DIVIDEND BEHAVIOUR OF PUBLIC LISTED FIRM IN MALAYSIA

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Abstract

The Malaysian financial market is governed and regulated by the Bursa Malaysia Berhad, an indicator of Malaysian financial market. Dividend policy in Malaysian companies is often inflexible as most of the firms are unwilling to cut or keep away from omitting dividend even when the company's earnings are falling. This research examined whether there are any correlation between earnings, firm's size and liquidity against dividend. This research used data from companies from seven different selected sectors covering over period of six years from 2007 to 2012. From the results obtained, this research confirms that profitability, sizes and liquidity are the important determinants of dividend payment in Malaysia and the influence of industry on payout decision. The companies studied appear to be reluctant to omit dividend even when they suffers losses.

Keywords*: dividend, determinant, payout decision*

Abstrak

Pasaran kewangan Malaysia ditadbir dan dikawal selia oleh Bursa Malaysia Berhad, yang merupakan penunjuk pasaran kewangan Malaysia. Dasar dividen syarikat Malaysia sering tidak fleksibel kerana kebanyakan firma tidak mahu untuk mengurangkan atau menjauhkan diri dari meninggalkan dividen walaupun pendapatan syarikat jatuh. Kajian ini menguji sama ada terdapat apa-apa hubungan antara pendapatan, saiz firma dan kecairan tunai terhadap dividen. Kajian ini menggunakan data dari syarikat dari tujuh sektor terpilih berbeza yang meliputi tempoh enam tahun 2007-2012. Daripada keputusan yang didapati, kajian ini mengesahkan bahawa keuntungan, saiz dan kecairan tunai adalah penentu penting dalam pembayaran dividen di Malaysia dan pengaruh industri atas keputusan pembayaran. Syarikat-syarikat yang dikaji kelihatan keberatan untuk meninggalkan dividen walaupun mereka mengalami kerugian.

Kata kunci: *dividen, penentu, pembayaran dividen*

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and back ground of the study

An organization's willingness to pay dividends to their shareholders over the time can provide a positive message about its financial fundamentals and performance. In general, profitable companies pay dividends and dividends are generally paid quarterly. Dividends also are able to provide a signal to other potential investors of what the company is really worth (Asquith and Mullins, 1983). A cautiously planned and executed policy is important to maximizing shareholder wealth. Dividend policy is needed as unpredictable dividend announcement will drop a bombshell to the market participants which can result in a drop in the company's value when there is a selling off. Thus, a well-devised policy could prevent these unexpected circumstances and safeguard or even boost company value (Salih and Alaa, 2010). Dividend refers to a sum, which a firm pays to its shareholders. Dividend payment is not a cost for a company; it is an allocation of assets among the shareholders. However high-growth companies rarely offer dividends because they normally reinvest the profit so that they can sustain higher growth[1] (Ross et al., 2006).

[1] Residual Dividend Approach, whereby firm will pay dividends only after meeting its investment needs.

A company should not make a decision to increase dividends lightly because it is a serious commitment. Though, organizations are not restricted to pay in terms of cash dividend to their investor. They are other types of dividend payments such as stock dividend, split dividend and share repurchases. There were situations whereby many high profiles Board of Directors decided to return excess capital to shareholders by offering stock repurchase to the shareholders, this will result in fewer shares outstanding and will gave the remaining share a bigger fraction rights in the company. Some firms possibly will come to a decision to give dividends in the form of stock or stock split. Neither of these actions has economic value as both of the options do not increase investors' wealth.

A dividend policy is a decision about when and how much from the portions of earnings is paid as dividends (Ross et al., 2006). There were many researchers who have come up with theories to explain why organizations should pay or not pay dividends. They had also produced and empirically tested a range of models to explain dividend behavior and the dividend policy adopted by organizations. Table 1.1 below summarizes the range of models tested in previous studies.

Table 1.1

Summary of Models Tested in Previous Studies

No	Study / Research	Descriptions
1	Hauser (2013)	Life-cycle model is used to predict the probability that a firm pays dividend.
2	Garrett and Priestley (2000)	Behavioral model of dividend policy
3	Abdulrahman (2007)	Statistical analysis of relationship between EPS and DPS via Pearson Correlation
4	Jasim Al-Ajmi and Hameeda Abo Hussain (2011)	Lintner's (1956) Model
5	Baker and Powell (2009)	Survey instrument and statistical test
6	Norhayati et. al. (2011)	Correlation test of four indicators DPS, EPS, ROE and CFPS.
7	Pandey (2003)	Multinomial Logit Model (1956)

Dividend policy that optimizes the value of the company is alleged to have an optimal dividend policy. There are many types of dividend policy that managers can choose from for their organizations. Thus, distinction exists in dividend policies of companies around the world. Generally, dividend policies will be based on the local tax laws. For example, company tends to retain greater amounts of earnings if the countries tax on capital gains is less than tax on dividends. However, in Malaysia, the Single Tier System was introduced in budget 2008 that resulted in any dividend paid after 2008 are exempted in the hands of shareholders. Business profit is taxed at the corporate level and can be considered as the final tax. Shareholders with the highest tax bracket will benefit the most from this as they do not need to pay for the tax differences. For example, if the corporate tax is currently at 25% and the shareholder's tax bracket is at 27%, he or she does not need to pay for the 2% difference from the dividend received. This was not the case under the Imputation

System[2]. This development in the system will attract more investors with the higher tax bracket or the high end investor to invest in a dividend paying company. Table 1.2 below illustrates the comparison between Imputation System and Single Tier Tax System.

Table 1.2

Comparison between Imputation System and Single Tier Tax System

Imputation System	**Single Tier Tax System**
• Payment of tax by a company is not a final • Tax is withhold from dividend paid, credited to shareholders • Shareholders will be taxed on gross dividends and to claim back under section 110 set-off • Tracking mechanism through section 108 account	• Tax paid by a company is a final tax • Tax will not be abstracted from dividend paid, credited or distributed to shareholders • Dividends are exempt in the hands of shareholders • No tracking mechanism is required

In countries where investor rights are not well protected, companies tend to pay greater amounts of earnings as dividends. As a result, a company would usually look at the external factors in adopting their company dividend policy. There are also internal factors that would influence dividend policy. The other influencing factors in determining dividend policy are constraints on dividend payments,

[2] Under the imputation system, tax will be established on the profit at company's level and at the shareholders level. Companies are required in advance to calculate tax at the corporate tax rate on dividends paid. The same income would be taxed again if the credit is not imputed to the shareholders (www.hasil.gov.my).

investment opportunities, and alternative sources of capital and ownership dilution (Besley, 2011).

Do investors prefer high or low payouts? There are three theories; first is the irrelevant theory which states that investors do not care whether payout is set. Next is the bird-in-the-hand theory which stipulates that investors prefer a high payout. Finally, the tax preference theory, says that investors prefer a low payout in order to get growth and capital gains. Many researchers have made the study that the changes in dividend when announced will often accompanied by abnormal stock price performance. These in facts indicated that investors have a preference for higher dividends payout instead. There is no empirical testing able to determine which theory, if any, is correct. Thus managers must use their own judgment and analysis when setting policy in terms of dividend payment. Consequently, the changes in dividend may transmit information about the company's anticipation of potential performance of the firm and represent an indication about the company's future earnings. Hence, the dividend change is implicit to indicate a major change in the company's earnings.

In this study we examine the underlying assumption that earnings changes, firm's sizes changes, liquidity changes and dividend changes are independent. A good measure of the company's performance is earnings per share. Few studies have examined the relationship between dividend changes and earnings. Watts (1973) examined the dividend-earnings relationship using annual data. He found that forecasts of future earnings improved only marginally when current dividends are

included in the forecasting model. Tanveer (2012) in his study on the impact of dividend policy on the share price in the Pakistan's banking sector discovered that the current year earnings per share have a positive relationship with the dividend payouts for current year. He also discovered that the size of the firms studied have a positive influence towards dividend distribution. Norhayati et. al. (2011) used Cash Flow per Share (CFPS) to measure liquidity and EPS together with ROE as a proxy of profitability. Correlation test was conducted against DPS and associations of relationship were established by them. In this study six independent variables were selected to represent specific measurement. Table 1.3 provides the summary of what the respective independent variables represent.

Table 1.3

Independent Variable

No	Independent Variable	Representing
1	Earnings per Share (EPS)	Profitability
2	Return on Equity (ROE)	
3	Sales	Firm's Size
4	Shareholder Equity	
5	Net Profit	Liquidity

There are three categories of changes in EPS to be identified; they are increases, decreases and negative of company's earnings. Meanwhile, for ROE the categories are increase, decrease and zero. Changes in Sales and Shareholder Equity categorize by increase and decrease of the respective items that represents the changes of the

firm's size. Changes of the firm's liquidity are represented by negative net income, increase of net income and the decrease of net income.

The purpose of this research is to study and examine the Malaysian companies trading in the Bursa Malaysia Berhad in their relation of companies dividend payments are closely related to changes in earnings, sizes and liquidity. The objective is to examine the relationship between dividend payment, earning, firm's size and liquidity and to provide the evidence that the firms decision towards dividend payments are closely related to changes in earnings, sizes and liquidity but however the firms do not instantly exclude dividends when the above decreases.

1.2 Problem Statement

Two major decisions will be faced by finance managers, the investment (or capital budgeting) and the financing decision. Capital budgeting focuses on the assets that the company should obtain while financing focused on the method of financing the assets to be attained. A third decision will be presented once the company begins to generate profit which is the distribution of profit to the shareholders. As the main objective of managers is to maximize the wealth of the shareholders, managers need to take into consideration the possible effect of their decisions on the share price (Bishop et al., 2000).

Previous empirical studies in the developed countries show that, profitability can correlate with dividend payout in either positive or negative correlation. Baker and Gandi (2007), in their study on the perception of dividends by Canadian managers

revealed that the higher the ROE, the larger is the company's retained earnings for reinvestment or the lesser is the dividend payment. Anupam (2012) in their study of Japanese companies for the year 2005 to 2010 also revealed that ROE has a negative relationship with dividend payment. Studies on Spanish firms by Alonso (2005) revealed that relationship can be established between growth prospects, debt, company's performance and dividend payout. Oliveres, Carlos (2008) observation on the financial factors influencing cash dividend policy by U.S manufacturing companies established that the profitability ratios, liquidity ratios and size of companies are the important determinants for dividend payout decision. He however, revealed that companies with high liquidity, profitability and larger sized pays greater dividend compared with companies with lower liquidity, profitability and smaller in sized. Dewenter, et. al. (1998) in their study associated dividend policies of U.S and Japanese firms, by investigating the correlation between dividend changes and stock returns and the hesitancy to change dividends. The results are consistent with the joint suggestions that Japanese firms faces fewer information asymmetry and fewer agency conflicts than U.S. firms and those information asymmetries or agency conflicts affect dividend policy. Japanese firms experience lesser stock price responses to dividend omissions and initiations, in other words they are less hesitant to omit and cut dividends and that their dividends are more receptive to earnings fluctuations.

Empirical studies in the developing countries also show that profitability can correlate with dividend payout in either positive or negative correlation. Taher (2012) in his study of the determinants of dividends by Bangladesh companies' and revealed that EPS is negatively correlated against dividend payment. However,

Alkuwar (2009) discovered that company's profitability seemed to have a positive relationship and a very significant determinant of dividend payment in the Gulf Cooperation Countries.

In Malaysia, there are several studies which examined the dividend policy and behavior of companies, Norhayati, (2005) and Nur-Adriana et al., (2002) agreed that declaration of dividend either increases or decreases will be followed by an increase or decrease in share prices respectively. The growing acceptance of unit trusts in Malaysia offers attentiveness of returns in the form of dividends to investors. These funds will invest in shares that can offer good returns in the form of capital gains and dividend payout. A study on the determinants of dividend policy will be essential to support the growth of this industry.

Firms in Malaysia are recognized to pay dividends; Normah et al. (2006) concluded this by conducting survey. The payout average for years 2003 to 2005 of 212 companies was about 83 percent. Firms are always hesitant to cut or omit dividends due to the fact that markets will respond negatively to a reduction. This indication was presented in studies conducted by Aharony and Swary, 1980, Dielman and Oppenheimer, 1984, Bajaj and Vijh 1990 and Norhayati, 2005, among others.

Norhayati et al. (2011) conducted a study on the determinants of dividend payout for the top 200 companies listed on the Malaysian share market. They concluded that profitability and liquidity were important determinants of dividend payment. However, their study does not include analysis across industries and did not identify

whether there are any differentiation of dividend behavior across these sectors. I.M. Pandey (2003) in his studied establishes that the probability of Malaysian companies eliminating dividend payments is highly unlikely when they experience negative earnings and also that the firms would generally increase DPS when EPS increases. He also concluded that when earnings decrease, the chances of dividend omissions are much lower than the chances of decreasing the dividend. However, the companies will recourse to dividend omissions when their earnings are negative and he established that the influence of industry on the payout ratios and will vary considerably across time

The study therefore addresses the question whether profitability, liquidity and size are important in determining the dividend payment in Malaysia and whether it is the same across the sectors classified in Bursa Malaysia. In other words, does the decision to pay dividend is really influence by the firms earning, liquidity, and size and can be concluded across the sectors?

1.3 Research Objectives

Specifically the objectives of the research are as follows:

1. To examine the correlations between dividend payout and firm' profitability, and firm's liquidity and firm's size across various sectors; and
2. To investigate the determinants in dividend payout in Malaysia.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The study of the correlation of dividend determinant and the payout decision is important in forecasting the future payment of a firm. We decided to select EPS, ROE, net income, sales and shareholders' equity as the determinants of this study, as these determinants are easy to spot and calculate even by non-finance educated individual. The increasing popularity of unit trust that emphasize on capital gain and dividend payment make it necessary even for them to understand on the behavior of dividend payment decision.

Despite the many studies conducted pertaining to dividend payment in Malaysia, hardly any of them investigate the effect of any of the determinants towards dividend payment across the sectors classified in Bursa Malaysia. This study will reveal whether all the sectors are affected by any of the determinants and whether it is consistent. This could help investor in making their investment decision, especially during crisis that may have different effect on certain selected sectors.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study is basically examine on the relationship between the earnings, liquidity, size and dividend changes of only seven selected sector trading in the Bursa Malaysia Berhad namely the Consumer Product, Construction, Industrial Product, Plantation, Properties, Technology and the Trading and Services from out of thirteen sectors listed companies. This is due to the number of companies in the sectors that were not selected is too small and might not reflect the statistical significance in this study. The financial data of companies listed must be a complete six years data that

present implication in terms of completeness of the data as some of the companies do take part in merger and acquisition exercise that resulted in changing of company's name and non-existence of the company itself. Companies that recorded zero dividend payout for the consecutive six years selected period will also be excluded.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, the paper will present a few basic areas of dividend research. It will briefly discuss a few basic concept and definitions of the various types of dividend distribution and previous findings concerning dividend trends.

2.1 Types of Dividend

Dividends can be refers to allocations of earnings of firms, whether those earnings are made in the present or previous period (Ross et al. 2006). Once a company generates profit, they have to decide whether to keep the profit for capital investment, expansion and etc. or should they pay out dividend to the shareholders. There are four types of dividends payout:

1. Cash dividend - the most common;
2. Stock dividend - paid out of treasury stock;
3. Split dividend -similar to stock dividend; and
4. Share repurchases - when company repurchases the stock.

Cash dividend means money paid to stockholders, usually out of the company's current earnings or accumulated profit. The board of directors must declare all dividends and are taxable as income to the receiver.

Eckbo, B. Espen and Verma (1994) discovered empirical proof shows when the voting power of the owner increase, cash dividend decreases, and almost no dividend were declared when owner-managers have total voting power of the company.

A stock dividend is a dividend payment made in the form of extra shares, rather than cash payout. It is also known as a 'scrip dividend'. They are usually issued in percentage to shares owned (for example, for each 200 shares of stock possess, 10% stock dividend will yield to 20 extra shares)

Anderson, Hamish D (2010) in their study, analyze China companies for 1992-2008, the market pays more or only stock dividends since stock dividends seen as a positive market indicator compared to cash dividends. They also establish evidence that when China general market flounders, cash dividend decrease while stock dividends increase considerably and non-tradable shares are possessed by two dissimilar groups who have diverse incentives and therefore are likely to prefer different dividend policies. Consistent with that, they also discovered that state-owned shareholders favor cash dividend, while legal-person shareholders favor stock dividends.

Shinozaki et. al. (2010) studied Japanese companies and suggested that companies with stock dividends strategy will pay greater dividend-to-equity ratios and with higher possibilities of disbursing or increasing dividends than firms that did not have such plans. Also, companies considerably increase dividend payouts after stock dividends adoptions and price-to-book ratio is positively linked with dividend-to-

equity ratio. Their results also suggested that in Japan where Classic Corporation pays low dividends, high dividend payments add to the increased in stock prices.

Split dividend means to split the outstanding shares of the company into a greater number of units without disturbing the stockholder's initial proportion participating interest in the firm. For example, in a 2-for-1 split, each stockholder will receives an additional share for each share he or she holds.

Li, Qiang, et. al., (2006) in their research discovered that REITs with dividend fluctuations as the signaling mechanism prior to splits will have smaller price reactions to the private information shown by splits that those do not provide such signals, consistent with the notion that dividends and splits are indeed information substitutes.

Share repurchases means buying of its own shares from the public by a company who's the management believes that the shares are undervalued. Its objective is to upturn the market value of the shares by reducing their number accessible for acquisition.

Share repurchases are evidently a more tax efficient way to return capital to shareholders because there is no additional tax on buy backs shares. However, there are many benefits of dividends cash to investors that are not available through share repurchases. For example a cash dividend can be enormously useful for a pensioner who needed cash for their daily use. Some of the disadvantages of share repurchases

are that it may signal to their investors that the company's investment are limited and that the company may pay higher price to repurchases shares. Brav, et. al. (2005) conclusions indicated that companies choices to sustain the dividend level is in fact on par with the investment decisions, while the result to repurchase are made out of the remaining liquidity after the investment spending. The link between dividends and earnings can also be observed as weakened. Repurchases are viewed as being more flexible than dividends and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market or to increase EPS.

Stock repurchases has varied considerably over the last 20 years. In total, repurchases remarkably at its peaked in 1999 when it almost surpasses the use of dividends, and touched its low in 1991, when only a quarter of dividends were noted. There have been little details given for why it happens. Dittmar et. al. (2002) research enlightened us on how the trend on aggregate payout policy relates to earnings and the general economy. The findings shows that repurchases will increase with the increase in both permanent and transitory earnings. Nevertheless, the change in dividends paid is not connected with transitory earnings but rather only permanent changes in earnings resulting from the changes in the macro-economy. Furthermore, transitory earnings are the main force in the choice between repurchases in dividends. In summary, dividends and repurchases are the substitute for distributing permanent earnings but repurchases can also be a good mechanism to give out transitory earnings. Further to the above, transitory earnings can be said as the primary determinants of stock repurchases.

2.2 Dividend Policy

If a company decides to pay dividend to their shareholders and investors, they would either follow the high or low method. There are three approached of dividend-paying method, first is residual, stability or a combination of the two policies.

2.2.1 Residual Dividend Policy

The residual dividend policy suggests that dividend payments should be observed as residual, meaning that the amount available after all acceptable or positive NPV's investment opportunities has been undertaken (Alli et. al., 1993; Keown et. al., 2002). As a conclusion, companies using the residual dividend policy prefer to rely on equities that are generated internally to finance new prospects. Resulting from that, dividend payment will be made from the residual or leftover, after every investments requirement are met and causing the dividend payment made to be unstable from years to years depending on availability of new investments opportunities. These companies will usually attempt to preserve balance in their debt to equity ratios prior to announcing any dividend payments, which shows that they will only decide on dividends if there is sufficient money available after all operating and expansion expenses are met. In his study, Jensen (1986) discovered that investment opportunities are an important factor in dividend decision. Companies with higher growth will need to maintain minimum payout, this will avoid external financing cost (Holder et. al. 1998) this policy minimizes new equity issues and hence flotation and signaling cost.

2.2.2 Dividend Stability Policy

The instability of dividends resulted from the residual policy noticeably distinguish with the firmness of dividend stability policy. Researchers have studied on the relationship of dividend stability with the risk factor. The stability of the underlying cash flow has been points out by stable dividend, explained onto lower level of improbability and business risk, while inconsistent dividend stream will cause the fluctuation of cash flow in the hands of shareholders. With the stability policy firms may decide to choose a cyclical policy that sets dividend at a flat portion of quarterly earnings, or it may choose a stable policy whereby dividends are set at a part of yearly earnings. Either way, dividend stability policy is a mean to reduce uncertainty for investors and to gives them with a steady income from the dividend payment. Samad et. al., (2007) in their paper examines whether there is a significant impact linking a stable dividend policy and firm performance of 120 stocks from seven selected sectors in Malaysia from 2001 to 2005. The results revealed that dividend stability does differ significantly across different industry sectors.

2.2.3 Low-Regular-Dividend-Plus-Extras

The other approach that company may opt is the low-regular-dividend-plus-extras. This is a hybrid or combination involving the residual and stable dividend policy. By choosing this approach, a firm tends to view the debt/equity ratio of their capital structure as a long term decision rather than a short-term goal. It is meant to keep expectations low for dividends. Presently, this approach is normally used by firms that pay dividends. As these companies will generally goes through business cycle fluctuations, they will usually have a single set of dividend, which is a set as a fairly

small fraction of yearly profits and can be easily preserved. Beside the portions mentioned, these companies will give an additional extra dividend that will be paid only when income surpasses the general levels. The disadvantage of this approach is the potential for negative signaling. Company using this approach would usually pay a predictable dividend every year whereby in years with good earnings they would pay their investors a bonus dividend.

2.3 Dividend Theory

This section will discuss the theories which explain certain behavior of dividend's payment by firms. Among others, the most renowned theories are The Tax Preference Theory, Irrelevancy Theory, Signaling Theory and The Bird in a Hand Theory.

2.3.1 Tax Preference Theory

Akpomi, et. al. (2008) study the impact of taxes on dividend policy of Nigerian banks and identified pattern of past dividends, which focused on preserving a target capital structure, certain degree of financial leverage, shareholders desires for dividend income. The analyses for the study show a considerable association between taxes and dividend structure of the banks and also proposed that income is a main determinant in the development of dividend policy of the organizations. The study shows significant impact of income on dividend and a positive relationship connecting profit, tax and dividend.

2.3.2 Irrelevancy Theory

Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani (1962) developed a theory called irrelevancy theory dividend policy that shows that in perfect financial markets meaning that when there is no taxes and no transactions cost exist the value of a firm will not be affected by the dividends distribution. Their argument is that value is determined only by the future earnings and risks of its investments. In summary, Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani argues that retaining earnings or paying investors and shareholder dividends will not give impact to the firms value, its cost of capital and also that dividend policy does not affect the required rate of return on equity. However, if dividends do affect value, it is mainly because of the information content that signals the management's future expectations. In their recent research, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) underlined that Miller and Modigliani's (1962) evidence of dividend irrelevance is based on the hypothesis that the amount of dividends allocated to shareholders is equal or greater that the free cash flow produced by the fixed investment policy. In their research, they also declared that if retention is permissible, dividend policy is not irrelevant and that the key assumption is not retention but is the NPV of the additional funds (either retained or raised), if NPV is zero, dividend irrelevance applies.

2.3.3 Bird-in-the Hand Theory

As a response to Miller and Modigliani's dividend irrelevance theory, Myron Gordon and John Lintner suggested that shareholders and investors favor current dividends and that a positive correlation linking dividends and company's market value exist. The fundamentals supporting this theory is the bird-in-the-hand

argument which suggested that investors are usually risk-averse and attach fewer risk to existing dividends in comparison to future dividends or capital gains since existing dividends have smaller risk, therefore investors prefers dividends. Under the bird-in-the-hand theory, stocks with high dividend payouts are sought by investors and consequently command a higher market price.

2.3.4 Signaling Theory

Signaling theory was deduced by Asquith and Mullins (1983) that the positive stock price move on a dividend initiation as a confirmation that managers use the news as a means of signaling their investors as well the shareholders. Watts (1973) studied that the impact of dividends on both stock prices and future earnings to see whether dividends contained any information for investors. Watts found that after conditioning on current and past earnings, dividends could not be used by investors to reliably predict future earnings and thus concluded "….in general, the information content dividends can only be trivial". However Bhattacharya (1979) argues that because a company's future cash position is determined by the quality of the projects in which it invests today, the only way that it will commit to a high level of dividends is if those projects are high quality. Therefore, managers can signal their optimism regarding project quality to investors by declaring a sustainable and preferably high level of dividends.

In line with Bhattacharya proponents are Miller and Rock (1985) in focusing in the credibility of the signaling theory. However, Miller and Rock arguments are that any company regardless of whether its prospect is excellent can pay a relatively

small dividend to its investors and shareholders. Thus, in order for a company to be considered a credible signal of good news, it must be large enough so that only company that has good prospects can afford to pay it. Companies do not want to cut dividend, so they will not make any decision to raise dividends unless they feels the increase can be sustain. Hence, investors view dividend increases as a signal of management's positive view of the future earnings. If a firm's stock price suddenly increase at the time it make an announcement of an increase in dividend payment, these could reflect the expectations for a higher future earning, not a preference for dividends over retentions and capital gains. In contrast, a cut in dividend would be a negative signal and reflects that the company is not confident of their future earnings. The signaling impact constraint dividend decisions by imposing huge cost on a dividend cut and by discouraging companies from raising dividends unless they are sure about their future earnings. Companies tend to raise dividend only when they are sure that their future earnings can comfortably maintain a higher dividend level and they cut dividend only as last resort. Since those regular dividends can be used by managers to provide signal or information about future prospects, thus in practice, it is too expensive to signal with dividends. Al-Yahyaee, et. al. (2010) on their study results show that announcements of dividend increases are usually associated with the increased in stock prices, while announcements of dividend decreases will cause the decrease in stock prices.

Few studies compare the market reaction to different cash payout methods. Choi and Chen (1997) show results indicating that tender-offer repurchases elicit a more positive stock price reaction upon announcement than increases in regular dividends. More recently, and after controlling for payout size and the market's expectation

about cash flow shocks, Guay and Harford (2000) present results indicating a higher positive market response to dividend increases when compared to open market repurchases. However, these studies involve essentially the treatment of only two payout methods. An exception is Lie (2000) who studies three payout methods but on a distinct basis**.** For firms paying large special dividends, he finds that their announcement residuals are related to their excess funds and investment opportunities. He observes a similar relation for self-tender offers and no significant relation when increments in regular dividends are considered

Franklin and Antonio (1998) argue that the clientele effect was the very reason for the presence of dividends. This paper designs an empirical work to investigate the determinants of corporate dividend policy. It shows that companies pay dividend as a signal to reduce agency cost and it also shows that liquidity and tax clientele effect are related to dividend policy.

2.4 Dividend Determinants

Industry of different sectors applies a different dividend policy. In a classic study, John Lintner's (1956) conducted a study on how dividend decisions were made by US managers. He was the first to start asking the corporate managers about their opinion on dividends and dividend policy. He conducted intensive interviews with managers that were accountable for deciding on the dividend payout of 28 well-established industrial firms, using 15 determinants that have influence on dividend decisions.

2.4.1 Profitability

The finding from Lintner's (1956) study concluded that a change in company earnings is the main variable in influencing the size of a company's dividend that results in a payout ratio that is for a time out of line with the firm's target payout ratio. He explained that firms will frequently tend to make periodical partial tuning in the payout ratio towards the desired payout ratio, rather than making unexpected changes in the cash dividend paid. Managers decided to do this as they concluded that shareholders would be fond of a stable stream of dividends to an unpredictable dividend. Therefore, managers smooth dividend payout in the short run to avoid any regular changes. Lintner developed an empirical observation that firm adjusts their dividends in response to changes in earnings. This would suggest that dividends change with earnings.

According to Adaoglu (2000), in Turkey, earnings are the key determinant of dividend payments of companies and they were required to distribute 50% of the distributable profits as cash dividends. Based on his study, the results show that because of regulation of compulsory distribution of profits, the Istanbul Stock Exchange companies followed stable dividend policy until year 1994. However, once the regulations impede, they followed unstable dividend policies.

Companies in high growth industries will rely on their internal fund or retained earnings (Holder et. al., 1998). As a result these companies have a tendency of paying fewer dividends and to retain their earnings. Amidu and Abor (2006) discovered that the profitability is highly negative and statistically significant

associated with the dividend payout. These show that the companies invest in their assets rather than making dividend payment. Baker and Gandi (2007) also discovered the similar result; they confirmed that the higher the company's return on equity, the greater the retained earnings. Thus, the dividend payout ratio is lower. Anupam (2012) studied Japanese companies for the year 2005 to 2010 also discovered that ROE has a negative relationship with dividend payout. Oliveres, Carlos (2008) studied the financial factors influencing cash dividend policy by U.S manufacturing companies confirmed that the profitability ratios, liquidity ratios and size of companies are the important determinants for dividend payout decision. He however, discovered that companies with high liquidity, profitability and larger sized pays higher dividend compared with companies with lower liquidity, profitability and smaller in sized. Similar empirical studies by Kun Li and Chung Hua (2012) concluded that companies are more likely to raise their dividends payout if they are profitable. They show that profitability have a positive relationship with dividend payout ratio. Alkuwar (2009) in his research discovered that company's profitability ratio have a strong positive relationship with dividend payment. The correlation index is 2.89, concluded that one unit increase in profitability would increase 2.89 units in dividend payment. Upon studying the companies on Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange, Turki and Ahmed (2013) discovered that EPS has positive relationship with DPS. So when EPS increase, DPS will also increase. Similar study was conducted by Mohammed and Mohammed (2012) on Industrial Corporation listed in Amman Stock Exchange discovered that EPS has the most significant effect on DPS.

2.4.2 Size of Firms

Payers and non-payers can be distinguished by their profitability, investment opportunities, and size of the firms according to Fama and French (2001). Evidence from their study suggested that the three main fundamentals mentioned above are the factors in the decision to pay dividends. Payers usually by firms those are large, profitable with earnings on the order of investment outlays. Smaller firms will never pay dividend as they are less profitable if compared with their larger counterpart. Nevertheless, they have more investment opportunities, and their investment expenses are much larger if compared with their earnings. According to Mitton (2004), size and growth has been proven to have a positive correlation with dividend payouts. This has been supported by Li and Lie (2006) that have also concluded that dividends will be cut if the firms have poor operating income, low cash balances and low market to book ratio. Eriotis (2005) in his study on Greeks companies suggested that a dividends policy is set not only by net earnings but also by the companies' size. Hafeez and Attiya (2008) reported otherwise, they discovered that there is a negative and significant relationship between size and dividend payout. Their research on dividend determinants of dividend policy in Pakistan reveals that large-size companies pay fewer dividends.

2.4.3 Liquidity

From a study conducted by Liu and Hu (2005) on Chinese listed firms, concluded that cash dividend payout ratio of most of the firms can be observe between 20 to 50 percent. The cash dividend payment was to be observed as higher than the accounting profit. However, 50 percent of the sample observed had dividend cash

payment higher than the free cash flow. This finding is the result of the ruling made by the security commission of China in 2000 which rules that listed companies must pay cash dividend in the past three years. The shortage of cash will be financed through selling shares or right issue.

Afza (2010) in his study of 100 companies listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) found that managerial and individual ownership, cash flow sensitivity, size and leverage to have negative correlation. Firms with high proportion of shares held by managers and individual are more reluctant to pay high dividends if to be compared with firms that have low proportion of shares held by managers and individual. High operating cash flows increases companies' probability to pay high dividend. Even though the sensitivity of cash flow resulting in the reduced of dividend payout; it is still among the determinants of dividend payment in Pakistan. Companies with profits that are unstable pay little cash dividends; this is to maintain cash in the company in order to avoid the cost of external financing, this has been concluded by Baker and Wurgler (2002). Thus, with the assumption that all the net profit is realized, we can conclude that the change in net profit is consistence with the change of cash flow in a company. Ahmed and Javad (2009) emphasize that liquidity situation is a significant determinant of dividend payouts decision. Companies with high liquidity are likely to pay dividends if compared with companies that have lower liquidity. Payments of dividend depend highly on cash flows which reflect the company's capability to pay dividends. A poor liquidity situation will mean fewer dividends due to lack of cash. Hafeez and Attiya (2008) discovered that the market liquidity of the companies has a positive influence

towards dividend payout which confirms that companies with greater market liquidity pay more dividends

2.5 Statistical Testing

Generally, in finding the results of our study we used Pearson chi-square statistical test to tell whether our results are significant. A chi-square test is used when we want to see if there is a relationship between two categorical variables. Also, Pearson chi-square is able to tell us whether to reject or to accept the proposed null hypotheses and alternate hypotheses. The null hypothesis states that there is no considerable dissimilarity between the expected and observed result. Chi-square is the sum of the squared difference between observed and the expected data, divided by the expected data in all possible categories. Pandey (2003) in his study used the cross-tabulation method in explaining the relationship between earnings and dividend. Changes of earnings were categorized as increases, decreases and negative, whereas changes in dividend categorized as increases, no change, decreases and omission. Norhayati et. al. (2011) employed the correlation test to study the relationship of DPS, EPS, ROE and CFPS.

On the other hand, multinomial logit model is the suitable approach in determine the relation of earnings changes and dividend changes. Jolls (1998) considers a model based on multinomial logit approach in her research of the importance of stock options in the choice between repurchases stock and increase dividends. Her findings show that companies with executive's stock option are more likely to substitute stock repurchase than to increase dividends. Kamakura Corporation (2010) in their

research confirmed that multinomial logit is a powerful tool for the simulation of mutually exclusive events which can be driven by common casual factors. With the lack of understanding of this model, multinomial logit will not be used in this research.

2.6 Hypotheses of the Study

Based on the discussion on the literature review of studies pertaining to the determinants of dividend payment, the following hypotheses are developed for this study.

H1o: Dividend payout is positively correlated with profitability of a firm.

H2o: Dividend payout is positively correlated with liquidity of a firm.

H3o: Dividend payout is positively correlated with size of a firm.

H4o: The correlations of dividend payout and profitability, liquidity and size are similar across all industries.

H5o: Profitability is significantly related with dividend payment in Malaysia

H6o: Firm size is significantly related with dividend payment in Malaysia

H7o: Liquidity is significantly related with dividend payment in Malaysia

From the above hypotheses, this study used EPS and ROE representing profitability of a firm to prove H1o is true. Sales and Shareholder equity used to represent size in order to prove that H2o is true and net profit to represent liquidity to prove that H3o is true.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

Based on the discussion on the dividend's determinant, Figure 2.1 below shows the illustrated representation of the conceptual framework of the study. The underlying theory for this study is the signaling theory, whereby firms will send signal to the shareholders of the firm's future prospect. The determinants of dividend payment are as discussed in the hypotheses section earlier, namely, profitability factor, size of the firm factor, and liquidity factor.



Figure 2.1:
Conceptual framework of the study

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This Chapter discusses the research method to be carried out in order to test the hypotheses of this study. This study will employ quantitative research method whereby data were collected and analyze using SPSS version 20.

3.1 Data Description and Sample Construction

In the study on the dividend behavior of Malaysian companies trading in the Bursa Malaysia Berhad, financial data of companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia Berhad website were used. The financial data of the sample companies were downloaded from Bursa Malaysia Berhad website for the research purposes. For each sample company, the six years financial data were compiled and earnings per share (EPS), return on equity (ROE), sales, shareholders' equity, net profit and dividend per share (DPS) were used.

Table 2.1

Sample Description

Sector	Number of Companies
Consumer Product	80
Construction	25
Industrial Product	54
Plantation	25
Properties	43
Technology	34
Trading and Services	71

All companies in the financial sectors, trusts and closed-end funds were excluded as these companies are generally governed by different rules and practices with regard to earnings management. Any dividend to be declared by financial institutions must first be approved by Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM)[3] as stated in the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA). The same provision is also stated in the newly enacted Financial Services Act 2013 (FSA) that came into force in 30 June 2013[4].As for the rest of the sector, there are no specific rules governing the distribution of dividend. Companies can freely decide the distribution of dividend. The Companies act 1965 only mentioned that dividend should be distributed from profit but does not mentioned whether it is from current or accumulated profit. The selected companies should be continuously been listed on the Bursa Malaysia Berhad and have their financial audited data published on the Bursa Malaysia Berhad website for the consecutive six years.

3.2 Data Analysis

The research objective of this study is to observe the behavior of the Malaysian companies trading in the Bursa Malaysia Berhad in terms of their earnings, liquidity and size changes and change on dividend payments across sectors. The purpose of this study is to investigate these relationships using structural change methodology that adjusts for a situation in which the variance of the dependent variables varies across the data. Furthermore, to examine theoretically the mechanism by which dividend payments serve as an indication of changes on company's earnings. EPS changes are categorized into increases, decreases and negative earnings. ROE

[3] Under BAFIA 1989, Section 58(2)
[4] Under the FSA 2013 Section 51(1).

changes are categorized into increases, decreases and zero changes. Net profit changes are categorized into decreases, increases, maintain and negative. Both sales and shareholders' equity are categorized into increases and decreases. Changes in dividend are categorized into increase, no change, decrease and omission.

There are many factors influencing the changes of dividends payments. One of the factors is the effect of tax reduction. Based on many past researchers, it was found that there was a statistically significant increase in the number of companies raising their dividends due to the effect of tax reduction. Dewenter, Kathryn L. and Warther, Vincent A (1998) in their study compared dividend the policies established by the U.S and the Japanese firms, by examining the association between the dividend changes and stock returns and the unwillingness to adjust dividends payout. The results observed are constant by means of the shared hypotheses that Japanese firms faced a lesser amount of information asymmetry and lesser agency arguments than U.S. companies and those information asymmetries or agency arguments have an effect on dividend policy. Japanese companies face lesser stock price responses to dividend exclusions and initiations, as a conclusion they are less hesitant to exclude and cut dividends and that their dividends are quicker to respond to earnings changes.

This study will examine how firms' decisions to change dividend payment are affected by changes in earnings, liquidity and size. Changes in earnings and liquidity can be categorize in three different ways, which are increases, decreases

and negative earnings or liquidity whereby changes in size can only be categorize into increase and decreases.

In testing the relationship the changes, statistical tests in the form of correlation and regression were conducted to determine whether profitability, size and liquidity give impact to the distribution of dividends across the sectors in Malaysia. In their study in analyzing the determinants of dividend payment for the top 200 companies listed on the Malaysian share market, Norhayati et al (2005) uses the correlation and regression tests in order to examine the linkage between liquidity and profitability against the distribution of dividends. From their finding, it is concluded that profitability and liquidity are the two important determinants in deciding dividend distribution. They made a suggestion to include analysis across industries as it will results in more accurate analysis.

I.M. Pandey (2003) in his researched found that the probability Malaysian firms omitting dividend payments is very high when they experience negative earnings and also that the firms would usually increase DPS when EPS increases. He also noted that when earnings decrease, the chances of dividend omissions are much lower than the odds of decreasing the dividend. However, the firms resort to dividend omissions when their earnings are negative and he confirmed that the influence of industry on the payout ratios and will vary significantly across time. He employed the cross tabulation method which gave a descriptive analysis on the effect of EPS changes towards dividend payout ratio.

Based on I.M. Pandey researched on Malaysia firms from year 1993 to 2000 we hope to compare with this research findings and to confirm that the pattern on the relation of earnings changes and dividend changes are still the same for the year 2007 to 2012. Consequently, the dependent variable is represented by dividend payment changes measuring the relationship towards the changes on earnings, size and liquidity and the independent variables is the changes on earnings, changes on size and changes on liquidity.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the research methodology used in this study has been discussed. This section discusses the findings of this research. The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the overall position of the dividend payment by companies across the selected sectors based on dividend-paying versus non dividend-paying companies. Section 4.3 discusses the results of cross tabulation among all the variables used in this study. Section 4.4 presents the correlation analysis of all the variables based on the sectors in the stock market and section 4.5 provides the conclusion of the chapter.

4.2 Percentage of Payers and Non-Payers

In this section present the overall position of the dividend payment by companies across the selected sectors based on dividend-paying versus non dividend-paying companies. A comparison of percentage of payers to non-payers was analyzed on a yearly basis from available data.

Table 4.1

Percentage of Payers and Non-Payers for the Selected Sectors

Sector		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Average
Consumer Product	Payers	85%	81%	76%	77%	81%	68%	73%
	Non-Payers	15%	19%	24%	23%	19%	32%	27%
Construction	Payers	88%	76%	76%	68%	68%	72%	75%
	Non-Payers	12%	24%	24%	32%	32%	28%	25%
Industrial Product	Payers	80%	74%	74%	81%	78%	76%	77%
	Non-Payers	20%	26%	26%	19%	22%	24%	23%
Plantation	Payers	84%	84%	76%	80%	78%	74%	83%
	Non-Payers	16%	16%	24%	20%	12%	16%	17%
Properties	Payers	81%	81%	72%	81%	84%	86%	81%
	Non-Payers	19%	19%	28%	19%	16%	14%	19%
Technology	Payers	50%	53%	44%	59%	56%	65%	54%
	Non-Payers	50%	47%	56%	41%	44%	35%	46%
Trading and Services	Payers	77%	68%	73%	72%	69%	70%	71%
	Non-Payers	23%	32%	27%	28%	31%	30%	29%
Total	Payers	78%	74%	71%	75%	74%	73%	74%
	Non-Payers	22%	26%	29%	25%	26%	27%	26%

The results in Table 4.1 shows that Plantation and Properties sectors have the most number of dividend paying companies with an average of more than 70% of the companies paid dividend. Technology sector recorded the lowest number of dividend payee with only 54% of the selected companies paid dividend. This is consistent with Holder et. al. (1998), who suggested that companies in high growth industries will rely on their internal fund or retained earnings; as a result these companies have a tendency of paying fewer dividends and to retain their earnings. The Technology sector is considered to be in high growth stage that requires companies in this segment to continually innovate, expand and to manage their cost. This observation is based on the assumption that the changes of dividend payout are not related to the changes in earnings, size and liquidity of the companies. On average, throughout the sector selected, 74% of the companies paid dividend and only 26% decided to exclude dividend payment as a mode of income distribution.

4.3 Cross Tabulation Results

This section presents the aggregate frequencies of dividend changes against earnings changes, liquidity changes and the changes in size for the 327 companies in the sample of the study for 6 years (2007-2012) through a cross tabulation testing. Cross tabulation is a type of descriptive, bivariate analysis of which we can evaluate the relationship between two variables in a table-based format. Chi-square test is used as a determinant whether there is a statistical significance between the observed and the expected cases.I.M. Pandey (2003) in his researched, uses the cross tabulation method and discovered that the probability of Malaysian firms omitting dividend payments is very high when they experience negative earnings and also that the firms would usually increase DPS when EPS increases. He also noted that when earnings decrease, the chances of dividend omissions are much lower than the odds of decreasing the dividend.

4.3.1 EPS and DPS

Table 4.2 is the aggregate frequencies of DPS and EPS changes of the companies in the sample of the study for the period of 2007 to 2012. From the cross-tabulation of EPS and DPS changes for the entire sectors selected, it may be observed that when EPS increase, there are about 50% cases of dividend increases. When EPS decrease, only 37.1% cases reduce dividends and about 18.5% omit dividends. In more than 40% cases, companies either increase or maintain dividends when EPS fall. 77.5% cases of dividend omission were recorded when EPS are negative.

In general, we can observed that most of the sector respond to the increase of EPS by increasing the dividend payment and reluctant to reduce or omit the payment when EPS decrease. Most companies will omit dividend when EPS are negative. Significant distinction can be observed in the technology sector whereby 35.3% cases of dividend omissions were recorded even with the increase in EPS, the highest among the sectors. This is consistence with Holder et. al. (1998), who suggested that companies in a high growth industries will pay less or omit dividend, even with the increase in earnings. Trading and services sector in second, with 25.3% case of dividend omission even with the increase in EPS. This concluded that technology and trading and services sector in Malaysia might be experiencing growth in pace with the significant cases of dividend omission even with the increase in EPS. The cross tabulation result for all the sectors is significant at 0.01 significant levels.

Table 4.2

Cross Tabulation of EPS and DPS

EPS	Sector	DPS			
		Decrease	**Increase**	**Maintain**	**Omission**
Decrease	Consumer Product**	39.5%	25.9%	18.4%	16.3%
	Construction**	48.8%	12.2%	26.8%	12.2%
	Industrial Product**	25.2%	24.3%	30.6%	19.8%
	Plantation**	51.7%	25%	8.3%	15%
	Properties**	40.3%	20.8%	27.3%	11.7%
	Technology**	29.7%	23.4%	17.2%	29.7%
	Trading and Services**	35.9%	25.8%	16.4%	21.9%
	All Sector**	**37.1%**	**23.7%**	**20.7%**	**18.5%**
Increase	Consumer Product**	19.5%	52.4%	12.4%	15.7%
	Construction**	7.8%	53.1%	17.2%	21.9%
	Industrial Product**	11.6%	51.2%	19.4%	17.8%
	Plantation**	8.3%	71.7%	5%	15%
	Properties**	13%	39.8%	28.5%	18.7%
	Technology**	4.4%	47.1%	13.2%	35.3%
	Trading and Services**	10.4%	46.2%	18.1%	25.3%
	All Sector**	**12.2%**	**49.9%**	**17.1%**	**20.7%**
Negative	Consumer Product**	0%	7.3%	0%	92.7%
	Construction**	10%	5%	5%	80%
	Industrial Product**	23.3%	10%	6.7%	60%
	Plantation**	0%	0%	20%	80%
	Properties**	0%	20%	20%	60%
	Technology**	8.1%	2.7%	2.7%	86.5%
	Trading and Services**	18.6%	7%	2.3%	72.1%
	All Sector**	**10.5%**	**7.3%**	**4.7%**	**77.5%**

**0.01 level of significance

4.3.2 ROE and DPS

Table 4.3

Cross Tabulation of ROE and DPS

ROE	Sector	DPS			
		Decrease	**Increase**	**Maintain**	**Omission**
Decrease	Consumer Product**	39%	26.8%	17.1%	17.1%
	Construction**	44.4%	17.8%	26.7%	11.1%
	Industrial Product**	25.4%	26.3%	29.7%	18.6%
	Plantation**	52.3%	27.7%	9.2%	10.8%
	Properties**	36.4%	20.5%	30.7%	12.5%
	Technology**	28.6%	24.3%	18.6%	28.6%
	Trading and Services**	29.5%	26%	21.9%	22.6%
	All Sector**	**34.9%**	**25%**	**22%**	**18.1%**
Increase	Consumer Product**	18.3%	54.4%	13.1%	14.2%
	Construction**	8.3%	51.7%	16.7%	23.3%
	Industrial Product**	11.4%	50.4%	19.5%	18.7%
	Plantation**	3.6%	72.7%	3.6%	20.1%
	Properties**	13.5%	42.3%	25.2%	18.9%
	Technology**	3.2%	48.4%	11.3%	37.1%
	Trading and Services**	14%	48.8%	13.4%	23.8%
	All Sector**	**12.4%**	**51.3%**	**15.5%**	**20.8%**
Zero	Consumer Product**	0%	7.3%	0%	92.7%
	Construction**	10%	5%	5%	80%
	Industrial Product**	20.7%	10.3%	6.9%	62.1%
	Plantation**	0%	0%	20%	80%
	Properties**	0%	20%	20%	60%
	Technology**	8.1%	2.7%	2.7%	86.5%
	Trading and Services**	18.2%	6.8%	2.3%	72.7%
	All Sector**	**9.9%**	**7.3%**	**4.7%**	**78.1%**

**0.01 level of significance

From the cross-tabulation of ROE and DPS in Table 4.3, we can observe that the effect of changes in ROE is more or less similar to the effect of the changes in EPS to DPS. This might be due to the fact that both of this ratios representing the profitability of the companies against its shareholders' equity. Cross tabulation for the entire sector selected shows that when ROE increase, there are about 51.3% cases of dividend increases. When ROE decrease, only 34.9% cases reduce

dividends and about 18.1% omit dividends. In more than 47% cases, companies either increase or maintain dividends when ROE fall. 78.1% cases of dividend omission were recorded when ROE are zero.

4.3.3 Sales and DPS

Table 4.4

Cross Tabulation of Sales and DPS

Sales	Sector	DPS			
		Decrease	**Increase**	**Maintain**	**Omission**
Decrease	Consumer Product	26.6%	29.4%	11.9%	32.1%
	Construction	26.5%	18.4%	18.4%	36.7%
	Industrial Product**	19.8%	22.8%	27.7%	29.7%
	Plantation**	52.1%	22.9%	4.2%	20.8%
	Properties**	30.1%	15.7%	31.3%	22.9%
	Technology**	14.1%	21.1%	14.1%	50.7%
	Trading and Services**	21.6%	21.6%	15.3%	41.4%
	All Sector**	**25.5%**	**22.2%**	**18.4%**	**33.9%**
Increase	Consumer Product	24.8%	40.2%	13.9%	21.1%
	Construction	21.6%	32%	18.4%	28%
	Industrial Product**	17.8%	43.2%	19.5%	19.5%
	Plantation**	14.3%	61%	9.1%	15.6%
	Properties**	16.7%	41.7%	25%	16.7%
	Technology**	15.2%	33.3%	11.1%	40.4%
	Trading and Services**	20.5%	39.8%	15.6%	24.2%
	All Sector**	**19.6%**	**41.7%**	**16.3%**	**22.5%**

**0.01 level of significance

Table 4.4 is the cross tabulation for the changes of sales and DPS, observation for the entire sectors shows that more than 40% companies either increases or maintain dividend payment with the decrease of sales. 22.5% cases of dividend omission and 19.6% cases dividend of dividend decreases were recorded with the increase of sales. In the plantation sector, the increase in sales causes 61% cases of increase in DPS

and the decrease in sales causes 52.1% cases of DPS reduction. This shows that DPS highly correlated against sale in this sector. For the technology sector, even with the increase in sales, 40.4% cases of dividend omission were observed, the highest compared to other sector.

4.3.4 Shareholders' Equity and DPS

Table 4.5

Cross Tabulation of Shareholders' Equity and DPS

Shareholders' Equity	**Sector**	**DPS**			
		Decrease	**Increase**	**Maintain**	**Omission**
Decrease	Consumer Product	20%	37.5%	16.2%	26.2%
	Construction	21.1%	39.5%	7.9%	31.6%
	Industrial Product	18.3%	38.2%	19.1%	24.4%
	Plantation	33.3%	53.3%	2.2%	11.1%
	Properties	25.3%	28.9%	26.5%	19.3%
	Technology**	15.2%	27.3%	18.2%	39.4%
	Trading and Services	19.2%	35%	17.5%	28.3%
	All Sector	**20.7%**	**36.2%**	**17.1%**	**26%**
Increase	Consumer Product	29.3%	36.7%	11.2%	22.8%
	Construction	21.8%	28.7%	23%	26.4%
	Industrial Product	18.7%	33.1%	25.9%	22.3%
	Plantation	26.2%	42.5%	10.1%	21.2%
	Properties	19.7%	33.3%	28%	18.9%
	Technology**	14.4%	28.8%	8.7%	48.1%
	Trading and Services	21.7%	33.6%	14.5%	30.2%
	All Sector	**22.3%**	**34.1%**	**16.9%**	**26.8%**

**0.01 level of significance

Table 4.5 is the cross tabulation of changes in shareholders' equity against changes in dividend. All of the sectors shows no statistical significant, which concluded that there is no relationship between shareholders' equity and DPS, except for the technology sector. This sector again recorded high cases of dividend omission, even

with the increase in shareholders' equity. 48.1% cases of dividend omission were observed, with the increase of shareholders' equity

4.3.5 Net Profit and DPS

Table 4.6

Cross Tabulation of Net Profit and DPS

Net Profit	Sector	DPS			
		Decrease	**Increase**	**Maintain**	**Omission**
Decrease	Consumer Product**	40.8%	24.6%	17.7%	16.9%
	Construction**	47.2%	8.3%	30.6%	13.9%
	Industrial Product**	26.2%	23.4%	31.8%	18.7%
	Plantation**	55.8%	23.1%	7.7%	13.5%
	Properties**	40.3%	17.9%	29.9%	11.9%
	Technology**	30%	23.3%	18.3%	28.3%
	Trading and Services**	36.5%	23.5%	18.3%	21.7%
	All Sector**	**37.7%**	**22%**	**21.9%**	**18.3%**
Increase	Consumer Product**	20%	50.5%	13.5%	16%
	Construction**	11.6%	52.2%	15.9%	20.3%
	Industrial Product**	11.1%	50.4%	19.3%	19.3%
	Plantation**	10.3%	67.6%	5.9%	16.2%
	Properties**	15.2%	40.2%	27.3%	17.4%
	Technology**	5.5%	45.2%	12.3%	37%
	Trading and Services**	12.2%	45.9%	16.8%	25%
	All Sector**	**13.5%**	**48.9%**	**16.7%**	**20.8%**
Negative	Consumer Product**	0%	7.5%	0%	92.5%
	Construction**	10%	5%	5%	80%
	Industrial Product**	25%	10.7%	3.6%	60.7%
	Plantation**	0%	0%	20%	80%
	Properties**	0%	20%	20%	60%
	Technology**	8.1%	2.7%	2.7%	86.5%
	Trading and Services**	18.6%	7%	2.3%	72.1%
	All Sector**	**10.6%**	**7.4%**	**4.3%**	**77.7%**

**0.01 level of significance

Table 4.6 is the aggregate frequencies of DPS and net profit changes of the selected companies. From the cross-tabulation of the entire sectors, it may be observed that

when net profit increase; there are about 48.9% cases of dividend increases. When net profit decrease, only 37.7% cases reduce dividends and about 18.3% omit dividends. In more than 40% cases, companies either increase or maintain dividends when net profit fall. 77.7% cases of dividend omission were recorded when EPS are negative

The plantation sector is highly responsive to changes in net profit with 55.8% cases decrease DPS when net profit decreases and 67.6% increase in DPS when net profit increase. 80% cases did not make any payment when net profit is negative. In the properties sector, the effect of decrease in net profit changes is rather weak with more than 47% cases either maintains or increases DPS even when net profit decreases. Even with negative net profit, 20% cases increases and 20% cases maintain the DPS payout. Only 60% cases of dividend omission were observed. In the technology sector, 37% cases of dividend omissions were recorded even with the increase in net profit, the highest among the sectors. Trading and services sector in second, with 25% case of dividend omission even with the increase in net profit. The cross tabulation result for all the sectors is significant at 0.01 significant levels.

The cross tabulation testing concluded that profitability and liquidity are significantly positively correlated with dividend payout in all the sectors. The dividend distribution varies, most of the companies reluctant to exclude or reduce dividend payout even with decrease or negative in profitability and liquidity.

4.4 Correlation Analysis

Correlation testing of the indicators, DPS, ROE, Sales, Shareholder's equity and net profit was run by sector in order to examine whether the above mentioned associations of relationships could be established by the respective sector.

4.4.1 Correlation Testing for All Sector

Table 4.7 shows the correlation matrix among all the variables used in this study for all companies in the sample of the study. The findings indicate that there are significant positive correlations between DPS and EPS, EPS and ROE, EPS and shareholder's equity, DPS and net profit, and ROE and net profit. This supports the hypothesis that profitability and liquidity are positively correlatedto dividend distribution policy. However, the strength of the relationship varies. The relationship of DPS and EPS, and net profit is weaker that the relationship of DPS and ROE.

Table 4.7

Correlation Matrix for All Sectors

	DPS	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholder's Equity	Net Profit
DPS	1					
EPS	.123**					
ROE	.615**	.192**	1			
Sales	.017	.036	.029	1		
Shareholder's Equity	-.002	.441**	-.037	-.008	1	
Net Profit	.146**	.153**	.201**	.044	.021	1

Notes: The correlation coefficients are based on the sample of 1,635 firm-year observations. **0.01 level of significance and *0.05 level of significance

4.4.2 Correlation Testing for Consumer Product Sector

Table 4.8

Correlation Matrix for Consumer Product Sector

	DPS	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholder's Equity	Net Profit
DPS	1					
EPS	.518**	1				
ROE	.780**	.689**	1			
Sales	-.022	.084	.027	1		
Shareholder's Equity	-.031	-.085	-.026	.103*	1	
Net Profit	.048	.775**	.207**	.062	.01	1

Notes: The correlation coefficients are based on the sample of 375 firm-year observations. **0.01 level of significance and *0.05 level of significance

Table 4.8 is the correlation matrix for consumer product sector. The findings indicate that there are significant positive correlations between DPS and EPS, DPS and ROE, EPS and ROE, EPS and net profit, ROE and net profit, and sales and shareholders' equity. EPS and ROE both are highly correlated with DPS, with the Pearson's correlation coefficient of .518 and .780 respectively. We can conclude that only profitability is related to dividend distribution policy in the consumer product sector.

4.4.3 Correlation Testing for Construction Sector

Table 4.9

Correlation Matrix for Construction Sector

	DPS	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholder's Equity	Net Profit
DPS	1					
EPS	.530**	1				
ROE	.356**	.689**	1			
Sales	-.013	.101	.069	1		
Shareholder's Equity	.071	-.2*	-.25*	.144	1	
Net Profit	.673**	.810**	.435**	.045	-013	1

Notes: The correlation coefficients are based on the sample of 125 firm-year observations. **0.01 level of significance and *0.05 level of significance

In Table 4.9, we examine the associations of relationships of DPS and EPS, ROE, sales, shareholders' equity, and net profit for the Construction Sector. The findings indicate that there are significant positive correlations between DPS and EPS, DPS and ROE, EPS and ROE, EPS and net profit, DPS and net profit, and ROE and net profit. This supports the hypothesis that profitability and liquidity are positively correlated to dividend distribution policy. However, the strength of the relationship varies. The relationship of DPS and EPS, and net profit is stronger that the relationship of DPS and ROE.

4.4.4 Correlation Testing for Industrial Product Sector

Table 4.10

Correlation Matrix for Industrial Product Sector

	DPS	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholder's Equity	Net Profit
DPS	1					
EPS	.068	1				
ROE	.108	.132*	1			
Sales	.156*	.028	-.156*	1		
Shareholder's Equity	.024	.746**	-.064	-.155*	1	
Net Profit	.220*	.105	.398**	.038	.025	1

Notes: The correlation coefficients are based on the sample of 270 firm-year observations. **0.01 level of significance and *0.05 level of significance

Table 4.10 is the correlation matrix for industrial product sector. We can observe that positive relationship of DPS exist only with sales and net profit. The significant level is rather small and so as the Pearson's correlation reading.

4.4.5 Correlation Testing for Plantation Sector

Table 4.11

Correlation Matrix for Plantation Sector

	DPS	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholder's Equity	Net Profit
DPS	1					
EPS	.674**	1				
ROE	.512**	.679**	1			
Sales	.389**	.465**	.362**	1		
Shareholder's Equity	-.037	-.194*	-.155	-.120	1	
Net Profit	.422**	.450**	.529**	.126	.032	1

Notes: The correlation coefficients are based on the sample of 125 firm-year observations. **0.01 level of significance and *0.05 level of significance

In Table 4.11, we examine the relationship of the indicators for plantation sector. There are strong positive relationships between DPS and EPS, ROE, sales, and net profit. With the exception of shareholders' equity, this supports the hypothesis that profitability, liquidity and size are related to dividend distribution policy in the plantation sector cases. However, the strength of the relationship still varies.

4.4.6 Correlation Testing for Properties Sector

Table 4.12

Correlation Matrix for Properties Sector

	DPS	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholder's Equity	Net Profit
DPS	1					
EPS	.164*	1				
ROE	.033	.780**	1			
Sales	.071	.382**	.425**	1		
Shareholder's Equity	.213**	-.232**	-.141*	.003	1	
Net Profit	.212**	.586**	.737**	.278**	.266**	1

Notes: The correlation coefficients are based on the sample of 215 firm-year observations. **0.01 level of significance and *0.05 level of significance

For the properties sector, we can observe that relationship exist between DPS and EPS, shareholders' equity and net profit. The level of significant for EPS is only .05 and the Pearson's correlation reading is rather small. We can conclude that size and liquidity are related to dividend policy distribution and there is a weak relationship between profitability and dividend distribution policy for properties sector.

4.4.7 Correlation Testing for Technology Sector

In Table 4.13, there is significant positive relationship between DPS and EPS, DPS and ROE, and DPS and net profit. Negative relationship can be observed between DPS and shareholders' equity, but the significant level is just .05 and the Pearson's correlation reading is small. This support the hypothesis that profitability and liquidity is positively correlated to dividend distribution policy. The strength of the relationship varies with the relationship of DPS and ROE weaker than the relationship of DPS and EPS and DPS and net profit.

Table 4.13

Correlation Matrix for Technology Sector

	DPS	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholder's Equity	Net Profit
DPS	1					
EPS	562**	1				
ROE	.262**	.432**	1			
Sales	.1	.204**	.342**	1		
Shareholder's Equity	-.157*	-.082	-.002	.034	1	
Net Profit	.543**	.786**	.563**	.168*	.021	1

Notes: The correlation coefficients are based on the sample of 170 firm-year observations. **0.01 level of significance and *0.05 level of significance

4.4.8 Correlation Testing for Trading and Service Sector

Correlation test for the trading and service sector in Table 4.14 confirms that profitability and liquidity are strongly related to dividend distribution policy. Associations of relationships could be established between DPS and EPS, DPS and ROE and DPS and net profit.

Table 4.14

Correlation Matrix for Trading and Service Sector

	DPS	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholder's Equity	Net Profit
DPS	1					
EPS	.452**	1				
ROE	.477**	.630**	1			
Sales	-.091	.064	-.050	1		
Shareholder's Equity	.010	-.068	-.001	.138**	1	
Net Profit	.411**	.678**	.297**	.030	.025	1

Notes: The correlation coefficients are based on the sample of 355 firm-year observations. **0.01 level of significance and *0.05 level of significance

4.4.9 Summary of Correlation Analysis

Table 4.15

Summary of the Correlation Analysis for All Sectors

Sector	Types of correlation				
	EPS	ROE	Sales	Shareholders' Equity	Net Profit
Consumer Product	Positive	Positive			
Construction	Positive	Positive			Positive
Industrial Product			Positive		Positive
Plantation	Positive	Positive	Positive		Positive
Properties	Positive			Positive	Positive
Technology	Positive	Positive		Negative	Positive
Trading and Services	Positive	Positive			Positive
All Sector	Positive	Positive			Positive

[a]The empty cell indicates that the correlation is not significant at both 1% and 5% level.

Table 4.15 give an overall summary of the correlation testing conducted earlier. From the table, we can conclude that EPS, ROE and net profit are important in predicting the dividend policy behavior of the sectors examined. With the exception of industrial product sector, EPS is an important indicator in all other sectors. Correlation between DPS and ROE could not be established in the industrial product and properties sector, whereby the correlation between DPS and net profit could not be established by only consumer product. This concludes that profitability and liquidity is both the significant indicator related to dividend distribution policy by companies in Malaysia.

4.5 Regression Analysis

Further test is needed to positively identify that profitability, sizes and liquidity are determinants of dividend distribution policy. Pooled regression analysis was conducted to examine whether such a relationship existed. The result of the regression is shown in Table 4.16.

Table 4.16

Pooled Regression Analysis

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	-14.122	4.259		-3.315	.001	-22.476	-5.769
	ROE	.717	.021	.579	34.021	.000	.675	.758
	EPS	.033	.005	.118	6.962	.000	.024	.043
	LN Sales	.01	.341	.221	10.770	.000	3.001	4.337
	LN Shares	-.108	.477	-.175	-8.620	.000	-5.043	-3.174
	Net Profit	.0061	.000	.093	4.688	.000	.000	.000

a. Dependent Variable: DPS

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.699[a]	.488	.487	18.216	.488	372.930	5	1956	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), Net Profit, ROE, EPS, LN Shares, LN Sales

From the regression results in table 4.16, it can be observed that the adjusted R^2 is 48.7%, implying that together, all the five independent variables selected for the study are able to explain, on average, 48.7% of the variation in the dividend payments of the firms in the sample of the study. All the five independent variables are significant in influencing the dividend payments of the firms in the sample of the study.

The result of the regression analysis also shows that shareholder's equity have a negative relationship and the other variables have positive relationship with dividend payment. According to Mitton (2004), size and growth have been proven to have a positive relationship with dividend payouts. This has been supported by Li and Lie (2006) that have also concluded that dividends will be cut if the firms have poor operating income, low cash balances and low market to book ratio. Eriotis (2005) in his study on Greeks companies suggested that a dividends policy is set not only by net earnings but also by the companies' size. Hafeez and Attiya (2008) reported otherwise, they discovered that there is a negative and significant relationship between size and dividend payout. Their research on dividend determinants of dividend policy in Pakistan reveals that large-size companies pay fewer dividends. With the different argument by researcher with regards to the firm's sizes, we could

not conclude whether sizes have a negative or positive correlation with dividend payment.

4.6 Conclusion

This section has discussed the findings from the analysis of result in the percentage of payers against non-payers tabulation, cross tabulation and the correlation analysis. From the percentage of payers versus percentage of non-payers tabulation, it is shown that an average cases of 70% to 80% pays dividend for all the selected sectors except for technology sector that recorded only for about 50% cases. The fact that technology sector was not profitable for these period of sample selection is unavoidable. For the purpose of this analysis, we assume that dividend payment decision is independent from any variables. This might support Holder et al. (1998) finding, which suggested that companies in high growth industry rely on their internal fund or retained earnings to grow.

From the cross tabulation testing, we discovered that profitability and liquidity are significantly positively correlated with dividend payout in all the sectors. The dividend distribution varies, most of the companies reluctant to exclude or reduce dividend payout even with decrease or negative in profitability and liquidity.

The correlation analysis concluded that both liquidity and profitability can generally be strong determinants in dividend payout policy in Malaysia. Most of the sectors studied show that DPS is highly correlated with EPS, ROE and net profit. Only industrial product sector did not show any significant correlation between DPS and

ROE and between DPS and EPS. This result is further verified by the cross tabulation analysis, whereby the changes in earnings in the industrial product sector do not significantly cause the changes in DPS. For example, when decrease in EPS were recorded 24.3% and 30.6% cases still increases and maintain DPS. Even with the negative EPS, 6.7% cases still maintain the DPS with 23.3% cases decreases the DPS but still made dividend payout.

The regression analysis further analyzes the determinants of dividend distribution by companies in Malaysia. The result shows that profitability, sizes and liquidity are the determinants with the indicators studied explain 48.7% of the dividend payments.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This section discusses the major findings of the research based on the research objectives developed earlier in the study. Section 5.1 describes the conclusion of this research which includes the significance of the findings and their theoretical, practical and policy implications. The recommendation for future research is highlighted in section 5.2.

5.1 Conclusion

In this study, we examined the dividend behavior of Malaysian companies' across all sectors as classified in Bursa Malaysia. The research questions of the study are as follows:

1. Do profitability, liquidity, and size important in determining dividend distribution of Malaysian firms?; and
2. Are these determinants having the same effect to all the sectors?;

From the cross tabulation testing, we discovered that profitability and liquidity could be established as the possible determinants for dividend payout in all the sectors. The results show that large number of Malaysian companies increase dividend payout when their earnings increase, but they are reluctant to decrease dividend payout when their earnings fall. This result is consistent with Pandey's (2003) finding. Upon examining the corporate dividend policy and behavior of the Kuala Lumpur Stock

Exchange (Bursa Malaysia), Pandey discovered that the companies appear to be reluctant to decrease or omit dividend when earning decreases. This might be consistence with the bird-in-the hand theory, whereby investors value dividends more than capital gains. Companies still retain the dividend payment, even with the decrease in earning in order to attract more investors.

The correlation analysis shows that liquidity and profitability significantly and positively correlated with dividend payout policy in Malaysia. Most of the sectors studied show that DPS is highly positively correlated with EPS, ROE and net profit with only industrial product sector did not show any significant correlation between DPS and ROE and DPS and EPS. This concludes that the correlation between DPS and the other variables varies across the selected sectors. In their study in analyzing the determinants of dividend payment for the top 200 companies listed on the Malaysian share market, Norhayati et al (2005) used the correlation and regression tests in order to examine the linkage between liquidity and profitability against the distribution of dividends.

From their findings, it is concluded that profitability and liquidity are the two important determinants in deciding dividend distribution. Comparing this study and the study conducted by Norhayati et. al. (2005), we can generally conclude that profitability and liquidity is important in determining dividend payout decision by companies in Malaysia, thus accepting H1o, whereby profitability of the firms is positively related to the payment of dividend and H3o, whereby the firm's liquidity is positively related to the payment of dividend. We reject H2o, whereby the size of the firms has a positive correlation with the dividend payment as the results of

statistical testing for size varies greatly across the sectors. We failed to accept H4o, whereby the correlations of dividend payout and profitability, liquidity and size are similar across all industries. This is due to the fact that the correlation of the determinants varies across the sectors studied.

From the regression analysis observation, EPS, ROE, sales, shareholders' equity and net profit are significant determinants of dividend payments. 48.7% of dividend payment of companies in Malaysia was explained by these determinants. In this regards, this study accept H5o, H6o and H7o whereby profitability, sizes and liquidity are the determinants of dividend payment in Malaysia. Shareholder's equity has a negative correlation whereby sales have a positive correlation with dividend payment. In this regards, this study cannot really established whether sizes correlate negatively of positively with dividend payout decision. According to Mitton (2004), size and growth has been proven to have a positive correlation with dividend payouts. This has been supported by Li and Lie (2006) that have also concluded that dividends will be cut if the firms have poor operating income, low cash balances and low market to book ratio. Eriotis (2005) in his study on Greeks companies suggested that a dividends policy is set not only by net earnings but also by the companies' size. Hafeez and Attiya (2008) reported otherwise, they discovered that there is a negative and significant relationship between size and dividend payout. Their research on dividend determinants of dividend policy in Pakistan reveals that large-size companies pay fewer dividends. With the different argument by researcher with regards to the firm's sizes, we could not conclude whether sizes have a negative or positive correlation with dividend payment

5.2 Recommendation

In this study, we could not establish the relationship between size and dividend payout decision. Payers and non-payers can be distinguished by their profitability, investment opportunities, and size of the firms according to Fama and French (2001). Evidence from their study suggested that the three main fundamentals mentioned above are the factors in the decision to pay dividends. Payers usually are large, profitable firms, while non-payers are smaller firms that are generally less profitable. Nevertheless, smaller firms have more investment opportunities, and their investment expenses are much larger if compared with their earnings. According to Mitton (2004), size and growth has been proven to have a positive correlation with dividend payouts. In this regards, future studies to determine the effect of size towards dividend distribution should be conducted with the selection of appropriate variables. In this study, we have chosen the changes in sales and shareholders' equity as the independent variables representing size, which may not be appropriate.

In representing liquidity, we have chosen net profit as the independent variables, because of time constrain and the net profit of companies is easily available. Even with the relationship established between net profit and dividend payout, this might be false as net profit is related to profitability of the company. We might want to use cash flow to represent liquidity in future study as being used by Norhayati et. al. (2005).

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Appendix

Appendix 1

EPS * DPS Cross Tabulation for Consumer Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
EPS	decrease	Count	58	38	27	24	147
		% within EPS	39.5%	25.9%	18.4%	16.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	61.1%	27.3%	54.0%	26.4%	39.2%
		% of Total	15.5%	10.1%	7.2%	6.4%	39.2%
	increase	Count	36	97	23	29	185
		% within EPS	19.5%	52.4%	12.4%	15.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	37.9%	69.8%	46.0%	31.9%	49.3%
		% of Total	9.6%	25.9%	6.1%	7.7%	49.3%
	maintain	Count	1	1	0	0	2
		% within EPS	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	1.1%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.3%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
	negative	Count	0	3	0	38	41
		% within EPS	0.0%	7.3%	0.0%	92.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	41.8%	10.9%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%	10.1%	10.9%
Total		Count	95	139	50	91	375
		% within EPS	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	149.268[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	136.072	9	.000
N of Valid Cases	375		

a. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.

Appendix 2

ROE * DPS Cross Tabulation for Consumer Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
ROE	decrease	Count	64	44	28	28	164
		% within ROE	39.0%	26.8%	17.1%	17.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	67.4%	31.7%	56.0%	30.8%	43.7%
	increase	Count	31	92	22	24	169
		% within ROE	18.3%	54.4%	13.0%	14.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	32.6%	66.2%	44.0%	26.4%	45.1%
	maintain	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within ROE	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.3%
	zero	Count	0	3	0	38	41
		% within ROE	0.0%	7.3%	0.0%	92.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	41.8%	10.9%
Total		Count	95	139	50	91	375
		% within ROE	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	153.924[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	139.890	9	.000
N of Valid Cases	375		

a. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

Appendix 3

Net Profit * DPS Cross Tabulation for Consumer Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Net Profit	decrease	Count	53	32	23	22	130
		% within Net Profit	40.8%	24.6%	17.7%	16.9%	100.0%
		% within DPS	55.8%	23.0%	46.0%	24.2%	34.7%
		% of Total	14.1%	8.5%	6.1%	5.9%	34.7%
	increase	Count	40	101	27	32	200
		% within Net Profit	20.0%	50.5%	13.5%	16.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	42.1%	72.7%	54.0%	35.2%	53.3%
		% of Total	10.7%	26.9%	7.2%	8.5%	53.3%
	maintain	Count	2	3	0	0	5
		% within Net Profit	40.0%	60.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	2.1%	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%
		% of Total	0.5%	0.8%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%
	negative	Count	0	3	0	37	40
		% within Net Profit	0.0%	7.5%	0.0%	92.5%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	40.7%	10.7%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%	9.9%	10.7%
Total		Count	95	139	50	91	375
		% within Net Profit	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	144.683[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	133.112	9	.000
N of Valid Cases	375		

a. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .67.

Appendix 4

Sales * DPS Cross Tabulation for Consumer Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Sales	decrease	Count	29	32	13	35	109
		% within Sales	26.6%	29.4%	11.9%	32.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	30.5%	23.0%	26.0%	38.5%	29.1%
		% of Total	7.7%	8.5%	3.5%	9.3%	29.1%
	increase	Count	66	107	37	56	266
		% within Sales	24.8%	40.2%	13.9%	21.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	69.5%	77.0%	74.0%	61.5%	70.9%
		% of Total	17.6%	28.5%	9.9%	14.9%	70.9%
Total		Count	95	139	50	91	375
		% within Sales	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.685[a]	3	.083
Likelihood Ratio	6.602	3	.086
N of Valid Cases	375		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.53.

Appendix 5

No of Shares * DPS Cross Tabulation for Consumer Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
No of Shares	decrease	Count	32	60	26	42	160
		% within No of Shares	20.0%	37.5%	16.2%	26.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	33.7%	43.2%	52.0%	46.2%	42.7%
		% of Total	8.5%	16.0%	6.9%	11.2%	42.7%
	increase	Count	63	79	24	49	215
		% within No of Shares	29.3%	36.7%	11.2%	22.8%	100.0%
		% within DPS	66.3%	56.8%	48.0%	53.8%	57.3%
		% of Total	16.8%	21.1%	6.4%	13.1%	57.3%
Total		Count	95	139	50	91	375
		% within No of Shares	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	25.3%	37.1%	13.3%	24.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.380[a]	3	.146
Likelihood Ratio	5.432	3	.143
N of Valid Cases	375		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.33.

Appendix 6

EPS * DPS Cross Tabulation for Construction

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
EPS	decrease	Count	20	5	11	5	41
		% within EPS	48.8%	12.2%	26.8%	12.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	74.1%	12.5%	47.8%	14.3%	32.8%
		% of Total	16.0%	4.0%	8.8%	4.0%	32.8%
	increase	Count	5	34	11	14	64
		% within EPS	7.8%	53.1%	17.2%	21.9%	100.0%
		% within DPS	18.5%	85.0%	47.8%	40.0%	51.2%
		% of Total	4.0%	27.2%	8.8%	11.2%	51.2%
	negative	Count	2	1	1	16	20
		% within EPS	10.0%	5.0%	5.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	7.4%	2.5%	4.3%	45.7%	16.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	0.8%	0.8%	12.8%	16.0%
Total		Count	27	40	23	35	125
		% within EPS	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	66.824[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	63.008	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.68.

Appendix 7

ROE * DPS Cross Tabulation for Construction

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
ROE	decrease	Count	20	8	12	5	45
		% within ROE	44.4%	17.8%	26.7%	11.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	74.1%	20.0%	52.2%	14.3%	36.0%
		% of Total	16.0%	6.4%	9.6%	4.0%	36.0%
	increase	Count	5	31	10	14	60
		% within ROE	8.3%	51.7%	16.7%	23.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	18.5%	77.5%	43.5%	40.0%	48.0%
		% of Total	4.0%	24.8%	8.0%	11.2%	48.0%
	zero	Count	2	1	1	16	20
		% within ROE	10.0%	5.0%	5.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	7.4%	2.5%	4.3%	45.7%	16.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	0.8%	0.8%	12.8%	16.0%
Total		Count	27	40	23	35	125
		% within ROE	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	59.746[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	56.410	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.68.

Appendix 8

Net Profit * DPS Cross Tabulation for Construction

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Net Profit	decrease	Count	17	3	11	5	36
		% within Net Profit	47.2%	8.3%	30.6%	13.9%	100.0%
		% within DPS	63.0%	7.5%	47.8%	14.3%	28.8%
		% of Total	13.6%	2.4%	8.8%	4.0%	28.8%
	increase	Count	8	36	11	14	69
		% within Net Profit	11.6%	52.2%	15.9%	20.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	29.6%	90.0%	47.8%	40.0%	55.2%
		% of Total	6.4%	28.8%	8.8%	11.2%	55.2%
	negative	Count	2	1	1	16	20
		% within Net Profit	10.0%	5.0%	5.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	7.4%	2.5%	4.3%	45.7%	16.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	0.8%	0.8%	12.8%	16.0%
Total		Count	27	40	23	35	125
		% within Net Profit	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	63.427[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	59.933	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.68.

Appendix 9

Sales * DPS Cross Tabulation for Construction

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Sales	decrease	Count	13	9	9	18	49
		% within Sales	26.5%	18.4%	18.4%	36.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	48.1%	22.5%	39.1%	51.4%	39.2%
		% of Total	10.4%	7.2%	7.2%	14.4%	39.2%
	increase	Count	14	31	14	17	76
		% within Sales	18.4%	40.8%	18.4%	22.4%	100.0%
		% within DPS	51.9%	77.5%	60.9%	48.6%	60.8%
		% of Total	11.2%	24.8%	11.2%	13.6%	60.8%
Total		Count	27	40	23	35	125
		% within Sales	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.784[a]	3	.051
Likelihood Ratio	8.082	3	.044
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.02.

Appendix 10

No of Shares * DPS Cross Tabulation for Construction

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
No of Shares	decrease	Count	8	15	3	12	38
		% within No of Shares	21.1%	39.5%	7.9%	31.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	29.6%	37.5%	13.0%	34.3%	30.4%
		% of Total	6.4%	12.0%	2.4%	9.6%	30.4%
	increase	Count	19	25	20	23	87
		% within No of Shares	21.8%	28.7%	23.0%	26.4%	100.0%
		% within DPS	70.4%	62.5%	87.0%	65.7%	69.6%
		% of Total	15.2%	20.0%	16.0%	18.4%	69.6%
Total		Count	27	40	23	35	125
		% within No of Shares	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.6%	32.0%	18.4%	28.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.485[a]	3	.214
Likelihood Ratio	4.998	3	.172
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.99.

Appendix 11

EPS * DPS CrossTabulation for Industrial Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
EPS	decrease	Count	28	27	34	22	111
		% within EPS	25.2%	24.3%	30.6%	19.8%	100.0%
		% within DPS	56.0%	28.1%	55.7%	34.9%	41.1%
		% of Total	10.4%	10.0%	12.6%	8.1%	41.1%
	increase	Count	15	66	25	23	129
		% within EPS	11.6%	51.2%	19.4%	17.8%	100.0%
		% within DPS	30.0%	68.8%	41.0%	36.5%	47.8%
		% of Total	5.6%	24.4%	9.3%	8.5%	47.8%
	negative	Count	7	3	2	18	30
		% within EPS	23.3%	10.0%	6.7%	60.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	14.0%	3.1%	3.3%	28.6%	11.1%
		% of Total	2.6%	1.1%	0.7%	6.7%	11.1%
Total		Count	50	96	61	63	270
		% within EPS	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	51.344[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	49.100	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	270		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.56.

Appendix 12

ROE * DPS Cross Tabulation for Industrial Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
ROE	decrease	Count	30	31	35	22	118
		% within ROE	25.4%	26.3%	29.7%	18.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	60.0%	32.3%	57.4%	34.9%	43.7%
		% of Total	11.1%	11.5%	13.0%	8.1%	43.7%
	increase	Count	14	62	24	23	123
		% within ROE	11.4%	50.4%	19.5%	18.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	28.0%	64.6%	39.3%	36.5%	45.6%
		% of Total	5.2%	23.0%	8.9%	8.5%	45.6%
	zero	Count	6	3	2	18	29
		% within ROE	20.7%	10.3%	6.9%	62.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	12.0%	3.1%	3.3%	28.6%	10.7%
		% of Total	2.2%	1.1%	0.7%	6.7%	10.7%
Total		Count	50	96	61	63	270
		% within ROE	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	49.350[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	46.263	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	270		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.37.

Appendix 13

Net Profit * DPS Cross Tabulation for Industrial Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Net Profit	decrease	Count	28	25	34	20	107
		% within Net Profit	26.2%	23.4%	31.8%	18.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	56.0%	26.0%	55.7%	31.7%	39.6%
		% of Total	10.4%	9.3%	12.6%	7.4%	39.6%
	increase	Count	15	68	26	26	135
		% within Net Profit	11.1%	50.4%	19.3%	19.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	30.0%	70.8%	42.6%	41.3%	50.0%
		% of Total	5.6%	25.2%	9.6%	9.6%	50.0%
	negative	Count	7	3	1	17	28
		% within Net Profit	25.0%	10.7%	3.6%	60.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	14.0%	3.1%	1.6%	27.0%	10.4%
		% of Total	2.6%	1.1%	0.4%	6.3%	10.4%
Total		Count	50	96	61	63	270
		% within Net Profit	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	53.540[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	52.285	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	270		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.19.

Appendix 14

Sales * DPS Cross Tabulation for Industrial Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Sales	decrease	Count	20	23	28	30	101
		% within Sales	19.8%	22.8%	27.7%	29.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	40.0%	24.0%	45.9%	47.6%	37.4%
		% of Total	7.4%	8.5%	10.4%	11.1%	37.4%
	increase	Count	30	73	33	33	169
		% within Sales	17.8%	43.2%	19.5%	19.5%	100.0%
		% within DPS	60.0%	76.0%	54.1%	52.4%	62.6%
		% of Total	11.1%	27.0%	12.2%	12.2%	62.6%
Total		Count	50	96	61	63	270
		% within Sales	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.245[a]	3	.007
Likelihood Ratio	12.624	3	.006
N of Valid Cases	270		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.70.

Appendix 15

No of Shares * DPS Cross Tabulation for Industrial Product

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
No of Shares	decrease	Count	24	50	25	32	131
		% within No of Shares	18.3%	38.2%	19.1%	24.4%	100.0%
		% within DPS	48.0%	52.1%	41.0%	50.8%	48.5%
		% of Total	8.9%	18.5%	9.3%	11.9%	48.5%
	increase	Count	26	46	36	31	139
		% within No of Shares	18.7%	33.1%	25.9%	22.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	52.0%	47.9%	59.0%	49.2%	51.5%
		% of Total	9.6%	17.0%	13.3%	11.5%	51.5%
Total		Count	50	96	61	63	270
		% within No of Shares	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	18.5%	35.6%	22.6%	23.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.011[a]	3	.570
Likelihood Ratio	2.020	3	.568
N of Valid Cases	270		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.26.

Appendix 16

EPS * DPS Cross Tabulation for Plantation

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
EPS	decrease	Count	31	15	5	9	60
		% within EPS	51.7%	25.0%	8.3%	15.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	86.1%	25.9%	55.6%	40.9%	48.0%
		% of Total	24.8%	12.0%	4.0%	7.2%	48.0%
	increase	Count	5	43	3	9	60
		% within EPS	8.3%	71.7%	5.0%	15.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	13.9%	74.1%	33.3%	40.9%	48.0%
		% of Total	4.0%	34.4%	2.4%	7.2%	48.0%
	negative	Count	0	0	1	4	5
		% within EPS	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	18.2%	4.0%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	3.2%	4.0%
Total		Count	36	58	9	22	125
		% within EPS	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	50.728[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	50.343	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 6 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .36.

Appendix 17

ROE * DPS Cross Tabulation for Plantation

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
ROE	decrease	Count	34	18	6	7	65
		% within ROE	52.3%	27.7%	9.2%	10.8%	100.0%
		% within DPS	94.4%	31.0%	66.7%	31.8%	52.0%
		% of Total	27.2%	14.4%	4.8%	5.6%	52.0%
	increase	Count	2	40	2	11	55
		% within ROE	3.6%	72.7%	3.6%	20.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	5.6%	69.0%	22.2%	50.0%	44.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	32.0%	1.6%	8.8%	44.0%
	zero	Count	0	0	1	4	5
		% within ROE	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	18.2%	4.0%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	3.2%	4.0%
Total		Count	36	58	9	22	125
		% within ROE	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	56.889[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	60.016	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 6 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .36.

Appendix 18

Net Profit * DPS Cross Tabulation for Plantation

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Net Profit	decrease	Count	29	12	4	7	52
		% within Net Profit	55.8%	23.1%	7.7%	13.5%	100.0%
		% within DPS	80.6%	20.7%	44.4%	31.8%	41.6%
		% of Total	23.2%	9.6%	3.2%	5.6%	41.6%
	increase	Count	7	46	4	11	68
		% within Net Profit	10.3%	67.6%	5.9%	16.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	19.4%	79.3%	44.4%	50.0%	54.4%
		% of Total	5.6%	36.8%	3.2%	8.8%	54.4%
	negative	Count	0	0	1	4	5
		% within Net Profit	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	18.2%	4.0%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	3.2%	4.0%
Total		Count	36	58	9	22	125
		% within Net Profit	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	50.656[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	49.307	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 6 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .36.

Appendix 19

Sales * DPS Cross Tabulation for Plantation

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Sales	decrease	Count	25	11	2	10	48
		% within Sales	52.1%	22.9%	4.2%	20.8%	100.0%
		% within DPS	69.4%	19.0%	22.2%	45.5%	38.4%
		% of Total	20.0%	8.8%	1.6%	8.0%	38.4%
	increase	Count	11	47	7	12	77
		% within Sales	14.3%	61.0%	9.1%	15.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	30.6%	81.0%	77.8%	54.5%	61.6%
		% of Total	8.8%	37.6%	5.6%	9.6%	61.6%
Total		Count	36	58	9	22	125
		% within Sales	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25.387[a]	3	.000
Likelihood Ratio	25.986	3	.000
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.46.

Appendix 20

No of Shares * DPS Cross Tabulation for Plantation

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Shares	decrease	Count	15	24	1	5	45
		% within Shares	33.3%	53.3%	2.2%	11.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	41.7%	41.4%	11.1%	22.7%	36.0%
		% of Total	12.0%	19.2%	0.8%	4.0%	36.0%
	increase	Count	21	34	8	17	80
		% within Shares	26.2%	42.5%	10.0%	21.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	58.3%	58.6%	88.9%	77.3%	64.0%
		% of Total	16.8%	27.2%	6.4%	13.6%	64.0%
Total		Count	36	58	9	22	125
		% within Shares	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	28.8%	46.4%	7.2%	17.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.332[a]	3	.149
Likelihood Ratio	5.919	3	.116
N of Valid Cases	125		

a. 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.24.

Appendix 21

EPS * DPS Cross Tabulation for Properties

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
EPS	decrease	Count	31	16	21	9	77
		% within EPS	40.3%	20.8%	27.3%	11.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	66.0%	23.5%	35.6%	22.0%	35.8%
		% of Total	14.4%	7.4%	9.8%	4.2%	35.8%
	increase	Count	16	49	35	23	123
		% within EPS	13.0%	39.8%	28.5%	18.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	34.0%	72.1%	59.3%	56.1%	57.2%
		% of Total	7.4%	22.8%	16.3%	10.7%	57.2%
	negative	Count	0	3	3	9	15
		% within EPS	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	4.4%	5.1%	22.0%	7.0%
		% of Total	0.0%	1.4%	1.4%	4.2%	7.0%
Total		Count	47	68	59	41	215
		% within EPS	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41.476[a]	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	38.972	6	.000
N of Valid Cases	215		

a. 4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.86.

Appendix 22

ROE * DPS Cross Tabulation for Properties

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
ROE	decrease	Count	32	18	27	11	88
		% within ROE	36.4%	20.5%	30.7%	12.5%	100.0%
		% within DPS	68.1%	26.5%	45.8%	26.8%	40.9%
		% of Total	14.9%	8.4%	12.6%	5.1%	40.9%
	increase	Count	15	47	28	21	111
		% within ROE	13.5%	42.3%	25.2%	18.9%	100.0%
		% within DPS	31.9%	69.1%	47.5%	51.2%	51.6%
		% of Total	7.0%	21.9%	13.0%	9.8%	51.6%
	maintain	Count	0	0	1	0	1
		% within ROE	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.5%
	zero	Count	0	3	3	9	15
		% within ROE	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	4.4%	5.1%	22.0%	7.0%
		% of Total	0.0%	1.4%	1.4%	4.2%	7.0%
Total		Count	47	68	59	41	215
		% within ROE	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42.081[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	40.128	9	.000
N of Valid Cases	215		

a. 8 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19.

Appendix 23

Net Profit * DPS Cross Tabulation for Properties

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Net Profit	decrease	Count	27	12	20	8	67
		% within Net Profit	40.3%	17.9%	29.9%	11.9%	100.0%
		% within DPS	57.4%	17.6%	33.9%	19.5%	31.2%
		% of Total	12.6%	5.6%	9.3%	3.7%	31.2%
	increase	Count	20	53	36	23	132
		% within Net Profit	15.2%	40.2%	27.3%	17.4%	100.0%
		% within DPS	42.6%	77.9%	61.0%	56.1%	61.4%
		% of Total	9.3%	24.7%	16.7%	10.7%	61.4%
	maintain	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within Net Profit	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	negative	Count	0	3	3	9	15
		% within Net Profit	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	4.4%	5.1%	22.0%	7.0%
		% of Total	0.0%	1.4%	1.4%	4.2%	7.0%
Total		Count	47	68	59	41	215
		% within Net Profit	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	43.916[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	40.588	9	.000
N of Valid Cases	215		

a. 8 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19.

Appendix 24

Sales * DPS Cross Tabulation for Properties

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Sales	decrease	Count	25	13	26	19	83
		% within Sales	30.1%	15.7%	31.3%	22.9%	100.0%
		% within DPS	53.2%	19.1%	44.1%	46.3%	38.6%
		% of Total	11.6%	6.0%	12.1%	8.8%	38.6%
	increase	Count	22	55	33	22	132
		% within Sales	16.7%	41.7%	25.0%	16.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	46.8%	80.9%	55.9%	53.7%	61.4%
		% of Total	10.2%	25.6%	15.3%	10.2%	61.4%
Total		Count	47	68	59	41	215
		% within Sales	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.893[a]	3	.001
Likelihood Ratio	17.888	3	.000
N of Valid Cases	215		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.83.

Appendix 25

No of Shares * DPS Cross Tabulation for Properties

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Shares	decrease	Count	21	24	22	16	83
		% within Shares	25.3%	28.9%	26.5%	19.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	44.7%	35.3%	37.3%	39.0%	38.6%
		% of Total	9.8%	11.2%	10.2%	7.4%	38.6%
	increase	Count	26	44	37	25	132
		% within Shares	19.7%	33.3%	28.0%	18.9%	100.0%
		% within DPS	55.3%	64.7%	62.7%	61.0%	61.4%
		% of Total	12.1%	20.5%	17.2%	11.6%	61.4%
Total		Count	47	68	59	41	215
		% within Shares	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	21.9%	31.6%	27.4%	19.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.093[a]	3	.779
Likelihood Ratio	1.085	3	.781
N of Valid Cases	215		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.83.

Appendix 26

EPS * DPS Cross Tabulation for Technology

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
EPS	decrease	Count	19	15	11	19	64
		% within EPS	29.7%	23.4%	17.2%	29.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	76.0%	31.2%	52.4%	25.0%	37.2%
		% of Total	11.0%	8.7%	6.4%	11.0%	37.2%
	increase	Count	3	32	9	24	68
		% within EPS	4.4%	47.1%	13.2%	35.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	12.0%	66.7%	42.9%	31.6%	39.5%
		% of Total	1.7%	18.6%	5.2%	14.0%	39.5%
	maintain	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within EPS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%	0.6%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.6%
	negative	Count	3	1	1	32	37
		% within EPS	8.1%	2.7%	2.7%	86.5%	100.0%
		% within DPS	12.0%	2.1%	4.8%	42.1%	21.5%
		% of Total	1.7%	0.6%	0.6%	18.6%	21.5%
Total		Count	25	48	21	76	172
		% within EPS	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	230.343[a]	16	.000
Likelihood Ratio	82.514	16	.000
N of Valid Cases	172		

a. 14 cells (56.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.

Appendix 27

ROE * DPS Cross Tabulation for Technology

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
ROE		% within DPS	80.0%	35.4%	61.9%	26.3%	40.7%
		% of Total	11.6%	9.9%	7.6%	11.6%	40.7%
	increase	Count	2	30	7	23	62
		% within ROE	3.2%	48.4%	11.3%	37.1%	100.0 %
		% within DPS	8.0%	62.5%	33.3%	30.3%	36.0%
		% of Total	1.2%	17.4%	4.1%	13.4%	36.0%
	maintain	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within ROE	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0 %
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%	0.6%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.6%
	zero	Count	3	1	1	32	37
		% within ROE	8.1%	2.7%	2.7%	86.5%	100.0 %
		% within DPS	12.0%	2.1%	4.8%	42.1%	21.5%
		% of Total	1.7%	0.6%	0.6%	18.6%	21.5%
Total		Count	25	48	21	76	172
		% within ROE	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0 %
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %
		% of Total	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0 %

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	231.947[a]	16	.000
Likelihood Ratio	84.878	16	.000
N of Valid Cases	172		

a. 14 cells (56.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.

Appendix 28

Net Profit * DPS Cross Tabulation for Technology

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Net Profit	decrease	Count	18	14	11	17	60
		% within Net Profit	30.0%	23.3%	18.3%	28.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	72.0%	29.2%	52.4%	22.4%	34.9%
		% of Total	10.5%	8.1%	6.4%	9.9%	34.9%
	increase	Count	4	33	9	27	73
		% within Net Profit	5.5%	45.2%	12.3%	37.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	16.0%	68.8%	42.9%	35.5%	42.4%
		% of Total	2.3%	19.2%	5.2%	15.7%	42.4%
	negative	Count	3	1	1	32	37
		% within Net Profit	8.1%	2.7%	2.7%	86.5%	100.0%
		% within DPS	12.0%	2.1%	4.8%	42.1%	21.5%
		% of Total	1.7%	0.6%	0.6%	18.6%	21.5%
Total		Count	25	48	21	76	172
		% within Net Profit	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	227.554[a]	12	.000
Likelihood Ratio	79.122	12	.000
N of Valid Cases	172		

a. 9 cells (45.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Appendix 29

Sales * DPS Cross Tabulation for Technology

			DPS				
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	Total
Sales	decrease	Count	10	15	10	36	71
		% within Sales	14.1%	21.1%	14.1%	50.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	40.0%	31.2%	47.6%	47.4%	41.3%
		% of Total	5.8%	8.7%	5.8%	20.9%	41.3%
	increase	Count	15	33	11	40	99
		% within Sales	15.2%	33.3%	11.1%	40.4%	100.0%
		% within DPS	60.0%	68.8%	52.4%	52.6%	57.6%
		% of Total	8.7%	19.2%	6.4%	23.3%	57.6%
Total		Count	25	48	21	76	172
		% within Sales	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	175.532[a]	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	25.344	8	.001
N of Valid Cases	172		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Appendix 30

No of Shares * DPS Cross Tabulation for Technology

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
No of Shares	decrease	Count	10	18	12	26	66
		% within Shares	15.2%	27.3%	18.2%	39.4%	100.0%
		% within DPS	40.0%	37.5%	57.1%	34.2%	38.4%
		% of Total	5.8%	10.5%	7.0%	15.1%	38.4%
	increase	Count	15	30	9	50	104
		% within Shares	14.4%	28.8%	8.7%	48.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	60.0%	62.5%	42.9%	65.8%	60.5%
		% of Total	8.7%	17.4%	5.2%	29.1%	60.5%
Total		Count	25	48	21	76	172
		% within Shares	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	14.5%	27.9%	12.2%	44.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	175.742[a]	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	25.407	8	.001
N of Valid Cases	172		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Appendix 31

EPS * DPS Cross Tabulation for Trading and Services

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
EPS	decrease	Count	46	33	21	28	128
		% within EPS	35.9%	25.8%	16.4%	21.9%	100.0%
		% within DPS	62.2%	27.3%	38.2%	26.7%	36.1%
		% of Total	13.0%	9.3%	5.9%	7.9%	36.1%
	increase	Count	19	84	33	46	182
		% within EPS	10.4%	46.2%	18.1%	25.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	25.7%	69.4%	60.0%	43.8%	51.3%
		% of Total	5.4%	23.7%	9.3%	13.0%	51.3%
	maintain	Count	1	1	0	0	2
		% within EPS	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	1.4%	0.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
		% of Total	0.3%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
	negative	Count	8	3	1	31	43
		% within EPS	18.6%	7.0%	2.3%	72.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	10.8%	2.5%	1.8%	29.5%	12.1%
		% of Total	2.3%	0.8%	0.3%	8.7%	12.1%
Total		Count	74	121	55	105	355
		% within EPS	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	80.732[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	80.387	9	.000
N of Valid Cases	355		

a. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .31.

Appendix 32

ROE * DPS Cross Tabulation for Trading and Services

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
ROE	decrease	Count	43	38	32	33	146
		% within ROE	29.5%	26.0%	21.9%	22.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	58.1%	31.4%	58.2%	31.4%	41.1%
		% of Total	12.1%	10.7%	9.0%	9.3%	41.1%
	increase	Count	23	80	22	39	164
		% within ROE	14.0%	48.8%	13.4%	23.8%	100.0%
		% within DPS	31.1%	66.1%	40.0%	37.1%	46.2%
		% of Total	6.5%	22.5%	6.2%	11.0%	46.2%
	maintain	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within ROE	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	0.3%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%
	zero	Count	8	3	1	32	44
		% within ROE	18.2%	6.8%	2.3%	72.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	10.8%	2.5%	1.8%	30.5%	12.4%
		% of Total	2.3%	0.8%	0.3%	9.0%	12.4%
Total		Count	74	121	55	105	355
		% within ROE	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	75.423[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	73.791	9	.000
N of Valid Cases	355		

a. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Appendix 33

Net Profit * DPS Cross Tabulation for Trading and Services

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Net Profit	decrease	Count	42	27	21	25	115
		% within Net Profit	36.5%	23.5%	18.3%	21.7%	100.0%
		% within DPS	56.8%	22.3%	38.2%	23.8%	32.4%
		% of Total	11.8%	7.6%	5.9%	7.0%	32.4%
	increase	Count	24	90	33	49	196
		% within Net Profit	12.2%	45.9%	16.8%	25.0%	100.0%
		% within DPS	32.4%	74.4%	60.0%	46.7%	55.2%
		% of Total	6.8%	25.4%	9.3%	13.8%	55.2%
	negative	Count	8	3	1	31	43
		% within Net Profit	18.6%	7.0%	2.3%	72.1%	100.0%
		% within DPS	10.8%	2.5%	1.8%	29.5%	12.1%
		% of Total	2.3%	0.8%	0.3%	8.7%	12.1%
Total		Count	74	121	55	105	355
		% within Net Profit	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	79.334[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	77.867	9	.000
N of Valid Cases	355		

a. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Appendix 34

Sales * DPS Cross Tabulation for Trading and Services

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Sales	decrease	Count	24	24	17	46	111
		% within Sales	21.6%	21.6%	15.3%	41.4%	100.0%
		% within DPS	32.4%	19.8%	30.9%	43.8%	31.3%
		% of Total	6.8%	6.8%	4.8%	13.0%	31.3%
	increase	Count	50	97	38	59	244
		% within Sales	20.5%	39.8%	15.6%	24.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	67.6%	80.2%	69.1%	56.2%	68.7%
		% of Total	14.1%	27.3%	10.7%	16.6%	68.7%
Total		Count	74	121	55	105	355
		% within Sales	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.095[a]	3	.002
Likelihood Ratio	15.308	3	.002
N of Valid Cases	355		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.20.

Appendix 35

No of Shares * DPS Cross Tabulation for Trading and Services

			Dividend per Share				Total
			decrease	increase	maintain	omission	
Shares	decrease	Count	23	42	21	34	120
		% within Shares	19.2%	35.0%	17.5%	28.3%	100.0%
		% within DPS	31.1%	34.7%	38.2%	32.4%	33.8%
		% of Total	6.5%	11.8%	5.9%	9.6%	33.8%
	increase	Count	51	79	34	71	235
		% within Shares	21.7%	33.6%	14.5%	30.2%	100.0%
		% within DPS	68.9%	65.3%	61.8%	67.6%	66.2%
		% of Total	14.4%	22.3%	9.6%	20.0%	66.2%
Total		Count	74	121	55	105	355
		% within Shares	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%
		% within DPS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	20.8%	34.1%	15.5%	29.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.856[a]	3	.836
Likelihood Ratio	.851	3	.837
N of Valid Cases	355		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.59.

Appendix 36

Correlations Result for Consumer Product

		DPS	EPS	ROE	LN Sales	Net Profit	LN Shares
DPS	Pearson Correlation	1	.518**	.780**	-.022	.048	-.031
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.677	.350	.555
	N	375	375	375	375	375	375
EPS	Pearson Correlation	.518**	1	.689**	.084	.775**	-.085
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.106	.000	.100
	N	375	375	375	375	375	375
ROE	Pearson Correlation	.780**	.689**	1	.027	.207**	-.026
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.602	.000	.616
	N	375	375	375	375	375	375
LN Sales	Pearson Correlation	-.022	.084	.027	1	.062	.103*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.677	.106	.602		.228	.045
	N	375	375	375	375	375	375
Net Profit	Pearson Correlation	.048	.775**	.207**	.062	1	.010
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.350	.000	.000	.228		.841
	N	375	375	375	375	375	375
LN Shares	Pearson Correlation	-.031	-.085	-.026	.103*	.010	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.555	.100	.616	.045	.841	
	N	375	375	375	375	375	375
Net Asset	Pearson Correlation	-.045	-.136**	-.062	.055	-.220**	.122*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.389	.009	.230	.286	.000	.018
	N	375	375	375	375	375	375

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 37

Correlations Result for Construction

		DPS	EPS	ROE	LN Sales	Net Profit	LN Shares
DPS	Pearson Correlation	1	.530**	.356**	-.013	.673**	.071
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.888	.000	.431
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
EPS	Pearson Correlation	.530**	1	.689**	.101	.810**	-.200*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.263	.000	.025
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
ROE	Pearson Correlation	.356**	.689**	1	.069	.435**	-.250**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.442	.000	.005
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
LN Sales	Pearson Correlation	-.013	.101	.069	1	.045	.144
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.888	.263	.442		.618	.110
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
Net Profit	Pearson Correlation	.673**	.810**	.435**	.045	1	-.013
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.618		.886
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
LN Shares	Pearson Correlation	.071	-.200*	-.250**	.144	-.013	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.431	.025	.005	.110	.886	
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 38

Correlations Result for Industrial Product

		DPS	EPS	ROE	LN Sales	Net Profit	LN Shares
DPS	Pearson Correlation	1	.068	.108	.156*	.220**	.024
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.269	.077	.010	.000	.699
	N	270	270	270	270	270	270
EPS	Pearson Correlation	.068	1	.132*	.028	.105	.746**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.269		.030	.651	.084	.000
	N	270	270	270	270	270	270
ROE	Pearson Correlation	.108	.132*	1	-.156*	.398**	-.064
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.077	.030		.010	.000	.295
	N	270	270	270	270	270	270
LN Sales	Pearson Correlation	.156*	.028	-.156*	1	.038	-.155*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.651	.010		.533	.011
	N	270	270	270	270	270	270
Net Profit	Pearson Correlation	.220**	.105	.398**	.038	1	.025
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.084	.000	.533		.681
	N	270	270	270	270	270	270
LN Shares	Pearson Correlation	.024	.746**	-.064	-.155*	.025	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.699	.000	.295	.011	.681	
	N	270	270	270	270	270	270

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 39

Correlations Result for Plantation

		DPS	EPS	ROE	LN Sales	Net Profit	LN Shares
DPS	Pearson Correlation	1	.674**	.512**	.389**	.422**	-.037
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.683
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
EPS	Pearson Correlation	.674**	1	.679**	.456**	.450**	-.194*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.000	.030
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
ROE	Pearson Correlation	.512**	.679**	1	.362**	.529**	-.155
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.000	.084
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
LN Sales	Pearson Correlation	.389**	.456**	.362**	1	.126	-.120
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.162	.181
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
Net Profit	Pearson Correlation	.422**	.450**	.529**	.126	1	.032
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.162		.722
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125
LN Shares	Pearson Correlation	-.037	-.194*	-.155	-.120	.032	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.683	.030	.084	.181	.722	
	N	125	125	125	125	125	125

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 40

Correlations Result for Properties

		DPS	EPS	ROE	LN Sales	Net Profit	LN Shares
DPS	Pearson Correlation	1	.164*	.033	.071	.212**	.213**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.016	.626	.300	.002	.002
	N	215	215	215	215	215	215
EPS	Pearson Correlation	.164*	1	.780**	.382**	.586**	-.232**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.016		.000	.000	.000	.001
	N	215	215	215	215	215	215
ROE	Pearson Correlation	.033	.780**	1	.425**	.737**	-.141*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.626	.000		.000	.000	.039
	N	215	215	215	215	215	215
LN Sales	Pearson Correlation	.071	.382**	.425**	1	.278**	.003
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.300	.000	.000		.000	.970
	N	215	215	215	215	215	215
Net Profit	Pearson Correlation	.212**	.586**	.737**	.278**	1	.266**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.000	.000	.000		.000
	N	215	215	215	215	215	215
LN Shares	Pearson Correlation	.213**	-.232**	-.141*	.003	.266**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.001	.039	.970	.000	
	N	215	215	215	215	215	215

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 41

Correlations Result for Technology

		DPS	EPS	ROE	LN Sales	Net Profit	LN Shares
DPS	Pearson Correlation	1	.562**	.262**	.100	.543**	-.157*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.001	.195	.000	.041
	N	170	170	170	170	170	170
EPS	Pearson Correlation	.562**	1	.432**	.204**	.786**	-.082
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.008	.000	.290
	N	170	170	170	170	170	170
ROE	Pearson Correlation	.262**	.432**	1	.342**	.563**	-.002
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000		.000	.000	.979
	N	170	170	170	170	170	170
LN Sales	Pearson Correlation	.100	.204**	.342**	1	.168*	.034
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.195	.008	.000		.029	.663
	N	170	170	170	170	170	170
Net Profit	Pearson Correlation	.543**	.786**	.563**	.168*	1	.021
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.029		.784
	N	170	170	170	170	170	170
LN Shares	Pearson Correlation	-.157*	-.082	-.002	.034	.021	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.041	.290	.979	.663	.784	
	N	170	170	170	170	170	170

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 42

Correlations Result for Trading and Services

		DPS	EPS	ROE	LN Sales	Net Profit	LN Shares
DPS	Pearson Correlation	1	.452**	.477**	-.091	.411**	.010
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.086	.000	.848
	N	355	355	355	355	355	355
EPS	Pearson Correlation	.452**	1	.630**	.064	.678**	-.068
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.232	.000	.202
	N	355	355	355	355	355	355
ROE	Pearson Correlation	.477**	.630**	1	-.050	.297**	-.001
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.344	.000	.989
	N	355	355	355	355	355	355
LN Sales	Pearson Correlation	-.091	.064	-.050	1	.030	.138**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.086	.232	.344		.579	.009
	N	355	355	355	355	355	355
Net Profit	Pearson Correlation	.411**	.678**	.297**	.030	1	.025
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.579		.640
	N	355	355	355	355	355	355
LN Shares	Pearson Correlation	.010	-.068	-.001	.138**	.025	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.848	.202	.989	.009	.640	
	N	355	355	355	355	355	355

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 43

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.699[a]	.488	.487	18.2163120	.488	372.930	5	1956	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), Net Profit, ROE, EPS, LN Shares, LN Sales

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	618754.438	5	123750.888	372.930	.000[b]
	Residual	649067.350	1956	331.834		
	Total	1267821.787	1961			

a. Dependent Variable: DPS

b. Predictors: (Constant), Net Profit, ROE, EPS, LN Shares, LN Sales

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	-14.122	4.259		-3.315	.001	-22.476	-5.769
	ROE	.717	.021	.579	34.021	.000	.675	.758
	EPS	.033	.005	.118	6.962	.000	.024	.043
	LN Sales	.01	.341	.221	10.770	.000	3.001	4.337
	LN Shares	-.108	.477	-.175	-8.620	.000	-5.043	-3.174
	Net Profit	.0061	.000	.093	4.688	.000	.000	.000

a. Dependent Variable: DPS