116	116	116
	Nature of Job	116	116	116	116
	Years of Experience	116	116	116	116
	Level of Education	116	116	116	116
	Marital Status	116	116	116	116
	DF_MEAN	116	116	116	116
	PRP_MEAN	116	116	116	116
	CI_MEAN	116	116	116	116
	OB_MEAN	116	116	116	116

Variables Entered/Removed[a]

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education[b]	.	Enter
2	OB_MEAN, DF_MEAN, CI_MEAN, PRP_MEAN[b]	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN
b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary[c]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	
					R Square Change	F Change
1	.400[a]	.160	.122	.54107	.160	4.191
2	.586[b]	.343	.287	.48744	.183	7.384

Model Summary[c]

Model	Change Statistics		
	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	5[a]	110	.002
2	4[b]	106	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education
b. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education, OB_MEAN, DF_MEAN, CI_MEAN, PRP_MEAN
c. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6.135	5	1.227	4.191	.002[b]
	Residual	32.203	110	.293		
	Total	38.338	115			
2	Regression	13.153	9	1.461	6.151	.000[c]
	Residual	25.186	106	.238		
	Total	38.338	115			

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN
b. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education
c. Predictors: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education, OB_MEAN, DF_MEAN, CI_MEAN, PRP_MEAN

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	4.938	.387		12.743	.000
	Job Position	-.069	.145	-.053	-.479	.633
	Nature of Job	-.639	.163	-.393	-3.908	.000
	Years of Experience	-.073	.054	-.134	-1.340	.183
	Level of Education	.126	.095	.145	1.318	.190
	Marital Status	-.081	.101	-.078	-.803	.423
2	(Constant)	3.380	.469		7.212	.000
	Job Position	-.143	.132	-.110	-1.076	.284
	Nature of Job	-.452	.157	-.278	-2.887	.005
	Years of Experience	-.056	.050	-.103	-1.120	.265
	Level of Education	.163	.087	.189	1.874	.064
	Marital Status	-.159	.093	-.153	-1.716	.089
	DF_MEAN	.150	.065	.255	2.287	.024
	PRP_MEAN	-.160	.091	-.219	-1.766	.080
	CI_MEAN	.347	.103	.377	3.374	.001
	OB_MEAN	.038	.074	.051	.511	.610

Coefficients[a]

Model		Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)					
	Job Position	-.204	-.046	-.042	.614	1.628
	Nature of Job	-.345	-.349	-.342	.755	1.324
	Years of Experience	.019	-.127	-.117	.765	1.308
	Level of Education	.115	.125	.115	.633	1.581
	Marital Status	.007	-.076	-.070	.818	1.223
2	(Constant)					
	Job Position	-.204	-.104	-.085	.597	1.676
	Nature of Job	-.345	-.270	-.227	.667	1.499
	Years of Experience	.019	-.108	-.088	.732	1.366
	Level of Education	.115	.179	.148	.612	1.633
	Marital Status	.007	-.164	-.135	.781	1.280
	DF_MEAN	.271	.217	.180	.497	2.013
	PRP_MEAN	.094	-.169	-.139	.405	2.471
	CI_MEAN	.384	.311	.266	.496	2.015
	OB_MEAN	.244	.050	.040	.612	1.633

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics	
						Tolerance	VIF
1	DF_MEAN	.329[b]	3.791	.000	.341	.903	1.108
	PRP_MEAN	.208[b]	2.312	.023	.216	.909	1.101
	CI_MEAN	.399[b]	4.742	.000	.414	.902	1.108
	OB_MEAN	.249[b]	2.931	.004	.270	.987	1.013

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Collinearity Statistics
		Minimum Tolerance
1	DF_MEAN	.598[b]
	PRP_MEAN	.609[b]
	CI_MEAN	.612[b]
	OB_MEAN	.614[b]

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN

b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Marital Status, Job Position, Nature of Job, Years of Experience, Level of Education

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	3.0735	4.9388	4.1342	.33819	116
Std. Predicted Value	-3.137	2.379	.000	1.000	116
Standard Error of Predicted Value	.074	.229	.139	.033	116
Adjusted Predicted Value	3.2104	4.9813	4.1339	.34093	116
Residual	-1.96818	.87184	.00000	.46798	116
Std. Residual	-4.038	1.789	.000	.960	116
Stud. Residual	-4.203	1.940	.000	1.008	116
Deleted Residual	-2.13257	1.02521	.00029	.51659	116
Stud. Deleted Residual	-4.582	1.966	-.003	1.028	116
Mahal. Distance	1.634	24.324	8.922	4.643	116
Cook's Distance	.000	.148	.011	.020	116
Centered Leverage Value	.014	.212	.078	.040	116

a. Dependent Variable: EP_MEAN