

**THE NORMALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES-LIBYA
RELATIONS, 2003–2006**

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**THE NORMALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES-LIBYA
RELATIONS, 2003–2006**

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**Thesis Submitted to the Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government,
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in Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the factors leading to the normalized relations between the United States (U.S.) and Libya in 2003–2006. The theoretical framework of this study was the rational actor model of foreign policy decision making, which held that the foreign policy decisions were made in such a way as to maximize benefits while minimizing costs. The study was divided into three parts. The first part looked at the political factors leading to the normalized relations between the two countries. These factors include the diplomatic, leadership and media. The second part looked at the economic factors such as the oil and economic sanctions. The last part looked at the security factors including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the Libya's attitudes towards Israel. The data for this study were collected mainly from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included documents, agreements, and treaties that signed by Libya with the U.S. In addition, the researcher analyzed the outputs of the U.S. and Libyan policy-makers and institutions relating to the research topic, such as speeches, official correspondences, decrees, and decisions of both governments relating to each other. Interviews with knowledgeable people were also conducted. The secondary sources included books, journals, magazines and newspapers. Key findings over the period studied indicated the importance of the political, economic, and security factors in forwarding the U.S. policy options towards the normalization of the U.S. - Libya relations in 2006. Furthermore, this study also concluded that the success of the normalized relations was a product of intertwining of these factors together through their influences on policy-makers of both countries to take flexible attitudes to resolve outstanding issues between them.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Libya, Normalized Relations, Rational Actor Model, United States

Abstrak

Kajian ini bertujuan menguji dan menganalisis faktor-faktor yang memulihkan semula hubungan antara Amerika Syarikat (AS) dengan Libya pada tahun 2003–2006. Kerangka kerja teori bagi kajian ini ialah model aktor rasional dalam penggubalan keputusan dasar luar yang berpegang pada ketetapan bahawa keputusan dasar luar dibuat dengan kaedah yang memaksimumkan faedah sambil mengurangkan kos. Kajian ini terbahagi kepada tiga bahagian. Bahagian pertama melihat pada faktor-faktor politik yang memulihkan hubungan antara kedua-dua buah negara. Faktor-faktor politik ini termasuklah faktor diplomatik, kepemimpinan, dan media. Bahagian kedua melihat pada faktor-faktor ekonomi seperti sekatan minyak dan ekonomi. Bahagian terakhir pula melihat pada faktor-faktor keselamatan termasuklah keganasan, senjata pemusnah massa, serta sikap Libya terhadap Israel. Data untuk kajian ini dikumpul khususnya daripada sumber primer dan sekunder. Sumber primer termasuklah dokumen, perjanjian, dan persetujuan yang ditandatangani oleh Libya dengan AS. Selain itu, penyelidik turut menganalisis output yang berkaitan dengan topik kajian. Output berkenaan dipetik daripada dokumen perbincangan antara pembuat dasar dan institusi AS dengan Libya, seperti ucapan, surat rasmi, dekri, dan keputusan kedua-dua kerajaan yang berkaitan antara satu sama lain. Temuramah dengan orang mempunyai mempunyai maklumat tentang topik kajian ini turut dijalankan. Sumber sekunder termasuklah buku, jurnal, majalah, dan akhbar. Dapatan utama sepanjang kajian ini dijalankan menunjukkan peri pentingnya faktor-faktor politik, ekonomi, dan keselamatan dalam membuat pilihan dasar AS demi memulihkan hubungan AS-Libya pada tahun 2006. Selanjutnya, kajian ini turut merumuskan bahawa kejayaan memulihkan hubungan berkenaan ialah hasil daripada jalinan antara faktor-faktor ini melalui pengaruhnya terhadap pembuat dasar daripada kedua-dua buah negara untuk menyesuaikan dengan sikap masing-masing dalam usaha untuk menyelesaikan isu-isu tertangguh antara kedua-duanya.

Kata kunci: Amerika Syarikat, Libya, Pemulihan Hubungan, Model Aktor Rasional, Dasar Luar

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List of Abbreviations

AEE	Atomic Energy Establishment (Libya)
ANO	Abu Nidal Organization
AU	The African Union
AUA	Union Authority
AUC	African Union Commission
CBL	Central Bank of Libya
CEN-SAD	The Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S.A
EIA	Energy Information Administration
EPSA	Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement
EU	European Union
GICDF	Gaddafi International Charity and Development foundation
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ILSA	Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JANA	Jamahiriya News Agency
JSO	Jamahiriya Security Organization
LAP	Libya Africa Investment Portfolio
LD	Libyan dinars
LIA	Libya Investment Authority

LIFG	Libyan Islamic fighting group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOC	National Oil Corporation
MTRC	Missile Technology Control Regime
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OXY	Occidental Petroleum Corp
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
RAM	Rational Actor Model
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
RSQ	RascomStar-QAF, it's a Communication Company
SAE	Libyan Secretariat of Atomic Energy
SISMI	Italian Military Intelligence Service
TNRC	Tajura Nuclear Research Centre
U.K	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
VPAF 103	Victims of Pan Am Flight 103
WICS	World Islamic Call Society
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the political, economic and security factors that led to normalized relations between the United States (U.S.) and Libya during the period between 2003 and 2006. The U.S. - Libya relations have witnessed a great development from the status of alliance and cooperation in the early years of Libya's independence in 1951 to a status of hostility after the Libyan revolution in 1969. The history of hostilities between the two countries is grounded in their conflicting efforts to spread influence in Libya, Africa, and Middle East during the Cold War and beyond. Moreover, "the hostilities only grew as a result of both states looking for vengeance" (Gosa, 2011, p. 5).

From the U.S. Government's perspective, this problematic relation was fueled by Libya's relations with the former Soviet Union, the alleged large financial support for extremist groups, its opposition to Israel, the Lockerbie incident in 1988 and its desire to possess nuclear weapons. While from the Libyan Government's perspective, it is a small vulnerable oil-rich country in the world system in which energy-hungry powerful nations dominate. "The end of the Cold War left Libya isolated, which provoked the Libya's government to re-evaluate its relations with key powerful states during the end of 1990's" (Gosa, 2011, p. 5). However, the early 2003s represented the beginning of the rapprochement efforts while 2006 was the formal restoration of diplomatic ties between the states.

The significance of the period covered in this study lies in the important developments taken by both countries in order to normalize their relations, within this period; Libya announced a formal plan to compensate the Pan Am 103 victims' families on April 29, 2003. Libya also agreed to pay US\$10 million in compensation to the family of each victim, adding up to a total of US\$2.7 billion, followed by a letter delivered to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) wherein Libya admitted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing (See Appendix A). In contrast, the U.S. declared that it had no objection to the Security Council lifting its sanctions on Libya and accordingly, they were removed. On September 12, 2003, the UNSC voted unanimously to lift sanctions imposed on Libya in 1992 (See Appendix B).

On December 19, 2003, Libya then went on and declared it would abandon its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and allowed inspectors into its facilities. A foreign ministry spokesman at that time in Tripoli said that, "the arms race contradicted Libya's great concern for a world that enjoys peace and security" (Bowen, 2006, p. 48).

The U.S. President George W. Bush welcomed Libya's announcement and issued series of decisions that ended most economic sanctions against Libya; on September 20, 2004, the President Bush issued Executive Order 13357 that allowed air flights between the two countries, permitted Libyan purchases of U.S. built aircraft, and released approximately US\$1 billion in Libya's assets that were frozen in the U.S. (See Appendix C). Furthermore, on September 28, 2005, the President issued two waivers of Arms Export Control Act restrictions on the export of defense articles to Libya. The waivers allowed U.S. companies to "possibly participate" in Libya's efforts to destroy its chemical weapons and precursor stockpiles, along with

the refurbishment of eight C-130 transport planes purchased by Libya in the 1970s that were withheld for the last 30 years (Blanchard, 2008, p. 7).

The U.S. government announced its intention to restore the diplomatic relations with Libya and followed through in doing so, also to rescind Libya's listing as a state sponsor of terrorism on May 15, 2006. "Full diplomatic relations were restored when the U.S. upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to Embassy status on May 31 2006" (Blanchard, 2008, p. 7).

This study is designed to probe into these issues in order to expose the real nature of interaction between the two countries through critical analysis of the events that took place in that period, and investigate the factors that led to normalized relations between the states.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

As stated in above, this study examines and analyzes the political, economic and security factors that normalized the U.S. - Libya relations during the period between 2003- 2006. The Libyan-American relations were one of the most complex and difficult relations to fathom, which continued for a long period of political confrontation, polarization, and even reached military confrontations. Looking beyond the political, economic and security factors that led to the normalized relations between Libya and the U.S. will demonstrate whether that improvement in U.S. - Libya ties considered a temporary detente, or is it a foundation for close and cooperative relationship.

The crucial developments in international relations since events of September 11, 2001, particularly with regard to the war on terrorism, include the attacks on Afghanistan, the occupation of Iraq and the desire of the U.S. to improve its image in the Arab and Islamic world. However, it could be said that Libya made a careful assessment of the changing global environment since the beginning of the twenty-first century and chose to alter both its foreign and domestic policies in response to the changing times. This study will try to answer the following questions:

1. What are the factors that led to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations in 2006?
2. How did the two countries manage to normalize their relations in 2006?
3. What are the meeting points (common interests) that helped to normalized relations between Libya and the U.S.?
4. What is the impact of the normalized relations between the U.S. and Libya in 2006 on domestic, regional and international levels?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to analyze and examine the political, economic and security factors that normalized the U.S. - Libya relations from 2003 to 2006. During this period, the relations between the two countries saw important developments that led to the normalized relations. Therefore, this study attempts:

1. To examine the factors that normalized relations between the U.S. and Libya in 2006.
2. To examine the mutual interests of both countries that led to the normalized relations in 2006.

3. To examine the impact of the normalization on the U.S. - Libya's relations.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study is important for several reasons. Firstly, this study is the first academic attempt to examine the factors that led to normalized relations between the U.S. and Libya during the period between 2003 and 2006. Secondly, this study is focused on the strategic interaction between the two countries in order to normalize their relations. Thirdly, this study is important because it highlights the successes and failures of the Libyan foreign policy during this period. Finally, the U.S. - Libya relations mirror potentials and drawbacks in bilateral relations between two disparate countries-that is one, a small power (Libya) and the other is a world superpower (the U.S.).

1.5 Literature Review

Decision-making in foreign policy involves the analysis and assessment of past and current data in light of past experiences, to further "identify the need and available options for action in the future, and the likely implications of each of these options for the protection and promotion of national interests" (Zenbou, 2010, p. 5). There are various studies that are helpful in understanding the U.S. - Libya relations. Some of these studies provide a general overview on the historical context of this relationship, while the overwhelming majority of studies were focused primarily on the U.S. attitudes in order to pressure Libya to change its political behaviour.

The literature reviewed below is divided into three categories: (1) studies that provide general analysis of U.S. - Libya relations, (2) studies provide literature on Libyan foreign policy, and (3) the studies that deal with the U.S. policy toward Libya.

1.5.1 General studies on U.S. - Libya relations

Masaud Almahdi (1999) in *Libya-United States Relations, 1969-1986* gives an outline of Libya-U.S. relations from 1969 until 1986, by specifically highlighting the major obstacles that hindered their relations. He covered the period of two decades since Libya established diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 1969. Almahdi argues that the relations between the two countries deteriorated especially after the September 1969 revolution under the leadership of Col Muammar Al Qadhafi, military personnel who brought in his style of leadership that was backed by popular Libyan support. Col Qadhafi's attempt to construct a new and truly independent Libya and make the country a key international player in the region is strongly met with resistance, particularly from the U.S. which grew to use to its increasingly dominant role within the region and which also went unchallenged. According to Almahdi, "the deteriorating relations between the two countries were attributed to several factors such as the American perception of Libya as a state that supported terrorists and terrorist acts and Libya's negative image that was being perpetrated by the Western media" (Almahdi, 1999, p. 37).

Saif Al Islam al-Qadhafi (2003) in *Libyan-American Relations* reviews the history of U.S. - Libya relations through highlighting the development that shaped these relations, he argues:

The conflict began soon after the Libyan revolution of 1969, when the new government under the leadership of Col Qadhafi, seeking to assert national independence, expelled American military bases from their territory. “We were a more radical country then. Colonialism forced us to adopt radical policies, even after we were nominally free like America two centuries ago. We have differed in views on many international issues such as the Israel-Arab conflict and to support liberation movements in the world, etc. (Al-Qadhafi, 2003, p. 36).

On the other hand, he describes the U.S. - Libya cooperation on security in the fight against terrorism as a positive and significant cooperation and mutually beneficial, and he concludes that, “at the crossroads of history. Libya recognizes America’s special role as a superpower, and Libya is now ready to transform decades of mutual antagonism into an era of genuine friendship” (Al-Qadhafi, 2003, p. 44).

Amal Obeidi (2001) in *Libyan Security Policy between Existence and Feasibility* focuses on the factors affecting Libyan security policy since the revolutionary regime came to power in 1969. She found that “the influence of each factor varied from one period to another” (Obeidi, 2001, p. 11). However, it might be useful to mention that some of these factors exerted an influence in previous historical periods. The first is the strategic element - the country’s oil resources. This factor is related mainly to the country’s economic base. The oil resources and the revenues it generates were used since 1969 by the Libyan policy makers to promote the radical transformational vision of the regime at the regional and international levels. The second factor is its geographical location. Whether through positive

involvement or by reaction, Libya is bound by virtue of its location to respond to developments in three different dimensions: the Arab world, Africa and the Mediterranean. The third factor is the state ideology because since 1969, the ideological factor has played a crucial role in all aspects within the Libyan society. The main ideological slogan, which the revolutionary leaders have developed as the premises and ideals of their revolution, has been “Freedom, Socialism, and Unity.” In general, “most of the policies implemented in Libya at the domestic and international levels were shaped by the framework of ideology, which was based on Arabism, Arab nationalism and support for the Palestine issue” (Obeidi, 2001, p. 33).

1.5.2 Literature on Libyan foreign policy

The process of decision-making in Libyan foreign policy has become more complex since the 1969 revolution for several reasons: for example, “the hegemony of Qadhafi’s ideology means that adopting the Arab nationalist dimension becomes the main factor for Libya’s foreign policy-making, this principle resulted in Libya undertaking a number of largely unsuccessful attempts at Arab unity” (Zenbou, 2010, p. 6).

Libyan foreign policy has faced many challenges from the international community as a result of its actions taken to achieve the objective of Arab unity. Among these challenges, Libya has been accused of interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries and the U.S. attempts to foiling of all those initiatives. One of the paramount policies was Libyan support for various liberation movements around the globe. Moreover, Libyan policy was characterized by hostility to the

West and imperialist-states which imposed on Libya many restrictions between 1969 and 2003, when Libya reformulated its foreign policy to cooperate and be more open with the West.

A survey of literature on Libyan foreign policy reveals that a number of studies have been undertaken over a long period; most studies emphasize the nature of the Libyan behaviour in key periods, for example, since the 1969 Revolution. The surveys highlight that Libyan foreign policy has been shaped by perceived external threats, particularly from Western forces. Therefore, the majority of the research focused primarily on the issue of security, particularly preventing the return of colonialism or foreign powers within the region.

Ronald Bruce St. John (1987) in *Qadhafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign policy, 1969-1987* identifies the basic tenets of Libyan foreign policy. The book gives a useful discussion in the background against which foreign policy under Qadhafi takes place. It also looks at Qadhafi's Third Universal Theory and its place within the history of Arab nationalism. St. John critically examines Qadhafi's attitudes toward Israel, his relationship with the superpowers, his search for Arab unity, his drive towards positive neutrality, his attempts to influence oil policy, his efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the way in which foreign policy is formulated in the Libyan state (St. John, 1987, p. 28).

St. John (2002) in *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife* asserted that, "the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Libya has rarely followed a smooth path. Washington has repeatedly tried and failed to mediate lasting solutions to prevent recurrent crises and to secure its own national interests in

a region of increasing importance to the U.S.” (St. John, 2002, p. 1). The book provides a “unique analysis of U.S.-Libyan relations, assessing within the framework of a conventional historical narrative the interaction of the governments and peoples of Libya and the U.S. over the past two centuries” (St. John, 2002, p. 255).

Tim Niblock (2002) in *The Foreign Policy of Libya* shows that Libyan foreign policy is predicated upon three durable factors that are critically important in setting its parameters: the economic base and oil exports; the way in which culture and geography have interacted in Libya; and Libya’s geographic and strategic location (Ehteshami & Hinnebush, 2002, pp. 213-234).

Khalil Matar and Robert Thabit (2004) in *Lockerbie and Libya: A Study in International Relations* study relations between Libya and the West, in particular, the U.S. They argue that the Lockerbie issue increased the gap between Libya and most Western countries. The period between 1988 and 2003 was one of the worst periods in relations between Libya and the West, after America accused Libya bombing of Pan Am flight 103 (Matar & Thabit, 2004, p. 80).

In this context, Charles Cecil (2008) in *Libya’s Relation with Africa and the West*, points out that Libyan-U.S. relation needs more clarity to improve cooperation in all areas. Cecil points out that improving Libyan-U.S. relations has become urgent because of the common interests between the two countries. Furthermore, this article shows that Libya is interested in improving its relations with the U.S. in order to ensure its foreign policy in Africa (Cecil, 2008, p. 12).

Yahia Zoubir (2006a) in *The U.S. and Libya from Confrontation to the Normalization* discusses the factors that led Libya to rehabilitate its foreign policy.

He focuses on two types of factors; Firstly, the external factors such as the fall of the Soviet Union, and the U.S taking the role as a dominant superpower, and that fact that Libya was put in solitude by the rest of the world. Secondly, the internal factors, such as the introduction of different political icons such as Saif Al-Islam, who assisted the Libyan government to pursue realistic choices to put an end to the hostility between Libya and the U.S with help of Tony Blair in the negotiations. Libya also wanted to pursue more beneficial relations with the U.S. He adds that, the U.S. very knowledgeable of Libyan oil resources and its important location could not keep away from the normalization of relations with Libya (Zoubir, 2006a, p. 65).

Miloud Mhadbi (2007) In *Lessons from Libya: How to Make Friends with Arabs* finds three main viewpoints that can help explain the revolution in U.S.-Libyan relations. In the first, the transformation is attributed to a set of crucial developments in the international environment since September 11, 2001, together with the influence of lobbying groups (within both countries) pushing for warmer bilateral relations. In the second viewpoint, the closer ties are ascribed to a number of strategic structural factors, from the role of Libyan oil wealth to the presence of common U.S.-Libyan interests in the “war on terror.” The third viewpoint looks at the role of internal factors within each country, which played a prominent role in setting the stage for such a radical transformation, and each country’s reexamination of their foreign policy (Mhadbi, 2007, p. 128).

In fact, an objective understanding of the relative transformation which took place in U.S.-Libyan relations has to rely on all the aforementioned factors – whether internal, international, or geopolitical – side-by-side with psychological and

historical dynamics. Since the transformation from confrontation to normalization cannot be explained by relying on a single viewpoint, it can be argued that these factors intertwined to help bring about change. He concludes that “the transformation would not have happened if the Libyan political leadership did not possess a significant degree of pragmatism and an ability to make decisive choices at a vital historical moment with the goal of protecting Libya’s greater national interest” (Mhadbi, 2007, p. 129).

1.5.3 Literature on U.S. policy toward Libya

Mahmoud Gebril (1985) in *U.S. Policy toward Libya, 1969-1982 the Role of Image*, identifies the important factor that affects the U.S. image of the policy toward Libya, 1969-1982, according to Gebril:

The objectives which are pursued consistently by the U.S. in the Middle East are: (1) maintaining access to oil resources, (2) protecting and enhancing the security and well-being of Israel, and (3) containing Soviet influence in the region.(4) confronting what the U.S. perceives as Libyan “terrorist” activities in the region and worldwide (Gebril, 1985, p. 32).

Gebril examines the Libyan conduct toward the four U.S. objectives stated above, and inferring the U.S. image of Libya as a consequence of the U.S. image of Libya’s conduct in the three U.S. presidential periods from 1976 to 1982, and comparing the U.S. image of Libya with its policy toward that country to find out the degree of congruence between image and policy. However, Gebril argues that, “Libyan policy toward the Soviet-Union was the most important factor affecting the U.S. image of Libya. The Carter administration was an exception to this pattern, where the perceived Libyan terrorist activities constituted the overriding concern for

the Carter administration's officials. Libyan oil policies and Libya's hostile attitude and policy toward Israel were not as significant as the above two factors in shaping the U.S. image of Libya" (Gebril, 1985, p. 119). Gebril also found that "with the relative exception of the Carter period (1977-1980), the U.S. image of Libya was substantially congruent with its policy toward that country" (Gebril, 1985, p. 351).

Kenneth Katzman (2003) in his study about the U.S. policies toward Libya, reviewed all the laws and regulations that govern the U.S. relations with Libya at the bilateral and multilateral scales. When reviewing each document of these documents, Katzman highlights on the effectiveness of these laws to serve the goals of the U.S. policy toward Libya, and offers some suggestions on the U.S. decision-makers in order to permanent settlement of outstanding issues between the two countries. At the end of his study he offers an article titled removal the restrictions on the U.S. relations with Libya. However, he presented a recommendation to use the suitable approach to begin of return of U.S. relations with Libya to normal track. "It will have to grapple with the policies, laws and regulations that prevent most U.S.-Libyan trade, ban the use of U.S. passports for travel to Libya, withhold portions of U.S. funding from international organizations working in Libya or otherwise block the path to normalization" (Katzman, 2003, p. 150).

Katzman proved that Libya was faced with one of the stringent U.S. sanctions regimes, especially in the recent years (Katzman, 2003, p. 143). According to Katzman, there should be a presidential decision to restore the U.S.-Libya relations, moreover it must remove the sanctions and restrictions that imposed on the trade exchange between the two countries as well as open the prospects of economic

investment, and work on closer cultural ties and enable the U.S. citizens from travelling to Libya. Katzman concludes that “a key component of the process of normalizing relations is the facilitation of cultural exchanges, educational exchanges, tourism, and other forms of people-to-people contact, such exchanges often lead to further efforts to movement toward formal diplomatic ties” (Katzman, 2003, p. 151).

Jamie Ann Calabrese (2004) In *Carrots or Sticks, Libya and the U.S. efforts to influence rogue states* argues that between the periods of 1986-2004, the U.S. managed to make a change in Libyan policy and convinced Libya to stop all aid for international terrorism, and its pursuit of the acquisition and construction of WMDs (Calabrese, 2004, p. 7). These U.S. efforts first commenced by President Reagan administration and were backed up by the administrations after it, which ultimately led to the isolation of Libya both on the diplomatic and economic fronts. Therefore, the conditions were set for the engagement with Libya. The first behavior change by Libya that wasn't negative towards the U.S. occurred while the President Clinton administration was in power with its very own version of conditional engagement. The Bush administration maintained the same strategy in its engagement with Libya, until Libya made an announcement to the world on 2003 that it renounces its ties with all terrorist organizations and ceased all pursuit for WMD acquisition. Since then Libya maintained those efforts to verify the new strategy and prove its word faithful. Here Calabrese insists that, “it is important that the U.S. be able to successfully influence rogue state behaviour not only do rogue states pose a near to a long-term threat to U.S. interests, successfully influencing them could prevent the U.S. from having to resort to war” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 90).

Calabrese concludes that, the beginning of Libyan reconciliation with the international community and with the U.S. was the extradition of both Pam Am 103 suspects to a neutral country after Libya demanded of such conditions. The U.S. side agreed to Libyan demands and both suspects were in fact handed over (Calabrese, 2004, p. 90). Secretary Powell indicated, frankly, “we’ve laid out a clear roadmap for them of what we expect them to do in order to move toward full normalization of relations between the U.S. and Libya, and the Libyans have been forthcoming. We have been forthcoming; I think it’s in our interest to receive Libya back” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 92).

The above studies provide a reasonable amount of material on the U.S. foreign policy in relation to Libya at some political, economic and security issues. There are many questions that were neglected in the past and few attempts were made to answer. What are the factors that led to normalize the U.S. - Libya relations in 2006? What is the link between the U.S. and Libya decision to normalize their relations and the impact of those factors on policy-makers in both countries, which led them to take this decision in 2006? This study is a humble attempt to fill this gap and therefore, may help a better understanding of the U.S. - Libya normalized relations in 2006.

1.6 Theoretical framework

In order to answer the question of the factors that determined and defined the relations between the U.S. and Libya during the period 2003–2006, we looked at the theories of international relations for guidance. Relations between nation-states take

place within specific theoretical paradigms. By doing this we hoped to find out part of the answer to our major question: what are the political, economic and security factors that led to normalized relations between the U.S. and Libya in the period between 2003 and 2006?

The study of international relations is guided by certain theories. There are three main ones: Realism, Liberalism and Dependency:

1.6.1 Realism Theory

The realism theory developed in the 1930s, after the League of Nations was unable to stop international conflict. It tries to explain the behavior of states in both peace and war conditions. It has its basis in the ideas of Thucydides (460BC-395 BC), Machiavelli (1469-1527), Hobbes (1588-1679), Morgenthau (1891-1967) and E. H. Carr (1892-1982). Thucydides was a famous Greek historian who lived and was active in the 5th century B.C. Niccolo Machiavelli was an Italian historian and philosopher during the 16th century A.D. Thomas Hobbes was an English historian and philosopher in the 17th century A.D; Hans J Morgenthau was an American political scientist of the 20th century and E.H. Carr was a British historian and international relations theorist. The ideas of these personalities shaped the modern international relations theory of realism. The theory holds that, the relations between states are guided by the struggle for power. Each state aims to both preserving its sovereignty and power or expanding and maintaining it within the international system.

Realism is summed-up by three basic values: statism, survival, and self-help. Statism is the belief that the state is the most predominant actor in international relations and that sovereignty symbolizes the existence of the state. Realism emphasizes on the character of states as determinants of international relations. Survival is the main priority of the state and the policies and actions of leaders must be guided by this objective. Self-help is the duty of the state. It is the principle reason for being i.e. to provide for its people without morality, honor, and fear or favor (Dunne & Schmidt, 2010, p. 87). Realists argue that the international system is anarchic. There is no higher authority to impose order and control over the behavior of Nation-States.

This argument is taken a little further by neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz (1924 --) According to them; the international system consists of Nation-States with different capabilities pursuing identical interests, and the relation between the different states is determined by their less or greater capabilities for performing similar tasks. The neo-realists continue to contend that the nature of the international system changes with the changes in the distribution of capabilities across the systems units and that a balance of power among units of the system can be a guarantee to peace and reduce chances of war. As Thucydides the father of the theory argued,

Political animals are highly unequal in their powers and capabilities to dominate others and to defend themselves. All states large and small must adapt to that natural given reality of unequal power and conduct themselves accordingly. If the states do that, they will survive and perhaps even prosper. If they fail to do that they will place themselves in jeopardy and may even be destroyed (Quoted in Jackson & Sorensen, 2007, p. 71).

Realism therefore emphasizes on the political and military power as the major factor in international relations. As Thucydides clearly stated, nation-states

must gauge their political and military power in comparison to other nation states and adjust its relationships in order to perform in the international arena. But national power involves more than power politics and military might.

1.6.2 Liberalism Theory

Liberalism or idealism which was the earliest theory of international relations is sometimes known as utopian theory, because it presents or points to the ideal situation in international relations. According to this theory, human nature is essentially good and nation-states and humans are naturally inclined to co-operate rather than conflict and therefore, conflict is a corrupt influence in the world, resulting from misinformation, misunderstanding, ignorance and undemocratic nation-states and leaders. Conflict may, thus, be removed or avoided through education, information exchange and inter-national cooperation.

According to Jackson & Sorensen (2007) liberalism has several strands, namely, liberal internationalism and liberal institutionalism. Liberal internationalism holds that in the natural order of things, Nation-States should live at peace with each other. The breakdown of such peace is therefore a product of undemocratic leaders using outdated practices and policies that corrupt the natural order (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007, p. 108). The proponents of this theory -Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), William Doyle (1911-1986), Schumpeter 1883-1950), Francis Fukuyama (1952-) etc. argue that war in the world may be avoided by abandoning aristocracy in favor of democracy, and autarky in favor of free trade, and balance of power system in favor of collective security.

The neo-liberals on their part extended the argument that since the democratic states learnt to live peacefully; world peace can be achieved by extending the zone or values of democracy in the world (Burchill & Linklater 1999, Jackson & Sorensen 2007, Chandra 1999). Liberal institutionalism believes that the international order can be constructed and managed by an international organization. According to this theory, an international organization such as the UNO should be able to regulate the behavior of nation-states in the international system to prevent war (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007, p. 108). This theory originates from the U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, and was behind the formation of the League of Nations. Liberalism addresses itself to the causes and the ways of avoiding war, but not the behavior of states outside the war situation. This is where realism comes in.

1.6.3 Dependency Theory

The third theory of international relations is dependency. This theory like the one of realism holds that relations between states in the international system are unequal. There are powerful and less powerful states. While the relations among the powerful state themselves and the relations among the less powerful themselves are guided by the struggle for power, the relations between the less powerful states and the more powerful are characterized by dependency. The less powerful states have less influence in the international system. They depend on the decisions and conduct of the more powerful. The less powerful only react to decisions and the behaviors of the powerful states in the international system. (Ojo & Orwa, 1985) Dependency theories emphasize the economic power as the primary factor in international

relations. The proponents of this theory include Paul Baran (1910-1964), Andre Gunder Frank (1929-2005), Walter Rodney (1942-1980), and Samir Amin (1931).

Wallerstein (2011) for example, argues that, there are three classifications of states in the international system: developed core, semi-periphery and lastly periphery. In this instance, periphery states are weak and backward providers of raw materials for the developed core, while the semi periphery may, with time move into the category of the developed core (Wallerstein, 2011, p .102). Dependency theory identifies a hierarchical international system in which the developed capitalist states dominate the less-developed ones. Dependency differs from realism only in emphases. While realism emphasizes on political and military power, dependency describes the relationship in terms of economic power.

1.6.4 Rational Actor Model

In examining the U.S. - Libya normalized relations; this study utilizes Rational Actor Model (RAM). However, RAM is the most suitable one as a theoretical framework of this research. In order to justify that, because the RAM highlights the actions of a country as an entirety and into the influence of international relations on these actions, “while it is important to note different theoretical frameworks that foreign policy research is constructed under, it should be mentioned that the great majority of arguments are analyzed under the RAM. The reason justified or not, is because it is the most simplistic way to understand and to conceptualize when studying the decision-making processes of a nation-state. In addition, it enables researchers with the perspectives to understand and predict with

greater confidence, future outcomes or actions taken by a country's government. It is worth outlining at this stage, the basic assumptions on which this model rests since it has been relied on in addressing most questions related to this study" (Hanna, 2001, p. 5).

RAM is one of the first of Allison's frameworks of foreign policy analysis introduced and elaborated in *Essence of Decision* with the real reference to Cuban Missile Crisis during 1962. When *Essence of Decision* was first published in 1971, RAM became the trademark of Allison, "attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments is the trademark of the Rational Actor Model" (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 13).

The model assumes that "a nation's actions are in response to strategic threats and opportunities in the international environment" (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24). In selecting a response, a process of rational choice is employed based on "identifying objectives and goals, usually expressed in terms of national security and national interests; proposing options for the attainment of the objectives; evaluating the cost and benefit of each option against the defined objectives; and selecting the option that ranks highest in achieving desired outcomes" (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24).

Order, precision and logic are connoted by RAM, giving it an appealing theoretical allure to explain the foreign policy decision-making process, as Allison notes, "the less information about the internal affairs of a nation or government, the greater the tendency to rely on the Rational Actor Model" (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24).

Regarding to the core concepts established under this model, which comprises of four core concepts: *Goals & objectives; Alternatives; Consequences; and Choice*, which are considered the model tools to explain the decision:

1. Goals and objectives refer to “the interest and values of the agent are translated into a payoff or utility or preference function, which represents the desirability or utility of alternative sets of consequences. It ranks all possible sets of consequences in terms of her or his values and objectives - number of side effects” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 18).
2. Alternatives can be explained as whenever the rational agent must choose among a set of choices displayed before her or him in a particular situation. It further takes its alternative choice to become the output of a decision. However, there could be several sets of implied decisions a decision tree may give.
3. Consequences which further takes rational actors to consider that “to each alternative is attached a set of consequences or outcomes of choice that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 18). Since this model is a sort of game of selecting all possible choices.
4. Choice is the final concept which is neither easy nor straight-forward to make. Choice in this model is explained explicitly, to put Allison’s version in terms of choice-rationality, “rational choice consists simply of selecting that alternative which consequences rank highest in the decision makers' payoff function; value maximizing choice within special

constraints” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 18). Rationality in RAM has high value and it refers to the consistent behavior of an actor in the game. In RAM, “the assumption of rationality also provides explanatory power” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 19).

As explained above, in most cases, state’s actions can be explained or predicted in terms of the objective situations it faces and passes through, combined with aforementioned four variable concepts. For more clarification Allison considered that:

National security and interests are the fundamental categories from which strategic goals/objectives are conceived. Once these goals have been articulated, the next step for the rational actor would be to consider the options available to it as a unitary actor. Here, the various possibilities pertinent to a strategic problem provide a broad selection of options to be chosen by the actor. After the options have been deliberated, the rational actor will then take into consideration the consequences of each of the possible options that are available. Typically, the rational actor takes into consideration the benefits and costs to a decision. Finally, when all of this information is gathered and evaluated, the rational actor selects a choice. In this final stage of the decision-making process of the rational actor, a choice is made based upon “value-maximizing” In other words; the rational actor makes his selection after determining which consequence is seen to be the highest ranking in terms of his goals and objectives (Allison, 1971, p. 33).

Allison has provided us with this model a glimpse of illustrations (see Figure 1.1) that are “widely used in thinking about government behavior and international relations” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 26). Very simple form and task of the RAM is to “link purpose and action.” As Allison declared, “If I know an actor’s objective, I have a major clue to his likely action by observing behavior and considering what the actor’s objective might be, when I identify an objective that is advanced effectively by the action, I have a strong hypothesis about why he did whatever he did. In this hyper-simple form, the danger of tautology is evident. Recall children’s

explanations of behavior: he did it because he wanted to, If the only evidence of what he did, the two statements are empirically equivalent” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 49).

Objectives, calculations, choices, threats, opportunities are the key words, weighing all pros and cons and taking up value-maximizing option regard the major formula in RAM Allison employs. This is how the U.S. did in Cuban Missile Crisis choosing Blockade, Ultimatum, Air Strike and Quarantine; among others: weighing all pros and cons and choosing the options that served the U.S.’s value-maximizing choice. Allison at the end of the model summarizes: “the full RAM includes not only objectives but also calculations about the situation in which the actor finds himself. This context presents threats and opportunities that the agent packages as the option with pros and cons. The actor chooses the alternative that best advances his interests. Thus in explaining what an agent did or, in making bets about what he is likely to do, an analyst must consider not only the actor’s objectives but also the options he identifies, the costs and benefits he estimates to follow from each option, and his readiness and reluctance to take risks” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 49).




Figure 1.1: The Components of the RAM, Source: (Saikaly, 2009, p. 77).

1.7 Research Methods

This study examines and analyzes the political, economic and security factors that led to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations. It is a qualitative study. Data collection of this study relies on document study, using both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include the Congressional Research Reports, policy statements (May 15, 2006, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Dick Lugar statement about the removal of Libya from the list of designated state sponsors of terror), speeches (Col Qadhafi, August 31, 2003, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, December 19, 2003), press releases (Libyan Foreign Minister Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, stating that Libya, of its “own free will,” had decided to become completely free of internationally banned weapons). Interviews with knowledgeable people were also conducted. Agreements and treaties that Libya has signed with the U.S. were also considered. In addition to these primary sources, secondary sources include newspapers, magazines, journals and some useful books were consulted (Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife).

1.8 Limitation of the study

Similar to any other study, the researcher experienced a number of obstacles. Research in social sciences is conducted in a controlled manner, which imposes a number of constraints. In addition, conducting research in societies, such as Libya, can impose further constraints due to the under-developed nature of civil society. Therefore, people are reluctant to assist the researcher. Furthermore, gaining

permission to conduct research in the form of interviews in societies such as Libya can be challenging.

Importantly, due to secondary data constraints, particularly with materials that are related to diplomatic and security issues, it is difficult to ascertain the various elements of the research. Taking into account the systemic lack of data in Libya, it was not possible for this study to collect sufficient data for this research. The secondary data would have helped in contributing to an understanding of the sources of Libyan foreign policy and its direction towards the issue of normalized relations with the U.S... However, the lack of primary data resulted in many difficulties.

Furthermore, due to time constraints, this study analyzes the normalization of the U.S. - Libya relations in the period 2003 - 2006 and deals with the implications of such normalized relations during the subsequent four years until the end of 2010 only.

It was difficult to obtain sufficient information, including documents, because of bureaucratic impediments. In addition, there was paucity of resources in English, which led the researcher to translate documents from Arabic languages into English.

1.9 Outline of the study

This study examines and analyzes the political, economic and security factors that led to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations during 2003–2006 periods, to achieve this, this study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one contains a brief

introduction, problem under investigation, literature review, theoretical framework, and research methods. Chapter two provides a brief historical background of the U.S. - Libya relations. The U.S. - Libya relations have long history; it actually intensified in early 1950s. Therefore, this chapter discusses exclusively the 1951-2003 period. Chapter three examines the political factors that normalized the U.S. - Libya relations. This chapter discusses, specifically, the diplomatic, leadership and media factors and their roles in normalized relations between the two countries. Chapter four examines the economic factors led to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations. It analyzes oil and sanctions factors and their role to the normalized relations between the two countries. Chapter five explains the security factors that led to the U.S.-Libya normalized relations. This chapter analyzes the terrorism and WMDs and the Libyan attitude from Israel and their role to the normalized relations between the two countries. Chapter six provides an explanation of the rational actor model that is used to analyze this study. Chapter seven focuses on the impact of the normalized U.S. - Libya relations on the bilateral, regional and global levels. Final chapter summarizes the study and concludes the study findings with pertinent observations.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. - LIBYA RELATIONS FROM 1951 TO 2003

For many years, Libya has been known for its unique location. Libya is situated in the center of the northern part of the African continent. Its shores overlook the Mediterranean Sea. The country occupies a strategic position in the African continent. It links the Arab countries in the East with those in the West and it is at the same time the gateway to Central Africa (see Figure 2.1).




Figure 2.1: Location of Libya, Source: Worldofmaps.net / Africa (2012)

Libya is a vast country of about 1,775,500 km²; it is both the fourth largest state in Africa and the fourth largest in the Arab world (Fergiani, 1976, p. 3). About one-quarter, the size of continental United States, about 76% of the country is covered by desert (see Figure 2.2). It has no permanent rivers, but only seasonal watercourses or wades. The population of Libya is concentrated in three main areas in the North-Western and the North-Eastern parts and an interrelated group of Oases in “Fezzan” in the South.



Figure 2.2: Libya map, Source: Worldofmaps.net / Libya (2012)

Upon attaining independence on December 24, 1951, Libya inherited the longest coastline compared to any former Italian colony in the region. Its coastline on the Mediterranean Sea measures about 2,000 km and it shares borders with six African countries. It shares borders with Egypt to the east, Chad to the South, Tunisia on the North-West, Algeria to the West, Niger to the South-West and Sudan to the South-East (see Figure 2.1).

Libya's population is small in comparison to its vast area. According to a 2006 census, "its population then was about 5.67 million, of that number about 57% resided in three main settlement areas such as Tripoli (32%), the state capital, Benghazi (15%) and Sebha (11%)" (Ashiurakis, 1984, p. 3). The official language of Libya is Arabic and the official religion Islam that is embraced by all Libyans.

Libya rests on the periphery of three worlds-Arab, African and the Mediterranean. Its location has given it some flexibility as to where it will play a regional role, as well as create considerable uncertainty as to where it belongs. "For most of its history, Libya has lacked the human and material resources to impact simultaneously, the focus of its diplomacy has oscillated from one world to the other depending on where opportunities - or obstacles are great" (St. John, 1987, p. 12). In fact, Libya's physical geography and location have been determining factors in its history. The Libyan geographical location of land, sea and air is formed to balance a strong and important part of the strength of the state with all the different aspects of political, economic, cultural and social. This site serves as the heart of the ancient world between the three continents: Asia, Europe and Africa.

For most of their history, “the people of Libya have been subjected to varying degrees of foreign control. The Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, and Byzantines ruled all or parts of Libya. Although the Greeks and Romans left impressive ruins at Cyrene, Leptis Magna, and Sabratha, little else remains today to testify to the presence of these ancient cultures” (Fergiani, 1976, p. 26).

The history of U.S. - Libya relations goes back to the 18th century, when the U.S. gained independence from Britain in 1776. The U.S. started to search for overseas markets since it then had no marine forces, the country then formed a committee charged with constituting its maritime forces. The committee comprised of Franklin Roosevelt, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. “This committee also concluded several agreements with North African countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in order to ensure the protection of the American trade interests, including safety passages of its commercial shipping vessels in the Mediterranean Sea” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 50).

On November 4, 1796, the committees succeeded in concluding an agreement with Libya (see Appendix D). According to the agreement, the U.S. agreed (a) to pay US\$5600 annually as transit duty to Libya, (b) to supply Libya with military equipment, (c) to provide a military ship to the Libyan army, and (d) any other assistance that may be negotiated from time to time. Meanwhile, “Algeria, who was the mediator in the establishment of the U.S.- Libya agreement, also concluded a similar arrangement with the U.S... However, when the build-up of its marine forces

was completed, the U.S. decided to abrogate the agreements it had concluded with several North African countries, including those with Libya” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 51).

On May 14, 1801, Libya declared war upon the U.S. in order to reinforce the agreements that they had concluded (see Appendix E). “The U.S. responded with a two-part plan. First, it staged a military blockade of Tripoli; second, while the blockage was on, it also sought a peaceful settlement of the dispute through diplomacy” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 51).

The blockade of Tripoli failed, and the U.S. ship “Philadelphia” was captured. The crew of the Philadelphia which consisted of 307 sailors was captured and incarcerated. As a result, the American consul in Algeria was asked to negotiate with Yusuf Pasha, the then governor of Libya. Negotiations between the U.S. and Libya started in January 1804, and they centered on prisoner exchange and an offer of a replacement ship for the captured “Philadelphia” which had been burnt earlier on February 16, 1804 (Almahdi, 1999, p. 52).

The failure of the blockade and bombing of Tripoli were followed by the change in the leadership of the American fleet in the Mediterranean. This gave an opportunity for William Eton (the American consul in Tunisia), to launch his plan to attack and occupy Tripoli with the cooperation of Ahmed Pasha Al-Karamanli following approval of the plan by his government. Eton left for Alexandria (Egypt) where he met Ahmed Pasha and the agreement of cooperation was signed. The Plan called for the launching of attacks from two fronts: Tripoli and Derna. Derna was attacked on April 27, 1805 by the joint forces of American navy and Ahmed Pasha. The city fell, only to be freed by Libyan forces that came from Tripoli. Fighting

started again, but did not last long as both sides were exhausted. Hence, a truce was called and negotiations held. In Tripoli, an agreement was brokered on June 4, 1805 by the Spanish consular between Yusuf Pasha and the U.S. consul (see Appendix E). The agreement called for among others; first, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the city of Derna; second, the exchange of prisoners, third, the U.S. had to pay US\$60,000 as compensation to Libya; fourth, in future, prisoners had to be treated as such not as slaves; and fifth, the consuls and agents of both governments shall have the liberty to exercise their religious rites in their own homes (see Appendix E).

In general, the Americans considered this war as an important victory for them. This was even glorified in the U.S. Marines anthem that included a phrase: “From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli” (Bushashia, 2008, p. 3). The anthem played a significant role throughout the history of the U.S. - Libya relations. Tripoli resisted the war. It was badly affected by that war especially in economic terms, as its trading relations with neighboring nations were also severely affected, particularly with Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. These nations also felt the crunch of the American blockage.

An interview with Khalil Mohamed a researcher from the Libyan Center for historical studies explained that the war between Libya and the U.S. was significant for a number of reasons. First, it was launched by the U.S., a new political factor in world politics, soon after its independence in 1776. Secondly, the war was economically motivated; third, the war reaffirmed the importance of the Mediterranean in the region. Fourth, it also showed the extent to which Libya was also important in the overall picture of the relations between nations within the

Middle East and North African regions. Lastly, the war was a historical turning point in U.S. - Libya relations and one that continued to shape their relations thereafter (Khalil, personal communication May 6, 2010).

Aside from the 1792-1832 periods, when the U.S. was forced by the Tripoli rulers to pay annual tribute to ensure immunity for the U.S. ships, Libya - U.S. relations, until September of 1969, was marked by close friendship. Until the late 1950, Libya was considered by the U.S. as a strategic position for servicing its military bases overseas (First, 1974, p. 87), "Libya's strategic position became more important after the Soviet Union's failed attempt for trusteeship over Libya after World War II" (Gebril, 1985, p. 121).

In 1949, a committee of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by President Harry Truman, designed a contingency plan for World War III was expected to occur in 1957. The plan was called Operation Dropshot. It was declassified in 1977 and became public through the Freedom of Information Act. "One of the major assumptions of the plan was that there should be no permanent Soviet military presence in the Middle East or North Africa that could seriously interfere with the Allied war operations" (Wright, 1982, p. 53). The plan also called for the U.S. to provide air and naval protections for its military bases in the region. With respect to Libya, Dropshot recommended defending the former through the deployment of marine and air forces, particularly in and around Tripoli and Benghazi. In essence, "the plan reflected the strategic context of the U.S. official thinking during the late 1940s and the 1950s, when the containment of the communist threat was the major concern for U.S. policy-makers" (Almahdi, 1999, p. 56).

To seek a better understanding of the historical background of the U.S. - Libya relations, we will focus on the most important periods of these relations as follows:

2.1 The U.S. - Libya relations 1951-1969

Libya's relations with the U.S. during the pre-independence period were resurrected in early 1943. In that year, Britain and France which then ruled over Libya, allowed the American to establish the Wheelus Airbase in Tripoli as its air base (Essayed, 1994, p. 41). When the independence of Libya became imminent, the U.S. initiated negotiations with the provisional government of Libya over the future status of its military presence in the country. Negotiations were held between Mohammed Al-Muntasir, the provisional head of Libya, and Andrew G. Lurch, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Tripoli. The negotiations resulted in an agreement that were assented to by the king of Libya Idris al-Sanusi, who instructed his premier to sign on behalf of Libya (Almahdi, 1999, p. 57).

The agreement that sealed formal relations between Libya and the U.S. was signed on the former's Independence Day that fell on December 24th 1951 (Essayed, 1994, p. 41). The agreement contained 27 Articles that outlined details of terms and obligations under the terms of agreement; some of the provisions were as follows:

1. The U.S. was granted the right to stay on at the Wheelus Air base for the next 20 years.
2. The U.S. was given complete control of Libyan air space and water ways.

3. The American troops were also given free access to end movement in the country.
4. The U.S. military bases in Libya may also be used by third countries or persons.
5. The American troops were to be exempted from paying any levies or taxes.
6. The American military personnel were not subjected to the Libyan law.

In return for the above privileges, Libya was to be compensated to the amount of US\$2 million annually (Essayed, 1994, p. 43).

The Wheelus Air base, which was the biggest air base outside of the U.S., gave the U.S. several strategic advantages. First, it provided a training base for its military personnel that were stationed overseas, especially those that were stationed in several European countries such as in West Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and Turkey. Second, the Wheelus airbase provided the Americans with strategic position from which to coordinate its overseas bases, especially in any military move toward checking and confronting Soviet expansionism. Third, the Wheelus airbase also gave the Americans a strategic crossing position in the Mediterranean area (Almahdi, 1999, p. 55).

The growing importance of the Wheelus airbase for the Americans became apparent following several developments. First, the U.S. was trying to establish its presence in the Northern African region. Second, the closure of the Adam British airbase in Libya meant that Wheelus air base had become more important, especially because the latter provided the necessary desert terrain that characterized the region

that the U.S. had become interested in. Third, the importance of Wheelus airbase was also enhanced due to the closure of its Morocco airbase that had been maintained at a much higher price (Essayed, 1994, p. 44).

Although Libya became independent in 1951, its relations with the U.S. continued to be modeled after that which the British Government had set out previously. This line of policy was assisted because in 1952, the U.S. offered Libya financial assistance under the four points Technical Assistance Program of the Truman project for third-world countries. When Mustafa bin Halem became premier on April 11, 1954, he pursued a foreign policy of friendship and cooperation with the U.S... The premier continued this line of policy with the U.S. in order to ensure not only that Libya would continue to receive economic development aids, but also to secure some US support in its unresolved problems with France, Italy and neighboring states. During his premiership, Mustafa bin Halem sought further U.S. assistance, and this led to resumption of talks by the Libyan-American committee. On May 9, 1954, both the Libyan and the American governments agreed to newly proposed provisions (See Appendix F) some of these provisions are followed:

1. Areas granted to the U.S. under this agreement were: the Giant Wheelus airbase and areas in Misurata, Derna, Benghazi, and Tobrouk and any other areas the U.S. deemed necessary for defense purposes.
2. Article 1 of the agreement provided U.S. government the use of areas occupied by its troops for military purposes, and any other purposes agreed to by both parties.

3. Article 3 granted U.S. control over vessels and boats entering the agreed areas, and allowed U.S. the right to establish communication stations inside and outside of the area.
4. Article 6 allowed both governments to cooperate with other governments that had concluded friendship and cooperation agreement with Libya, specifically Great Britain and France.
5. Article 8 gave the U.S. aircraft troops and sea vessels “free access” and freedom of movement within Libya.
6. Article 16 exempted U.S. troops from taxes on all materials, equipment, supplies and goods. This article also allowed U.S. military personnel custom free furniture and imported cars.
7. Article 20 was further refined to give the U.S. exclusive authority over its troops in Libya, including conducting police operation outside its bases.

In conjunction with the Libyan request for additional aid, Mustafa bin Halem thought it opportune to visit America and hold direct talks with Washington. On his July 1954 visit, he met former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower. The result of the visit was the agreement by the U.S. government to provide additional aid within the limits of the credits allocated by the U.S. Congress for assistance. Furthermore, “relations between Libya and the U.S. were further enhanced when in September 1954, the American representation to Libya was raised to the status of an Embassy and thereafter John Tayek was appointed as Ambassador” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 60).

Soviet Union’s role became prominent in the Middle East following the emergence of many small independent Middle Eastern countries. The latter had

sought Soviet Union's help in order to consolidate and strengthen their newly acquired independence. Soviet emerging role in the Middle East was frowned upon by the U.S. as the former appeared to be gaining ground at the expense of the American government which by then had begun to view the area in terms of its strategic interests, especially in economic and security terms. This led President Dwight Eisenhower, on January 5, 1955, to ask the American Congress to grant him the power to provide the economic and military assistance program for the Middle East in order to contain the Soviet Communist hegemony in the area. On March 9, 1957, a joint resolution of the U.S., Houses of Representatives and the Senate approved the proposal. The US President had executive authority to act under what was later termed as the "Eisenhower Doctrine" (see Appendix G).

Despite Soviet denunciation of the Doctrine, Congress authorized the President to initially spend US\$200 million for economic development aid in the Middle East. To dispense this development aid, James P. Richards was appointed as a special assistant. On March 11, 1957, Richards visited North Africa and the Middle East to explain the "Eisenhower Doctrine" and to offer assistance under the aid package. Before Ambassador Richard's visit to Libya, the US Vice President, Richard M. Nixon, called on the Libyan government on March 15, 1957. Nixon took the opportunity to exchange views with Libyan political leaders. Although aid offered to Libya was small, in sum, Mustafa bin Halem accepted it. In so doing, the Libyan government agreed with the U.S. position that the communist consolidation in the area was threatening the national independence of the countries there and the world peace in general. It also accepted the American argument that the U.S. policy

in the Middle East was aimed not at establishing areas of influences or special power center, but at helping to strengthen the area and the peoples so that they could be masters of their own besting. For their part and their particular understanding of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Libyan government was promised additional assistance (Almahdi, 1999, p. 60).

Amidst bitter criticism of the Eisenhower Doctrine by the Arab countries, Libya requested for additional assistance from the U.S. In a joint communiqué between Libya and the U.S. that was announced on March 20, 1957. The extra assistance comprised the following provisions:

1. A general survey of Libya development requirement
2. A advancement of broadcasting services
3. Additional assistance to develop electrical powers
4. Improvement of cable services
5. Improvement of household water distribution system.
6. Educational assistance program, including grants and educational materials.

On acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, “Libya received a US\$7 million aid package, and this had increased to about US\$23 million by the end of the fiscal year 1957” (Essayed, 1994, p. 43).

To administer the U.S. aid, the Libyan government established the Libyan-American Development Department in 1955. An American advisor to the Board of Directors oversaw the activities of the Department. However, the work of this Department was later transferred to the Board of Construction. From then onwards, the functions of the Department were limited to drawing up program. It was assisted

by American assistants and reported to the American Embassy. The main projects included areas such as agriculture, natural resources, health and education.

In 1955, an independent department was established, called the Joint Services Department. This department was attached to Libyan-American Development Department and its main function was to provide assistance in implementing programs funded by American aids. In addition to the Aid, the U.S. also provided Libya with technical assistance to develop agriculture and water resources and fund education as well as the health services. This led to the emergence of the “U.S. Operation Mission” which was run by American experts and expatriates. The needs for development funds and aids had inevitably led to Libyan dependency on the U.S. Naturally this, on the other hand, “meant the loss of Libya’s sovereignty and independence, a heavy price that came with accepting this aid and other related conditions attached to the aid given” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 63).

While oil exports provided the means of achieving national unity, it also generated foreign relations complications and difficulties that surfaced violently for the first time on January 13-14, 1964, students demonstrated in the streets of Tripoli and Benghazi against Israel and the U.S., and supported the Cairo Meeting of Arab States. The demonstrators forced the government to close the Wheelus air base.

Soon thereafter, the Prime Minister Mahmoud Al-Muntasser issued a statement declaring that his government would not propose to renew or extend the military agreement with the U.S...The statement also further declared that it supported the stand taken by other governments of the Arab world in resisting imperialism. Prime Minister Muntasser asserted that his government was committed

to terminating the existing agreements with the U.S. and that a new date will be determined for the eventual evacuation of the base occupied by American military personnel in Libya. This was followed by the passing of resolution by the Libyan Chamber of Deputies (parliament) calling for the quick achievement of this plan, It further stated that if negotiations for eventual evacuation were not carried out, the Chamber would pass legislation to abrogate the treaty and close the base (Almahdi, 1999, p. 66).

The above proposal found adherence among the Libyan press that added its voice calling for the liquidation of the U.S. base. Under pressure from the parliament, the Prime Minister in March 1964 informed the U.S. government that it was not prepared to renew or extend the agreement on the base. In March 1964, the government's position was clarified by the Minister of State, Omar Baruni, who expressed the desire despite the imminent closure of the U.S. bases in Libya. The country wished to continue to maintain economic and trade relations with the U.S. (Wright, 1982, p. 104). On its part, the U.S. continued to hold talks with its Libyan partners on the future status of its base. However, in August 1964, the Libyan Prime Minister announced that the evacuation of the American military personnel had been agreed to in principle. In October, two Libyan-American commissions started discussing the Wheelus airbase, but negotiations did not proceed as a matter of urgency. Furthermore, "both the Libyan and the U.S. governments announced that negotiations were suspended. Following that, there was a little prospect that the Americans would withdraw from Wheelus airbase, at least not until the agreement expired in 1970" (Wright, 1982, p. 104).

The outbreak of the six-day war between Arab and Israel on June 5, 1967, regarding this matter, Michael Oren in his article *Remembering Six Days in 1967*, said, “After a period of high tension between Israel and its neighbors, the war began on June 5 with Israel launching surprise bombing raids against Egyptian air-fields. Within six days, Israel had won a decisive land war. Israeli forces had taken control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria” (Oren, 2011, p. 2).

As elsewhere in the Arab world, the popular reaction in Libya to the war was widespread, prolonged, and violent, especially in Tripoli and Benghazi. Where the American Embassy in Tripoli was attacked after President Nasser and King Husain claimed that the U.S. participated and helped Israel. At the same time, “the Libyan oil workers ignored government appeals to reopen the ports and resume services to ships of “Friendly nations,” oil industry workers refused to load waiting tankers in compliance with the Arab oil industry producers embargo that had been agreed to in Iraq’s capital city, Baghdad” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 67).

In order to solve the crisis, the King Idris has sacked Prime Minister Hussein Maziq on June 28, 1967 and appointed a new premier, Abdul Khader Badri. The new Prime Minister immediately began a campaign to take actions against the Trade Union and the students who had played an active role in the demonstrations. Seven Union leaders were arrested and sentenced to jail (Almahdi, 1999, p. 67).

By 1969, “the U.S. had total domination over the Libyan oil industry, with twenty American companies exploring and producing Libyan oil. By 1968, Libya was second only to Saudi Arabia as the cheapest source of oil for U.S. companies, in

that year, the total American investment had reached US\$1,500 million” (Gebril, 1988, p. 74).

The former Ambassador to Libya David Newsom in an official report estimated that in July 1970, “American investment in Libya had a market value running into several billion U.S. dollars and that their oil operations in Libya accounted for about 88% of the total Libyan oil production. America’s investment in Libya was also reported to contribute about US\$60 million to the U.S. balance of payments in 1969” (Newsom, 1970, p. 93).

By late 1969, Libya was virtually a paradise for western interests in the region. A pro-Western regime had alienated land for Western military installations, supplied the West with low-priced oil under favorable terms and promoted Western influence in the region through its opposition to Arab radicalism.

2.2 The U.S. - Libya Relations 1969-2003

On September 1, 1969, a group comprises of a handful of army personnel who refer to themselves as the Free Unionists' Officer Movement, made a successful attempt to overthrow the monarchy. This group imitated a new government in effect with the title of the (RCC). This government had twelve main representatives headed by twenty seven-year-old Muammar Al-Qadhafi. “The RCC was against all forms of colonialism and imperialism; anti-Western, anti-Soviet, officially non-aligned, they were firmly dedicated to both Arab unity and the support of Palestine” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 97).

According to Blake C & Abu-Osba, “the September 1, 1969 revolution was directed not only against the monarchy but also against foreign dominance of Libya’s economy and foreign policies. One of the objectives of the Revolution was to end Libya’s isolation in the Arab world and start a new and more active role in regional and international politics” (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 240).

Since the closing down of foreign military bases in the country, “the evacuation of American troops and the nationalization of all foreign banks, insurance companies, oil distribution facilities and oil companies, Libya had started to formulate a new course of policies to serve its national and domestic interests” (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 241).

Before entering into the analysis stage of the U.S. and Libya policies toward each other, it is important to take note of the shifts in Libya oil policy and Libya’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.2.1 Libya oil policy

In 1970, after the evacuation of the American and British bases from Libyan soil, Col Qadhafi believed that Libya’s freedom was not complete unless the country’s economy was also liberated from western domination. Libya’s strategy against oil corporations that were controlled by foreign interests comprised of three-step actions, namely raising prices, demanding participation, and nationalization (Wright, 1982, p. 239).

Less than five months after the September revolution, the Libyan leader informed representatives of 21 oil companies that Libyan oil was priced too low in

relation to its production cost, its high quality, and its nearness to markets. Qadhafi also complained that Libyan oil workers were not being fairly treated by their western employers and warned that Libya could survive without oil revenues while it trained its own oil technicians. On top of these, the Libyan leader demanded a number of adjustments, the most important of which was a price increase of about US\$0.44 per barrel (Almahdi, 1999, p. 72).

The oil companies rejected the demand and made a counter offer of between US\$0.06 and US\$0.10 per barrel increase. Confronted with this, the Libyan government restarted to a successful counter strategy. First, the Libyan government confronted independent oil companies that developed and exported most of Libyan oil. As these independent oil companies such as Occidental, Continental, Marathon, Amerada and Banker Hunt had most of their Middle East oil investments and operations in Libya, they were more fearful of losing out on their investments. Second, the Libyan government threatened to cut back production and to nationalize the oil industry. Third, Libya coordinated its efforts with some oil-producing Arab countries in order to show the companies that Libya did not stand alone in its oil battle. Fourth, the country established contacts with European, Soviet, and Japanese firms in its effort to show that the American oil companies could easily be replaced. Finally, the Libyan government demonstrated its seriousness in its effort to stop completely all sorts of oil production and exportation if the oil companies did not comply (Almahdi, 1999, p. 73).

On September 4, 1970, it was announced that Libya had accepted in the posted price, plus a US\$0.02 increase in the posted price, plus a US\$0.30 increase in

the posted price, plus a US\$0.02 increase annually for the next five years from 1971. In return, it was also agreed that the tax rate be revised from 50% to 58% and that the company be allowed to increase production from 435,000 barrels per day to 700,000 per day. A little more than two weeks later, on September 21, three independent oil-producing partners in the Oasis group (Continental, Amerada, and Marathon) agreed to a broadly similar term, and before the end of the month, all other remaining companies had followed suit, except Shell, which refused to sign the agreement. Consequently, “the government stopped all Shell productions, which amounted to 150,000 barrels per day - i.e., which was shared with the Oasis production total of about 900,000 barrels per day” (Bearman, 1986, p. 90).

On October 16, Shell complied with the government’s demand. The Libyan action against foreign oil producing companies inspired other oil-producing countries to initiate their own demands. In July 1970, Algeria imposed an increase of US\$0.72 per barrel on French oil companies. By the end of the year, the Shah of Iran was pressuring for an increase in the price of oil from the foreign oil companies there. Consequently, most OPEC countries began demanding a US\$0.30 increase per barrel above the posted price and a tax base of about 55% (Fergiani, 1976, p. 194).

In the second and third stages of the Libyan action with regard to its new oil policy, it became clear that the oil issue was being turned into a political weapon. The first indication was toward the end of 1971, when the oil companies collectively agreed to resist any demands for any increases in prices in order, they argued, to compensate for the devaluation of the U.S. dollar. In November 1971, Britain withdrew from three tiny Islands of Thanab Alkobra, Thanab Essogra and Abo-

Mossa situated in the Strait of Hourmoz, leaving them to be occupied by Iran, which was then perceived to be a close ally of Israel. Libya responded by announcing a full nationalization of all British Petroleum rights in the country (Bearman, 1986, p. 90).

On July 11, 1973, Libya announced the nationalization of Hunt's assets as a "strong slap in the cool arrogant face" of the U.S. for its support of Israel. This action, the Libyan leader said, was a warning to the U.S. to "end its hostility toward the Arab nations" (Gebril, 1985, p. 56).

On August 13, 1973, the RCC issued a decree nationalizing the U.S. - owned Occidental Oil Company. On September 1, 1973, Libya issued a 16 article law nationalizing 51% of the assets of all the remaining Oil Companies in Libya. This policy was not outright nationalization. It was part of a general program of 'Libyalization' the economy. A total nationalization could not be pursued then, at least not until the Libyan personnel could be trained to take over the operation completely.

However, this fact did not prevent the revolutionary government to use oil as part of its weapon even then; Libya took part in the oil embargo of 1973 and was strongly opposed to lifting it. Even so, the embargo was lifted in early 1974. Nevertheless, Libyan government was persistent in its oil stand, for instance, as an immediate response to the Washington oil conference of consuming states on February 11, 1974, that was seen by the Arabs as an American attempt to intimidate them, Qadhafi decided to nationalize three American companies. These included the remaining 49% share of the California Asiatic Company, the American Overseas Petroleum Company, and the Libyan- American Oil Company. "The impact of Libya

oil policy was strongly felt during the 1970s through pricing, nationalization and boycotts. However, “these forms of policy started to change during the 1980s due to the world economic recession, the oil glut in the world market and the U.S. pressure” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 74).

In October 1981, the Reagan administration requested the American oil companies operating in Libya to terminate their operations and leave Libya. This was followed by the U.S. embargo of Libyan oil. As a result, Libya’s revenues dropped from US\$24 billion in 1980 to less than US\$14 billion in 1981 (Gebril, 1985, p. 143).

The U.S. economic pressure, which came during an oil glut in the world market, inevitably caused considerable damage to the marketing of Libyan oil and Libyan plans for development. In March 1982, Qadhafi described the country’s situation as follows:

What is happening is that the oil market has been flooded, there is a glut? Oil tankers are loaded with oil, but no one wants to buy. This is due to the increase in Saudi oil production, which has reached 8.5 million barrels per day. As a result of the surplus due to the Saudi oil, we cannot sell the quantity that we decided to sell because those who would buy from us will say they are buying from Saudi (Qadhafi, 1982).

The Libyan petroleum Secretary added his explanation: “Our own revenues, plans and assistance to friendly and sisterly countries have been harmed as a result of this hostile imperialist stand imposed on our people” (Gebril, 1985, p. 144).

The U.S. economic pressure on Libya was perceived as an imperial plot against Libya. “This plot could never have had much effect on Libya’s economy if it were not for the “reactionary” Saudi regime which assisted the U.S. by increasing their oil production so that the Libya factor in oil can be neutralized without

affecting the needs of consumer countries, including especially the U.S” (Gebril, 1985, p. 144).

2.2.2 Libya Policy towards the Arab- Israel Conflict

The September revolution was triggered by the defeat of the Arab in the Arab- Israeli War in June 1967, Libya saw Israel as an enemy state whose aim was to serve imperialist policies and ambitions through dividing the Arab nation. Libya’s policy under Qadhafi was clear. The right way to dealing with this enemy state, Qadhafi pointed out “... is by eliminating it, and this can only be done by force” (Gebril, 1985, p. 45).

Libya believes that victory over Israel is possible only if the Arabs are united and willing to engage a full battle against the former. On its part, Libya was ready to place the country’s Manpower, oil and financial resources at the disposal of the Arab states fighting Israel. This commitment was seen when Libya’s fulfilled its promise in the 1973 October war. Libya provided assistance to Syria and Egypt with oil, funds and weapons to enable both countries to carry on the fighting against Israel (Blake & Abu- Osba, 1982, p. 248).

The war aid was given even as Libya disagreed with the Egyptian - Syrian war plans and goals. It had felt that both countries should not have limited their objectives to the Liberation of the Sinai desert in Egypt and the Golan Heights in Syria, but should have also strived for the complete liberation of Palestine (Blake & Abu- Osba, 1982, p. 249).

Libyan leader Col Qadhafi made it clear that will not take part in any war unless its objective is the liberation of Palestine and further stipulated that the battle should be conducted on the enemy's territory. He also advocated for the countries from which they had come from the Jews, whom he calls "our cousins and brothers" should be allowed to "live in our midst in peace as they did in the past" (Gebril, 1985, p. 49). Col Qadhafi does not see any way for the Arabs and Israelis to co-exist because, in his view, there are in the Arab region, two nationalities, two religions, two civilizations, two nations and two heterogeneous histories, of which can absorb the other and the relationship between them is that of hostility. Therefore, it is inevitable for the conflict to continue until one of the two entities in finished off (Gebril, 1985, p. 50).

Since the region can accommodate only one entity, Qadhafi further argued that, "the Arabs must maintain their military preparedness and not to lie down their guard because the big battle is yet to come as he put it: I am of the opinion we work for further preparation and determination because the conflict between Israel and us is natural and is one of the laws of nature" (Blake & Abu- Osba, 1982, p. 249).

Libya's support for the Liberation of Palestine because more prominent, especially after Egyptian President Sadat's new policy in the Middle East that was signed in the "Camp David Accords" between Egypt and Israel. The Accord led Libya to not only finance arm and train the Palestinian military personnel, but to also actively participate in the Palestinian operation against Israel (Gebril, 1985, p. 101).

Libya's policy toward the Arab - Israel conflict became more important and prominent. The Camp David Accords of September 1975 and Sadat's visit to Israel

in November 1977 gave Libya the opportunity to exert its role in the Arab world. Libya was convinced that the single possible solution to the Arab-Israel dispute is through armed struggle and using western economic interests in the region as a pressuring tool against any country that would support Israel, especially the U.S., and it did not see that the U.S. as a friend of the Arabs because the latter not only has been arming Israel but has also been supporting Israel to occupy Palestine.

2.2.3 Libya's Foreign Policy towards the U.S

The Libyan perception of the U.S. had been mainly shaped by its national and international interests. "The U.S. was perceived as an imperialistic power that sought military, economic, and political domination over the Arab nation, Western countries in general and the U.S. in particular, had invented Israel in the Arab land in their effort to keep the Arab nations divided, backward and dependent" (Almahdi, 1999, p. 76).

Libya's rejectionist policy and stand towards the U.S. was clear from the start, especially following the rise of the new leadership after the September revolution. Hence, immediately after the revolution, the new Libya demanded that the U.S. and Britain withdraw their military presence from the Libyan soil (Almahdi, 1999, p. 76).

Having been successful in getting rid of the American and British military presence, Libya's continuing antagonistic policy towards the U.S. was further fueled by the American support of Israel. Libyan policy toward U.S. during the 1969-1976 periods followed a dual track pattern. The first emphasized the strengthening of

economic and cultural relations, taking into account that most of the oil sectors in Libya were staffed and operated by American companies and that Libya also needed American oil technology (Gebril, 1985, p. 64). Hence, this period witnessed stronger economic relations between the two countries. Libya was also an important Arab oil exporter to the U.S. Table 2.1 shows the volume of trade between the two countries. In addition, thousands of Libyan students were sent to the U.S. for study in various fields of education (Almahdi, 1999, p. 78).

Table 2.1
Libya – U.S. Trade 1969-1976

Year	Export to U.S.(US\$ 1000)	Import from U.S. (US\$ 1000)
1969	111,087	126,425
1970	63,233	76,459
1971	161,871	48,508
1972	227,046	65,770
1973	301,727	95,556
1974	7,055	107,226
1975	1,498,813	141,452
1976	2,466,253	131,720

Sources: United Nations yearbook of international trade Statistics: 1969 – 1976.

The second track policy emphasizes that in order to maintain good Libya-U.S. relations, it was necessary that the U.S. changed its stand regarding the Arab-Israel conflict. Towards this objective, Libya tried to use the means at its disposal to pressure the U.S. to change its policy in the Middle East. This included using oil as a political weapon. According to Gebril, “Libya took part in the oil embargo of 1973

and was opposed to lifting it. The embargo was lifted early in 1975” (Gebriel, 1985, p. 65). For instance, on February 11, 1974, following the Washington Oil Conference of the Consuming States, which was considered by the Arabs as an American attempt to intimidate them, Qadhafi decided to fully nationalize three American companies. That included the remaining 49 percent share of the California Asiatic Company, the American Overseas Petroleum Company, and the Libyan-American Oil Company. Once again, as John Cooley put it, “Western resistance to Qadhafi collapsed, and Qadhafi proved to Libya and the rest of the world that oil was indeed a political weapon, and that he could successfully use it, especially when it was to his advantage to do so” (Cooley, 1981, p. 74).

By 1976, the Libyan approach toward the U.S. was back on the double track that called for better relations while showing complete dissatisfaction with the U.S. policy toward Israel. On September 27, 1976, Libyan Press Minister, Mohammed Zawai, stated that “Libya would like to establish normal relations with the U.S., but the U.S. is deliberately opposed to any improvements in relations” (Essayed, 1994, p. 65).

He further argued the U.S. establishment to enter into a new dialogue. To further assert his Press Minister’s statement, the Libyan leader told the “Jeune Afrique” magazine on October 8, 1976 that he wished his country’s relations with the U.S. were as good as those that were established with the Soviet Union.

Qadhafi further blamed the Americans for the coldness in the U.S. - Libyan relations, arguing that it was Washington, which had refused to exchange ambassadors and that Libya was willing to buy arms from the U.S. only to be turned

down (Essayed, 1994, p. 66). On October 14, 1976, the Libyan ambassador to the United Nations attacked the conduct of both Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, whom the former accused of conducting their presidential election campaigns as if they were running for the post of Mayor of Tel Aviv, the capital city of Israel (Pasha, 1984, p. 15).

On June 11, 1977, Libya urged the U.S. President, Jimmy Carter to improve relations by exchanging ambassadors but such hope was not realized not only because the U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict did not change but also because the new administration started early in May 1977 to adopt a more hostile attitude and policy towards Libya.

The U.S. began to publicly accuse Libya of terrorism and blocked the sale of Italian transport aircraft to Libya (St. John, 2002, p. 110). Libya's negative perception and hostility towards the U.S. grew even stronger after the U.S. sided with Egypt when the latter assaulted Libya in July 1977. In that incident, Libya accused the U.S. of not only supporting Egypt but was also directly involved in the military operations into Libyan territory. America's continuing refusal to sell military equipment to Libya was also interrupted as a sign of hostility. The announcement of the sale of military equipment worth US\$200 million to Egypt just after the Libyan-Egyptian war was seen as a clear indication of U.S. antagonism (St. John, 2002, p. 110).

Between the late 1978 and the end of 1979, some improvements in U.S. - Libyan relations seemed to have taken place. This improvement may have been brought about as a result of the official contacts that took place between officials of

both countries during the 1978-1979 periods. During 1978-1979, Libyan policy vis-à-vis the U.S. moved in two directions, the first was the diplomatic official line that focused on intensive contacts with U.S. officials for the purpose of explaining the facts of Libya's foreign policy and eliminating some of the misunderstanding of Libya's policies, especially regarding terrorism. It was hoped that improved U.S. - Libyan relations could start by securing the release of the purchased C-130 planes.

The second direction focused on establishing some circles of friendship with some American celebrities (such as Billy Carter, Lillian Carter, Senator Fulbright, Mohammed Ali) who were perceived as having some potential for influencing U.S. policy toward Libya, Libya's people - to - people approach was centered mainly in Georgia, the President's home state, and Idaho, the home state of Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was opposed to the delivery of the C-130 planes to Libya. Delegations of businessmen from both states visited Libya in 1978, and also Libyan delegations were received in both states in 1978-1979 (Lahweij, 1998, p. 103).

The prospect of strengthening the economic relations between the two states and Libya was discussed. Billy Carter, the President's brother, was a member of the Georgia delegation. In 1978 and in September 1979, he and his brother and sister attended the tenth anniversary of the Libyan Revolution, "when it was also reported that he was photographed together with Yasser Arafat and other liberation movement members, it was also claimed that he promised to try to do something about the release of the C-130 planes to Libya" (Lahweij, 1998, p. 103).

Libya's contacts in both states attracted media attention, especially from journalists with connections to the Zionist Lobby in Washington. Claim was made that Libya was trying to win the support of Idaho's Senator James McClure, and Representative Steven Symms, in an effort to get the delivery of the planes. It was also suggested that the same objective was behind the Libyan flirtation with Billy Carter, other press reports suggested that the Libyan "infiltration" of Idaho was mainly for the purpose of basing some candidates who sympathized with Libya, such as Steven Symms against Frank Church in the coming elections of 1980 (Lahweij, 1998, p. 104).

Another major effort at the people's level, which did not get much attention in the press, was Libya's hosting of the Arab-American People-to-People Dialogue Conference in Tripoli. In October 1978, the conference was attended by former Senator William Fulbright, Najeeb Halabi, and Richard C. Shadyac representing the U.S. It was a good opportunity for the Libyans to clarify and explain their point of view regarding many issues in general, and terrorism and the Camp David Accords in particular. Again, it was reported in the press that Fulbright pledged "to be going home to have the planes released that Libya had paid for never received" (Lahweij, 1998, p. 105). But this did not lead to any positive improvement thereafter because it had not been based on any comprehensive political understanding. Thus, the improvement in relations was very short-lived.

By December 1979, relations between the two countries had dropped to their lowest level. This was precipitated by a demonstration staged by about 2000 Libyans on December 2, 1979, in support of the burning of the American Embassy in

Pakistan and the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran. The American Embassy in Tripoli was reportedly attacked and burned. Following this, relations with the U.S. went downhill from bad to worse. In response, the U.S. accused Libya of sponsoring the attack on the Tunisian of Gafsa. In the incident, both U.S. and France provided prompt military assistance to the Tunisian regime. In February 4, 1980, the French Embassy in Tripoli was sacked. In retaliation, the U.S. withdrew its charge d'affaires from Tripoli, soon thereafter. A press report revealed that an assassination campaigns against Qadhafi's allies aboard was underway in Europe. Following this, the U.S. reacted by ordering its two remaining diplomats in Tripoli home and closing the Embassy (Essayed, 1994, p. 82).

When Ronald Regan was elected the U.S President in 1981, Libya expressed the hope that there might be a positive change in the U.S. stand towards Libya and the Arab-Israel conflict, Libyan Leader Qadhafi sent a letter to Reagan asking him for a positive stand toward the conflict, but this fresh hope soon faded as the new administration started to follow through with the aggressive policy toward Libya. The expulsion of members of the Libyan Bureau in Washington showed that the new government was determined to put more pressure on Libya. To the Libyans, the new administration appeared more indifferent than the previous Carter administration (Pasha, 1982, p. 18).

Consequently, Libya started to use the Soviet card as a measure that might further deter increasing American pressure on Libya. This approach was clearly illustrated in Major Jalloud's statement in May 1981, "Libya is a neutral country but

... the U.S. pressures do not help it remain neutral and could force it to become completely pro-Soviet” (Gebril, 1985, p. 151).

In addition to this tactical approach, Libya was still trying to show its readiness for dialogue and compromise with the U.S. This readiness was reflected in a June 1981 visit by a high-level Libyan official to Washington to meet with U.S. officials and members of Congress to clarify what was believed to be a “misperceived Libyan policy” (Gebril, 1985, p. 151). The visit did not bring about any concrete results. By July, Col Qadhafi was again calling on the Arabs to reexamine their “alliance with the enemy of Arab’s nations (i.e. America) and the cheap and deep flowing supplies of oil, which only meets into requirements for the enemy” (Gebril, 1985, p. 151).

In August 1981, Libya sent a note to the Security Council charging that the U.S. was making preparations to launch a military attack upon Libya. On August 17, Libya signed a friendship treaty with Ethiopia and South Yemen pledging to combat the “Imperial influence” in the area. This treaty was viewed by the U.S. as “a threat to American interests in East Africa” (Pasha, 1982, p. 18).

Throughout the period 1982-1986, Libya’s perception toward the U.S. followed a dual approach. First, reacting to the growing American squeeze and second expressing willingness for better relations, the U.S. economic embargo of Libya was viewed as another step of “American terrorism” against Libya. On March 9, Libyan radio announced that an American informant had told the Libyan security authorities that Israel would soon launch a military offensive on Southern Lebanon and that during the same time the U.S. would attack Libya (Gebril, 1985, p. 153).

Libya's willingness for a compromise and better relations with the U.S. was expressed by the Libyan leader during his visit to Austria in March 1982, when it was reported that he had asked chancellor Kresiky to mediate between the two countries. In June 1982, Col Qadhafi reasserted this readiness when he stood in an interview with the Italian "La Repubblica":

I believe dialogue is possible with the U.S....This is why we issue continual invitations; we are always willing to negotiate with the U.S. (Gebril, 1985, p. 282).

Libya's basic stand was that normal diplomatic relations with the U.S. could and should be maintained to promote mutual interests. This was despite the existence of a very basic contradiction between the two countries foreign policies.

As Qadhafi argued in his statement in September 1981:

We went to all states and asked to mediate [on our behalf] with the U.S. so that we might have normal relations with the U.S., we did not want to be enemies or friends with the U.S.; we wanted to have diplomatic relations with the U.S. and if there was any room for mutual interests, then we would welcome it. However, the U.S. interests that there should be not relations, as long as there are revolution in Libya (Qadhafi, 1981).

According to the Libyan view, one of Libya's obstacles to normal relations with the U.S. was due to President Ronald Reagan, who was not held in any high regards by the Libyans. For example, in one of his numerous statements, Qadhafi spoke of President Reagan as follows:

He was born to be an unsuccessful actor. All his acting dealt with the smuggling of funds outside America. Col Qadhafi added, "How could he [Reagan] become President of the greatest state on earth? What a comedy-the comedy of the 20th century, the absurdity of the 20th century, the triviality of the 20th century" (Qadhafi, 1981).

This quote typifies the mutual antipathy between President Reagan and Col Qadhafi, but also shows a respect for the U.S. as “the greatest state on earth.” During a news conference on April 9, 1986, Ronald Reagan called Qadhafi “this mad dog of the Middle East.” The insult was of particular severity to Arab’s ears, to which comparison with dogs was made, let alone mad dogs. “This hostility caused the U.S. to seek the opportunity to overthrow Qadhafi; it also orchestrated attempts on his life, Reagan thus characterized Libya as an outlaw state” (Gebriel, 1988, p. 152).

On December 21, 1988, Pan American flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground, including several U.S. government employees. “Early theories about the responsibility blamed different groups and states, including a drug-smuggling operation with claims of a connection to the CIA. Libya was not initially among the accused, which included Iran, directly or by proxy, Syria and radical Palestinian groups aligned with both countries” (Matar & Robert, 2004, p. 7). However, “those who accused Iran claimed the main incentive for this attack to seek revenge for the U.S. Navy shooting down of an Iran Air flight over the Persian Gulf in July 1988 killing 290 people abroad” (Matar & Robert, 2004, p. 7).

However, after a lengthy and costly investigation, the crisis began officially on November 14, 1991, almost three years after the Lockerbie incident. The U.S. District court for the District of Columbia and the Lord Advocate of Scotland announced their discoveries and indictment. In Washington, the indictments of two Libyan citizens, Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah alleged that the defendants and co-conspirators as officers and operatives of the

Jamahiriya Security Organization (JSO) to carry out the scheme to destroy flight Pam Am-103, this was an American aircraft. Not long after in November 27, 1991, France, and the UK and the U.S. issued a tripartite declaration demanding Libya hand over the suspects. “This prompted the U.S. and Britain to send a joint memorandum to the Libya’s authorities on November 27, 1991 asking them to provide all the defendants to trial reveal any available information and allow full access to witnesses, documents and other evidence, in addition to the payment of appropriate compensation to the families of the victims” (Matar & Robert, 2004, p. 9).

The Libyans considered this as a form of warning, especially in the side (to comply fully with the U.S.), which was considered a prejudice to the sovereignty of Libya. It also included compensation for families of victims before waiting for the outcome of the investigation. When Libya refused to surrender the suspects, Washington and London started the initiative in insisting for the UN sanctions in order to force Libya to cooperate with investigations process. “The debate within the U.N. on how to respond to the attacks occurred in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, in which the international community had successfully acted to protect itself from an aggressive state. As the leader of the campaign against Saddam Hussein the Bush administration was better situated than the Reagan administration to court the support of the international community” (St. John, 2002, p. 167). In January 1992, the UNSC endorsed their demands, this is the first time that the UNSC requested a country to hand its own citizens, leading some nations to express disbelief over the

tendency of the Council - and its permanent members- to redefine international standards.

The first reaction by Libyan decision makers in dealing with this note was of make a declaration. This was done by the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation on May 13, 1992. The statement included: Firstly, Libya had decided to end its relations with all groups and organizations which were involved in any sort of international terrorist activities. Secondly, Libya confirmed that it had no training camps or facilities for terrorists or groups of terrorists to operate on its soil, and Libya invited any committee appointed by the Security Council or the UN Secretariat or any other organization of the UN to come and investigate the truth. Thirdly, Libya would not allow any organization or individual by any means to carry out terrorist activities directly or indirectly and was willing to punish severely any Libyan or any other nationals living in Libya who had proven to be involved in terrorist activities. Fourthly, Libya was obliged to respect the choice of all countries and wished to develop its relations on mutual respect and non-involvement in the international affairs of any countries (See Appendix H).

The Libyan authorities also announced that it would prosecute the defendants named in that note under the Libyan judiciary. Because of difficulty of dealing with the note or acceptance of its items, according with Montreal Convention, that signed on September 23, 1971, about the violence accidents against civil aviation which had ratified by the U.S. and Libya and Great Britain. Libya has two options between handing the suspects or prosecuting them. Libya decided to initiate an investigation

on its own, and it will provide information about the progress of the investigations to the American and British authorities (Plachta, 2001, p. 127).

The U.S and UK rejected the Libyan step, and asked the UNSC to face this threat to international peace and security, which led Libya to pass the case to the International Court of Justice, under the pretext of violation of the U.S and UK for the Geneva Convention and to stop the threat of coercion. Some non- permanent members of the UNSC faced a strong pressure from the U.S. and UK to stand with its position. However, reportedly that China was also threatened with the loss of preferential trade status if it used its veto against the decision. “The following year, similar U.S. pressure marked the passage of a new resolution intensifying the sanctions: the council ordered a partial freeze on Libyan assets and sanctioned equipment needed for oil refineries and export” (Sinnar, 2000, p. 27).

According to a report on the impact of UN sanctions against Libya, which was referred to the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali by the Libyan Mission to the UN in September 1996 the sanctions had caused “tragic toll” in all areas of humanitarian, economic and social, causing as many as 17,820 deaths in three and a half years. Libya claimed that agriculture was the hardest-hit sector, with losses estimated at US\$5.9 billion. The total of losses was estimated at US\$24 billion (See Appendix I).

In his letter dated July 22, 1996 to the President of the Security Council, Col Qadhafi said:

The world as a whole is no longer able to bear this injustice. Indeed, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the members of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States, which are the overwhelming majority of the members of the UN are threatening to abandon their

compliance with the unjust Security Council resolutions against Libya, resolutions that have no parallel in history, having become convinced of the justice of Libya's cause and the soundness of its position and having been affected by the grievous suffering of the Libyan people and by the damage caused to all of these peoples in a number of fields (see Appendix J).

In the period between 1992 and 1998, there are many Arab, Islamic, and African countries that objected to impose sanctions on Libya. "From the outset, many argued that U.S. and British actions had exacerbated the crisis and challenged international law, and urged them to accept a compromise. In 1994, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on the U.S. and Britain to accept a trial of the two suspects in a neutral third country, a proposal apparently accepted by Libya and the regional organizations" (Sinnar, 2000, p. 28).

In the author's interview with ambassador Abdul Nasser Saleh, the Assistant Director for African Affairs in Libyan Foreign Ministry said, I believe the efforts of African leaders in general and President Nilsson Mandela, in particular, to mediate between the two parties in order to persuade them to accept to hold a trial in a third country, were the most important in the Lockerbie case. In fact, we owe to those leaders who struggled with us to settle this long-standing dispute (Saleh, personal communication May 16, 2010).

President Mandela also intervened to regulate the trial of two Libyans accused by the U.S. and the UK in the Lockerbie bombing. In 1992, Mandela informally suggested to President George H.W. Bush to try the Libyans in a third country. Bush accepted the proposal as did the French President François Mitterrand, and King Juan Carlos of Spain. In November 1994, six months after his election, Mandela suggested that South Africa was the suitable country to host the trial but the

British Prime Minister John Major rejected the idea, saying that his government did not trust a foreign court. Mandela renewed his bid three years later to Tony Blair in 1997. The same year, at a conference of heads of Commonwealth governments in Edinburgh, Mandela warned that “no nation should be complainant, prosecutor and judge” (Hamill & Lee, 2001, p. 37).

The pressure on the U.S. and UK had increased in 1998, while the two accused not hand over to trial after several years of sanctions. Furthermore, the statements of the South African President Nelson Mandela and his call for the lifting of the embargo on Libya received appreciation and respect from everyone. Moreover, the International Court of Justice ruled in February 1998 that it had mandate to look into the issue, not a judgment on the merits of the case, but a political nuisance for the U.S. and UK position in UNSC.

In this connection Shirin Sinnar (2000) pointed out that, “In an open debate in March 1998 at the U.N., many countries demanded an end to sanctions on Libya. That summer, the Organization of African Unity passed a resolution instructing its members to ignore the sanctions, and the Non-Aligned Movement (representing over 100 countries) threatened to do the same at its next meeting. These were unprecedented challenges: in effect, a majority of the U.N.’s states were threatening to defy mandatory U.N. sanctions. At the same time, British victims’ families came out in support of the compromise proposal. Commercial interests thirstily eyed Libyan oil and a general disenchantment with sanctions dampened the enthusiasm for their maintenance” (Sinnar, 2000, p. 29).

Consequence of these developments, the U.S. and UK accepted to hold the trial in Holland under the Scots law. Kofi Annan announced the U.N. sanctions against Libya would be suspended and could be lifted after 90 days, as provided in Security Council resolution (1192) on August 27, 1998.

On April 5 1999, after seven years of U.N. sanctions and thirteen years of the U.S. sanctions and a few months of Arab and African mediations, Kofi Anan and Nelson Mandela, met with Col Qadhafi and offered personal assurances that the Scottish courts sitting in The Netherlands could be trusted to be fair and impartial. Libya surrendered the suspects to the U.N. to face trial in The Netherlands, and the U.N. suspended its sanctions (without lifting) (Sinnar, 2000, pp. 27-28). Thus, after more than a dozen years of controversy and recriminations, and nine years and three months of accusations by British - Americans against the Libyan officials, and after twenty- two months, they handed over the suspects for trial, which considered by former British Foreign Secretary as an innovative solution imagination. The judges had more than ten thousand pages to read, while the legal proceedings and hearings lasted about eighty-four days during the court listened 230 witnesses. The cost of this trial was more than 30 million pounds sterling, which was the most expensive in Britain judicial history. On January 31, 2001, three Scottish judges found only one of the suspects, Abdel Basset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi guilty of murder and acquitted the second defendant, Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima. “The U.S. welcomed the guilty verdict but still refused to lift sanctions until Libya complied with the remaining conditions stipulated by the U.N., including the payment of compensation to the families of the victims” (St. John, 2002, pp. 183-187).

The most important events in Libya’s rapprochement with the West had taken place since the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, which paved the way for starting intelligence collaboration and to quicken political rapprochement. Libya had truth be told been the first to report Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to Interpol in

1998. In his proclamation to the American people, Col Qadhafi denounced the terrorist strikes and said that, “despite political differences and conflicts with America. This should not become a psychological barrier against offering assistance and humanitarian aid to U.S. citizens and all people in America, who suffered most from these horrific attacks” (St. John, 2002, p. 191), and he urged Libyans to donate blood for the U.S. victims.

Libya itself faced internal challenges including assassination plots on Col Qadhafi in June 1996, and June 1998, by extremist groups usually consisting of returning Mujahedeen, such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which President Bush named as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity through the medium of Executive Order 12334 signed on September 23, 2001 (Kohlmann & Lefkowitz, 2007, p. 17).

During the year 2000, the first signs of a rapprochement between Libya and the U.S. appeared, prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Libya had already taken steps calculated to improve its relations with the U.S. In October 2001, the U.S. and Libyan officials met in London to discuss Libya’s compliance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions. On April 29, 2003, Libya announced a formal plan to compensate the Pan Am 103 victims’ families. Libya agreed to pay US\$10 million in compensation to the family of each victim, adding up to a total of US\$2.7 billion. According to the agreement, this compensation is payable in three installments, with the total to be deposited in a special account for eight months during which time sanctions were to be lifted or the agreement considered void. The first installment of US\$4 million per family, was set to be paid after Libya’s

declaration of its responsibility; the second, also US\$4 million for each family, when the U.S. agreed to lift trade sanctions against Libya, and the last installment of US\$2 million, when the U.S. agreed to remove Libya from its list of countries that harbor terrorism.

It seems that the Libyan leadership's goal behind the Lockerbie deal was to achieve five objectives: Firstly, close the judicial branch of the victims by gave up their rights to future claims against the Libyan leadership after receiving generous compensation. Secondly, lifting of sanctions imposed on Libya by the U.N. Security Council since 1992. The sanctions hurt Libya politically, economically and diplomatically. Thirdly, lifting U.S. sanctions on Libya would open the door for U.S. companies to invest in its oil and help to modernize Libya's oil industry, which suffered from a lot of difficulties. Fourthly, removing Libya from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, Accusation of supporting terrorism had caused panic in many of the Arab leaders, including the Libyan leadership. Finally bringing Libya to the international arena, and establishing its diplomatic presence regionally and globally, after the stifling long isolation.

According to Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, "Libya insists on Washington's stating explicitly that, following the settlement; it will permanently lift the barriers to Libya's normal relations with the outside world. This applies particularly to the U.S. itself. Libya must no longer be subject to an embargo ... Its name must be removed from the list of states that sponsor terrorism, its citizens must no longer be singled out for discrimination in obtaining American visas" (Al-Qadhafi, 2003, p. 39).

2.2.4 U.S Policy toward Libya

From the early days of the Libyan revolution, the Libyan government had declared that any nation maintaining diplomatic relations with Libya would be considered as recognizing the new Libyan government. The U.S. itself was maintaining diplomatic ties with the new government and looked forward to continuing good relations as they had been in the past. Libya's antagonism towards communism in general and the Soviet Union, in particular, was used by some U.S. officials to convince President Richard Nixon and his top aides to recognize the new-born regime. The U.S. viewed Libyan earlier political as anti-Soviet, and that they were seen as not only resisting communism domestically but also seen as combating communism in other Arab countries as well as non-Arab states, for example, Libya's stand towards the communism coup attempt in Sudan in 1971 and its support of Pakistan in the latter's war with India were seen by the U.S. as strong indication of Libya anti-Soviet attitude. Initially, this served as an important basis for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Libya.

The U.S. relations with Libya during 1970-1973 had reached a high level of understanding by 1970 as the U.S. was Libya's second largest supplier of primary capital goods. The value of U.S. exports to Libya was estimated at US\$104.4 million. In 1971, the amount dropped to about US\$77.7 million, but it grew steadily and reached US\$103.7 million in 1973. In contrast, imports from Libya grew steadily, from about US\$39.1 million in 1970 to about US\$215.8 million in 1973 (Almahdi, 1999, p. 107).

In early 1973, the U.S. sent its first signal of dissatisfaction with Libya's policies by not appointing a successor to the American Ambassador (Joseph Palmer) who had resigned in late 1972. From that time until May 1980, U.S. - Libyan relations were conducted through a charge d'affaires. In 1973, the U.S. blocked the delivery of another eight C-130 planes to Libya despite the fact that Libya had paid for them. The U.S. also decided not to sell Libya military weapons and certain other equipment that could add significantly to Libya's armed capabilities.

The U.S. reaction to the Libyan nationalization of the American oil companies was in contrast to its earlier passivity in 1970 - 1972, for instance, when Libya nationalized the shares of Banker Hunt oil company in June 1973, the U.S. officially protested by calling the measure "arbitrary and discriminatory." Libya retaliated by nationalizing three other companies that had made legal claims against Libya, informed other companies not to export oil from the fields under the legal dispute, and requested other governments not to receive oil from those fields (Almahdi, 1999, p. 108).

Between mid-1973 and 1976, U.S. policy toward Libya started to show some signs of being under pressure due to new development in Libyan foreign policy. First, the growing involvement of Libya in the Arab-Israeli conflict was reflected in Libya's military involvement in the preparations for the 1973 October war and its opposition to the American-sponsored peace plans that followed the war. Second, Libya was willing to use oil as a political weapon. Between 1973 and 1974, it nationalized four U.S. companies. Third, the growing Libyan -Soviet rapprochement

began in May 1974, and it was followed by Libya's purchase of substantial quantities of sophisticated Soviet arms (Almahdi, 1999, p. 108).

After the Libyan-Soviet rapprochement in May 1974, the U.S. began to exert more pressure on Libya. On January 21, 1975, Libya's purchase of a US\$200 million air-defense system - a computer from Westinghouse and the radar equipment from Northrop - was delayed. In August 1975, the state department confirmed the action and refused to permit Libyan air force trainees to enter the U.S. for training in aircraft maintenance. By the end of 1976, for the first time, the U.S. used a different kind of political pressure. "In President Ford's press conference of July 1970, he stated that Libyan activities might have stimulated terrorism. This charge became a policy line in the 31st session of UN General Assembly when the U.S. led a group of European countries in attempting to accuse Libya of financing and supporting terrorism" (Bianco, 1975, p. 76).

In 1977, the U.S. publicly condemned what it called "Libya's support of international terrorism" and its subversive activities in neighboring countries. Therefore, in April 1977, it granted President Sadat's request for arms under the pretext of countering the Libyan threat. More weapons were also sent after the Libyan - Egyptian military clashes of July 1977 by using the same argument. "In the meantime, the U.S. continued its ban on the delivery of the eight C-130 planes to Libya and also rejected Qadhafi's proposal to appoint an ambassador; instead, the appointment of a charge d'affaires was acceptable" (Gebriel, 1985, pp. 226-227).

By mid-1978, U.S. policy toward Libya seemed less restrictive. In May 1977, the U.S. State Department lifted its ban on the sale of two Boeing 727s estimated

worth about US\$30 million that was ordered by the Libyan Airlines. But the lifting of the ban was only after the Boeing Company had warned that Libya might buy the European Airbus instead. “The delivery of the two Boeings in November was followed by another sale of 400 heavy trucks estimated to worth about US\$70 million from the Oshkosh Truck Corporation” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 110).

From mid-1979, U.S.-Libyan relations moved talks between Libyan and American officials that took place from late 1978 until November 1979. The talks were conducted at a level higher than at any time since the early days of the revolution. From the Libyan side, Major Abdussalam Jallud, who was perceived by U.S. officials to be the second man in Libya, Libyan foreign Secretary Dr. Ali Turayki, and Libyan’s representative to the U.N., while from the American side, U.S. Secretary Cyrus Vance, Undersecretary for political affairs David Newsom and Ambassador Quainton participated in those talks, though the talks confirmed the wide differences that divided the two governments. Soon the U.S. aggressive policy returned when U.S. stopped the export of three Boeing 747 aircraft that were ordered by Libya in 1979 (Almahdi, 1999, p. 111).

The attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli on December 2, 1979 further complicated relations. In that incident, the U.S. Embassy was attacked by about 2,000 demonstrators in display of support of the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The U.S. accused the Libyan government of sponsoring the attack. Libya officially apologized and offered to repair the damages. In a later incident, Libya was accused by some Tunisian officials of supporting the attack on Gafsa. “The U.S. sent troops to Tunisia under the pretext of helping a friendly government to defend itself

against the Libyan threat, though many observers doubted Libya's responsibility in the incident" (Pasha, 1984, p. 23).

The event marked the beginning of a series of U.S. initiatives to put more pressure on Libya. In February 1980, the U.S. withdrew its charge d'affaires from Tripoli, and in May in the same year, expelled six members of the Libyan's people's Bureau in Washington and recalled home the two remaining American diplomats in Tripoli. Thus, the American Embassy in Tripoli was closed.

It can be said that the U.S. energy security and international relations are embodied in the Carter Doctrine. In January of 1980, Jimmy Carter shared his doctrine with the public in his last state of the Union speech: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force" (Carter, 1980).

The U.S. - Libya relations during the Reagan era were defined by an increasing confrontation and outright conflict. "There are four areas that define the deteriorating relations are oil, terrorism, regional influence and Soviet influence. In January 1981, CIA chief William Casey gave a presentation at the White House on reasserting American dominance across the world and the terrorist activity by Syria, Iran and Libya" (Simons, 1996, p. 324).

In addition, The Reagan Doctrine called for the support of terrorist (freedom fighters) that struggled to overthrow left-leaning governments, while freedom fighters (terrorists) attempting to overthrow a right-leaning government were to be

stopped (Simons, 1996, p. 332). Essentially, this meant that the ideological beliefs of both the new Libyan government and the Reagan Administration were at odds.

Under the pretext combating international terrorism, the Reagan administration led a campaign of pressure to isolate Libya internationally. On May 6, 1981, the Reagan administration expelled all members of the Washington D C., who were accused of having links to a plot to assassinate one Libyan student in Colorado. The State Department Spokesmen justified the administration's action by declaring that from the first day of the administration, "both the President and Secretary Alexander Haig had made known their very real concern about misconduct, including support for international terrorism" (Gebril, 1988, p. 168).

Western Europe was an important area through which U.S. pursued its policy to isolate Libya. Its NATO allies, particularly Italy, were asked not to allow state visit by Libyan leader Qadhafi. The Italian government was also asked not to sell any military spare parts to Libya. Greece was the target of the same U.S. pressure to prevent an official visit by the Libyan leader. In March 1982, the U.S. government informed Austria of its dissatisfaction with Qadhafi's visit to Vienna in March of that year. Though most European governments did not share Washington's view of or its policy toward Libya some of them, like Italy, reluctantly agreed to the U.S. request and canceled scheduled visits by the Libyan leader in Africa. The U.S. also worked to persuade African leaders from not attending the 1981 OAU summit meeting that was going to be held in Tripoli. This was to deprive the Libyan leader of a platform to promote itself and its brand of international politics that the U.S. found objectionable. For this purpose, "Vice- President George Bush and U.S.

Ambassador to Morocco toured many African countries to convey this message. On the other side, Col Qadhafi declared that he had evidence that the U.S. was bribing some African leaders not to attend the OAU summit” (Gebril, 1988, p. 168).

The evidence was enough to make public stands of untold proportion. As a result of the American pressure, combined with that of Egypt and Sudan, the OAU summit meeting was eventually moved to Ethiopia. In addition, “most of the African countries that were unable to withstand the U.S. pressure eventually broke diplomatic relations with Libya” (Gebril, 1988, p. 169).

In conjunction with the political pressure, the Reagan administration also applied economic pressure as another tool to put the squeeze on Libya. Believing that Libya’s oil revenues were almost exclusively diverted to the purchase of armaments, the training of international terrorism and the promotion of interventionism in the neighboring states of North Africa, U.S. officials argued that by putting the pressure on the Libyan oil industry, Libya’s ability to finance terrorism would severely be curtailed. Therefore, in October 1981, the U.S. government ordered all American citizens in Libya to leave which it termed as “the danger which the Libyan regime poses to American citizens” (Wright, 1982, p. 14). The action was reportedly preceded by repeated warnings to the American oil companies working in Libya to remove their people and terminate their operations. On July 14, 1981, the Wall Street Journal quoted a U.S. official as saying that...”The U.S. companies won’t get another warning. We’re playing confrontation politics and we want them out, whether there is a coup in works or not” (Gebril, 1985, p. 318).

By late 1981, most of the U.S. companies began evacuation of their American employees. In March 1982, the Reagan administration further tightened its economic squeeze on Libya by ordering a ban on all future imports of Libyan oil. The decision also extended over control on most U.S. exports to Libya. Accordingly, licenses would be required for all exports to Libya, except food, agricultural and medical supplies. All licenses were to be denied for exports of oil and gas equipment, “sensitive” high-technology items, and weapons and military items (Pasha, 1984, p. 5).

The U.S. economic embargo came at a time when U.S. oil imports from Libya were at their lowest level, which had stood at less than 3 percent of its total oil import by the beginning of 1982 compared to about 10 percent in 1980. Neither did the ban disrupt U.S. oil consumption because there was already an oil glut. However, the economic embargo reduced U.S.-Libyan trade relations to its lowest ebb since the Libyan revolution in September 1969 (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3

U.S. - Libya trade 1981-1982

Year	Export to Libya	Import from Libya
1981	809,024	5,475.910
1982	300,946	533,215

Source: U.N. year book of international trade statistic 1981-82

The U.S. economic embargo did not bring any change in Libyan government behavior, nor did it create any major economic problems for Libya. The only losers arising from this turn of events were the American business interests which saw the net profit going to the Western European countries that became Libya's business partners. For instance, when the Reagan administration blocked the delivery of a dozen, Boeing passenger planes that were estimated to be worth about US\$600 million, that amount went to European Airbus Industries from which Libya bought its planes. In February 1983, a U.S. Commerce Journal reported that the European countries were substantially profiting from Reagan's policies toward Libya. One official of a U.S. shipping firm which had done some business with Libya maintained that "Libya discovered it can get most of the high-technology products it needs from Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K...Consequently, European- Libyan trade has increased" (Gebriel, 1985, p. 321).

The U.S. government also banned about 200 Libyan students from studying nuclear science and aviation-related subjects from their universities. This was apparently a move to prevent Libya from acquiring and becoming a nuclear power (Muller, 1987, p. 264).

On January 7, 1986, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions, which broadly prohibited its companies or persons from engaging in financial transactions with Libya, including in part, the following: the importation of goods or services in support of industrial, commercial or governmental projects in Libya, or dealing in any property in which the government of Libya had any interests. The economic sanctions, in part, also prohibited American individuals from working in Libya. To

Qadhafi, the U.S. economic sanctions were tantamount to a “declaration of war.” In response, he offered that Libya would shoulder the responsibility for purging the region of U.S. military bases [and promised] that more cooperation between Libya, and the Soviet Union would be pursued.

Besides the political and economic measures, the Reagan administration took military action which it concluded would be more effective in its scheme to isolate Libya. These military measures took the form of a planned coup d’état, increased sales of U.S. weapons to Libyan enemies such as Sudan and Chad and enhanced naval presence in the Mediterranean (Almahdi, 1999, p. 119).

In May 1981, the U.S. sent two radar surveillance planes (AWACS) to monitor the Egyptian-Sudanese boarder with Libya. There were reports that revealed that there was a “coup d’état attempt planned with Libya” and that the role of the AWACS was “to co-ordinate the military support that Egypt might have been sent a cross the border to aid the rebels” (Wright, 1982, p. 15).

On August 19, 1981, U.S. aircraft shutdown two Libyan jets in military maneuvers over the Gulf of Sirte, an area Libya claimed was an integral part of its territorial waters. In May 1984, Libya charged the U.S. in collaboration with Britain and Sudan, were behind a series of explosions and assassination attempts in Libya, including an attempt to attack Qadhafi’s residence. Libya announced that “the plotters were from the Muslim Brotherhood Movement and that they were trained in the U.S. and Sudan” (Gebiril, 1988, p. 177).

By 1986, relation seemed to have reached a new climax in hostility. On January 7, 1986, President Reagan accused Libya of fomenting the December 1985

attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports and that the Libyan government had “engaged in armed aggression against the U.S” (Wills, 2003, p. 184). He called for a swift retribution and demanded the world body “act decisively and in concert to exact from Qadhafi a high price” as a result a set of economic sanctions against Libya was announced by the President (Gebriel, 1988, p. 173). In the meantime, the U.S intelligence voiced its concern about Libya’s deployment of new Soviet Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) including SA-5s which were seen as a potential threat to the sixth fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.

The war of words between the two countries started to be backed by actions. The U.S. navy began a new series of maneuvers in front of Libyan Gulf of Sirte. Leader Qadhafi who branded the maneuvers as “aggressive provocation” ordered his army to be on “total alert” and promised to defend “Libya’s territorial waters.” The Libyan leader draw “the Line of Death” at 32 degrees 30 minutes north between a point near Benghazi and the western headland of the gulf at Misurata with an exclusive 62 nautical miles (115 km) fishing zone. To the U.S. officials, the navy exercise was meant to exert more pressure on Libya, hoping it might provoke Libya into a military confrontation. The U.S. decision to proceed with the maneuvers reflected the new official conviction “that if we want to settle the account with Qadhafi, we will have to do it ourselves” (Herald, 1986).

This new conviction and strategy were the result of the reluctance among the American allies to take part in U.S. economic and military plants against Libya. Therefore, the maneuvers were part of a plan aimed at provoking Libya into a military confrontation. However, the U.S. called off the plan and revised to provide

“the optimum margin of safety.” The revised plan, named “prairie fire” was approved by Reagan at a National Security Council meeting held on March 14, 1986. On March 26, the U.S. navy vessels sailed into Gulf of Sirte and thus posed a direct challenge to Libya. The latter responded. By the time the Gulf confrontation ended on March 17, the U.S. reported that its campaign had sunk two Libyan vessels and temporarily shut down an SA-5 missile base. U.S. officials hailed the operation as a victory and claimed that it diminished the Soviet’s prestige “both by revealing the inferiority of the weapons, the Soviets had supplied to Libya and by exposing their reluctance to do anything other than light up their ships and head for safety when fighting broke out” (Gebril, 1988, p. 188). For his part, Reagan proclaimed the operation “a message to the whole world that the U.S. has the will and the ability to defend the free world’s interest” (Watson, 2007, p. 136).

On March 5, 1986, an explosion occurred at a West Berlin nightclub. U.S. officials blamed the incident on Libya and used it as a pretext to accelerate the speed and broaden the scope of its military action against Libya (Gebril, 1988, p. 188). Early in the morning of April 15, U.S. air and naval forces launched a series of strikes against five Libyan targets, including the military compound where leader Qadhafi’s residence was located. Qadhafi’s “headquarters and home, military barracks, a military airfield and a naval school were heavily damaged. Qadhafi claimed to have been injured in the attack, and his eighteen-month-old adopted daughter was reportedly killed. Tripoli also sustained damage, as at least one 2000-pound bomb strayed from its target and crashed into a populated area. Reports indicate that around 100 Libyans were killed in the raid” (Pfundstein, 2011, p. 25).

The attack against Libya was proclaimed by the Reagan administration as an effective manifestation of America's demonstration to facing countries that support terrorism (Cohen & Dolan, 2005, p. 171). Except for Canada, Israel and Britain which approved the aggression and assisted in its execution, voices of criticism were raised all over the world against the U.S. for its military aggression against Libya.

Beginning in 1989, “the Rogue States Doctrine served as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy and as the nomenclature suggests, was perceived as a way of combating the expected military cuts by Congress following the anticipated fall of the Soviet Union” (Zoubir, 2002, p. 33). It can be mentioned that the term ‘rogue state’ was applied selectively to developing states that rejected U.S. hegemony and its support for Israel. Rogue states were punished with sanctions, threats of regime change and in some cases, actual military action. All the rogue states are located in the Middle East except for Cuba and North Korea. With the exception of Iran (not Arab); Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria are all Arabs, and all are officially Islamic States.

A similar foreign policy regarding Libya prevailed under George H. W. Bush as under Reagan. The adherence to the Rogue States Doctrine by both the Reagan and the first Bush Administration codified a pretext for the U.S. to repeatedly shun Libya’s attempts at begin any serious diplomatic negotiations about normalizing relations. “The first Bush Administration was more cautious with Libya than the Reagan Administration as it was aware that Qadhafi’s hatred to Islamist fundamentalists could prove to be beneficial to U.S. interests” (St. John, 2002, p. 165).

In addition, “U.S. officials worried that if Qadhafi was removed, the lack of a clear Libyan successor might instigate chaos in a country where tribal affiliations were stronger than the political system” (St. John, 2002, p. 165). Therefore, U.S. attention was focused more on Iraq and the events that culminated into its invasion of Kuwait. The Gulf War demonstrated the hegemonic power of the U.S. and its unchallenged power in the Middle East. The awareness of the increased hegemonic threat in the region worried Libya. “This fear, combined with internal economic and political pressures in Libya forced the Libyan government to reposition itself more favorably towards the U.S. and Western Europe in order to ensure regime survival. The growing domestic insecurity forced Tripoli to reconsider its international isolation in order to secure help (money and weapons) from the U.S. in its fight with insurgents (Gosa, 2013, p. 22).

As for the President Clinton policy towards Libya, it can be argued that while Qadhafi was hopeful that the 1992 American presidential campaign would yield a democratic President and change the direction of U.S. foreign policy (St. John, 2002, p. 168). Clinton won the election but was constrained in his ability to reorient his foreign policy, particularly toward rogue states such as Libya. The Libyan diplomats sent to negotiate with the Clinton Administration were full of hope in moving state relations forward, yet the Clinton Administration further ignored the Libyan diplomats and instead subjected Libya to harsher sanctions (St. John, 2002, p. 171).

Clinton's administration was tougher on Libya than the previous administration of George H. Bush (Zoubir, 2002, p. 35). Both the Clinton Administration and the Republican-held Congress drove this tough stance.

Although, Clinton did hope to engage Libya, but he had to do so carefully in order to avoid problems with the families of the Lockerbie victims (Zoubir, 2002, p. 45).

During his presidential campaign, Clinton promised the families of the Lockerbie victims that he would tighten international sanctions on Libya. Clinton kept his promise and toughened the international sanctions on Libya to ensure that the families of the Lockerbie incident were compensated, and the Lockerbie suspects were surrendered. In addition, “former-Secretary of State Warren Christopher, threatened Libya with a global oil embargo meant to cripple the Libyan economy that relied almost solely on its crude oil exports” (Zoubir, 2002, pp. 35-38).

From the start of Clinton’s administration, Qadhafi tried to open back-channels, using various Arab interlocutors with little success. According to Alex Miles “two issues appear to have prevented the Clinton administration from considering any grand bargain with Libya, first, the existence of strong anti-Libyan sentiment in Congress, driven by the failure to secure compensation for the victims of the Pan Am flight and reflected by the imposition of (ILSA). Secondly, according to former Clinton's officials, Libya’s WMD program was not an imminent threat and that getting Libya out of terrorism and resolving the pan am issue was the primary condition for engagement” (Miles, 2013, p. 126).

The continuation of pressure on Libya by the Clinton administration and the international community helped isolate Libya. Although those actions aligned with the goals of hindering Qadhafi from gaining WMDS and supporting terrorism, they ultimately proved inadequate to fulfill those goals. At best, “the compliance and deterrence policy set the conditions in Libya through diplomatic and economic

isolation for a favorable Libyan response to a strategy of limited conditional engagement” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 68).

However, when Libya disposed of the training grounds for the Palestinian Abu Nidal and his group and after the two Lockerbie suspects were given to the international community. The U.S administration saw a glimmer of hope for more positive relations, and those actions were seen as a result of limited conditional engagement which ultimately led Libya to renounce of terrorism. Ronald E. Neumann, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, said, “as far as we can tell, the Libyan government’s actions are not window-dressing, but a serious, credible step to reduce its involvement with that terrorist organization” (Lancaster, 1999). The U.S responded by modifying the sanctions and had no objections upon the removal of UN sanctions. In addition, U.S oil firms were allowed entry to Libya for assessment of the current situation of their financial assets. Those steps proved useful in pushing for a better strategy in order to behavior change in Libya (Calabrese, 2004, p. 69).

For the Bush administration however had two major factors in its foreign policy strategy. Terrorism and WMDs were a primary threat to the U.S .The Bush administration didn’t waver to deal with those threats such as the most evident Iraqi threat which resulted in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Bush administration demonstrated very harsh actions on states who are implicated in those threats (Calabrese, 2004, p. 71).

Judith Miller argued that, The Bush administration's actions triggered a behavior change in Libya, Libya took the blame for the Lockerbie Bombing and both

suspects were handed over, Libya also agreed to pay a compensation sum to the relatives of the victims. Libya then announced the ending of its WMD pursuit (Miller, 2004).

Arguably, the change did not come about from the Bush administration alone, but it was the approach that was first adopted by Reagan and his administration and thereafter the administrations that followed. In addition, “the Bush Administration did, however, provide several unique contributions to the existing strategy that likely helped facilitate Libyan behavior change” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 71).

The U.S.-Libya ties during the Bush administration can be highlighted by several key events; (a) Bush's unwillingness to decrease the pressure on Libya until Libya reconciled and complied with U.N resolution requirements. Libya was also expected to compensate the Pan Am 103 victim's relatives, as well as giving up the Libyan goal for WMD acquisition, (b) Bush's rough actions against terrorist states mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan pushed Libya to reconcile and carry on the conditional engagement strategy, and (c) “the piecemeal positive steps taken by both Libya and the U.S. in a continuation of the limited conditional engagement begun in the Clinton Administration” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 80).

The sudden change in U.S strategies due to 9/11 showed that the U.S. is willing to take massive actions against the terrorism which ultimately granted Bush the credibility against Libya. He was decisive and made the decision to maintain Libyan sanctions imposed on Libya until Libya was willing to reconcile and complied with U.N requirements. The moment Libya proved willing to reconcile and

gain its position into the world, “the Bush Administration reciprocated these positive steps with rewards and assurances of better relations with continued behavior change. Both states were ready to rehabilitate the relationship, though slowly and through trust building measures. The result was normalized the U.S. - Libya relations in 2006” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 81).

2.3 Conclusions

The U.S. - Libya relations have always been complicated and witnessed a great development from a status of alliance and cooperation in early years of Libya’s independence in 1951, to a status of confusing and mutual misunderstanding after the Libyan revolution in September 1969. This misunderstanding has reached a military conflict during President Reagan's administration in 1986. The diplomatic estrangement which lasted for more than three decades was an important reason to deepen the animosity between the two countries.

In 1951-1969 period, the U.S.- Libya relations were not based on equal partnership and constructive cooperation for mutual benefits but can be described as a state of reliance and dependency on the U.S., politically, economically and as well as militarily.

The period 1969-2003 had seen four distinct phases that corresponded with the status of U.S. - Libya relations. We can identify each phase by correlating with their different issues that played important roles in shaping relations between the two countries. For example, in the first phase between the September 1969 and 1973, the relations were generally lukewarm, i.e. nothing significant developed beyond what

had already been accomplished before 1969. In the second phase between 1974 and 1980, the main change in Libya's policy was represented in Libya's oil policy and its support of Arab nationalism, Pan-African nationalist movements, and the Arab's Israel conflict which were seen by the U.S. in a new and different way. Relations became strained, and Libya's support of nationalist causes was increasingly seen as terrorist acts and the country and its leader were beginning to be labeled as sponsors of terrorism.

The lowest level of relations between the two countries was reached in the third phase, between 1981 and 1986. On May 2, 1980, formal relations were severed. This was followed by a military attack upon Libya in 1986, which followed by the Lockerbie tragedy which led to the imposition of UN sanctions, the matter which brought the U.S.-Libyan relations to a virtual standstill.

The U.S. - Libya rapprochement has unfolded gradually since 2003 through major developments and critical transformations in the two countries attitudes that would eventually lead to normalized relations between the two countries, which will be covered in the following chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICAL FACTORS

Diplomacy, leadership and the media are three major factors that played important roles that led to the U.S.- Libya normalized relations during the period between 2003- 2006. In this regard, this chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part looks at the diplomatic factor and the second part looks at the leadership, while the last part looks at the role of the media.

3.1 The diplomatic factor

As shown in the previous chapter, the history of hostilities between the two nations is grounded in their conflicting efforts to spread influence in Middle East, Africa, and Libya beyond during the Cold War. Moreover, the hostilities only grew as a result of both states looking for retribution. “From the U.S. Government’s perspective, this problematic relationship was fueled by Libya’s relationship with the former Soviet Union, the alleged of large financial support for extremist groups, its opposition to Israel, the Lockerbie incident in 1988 and its desire to possess nuclear weapons” (Gosa, 2011, p. 5). From the Libyan Government’s perspective, it is a small vulnerable oil-rich country in a world system in which energy-hungry powerful nations dominate. “The end of the cold war left Libya isolated, which provoked the Libyan Government to re-evaluate its relationships with key powerful states during the 1990’s” (Gosa, 2011, p. 5).

It is evident that Libya has been ready to reclaim its position in the world economy and restore ties with the international community for a decade.

Nevertheless, “the incident of Lockerbie bombing was one monumental obstacle stood in the way of normalization efforts between the Libyan and American states which was the impetus for the U.S. and U.N sanctions against Libya, So Lockerbie was used by Washington as a negotiating tool” (Gosa, 2011, p. 12).

Simultaneously, the main priority for the Libyan regime was to end the Lockerbie case and thereafter have better relations with the U.S. This can be seen in a message delivered to the Security Council on March 11th, 2002, where Libya accepted the responsibility for the bombing and agreed to pay the families of the victims with a total amount of \$2.7 billion (See Appendix A). Libya, however, “only accepted responsibility and never admitted guilt for the tragedy, this was seemingly a symbolic closure for both countries of a bitter economic and diplomatic history that Libya especially wished to overcome” (Simons, 1996, p. vxiii).

According to Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock (2005), the real story is more about skilled and clever diplomacy. “The diplomatic track dates back to the Bush Sr. administration and the successful effort in 1992 to get U.N. Security Council multilateral economic sanctions against Libya. It continued through the Clinton administration, including further tightening of UNSC sanctions in 1993 and later joining the British in secret direct negotiations with high-ranking Libyans. The Bush Jr. administration initially balked at continuing these talks, but participated in these talks post-September 11, 2001, in one of the few first-term initiatives not dominated by the neo conservatives” (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 4).

Jentleson and Whytock asserted that, “the multilateral support is crucial for diplomacy success. The differences in the Libya case between phase one with its

very limited U.S.- European cooperation, and phase two when the U.N Security Council gave its normative legitimacy and economic weight to the sanctions” (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 5) “the first time in the history of the international struggle against modern terrorism that a broad multilateral coalition had succeeded in imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-sponsoring state under the auspices of the U.N Security Council” (Schweitzer, 2004, p. 10) and “phase three when the U.S. and Britain worked closely together with Libya in the secret diplomacy success” (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 5).

Jentleson and Whytock believe that, “the WMD disarmament and terrorism deal did not resolve all concerns regarding Qadhafi’s foreign and domestic policies. But the strategy for dealing with them to a great extent was a continuation of the approach that had led to the shift on WMD: pressure for policy change, but not regime change, and a mix of coercive instruments as well as incentives” (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 6). This eventually led to the U.S. – Libya normalized relations in May 2006 with the establishment of diplomatic ties.

According to former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Ambassador David Mack, the principal rationale for U.S. diplomatic relations is not to celebrate friendships with ideal democracies blessed with free-market economies. “The real diplomatic challenge, and the one that offers the most benefit, is moving countries from the status of adversaries to former adversaries to partners, to deal with a world of global threats and cultivate common interests, Washington and Tripoli can take pride in having moved this process forward” (Mack, 2011, p. 29).

On the other side, Libya focused on the belief that the language of dialogue and understanding between the governments and peoples are conducive to bringing close relations among multiple sovereign states and contributes to the advancement and progress of the world community of paramount importance to Libya as the economic means are used to implement its foreign policy, through the provision of humanitarian assistance and investments.

Accordingly, it can be argued that the U.S. and Libya both have demonstrated significant diplomatic skills in establishing a new relation that would allow both sides to benefit from their shared interests, particularly through resolving the outstanding issues between them behind the scenes before they are aired publicly. According to Former Secretary of General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Abdul Rahman Shalgam in his lecture on Libyan foreign policy and regional variables in the Green Book Center in Tripoli on September 16, 2007, "who wants to spare his country and his people the problems, he must close its files, no matter how the small and simple, unclosed file means more complications and problems, any open file would be added new papers" (Shalgam, 2007, p. 18). This statement means that Libya should accelerate to solve its problems with the U.S., because every delay will cost more complications.

Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF) took the lead to close all Libya's open files with the West. Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, the chairman of GICDF succeeded in this mission because of two reasons: Firstly, he was the Libyan leader's son, and he was able to discuss the critical issues with his father. Moreover, his situation outside the governmental system gives him free

movement to lead direct negotiations in order to solve all the obstacles between Libya and the U.S., in particular, and the West in general. In an interview with BBC News on November 16, 2004, in answering how he persuaded his father, he said,

I mean the issue in the beginning was trust because we didn't trust each other at that time. However, slowly we managed to bring both parties together. We sat with each other in one place and talked face to face in order to erase the distrust, and I think that was the beginning. After that everything was ok, because both sides realized that both are genuine and sincere and serious regarding the rapprochement. Therefore, we managed at the end to reach that big compromise regarding WMD, and regarding Lockerbie (BBC News, 2004).

Secondly, his chairmanship of the GICDF gave him ability and flexibility to conclude financial settlements through the establishment of a compensation fund, to follow the settlement of damages sought by terrorist acts, which Libya was accused of in the past, so that the payment of such compensations was not recognition of the Libyan state of guilt for those acts. The Lockerbie case, the UTA case and the Label disco case which amounted to about \$3billion. In addition to this was his important role of abandoning the Libyan programs of weapons of mass destruction (see Chapter 5, section 2).

In his interview with Alsharq AL-Awsat newspaper on February 4, 2009, Saif Al-Islam said,

I played a big role in opening Libyan doors to the outside world. I put in a lot of effort into turning Libya from a country besieged and boycotted, to a country that has a seat on the UN Security Council. Therefore, the way is open at the moment to have normal relations with Europe and America. And now it is up to them to benefit from the battles and measures that I carried out and stirred up with the West (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 2009).

In fact, this researcher argues that there are four important factors that helped Saif al-Islam to move forward to normalize the U.S. - Libya relations:

3.1.1 Libya's Relationship with Arabs

Arguably, after more than two decades of Libyan unsuccessful attempts to build a Pan Arab coalition (See Appendix K). Libya's disappointment from the attitudes of Arabs in general and the Arab world's response to the U.S. and U.N. sanctions, in particular, Qadhafi indicated in his speech;

We sacrificed everything [for them], even our children's bread...we exhausted our economy for their sake. [Now], the fig leaf has been dropped, and everything has been laid bare: The Arabs are these days' reserves for the [U.S.] Marines...it would not be surprising if [the Arabs] were overcome with joy listening to the [Security Council sanctions] resolutions. The intensity of Qadhafi's sense of betrayal was echoed in the state media. Most typical was the statement that "we Libyans no longer trust the Arabs. The truth about the Arabs is that were hypocritical toward us. They deceived us (Ronen, 2008, p. 125).

These tensions reached its peak at the Arab league Summit at Sharm al-Shaykh in March 2003. The summit was devoted to a discussion on war in Iraq, provided an opportunity for Qadhafi repeated his call to Arab countries to find their own solution to regional crises, particularly the crises in Iraq. He criticized Crown Prince Abdulla bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud for the Saudi kingdom's "pact with the American devil." The Saudi-Arabian prince responded by calling Qadhafi a liar who should not speak on a subject, he knew nothing about, accusing Libya of being an agent of imperialism and concluded by saying, "The grave is in front of you" (Times, 2009). This exchange was caught live by the media, aggravating Qadhafi's long-held grudge against the Saudis. Qadhafi did not forget this affront. Six years later, while he was attending the Arab league summit in Qatar 2009, Qadhafi criticized Saudi's King Abdullah, calling him a "British product and American ally" and added. Now

after six years, it has proven that you were the liar.” Qadhafi said, adding that he now considered their problem over and was ready to reconcile (Times, 2009).

3.1.2 The Political Impact of Sanctions

The political impact of sanctions on Libya was considerable, particularly over the course of the 1990s. These sanctions politically led to circumscribe Qadhafi’s political influence on the global stage. In addition to other factors, including the use of other policy tools and Qadhafi’s own behavior, also contributed to Libya’s overall political isolation. As a result, Qadhafi as a leader who, by his own admission, was bored by of day-to-day governance and yearned for a more pronounced role in international politics, found himself politically sidelined by Western countries (even those who dependent on Libya’s economic resources) and Arab states.

The political marginalization of sanctions imposed on the regime seemed all the greater, as it complemented what would have been in itself a gulf between Libya and much of the Arab world in the 1990s given Qadhafi’s absolute rejection to the peace process between the Arab and Israel for much of the decade and growing Arab support for it. Libya’s global political estrangement was compounded by the physical isolation of the country, which resulted from the severance of air links between Libya and the rest of the world. Sanctions shaped Libya’s political environment in even more subtle ways. For instance, the political reorientation of Libya away from the Arab world toward Africa over the 1990s was in part attributable to the influence of U.N. sanctions. Qadhafi, who perceives himself as a great Arab leader and an

inheritor of Nasser's vision, was hugely disappointed by the unwillingness of the Arab League or individual Arab countries to contravene the U.N. sanctions against Libya. At the same time, "African leaders and countries gave Libya a warm reception and were sympathetic to its cause, a contrast that helped move Qadhafi away from his long-term cause of Arab unity toward the eventual promotion of the "U.S. of Africa" supporting for the establishment of an AU in July 2002" (Huliaras, 2001, p. 5).

3.1.3 The Situation of the Lockerbie Victims' Families

There were 270 victims on the Pan Am Flight 103 from 21 countries; 243 passengers, 16 crew members and 11 people on the ground were killed. 190 were American citizens, including 35 students from Syracuse University (Cohen & Cohen, 2000, pp. 1-3). The victims' families had always played an important role in lobbying their governments from different perspectives, on how to achieve justice for the loss of their loved ones. In fact, they had a serious interest in exposing the real culprits behind this heinous act of terrorism, which caused the loss of their family members.

As the Pan Am 103 victims' families and friends resolved to learn for them what had happened and, more to the point, how such future tragedies could be prevented. Thus, "the group of victims of Pan Am Flight 103 (VPAF 103) was born. It would, however, soon splinter into rival factions, as disagreements over objectives, goals, and the means through which to achieve them surfaced" (Cohen & Cohen, 2000, pp. 97- 99).

The sources of division among Pan Am 103 families eventually led to the establishment of four separate groups (a fifth represents victims living in the UK). “The two main ones are VPAF 103 and Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie. VPAF 103, as the parent organization, not surprisingly has the largest membership of the Pan Am 103 group, claiming to represent 160 families as of 1997. At the same time, Families of Pan Am 103 had 70 members. The remaining two groups, Justice for Pan Am 103 and Terrorism Watch: Pan Am 103, are minor offshoots of these two larger bodies, both having been founded in 1995” (Hoffman & Kasupsk, 2007, p. 18).

Libya lobbied these families since the early days of this conflict; most of them were receiving Libya’s positions directly, though some did not accept Libya’s communication. As its starting point, Libya bought advertising space in U.S. newspapers, presenting their position. Then they began sending the families' letters explaining developments on the case. The effect of this campaign proved fruitful when the U.S. and the U.K finally changed their positions. Many became aware that their previous positions had led to stagnation. The conclusion for Libya was to reaffirm that:

The only way to end the suffering of both the Libyan people and the families of the victims is accepting to hold the trial in a neutral country. Justice is what you need. Justice is what we want (Matar & Thabit, 2004, p. 109).

Furthermore, Libya worked to take the issue from the Security Council to direct negotiation with families of victims through their lawyers and the small group of Libyan officials in Paris. On April 29, 2003, Libya agreed to pay \$10 million per victim in compensation; this payment would be made in three tranches “when the U.N. sanctions are lifted, each family will receive \$4 million. When the U.S.

sanctions are lifted, each will receive another \$4 million, and when the U.S. removes Libya from its list of states that support terrorism, each will receive another \$2 million” (Alterman, 2006, p. 5).

In August 2008, BBC News TV interview, Saif Al-Islam launched into an attack on the families of the Lockerbie victims. He said, “You have to ask the families of the victims. The negotiation with them, it was extremely terrible and very materialistic and was too greedy. They were asking for more money and more money and more money.” He added, “I think they were very greedy, and I think they were trading with the blood of their sons and daughters” (BBC News, 2008).

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch declared that the deal would “give fair compensation to the claimants from both sides for the past incidents” (U.S. Department of State, 2008a). Out of the \$1.5 billion fund, \$300 million went to Libya drawing an implicit moral equivalence between the victims of terrorism and U.S. counter terrorism operations. In its official description of the fund, the State Department pointed out that “the agreement is being pursued on a purely humanitarian basis and does not constitute an admission of fault by either party” (U.S. Department of State, 2008a). The agreement no doubt helped avert a crisis, but it also enabled Libya to pay and accept responsibility for the actions of its officials.

It is clear from what previously mentioned that agreement came as a result of six rounds of negotiations. The objective of these negotiations was to reach a formula to compensate American victims caused by the Lockerbie bombing, and the Libyan victims caused by the U.S. attack on Libya in 1986. Both parties agreed to

the establishment of an “International Humanitarian Fund” to assume the distribution of the compensations to the victims from both countries (U.S. Department of State, 2008a).

It must be stated that, in recently we witnessed numerous cases filed against the two countries before their respective courts in order to claim compensation. For instance, In Libya, three cases were filed against the American government, two of which related to damages resulting from the U.S. raid on Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986 that led to the martyrdom of 41 Libya’s citizens and the injury of 226 others (Qadri, 2006). Two court sentences were issued in those two cases claiming compensations that amounted to nearly thirty-three billion Libyan dinars (LD). The third case resulted in a court sentence to compensate the family of a Libyan citizen whose plane was shot down by two American aircraft. The court ruled to pay his family 700 thousand LD in compensation. As for the American courts, 26 lawsuits were filed against the Libyan State, and the claims in these cases amounted to dozens of billions of dollars. Recently, a ruling was issued in one of those cases claiming the payment of compensations to the plaintiffs amounting to approximately seven billion U.S. Dollars (Qadri, 2006).

It is no secret, that the damage suffered by Libya and the U.S. because of these lawsuits and claims was immeasurable, in addition to obstructing the development of relations between the two countries and raising fears of exposure to the seizure and sequestration of their respective properties and assets. The GICDF hopes that the closing of these files and the settlement of these issues would pave the

way for more cooperation between Libya and the U.S. in various spheres and to the interest of the two peoples (Qadri, 2006).

3.1.4 The Secret Diplomatic Negotiations

There are many scholars and diplomats attribute the improvement of the U.S. - Libya relations due to the secret diplomacy and direct negotiations. For instance, according to St John (2004) “the evidence suggested that Libya was a win, not for a strategy of preemptive strikes, but for a policy of engagement, supported by persistent patient diplomacy” (St John, 2004, p. 402).

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk, who led the 1999-2000 secret negotiations with Libya, and the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage as well as the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair made similar allegations. The argument that the secret diplomatic negotiation was the determining factor in the 2003 retraction was based largely on timing. According to Ronen, “Libyan leaders claimed that although it was announced only at the end of 2003, the decision was made nine months earlier during secret trilateral negotiations between Washington, London, and Tripoli. The ‘Iraqi effect’ was thus entirely ‘irrelevant’ concluded Saif al-Islam. Rather, he expounded; the decision was the result of Libya’s yearning to end the dispute with the U.S. and gain security, political stability, and economic prosperity” (Ronen, 2008, p. 67).

The U.S. - British secret talks with Libya began in May 1999, immediately after the handing offer of Lockerbie suspects. The U.S side was represented by Martin Indyk who was the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern

Affairs. Libya was represented by Musa Kusa the former director of Libyan Intelligence, who was also close to Qadhafi and participated in earlier talks with the British. There were other facilitators of those talks such as the Prince Bandar bin Sultan the Saudi ambassador in the U.S at that time. On Lockerbie issue, the demands continued by the U.S for full compensation to the victim's relatives, and for an acceptance of responsibility for the incident (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 24).

Libya also offered to participate in the chemical inspection convention and pledge to have its facilities inspected. Clinton however maintained that the sanctions on Libya won't be removed until an agreement is made on the WMD issue, talks however continued to focus on terrorism and the Lockerbie issues. "This relative lack of attention to the weapons issue in part reflected intelligence reports that indicated only some WMD activity of concern and no imminent WMD threat" (Center, 2000).

In this context, "the political constraints imposed by the Pan Am 103 victims' families, who insisted that Libya comply with U.S. demands regarding the Lockerbie bombing before further steps were taken toward normalization of relations with Libya, also contributed to the deferral of talks on WMD. Indeed, the talks were suspended in 2000 out of concern that they would be leaked during the presidential campaign" (Slavin, 2004).

Not long after Bush was in power in 2000. Another Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs was appointed. Edward Walker gave a briefing to the new administration on Libya's secret negotiations, as Walker stated, "administration

officials expressed surprise that the talks had been taking place and showed their own concern about pressure from the Lockerbie families” (Slavin, 2004).

After the conviction of one of the Lockerbie bombing suspects, the new U.S. administration commended the result and made demands that Libya compensates the families of the victims and take full responsibility for the bombing (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 71).

In the midst of the Year 2001, officials of State Department wanted to resume the U.S.-Libya secret talks. Flynt Leverett gave a statement on the National Security Council saying, “We [the U.S. and Britain] presented the Libyans with a ‘script’ indicating what they needed to do and say to satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of the Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the case” (Leverett, 2004).

U.S representatives in the secret talks re-voiced that the Libyan desire of a permanent lifting of the imposed sanctions was in exchange that Libya abides by U.S demands, “at this point WMD still was not included as a major part of the U.S. strategy, although as under Clinton, the Bush administration signaled that WMD would be the central obstacle to restoring relations after the Pan Am case was resolved” (Slavin, 2001).

On 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda, Col Qadhafi was very quick to condemn them. Only few days after the incident, Libya was in full cooperation with the U.S to investigate the attacks, “in very serious ways, including by providing a list of suspects” (Schmemann & Attacked, 2001). The following month, the U.S.-Libya

secret talks re-commenced with British involvement. The representatives were Musa Kusa on the Libyan side, and William Burns on the U.S. behalf. In a speech in January 2002, Burns gave a detailed account for the Policy of the U.S. as “hard-nosed and realistic but not oblivious to the possibilities for change, he even made reference about meetings that took place, in recent months that have been constructive and clearly focused” (Burns, 2002).

The U.S. administration under Bush had “disagreements about how to deal with Libya since Libyan efforts were noticeable to cooperate which indicated its absence from the axis of evil. There are suggestions that the phrase was intended only for Iraq originally, and Iran was added with the request of Condoleezza Rice, and North Korea was an afterthought" (Hertzberg, 2003).

An additional influencing factor was British involvement in the chain of events; Neo-conservatives icons such as undersecretary of state John Bolton made requests that Libya be included in the Axis of evil. The British however saw that this move could discredit the talks and end them with Libya (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 73). Then, “in a speech delivered in May 2002 to the Heritage Foundation, Bolton accused Libya of being one of those rogue states beyond the axis of evil intent on acquiring WMD” (Bolton, 2002).

The U.S. administration announced its National Strategy to Combat WMDs, Libya was included in an appendix with Syria, Iran, and North Korea but kept classified “among the countries that are the central focus of the new U.S. approach,” that included the military strike option against countries and terrorist groups that may acquire or seek the acquisition of WMD (Allen & Gellman, 2002).

The intensity of the latest developments of the WMD talks increased on August 2002, where Foreign Office Minister of Britain Michael O'Brien, who "had broached the subject with Qadhafi... and had received positive assurances" (Joffe, 2004, p. 223). In a meeting between Bush and Blair at Camp David., Blair made a proposition and Bush agreed, the deal entitles that a WMD deal should bring normalized U.S. - Libya relations. After the agreement Blair wrote a letter to Qadhafi to which he responded positively. In addition to the diplomatic efforts in the negotiations, the negotiators made use of Qadhafi's son who was pursuing education in the UK at that time (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf, 2004, p. 15).

Evidently, not everyone in the Bush administration agreed to the negotiations, "Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly sent a memo to President Bush; cc'd to National-Security Adviser Rice and Secretary of State Powell, arguing that democratization and human rights, not just terrorism and WMD, should be on the negotiating agenda, and that UN sanctions should not be lifted just for a Lockerbie settlement" (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 73). "Undersecretary of State Bolton pushed for a greater role in the negotiations, but pressure from British officials at the highest level persuaded the White House to keep him off the negotiating team" (Hirsh, 2005).

In March 2003, according to the British delegation, U.S. Libya negotiations reached a decisive point when the Libyan displayed readiness for a deal on WMDs and the Lockerbie affair, the penultimate step before the US\$2.7 billion settlement reached in August with the victims' families (Wightman, 2004).

In October 2003, “any pretense the Libyans still may had of downplaying the extent of their WMD programs was shattered by the PSI interdiction in the Italian port of Taranto of the BBC China, a German-owned ship bound for Libya carrying centrifuge technology purchased from the Khan network” (Winner, 2005, p. 137). “This provided definitive proof that Libya was developing a uranium-enrichment program and served as a critical factor in Tripoli’s decision to open up its weapons programs to international scrutiny” (WMD Commission, 2005, p. 258).

Soon after that, “the U.S. and British technical teams were allowed into Libya to inspect weapon's sites, laboratories, and military factories. These initial inspections revealed, more extensive Libyan nuclear activities than previously thought, significant quantities of chemical agent... [But] no evidence of an offensive biological weapons program” (Tyler & Risen, 2003). “One of the last stumbling blocks was Qadhafi’s insistence on further reassurances about policy change and not regime change, that if Libya abandoned its WMD program, the U.S. in turn would drop its goal of regime change” (Hirsh, 2005).

The UK again was a mediator in those final negotiations. The final outcome came on December 19, 2003 with the agreement for fully disarm of WMDs. It can be said that the two countries moved towards normalizing their relations through the diplomatic tools, where the secret negotiations were the decisive ingredient to the settlement of outstanding problems between the two countries.

In an interview with CNN, September 28, 2009, Qadhafi stated, “Regrettably, Libya did not benefit from this historic action that it took in the service of world peace. Libya was not rewarded for this significant action that was done, I would say

Libya benefited, but was not rewarded” (CNN & Live, 2009). The slow U.S. feedback and Qadhafi statement suggested that Libya was not responding to a new offer on the table, but rather it was responding to other factors.

To show explicitly how the diplomatic factors played its role to normalize relations between the two parties it can be said that, with respect to hard-line strategy that the Bush administration utilized in terms of dealing with rogue states, however it did leave the door to conditional rapprochement with Libya open. Clinton's administration was the first to utilize this strategy in dealing with Libya. Since the day Libya made the decision to give up the flight incident suspects and was willing to pay compensation to the victim's families, the trust between both sides began to increase. Bush saw this initiative as a step closer to normalizing the relations and took the opportunity to further talks with Libya on the WMD issues. The negotiations between both sides saw a great deal of aid from British diplomats, and the language of action and reaction occurred. For every action Libya makes, The U.S would be bound to recognize and offer benefits to Libya. The order of the actions happened as followed:

- 1- When Libya showed guilt and took the responsibility when it declared that it was behind the Lockerbie bombings. The U.S. did not refuse the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Libya.
- 2- Libya then vowed to stop all pursuit for WMDs bush encouraged this pledging and encouraged Libya to follow through with its vows so ties can be restored.

3- Libya then began to fulfill its vows surrendering the WMD materiel and gear.

The U.S then allowed travel to Libya and sent an invitation for Libya to start an interest section in Washington.

4- Libya then got rid of its declared unfilled chemical ammunition and made its ballistic missile force useless by destroying key parts of changing them rendering the weapons redundant. In contrast, “the U.S. terminated ILSA, modified economic sanctions to allow resumption of most commercial activities, and established a U.S. Liaison Office in Tripoli” (White House, 2004b).

This Cycle of actions between the U.S and Libya was an effective strategy adapted by both sides. The incremental engagement approach proved very useful for both sides for better normalized relations.

3.2 The Leadership Factor

At the top of government sits a leader, or leaders, who have the authority to make foreign policy decisions. “Characteristics of leaders are generally more important when they have significant latitude in shaping policy and the situation is ambiguous, uncertain, or complex. Under these conditions, which occur frequently in foreign policy making, a leader’s personality and beliefs may shape what the state does” (Sears, Huddy & Jervis, 2003, p. 112). “Leaders’ decisions may be shaped by their own personal history, their childhood or early political experiences, for example, it may teach them that certain values and ways of handling problems are important” (George & George, 1964, p. 189).

The formulation of foreign policies can be further understood in terms of studying various personalities who surround the institution of leadership. The U.S. President and the Libyan leadership may be the most important factors in that they represent the final stage in the decision-making processes within their respective countries. However, both have relied on complex processes and agents in reaching the latest decision. What happens before that final decision is made is equally important as these processes will reveal significant factors that are taken into consideration and important characters that influenced the decisions.

3.2.1 The Libyan Leadership

Libyan foreign policies cannot be understood in isolation from the general thinking and personality of its charismatic leader, Col Muammar Qadhafi. The charisma and leadership of Qadhafi were empowered by the vision and mission that he set for Libya and which was launched through the 1969 Revolution. Qadhafi's personality remains a mystery to all, but known to those closest to him. The following description of the man is typical:

Qadhafi is a man about whom relatively little is known, a man who hides secretiveness behind flamboyance, whose paradoxes are many, Qadhafi is an intensely private individual; his quite, even ascetic, domestic style contrasts sharply with his aggressive political behavior. Some—including a few Arab leaders have called him mad. Others believe he has 'baraka', a quality of personality that goes beyond charisma into the realm of the mystical (Harris, 1986, p. 43).

As the Arab historiographer Ibn Khaldun said, "The human is the son of his social environment" (Khaldun, 1967). Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi was born in a Bedouin tent in the desert near Sirte on June 7, 1942. His

family belongs to a small tribe called (Qathathfa) of Arabized Berbers. Were herders of camels and goats, eking out an existence in one of the poorest countries in the world (Harris, 1986, p. 45). As a boy, Qadhafi attended a Muslim elementary school in Sirte, where he completed six grades in four years. He then enrolled in secondary school in Sebha, a small-market town in south-central Libya. His student days in this remote, relatively small, regional center proved pivotal to his later political development. For the first time in his life, he had regular access to Arab newspapers and radio broadcast, especially the voice of the Arabs news programs from Cairo, and he was listening to Nasser's speeches and discussing them with his classmates (Harris, 1986, p. 46). When the Algerian revolution erupted in 1954, Qadhafi, still a boy, was moved to give speeches in schools and mosques in support of the Algerian struggle for liberation. He even collected money from neighbors to send to the Algerian rebels (El-Khawas, 1986, p. 4).

In Sebha, most of his teachers, together with the school curriculum, came from Egypt, stimulating his interest in the Egyptian revolution. He was active in political activities, including the distribution of posters and the organization of unauthorized political demonstrations. As a result, Qadhafi and his family were asked to leave Sebha by the authorities before he graduated from high school (El-Khawas, 1986, p. 5). There are varying accounts as to exactly why he was expelled from school, but their common thread is that he was a political activist, distributing literature critical of the monarchy and organizing public protests. From this experience, Qadhafi concluded "nonviolent political activities were ineffectual in changing undemocratic regimes" (El-Khawas, 1986, p. 5).

Furthermore, the military and political events in the Middle East, more specifically, the 1948 Arab defeat by Israel in Palestine, the 1952 Egyptian revolution, the 1956 Suez crisis and the 1958 Egypt-Syria union had a strong impact on Qadhafi's outlook. In the process, he became a fervent admirer of the revolutionary policies of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. "The anti-imperialist, Arab nationalist foreign policies and the egalitarian, socialist domestic reforms of the Egyptian revolution were widely popular throughout the region, and support for them was hardly unique" (St. John, 2008a, p. 136).

Qadhafi completed his secondary school in the town of Misurata, the third-largest city in Libya. Qadhafi's time in Misurata was a defining moment in the development of his political activism. The early 1960s were a time of considerable political activities in the Arab world with groups like the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Baath) party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Arab Nationalist Movement. He also feared membership would undermine his chances of obtaining admission into the royal military academy. In regard to his political education, it can be said that he read widely especially books by the Syrian political thinker Michael Aflak and biographies of Sun Yat-sen, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, and Abraham Lincoln. He also read all the books about Gamal Abdul Nasser and the Egyptian revolution as well as everything available on the French Revolution (St. John, 2008a, p. 137).

Qadhafi entered the Libyan military academy at Benghazi in 1963 and along with most of his colleagues from the Revolutionary Command Council, and he graduated in August 1965. He then commissioned as a communications officer in the signal corps. In April 1966, he was sent to Britain for further training at the British

Army Staff College, now the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and returned in 1966 as a commissioned officer in the Signal Corps. Qadhafi association with the Free Officers Movement began during his days as a cadet. “The frustration and shame felt by Libyan officers who stood by helplessly at the time of Israel’s swift and humiliating defeat of Arab armies on three fronts in 1967 fueled their determination to contribute to Arab unity by overthrowing the Libyan monarchy” (Metz, 2004, p. 63).

The revolution of September 1st 1969 was staged without bloodshed. The Libyan people supported the revolution which was carried out in their service and the revolution was quickly described as the White Revolution. Qadhafi promulgated the three goals of revolution, “Freedom, Socialism, and Unity” (They are the same goals called for by Nasser’s revolution on July 23, 1952) Qadhafi saw these goals as essential to rid Libya of its misery. As he put it in a TV interview on October 14, 1969, “the true cause of the revolution lay in the backward Arab life which reduced the Arab to an almost complete lack of affiliation with the twentieth century, it is by turning to the three slogans that the Arab world rediscovers its dignity and its place in history” (Gebril, 1988, p. 44).

The general thinking of Qadhafi came from and represented the amalgam of the two principal doctrines centered on Islam and Arabism. Islam is the main source of inspiration in the thinking and actions of Col Qadhafi, according to Mirella Bianco “Qadhafi is deeply religious; he believes that his religion must guide all his country’s policies, even to the details of legislation” (Bianco, 1975, p. 4). Furthermore, according to Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui (1998) in *Qadhafi:*

The Man and his Policies, “Qadhafi is definitely a pious Muslim, with Islam playing a central role in his motivations, policies, positions and views of the world, The Holy Quran is regarded as the repository of all types of knowledge, but the traditional religious hierarchy is viewed as a secondary source of authority in Qadhafi’s interpretation of his faith” (Monti-Belkaoui & Riahi-Belkaoui, 1996, p. 19).

It is important to note that, when he learnt about Nasser’s revolutionary ideas, i.e. freedom, socialism and unity, they became the underpinning basis for his foreign policy choices. When Qadhafi became the leader of Libya, these factors featured predominantly in many of Libya’s foreign policy alternatives. For example, he strongly believed in the cause of Arab nationalism that could be easily banded by the commonality of language, religion and history. Consequently, Libya under Qadhafi was preoccupied with the basic question on Arab nationalism and unity. This preoccupation propelled him to take a prominent role in a number of issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, anti-imperialism, national and independence movement in the African continent and national liberation movement in the Third-World Countries. It would not be an understatement that all of Libya’s policies can be attributed to Col Qadhafi and his influence among other Libyan high-ranking policy-makers (Bianco, 1975, p. 7). In pursuing all the above ideas and ideals, there can be no doubt that Libya’s foreign policy alternatives will find opposition from the U.S. and other Western powers that sought to implant their influence and power, not only in the Arab world but also in the Third-World countries.

However, “each time a new American President is elected, Col Qadhafi makes optimistic remarks suggesting beliefs that the fundamental U.S. position

toward Libya could change rapidly by virtue of a new head of state and /or political party and that the incumbent candidate would naturally desire a less hostile relationship” (Bushashia, 2008, p. 35). For instance, Qadhafi hopeful that President Carter’s religiosity would guide him to a more ethical and fair view of the Arab-Israeli struggle and thus settle the chief obstacle, from the Libyan perspective, to friendlier relations, in June 1977, Qadhafi expressed, “we hope that the current American administration will, perhaps, avoid the mistakes that were made by the previous U.S. administration, we are ready to meet halfway any new American steps, if they are in keeping with the aspirations of the people” (Gebriel, 1988, p. 106).

Although “Qadhafi initially spoke publicly and made overtures in hopes that the election of former President George H. Bush Sr. represented an opportunity to improve U.S. - Libyan relations, the Bush Sr. administration followed the policy of the Reagan administration, for the most part, with the Cold War prism changing to Rogue State doctrine in the early 1990s, but having a similar effect on relations with Libya” (Bushashia, 2008, p. 33).

In occasion of President Clinton victory in election 1992, Qadhafi made the following statements at El-fateh University in Tripoli, misreading both Clinton and the nature of the Democratic Party:

Clinton won and the Democratic administration succeeded. The whole world believes that America will change during the era of the Democratic administration. The Democrats originally consisted of minorities, the oppressed. We have been defending these people during the Reagan era. Because of this, Reagan’s vengeance against us increased, because we used to back the blacks, the Red Indians, the minorities, the workers, and the oppressed, which actually were the foundations of the Democratic Party. In actual fact, the force that formed the Democratic Party to which Clinton belongs, this force is actually is our ally (St John, 2002, p. 169).

Sometimes when Democratic Presidents such as Clinton or Carter did not shift their policy toward Libya, substantially, Qadhafi presented another opinion of the American political system:

Anyway, we have no problems with Clinton at all. He is a man who came from a small state. He is a young man. He is not from the generation of World War II, and he has no colonization ambitions in the world. Naturally, there are imperialist circles manipulating him. Damn them. They are in the Pentagon, State Department, CIA, National Security Council, and the 400 families of the largest companies; these are the hellish circles manipulating the world in the name of America (Kandil, 1979).

In January 2001, when President George W. Bush Jr. took office, his administration brought a more realist move compared to Clinton's administration, but after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the policy shifted to facing the new challenge of terrorism, "the changed perspective on Libya began in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, after which a common enemy of Islamic radicalism led the way to intelligence cooperation and accelerated political rapprochement" (Ahmed, 2005, p. 115). In a statement made to the American people, Col Qadhafi denounced the terrorist attacks and said that "despite political differences and conflicts with America. This should not become a psychological barrier against offering assistance and humanitarian aid to U.S. citizens and all people in America, who suffered most from these horrific attacks" (St. John, 2002, p. 191).

Qadhafi's attempts to settle the remaining issues concerning the Pan AM 103 bombing. For an end to the sanctions imposed on Libya, and to remove Libya from the list of terrorism sponsoring countries, and to enhance Libya's relations with the U.S. According to Crocker and Nelson, "the cooperation with the U.S. on this aspect reflects at least two interests. First, he does not want to become a target of the U.S. in

its war on terrorism. Second, he wants U.S. cooperation against al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist elements that have threatened both his rule and his life. Furthermore, Libya also has broad economic and political interests indicated by its application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), If Libya is accepted, the accession process will open up the Libyan economy too much closer international scrutiny and probably lead to important reforms” (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 4).

3.2.2 The U.S Leadership

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that, personal animosity towards Qadhafi, especially among a number of officials in the Reagan administration (Gebriel, 1985, p. 66). General Alexander Haig, former supreme Allied Commander of European, reportedly believed that “Libya was behind the assassination attempt against him in Europe. Later when Haig became the U.S. Secretary of State, he was said to have rejected a state department report arguing that taking any direct action against Libya would endanger the American people’s anti-policies” (Gebriel, 1985, p. 39). Haig was slightly obsessed by the idea of overthrowing Col Qadhafi, whom he believed, “a cancer that should be removed” (Gebriel, 1985, p. 66).

When he was in power, Haig played an important role against any improvement in U.S. - Libya relations. He also played significant role in the economic embargo enforced against Libya. In an interview with Newsweek on December 21, 1981, he was reported to have said:

The resources received by Qadhafi from his oil are almost exclusively diverted to the purchase of armaments, the training of international terrorist and the conduct of direct intervention in the neighboring states of North Africa (Pasha, 1984, p. 80).

Although Alexander Haig was forced out of the state department in mid-1982, his anti-Libyan adviser and specialists on terrorist, Michael Ladeen, stayed on as the consultant to both the state and defense departments (Bearman, 1986, p. 3). During the 1980 presidential election campaign, “he used his contacts in the Italian military intelligence service (*SISMI*) to obtain evidence of Billy Carter’s connections with Libya” (Bearman, 1986, p. 3). The objective was to help Ronald Reagan’s campaign by making President Carter look pro-Arab among the Jewish voters. Ladeen was also closely associated with the Israeli Network in the administration, including having close rapport with Richard Parle, the American Assistant Secretary of Defense and his wife, Leslie Barr, an official of the U.S. customs’ service (Bearman, 1986, p. 3). Ladeen’s wife was as well employed as an assistant in the office of Parle’s deputy, Stephen Bryon. It was reported that “they pressed for a total U.S. embargo on oil imports from Libya as well as U.S. exports to Libya” (Bearman, 1986, p. 3).

Another official with a personal grudge against the Libyan leader, Qadhafi, was the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, William Casey, who was believed to have wanted Col Qadhafi at any cost. The defeat of the Libyan leader was important in order to boost morale and credibility to the agency that he believed was damaged by two former CIA agents, Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil, whom he alleged had connections with Libya (Bearman, 1986, p. 3). “The two previous CIA agents planned to ship explosives to Libya. The third person connected to Wilson Terpil, Jerome Browser, was the supplier of the explosives and other hazardous materials intended to be sold to Libya” (Haley, 1984, p. 125).

On October 21, 1981, two members of the U.S. Congress, Senator Gary Hart and Senator Edward Kennedy, sponsored the oil sanction against Libya, declaring that:

Congress condemned Libya government for its support of international terrorism movements, its disruption of the efforts to establish peace in the Middle East, and its attempts to control other North African nations, (Wright, 1982, p. 14).

Both senators further called upon the U.S. President to "...review steps the U.S. might take with its allies to force Libya to stop such activities." In 1982, George Shultz, another former U.S. Secretary of State and the architect of U.S. strategy against Libya, declared. "...we have to put Qadhafi in his box and close the lid" (Pasha, 1984, p. 3). Meanwhile, Chester Crocker, then former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa also accused Libya as probably the most potent and disastrous source of destabilization in Africa. In a statement, Crocker alleged that "the activities of the former Soviet Union and their (partners) threatened the security of Africa... in accordance with our objectives; the U.S. was working to frustrate these activities" (Pasha, 1984, p. 3).

In terms of the U.S. - Libya relations, the same foreign policy prevailed regarding Libya under George H. Bush, along with added pressure during the build up and aftermath of the Gulf War in 1990-1991. The Gulf War demonstrated the unchallenged power of the U.S. in the Middle East. In addition, the implementation of the rogue state doctrine against Libya by both the Reagan and the first Bush Administrations provided ample reasons for the U.S. to repeatedly shun Libya's attempts at beginning serious diplomatic negotiations. The habit of ignoring Libyan diplomats sent for negotiations continued during the Clinton Administration.

Internal pressure, specifically from the Lockerbie victim's families on U.S. Congress was a "major restriction for early U.S. engagement with Libya in the 1990's" (Gosa, 2011, p. 8).

President Clinton's administration was tougher on Libya than the previous administration of George H. Bush (Zoubir, 2002, p. 35). Clinton toughened the international sanctions on Libya to ensure that the families of the Lockerbie incident were compensated (Zoubir, 2002, p. 35). Libya was already under the U.S. sanctions that began in 1981, in addition to UN imposed sanctions in 1992 as a result of the Lockerbie incident. The UN sanctions in May of 1993 restricted air travel to Libya, spare parts for the oil industry, imposed an arms' embargo, froze Libyan funds abroad in addition to a decreased number of diplomats globally (Zoubir, 2002, p. 35). The additional pressure was intended to force the Libyan government to hand over the Lockerbie suspects. It agreed to hand over the Libyan suspects, but not exactly on the U.S. terms. Its concerns about the extradition of the two Libya's suspects to the U.S. or one of its allies caused them to offer other alternatives in order to ensure a fair trial (Zoubir, 2002, p. 35). In 1999, the Libyan Government at last accepted to hand over its own citizen's suspects to appear in a Scottish court in Holland.

The September 11th 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington were the catalyst for many changes in terms of foreign policy initiatives between the U.S. and countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions. The MENA countries include all the countries between Morocco and Iran. The North African countries are referred to as Al Maghreb (the west) and the countries of Egypt

to Iran are known as Al-Mashreq (the east). Historically, the MENA region has been strategically important to the U.S. As a result of the War on Terror; MENA gained another dimension of significance in terms of U.S. domestic security. Of particular economic importance are the Mashreq countries or Persian Gulf countries of Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Except for Iran, the countries in this region are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and have close relations with the U.S. as a result of their large oil reserves (Gosa, 2011, p. 9).

The Maghreb countries have historically been under great influence of post-colonial European powers. However, after September 11th 2001, “the U.S. increased its economic, security and military ties with the central Maghreb countries of Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya” (Zoubir, 2006b, p. 10). Of these countries, Libya stands out because of its historical tensions with the U.S. and the opportunity that Libya took to make a change in those tense relations with the U.S. September 11th 2001 presented Libya an opportunity to improve its relations with the U.S. After the September 11th 2001, the Libyan Government quickly offered its sympathy and full cooperation in the War on Terror (St. John, 2004, p. 393). Precisely, what was officially the cause of Libya’s international isolation became one of its negotiating tools. Its links to terrorist groups throughout the world allowed for the chance to officially sever Libya’s ties with such groups and reinvent itself as a supporter of the War on Terror. However, “for a country that supported terrorist groups on a global scale, it was ironic that Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden would be a security issue for the Libyan State since it could hypothetically be a safe haven for

Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden. Both the U.S. and Libya shared some of the same security concerns; Al-Qaeda was one of them” (Gosa, 2011, p. 10).

A long-time target of Islamist militants, the Libyan Government was eager to share its knowledge of terrorist suspects and networks (St. John, 2004, p. 394). In fact, “Qadhafi actually issued the first Interpol warrants for Osama Bin Laden back in 1998 after an alleged assassination attempt was made by Bin Laden on Qadhafi” (Anderson, 2006, p. 42).

The September 11th, “became the focus of the second Bush Administration. The new Bush doctrine of preventive war was published in the National-Security Guidelines on September 20th, 2001 of which called for unlimited American military action regardless of international law or the UN” (Lynch, 2002, p. 225). As former President George W. Bush built his case to legitimize American military action against the government or terrorist group of choice, the Libyan government carefully positioned itself as an ally to the U.S., Qadhafi’s regime was an easy target for military action from the U.S. after September 11th, 2001, because of its history of support for terrorists. George W. Bush’s administration was keen to publicly rename some of the well-known rogue states, yet Libya had succeeded in being removed from the official list of terrorism sponsors. Fear of the toppling of his regime and the economic losses endured by Libya as a result of the two decades of isolation were the two principal reasons for the change of policy within the Libyan government. UN sanctions had cost Libya an estimated US\$33 billion of loss revenue until 2001(Takeyh, 2001, p. 65). “The Libyan government also succeeded in diverting unwanted pressure for democratization, it learned from Pakistan and Egypt that

becoming an ally in the War on Terror was rewarded with less democratic reform rhetoric from Washington” (Gosa, 2011, p. 30).

George W. Bush’s January 29th, 2002 State of the Union address, Bush reassured Americans of the safety that has been restored by the military as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. He also described Iran, Iraq and North Korea and states like these as states comprising of the ‘axis of evil’ (Bush, 2002a). Knowing the history of diplomatic negotiations in order to restore normalization between the U.S. and Libya, it can be understood why Libya was left out of being labeled a country belonging to the axis of evil. Libya was not named as a concern since Libya was not truly a significant threat to U.S. interests and more importantly, Libya was viewed as a prosperous future economic interest. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 on the premise of WMD, the Libyan Government understood that it would not have much support in the African or Arab world if the U.S. decided to invade Libya. The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq surely had an impact on Libya’s decisions on the U.S’s demands on collaboration efforts. Nonetheless, “Libya was engaged in rapprochement efforts since the early 1990s and formal diplomatic negotiations since 1999, these invasions, especially the invasion of Iraq simply expedited the negotiations from both the Libyan and American side” (Gosa, 2011, p. 12).

Libya was ready to reclaim its position in the world economy and restore ties with the international community for a decade. Nevertheless, there was still one monumental obstacle stood in the way of normalization efforts between the Libyan and American states. Lockerbie was still haunting Libya. The trial for the bombing

of Pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 had been the impetus for the U.S. and UN sanctions against Libya. Lockerbie was used by Washington as a negotiating tool. On March 11th, 2002, Libya accepted the responsibility for the bombing and agreed to pay the families of the victims a total of US\$ 2.7 million (St. John, 2004, p. 6). Libya only accepted responsibility and never admitted guilt for the tragedy. “This was seemingly a symbolic closure for both countries of a bitter economic and political history, one that Libya especially wished to overcome. This proved to be a long and tiresome road for Libya. Economic incentives for U.S. oil firms in Libya are particularly noteworthy in U.S. in the attempts to normalize relations. The driving force behind the U.S interest in Libya was the War on Terror, its need to further expand national markets and ensure energy needs” (Simons, 1996, p. xviii).

3.3 The Media Factor

It is widely believed that the best method of communication between states is using of diplomacy that has a real power to solve crisis, control situations and obtain information and mass media represents an opinion of the states or be a means to promote and achieve economic, cultural and political interests of states. However, before any examination on the subject of media, one has to have a clear comprehension and its relevant vocabulary. The most basic definition for media is how data is communicated; it is the forms of data representation to the public; it can be in the forms of Radio, Television, Movies, newspapers, magazines and many more. To properly understand media, one will also have to be knowledgeable in its

types, shapes, and forms. For instance, the combination of audio, video, and graphics is referred to as Multimedia.

Simon J. Hulme (2001), in his study *the Modern Media: the Impact on Foreign Policy* asserted that the recent improvements in technology had a direct impact on the capability of modern media in several ways:

Firstly, Modern satellite communications broke many of the barriers to news production. There are few, if any places left on the planet that cannot be covered by satellite communications. Secondly, the television news media in combination with modern technology also has the power to generate news where there is no story. Author, social scientist and correspondent. Thirdly, the speed of the transmission of the news reduces the time available to take decisions at the critical level in government. This increase in the speed of news item production and transmission has been facilitated by the reduction in size and cost of the media production equipment. Commensurate with this portability, is an increase in the speed of the transmission of the finished news report or article, but more importantly than the speed with which a report can be sent, it is the second-order effect of that speed on time available to those who take decisions. Fourthly, the amount of news coverage available increased exponentially in the last few years. Modern technology has also meant an increase in availability for the news media. Television coverage of news events is more than just twenty-four hours a day business demanding answers and opinions from leaders and the public alike, at any time of the day and night (Hulme, 2001, p. 33).

According to Simon J. Hulme (2001) “all the above factors combined to have the ability to pressure decision-makers and shape public opinion, which in turn affects the politician. This combination of speed of production, transmission, pressure for potential decision time and the fact that the news is everywhere has amounted to a capability to produce a force that can have an effect” (Hulme, 2001, p. 34).

The three potential media effects or outcomes of media action were defined by Stephen Livingston who argues that there are three possible basic media effects on foreign policy: (1) the media force can either manifest itself as an accelerant, (2)

impediment, or (3) act as an agenda setting agency (Livingston, 1997, p. 2). These can further be divided into subgroups; he calls the complete definition the “Conceptual Variations of the CNN Effect”. According to Livingston:

The *accelerant* shortens not only the decision-making process and amount of time available to decision makers in producing a policy, but also acts as a force multiplier in assisting the sending of signals between national leaders; a phenomenon not uncommon in most foreign policy issues that receive media attention. The media as an *impediment* comes in two forms: first, Emotional pressure, which in this scenario is where both government and political morale may be undermined by poor TV coverage. Secondly, where real-time media coverage presents a direct threat to operational security, the third and final media effect is as an *agenda-setting agency*. Within this role, the media would be capable of compelling military intervention by covering global issues and raising the profile of the event on the political ladder (Livingston, 1997, p. 3).

It can be argued that, although there is a vast difference between the media in Libya and in the U.S., They have plenty of comparable characteristics. One main characteristic is the task the Libyan media plays in educating people in general subjects like health care, child care, maternal care, environmental issues, and domestic problems. The media often offers suitable solutions to overcome such problems.

According to Ahmed Mady (2005) in *Roles and Effects of Media in the Middle East and the United States* “we have to understand that each media asset has an agenda and interests which find reflection in the pursuit of specific goals. Much depends on who is in control” (Mady, 2005, p. 38). All media firms usually have a chain of command. The media in Libya and the U.S. are no different and follow the same structure; they either take orders from the government or owners. Libya’s media however only subject to the Libyan regime. It is considered as a medium for the regime to use in security and on local relay occasions. Every piece on

information goes through the regime. The scale of control on the media in the U.S is rather limited, for example, when the Abu Ghrib scandal was about to be reported in ABC news, the U.S asked ABC news to delay the news of the scandal for an intended timeline (Mady, 2005, p. 38).

Unlike the U.S, Libyan media is in no way given the right to contest government's influence, though the U.S media has a lenience of its content. The media in Libya also has no definitive goals and objectives. However, the U.S media has its own agenda and plans to achieve those agendas in their own respective line of work. This is a significant difference between Libyan Media and The U.S media (Mady, 2005, p. 38).

Furthermore, the third major difference between media in the U.S. and Libya, the most media organizations in Libya owned by the Libyan government; they are therefore, financially dependent upon the government, as for the U.S. there are many private owners of media organizations has to seek financial support through advertisements and other resources.

Another major difference in both in the media in both countries is the audience it delivers to. The U.S. media has reached a global status and airs in the English language on a global scale. The Libyan media however targets local civilians and neighboring countries such as the Arabic countries. The language it airs with is Arabic.

Yet another difference is the religious influence on the media. In Libya Islam is the most popular religion which forces the media to display certain religious qualities and habits. The U.S however depicts no preferences faith wise and is not

restricted by any religious views. “This major difference is reflected in the media content, in implied and explicit constraints on the media, in many respects on the very latitude with which the media may treat potentially sensitive subjects” (Mady, 2005, p. 39).

However, there is a close relationship between the U.S. media and the American government. At the domestic and international levels, they may be at odds, but where American interests abroad are concerned, the two institutions seem to frequently share the same agenda, that is to project and protect its interests and those of its allies. Towards this end, the U.S. media have frequently spread illusions and distorted the images of any person or nation that it deems to be a hindrance to the pursuit of the U.S. interests at any costs. “The distortion of images of other countries, including Libya is facilitated by the fact that the U.S. foreign policy- makers have broad control over release and what to conceal from the press” (Gebriel, 1985, p. 80). This power has given policy- makers the ability to manipulate press and information in order to promote their policies. Policy- makers issue statements such as allegations of Libya’s misconduct in the international arena; it will be headline news for the media (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 66). Such can be further dramatized and sensationalized in order to sell news and draw audience.

American media, including their western counterparts, have painted the Arabs in general and Libya in particular as terrorists. Blake and Abu Osba (1982) observed that:

Besides these stereotypes of the Islamic peoples, we must note certain images of Arabs, in particular, that have taken on almost archetypal qualities in the west’s perception. One type is ...the terrorist in ... [which has become]

...clearly visible in the public consciousness of the west since shortly after the six-Day war of 1967 (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 67).

The U.S. media stereotypes Libya under Qadhafi as a state that sponsors terrorism. This portrayal is consistent with how the American government perceived Libya, during Ronald Reagan's presidency, for example, on November 12, 1981 where an American diplomat in Paris was attacked, the U.S. quickly linked Libya on it. This can be seen when the former U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig was quick to link the attacker in his November 13, 1981 as reported, "a young man in his early 30s, bearded and of Middle Eastern Origin." He was also reported to have further commented as follows:

We have no other information, except to underline once again that the reports that come to us were from reliable sources and that Mr. Qadhafi has been funding, sponsoring, training, harboring terrorist groups, which conduct activities against the lives...of American diplomats (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 68).

Indeed, three days before the above report appeared, an editorial in the Washington Post November 10, 1981 asked:

How dangerous is Col Qadhafi?! He is an overcompensating anti-imperialist capable only of an occasional assassination (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 68).

The same article proposed a punishment for Libya and that was to cut back American purchases of oil from Libya and to recall the 2,000 Americans working in Libya. Both suggestions were adopted one month later by the Reagan administration (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 68). Jim Beliu, one of the American workers who left his job in Libya following President Reagan's order to recall U.S. workers, said in an interview:

...the President is using Libya and other foreign national to divert attention from American's economic problems. If you are doing terrible thing to the economy, you can holler "Libya" or "Poland" or "Elselvador" and take the heat off where you don't want the heat to be (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 69).

The line of thinking of foreign policy- makers in Washington is that if a third-world country is not a "friend" of the U.S., then it must be acting as a proxy for the former Soviet Union. This view dominated the Western media and the main thrust of media coverage on Libya as to portray Libya as a Soviet satellite and therefore, a threat to the U.S. and Western European countries. Journalists with close ties to intelligence agencies such as William Safire, Jack Anderson, John Cooley and others started as early as March 1981 to publish reports about the alleged Libyan-Soviet connection. They also started accusing Libya as the Soviets "surrogate" in carrying out terrorist activities in the Middle East, arguing that these activities will have some impact on the western influence in those areas. On March 1, 1981, for instance, Drew Middleton wrote in New Times alleging for "a strong possibility that Libyan bases would be available to the Soviet Air Force in the event of a crisis in the Mediterranean" (Wright, 1986, p. 65).

The same line of argument was also strongly emphasized by William Safire writing for the Washington Post. John Cooley presented what he argued was "evidence of Soviet buildup in Libya." Two books that promoted this line of idea about Libya were written by journalist closely associated to the Reagan Administration and the U.S. Intelligence. The first was called "Spike" written by Robert Moss and Arnuaud de Borchgrave. The novel portrays the administration's perspective on the threat posed by the former Soviet Union and their "proxies" to the

west. The second book was by Claire Sterling called “The Terror Network” in which she called the Libyan leader Col Qadhafi “the Daddy Warbucks of international terrorism” (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 160). In the book, she attributed all “terrorist” groups and terrorist actions to the former Soviet Union. The two books were published by the International Communication Agency and all over the world were promoted among leaders (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 160).

Moreover, it was reported that former U.S. Secretary Haig made it a point to send copies of Sterling’s book to all members of the Senate foreign relations committee (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 160). By late April 1981, both Sterling and de Borchgrave were the leading witnesses before the newly established judiciary Sub-Committee on Security and terrorism, and by October 1981, the U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N. was using Sterling’s book to promote the alleged Libyan-Soviet “terrorist” connection at the General Assembly (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 160).

The basic aim of the Western media and propaganda in general and of the U.S. media, in particular, which are both under majority control of the “the Israel Lobby” is to influence decision-makers to support Israel in the latter’s conflict with the Arab and further widen the gap in the U.S. - Libya relations (Almahdi, 1999, p. 151). Generally, some of the aims of the Western and U.S. media are: Firstly, to divert attention from U.S. economic problems. Secondly, to punish Libya for its support of international liberation movements such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Thirdly, to destroy the Libyan image all over the world, fourthly, to paint Qadhafi as the main source of terrorism around the world, and lastly, to paint

the picture of Col Qadhafi as “the most dangerous man into the world” (Almahdi, 1999, p. 151).

On the other hand, “the September 11th terrorist attacks were a major turning point in Bush's presidency. In a September 20th speech, Bush condemned Osama Bin Laden and his organization Al-Qaeda, and issued an ultimatum to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, where Bin Laden was operating, to hand over the terrorists, or share in their fate” (Bush, 2001).

After September 11th, Bush Jr. announced a global war on Terror. “The Afghan Taliban regime was not forthcoming with Osama Bin Laden, so Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime” (Bush, 2001). In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address, he asserted that an “axis of evil” consisting of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq was “arming to threaten the peace of the world” and “posed a grave and growing danger” (Bush, 2002a). The Bush Administration asserted both a right and the intention to wage preemptive war, or preventive war (Bush, 2002b, p. 15). This became the basis for the Bush Doctrine which weakened the unprecedented levels of international and domestic support for the U.S. which followed the September 11 attacks.

In late 2002 and early 2003, Bush urged the UN to enforce Iraqi disarmament mandates, precipitating a diplomatic crisis. In November 2002, Hans Blix and Mohamed El-Baradei led UN weapons inspectors in Iraq, but were advised by the U.S. to depart the country four days prior to the U.S. invasion, despite their requests for more time to complete their tasks (USA Today, 2003). The U.S. initially sought a

UNSC resolution authorizing the use of military force but dropped the bid for UN approval due to vigorous opposition from several countries.

More than 20 nations (most notably the U.K), designated the “coalition of the willing” joined the U.S. (Schifferes, 2003) in invading Iraq. They launched the invasion on March 20, 2003. The Iraqi military was quickly defeated. The capital, Baghdad, fell on April 9, 2003. On May 1, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq.

Accordingly, it can be argued that, while the Media's focus on follow up these major events, it does not heed to the secret negotiations between the U.S. and Libya in order to solve the outstanding obstacles to normalize their relations. In addition, the U.S. keen to success of the bilateral talks with Libya which required work away from the eyes of the media because of the complex relationships between the U.S. media and Qadhafi, which may adversely affect the proper functioning of these talks. In fact, world events such as September 11 attacks, the war against terror, the invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq gave the policy- makers in the two countries a chance to work together in order to complete the negotiation process between both sides. Hence, it can be said that the positive role of the media in the normalization process of U.S. - Libya relations came not by shining lights on these negotiations, but as a result of their absence.

3.4 Conclusions

This chapter shows that political factors played an important role in the U.S. - Libya normalized relations. These include diplomacy, leadership and the media. The main

priority for the Libyan regime was to end the Lockerbie case and thereafter have better relations with the U.S. Thus, the two countries move towards normalized their relations through the diplomatic tools. The secret negotiations were the decisive ingredient to the settlement of outstanding problems between the two countries.

It was clear here, the direct supervision of Saif al-Islam al Qadhafi on the progress of these negotiations in overcoming the difficulties encountered in the multi-stage. In addition, some conditions that helped both sides to reach this achievement.

In terms of the leadership factor, for Libyan side undoubtedly that the Col Qadhafi's control over the course of events played a prominent role in taking the crucial decisions at the right time in order to reach what is believed to be an honorable settlement for his people and his country. On the other side, the U.S. Presidential system enabled for a number of Presidents to deliberate over the Libyan case; some of them understood the environment and the culture of Libyan society and knew how to deal with it. Others did not even try to know it. However, U.S. President George W. Bush and his decisions after the events of September 11, starting with the invasion of Afghanistan and ending with the occupation of Iraq, the difficulties faced by the U.S. forces in Iraq, and the desire of the U.S. to improve its image in the Arab region and in the world, which led President Bush to take a flexible policy towards Libya, to explain to the world that the U.S., as far as possible, will punish rogue states and reward cooperating states like Libya.

In terms of the role of the media factor to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations, it can be concluded that the Western media in general and the U.S., in

particular, had a certain prejudicial image in portraying non-Anglo-Saxon persons; it negatively painted the Arab Nations, mainly Libya, Syria, and Iraq as terrorist countries, thereby posing a risk to the U.S. national interests and its European counterparts. In addition to the concern of the media on the major events such as September 11 attacks, the war against terror, the invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq, and the nature of the secret negotiations between the U.S. and Libya, hence, we can say that the positive role of the media came not by shining lights on these negotiations, but came because of their absence from these important negotiations.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ECONOMIC FACTORS

Economic relations between the U.S. and Libya had a long history started before Libya gained independence in 1951, when Washington started an economic aid program to the Libyan government. Then, these relations strained after Libyan oil nationalization in 1970, not to mention the cutting of these relations during the Reagan presidency period in 1980s. In truth, there are several factors that played a significant role leading to normalization of the U.S.-Libyan relations during the period 2003–2006. Oil and sanctions are two major economic factors that played important roles in the U.S.- Libya relations during this period. This chapter examines these factors in an attempt to better understand their role in the U.S. - Libya relations. It is divided into two main parts. The first part looks at the oil factor. The second part looks at the sanctions, and analyzes their roles that led to the normalized relations between the two countries.

4.1 The Oil Factor

It is very clear that oil plays an active role influencing global politics in a major way. Oil has influenced governments' decisions to go to war and at the same time has influenced their relations with other countries. International politics is fraught with alliances and divisions, and it's undoubtedly true that the oil trade has influenced these relationships. What is most noteworthy of all is that the West countries need for oil has only grown with time. "This means until an alternative energy source is

discovered, or the oil reserves are depleted, oil is going to continue to influence international politics” (Abraham, 2011).

So what makes oil so highly valuable for individuals, companies and sovereign states? First, “Oil is Universal” Oil plays a major role in practically every aspect of our lives from technology and transportation to the very food and business necessary for human life. Second, “Oil is Unique” While there may be various alternative energy supplies available for some industrial tasks such as creating electricity, there is currently no reasonable substitute for oil when it comes to transportation. Third, “Oil is Rare” According to scientific calculations; oil is a progressively depleting fuel that is disappearing at an exponentially alarming rate. “While there are still an undetermined number of untapped oil deposits left to be discovered around the globe, reasonable arguments will continue as to just how quickly the world’s oil supply might run out. However, even among the most optimistic and pessimistic prognosticators, there is virtually no debate that there is currently less oil available to us than there was just 50 years ago” (OilPrice.com, 2009).

Oil is the main natural resource in Libya; the existence of oil under the sands in the Libyan Desert was suspected even before the Second World War the equipment and the gear was not enough at that time for this type of work. Oil exploration in Libya started in 1955, the Key National Petroleum Law No. 25 was enacted in April 1955, and the first oil fields were discovered in 1959 when American prospectors confirmed their location at Amal and Zelten now known as Nasser. Oil exports began in 1961 (Fergiani, 1976, p. 191).

The following decade saw dramatic increases in both production and revenues. Within a few years, however, Libya became the world's fourth most prolific producer of oil. This phenomenal growth was triggered by a combination of circumstances that made the country's oil an eagerly sought-after commodity. The first of this was the fact that, despite an overabundance of oil in the World market; the post-war European demand for oil was increasing at an accelerated pace. This was prompted in part by the European countries' determination to replace their coal industry with a more efficient and more environmentally friendly fuel, and also by the Continent's rapidly expanding transportation network. Libyan oil would prove ideal for meeting these demands. As the result of geological factors, the oil deposits that were discovered in the Sirte Basin proved light in gravity and contained very little sulphur. They were particularly of interest to European refiners trying to meet increasingly stringent rules on sulphur emissions. "Libya's location also proved to be a significant asset. Situated close to the European market, Libyan oil commanded an important advantage over Middle East oil: lower transportation costs, particularly to the southern European ports" (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 54).

However, "the Libyan economy is heavily dependent on the hydrocarbon industry which, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), accounted for over 95 percent of export earnings, an estimated 85-90 percent of fiscal revenues and over 70 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008" (International Monetary Fund, 2005). According to the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), "Libya holds close to 44 billion barrels of oil reserves, the largest in Africa, Energy Information Administration (EIA) data indicate that the 2008 total oil production

(crude plus liquids) was approximately 1.88 million barrels per day” (bbl/d) (International Monetary Fund, 2005).

Libya produces high-quality, low-sulphur (“sweet”) crude oil at very low cost (as low as US\$1 per barrel at some fields). During the first half of 2003, Libyan oil production was estimated at nearly 1.5 million bbl/d, an increase from the 2002 levels, but still only about two-fifths of the 3.3 million bbl/d produced in 1970 (see Figure 4.1). Libya, a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, followed by Nigeria and Algeria. According to Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), “Libya had been total proven oil reserves of 43.7 billion barrels as of January 2009, up from 41.5 billion barrels in 2008. However, Libya remains relatively unexplored, and the potential for fresh discoveries means that the true total could be far higher” (Pagnamenta, 2009).




Figure 4.1: Top 5 African Oil Reserve Holders, 2009. Source: Oil and Gas Journal, January 2009

Libya’s oil industry is run by the state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC), along with smaller subsidiary companies, which combined account for around half of the country’s oil output. Several international oil companies are

engaged in exploration/production agreements with NOC. The leading foreign oil producer in Libya is Italy's Agip-Eni, which has been operating within the country since 1959. Two U.S. oil companies (Exxon and Mobil) withdrew from Libya in 1982; (EIA, 2002). Following a U.S. trade embargo that begun in 1981, five other U.S. companies (Amerada Hess, Conoco, Grace Petroleum, Marathon, and Occidental) remained active in Libya until 1986, when President Reagan ordered them all to cease activities there. Conoco, Amerada Hess and Occidental made up the "Oasis Group," which produced around 850,000 bbl / d in 1986 (EIA, 2002). The development of oil in Libya was helped by its geographical position; Libya is nearer to key European and North American markets than some of the most important oil producers, notably those of the Middle East. Thus, Libya found itself on the market side of a Suez Canal closed by the Middle East war of June 1967 (Simons, 1996, p. 187). The oil companies then worked to expand their Libyan activities rather than simply rely on the earlier policy of consolidation. It was cheaper by far to ship oil from the Mediterranean to Europe and North America than to travel from the Arabian Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope (Simons, 1996, p. 187).

As for natural gas, the expansion of natural gas production remains a high priority for Libya for two main reasons. First, Libya aims to use natural gas instead of oil domestically for power generation, freeing up more oil for export. Second, Libya has vast natural gas reserves and is looking to increase its natural gas exports, particularly to Europe. Libya's proven natural gas reserves as of January 1, 2007 were estimated at 2.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) by OGJ (Libyan Times, 2010). Some

Libyan experts believe, with more explorations, reserves may possibly reach 70-100 Tcf (Libyan Times, 2010). Major producing fields include Attahadi, Defa-Waha, Hatiba, Zelten, Sahl, and Assumud. To expand its natural gas production, marketing, and distribution, Libya is looking to foreign participation and investment. Libya's natural gas production has grown substantially in the last few years. According to EIA, Libya produced 399 billion cubic feet (Bcf) in 2005, while consuming 206 Bcf. In 2006, HIS energy reported that Libya produced 985 Bcf of natural gas, more than two times the amount produced in 2005 (Libyan Times, 2010). Of the 985Bcf, 474 Bcf was exported to Italy and Spain. 385 Bcf was used in oilfield recovery projects and the remaining 146 Bcf was used in the generation of electricity in Libya (Libyan Times, 2010).

4.1.1 The role of oil in U.S. - Libya relations

The top foreign policy goal of any country, whatever the nature of its political system, and whatever its size or population, is to maintain its presence and protect its national security. Hence, this requires state to use all its national capacities to achieve those goals. Moreover, in order to examine how the oil factor influencing policy shift decision on both sides. It must be seen within the following context:

4.1.1.1 The obstacles that faced the Libyan oil sector before 2003

It must be recognized here that Libya is a clear example of a rentier state, i.e.; its economy depends on its production and export of oil and thus provides the needs of the Libya's society through the money raised from these sales. The figures for the

development of production in Libyan oil fields from 1968-2003 indicate the decrease of production during the period following the withdrawal of the U.S. oil companies from Libya in the 1980s (see Table 4.1). This is because of two reasons; the first, the ban of export of American equipment that could be used for extracting oil and transporting it to export terminals. The second, oil production might also have been damaged by the freezing of Libyan assets abroad, which Libya faced difficulty in investing in the oil sector.

Table 4.1

Libya Oil Production (1968-2003) in million barrels per day

Year	Production	Year	Production	Year	Production	Year	Production
1968	2.605	1977	2.065	1986	1.065	1995	1.439
1969	3.110	1978	1.985	1987	1.005	1996	1.452
1970	3.320	1979	2.090	1988	1.060	1997	1.489
1971	3.765	1980	1.830	1989	1.165	1998	1.480
1972	2.240	1981	1.220	1990	1.430	1999	1.425
1973	2.180	1982	1.135	1991	1.540	2000	1.475
1974	1.520	1983	1.110	1992	1.475	2001	1.425
1975	1.480	1984	1.105	1993	1.402	2002	1.376
1976	1.930	1985	1.060	1994	1.431	2003	1.488

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, several years.

Libya's crucial hydrocarbon industry was also experiencing problems with reform as the International Energy Agency noted, "Most of the fields in Libya are relatively cheap to develop successful development, however, will depend on Libya's capacity to attract foreign investors" (International Energy Agency, 2005, p. 433).

Libya was in urgent need of new investment in oil and gas technologies; Libya's oil reserves were declining at a rate of 8 percent a year, falling to fewer than 10 billion barrels from a high of over 30 billion in the 1970s (Ronen, 2008, p. 63). Some of the larger oil fields became depleted and some gas fields that had produced liquefied natural gas were now completely exhausted. While preferring U.S. oil technology, Qadhafi's drive to put its oil companies back in business in Libya may also have reflected other motives such as a desire to rehabilitate his complex relations with the U.S. administration. This would provide Tripoli with a security net by making it difficult for Washington to order US oil companies to leave Libya again should another hour of crisis arrive (Ronen, 2008, p. 63).

The promotion of the return of American oil companies was one of the primary objectives of the government of Shukri Ghanem. In its pursuit, he sought to accelerate a process that began in May 2000. The previous government opened "137 blocks" to be negotiated as a new concession (Martinez, 2007, p. 134). The Libyan government was seeking the help of foreign companies to increase the country's oil production capacity from 1.4 million barrels a day (bbl/d) at present to (2) million bbl/d by 2010, and to 3 million bbl/d by 2015 (Cordesman, 2005, p. 19). In order to

achieve this goal, and also to upgrade its oil infrastructure in general, Libya was seeking as much as US\$30 billion in foreign investment over that period.

However, “If Libya does reach 2 million (bbl/d) in oil production capacity, this would take the country back to a level it has not seen since the late 1970s. During that decade, Libya’s revolutionary government imposed tough terms on producing companies, leading to a slide in oilfield investments and oil production - from 3.3 million bbl/d in 1970 to 1.5 million bbl/d in 1975, before rising again to 2.1 million (bbl/d) in 1979. During the 1980s Libyan oil production averaged around 1.2 million bbl/d rising to around 1.4 million (bbl/d) in the 1990s” (Cordesman, 2005, p. 19).

According to the EIA analysis, sanctions caused delays in a number of field development projects and deterred capital investment to an extent. The full lifting of sanctions means that Libya can now resume purchases of oil industry equipment. EIA notes, “however, US sanctions remained in place, which was important since US companies were leaders in advanced oil and gas technologies, many of which they have under patent” (Afrol News, 2009).

Petroleum talks for the return of the Oasis Group (comprising Amerada Hess Corp, ConocoPhillips, and Marathon Oil Corp) continued until late December, when Oasis and NOC agreed to a 25-year extension of the group’s exploration and production agreements on the Waha concessions in the Sirte Basin (Mobbs, 2005, p. 25). State-owned Waha Oil Co. operated the Sirte Basin fields since the group had been obligated to leave Libya as a result of sanctions imposed by the U.S. under Executive Order 12543 of January 7, 1986. “The original concession agreements

expired during the hiatus. The new agreement called for the Oasis Group to pay US\$1.3 billion for their resumption of management of the oilfields and for the concession extension and US\$530 million to partially refund investments in the operation made by Waha Oil” (Mobbs, 2005, p. 25).

In July, “Occidental Petroleum Corp. (Oxy) and NOC agreed that Oxy could be resume production operations on the three concession areas that U.S. sanctions forced Oxy to leave in 1986. The original concession agreements expired in 2009 and 2010. State-owned Zueitina Oil Co. managed the concessions since 1986” (Mobbs, 2005, p. 25).

In early 2005, “exploration permits were awarded for nine onshore and six offshore blocks that were offered in the initial round of bids for licenses under the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement-IV (EPSA-IV). In October 2005, the second round of bids under EPSA-IV resulted in the awarding of exploration permits for 24 onshore and 16 offshore blocks. Additional licensing rounds for exploration permits were scheduled to be held in 2006 and 2007” (Mobbs, 2005, p. 25).

When Libya opened its nuclear sites for inspection and began to dismantle the program, the U.S. responded by lifting the sanctions that barred American oil companies from operating there. Although previous suspension of U.N. sanctions resulted in a modest increase in Libya’s output, U.S. oil companies were necessary to reach the level of investment required for more significant growth, calculated at US\$41 billion by the International Energy Agency (International Energy Agency, 2005, p. 456). American firms were valued not only for their technological prowess, but also for their historical links and psychological worth to Libya. Tripoli also

realized that American business models (e.g., best practices) offered an opportunity to develop homegrown talent. When sanctions were lifted, direct U.S. involvement in the oil sector quickly ensued. More than 90 percent of the entities involved in Libya's 2005 Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) IV were U.S.-majority partnerships (Moss, 2010, p. 8). The resultant contracts constituted an immediate cash influx focused largely on the development of preexisting fields, just as Tripoli wanted.

Moreover, "the terms of the contracts focused on production allocation, amplifying the gains for Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC). Occidental Petroleum, for example, signed a thirty-year agreement with the NOC to upgrade its existing contracts, a deal expected to generate a total capital investment of approximately US\$1.9 billion" (Moss, 2010, p. 8). The new agreements allowed the NOC and Occidental to design and implement major field redevelopment and exploration programs in areas such as the Sirte Basin. Furthermore, following its participation in EPSA IV, Occidental was committed to invest an additional US\$125 million in exploration projects over the next five years. Meanwhile, "the Oasis Group paid a US\$1.8 billion fee to return to Libya, US\$530 million of which was committed to direct investments. The various companies that made up the Oasis Groups Amerada Hess, Marathon, and Conoco Phillips - also began to invest in and develop gas as well as oil fields" (Moss, 2010, p. 8).

According to Dana Moss, Libya's oil fields are showing modest increases. Production has already risen somewhat from 1.4 mbd before 2003 to 1.7 mbd in 2007; other production trends are promising as well. The Oasis Group, which

operates in al-Waha field, has made plans to increase production from 350,000 bd to 600,000 bd by 2013. Altogether, U.S. joint-operated companies will be involved in up to one-third of Libya's planned medium-term drive to increase oil production from 1.75 mbd to 2.5 mbd by 2015. Regarding specific projects, the Oasis partners have only begun two smaller upgrades so far: Faregh Phases 1 and 2, together costing US\$174.6 million. Future field development is conditional on many factors, including the price of oil, the terms of future contracts and economic conditions in Libya and at the NOC. The involvement of U.S. companies goes beyond direct investment in oil fields. These investments have secondary benefits for the Libyan economy, as the government requires international companies to form joint ventures with local partners and to hire and train Libyans. Exxon Mobil, for example, agreed to pay US\$25 million to fund training programs and scholarships for Libyans as well as US\$3 million to improve local schools. And Libyans constitute 90 percent or more of the workforce at the two joint oil companies through which the U.S. firms Oxy and the Oasis partners operate (Zueitina and Waha, respectively) (Moss, 2010, p. 8).

The renewal of U.S. relations had a measurable impact on Libya's overall economic prospects. In 2006, for example, foreign direct investment totaled US\$4 billion, a six-fold increase over the previous year. With the end of U.S. sanctions and the removal of Libya from the U.S. terrorism list, business confidence in the country increased. Its renewed ties with the U.S. made Libya seem like a less risky environment for international investors. In 2003, for instance, around eleven oil

companies were operating in Libya; that figure is now greater than fifty (St John, 2008b, p. 134).

Hence, these reasons led Libyan policy makers to take flexible positions on the face of American demands. Libya also tried to take advantage of the U.S. oil companies lobby to assist in influencing U.S. decision-makers to make the same flexibility from the other direction.

4.1.1.2 The role of American Oil Companies

In fact, “there was a belief in political circles about the role played by the American Oil Companies in the normalization of the U.S. - Libya relations” (Ronen, 2008, p. 63). In this context, according to Ronen, “both Libyan and U.S. oil companies exerted pressure on the Bush administration to improve the relations between the two countries and thus enable the companies, which ran much of Libya’s oil sectors until forced out by their government in 1986, to return to Libya” (Ronen, 2008, p. 63).

According to Robin Pagnamenta, “with an estimated of 42 billion barrels that make Libya the largest proven oil reserves of any African country, this is equal to 3 percent of the global total” (Pagnamenta, 2009). Its gas reserves are some 1.5 trillion cubic meters, the forth-largest in Africa. However, “Libya remains relatively unexplored and the potential for fresh discoveries means that the true total could be far higher. That is why Libya’s return to the international fold triggered a scramble for drilling rights among international oil companies” (Pagnamenta, 2009).

Exploration work in Libya in the 1960s identified at least ten fields each with more than a billion barrels of oil. Modern techniques could uncover more as

vast areas of the Libyan Sahara remain unexplored. Exploration licenses covered only one-third of the country. A spokesman for BP quoted as saying that “if its exploration programs offshore and in the country’s west are successful it could invest US\$20 billion or more over the next 20 years building refineries, pipelines, and petrochemical and liquefied natural gas plants to allow exports to the UK and elsewhere” (Pagnamenta, 2009).

Three of Britain’s biggest companies - BP, Shell and BG group signed preliminary deals to provide cash and expertise to develop Libya’s investment-starved oil and gas industry. In 2004, “Shell signed exploration deal with Libyan government; only months after Libya publicly abandoned plans to develop weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to lift sanctions. BP’s much bigger deal worth an estimated \$900 million was announced in 2007 during a visit by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair to Tripoli” (BBC News, 2007a). “The company which withdrew from Libya in 1974 when the country nationalized its oil industry will explore 54, 000sq km at the onshore Ghadames and offshore Sirte basins” (BBC News, 2007a).

British companies were competing against a host of rivals, including Total of France, the American ConocoPhillips, China National Petroleum Corp and Gazprom, the Russian state-controlled producer. “The British government had also a strong vested interest in the program. With North Sea gas running out fast; it hoped that Libya could become an alternative to Russia as a source of supply” (Pagnamenta, 2009).

The four American oil companies that were forced by U.S. sanctions to suspend operations in Libya (Occidental Petroleum Corp., Amerada Hess Corp., Marathon Oil Co. and Conoco Inc.) were eager to return to Libya. Tripoli did not give any award their properties to any competitors, but since the 1999 suspension of U.N. sanctions, although several European companies pressed Tripoli to do so (The Wall Street Journal, 2002).

In December 1999, U.S. oil company executives from Oasis plus Marathon traveled to Libya with U.S. government approval to visit their old oil facilities in the country. The former head of NOC, Abdullah al-Badri has stated that “if U.S. companies return to Libya, they will return to the fields they used to operate throughout the country” (World Investment News, 2003, pp. 14-15).

However, in the first part of 2001, Libya contacted the U.S. companies and indicated that, given its desire to develop their fields, Libya was considering transferring them to European companies. In September 2001, “Libya stated that the U.S. companies must either make use of their concessions within a year or risk losing them” (World Investment News, 2003, p. 15).

Three of the U.S. firms, Conoco, Marathon and Amerada Hess, have hired Kenneth Duberstein, former chief of staff in the Reagan White House, to lobby on “initiatives to protect U.S. companies assets in Libya” according to recent lobbying registration forms. “The oil companies had been pressing Washington to let oil-industry engineers travel to Libya to inspect their oil fields. In January 2001, the administration issued the companies licenses for such an inspection trip” (The Wall Street Journal, 2002).

A spokesman for Conoco, Peter Hunt said, “considerable progress has been made toward resuming more normal ties, among the four oil companies Conoco was the most outspoken in calling for an end to unilateral U.S. sanctions” (The Wall Street Journal, 2002).

Conoco estimated that since the company was forced to leave Libya in 1986, “it had lost net production of 300 million barrels of crude oil, or more than \$5 billion in revenue. Peter Hunt called that a conservative estimate. However, Conoco declined to speculate on what the dropping of sanctions would mean for the company, or for the U.S. oil industry” (The Wall Street Journal, 2002).

A spokesman for Occidental, Dale Petroskey, said “the company was encouraged to see the two countries engaged in dialogue. A Marathon spokesman, Paul Wee ditz, said it was difficult to predict how the efforts to improve ties would come out. Amerada Hess declined to comment. The oil companies already had friends in high places. Conoco's chairman and chief executive officer, Archie Dunham, had longtime ties to Vice President Dick Cheney, who formerly headed Halliburton Co., an energy-equipment maker. During his business career, Mr. Cheney was a regular critic of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions” (The Wall Street Journal, 2002).

On December 29, 2005, ConocoPhillips announced on its website that, “in conjunction with its co-ventures, it had reached agreement with the Libyan National Oil Corporation on the terms under which it will return to its former oil and gas production operations in Libya” (Conoco, 2005). Under the agreement, ConocoPhillips and co-ventures Marathon and Amerada Hess will return to their

previous exploration and production interests in the Waha concessions in Libya. According to Jim Mulva, Conoco Phillips chairman and chief executive officer, “this agreement provides a strong basis for us to invest in our aligned goals for increased reserves and production and in the training and development of our Libyan work force” (Conoco, 2005).

Undoubtedly, both Libya and the American Oil Companies were looking out for their economic interests, but sometimes they cannot separate between the political and economic interests in such cases. In his Senate testimony on Foreign Relations Committee, Porter, Geoff D. argued that, “Libya is a country where diplomatic relations disproportionately impact foreign direct investment. Where relations are favorable, companies reap the benefits. When relations sour, companies bear the brunt of retaliatory measures” (Porter, 2010).

Porter divided the International oil companies that signed oil and gas exploration deals in Libya into three categories. “The first group comprised of those companies that reclaimed dormant leases that they were forced to leave Libya because of U.S. and international sanctions in the 1980s. The Oasis group (Amerada Hess, ConocoPhillips, and Marathon Oil) fall within this category. The second group consisted of companies that participated in four open bid rounds to lease tracts of previously unexplored areas. In this process, companies’ submitted bids and those with the bids most favorable to Libya won the right to explore the area on those terms. The third category comprised of companies that negotiated bilateral deals with Libya to explore new areas for development. Only three companies in this time

period negotiated bilateral exploration deals with Libya: BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and ExxonMobil” (Porter, 2010).

Libya is a rich country in both petroleum and gas resources. “It ranks ninth in the world in terms of proven oil reserves, with 44 billion barrels of oil. It also has substantial amounts of natural gas” (OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin: 2006). Furthermore, “because Libya is still relatively under-explored in comparison to many other oil-producing nations, it represents one of the world’s leading prospects for additional oil and gas discoveries. Libyan oil is high quality, low in sulfur and commands a high price on the international market, in addition given Libya’s proximity to Europe, transportation costs are low” (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 14).

It is thus harmful to the U.S economy and energy resource security interests that the imposed sanctions prohibit U.S. oil industry firm to abide by their previous arrangements that provide access to Libyan oil, the sanctions also forbid those firms from exploring any large scale infrastructure developments in Libya which is an opportunity for U.S companies (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 14).

It can be argued that, “although UN sanctions and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) were combined to discourage participation by non-U.S. companies in Libya’s petroleum sector, neither has acted as a complete barrier. By the time UN sanctions were suspended in 1999, there were already more than 20 non-U.S.- domiciled companies with active Libyan petroleum licenses and many more seeking petroleum exploration and production rights. Since the 1999 suspension of UN sanctions and the subsequent restructuring of the Libyan National Oil Company into a modern internationally competitive petroleum management

regime, foreign interest in the Libyan oil and gas sector has increased further” (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 15).

Until 2003, "there are more than 100 exploration licenses open for competitive bidding, and non-U.S. companies are eagerly submitting offers for these licenses. This effectively opens all prospective Libyan acreage to access by every global oil industry participant except U.S.-domiciled companies. It also leaves the U.S.-held Waha and Zueitina concessions, some of the most potentially lucrative acreage in Libya, without foreign access. Not surprisingly, non-U.S. firms have expressed a desire to take over U.S. interests in these concessions” (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 15).

For a while, Libya's neighboring countries, Egypt and Algeria were increasing the development of their own power resource sectors, building infrastructure and making new alliances in the southern European market. "Libya saw itself as falling behind in this competitive environment and feared that it will be shut out of the market if it continued to defer the development of its gas reserves. Significantly, the U.S. concessions include large gas reserves and the NOC is being lobbied by foreign companies to open these gas projects, especially now that Libya is building a gas export pipeline to Italy” (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 15).

Crocker & Nelson (2003) described these concessions as "one of the richest petroleum prizes in the world, with over 6 billion barrels of remaining oil reserves and almost 3 billion equivalent barrels of gas and condensate. For the U.S., any change in the ownership status of these concessions would mean a loss of U.S. influence over a large strategic oil resource. Beyond the obvious impairment to the

U.S. oil companies with existing interests in these concessions, there would be a corresponding loss to U.S. business in the full scope of related activities. As non-U.S. competitors continue to seek access to the U.S. - held concessions aggressively, at some point Libya will decide it no longer wants to hold the door open for sanctions-bound U.S. firms” (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 15).

To sum up, the U.S. oil supply diversity would increase if Libyan oil resources be developed by U.S. firms which reduced the reliance on the Arab gulf oil, and allow for more competition with the global oil firms that take advantages of U.S sanctions.

4.2 The Sanctions factor

In fact, Libya faced two kinds of sanctions (unilateral and multilateral) which clearly influenced its government and people. Usually unilateral sanctions are imposed by one country against another to cut off business and trade relations such as importation and exportation of some or all commodities as well as financial loans. These methods of foreign policy instituted when one country disagrees with another country’s mode of government, issues of human rights violations, environmental pollution and other policy issues. Primarily, the main goal of unilateral sanctions is to punish the targeted nations and give them an impetus to change their policies.

According to Herman Franssen, "in the last 80 years the U.S. imposed unilateral sanctions on nearly 70 countries, covering every continent and almost half of the world’s population. Since then, five more countries were added to the list, making some 40 per cent of the world subject to U.S. unilateral sanctions. The list

includes very specific as well as more general sanctions and some were much more severe in their economic impact than others. The growing use of sanctions as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy coincided with the end of the Cold War, which weakened bipartisan support for foreign policy in the U.S. Congress and reduced the interest of the American public at large on foreign policy issues” (Franssen, 2002).

The Libyan sanctions came in three broad phases; the first phase ran from the 1970s to late 1991. The second phase ran from the late 1991 to mid-1996. The third phase began in mid-1996 to 2006. Although U.N. sanctions were not imposed on Libya until 1992, this was not the beginning. The U.S. applied its own sanctions on Libya over the three decades prior to that (See Appendix N).

Actually, Libya was subjected to one of the strictest U.S. sanctions’ regimes since 1979 to 2006. In fact, the American sanctions against Libya were formulated through the presidential Executive Orders as follows:

- 1- The Executive Order 12538 signed by the former President Ronald Reagan on November 15, 1985 (See Appendix O).
- 2- The Executive Order 12543 signed by the former President Ronald Reagan on January 7, 1986 (See Appendix P).
- 3- The Executive Order 12544 signed by former President Ronald Reagan on January 8, 1986 (See Appendix Q).
- 4- The Executive Order 12801 signed by former President George H Bush Sr. on April 15, 1992 (See Appendix R).
- 5- The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was signed by the former President William J. Clinton on August 5, 1996. (See Appendix S).

On the other hand, the list of multilateral sanctions is much shorter than unilateral sanctions. The first comprehensive effort for international pressure against Libya came from the G7 summit in 1986. Here, leaders issued a joint declaration pledging stepped-up efforts against terrorism with particular emphasis on Libya. Notwithstanding Libya's attempt to justify its refusal to hand over its citizens accused of the Lockerbie case, the U.S., Britain, and France brought the issue before the U.N. Security Council.

The U.N. started tightening international sanctions on Libya in January 21, 1992 when the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 731, which strongly deplored the fact that "the Libyan Government had not yet responded effectively to the requests to cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts against Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772 and urged the Libyan government immediately to provide a full and effective response to those requests so as to contribute to the elimination of international terrorism. The Secretary-General sought the cooperation of the Libyan government to provide a full and effective response to those requests" (Katzman, 2003, p. 60).

The second U.N. Resolution 748 was passed on March 31, 1992 with a lot of fuss. At the time, this was praised as "the first time in the history of the international struggle against modern terrorism that a broad multilateral coalition succeeded in imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-sponsoring state under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council" (Schweitzer, 2004, p. 10). This resolution imposed a ban on all flights on the Libyan airspace and prevented the operation of Libyan Arab Airlines offices abroad, reduced the volume of workers in

embassies including the consular centers, banned the sale of some equipment for oil production and supplies of arms and formed a committee of the UNSC to oversee the implementation of these sanctions to review every 120 days.

In November 11, 1993, the U.N increased its sanctions on Libya by the resolution 883, which included the freezing of Libya's assets abroad, and attended the import of selected equipment for operations in the hydrocarbon sector, excluding sales of oil daily in order to protect the economic interests of the countries of Western Europe (Katzman, 2003, p. 65) with a note that all those resolutions were made under Chapter VII of the Charter of the U.N. However, in 1996 The U.S. increased the economic pressure upon Libya by imposed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). "The U.S. Act sought to isolate Libya further by penalizing foreign companies that invested in the U.S. and invested more than US\$40 million per annum in Libyan or Iranian oil and gas industries, some observers saw the specific goals of the ILSA at the time, suggesting that it was in part intended to reinforce U.N. sanctions" (Katzman, 2003, p. 55).

4.2.1 The effect of Economic Sanctions

Over the decades, the sanctions on Libya imposed by the U.S and the UN were in effect. The economic performance of Libya grew relatively slower. After showing great promise in the 1970s when its oil wealth boosted growth and per capita income, Libya's economy began to falter in the 1980s. Libya's economic prospects steadily declined throughout the 1990s, at least until the very end of the millennium. Sanctions - both multilateral and unilateral ones - contributed to this overall decline.

According to “an official assessment of the economic impact of sanctions on Libya prepared under the auspices of the Libyan secretariat for foreign liaison at the beginning of 1998, the cost was put at about US\$24 billion” (Niblock, 2002, p. 63). Furthermore, an Arab league report, prepared in mid-1998 and covering the period up to the end of 1996, put the figure at US\$23.5 billion. The main areas of loss, according to the latter report, were the energy sector (US\$5 billion), the commercial sector (US\$5.8 billion), the industrial sector (US\$5.1 billion), the transportation and the communication sector (US\$2.5 billion), and the agricultural sector (US\$337 million). “Although these figures may represent accurate estimates of the scale of damage done, the real effect was more complex and nuance and cannot be conveyed by simple monetary figures” (Niblock, 2002, p. 63).

There are three ways to judge on the effectiveness of all these unilateral and multilateral sanctions. Firstly, how much of what they set out to gain was truly gained? Secondly, how much of an impact did they truly have on the Libyan economy? Lastly, how did Libya’s government react with them?

In terms of the demands and results, the U.N. made four demands before sanctions can be lifted: (1) stop all suspicious activity, including Libya's relationship with Irish Republican Army (IRA), (2) agreeing to accept the responsibility of its citizens acts of terrorism, (3) collaborate with the continuing investigations, including handing over the two suspects and cooperating with French government in the issue of the French airplane that destroyed over the Niger desert, and (4) pay suitable compensation on the earlier acts of terrorism. In fact, Libya already

responded to all these U.N. demands. Indeed, such cooperative behavior of Libyan government contributed a great deal on the U.S. - Libya normalized relations.

In terms of economic costs, to understand the effectiveness of sanctions in the Libyan calculus, one must look at their impact on the target country in relation to their goals. Meghan O’Sullivan in her book “Shrewd sanctions: Economic Statecraft in an Age of Global Terrorism” offers useful tools and methodology to analyze the power and effectiveness of different types of sanctions. Additionally, her text contains an in-depth look at the Libyan case.

According to O’Sullivan (2003) “the U.N. sanctions of 1993 also banned the export of oil production equipment to Libya had an immediate effect, as spare parts became unavailable. However, oil production after 1993 only decreased slightly and then remained relatively constant until 2003” (see Figure 4.2).




Figure 4.2: Libyan Oil Sales “OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet” August 2009.

In terms of Libya’s ability to mitigating of the effects of sanctions on the oil sector during the sanctions' period, according to the Ahmouda Laswad the former director of Libyan National Oil Corporation:

The Americans knew our equipment, and they placed every item on the sanctions list. Then, when the U.N. embargo was imposed in 1992, the problem became even more complicated because we couldn't buy on the open market. Some machinery has been smuggled in, but we've now used up all our stores. We've had to go to junkyards to recondition discarded parts, and we've even attempted to manufacture our own parts, but we haven't been successful. . . Since American companies are way ahead of Europe in technology, especially in the enhancement of depleted fields, we need their help (Quoted in Viorst, 1999, pp. 71-72).

Without a doubt, Libya was severely affected by the impact of the U.S. and U.N. sanctions on all levels; economically, politically and socially. Moreover, Libya's economy has suffered from a dirty blackmail process from international companies, especially in neighboring countries. These companies took advantage of the imposition of U.N. sanctions on Libya to reap from behind the huge profits at the expense of the Libyan people's livelihood.

An interview with former chairman of Libya's NOC explained that, "the petroleum sector has suffered considerable material losses as a result of the mandatory sanctions applied pursuant to Security Council resolutions on Libya. Furthermore, the negative repercussions have been felt in most of the vital facilities and economic entities of that sector. The financial losses suffered by the sector are in the order of US\$3 billion" (Ghanem, personal communication May 14, 2010).

An interview with former director of Inspection & Quality Control in Libyan Ministry of Industry, asserted that, "the industry and mining sector has suffered considerable losses and other material damages in the sanctions' period. The total financial loss resulting from these increasingly adverse effects on all aspects of industrial development amounts to approximately US\$4 billion in addition to the

considerable negative effects of these sanctions, which have limited the capacity of companies and enterprises in the industrial and mining sector to meet the targets they have set for themselves; this has resulted in a decrease in production and in the rates of utilization of production capacity, which has forced the leaders in the sector to lay off a part of the nation's labor force and foreign technical assistance personnel; this has meant the loss of many job opportunities both for Libyans and for skilled foreigners residing in Libya" (Ben Arous, personal communication May 18, 2010).

An interview with former Assistant of the minister of agriculture and animal husbandry in Libya, said that, "since 15 April 1992, the implementation of the sanctions under Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) has inflicted serious damage and caused major financial losses in the agriculture and animal husbandry sector, These have affected all companies and institutions within the sector, as well as related development programs. Agricultural output and meat production have fallen off markedly, resulting in financial losses estimated at US\$6 billion" (Taher, personal communication, May 7, 2010).

4.2.2 The Lifting of Sanctions

In her published study Dianne R. Pfundstein pointed out that, "the UN sanctions against Libya unraveled by 1997 as many African leaders called for their elimination and the Arab League voted to unfreeze Libyan assets in Arab banks. In May, the U.S. administration reached a deal with European leaders to lift some U.S. restrictions on multinational corporations doing business with Libya, Iran and Cuba and in mid-July announced that it was evaluating the possibility of creating a special

court in The Netherlands to try the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing” (Pfundstein, 2011, pp. 28-29) according to Pfundstein, “this signified a concession by the Clinton administration, which had until this point refused to hold the trial in a third country, although Qadhafi had claimed for several years that he would have accepted such an outcome” (Pfundstein, 2011, p. 29).

In early 1999, Libya was attentive to foreign initiatives to advance a settlement of the Lockerbie dispute, most notably the plans proposed by South Africa and Saudi Arabia in coordination with the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In order to achieve that, the UNSC passed Resolution 1192 dating on August 28, 1998, “which decided that the sanctions shall be suspended immediately if the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the two accused arrived in The Netherlands for the trial, and that the Libyan Government would satisfy the French judicial authorities with regard to the bombing of UTA 772” (St John, 2002, p. 175).

In August that year, “Libya accepted the proposal to try the two suspects in The Hague under Scottish law. After intense diplomacy involving representatives from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and South Africa and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Libyan government handed over the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 on April 5, 1999. Upon the surrender of the two suspects, the UN suspended some sanctions against Libya, and reinstated both air travel and the sale of industrial equipment to the countries” (St John, 2002, p. 175-176).

In conjunction with the arrival of the two Libyan suspects to Netherlands on April 5, 1999, the UN sanctions were suspended. The main priority for the Libyan regime was to end the Lockerbie case and thereafter have better relations with the

U.S., despite the fact that the UN lifted its sanctions on Libya in 1999, the U.S. did not stop its sanctions. In 1999, “the U.S. administration refused to lift its sanctions, arguing that Libya did not meet the full terms stipulated by the UNSC, which required that Libya pay compensation for the families of the victims of the bombing of Flight 103, cooperate with the trial of the two suspects and declare an end to support of terrorist activities” (St John, 2002, pp. 180-182).

But within the U.S., there was a growing awareness of “sanctions fatigue” and pressures from the agricultural sector for increased trade with Libya. The European Union lifted its sanctions in mid-September, reportedly to reward Libya for abandoning terrorism, but did not lift its arms' embargo. By the end of 1999, the U.S. administration still refused to lift its sanctions, arguing that Libya did not meet the full terms stipulated by the UNSC, “which required that Libya pay compensation for the families of the victims of the bombing of flight 103, cooperate with the trial of the two suspects, and declare an end to support of terrorist activities” (St John, 2002, pp. 180-182).

Despite the U.S. refusal to lift all of its sanctions, relations between the U.S. and Libyan regime showed signs of improvement by the turn of the new millennium. “The U.S. opted not to block Libyan participation in a UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a reversal of previous efforts to prevent Libya from intervening in other African states. The Clinton administration remained reserved, refusing to lift the travel ban on Libya at least through the trial for the bombing of flight 103, which got underway in May 2000 at a former U.S. Air Force base in The Netherlands. During the trial, Qadhafi publicly distanced himself from the accused,

asserting that the alleged bombers did not act on his orders” (Pfundstein, 2011, p. 29) according to St John, “at the end of the eighty-four day trial, three Scottish judges found only one of the suspects, a Libyan intelligence officer, guilty of murder. The U.S. welcomed the guilty verdict but still refused to lift sanctions until Qadhafi complied with the remaining conditions stipulated by the UN, including the payment of compensation for the families of the victims” (St John, 2002, pp. 183-187).

By 2000, the Clinton administration thought that, “the sanctions helped to drive Qadhafi away from the support of terrorism. Although Libya was now one among a handful of states of concern and no longer called a rogue state, the Clinton administration still hoped to block Qadhafi’s ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction, to take responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, and to cease opposition to the Middle East peace process” (St John, 2002, p. 189).

Accordingly, “the Clinton administration extended the state of emergency towards Libya in one of its last official acts. Given the erosion of the multilateral sanctions’ regime and the failure of unilateral sanctions and limited military actions during the Reagan administration, the incoming Bush administration was left with few sticks with which it could hope to coerce the Libyan regime” (Pfundstein, 2011, p. 31). According to St John, “When the 1996 Iran-Libyan Sanctions Act came up for renewal in 2001 Congress voted to extend the act for five years on the grounds that a shorter extension would send the wrong message” (St John, 2002, p. 191).

Despite this refusal to publicly work toward a thaw in the U.S. - Libya relations, the Bush administration presided over Libya’s shocking reversal on its WMD policy. In March 2003, Libya initiated meetings with British intelligence

officials at which Musa Kusa, Libya's head of intelligence, indicated that his government wished to initiate discussions with the U.S. and Britain about terminating its WMD programs. After nine months of diplomacy, on December 19, 2003, Libya announced that it would abandon and dismantle its programs to obtain weapons of mass destruction and to grant access to teams of international inspectors to verify compliance. These inspections yielded a wealth of information about Libya's clandestine program to develop a nuclear weapon and suggested that limits on trade in technology severely hampered Libya's ability to develop a nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, the negotiations about the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, and the Libya's WMD programs occurred in conjunction with negotiations about the lifting of the U.S. sanctions, reaching to normalize the U.S. relations with Libya. Therefore, in May 2002, "the Libyan government proposed the compensation for the victims' families, offering each family US\$10 million, for a total sum of US\$2.7 billion. The proposed scheme consisted of offering the first US\$4 million after the definitive lifting of the U.N. sanctions, another US\$4 million following the termination of U.S. sanctions, and US\$2 million once Libya was removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism" (Labott, 2002). The offer was seen inadequate by the U.S and thus making demands that Libya must take responsibility of the Lockerbie case. The offer was then repeated by Saif al-Islam Qadhafi in an article published in Middle East policy 2003:

Libya insisted on Washington stating, explicitly that following the settlement; it will permanently lift the barriers to Libya's normal relations with the outside world. This applies particularly to the U.S. itself. Libya must no longer be subject to an embargo. Its name must be removed from the list of

states that sponsor terrorism. Its citizens must no longer be singled out for discrimination in obtaining American visas (Al-Qadhafi, 2003, p. 42).

At the end, Libya officially recognized in April 2003 the civil - not criminal - responsibility of its citizens in the Lockerbie attack. In a letter presented to the UNSC on August 15, 2003, Libya accepted “responsibility for the actions of its officials” in the Lockerbie affair. This resulted in the definitive lifting of U.N. sanctions after one month by the resolution 1506 (Boucek, 2004, p. 5). For more explain how the UNSC decided the resolution 1506 (see Appendix E) to lift sanctions against Libya. This is a chronological list of significant events:

1. March 12, 2003, Libya agreed to take some responsibility for the Pan Am bombing after US and UK assurance that the move would not be used as grounds for legal action against the government. Compensation of victims and acceptance of responsibility are conditions for the lifting of UN sanctions. US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage stated, “We are in striking distance of an agreement to lift UN sanctions. However, no one in the State Department is talking about lifting U.S. sanctions. Our concern is weapons of mass destruction. The UN's is Lockerbie” (Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism, 2004).
2. August 13, 2003, Lawyers for the families of the Pan Am victims and Libya signed an agreement on US\$2.7 billion in compensation, to be deposited in an account at the Bank of International Settlements. The proposed payments schedule is closely linked to the lifting of UN and US sanctions. Families will receive \$4 million after UN sanctions are lifted, another US\$4 million when US sanctions are lifted, and a final US\$2 million once Libya is

removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In order for families to receive the second and third installments, U.S. sanctions must be lifted within eight months (Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism, 2004).

3. August 15, 2003, Libya submits a letter to the UNSC accepting responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 as a “sovereign state accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials.” Wording of Libya’s letter, carefully negotiated in talks with the U.K and the U.S., ties its legal responsibility to the employment of Megrahi, not to an admission of government involvement. Fulfilling the remaining UN condition, Libya also officially renounced all forms of terrorism (Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism, 2004).
4. August 18, 2003, The U.K submitted a resolution calling for the lifting of UN sanctions. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “the lifting of sanctions at the UN will not affect U.S. bilateral measures, which will remain in place” (Washington Post, 2003). France threatened to veto the resolution unless Libya offers larger compensation to families of UTA bombing victims (Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism, 2004).
5. September 12, 2003, “The UNSC formally lifted 11-year-old sanctions against Libya after Libya and France reached a tentative agreement on the UTA issue. France and the U.S. abstain from the 13-0 council vote” (Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism, 2004).

The Libyans saw this assumption of responsibility for the Lockerbie case as a way of putting an end to the sanctions and attract the U.S. to have normalized

relations with Libya. As Abdul Rahman Shalgam former Foreign Minister put it “the issue was not compensation, but the purchase of the annulment of the sanctions” (Aljazeera, 2004).

Bush however, only lifted some of the sanctions imposed on Libya in the 22nd of April, 2004. Those sanctions prohibited U.S citizens to make and invest in businesses on Libyan soil. Eventually, most of the sanctions were lifted on 20th of September of 2004, when President Bush Jr. signed Executive Order 13357, which announced the termination of the national emergency with respect to Libya, removing all remaining economic sanctions that were in place against the country since 1986, where the prohibitions of the Libyan Sanctions Regulations were lifted, and all property and interests blocked under this program well be unblocked. In response, the U.S. Department of the Treasury unfrozen US\$1.3 billion in assets blocked under the Regulations, which was blocked since the sanctions were imposed.

In September 2004, the EU was influenced by Italy to remove the arms embargo imposed on Libya. This came into effect on October 11, 2004. An Italian paper pointed out that:

It was in the EU’s interest to allow Libya to control efficiently its land and maritime borders by allowing Tripoli to acquire the necessary equipment to monitor its 2,000-kilometer coast, including naval ships, monitoring aircraft, and night-vision goggles (Zoubir, 2006a, p. 65).

On May 15, 2006, the former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that the U.S. restored full diplomatic relations with Libya. Consequently,

on June 30, 2006, the U.S. formally rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism after 27 years of having Libya on that notorious list.

4.3 Conclusions

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, oil and sanctions were the economic factors that played an important role that led to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations in 2006. Since the first days of the Libyan revolution on September 1, 1969, the economic relations strained between both countries because of the Libyan oil policy taken in 1970s when the Libyan government nationalized foreign oil companies that worked in Libya. The strained relations increased during Ronald Reagan's presidency in 1986 when he ordered American oil companies to leave Libya. This withdrawal had a dual effect on both sides. As for Libya, it was clear that oil was the main natural resource in the country. Ninety-five percent of the Libyan economy depended on oil wealth; Libya holds close to 44 billion barrels of oil reserves, the largest in Africa. Moreover, Libya produces high-quality, low-sulphur ("sweet") crude oil at very low- cost and it is nearer to key European and North American markets than to some of the most important oil producers, notably those of the Middle East.

This withdrawal led to decrease of production during this period. This was due to the lack of American technological equipment that could be used for extracting oil and transporting it to export terminals. On the other hand, It cannot be denied the role played by the lobby made by the U.S. oil companies through pressure on successive American governments in order to preserve their previous privileges in

Libya, trying to reduce the magnitude of losses incurred in the last three decades where they were producing more than a million barrels a day before they withdrew in 1986. They took advantage of the improvement of political relations between the two countries, and went back to Libya. Moreover, the system of the sanctions weakened the Libyan position by weakening the main resource of the Libyan economy. It can be said that Libya faced two kinds of sanctions (unilateral and multilateral) for three decades. The objective of Libya foreign policy through this period was seeking to lift these sanctions. Hence, it required hard work to dismantle the causes for its imposition in order to get rid of its negative consequences on the people and government of Libya. Hence, the mutual interests of both countries, especially in the area of production and consumption of oil led both U.S. and Libya's decision-makers to take flexible attitudes and take positive steps toward normalizing their relations. This new cooperative political behavior, factored by the economic gains led to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations in 2006.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECURITY FACTORS

In addition to political and economic factors, security factors also contributed to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations. It can be argued that the security factors became a pawn in Libya's effort to normalize relations with the U.S... Furthermore, the Libyan commitments to resolve the issue of the entanglement in with terrorist groups and its pursuit of the acquisition of WMDs. and the Libyan attitude towards Israel are three major factors that played important roles that led to the U.S.- Libya normalized relations in 2006. This chapter is divided into three main parts; these include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the Libyan attitude towards Israel.

5.1 Terrorism

The American concept of terrorism is politically motivated. Nonetheless, the U.S. does not really recognize the concept of state terrorism. Instead, it acknowledges that terrorism is an act of aggression carried out by individuals rather than a state. In this aspect, the U.S. extends its influence more widely on the world in order to remove the violent act carried out by one state against another from being labeled as a terrorist act. This involves:

...any person who, in illegal conditions, kills another, or causes him serious bodily injuries, or kidnaps him or attempts such acts commits an offence of international dimension (Husseiny, 1990, p. 24).

The U.S. magazine, the military Review, confirms the American concept of terrorism as the:

...illegal use of force of violence, or threatening to use such means, by a revolutionary organization against individuals or possessions, with the intent of forcing government or communities to fulfill their objectives, which generally are ideological. Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency defined (international) terrorism as an act of violence committed by a foreigner in one country or one that is directed against a foreigner in a country where the perpetrator resides (Husseiny, 1990, p. 24).

The American perspective considers the offence to have an international dimension if the act is committed under some of the following conditions:

1. Committed outside the territory of the country to which the perpetrator is a citizen.
2. Committed against members of the armed forces of a country during hostilities.
3. Committed to prejudice the interests of or obtain a concession from a country or an international organization (Husseiny, 1990, p. 24).

The widening of the concept of terrorism has led to the inclusion of another element; the presence therein or the existence of a probable threat to the U.S. interests and those of its allies. At the same time, the American concept of combating international terrorism has been further widened to include confronting countries sheltering terrorist organizations. Based on this, U.S. has resorted, in order to confront such terrorism, to other means besides direct intervention and this has included economic sanctions.

As for the real impact of terrorism on the U.S., Mark E. Kosnik (1999) asserted that, "if you asked the average American about the threat of terrorism, it

would most likely conjure up images of the violent destruction and loss of life resulting from the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York or the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa” (Kosnik, 1999, p. 4). Through reviewing the statistics that declared by the U.S. Department of State over the twenty-years from 1978 until 1997, “there were 9,552 international terrorist incidents against U.S. targets or an average of 478 incidents per year” (U.S. Department of State, 1997).

Kosnik added, “despite the apparent significance of these numbers and the horrifying images of terrorist violence imprinted on the national conscience. The danger from terrorism is not a physical one. American citizens and property, both in the U.S. and abroad, are relatively safe and secure, and the average U.S. citizen does not live with the day-to-day fear that he or she will be a victim of some random act of terrorism” (Kosnik, 1999, p. 4). Likewise, despite the number of terrorist actions varies from time to time, there are no indications of the spread of terrorism. In reality, “based on empirical analysis, there has been a general reduction in the number of yearly international terrorist incidents since the late 1980s” (U.S. Department of State, 1997).

Moreover, in spite of intense individual loss experienced by the personal victims, when viewed from the context of the larger community, “it is clear that terrorism is not a major threat to the physical safety of the American public as compared to other realities of everyday life. For example, from 1992 through 1997, fifty-five Americans were killed by terrorism” (U.S. Department of State, 1997) even though the number of the U.S. citizens who were killed because of accidents of

alcohol abuse in 1993 reached the 17,461 person (Kosnik, 1999, p. 5). Similarly, “the average number of U.S. citizens killed each year due to terrorism acts, is less than the weekly death toll in one city (i.e., New York) because of criminal homicide” (Lepgold, 1998, p. 136).

Despite the fact that terrorism is only a minimal physical threat to U.S. citizens, it is a risk in other important trends. At its fundamental level, terrorism tries to use force and threatening to obtain influence, create horror, and make citizens to feel unsafe. In short, the U.S. citizens are often subject to terrorism only due to the America values that they represent (Kosnik, 1999, p. 5).

To threat the U.S. national interests the terrorism takes the following methods. Primary, it acts as a means for a terrorist group to achieve more political goals or aims that are usually in the face of the U.S. national interests. In order to explicate the motivations behind terrorism Phillip Heymann, asserted that, “the terrorism is generally a calculated move in a political game. When the targets of one player, the terrorist group, are American citizens, it is generally because the terrorists intend to force the U.S. government into becoming the other player...in short, the terror - are generally the calculated results of carefully selected steps intended to affect domestic or international politics. The effort may be to reduce the credibility of a government or to change particular policies or to strengthen a rival movement. In each case, the objective is political” (Heymann, 2000, p. xix).

According to this interpretation, these terrorist groups are trying to force the U.S. to take actions which benefiting these terrorists, and are therefore not in the

interest of the U.S people. Thus, the final outcome will be Loss of the U.S. influence and the erosion of its national interests.

Secondly, in order to achieve political goals, the terrorists also tries to destabilize the trust of the American people of his government through making it looks weak and ineffective, and unable to protect its people, where that, terrorism has the ability to shake the trust in government which is indispensable in achieving security and stability. Walter Laqueur, offers another explanation for this side of terrorism, where he says:

The impact of terrorism is measured not only in the number of its victims. Terrorism is an attempt to destabilize democratic societies and to show that their governments are impotent (Lacqueur, 2001, p. 103).

Viewed from this perspective, terrorism is a dangerous psychological and that pushes to steady sense of threat to the American community. Terrorism threatens the U.S. ability to work comfortably as dictated by its own national interests. As Phillip Heymann said that, "the simple truth is that a few of people can use killing, willful burning, and kidnapping to bring a widely attentions to influence on the United States policies in ways totally unequal to their numbers, but much less because of the damage they can be impose than because of its psychological, political, and social influences" (Heymann, 2000, p. 15).

In fact, in consequence of the leadership role played by the U.S. at the international level, the terrorist threats represent a source of particular concern to U.S. policy makers, and this role requires the U.S. to take measures to ensure a guarantor of peace and security on the international and local arena as well.

According to this perspective, terrorism represents a real threat if the terrorist groups succeeds in extending its influence through acts of intimidation, and therefore the appearance of the U.S. government as unable to protect its citizens or its national interests, if they achieves that goal, the terror will decreases the credibility of the U.S. and therefore, the terror threatens the principles that are the base of the U.S. national security (Kosnik, 1999, p. 7).

However, Libya's view of what constitutes terrorism is much broader than the common usage of the term. In the first Arab-American People-to-People Dialogue Conference (held in Tripoli October 9-12, 1978), Qadhafi, said this about the problem and its solution:

Foreign bases, nuclear weapons, starvation, economic warfare, naval fleets, hijacking of planes, the holding of hostages for ransom, and the killing of innocent people are all acts of terrorism... if we are serious in combating terrorism, we have to put all these deeds on one list and find the necessary solution for them. We are ready to put our sources in the service of this objective. Why do Americans forget that the Palestinians have been expelled from their homeland and that the U.S. is helping the occupier keep hold on the land of Palestinian? But when a Palestinian hijacks a plane to express his despair, the U.S., an end must be put to terrorism, but we should seek solutions to the underlying problems which have led to this kind of terrorism (Blake & Abu-Osba, 1982, p. 100-101).

When asked how he understood terrorism, in his interview with Time Magazine Qadhafi commented:

First, the American government is not entitled the talk about terrorism, since it practices the highest degree of terrorism in the world. Secondly, there is a big difference between supporting liberation movements, the just cause of people fighting for freedom, and supporting terrorism. We have emphasized many times that we are opposed to real terrorism. The struggles of the Palestinian people are just causes. On the other side are terrorist groups such as the red brigade and Baeder-Meinhof (Former Germany Movements). We could never, under any circumstances, have any relationship with them (Qadhafi, 1981a).

In the author's interview with Prof. Hamed Salem director of the Libyan national center for studies of the strategic, he asserted that the lack of a specific definition of terrorism has led to a kind of selectivity in description of Individuals or groups as terrorists depending on the whims and interests. In his opinion, this selectivity was behind inclusion of Libya on the list of countries sponsoring terrorism (Salem, personal communication, May 9, 2010).

Col Qadhafi challenged Reagan to allow him to conduct an investigation to let the American people and the Libyans know the truth. In another exchange, the Libyan information minister responded to one U.S. official allegation that Libya practiced "diplomacy of subversion in Africa and in the Arab world" said:

The U.S. accusation fit within the framework of the terrorist campaign launched by the U.S. Administration against Libya as Washington is perfectly aware the position of the Jamahiriya constitution is like an unbreakable dam blocking U.S. imperialist infiltration into the Arab regions and Africa. America is the planning to dominate Africa under the guise of what it terms as "containing the Libyan expansion" (Pasha, 1984, p. 13).

The Washington Post reported that on February 25, 1980, Ahmad Madfai, the then charge affaires of the Libyan Embassy in Washington D.C said:

We are trying to do our best to have good relations with U.S. ...we are not terrorists..., but we are a free country...we have our principles... we don't want you to be on our side; we just want you to know the truth (Blake & Abu-Osba 1982, p. 80).

As a 'revolutionary state', Libya, led by Col Qadhafi, supported a great number of national liberation movements while dedicated anti-imperialist and anti-colonial forces received support through both words and deeds. Qadhafi supported liberation movements worldwide without regard to national, religious, racial, or even ideological affiliation. These include the anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa

(AIM) and other militant Indian movements, the (IRA), the Sandinista in their revolutionary phase, and the Palestinian struggle. Tripoli also maintained relationships with other groups in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines (Alteer, 2005, p. 63).

According to the report of the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of 1982, Libya also provided support to liberation movements in the world (See appendix T).

This led to the indictment of Libya as a sponsor of international terrorism. In the absence of a clear and precise concept of distinction between terrorism and liberation movements, Libya's image in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world was severely damaged as a result of Western description of these movements as terrorists (Alteer, 2005, p. 64).

Libya's revolutionary activities within other Arab countries and worldwide did not receive any U.S. official attention at all between the period 1969 and 1975. Only one official statement during that era, worded in very natural language, referred to Libya. Words such as "terrorist" or "destabilizing" were not used to describing Libya's revolutionary activities. Instead, in 1971, the official U.S. statements read as follows:

Libya has increasingly interested itself in sub-Saharan Africa through expression in the past of support for Muslim populations in other states and opposition to what it regards as Israeli influence detrimental in the Arab cause in Africa (Gebril, 1985, p. 81).

By late 1976, when Libyan - Soviet relations improved substantially. The official American view of Libya began changing its revolutionary activities, which were not neglected anymore. Nevertheless, the language used in official statements

was still not strong or assertive in its condemnation of Libya's activities. This was clear in former President Ford's press conference held on July 19, 1976, when he responded to a question about whether the administration had any evidence or information about allegations of Libya's connection to terrorism. The President's reply was:

We do know that the Libyan government has done certain things that might have simulated terrorist activity, but I don't think we ought to discuss any evidence that might prove or disprove that (Gebril, 1985, p. 82).

In 1977, the Carter administration's view of Libya was solely centered on the issue of terrorism. All official U.S. statements in 1977 explicitly described Libya as pursuing subversive, destabilizing policies in neighboring countries and as one of the main supporters of international terrorism. Only a few months into the Carter Administration, the State Department officially accused Libya of supporting international terrorism. In a letter to Senator Jacob Javits dated sometime in 1977, "the state department named Libya, Iraq, former South Yemen, and Somalia as supports of international terrorists" (Gebril, 1985, p. 116). The letter asserted that, "the Libyan government had at least since 1972, actively assisted terrorist groups and individuals, including the Palestinian" (Gebril, 1985, p. 116). Another official report in 1977 alleged that Libya remained at the forefront of such activity.

In 1978-1979, as a result of Libya's effort to dissociate itself from terrorism and related allegations, the intensity of the U.S. accusation of Libya as "sponsor" of "terrorism" dropped dramatically. This was quite an obvious in Cyrus Vance's response to a question in January 1978 about whether the U.S. changed its view of Libya as a "supporter of terrorism":

Libya has now signed the three conventions with respect to hijacking in the air - which is different from the past, we are continuing to watch and observe the situation there (Gebril, 1985, p. 116).

It is interesting to compare how the U.S. officials viewed Libya's conduct abroad in the 1970-1976 and 1977-1980 periods. In the first period, Libyan revolutionary activities were very intense and covered many different spots in the world. Nevertheless, they were not significant issues to either the Nixon or Ford administration. Neither did it affect the relations between the two countries. In contrast, Libya's revolutionary activities were minimal in 1977-1980 because of Libya's efforts to dissociate itself from the allegations of terrorism. Yet Libya's activities abroad then were factors that negatively affected the U.S. - Libya relations during the Carter administration. There were logical explanations for the two different views based on the two different periods. While the main concern of the Nixon and the Ford administrations was to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East, Libya's hostility toward the former Soviet Union in the early 1970s then had made both administrations neglected what later U.S. government called Libya's "terrorist" activities. In contrast, the Carter administration saw the Soviet Union as less of a threat. U.S. policy during this period had changed the beginning of emphasizing on the liberal rhetoric such as defending "human right" and combating what it called and labeled "terrorism" (Gebril, 1985, p. 119).

During the Reagan administration, "the U.S. government began preparing strategies to combat the communist peril and the Soviet influence in all parts around the world. It alleged that the then Soviets Union supported international terrorism" (Gebril, 1985, p. 102). Therefore, all nations friendly to the former Soviet Union in

the third world, including Libya were considered as supporters of terrorism. This strategy was promulgated by the former U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, who said that “terrorism supported by certain countries is considered a form of war” (Gebril, 1985, p. 102).

In addition, the Reagan administration had to react harshly to the wave of attacks on American significant interests from the period between 1981 and 1985. The possible instigators were Syria, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. Libya's foreign strategy and decision making worries the U.S, especially the Libyan definition of terrorism and terrorist supportive foreign policy. “This period saw several ‘tit-for-tat’ exchanges of military force between the U.S. and Libya. These exchanges were often the result of U.S. military deployments into the Gulf of Sirte, which was considered territorial waters by Libya and international waters by the U.S” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 33).

Political observers like Zimmermann (1994) argued that, “the granting authorization to the U.S. military to cross the waters claimed by Qadhafi was a deliberate attempt to provoke Qadhafi into combat with the goals of demonstrating U.S. resolve both to Libya and to its allies and of testing and wearing down Libya’s anti-aircraft capabilities in anticipation of a future attack” (Zimmermann, 1994, p. 209). He also argues that, “the Reagan administration harbored hope that any military defeat might have driven the Libyan armed forces to overthrow Qadhafi” (Zimmermann, 1994, p. 212). Litwak (2007) also argued that “the military engagement was a further attempt by the Reagan administration to deter Libya from sponsoring terrorist acts and to signal to Qadhafi that the U.S. would not fail to

respond with its military might in the event that he did not halt his support for terrorism” (Litwak, 2007, p. 175).

However, on April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded in the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin, killing three people and wounded 203. Two of the dead and 50 of the wounded were U.S. military personnel. The U.S. government soon charged that “the government of Libya and its East Berlin People’s Bureau were involved in the planning and executing of the attack; the attack on the disco in Berlin was allegedly undertaken in retaliation for the military confrontation in the Gulf of Sirte the previous week” (Litwak, 2007, p. 175).

U.S.’s reaction to the attack came quickly; Reagan and his administration began to finalize plans for a retaliatory attack. Although the administration hoped to use the occasion of the bombing of the disco to enlist its European allies for a more comprehensive program of multilateral pressure on the Libyan regime, they failed to secure support for multilateral coercion at this time.

Former France President Jacques Chirac In the first part of his memoirs entitled, “*Each Step a Goal*” said that

On April 11, 1986, President Reagan telephoned me. “We are going to kill Qadhafi,” he announced. “Our bombers need to be able to cross your territory.” Shocked that France could be implicated in an operation about which it had not even been consulted, I immediately refused that American request. “France’s involvement in this affair is completely out of the question, I said to Reagan. “Especially as you are very unlikely to get Qadhafi...Such operations rarely succeed.” Indeed, American planes, obliged to circumvent French territory, would bombard Tripoli and Benghazi in vain four days later, succeeding only in killing one of the daughters of the Libyan leader (Chirac, 2012, p. 99).

The Lockerbie bombing on December 21, 1988, was seen as Libyan retaliation for U.S. air strikes on Libya on April 15, 1986. In addition, there was the

destruction of French airplane UTA on Nigerian soil on September 19, 1989, which was followed by the accusation on Libya for responsibility for these terrorist acts and investigations and multilateral sanctions on Libya. In fact, Libya continued to linger on the state sponsors of international terrorism list put in place by the U.S. for 35 years, beginning on December 29, 1979, until the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the removal of Libya from that list on June 30, 2006.

Accordingly, it can be argued that terrorism was an important factor that affected the U.S. - Libya relations. It became a significant factor, especially during the Reagan administration. The Reagan administration took up terrorism as an important issue in their effort to propel the U.S. into a dominant role in international politics. Toward this end, Libya became the victim of the aggressive U.S. foreign policies as did some other countries that were also accused of terrorism such as North Korea, Sudan, Iraq and Syria, but one of the common factors that tied these countries together was their close relationship with the then Soviet Union and the former Soviet bloc countries.

5.1.1 U.S. - Libya cooperation against terrorism

U.S. - Libya cooperation on the war on terror started shortly after September 11, 2001. Libya was one of the first countries to condemn the 9/11 attacks on American soil. Cooperation against terrorism offered Libya and the U.S. an opportunity for a political rapprochement, although the two countries did not share the same conception of terrorism. Qadhafi justified this cooperation with two aspects:

The attacks on the U.S. were an act of aggression against it. The U.S. like all other countries has the right to the self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.

Charter. The U.S. is strong enough to exercise that right. The phenomenon of terrorism is not a matter of concern to the U.S. alone. It is the concern of the whole world, and it requires international cooperation and joint action on the world level. Most regrettably, there has been wide-spread confusion and a profound misunderstanding of this matter. Cooperation to combat terrorism is not a service for the US. It is an act of self-defense for each of us. It is a threat to us all whether or not the U.S. was attacked on 9/11. Indeed, hypocrisy, fear and greed are the causes of this wide-spread confusion, and a profound misunderstanding of this matter (Al Qadhafi Speaks, 2003).

In this connection, Carlos quoted Qadhafi as announcing that he wished to “eliminate the common dangers of international extremism and terrorism. Objectively, the Libya’s regime had already in 1998, through Interpol, warned the international community against the threat that al-Qaeda posed to the world” (Echeverria, 2004, p. 7) it seems that this new Libyan attitude was helpful in sending a positive message with regard to the regime’s willingness to renounce its support for terrorism abroad perhaps this move also (renouncing terrorism) intended to get international support in Libya’s fight against its own radical domestic terrorists group (the Islamic combatant group) which listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. (Djaziri, 1999, p. 172).

No doubt 9/11 constituted the real occasion that allowed Libya to progressively lose its pariah status. Libya’s professed expertise in the war against terrorist organizations and the amount of information that its authorities held about various foreign terrorist groups became the strongest selling point for the Libyan regime. The ultimate objective, obviously, was the normalization of relations with the U.S. and improvement of relations with Europe that Qadhafi had been seeking since the mid-1990s.

Thus, Musa Kusa, former head of Libya's intelligence, continued regular communication with European intelligence and counterterrorism agencies and offered to share information with them on various Islamist groups (Zoubir, 2006a, p. 65). In fact, because of the situation in its own neighborhood (Algeria, Egypt and Sudan), characterized by a strong Islamist presence and immigrants from South Asia and the Arab world on its soil, "Libya held precious information on various radical Islamist groups, including the so-called Arab Afghans and others associated with al-Qaeda. Given that Libya had detained for long periods, hundreds of individuals from Pakistan, Algeria, Sudan and Tunisia, the authorities were able to amass valuable data on different radical Islamist factions" (Zoubir, 2006a, p. 65). Furthermore, the role that the World Islamic call society played in the collection of information about various Islamist groups should not be discounted. Qadhafi's son Saif Al Islam's charity foundation, "which played a critical role in the resolution of the Jolo hostage crisis in 2000, assisted Western governments in dealing with some Islamist groups. Probably, the first success of Libya's policy of rapprochement with the West through participation in the global war on terrorism was the non-inclusion in 2002 of Libya in President Bush's axis of evil, which included North Korea, Iran and Iraq" (Zoubir, 2006a, p. 65).

The Libyans proved their good faith by assisting the U.S. in the war on terrorism. The British government, for its part, began asking Libyans for their cooperation on intelligence about international terrorism. Indeed, the Libyan authorities responded positively and provided intelligence on hundreds of al-Qaeda and other Islamist militants. Qadhafi, in the interview with Newsweek, admitted that

“intelligence agencies in Libya and in the U.S. are exchanging information; there are Libyan terrorists in America and in Britain. The Libyan intelligence service exchanges information so that they will be wiped out” (Zoubir, 2006a, p. 66).

In an interview given to the National Review, Saif Al Islam reiterated Libya’s engagement in the worldwide war on terror, “Libya has offered full cooperation in the global war against terrorism. Don’t forget that Libya, too, has been a victim of terrorist groups, some of which had their headquarters here in London along with other terrorist organizations from many different countries and that in the war on terrorism “we are doing our part” (Taheri, 2003).

On his evaluation of the U.S. - Libya cooperation in the fight against terrorism, the U.S. Ambassador in Libya, in an interview entitled “U.S. - Libyan relations: the second year of normalization” on June 4, 2010, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said:

Today, Libya remains a strong ally in countering terrorism in a volatile region. It has fought the expansion of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, has condemned kidnappings and has taken a position against the paying of ransom to kidnappers. Libya also has taken the lead in developing new approaches to counterterrorism, undertaking serious rehabilitation efforts with Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members and other former extremists. This initiative has arguably influenced the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s decision to break ties with the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb network. Libya’s efforts in this regard, led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, are under careful review by international counterterrorism experts and are worthy of further attention. They may serve as a model to apply to other extremist groups across the globe (Cretz, 2010).

In his speech on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the U.S. raid on Tripoli and Benghazi on April 15, 2010, Col Qadhafi said, “I wish we are assessing the situation and amending the concepts that must be altered, But always be vigilant.” He asserted that If America is an imperialist state, this is not a problem for

the Libyan people; this is a problem for all the peoples of the world, and If it is a nuclear country and powerful force, this cannot be of interest to the Libyan people alone; these are of concern to the Russian Federation and of interest to China and of interest to the rest of the world, and if America with Israel moves against the Arabs, this does not belong to the Libyan people alone, but belongs to the peoples of the Arab nation, in particular, for the Palestinian people.

Qadhafi added:

We will not be vice of the rest of peoples to address America in this; this is a problem of the whole world. We feel this is something comfortable and a large gain, after a long battle which has now reached almost a quarter of a century, there are no bilateral problems between Libya and America, there is not a problem on the Gulf of Sirte, or on the border, or the oil, or on terrorism. Any kind of problems does not exist currently between Libya and America. I can assure the Libyan people and the world and the American people in terms of bilateral relations now there are no problems between Libya and America (Qadhafi, 2010).

In fact, the U.S. and Libya share an interest in curbing al-Qaeda and other Islamic groups, but their mutual interests do not extend past that narrow spectrum, and despite years of the U.S. engagement, Qadhafi's views of "resistance" organizations and its legitimacy as a foreign policy tool appears to be unaffected.

5.1.2 Removal of Libya from List of State Sponsors of Terrorism

The list of state sponsors of terrorism is the designation and the naming applied by the U.S. department of state on countries that have direct or indirect support of international terrorism. The list came into being on December 29, 1979, and a state being in the list meant it would be under strict sanctions. The countries in the list

include Syria, Cuba, North Korea, and Iran. Ironically, Libya was added to the list on the same day the list was made (“State Sponsors of Terrorism,” n.d.).

This came as retaliation for the burning of the American embassy in Tripoli on December 2nd, 1979, furthermore, the accusations claiming that Libya trained and supported roughly thirty international terrorist and revolutionary movements worldwide as well as providing a safe haven for those movements in its soil (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 132). Libya was also accused by the U.S. of several terrorist attacks around the world such as the Vienna and Rome airports, the attack on Le Belle nightclub in West Berlin, ending with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Qadhafi issued a statement condemning the attacks, and declared that the U.S. had the right to retaliate military against those responsible for the attack. He also directed Libyan Intelligence Services to share information for the al Qaeda-linked Libyan group, the Libyan Islamic fighting group (Lawless, 2007, p. 754). Not long after, The U.S. Department of State in its 2002 annual reports on terrorism, acknowledged that Libya gradual renunciation of international terrorism and acknowledged its efforts in the fight against terrorism as well (U.S. Department of state, 2002, p. 80).

Libya knew that if it wanted to come clean and be removed from the U.S. list of states sponsoring terrorism it had to put an end to the Lockerbie issue and all the accusations on it, Thus, on August 13, 2003, its delegation signed an agreement to pay about US\$2.7 billion in compensation to the families of the 270 victims of the 1988 Pan Am Lockerbie bombing (U.S. Department of State, 2004a, p. 89).

Consequently, after 27 years, the U.S Department of state removed Libya from the list of state sponsors of international terrorism on May 15th 2006. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said “Libya was being rewarded for its renunciation of terrorism and the excellent cooperation Libya has provided to the U.S. in the war on terror” (Radia, 2006).

According to Lawless (2007) several factors accounted for the decision to remove Libya from this list. Apart from Libya’s renunciation of international terrorism, it also accepted responsibility for previous terrorist act and complied with all UNSC resolutions (Lawless, 2007, p. 749). Libya also embarked on the elimination of its WMDs program and continued to cooperate with the U.S. in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Besides these efforts, “strong international lobbying by African and European states as well as multinational oil companies for the removal of sanctions against Libya and restoration of full diplomatic relations with the state influenced the decision to remove Libya from the list” (Lawless, 2007, p. 749).

5.2 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Despite the positive steps taken by Libya in order to normalize its relations with the U.S., beginning with the declaration of acceptance of trial of its citizens accused in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland, its announcement to renounce the so-called terrorism, and accept the responsibility for the actions of its citizens, containing the payments for the victims' families as a compensation. It can be said that the Libyan declaration to abandon its pursuit of WMDs on December 19,

2003, was the most important step that led to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations.

This section will analyze the accuracy of this assumption.

5.2.1 The historical context of Libyan WMD

The critical question here is. Why do countries want to have nuclear weapons? In trying to answer the question, Kenneth Waltz puts seven main reasons:

First, great powers always counter the weapons of other great powers, usually by imitating those who have introduced new weapons...Second; a state may want nuclear weapons for fear that its great-power ally will not retaliate if the other great power attacks...Third, a country without nuclear allies will want nuclear weapons all the more if some of its adversaries have them. So China and then India became nuclear powers, and Pakistan naturally followed. Fourth, a country may want nuclear weapons because it lives in fear of its adversaries' present or future conventional strength... Fifth, for some countries nuclear weapons are a cheaper and safer alternative to running economically ruinous and militarily dangerous conventional arms' races. Nuclear weapons promise security and independence at an affordable price. Sixth, some countries are thought to want nuclear weapons for offensive purposes...Finally, by building nuclear weapons a country may hope to enhance its international standing (Waltz, 1981, p. 7).

This is thought to be both a reason for and a consequence of developing nuclear weapons. One may enjoy the status that comes with nuclear weapons and even benefits from it. Thus, North Korea gained international attention by developing nuclear military capability. A yen for attention and prestige is, however, a minor motivation. Would-be nuclear states are not among the militarily most powerful ones, and we may expect that deeper motives than desire for the prestige lie behind the decision to enter it (Waltz, 1981, p. 8).

In fact, the Libyan motives for developing WMDs are not different from the motives of those countries that have such weapons, or which are still seeking to acquire them, starting to secure the country from enemies and protect the regimes

from any threats. In addition, this is also the desire of a leading position in the world as a nuclear state. Historically, Libya nuclear programs began in the early 1970s and continued steadily until the programs dismantled in 2003. Financed largely through oil wealth and facilitated by outside expertise, by the time the program was canceled, “Libya had successfully acquired most of the pieces necessary to construct a nuclear weapon by the Abdul Qadeer Khan Network” (Bowen, 2006, p. 25). However, despite having much of the necessary equipment, materials and technology required to manufacture a weapon, Libya’s efforts were still hampered by a lack of domestic support, both in terms of skilled personnel and support industries. Moreover, “the program’s progress was also impeded by the fact that A.Q. Khan Network had not completely fulfilled Libya’s requirements” (Bowen, 2006, p. 25).

The history of Libyan nuclear development follows a very familiar path. The program first developed in the early 1970s, supposedly as a civilian program for power generation. Because of the secret information about this program, the published information after Libya’s announcement to abandon its WMD programs can be read as such:

According to IAEA Report published on September 2008; The Libyan nuclear program originated in 1973, when the Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) of Libya set up with a view to building Libya’s capabilities and infrastructure in nuclear sciences and technologies. According to Libya, the aim of the program during that time was to promote the use of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. In January 1981, the Libyan Secretariat of Atomic Energy (SAE) was founded, and the AEE and the Tajura Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) were brought under its authority. According to information provided by Libya, between 1986 and 2003, multiple changes were made in the governmental entities charged with implementing Libya’s nuclear program. However, the person responsible for the Libyan nuclear program has remained the same since 1995 (General, 2008).

According to Hagger in his book *The Libyan Revolution, Its Origins and Legacy*, “Libya had begun an attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in 1972, when Belgonucleaire, a Belgian state-owned company, acted as a nuclear-energy consultant for the Libyan regime” (Hagger, 2009, p. 111).

Bowen in his paper titled *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink* divides the history of the Libyan nuclear program into three main periods; The first period running from 1969 through to 1981 encompassed Libya’s initial efforts to procure the building blocks of an ostensibly ‘civil’ program, ranging from uranium exploration through conversion and enrichment to the construction of research and power reactors and the reprocessing of plutonium. “The genesis of the Soviet–Libyan nuclear relationship included the construction of the TNRC where a Soviet-supplied research reactor became operational in 1981. The TNRC subsequently became the focal point for Libya’s covert nuclear activities for the next 10 to 15 years” (Bowen, 2006, p. 25).

The second period from 1981 through to the mid-1990s encompassed Libya’s active exploration of the routes to acquiring the fissile material required for nuclear weapons based on both plutonium and uranium enrichment. While the period witnessed some limited nuclear achievements by the Libyan regime, it was characterized primarily by significant frustration. As in the 1970s, “Libya was generally unsuccessful in legitimately acquiring sensitive technology and expertise from overseas. There was also a major decrease in Soviet nuclear assistance from the mid-1980s, mainly because of Moscow’s proliferation concerns. Moreover, “the American attack on Tripoli in April 1986 prompted the Libyan regime to begin

physically concealing significant elements of the program and this served to further undermine progress” (Bowen, 2006, p. 26).

The third period, from the mid-1990s to December 2003, witnessed the reinvigoration of Libya’s nuclear efforts, particularly in the enrichment field. It was characterized most notably by the A.Q. Khan Network’s support for Libya’s nuclear aspirations, including the supply of gas centrifuge technology as well as a weapon design and manufacturing instructions. In theory, “the infusions of technology from the network should have put Libya in a position to initiate a step change in its capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In reality, however, Libya’s progress was constrained by planning, technical and Manpower problems” (Bowen, 2006, p. 26).

Many challenges faced the Libyan program, perhaps the most significant factor that prevented Libya’s nuclear weapons program from advancing further was the absence of a high technology industrial and scientific base and associated education system, all of which contributed to a dearth of requisite local expertise in key areas such as centrifuges. “While the regime focused on buying the technical pieces of the program, the absence of suitable domestic infrastructure and local expertise led to the failure of the regime’s ability to establish an effective nuclear-weapon program” (Bowen, 2006, p. 44).

5.2.2 The Libyan Announcement about (WMD)

The Libyan government announced on December 19, 2003 that it had chosen to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons' programs as well as to forego its long-

range ballistic missile capability. According to the Former Secretary-General of People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Foreign Minister) Abdul Rahman Shalgam, the Libyan decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction on December 19, 2003 was as follows:

In view of the international environment that prevailed during the Cold War and the tension in the Middle East, Libya has urged the countries in the region to make the Middle East and Africa a region free of the weapons of mass destruction. As its calls have received no serious response, Libya had sought to develop its defense capabilities. Libyan experts have conducted talks with experts from the US and the UK on Libyan activities in this field. The Libyan experts showed their (US and UK) counterparts the substances, equipment and programmers that could lead to production of internationally banned weapons. These are centrifuging machine and equipment to carry chemical substances. According to the talks held between Libya, the USA and the UK, which are two permanent members of the (UN) Security Council that is responsible for the preservation of international peace and security, Libya has decided, with its own free will, to get rid of these substances, equipment and programmers and to be free from all internationally banned weapons. Libya has also decided to restrict itself to missiles with a range that comply with the standards of the MTCR surveillance system. It will take all these measures in a transparent way that could be proven, including accepting immediate international inspection (Libyan, 2003).

In addition, Libya will abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Biological Weapons Convention as well as accept the Additional Protocol of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Treaty. Libya believes that, “the arms' race will neither serve its security nor the region's security and contradicts its (Libya's) great concern for a world that enjoys peace and security. By taking this initiative, it wants all countries to follow its steps, starting with the Middle East, without any exception or double standards” (Libyan, 2003).

The final decision on nuclear rollback was made possible by intense meetings of Libyan officials with British and American counterparts on a variety of topics

(mainly Lockerbie and terrorism) related to Libyan normalized relations with the U.S. As early as October 2001 the head of the Libyan intelligence services Musa Kusa met with British officials in London. “Musa Kusa met with the CIA’s deputy director of counter-terrorism, Ben Bonke, at the London home of the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Bandar Bin Sultan” (Suskind, 2006). “Meetings between the two sides continued for the next couple of years, covering a variety of issues especially Lockerbie but also WMD” (Joffe, 2004, p. 223), “The main focus of the discussions was intelligence on al-Qaeda” (Tenet, 2007, p. 288). American officials reportedly conveyed that “the UN and U.S. sanctions would be lifted only after settling Lockerbie and dismantling WMD programs” (Suskind, 2006). When British Foreign Office minister Mike O’Brien visited Tripoli in August 2002, Qadhafi apparently reassured him that “Libya would cooperate on the WMD issue” (Joffe, 2004, p. 223). O’Brien felt that Qadhafi was serious on giving up WMD (Corera, 2006, p. 180). In September 2002, Tony Blair reportedly wrote to the Libyan leader stating his concerns on Libya’s WMD programs (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf, 2004, p. 15).

In March 2003, Libyan officials contacted Britain’s intelligence services with a “willingness” to end its WMD programs in exchange for lifting U.S. sanctions (Moss, 2010, p. 3). Nevertheless, it appears that the leadership had not yet “made a final decision to give up its programs” (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf, 2004, p. 15). It is reported that Qadhafi’s son Saif al Islam led the initiative (Joseph, 2009, p. 5). Between March and September 2003, British and Libyan intelligence officials met several times in London, Geneva, and Tripoli (Tucker, 2009, p. 365). The October

2003 interdiction of a ship carrying centrifuge components to Tripoli was a major development leading to nuclear rollback (Rice, 2011, p. 249). It appears to have powerfully conveyed to the Libyan leadership that it would be nearly impossible to build nuclear weapons capability without being caught. In doing so, it likely heightened threat perceptions regarding a possible US attack (Joseph, 2009, p. 12-13). Just two weeks after the interdiction, a joint British-American team conducted a technical visit to Libya's WMD and missile facilities (Joseph, 2009, p. 7).

The negotiations in 2003 were not easy – the Libyans were concerned that they would be penalized if they revealed too much (Corera, 2006, p. 185). They were very reluctant to admit having WMD programs even at later stages of the negotiations (Joseph, 2009, p. 15). The U.S. and Britain reassured the Libyan government that it would be rewarded rather than punished for revealing past WMD programs, and that the potential benefit of rollback was the expectation of normalization through such measures as the termination of U.S. sanctions and formal end to UN sanctions (Joseph, 2009, p. 59-60). While the 'carrot' of normalization was offered, the 'stick' of an unspoken threat of military intervention was more ambiguous (Corera, 2006, pp. 181-182). The negotiations were effective because of clarity in the demand as well as the associated reward and punishment (Joseph, 2009, p. 9).

In sum, the Libyan resolution to abandon its nuclear program was the direct result of secret negotiations conducted by Libya, the U.K and the U.S. The decision itself was the subject of several speculation, with some difference of opinion about the relative weight given to the contributing factors. These issues ranged between a

desire in Libya to lift the sanctions, and quiet diplomacy through negotiations, also there was a belief about the impact of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein on Libyan leadership decisions. In addition to obtain intelligence information of nuclear-related materials sent to Libya by the AQ Khan network. To explain the issue, the researcher reviews an official perspectives of the three countries that involved in the negotiation process:

a) The Libyan perspective

There are many various statements by the Libyan leader and his eldest son Saif-al-Islam, and some of the Libyan officials at that time confirmed that the regime's official position depends on two elements: First that the pursuit and possession of WMDs no longer in line with the security interests of Libya. Second, that Libya believed that the arms' race will not serve its security nor the region's security, and contrary to its aspirations towards building the world of peace and security. Libyan statement to the UNSC which was published on December 23, 2003, likewise noted that "the arms' race was conducive neither to its own security nor to that of the region and runs counter to its strong desire for a world blessed with security and peace" (Murphy, 2006, p. 374).

Besides the security rationale and the allegations to have acted willingly, the statements by official senior Libyans also pointed out socio-economic factors in the decision-making process. Furthermore, there was the negative effect because of acquiring of the WMD on the economic and social development in the country, and the significance of improving Libyan relations with the U.S. in particular, and with the EU countries in general in order to enhancement Libya's future development. In a

seminar in Al-Ahram on May 7, 2010, Saif al-Islam revealed for the first time, details of a package of weapons of mass destruction, which he conducted from A to Z as he said:

The decision to Libya's renunciation of WMD had been taken without consulting with any state; it has been in secret until the last day. And although the timing of the announcement coincided with the Iraq war, we were working on this subject some years ago...there were programs of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons...And that the program was designed to bring security and stability to Libya and that is what has been ...that the program cost 30 million dollars, but we asked for 3 billion dollars return, and they agreed to do so (Al-Ahram, 2010).

Following his announcement that he was willing to dismantle his WMD program, Libyan leader Col Qadhafi appealed to Syria, Iran, and North Korea to follow his example "to protect their nations from catastrophe" (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 2003). The following is excerpts from articles reacting to Qadhafi's move, published by Libyan newspapers:

Editorials in the Libyan newspapers enthusiastically supported Libya's announcement. An editorial by the Libyan government daily Al-Jamahiriya stated: "Libya is turning the nuclear, biological, and chemical arms' race upside down, and is pointing it in the other direction, of ridding itself of this horrific weapon that has become a burden to the world after it was a major stabilizing factor during the Cold War... Libya has declared war on the diplomacy of death ... and set the world locomotive...on the track of war on poverty, disease and illiteracy...the world that spends some trillion dollars on producing the tools of death needs only a tiny fraction of that to produce life" (Al-Jamahiriya, 2003).

The Libyan daily Al-Shams wrote, "the advocates of peace and those who want a greener, safer, and more stable planet will welcome this courageous measure...Victories [achieved] with blood, destruction, and ashes bring only tragedies upon the peoples...the world does not need WMD...Libya is not a party to

a regional or international arms' race. Its concerns are the individual and human rights" (Al-Shams, 2003).

In an editorial titled "We Say It Honestly - We Have Weapons of Mass Destruction," the organ of the Libyan Revolutionary Committees Movement, the Al-Zahf Al-Akhdhar daily, stated: "The [real] WMD is the ideas and plans in the mind of every man... but there is [another] weapon of destruction that no effort has been made to eradicate. It's the weapon that embodied by poverty, backwardness, and the legacy of the past, such as reactionaries ... nepotism and corruption..." (Al-Zahf Al-Akhdhar, 2003).

b) The American perspective

While the American official view appreciated the significant role played by diplomacy, and Libyan sought to go back to the international community. It underscored the contribution of the national security strategy from the George W. Bush administration, in particular it's a strong approach to combat nuclear proliferation. For instance, at the same time the former President Bush noted that the 'understanding with Libya' had come 'via quiet diplomacy, the official White House response declared that:

Libya's announcement today is a product of the President's strategy which gives regimes a choice. They can choose to pursue WMD at great peril, cost and international isolation. Or they can choose to renounce these weapons, take steps to rejoin the international community, and have our help in creating a better future for their citizens (White House, 2003).

The official response went on to note that the decision was a product of the U.S. determination through the years following September 11, 2001, "to work in partnership with our allies to combat the nexus of terrorism and WMD" (White

House, 2003). In doing so, the U.S administration also wanted to forward messages to other governments which seeking to gain WMD programs. In this respect, the White House noted that, “these actions have sent an unmistakable message to regimes that seek or possess WMD: these weapons do not bring influence or prestige– they only bring isolation and other unwelcome consequences. When leaders make the wise and reasonable choice to renounce terror and WMD, they serve the interests of their own people and add to the security of all nations” (White House, 2003).

c) The British perspective

The British official opinion for the Libyan declaration emphasized the role of diplomacy and negotiation. On December 19, 2003, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated, “It shows that problems of proliferation can, with good will, be tackled through discussion and engagement, to be followed up by the responsible international agencies. It demonstrates that countries can abandon programs voluntarily and peacefully” (BBC News, 2003a). In a clear reference to the Iraq war, which had been conducted from a British viewpoint on WMD-disarmament reasons, he also noticed that “Libya shows that we can fight this menace through more than the purely military mean” (BBC News, 2003a). For his part, former British Foreign Minister Jack Straw remarked that the UK had been involved in diplomacy with Libya “going back for six or seven years” Straw declared that, “he would not claim any crude connection...between military action in Iraq and what has happened in Iraq and in Libya” (Kerr, 2004, p. 6).

It is clear from what was previously mentioned that the major reason which called Libya to abandon its WMD programs, due to Libya's rational choice which made a realistic assessment of the conditions surrounding this program, at all levels, internationally, regionally and domestically. Furthermore, what could Libya reap as a result of this unprecedented decision, and choosing the right time to announce Libya's important step? Qadhafi gave a statement on an interview explaining this issue with the French newspaper Le Figaro:

The WMD program had been initiated a long time ago, when it was fashionable to engage in an arms' race. But, for him, the world has changed and so have coalitions; new challenges have emerged. Libya has to reconsider its programs: If a country like Libya makes the nuclear bomb, what would it do with it? Furthermore, Libya ran the risk of launching itself in the production of weapons that were not up to its level. And in which area would one use this weapon? In which theater of combat ... we don't have an enemy that is well-defined enough for us to be able to say, 'We will use this weapon against it.' Also, our program has created fears among our neighbors. Thus, the best decision, the most courageous decision, was to dismantle it (Le Figaro, 2004).

In the official statement regarding disarmament, Qadhafi said that he believes that the arms' race will neither serve (Libya security), and it disagreed with its own vision for a world enjoyed in an environment of peace and security (BBC News, 2003b). Libya was also hopeful that by giving up its WMD programs, relations with Washington would improve considerably and open the door to close cooperation in different areas. Bush's statement on December 19, 2003 seemed to support such a prediction:

Leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to better relations with the U.S. and other free nations. With today's announcement by its leader, Libya has begun the process of rejoining the community of nations. And Col Qadhafi knows the way forward; Libya should carry out the commitments announced today (Bush, 2003).

On the other hand, Libya's decision to abandon its WMD shed light on the international community to consider the only nuclear-capable state in the Middle East, Israel, which also acquired chemical and biological weaponry (Le Figaro, 2004).

In terms of the benefit of Libya's decision from the abandonment of WMD, we can refer to the following: First, "the U.K. has agreed to offer Libya security assurances and strengthen their mutual security relationship in an effort to encourage other countries to follow Libya's lead in abandoning its chemical and nuclear weapons programs. On June 26, 2004 in Tripoli, British Junior Foreign Minister, Kim Howells signed a Joint Letter of Peace and Security with his counterpart, Libyan Secretary for European Affairs, Abdullati Obeidi. The letter pledged that the U.K. will seek UNSC action if another state attacks Libya with chemical or biological weapons. The U.K. also pledged to aid Libya in strengthening its defense capabilities, and both states pledged to work jointly to combat the proliferation of WM" (Nguyen, 2006).

Second, Libya signed a cooperation agreement with the U.S. in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. According to Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA), this agreement aimed to establish a nuclear station in Libya to produce electricity and desalinated water and develop the radiochemistry performance at the energy research center. The agency added that the draft of this convention provided an open door to study in fields of nuclear energy in American universities for Libyan students as well as to strengthen cooperation in the field of world peace and peaceful uses of atomic

energy in the areas of energy, water, medicine, agriculture, industry and environment for the benefit of both countries (BBC News, 2007b).

According to American ambassador in Libya, Gene Cretz, the U.S. is working with Libyan scientists not only to complete the dismantling of Libya's WMD programs, but also to convert former weapons of mass destruction facilities into peaceful uses, such as pharmaceutical factories, water desalination plants, and nuclear medical centers. Cretz added, "They have also made great strides in the last year on military cooperation, first, by signing a Memorandum of Understanding with Libya on future defense cooperation and then by finalizing an end-user agreement that sets the stage for a new security assistance relationship, they plan to launch a bilateral Political-Military dialogue that will form the basis for a security engagement in the years to come" (Cretz, 2010, p. 2).

It is clear from what has been previously mentioned that, the rational actor explanation, points to the ever-increasing realization by the Libyan regime that the costs of pursuing nuclear weapons was outweighed by the gains that could be achieved, in terms of international security and economics, by abandoning the program.

5.3 Libyan attitude towards Israel

The most motivating factor that inspired the young military officers in Libya to take over the monarchy on September 1, 1969, Qadhafi states, was the humiliating defeat of the Arabs in June 1967. Israel, to revolutionary Libya, is a strange entity that was artificially planted in the Arab land to serve the imperial and Zionist designs and to

keep the Arab nation divided. The terms, “Arab-Israeli conflict,” or “the Middle-East dispute,” are unrecognizable terms in the dictionary of revolutionary Libya’s foreign policy statement. The issue is the Palestinian cause, and what is called the Middle-East conflict is only a consequence of that basic cause. The right way of dealing with this strange entity, Qadhafi points out, is by eliminating it. And this can only be done by force. And this latter cannot be achieved but through Arab unity. Thus, “solving the Palestinian problem (by returning the Palestinians to their homeland, Palestine) and achieving Arab unity, became two sides of the same coin-- you cannot have one without having the other, that is why since the first day of the revolution, Qadhafi's dream was to achieve Arab unity whatever the cost might be” (Gebril, 1988, p. 45).

Libya- Israel relations became more tense in particularly in 1973, “when on February 21; a Libyan Airlines plane en route to Cairo lost its bearings and headed towards the Sinai Peninsula, where it was shot down by an Israeli aircraft, killing 108 Libyan passengers. Despite Israel’s explanation that the airliner was mistakenly shot down by pilots who believed it to be a military aircraft on its way to destroy Israel’s nuclear reactor in Dimona, the incident greatly antagonized Tripoli” (Otman & Karlberg, 2007, p. 36-37).

The tension in Libyan–Israeli relations increased further in the summer of 1976, when Israel carried out its raid on Entebbe’s Airport in Uganda, to release the Israeli passengers held hostage by Palestinian commandos. This event infuriating Tripoli. As a result of this, “Libya’s campaign in the UN became acrimonious. Its representative joined Benin and Tanzania in sponsoring a resolution demanding that

Israel compensate Uganda for all losses that occurred during the raid. While Tunisia and Morocco responded to the raid in a moderate fashion, Tripoli lashed out at the U.S. and threatened to cut off all oil exports unless it stopped supporting Israel” (Otman & Karlberg, 2007, p. 37).

Libya’s policy towards Israel continued the same pattern of hostility during the 1980s. On September 1st 1980, Libya proposed a union with Syria to institute a democratic union against Zionism, imperialism and reaction. However, “the plan never got off the ground as the past hostility between Libya and Egypt lessened following Sadat’s assassination on October 6, 1981. But Libyan–Israeli antagonism continued, and on July 13, 1982, Tripoli announced that it had discovered a joint Egyptian–Israeli plot to attack Libya” (Otman & Karlberg, 2007, p. 38). Moreover, “Col Qadhafi himself blamed Israel for terrorizing the Arabs with its nuclear program, calling the Israeli nuclear plan real terrorism” (Otman & Karlberg, 2007, p. 38).

Libya continued to be suspicious of Israeli–Egyptian reconciliation, and in a speech commemorating Syria’s 21st anniversary of the revolution, “he blamed Egypt for signing the Camp David peace accord with Israel, saying that Egypt allowed the Israeli Chief of Staff to inspect the Libyan border. He asked his audience, who can guarantee that the Israeli forces would not be capable of passing through Egypt and thus threaten Libya” (Otman & Karlberg, 2007, p. 38).

What increased the bilateral tension even further were the reports that Israel supporting the U.S. during its attack of Libya on April 15, 1986. According to Otman and Karlberg, “The Israelis responded to this by saying that Libya could be

contained only with force. On April 27, 1986, Israel's Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir met Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister, who informed him that his government had increased its security measures against terrorism; Shamir responded by saying, Security measures are not enough. When his guest asked how was it possible to convince countries such as Syria and Libya to desist from supporting terrorism, Shamir said, Israel believes that the only way is a military strike similar to the one carried out by the Americans in Libya" (Otman & Karlberg, 2007, p. 38).

The Arab-Israeli conflict was another particularly pointed source of tension between the U.S. and Qadhafi: "Libya remained distinctly opposed to negotiation or reconciliation with Israel throughout the Cold War era and the 1990s, promoting armed struggle as the only viable means to end Israel's occupation of territory it captured from neighboring Arab states in 1967" (Blanchard, 2009, p. 4).

The Libyan regime considered Israel was the most dangerous source of the regional threats; it is also the most vicious and aggressive state towards the Arabs, particularly in Palestine, Lebanon and the Golan Heights in Syria. Libya further believed that "Israel's possession of nuclear weapons is not only an immediate threat to the region but also to global peace and security" (Zenbou, 2010, p. 112).

Libya perceives that the very existence of Israel is the source of most of the Arab region's problems, because ultimately, Israel's security perception is essentially different to the Arab one. It also points to the danger of Israel's ideology, which states that Palestine is merely the starting point of the Jewish National State (Japer, 1974, p. 32). Thus, "Israel is truly seeking to achieve the Knesset's aim of a

Jewish state expanding between the Nile and the Euphrates, Libya perceives this as a direct and dangerous threat to Arab national security” (Laqueur, 2003, p. 45).

In its examination of Israel, Libyan foreign policy relies on the accounts and speeches of Israeli leaderships, which have not missed an opportunity to claim that Israel is a state in the process of formulation. This is taken to mean that Israel is not satisfied with Palestine, but is seeking to capture other Arab lands. Thus, it is considered that Israel’s sole aim of possessing a nuclear weapon is to use it against the Arabs whenever it wishes. Evidence of this occurred during the 1973 War, when Syrian tanks progressed through the Golan and into the Jalil, Israel informed the US that Israeli would use nuclear weapons (Imam, 2005, p. 5).

Furthermore, David Ben Gurion stated that ‘the Jewish state had been established on only a part of Israel.’ Thus, he claimed that one of the aims of the Suez War in 1956 was to liberate the part of Israel that had been invaded. Moshe Dayan said after the June 1967 that, ‘now we [Israel] have the military ability and the armies through which we can control the area from the Suez Canal to Jordan and Mt. Harmon, only then will we achieve the goals of Zionism.’(Naor, 1999, pp. 150-177) Furthermore, Menachem Begin called on the Jewish youth to migrate to Israel from all four corners of the world so “we can build Israel together, for there are millions of spaces for those coming back to Israel” (Begin, 1977, p. 67).

In addition to occupation of Arab lands, the Israeli state has supported Jewish migration to Palestine (Shufani, 1977, p. 126) and prevented Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes. Furthermore, it has initiated various wars with the Arabs and has interfered in Arab internal affairs.

As a result of all the above, Libya considers Israel as the most dangerous threat to Arab national security and perceives the Arab-Israeli conflict as the central issue for Arabs. Thus, Libya has constructed its foreign policy to take account of this, whilst taking into account each country's stance on the conflict. Libya has always called for national resistance, the unification of the Palestinian factions and committing financial aid and support to Arab countries that share frontiers with Israel, as long as these frontiers are open for resistance and there are no direct negotiations with Israel.

Libyan decision-makers consider the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of survival of the Arab world and not a mere battle over borders. Furthermore, Libyan policy believes that all attempts at peace and resolution of the conflict are only efforts to sanction Israeli presence in the region. It is a given that Libya has always rejected Israel's presence in the region perceiving it as the most dangerous threat to the region. Furthermore, since the 1969 Revolution, Libya has placed the Palestine issue at the centre of its list of priorities and has rejected all Western meddling in the conflict. Libya also rejects the various calls that appear within the peace process, such as 'land for peace', believing that such attempts merely support Israel so as not to alter the balance of power into the Arabs favor.

From the other side, the U.S.- Israel's relations goes back to the 1920s, when President Woodrow Wilson stated that the U.S. understood the Balfour Declaration in 1917 regarding the establishment of a homeland for Jewish people on Palestinian land. However, there was no fiscal or political support from the U.S. for this

Declaration. Relations between the two nations continued to grow when U.S. President Truman recognized Israel on May 15, 1948. In addition,

U.S. leaders tried to strike a balanced position between Israel and the Arabs and carefully avoided making any formal commitment to the Jewish state for fear of jeopardizing more important strategic interest. This situation changed gradually over the ensuing decades, in response to events like the Six-Days War of 1967, Soviet arms sales to various Arab States, and the growing influence of pro-Israel groups in the U.S. (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 7).

This growing relationship later became responsible for the resistance towards the U.S. and its role in the Middle Eastern countries.

Two arguments surround U.S. - Israeli relations. First, some scholars and politicians in both the U.S. and their Middle East counterpart argued that this relations runs much deeper than just sympathy extended to Jewish individuals. Mearsheimer and Walt noted that with “this dramatic transformation in America’s role in the region, it makes little sense to try to explain current U.S. policy – and especially the lavish support that is now given to Israel – by referring to the religious beliefs of a bygone era or the radically different forms of past American engagement” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 7). Mearsheimer and Walt tried to support this argument by saying, if this sympathy is focused on finding a homeland for the Jewish people, why did it have to be Palestine and not elsewhere? Mearsheimer and Walt cited an old conversation between the first prime minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion, in 1956 when he told Nahum Goldmann, then-President of the World Jewish Congress, saying, “If I was an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country. Sure, God promised it to us, but what does that matter to them? Our God is not theirs. We come from Israel. It is true, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There

has been anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 7) This conversation identified religion a crucial factor.

Second, some scholars and policymakers believe the U.S. supports Israel as a nation because it shares the same democracy and freedom values and is the only democratic state in the region. It goes to follow, then, that U.S. relations with Israel would improve with time, and America should support freedom anywhere in the world as one of its foreign policy principles with Israel as its leading example. According to Migdalovitz (2008) "The U.S. and Israel have developed a close friendship based on common democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests U.S. - Israeli bilateral relations are multidimensional" (Migdalovitz, 2008, p. 1). However, each one of these arguments has its own supporters, but as Walt and Mearsheimer wrote, "There was nothing inevitable or predetermined about the current special relationship between the U.S. and Israel" (Migdalovitz, 2008, p. 1), such debates over this relationship may never reach an end.

In fact, the U.S. played an important role in stopping the 1956 War (Suez crisis) between Israel, France, Britain from one side and Egypt from the other; this war is also known as the Tripartite Aggression. At that time, the U.S. became involved, not because of strong relations with Israel, but because of concern that Egyptian leaders would ask the Soviet Union for assistance. According to U.S. policymakers, the Suez Crisis would provide a clear opportunity for Moscow to obtain a foothold in the region, which conflicted with Washington's desires. After

the 1956 war, the U.S. policymakers realized that a balance was needed between support for the Jewish state and maintaining its Arab alliances in the region. The U.S. began direct talks with President Nasser of Egypt and began supplying countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan with economic and technological support. This policy would prevent the Soviet Union from creating close relations with countries in the Middle East.

However, this policy was short-lived, and a new age of U.S. policy toward the region emerged. The unconditional U.S. support for Israel became apparent in the Six-Days War in 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Israel became the strategic ally to the U.S. and began receiving significant portions of U.S. aid to the region. According to some reports, “from 1976-2004, Israel was the largest annual recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, having recently been supplanted by Iraq. Since 1985, the U.S. has provided nearly US\$3 billion in grants annually to Israel” (Sharp, 2008, p. 1). Most of this aid goes to military and economic support, which guarantees Israel’s superiority over its Arab neighbors. Israel also receives significant political support from the U.S. in all international organizations regarding its conflict with the Arab states.

Some specialists and political observers have said that U.S. vital interests have not changed, but the new factor (Israel’s security) topped the U.S. agenda and goals. In other words, the primary U.S. goals (oil and containment of communism up until the Soviet collapse in 1991) in the region remained the same, but the Israel factor occupied a very important position in Washington’s foreign policy toward the

Middle East. According to those specialists, this change was a result of the rapidly-growing.

Israeli lobby in the U.S. at all levels: politically, militarily and economically. The lobby became very important in the U.S. political body “because it has a significant influence on American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 6). This lobby convinced U.S. policymakers that Israel is their strong ally and shares with Americans the same democratic values. Thus, the U.S. should play a role in the protection and support of the new democratic state. The lobby also created the perception that Israel’s religious beliefs are strongly aligned with the Christian majority in the U.S. This lobby became a key factor in U.S. foreign policy with regard to Middle East policies “in a 2006 survey of international relations scholars in the U.S., 66 percent of the respondents said that they agreed with the statement the Israel lobby has too much influence over U.S. foreign policy” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 10). Today in the Arab world most politicians and citizens alike believe that the Israeli lobby is responsible for events that occurred in the Middle East, like the wars in 1967 and 1973, the Camp David Peace Agreement, the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq war in 2003, and believe that Israel will continue to influence policy decisions. This lobby has significant influence even in U.S. domestic affairs. Mearsheimer and Walt note that “In 2008, as in previous election years, serious candidates for the highest office in the land will go to considerable lengths to express their deep personal commitment to one foreign country--Israel--as well as well as their determination to maintain unyielding U.S. support for the Jewish state” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 3).

Historically, U.S. administrations considered their relations with Israel part of maintaining national security interests. However, this belief appears counterintuitive to the benefits that Israel actually provides for the U.S. Mearsheimer and Walt argue that Israel lacks natural resources and strategic geographical purpose. Furthermore, the fact that Israel was vital in the prevention of the spread of communism during the Cold War is no longer relevant. Many political observers in the Middle East believe that the blind support of Israel by the U.S. has further strained U.S.-Middle Eastern relationships. However, focusing on the Israeli lobby's strength is not the aim here, rather my point to show the reader the extent to which Israeli security factors are one of the central goals of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, even after the dissolution of the communist.

According to Miloud Mhadbi (2007) in *Lessons from Libya: How to Make Friends with Arabs*, the Arab-Israeli conflict did not pose a barrier to closer Libyan-American relations in comparison with the frontline states for a number of reasons. For one, Libya does not directly border Israel and there had already been a decline in Libyan support for Palestinian military action against Israel. It cannot be denied that Libya had backed these actions before the 1993 Oslo Accords as a means of supporting an armed national struggle and the right to self-determination according to international law. However, after the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements, with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) amending its charter and giving up the "armed struggle" option, Libyan support appeared to be in violation of

international law, which blurred the line between resistance and terrorism (particularly after September 11) (Mhadbi, 2007, p. 129).

The decline in Libyan support for armed Palestinian action – regardless of the motives – was an important factor in creating common ground between the U.S. and Libya, especially post-September 11. Moreover, Libya has called for a single democratic state in historical Palestine, where all would live without ethnic, racial or religious discrimination (the “Isratine” or one-state solution of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi’s White Book). Libya seeks to end this hostility between the Arabs and the Jews, which has exhausted the peoples and states of the region, causing enormous suffering and pushing extremist forces (on all sides) to believe that the conflict is never-ending. This one-state solution (even if it is rejected by a number of extremist forces in Israel and the U.S. because they see it as a threat to Israel and is also opposed in the Arab world) is supported by a number of intellectuals in Israel and America. “Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict no longer serves as the backdrop to tensions in Libyan-American relations the way it does for America’s relationships with several other Arab countries” (Mhadbi, 2007, p. 130).

In this context, Qadhafi’s initiative for a “one-state state solution” based on reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes a so-called ‘Isratine’ which include: new state is the one country, a democracy for Jews and Palestinians, Christians and others, a democratic state without national or religious intolerance and linguist. Therefore, “it can stop the arms’ race and look to the future with the mentality of a new generation of the future” (Qadhafi, 2003, p. 17). Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict no longer serves as the

backdrop to tensions in Libyan-American relations the way it does for America's relationships with several other Arab countries.

5.4 Conclusions

As shown in this chapter, one of the most serious of American allegations against Libya is that the latter was a supporter of international terrorism. Terrorism is an American perception that serves its political objectives. It has little similarity with the United Nation's concept neither with terrorism nor with how Libya defined it. The U.S. has disagreed with efforts and recommendations made on how to define international terrorism. One American insistence has been on the removal of the concept of state terrorism, i.e. it asserted that a state could not be viewed as a terrorist. On the other hand, it argued for the recognition that groups or organizations such as national liberation movements must be viewed as terrorists when they employ arm struggle to achieve their aims. On the other hand, Libya would view such national liberation movements from a different perspective because it recognizes that there is a big difference between supporting freedom movement such as the one staged by the Palestinian people for their homeland and supporting terrorism. From the foregoing discussion in this chapter, it is obvious that it was one of the main factors that had influenced the U.S. - Libya relations, especially during the Carter administration. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration viewed the Soviet Union as a supporter of international terrorism and therefore, considered all countries friendly to the Soviet Union as supporters of the terrorism as well.

Actually, the attacks on Washington and New York on 9/11 constituted a real opportunity for a political rapprochement between the two countries. While supporting terrorism was one of many reasons that led to deteriorating U.S.- Libya relations, without a doubt Libya's decision to renounce terrorism, and its cooperation with the U.S. in its anti-terror war, were the most important factors that led to the normalization of the U.S.-Libyan relations.

Virtually, all steps taken by the Libyan government to improve its relations with the U.S. did not achieve the desired results, but Libya's announcement to abandon its nuclear programs was one of the most important factors in the U.S.- Libya relations. Moreover, this announcement was a major surprise for many observers in terms of its causes and its timing. However, the success of secret negotiations and the direct involvement of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi had the greatest impact in reaching this achievement, with respect to Libya, which believes that the arms' race will neither serve its security, nor the world security.

For its part, the U.S. also want to send telegrams to other governments possessing or even thinking to get WMD, and emphasizing that the weapons do not bring influence or prestige – they only bring isolation and other unwelcome consequences, and thus invited other leaders to make a clever and rational choice to abandon WMD in order to improve relations with the U.S. and the international community as a whole. The U.S. considers the normalization of U.S. - Libya relations as a particular stimulus to such countries.

In fact, the Arab-Israeli conflict was another particularly pointed source of tension between the U.S. and Libya. Libya remained distinctly opposed to

negotiation or reconciliation with Israel throughout the Cold War era and the 1990s, promoting the armed struggle as the only viable means to end Israel's occupation of territory it captured from neighboring Arab states in 1967. However, the decline in Libyan support for armed Palestinian action was an important factor in creating common ground between the U.S. and Libya, especially post-September 11, 2001. Besides, Qadhafi's initiative for a "one-state solution" based on reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state. This refers to the Arab-Israeli conflict no longer serves as the backdrop of tensions in the U.S. - Libyan relations.

CHAPTER SIX

THE EXPLANATION OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL

6.1 The Rational Actor Model (RAM)

In analyzing the U.S. - Libya normalized relations in 2003–2006, this study utilized RAM. This model looks into the actions of a country as a whole and into the impact of international relations on these actions. In RAM the basic unit of analysis is the actions chosen by the national government to maximize its strategic goals and objectives (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24). The nation or government conceived as a rational unitary decision maker with “one set of preferences ... one set of perceived choices, and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24). As Allison and Zelikow note, “two of the assumptions of classical realism, namely that unitary states are the main actors in international affairs and that states act rationally in selecting the course of action that is value-maximizing, find resonance in the RAM” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 27).

The model assumes that, “a nation’s actions are in response to strategic threats and opportunities in the international environment” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24). In selecting a response, “a process of rational choice is employed based on identifying objectives and goals, usually expressed in terms of national security and national interests; proposing options for the attainment of the objectives; evaluating the cost and benefit of each option against the defined objectives; and selecting the option that ranks highest in achieving desired outcomes” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24).

According to Travis “the necessity of policy development and the preclusion of policy options are often conditioned by shifts in the international setting” (Travis, 2000, p. 252). “Reaching a decision takes into consideration a strategic problem; state objectives that address the problem and secure the national interest; set of options that could achieve these objectives; cost and benefit analysis for each option that maximizes utility in terms of these objectives; and the strategic interaction between the state and its adversary, which ultimately determines the option chosen by the state” (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Yetiv 2004).

As pointed earlier, the components of RAM include: (1) Goals and objectives, national security and national interests are the principal categories in which strategic goals are conceived, (2) Options; various courses of action relevant to a strategic problem provide the spectrum of options, (3) Consequences; enactment of each alternative course of action will produce a series of consequences. The relevant consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms of strategic goals and objectives, and (4) Choice, rational choice is value-maximizing, “The rational agent selects the alternative whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives” (Allison, 1971, p. 37).

To examine how the RAM can explain the decision-making process of the normalization of the U.S.- Libya relations, this study would have to find evidence in the data articulating the following: (1) the strategic problem, (2) the national interest of the state in terms of goals and objectives, (3) the options of the state to achieve its goals, (4) the costs and benefits associated with each option, and (5) strategic interaction.

6.2 The Strategic Problem

The RAM indicates that “the state has goals and objectives derived from its understanding of its national interests, the attainment of which is supposed to eliminate a problem that poses a threat to these national interests” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24).

Ever since the 1980s, Libya continued to be a thorn in U.S. side for over four different governing administrations starting with then U.S. President Reagan and ending with former President George W. Bush Jr. This was the result of Libya posing a direct and an indirect threat on U.S. interests on a global scale with the utilization of several aggressive strategies such as the pursuit of WMDs and the overall support of International terrorist organizations (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 9).

The U.S position on terrorism is very clear and it considers terrorism a primary threat to the U.S., such vigil position is clearly documented in several key documents such as the National Security Strategy of 2002 and the National Strategy of Combating Terrorism (2003) “The U.S. considers terrorism as one of the primary threats to its national security, and many resources have been and will be allocated to prosecute and ultimately bringing this worldwide problem under control” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 3).

Terrorism and WMDs were the two major issues in U.S. foreign policy towards Libya. Both were considered to be the primary threats to U.S. national security, and both resulted in major military operations such as the occupation of Afghanistan and the war on Iraq. Rogue states were met with combined harsh

rhetoric followed by strong actions by the U.S specifically the then Bush administration in its war against terrorism and WMDs (Calabrese, 2004, p. 71).

According to Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance, on her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

With an eye to the terrible threat to U.S. national security interests—and to the lives and well-being of thousands or perhaps millions of innocent people—posed by the proliferation of WMD around the world, the President has developed a bold strategy to use every tool at our disposal to halt the spread of these weapons. We use diplomacy at all times, economic pressure when we can, military pressure when we must. The President, indeed the entire U.S. Government has demonstrated a strong commitment to the goal of nuclear, chemical and biological nonproliferation (DeSutter, 2004, p. 2).

Robert J. Art (2000) in his writing on the *Strategy of Selective Engagement* argued that “the coupling of rogue states, terrorists, and WMD are one of the greatest threats to the U.S. interests” (Art, 2000, p. 188). He stated that “the proliferation of WMD is inherently bad for the following two reasons. First, as WMD materials proliferate, so does the potential for other rogue states and/or terrorists to gain access to those materials. Second, WMD in the hands of rogue states may mistakenly embolden their leaders to strike out against U.S. interests” (Art, 2000, pp. 190-191).

By articulating the perceived threat that the Libyan regime posed to the U.S. interests, the then President Bush and his administration focused the attention of the nation on the next problem that should be dealt with. Thus, Libya was portrayed as the strategic problem that threatened the U.S. national interests: terrorism and WMD. Therefore, in order to secure its national interests, objectives were devised to eliminate the Libyan problem.

6.3 Objectives/Goals

As the RAM suggests, “the state has goals and objectives that are considered to be in the national interest, which are threatened by the strategic problem mentioned above” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24).

In situating the U.S. - Libya’s relations under Qadhafi's leadership which was coincided with the four U.S administrations, the U.S. interests were under threat. When former President George W. Bush Jr. was in power, in particular after the September 11, attacks, the U.S. faced more increased threats to the U.S. interests at home and abroad (O’Brien, 2011, p. 5). With respect to Libya, the Bush administration devised its goals were as follows: First, to end Libyan support for terrorism, then to accept responsibility and pay compensation for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, and assist with the Lockerbie investigation, after that, to prevent Libya from obtaining WMD, and the last is to contain Libya’s regional ambitions, at least those that run counter to U.S. interests.

September 11, 2001 stressed the urgent need to make certain of the safety of U.S. soil and U.S. civilian population, such concerns became the priority of Bush and his administration. In 2002, Bush delivered a statement in his State of the Union address asserting that:

Our first priority must be the security of our nation....The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to protect our citizens and strengthen our nation against the ongoing threat of another attack.” More specifically he stated, “Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction (Bush, 2002a).

Once again, on September 17, 2002, the White House published a document entitled “The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” U.S.

president re-voiced his top priority goal of securing the homeland by voicing the following: “We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. We must accord the highest priority to the protection of the U.S., our forces, and our friends and allies from the existing and growing WMD threat.” The President re-expressed his intentions by stating the following, “Defending the American homeland is the most basic responsibility of our government” (White House, 2002).

In addition, on May 31, 2003, former President Bush Jr. announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) a partnership of states seeking to interdict proliferation of WMD and missile technology at sea, in the air, or on land. John Bolton under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, testified before the house international relations committee. He advised to implement Bush's strategy to reduce WMD increase:

We aim ultimately not just to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to eliminate or “roll back” such weapons from rogue states and terrorist groups that already possess them or are close to doing so...While we pursue diplomatic dialogue wherever possible, the U.S. and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as (1) economic sanctions; (2) interdiction and seizure...and (3) as the case of Iraq demonstrates, preemptive military forces were required...Proliferators—and especially states still deliberating whether to seek WMD—must understand that they will pay a high price for their efforts (Bolton, 2003).

Another strategic goal, recognized for the past three decades by every U.S. President as an important national interest, was the security of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. “The primary goal in securing that region was to ensure that oil would continue to be produced without interruption to fuel the global economy. The reason behind U.S. concerns was that approximately 65 percent of the

world oil reserves are located in this region. Moreover, some 40 percent of the world gas reserves are located in this area accounting for 28.5 percent of global oil production. It is also significant that MENA countries possess around 83 percent of OPEC excess capacity” (Vakhshouri, 2011, p. 4).

The U.S also has additional economic interests at stake; the Libyan market had significant demand for aircraft and additional transportation equipment. Moreover, Libya also had planned projects such as the "Great Man Made River" and a gas pipeline project that delivers gas over the Mediterranean Sea; such projects were attractive for major U.S construction firms. However, the U.S. sanctions deterred those opportunities which therefore allowed European counterparts to acquire long term contracts in Libya (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 1-2).

At a time, “when anti-Americanism was on the rise in much of the Muslim world and when the U.S. faces charges of engaging in a war against Islam, the U.S. had a significant interest in successfully graduating Libya out of the rogue state category, provided that it earns such a promotion” (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 2). Not only that this action would rid the U.S. of its Anti-Islamic image, “but it would also send a message to similar states, and allies, that the U.S. is willing to adapt its sanctions policies to recognize positive changes in the behavior of targeted regimes” (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 2).

Establishing that Libya posed a threat to the U.S. national interests, solving the outstanding issues between the U.S. with Libya became the goal that would assist to ensure these interests. However, in then President Bush's 2004 State of the Union Address “Because of American leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the

better. Last month, the leader of Libya voluntarily pledged to disclose and dismantle all of his regime's WMD programs, including a uranium-enrichment project for nuclear weapons. Col Qadhafi correctly judged that his country is better off and far more secure without weapons of mass murder” (Bush, 2004). President Bush added, “Nine months of intense negotiations involving the U.S. and Great Britain succeeded with Libya, while 12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible. And no one can now doubt the word of America. Different threats require different strategies” (Bush, 2004). The implication was that the disarmament of Libya’s WMD would be an example to other countries around the world.

6.4 Options

In the previous part of this study, it was demonstrated that the U.S. national interests were: (a) Homeland security and safety of American people (b) prevent Libya from obtaining WMD, and (c) Limit Libyan regional desires, at least the ones which can be threatening to U.S interests as pointed earlier. Those national interests were translated into the following objectives: (a) End Libyan support for terrorism, (b) accept responsibility and pay compensation for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, and assist with the Lockerbie investigation, (c) elimination of WMD and disarmament. To achieve these intertwining goals the U.S. administration discussed several options: (a) Continuing to tighten sanctions, (b) policy change or regime change in Libya, and (c) reconciliation and normalizing relations with Libya.

Not long after Bush rose to power, only one of the Lockerbie suspects was deemed responsible, the convict whose name is Abdul Baset Megrahi, Qadhafi reacted with the following statement: “the Government of Libya had no connection with the Lockerbie bombing and to refuse the idea of compensating victim’s families” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 72). In that interview, Qadhafi made a point that Libya still intends to have better relations with the U.S if the U.S was willing to resolve peacefully the previous misunderstandings that went on in the past between both countries. Qadhafi declared, “If the U.S. wants peace, we also want peace, and we have no interest in war and confrontation” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 72).

Former President George W. Bush championed the first option of continuing to tighten sanctions, when questioned whether the conviction of the Lockerbie suspect would influence a change of policy towards Libya and the sanctions imposed on it, Bush indicated that “his intention was to continue sanctions until the Libyan government admitted to their complicity in the Lockerbie bombing and paid restitution to families” (Otman & Karlberg, 2007, p. 49). Bush reassured his stance by “the renewed of the national emergency and economic sanctions against Libya at each six-month renewal point. Additionally, despite his uncertainty over the effectiveness of sanctions, he ultimately approved a five-year extension of the controversial Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), arguing that the Libyan government had yet to meet all the UN resolution demands” (Otman & Karlberg, 2007, p. 49). Moreover, there was further insistence within the Bush administration by Neoconservatives which was then promoted by the former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, “when he reportedly sent a memo to President Bush cc’d to then National

Security Adviser Rice and former Secretary of State department Powell, arguing that democratization and human rights, not just terrorism and WMD, should be on the negotiating agenda, and that UN sanctions should not be lifted just for a Lockerbie settlement” (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 73).

The second option or strategy discussed was a Policy change or regime change in Libya. “It was evident that the U.S. air raid on April 15, 1986 was an attempt to force both policy change and regime change, since Qadhafi's residence was targeted” (Jentleson, 1991, p. 63). However, when the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Libya had lost a biggest arms provider, and who was an important supporter in cold war period. The Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772 bombings in 1988 and 1989, respectively, were the bloodiest acts of terrorism around the world prior to 9/11. They galvanized European support for multilateral military, diplomatic and economic sanctions against Libya.

By 1991, “the then Bush administration shifted from a policy goal of regime change to a more limited goal of the policy change” (Jentleson, 1991, p. 63). In keeping to policy change and not regime change, proportionality between ends and means was maintained. “The pattern was quite striking of the Libyans’ seeking reassurances throughout the negotiations that the terms were policy change not regime change. They did so in the discussions leading to the Lockerbie settlement; in the 1998-99 deal for surrender of the two Libyan suspects and assurances through then UN Secretary-General Annan that the trial will not be used to undermine the Libyan regime” (Jentleson, 2006, p. 5). In a lot of reassurances given in the direct negotiations by former Assistant Secretary Indyk, and former Assistant Secretary

Burns, “the U.S. and British assurances in March and August 2003 on the final Lockerbie deal that the official acceptance of civil responsibility would not be used as grounds for legal action against the Libyan government; and in the WMD agreement in the final reassurances needed to close the deal. Had Libya had to guard against policy concessions opening the way to efforts at regime change, it would have been less likely to make its dramatic policy changes” (Jentleson, 2006, p. 5).

On the other hand, then under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton preferred regime change by use of force, according to Bolton, “we should have treated Pan Am 103 as an attack on the U.S. and responded accordingly. We made a mistake by treating it as a diplomatic or judicial matter. We should have followed President Reagan’s example in the wake of the La Belle Disco bombing...We should have attacked Libya militarily and hopefully gotten a little bit luckier than the Reagan administration bombing” (Bolton, 2000).

In this context, Michael Hirsh wrote in *Newsweek*, *Bolton's British Problem*, A crucial issue, according to sources involved in the affair, was Col Qadhafi's demand that if Libya abandoned its WMD program, the U.S. in turn would drop its goal of regime change. But then Undersecretary Bolton was unwilling to support this compromise. The White House agreed to keep Bolton “out of the loop” (Hirsh, 2005, p. 30), as one source puts it. A deal was struck only after Qadhafi was reassured that Bush would settle for “policy change”--surrendering his WMD. According to *Newsweek*, “the Libya deal succeeded only after British officials “at the highest

level” persuaded the White House to keep Bolton off the negotiating team (Hirsh, 2005, p. 30).

The reconciliation and normalizing relations with Libya option discussed by the U.S. administration, Rep. Tom Lantos, was the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee in January 2004, when he became the first U.S. elected official to visit Libya in almost four decades, and the primary ever to meet personally with Qadhafi, called on the Bush administration to lift the ban on American travel to Libya as a first step in normalizing relations with Tripoli. According to Lantos "My recommendation is that we proceed step by step to move toward normalization of relations" Mr. Lantos said, adding that “another goal should be to allow Libyan students to return to the U.S. universities” (Tyler, 2004).

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that, “the key development in the intensification of the WMD negotiations appears to have been an August 2002 trip to Libya by then British Foreign Office Minister Michael O’Brien who broached the subject with Qadhafi... And had received positive assurances” (Joffe, 2004, p. 223). “At a meeting at Camp David the following month, Blair proposed and Bush reportedly accepted a reaffirmation that a deal on WMD would bring normalization of relations, Blair then wrote a letter to this effect to Qadhafi, who responded positively” (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf, 2004).

In addition to the official channel through former head of Libya’s intelligence, U.S and British representatives also made efforts through supervision of Qadhafi’s son Saif al Islam. Consequently, former Secretary of State Powell

indicated that progress was made in the direction of Libyan reconciliation, Powell had faith in the success of conditional engagement strategy, Powell is hopeful,

...frankly, we're impressed with what they have done in recent years: resolved the Pan Am 103 case, turned in all their weapons of mass destruction...We've laid out a clear roadmap for them of what we expect them to do in order to move toward full normalization of relations between the U.S. and Libya...The Libyans have been forthcoming. We have been forthcoming...I think it's in our interest to receive Libya back into the international community (U.S. Department of state, 2004b).

However, each of the options listed above had costs and benefits that were given a significance by administration officials.

6.5 Cost and Benefit Analysis

The U.S. administration under President Bush declared that the benefit of continuing to tighten the imposed sanctions would be to force Tripoli to take further steps to compensate the victims of terrorist attacks and cooperate in counter terrorism and nonproliferation efforts. Because the lifting of sanctions on Libya at that time would be a grave mistake, Libya still posed a growing threat to national interests and international security at that time (Gardiner, Philips & Brookes, 2003).

The then Director of CIA George Tenet made a statement to congress in the years of 2002 – 2003 indicating that “Libya was continuing to pursue offensive nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capability and since the lifting of UN sanctions had renewed contacts necessary to do so” (Center, 2000, p. 7) However, the U.S position remained the same with the statement made to the UN by James Cunningham on WMDs concerns.

However, opponents of sanctions represented by Ronald E. Neumann, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs claimed that, “the economic sanctions could be effective components of a coercive diplomacy strategy when imposed multilaterally and sustained over time, as of the mid-to-late 1990s, sanctions did not appear to be leveraging much change in Libyan policy” (Neumann, 1999). Eventually, though the sanctions were a pressuring tool on Libya, the International support for Libyan isolation faded since 1999. Neumann mentioned that:

Much of the world has been quick to welcome Libya back into the community of nations. On the political front, a number of nations have reestablished diplomatic relations, and Libya has become much more active in regional organizations. On the economic front, immediately following the suspension of UN sanctions proscribing to direct air travel to and from Libya, foreign airlines opened direct routes to Tripoli. Foreign firms have also welcomed Libya’s indications of interest in large infrastructure projects, including in the petroleum sector and aircraft purchases (Neumann, 1999).

In addition, the sanctions would damage the American companies themselves; there was an increasing number of the U.S. companies that expressed discontent with the effects of these sanctions in their activity. Including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce which bemoaned on contracts and shift profits presumed to other companies. Because of these reasons, continuing to tighten sanctions did not assure that the Libyan regime would accept the U.S. demands especially with regards to nuclear disarmament.

The benefit of the transition from a strategy of changing the regime to a policy change was that relativity between ends and means. Bruce Jentleson (2006) reported that “policy change was possible without regime change is a crucial point. The Libya case showed what can be achieved when regime change is taken off the

table...The Libyans sought firm and repeated reassurances that concessions on terrorism and WMD would not be the thin end of the wedge leading to further pressure for regime change” (Jentleson, 2006, p. 7).

The costs of pursuing regime change could be counterproductive instead of actually achieving policy change. It could also be a waste of time in preparation, planning, and the search for a third party to ensure the elusive Qadhafi regime changed. It could require complicated procedures for secure communications and negotiations between the parties and that could fail in the case of leaked information about it to the media, especially which adopted a hostile stance of Qadhafi. Furthermore, Bolton objected with the regime change alternative for being hard to manage, unproductive, and takes a long time to prepare, which shows why he preferred the military action alternative to eliminate the Qadhafi regime as then President Reagan did in 1986. According to Jentleson, “this ran counter to the view that keeping regime change ‘on the table’ as an option enhanced leverage and coercive pressure. Rather it could, quite to the contrary, harden positions and obstruct any possibility of an agreement” (Jentleson, 2006, p. 7).

As for the benefits of the reconciliation and normalized relations with Libya options, there was a common stance that the halting of Libya’s WMD program would be considered one of the Bush administration’s most stellar nonproliferation achievements, and a success of the administration’s policies in the Middle East. In addition, the U.S. government's efforts to understand and roll up proliferation efforts around the world benefited enormously. As Powell stated, “it is in the U.S. interest to bring Libya in from the cold. Reconciling the relationship between the U.S. and

Libya and reforming Qadhafi through other means rather than coercive war sends a message to the international community that the U.S. has more than one way to manage rogue states and will reward positive behavioral changes” (Calabrese, 2004, p. 92).

Moreover, close cooperation with Libya’s authorities can benefit the U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, as well as assist in unraveling the murky network of international proliferators. As it was the case since Tripoli began its cooperation with Washington, the Libyan regime provided significant help in unraveling the global black market in nuclear material and know-how. Such cooperation helped shut down what has come to be known as the Pakistani connection. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Tripoli was able to do much to help end this illicit network, and was a small price to pay for closing one of the single greatest proliferation networks in recent memory.

In terms of the reconciliation and normalized relations with Libya, the U.S. administration presented a list of other benefits that would be associated with this option as follows: Firstly, an equally important benefit of renewed relations with Libya could come in the form of access to military basing rights such as at the former strategic U.S. facility known as Wheelus Air Base. The renamed Uqba Ben Nafi Air Base boasts huge operational facilities, and a runway reported to be 10,500 feet in length. It has served as Libya’s primary air force installation as well as a major training facility “Access to such facilities offered U.S. forces considerable power-projection in an area of the world identified by the Pentagon as one of the rising strategic significance” (Boucek, 2004, p. 5). Secondly, positive relations with

Libya offer the U.S. several important benefits. First is access to the Libya's hydrocarbon market. The U.S. Department of Energy forecasts Libyan exports doubling within the next five years. American oil companies such as Marathon and ConocoPhillips are "understood to still have extensive assets in Libya, which were frozen since 1986" (Boucek, 2004, p. 4). Finally, an acceptance and recognition of Libya's responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie and agreed to pay US\$10 million in compensation to the family of each victim, adding up to a total of US\$2.7 billion, without a doubt will be of great benefit to the U.S. government by reaching to the definitive solution for this issue.

6.6 Strategic Interaction

This class of the RAM contains the concept of strategic interaction as first laid out by Schelling (1960), and then put into practice by Yetiv (2004). To elaborate on this concept, Allison & Zelikow (1999) stated "each nation's best choice depends on what it expects the other to do. Strategic behavior seeks to influence another actor's choice by working on his expectations of how his behavior is related to one's own" (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 41). The expected reactions of the Libyan leadership, the Libyan population, and the Libyan military, played a vital role in making the decision, which the administration perceived would maximize utility in terms of its objectives.

Regarding the Libyan army at that time, it was perceived that it was in a feeble weak condition as a result of three decades of arms' embargo which significantly weakened its potential. However, its morale wasn't diminished by the

arms embargo. In addition, there were expectations of the Libyan army welcoming the U.S. normalized relations with Libya. Therefore, because of the anticipated condition and behavior of the Libyan armed forces, it was expected that the normalized relations with the U.S. will be of great benefit, and the opposition to normalization within the Libyan army with the U.S. will be very little, and thus, its expected usefulness would expand.

Regarding the Libyan population, and according to former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, David Welch, the expectation was that they would confirm the existence of good faith and a strong will on the Libyan side to develop bilateral relations. Furthermore, The U.S. administration presumed that the Libyan population would be in favor of and would be non-hesitant to welcome the normalized relation which will be achieved. Judging by the belief of how the Libyan population would respond, the U.S administration was aware that the opposition to the normalized relations was very little. Thus, the cost of normalization would diminish and the perceived utility would become greater.

Regarding the Libyan leadership's response, the U.S administration anticipated that Qadhafi would be in extreme caution, because he did not trust of the West in general, and the Americans, in particular. He was always afraid and hesitant and very cautious, especially with regard to declaring Libya to give up WMD. On his book, *At the Center of the Storm*, George Tenet reported, on October 21, after two days of limited progress, Qadhafi asked that CIA Deputy Director Steve Kappes to meet him alone. Back in his big office, the colonel asked if the U.S. would really fulfill its commitments if he renounced his WMD programs. "Yes sir, the President

is a man of his word,” CIA Deputy Director Steve told Col Qadhafi. “But if he feels his word has been dishonored ... well; he is a very serious-minded man.” Qadhafi just kept repeating that he wanted to “clean the file, clean the file” (Tenet, 2007, p. 295).

Qadhafi's desire to clean the file provided further evidence on Qadhafi's keenness to improve his country's relations with the U.S. and the closure of all the thorny issues between the two countries starting with the Lockerbie issue to the WMD. Consequently, the U.S. administration expects the cost of its normalized relations with Libya Would become less, and the expected usefulness would expand.

6.6.1 Other Considerations

There were other conditions that influenced the Bush administration to the resolution that the usefulness of normalized relations with Libya was greater than the expected cost; Firstly, the hope that North Korea and Iran and other countries to follow the example of Libya, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that,

the Libya's decision to renounce the support for terrorism and eliminate its programs for WMD, and ballistic missiles is a model that Iran and North Korea should emulate, “Libya is an important model,” Rice said in a written statement May 15, 2006 announcing the return to full diplomatic relations with Libya, as the international community tries to encourage behavior changes in Tehran and Pyongyang ...”changes that could be vital to international peace and security...we urge the leadership of Iran and North Korea to make similar strategic decisions that would benefit their citizens” (U.S. Department of State, 2006).

In his formal remarks at the post-announcement press conference, Ambassador Welch captured the essence of the Libyan model when he said, “diplomacy in this case produced results” (U.S. Department of State, 2006).

Expanding on the theme, he argued, “Today’s announcement demonstrated that when countries make a decision to adhere to international norms and behavior, they will reap concrete benefits. Libya serves as an important model as we push for changes in policy by other countries such as Iran and North Korea” (U.S. Department of State, 2006).

Secondly, hopes to strengthen its control on Libya and other Middle Eastern, African oil-producing countries. Libya is wealthy in oil and gas resources, it is ranked 9th in the world based on its reserves. According to Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), Libya has a total proven oil reserve of 44 billion barrels; Libya holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, and among the ten largest globally (Oil and Gas Journal, 2010). Due to U.S. economic sanctions, Libya’s oil field development and exploration work for many years unknown pause, so some experts believe that the potential of Libya’s oil reserves may be increased greater than those expectations.

In his 2001 National Energy Policy Report, then Vice President Dick Cheney highlighted the importance of African oil to the U.S., he said, “west Africa is expected to be one of the fastest growing sources of oil and gas for the American market” (Wihbey & Schutz, 2002, p. 2). He added, “African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulfur, making it suitable for stringent refined product requirements, and giving it a growing market share for refining centers on the East Coast of the U.S.” (Wihbey & Schutz, 2002, p. 2). Furthermore, Ed Royce, chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa said, “African oil should be treated as a priority for U.S. national security post September 11. I think

that post September 11; it's occurred to all of us that our traditional sources of oil are not as secure as we once thought they were" (Wihbey & Schutz, 2002, p. 5).

It is thus detrimental to U.S. economic, and energy security interests, "that unilateral sanctions deny U.S. oil companies the ability to act on existing agreements that would provide access to substantial amounts of oil in Libya, and that these same sanctions also block the U.S. companies from participating in what some have described as the most attractive exploration and infrastructure development opportunities currently available in the entire industry" (Crocker & Nelson, 2003, p. 14). In sum, the U.S. oil supply diversity would increase if Libyan oil resources be developed by U.S. firms which reduced the reliance on the Arab gulf oil, and allow for more competition with the global oil firms that take advantages of U.S sanctions.

Thirdly, hopes to build a global anti-terrorism strategic base, after the September 11 events, the U.S. has been established national strategy against terrorism and against the proliferation of WMD, in order to respond effectively to the threat of terrorism, the U.S. military has begun strategic focus from the traditional Europe to throughout the Caribbean, North Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Korean peninsula a so-called "arc of instability" (Sanders & Lau, 2012, p. 1) with plans to establish in these areas more than small-scale, with a rapid reaction capability "forward operating base" (Volman, 2010, p. 10). The fear of terrorists' use of Africa's unique environment - the chaotic border, regional conflicts, loose financial system, WMD - to create and expand their network the U.S. strengthened its cooperation with Africa, in particular (in particular, North Africa and the Horn of Africa) anti-terrorism military cooperation (Ghanmi, 2006).

In July 2005, 300 U.S. Army soldiers and Algeria, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and other eight countries in North Africa and West Africa, jointly held two-week anti-terrorism military exercises. In February 2006, then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made his first visit to three North African countries, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, Rumsfeld said, “the U.S. wanted to strengthen military ties with North African states, highlighting to the importance the strategic position of North Africa for the global anti-terrorism strategic base” (Ghanmi, 2006).

An equally important benefit of normalized relations with Libya could come in the form of access to military basing rights such as at the former strategic U.S. facility known as Wheelus Air Base. Wheelus Base was vacated in June 1970. The renamed Uqba Ben Nafi Air Base boasts huge operational facilities, and a runway reported to be 10,500 feet in length. It has served as Libya’s primary air force installation as well as a major training facility (Boucek, 2004, p. 4). Access to such facilities would offer U.S. forces considerable power-projection in an area of the world identified by the Pentagon as one of the rising strategic significance. As a result of the reasoning and the rationale explained earlier, the anticipated usefulness of normalized relations would be increased in the U.S. administration estimation.

6.7 Choosing the Option

Due to this reasoning the U.S. was convinced that the usefulness of normalized relation with Libya exceeded the costs and the usefulness of other alternative choices. Based on past actions, imposed sanctions would not insure Libya’s disarmament. A change Qadhafi’s regime was pointless judging on his tight grip

over the state (Blakely, 2010, p. 30). The anticipated response of the Libyan army and the Libyan population, and the Libyan leadership in addition to the regional support to Qadhafi's regime made the normalized relations option seem less risky. In addition, the state of global anarchy, the very little amount of credible intelligence, and the lack of information pushed the U.S to conclude that the international community wasn't reliable to pressure Libya and waiting for the normalization process was not an alternative. Therefore, the normalization option would make the most use for the U.S administration with regards to achieving its own goals and protect its interests.

6.8 Conclusion

In analyzing foreign-policy decisions, this study utilized the RAM. "It is most useful at the stage of identifying and articulating the problem, and the issues connected with it; regarding the evidence of rationality, we would expect that decision makers would include plausible alternatives as solutions to the complex relations between the two countries.

In order to apply the RAM on this study the researcher tracking the core concepts of this model as tools to explain the decision of the normalization of the U.S.- Libya relations on 2006. RAM comprises four core concepts: Goals & objectives; Alternatives; Consequences; and Choice, which consider the model tools to explain the decision.

In this chapter, the study details how the Bush administration began to identify and articulate to the nation the strategic problem facing the U.S. interests.

Then national interests were identified, and the Libyan regime was portrayed as the strategic problem that threatened the U.S. national interests.

To secure these national interests, objectives were identified as to end Libyan support for terrorism, force Libya to accept responsibility and pay compensation for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing with full cooperation in the Lockerbie investigation, prevent Libya from obtaining WMDs, and Limit Libyan regional desires, specifically, ones which can be threatening to U.S interests.

To accomplish these objectives, several options were identified; to continue to tighten sanctions; make change either to Libyan policy or Libyan regime; and reconciliation and normalized relations with Libya.

Costs and benefits for each option were identified whereby each option was viewed with its own costs and benefits. The normalized relations option was chosen because it was deemed as the most maximizing utility with respect to the objectives of the state. Strategic interaction is also an important element of RAM; thus, it was evident in the administration's expectations of the reactions of the Libyan people, the Libyan military, and Col Qadhafi; which, in turn, helped the decision-making process.

Hence, this chapter concludes that identification of the strategic problem, national interests, goals, options, costs and benefits, and expectations took place. Therefore, at this stage, the RAM proves to be most useful in explaining the whole process of the normalization of the U.S. - Libya relations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE IMPACT OF THE NORMALIZATION ON U.S. -LIBYA RELATIONS

Since the U.S.-Libya normalized relations in 2006, the bilateral relationship improved quickly in various aspects of cooperation a result of both sides' efforts to deal with barriers from the past. In addition, changes in the international and regional arenas facilitated the relationship to further development. Libya and the U.S. considered cooperation as the first priority for common interests and mutual benefits. This chapter discusses the bilateral, regional, and international implications of the U.S.-Libya normalized relations in 2006. This chapter divided into three main sections. The first section deals with bilateral implications, which include political, diplomatic relations, economic, trade and investment relations, and defense, and security relations. The second section deals with regional implications, while the last section deals with global implications.

7.1 Bilateral Level

7.1.1 Political and diplomatic relations

One of the implications of U.S. -Libya normalized relations in 2006 on the political and diplomatic side was the re-establishment of diplomatic and political presence in both countries. Interest sections of both sides were also established. The U.S. started off first with the establishment of its interest section in Tripoli on February 8, 2004, then the U.S. went ahead and upgraded the mission to a U.S. Liaison Office on June

later that year. Libya was not far behind such actions. In fact, Libya established its own interest section on July 8, 2004. Similarly, Libya also upgraded its mission to a Liaison Office in December 2004. The re-establishment of embassies from both the U.S. and Libya took place on May 31, 2006 (U.S. Department of State, 2009).

Furthermore, in May 15, 2006, the State Department announced its intention to rescind Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in recognition of the fact that Libya had met the statutory requirements for such a move. An excerpt from the announcement says, "...it had not provided any support for acts of international terrorism in the preceding 6-month period, and provided assurances that it would not do so in the future. On June 30, 2006, the U.S. rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism" (U.S. Department of State, 2008b).

In 2007, there were series of senior-level meetings between the U.S. and Libyan officials. The meetings focused on a broad array of issues including regional security and counter-terrorism cooperation. Then, the U.S. Secretary Department Rice in her meeting with then Foreign Minister, Shalgam on the margins of the UN General Assembly further discussed the resolution of outstanding issues and charting a path for future cooperation. On July 11, 2007, the then U.S. President Bush nominated career diplomat, Gene A. Cretz as the U.S. Ambassador to Libya (U.S. Department of State, 2008b).

The exchange of ambassadors in Washington and Tripoli in early 2009 reflected in the U.S. - Libya normalized relations. Accreditation to Ali Sulaiman Aujali as the Libyan Ambassador to the U.S. and Gene A. Cretz as the American

ambassador to Libya opened a new chapter in relations between Washington and Tripoli.

In fact, although various statements by U.S. officials, particularly during the Bush administration, noted the importance of the Libyan model, Tripoli not at any time received a visit from then U.S. President Bush. Similarly, Qadhafi was not also invited to the White House and had only received a brief handshake from the U.S. President Obama at the G8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy on July 9, 2009. It was the first time that Qadhafi met with the U.S. President for the last 39 years (Post, 2009).

On January 3, 2008, the then Foreign Minister, Shalgam made an official visit to Washington, the first official visit by a Libyan Foreign Minister since 1972. During that visit, the U.S. and Libya signed the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, their first bilateral agreement since the downgrading of diplomatic relations (U.S. Department of State, 2008b).

In May 2008, the U.S. and Libya began negotiations on a comprehensive claims settlement agreement to resolve outstanding claims of American and Libyan nationals against each country in their respective courts. On August 4, 2008, then President Bush signed into law the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, which Congress had passed in July 31. The act provided for the restoration of Libya's sovereign, diplomatic, and official immunities before U.S. courts. Subsequently, both sides signed a comprehensive claims settlement agreement on August 14, 2008. Former Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice certified on October 31 to Congress that the U.S. received US\$1.5 billion pursuant to the U.S. - Libya claims settlement agreement. "These funds were sufficient to provide the required compensation to

victims of terrorism under the Libyan Claims Resolution Act. Concurrently, former President Bush issued an executive order to implement the claims settlement agreement” (U.S. Department of State, 2008b).

The normalized relations provided both countries with increasing opportunities to push for progress in areas of mutual concern. For instance, on January 16, 2009, the U.S. and Libya signed Defense Contacts and Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding. Following that, on April 21, 2009, a series of senior officials from Libya visited the U.S. The most prominent one was from the visit of the former National Security Advisor, Mutassim al-Qadhafi to Washington, DC. He met with then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as well as other senior U.S. Government officials. Furthermore, in September 2009, Qadhafi himself visited the U.S. for the first time to participate in the UN General Assembly in New York, then a Trade Investment Framework Agreement was signed between both countries a year later (U.S. Department of State, 2010).

7.1.2 Economic, trade and investment relations

The final resolution of the Lockerbie issue, coupled with the scrapping of its WMDs program, put an end to the international economic embargo on Libya, ending its economic isolation and leading to a noticeable economic and political openness. As a result, Libya joined a number of international organizations including the WTO besides its initial status as a non-voting member of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement. Libya was also a member of other Arab and international organizations such as the Arab Organization for Free Trade and the 5+5 Club, which

includes five European and five North-African states. Furthermore, “after estrangement for more than seven years, Libya resumed its relationships with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” (Moussa, 2009, p. 161).

This move was initiated by the visit of the IMF Commission to the country in 2004 with the intention to discuss economic reform policies. Libya was viewed by many international analysts as a promising country for future investments. Libya’s intentions for economic openness coincided with the gradual modification of the state’s economic policies to accommodate a market economy, rendering it less government-directed in order to achieve what was known in Libya as “the people’s capitalism.” This involved a national strategy, mainly based on elements such as “the diversification of production, the determination of priorities, the encouragement of the private sectors, seeking economic partnerships, reassuring direct foreign investments and upgrading the banking and financial sectors” (Moussa, 2009, p. 162).

Since the lifting of the sanctions, Libya took a number of reforms aimed at the opening of its economy and better utilization of its productive resources. These reforms include as follows:

1. *Structural reforms*: A framework for the management of the oil wealth was established through the creation of the Libya Investment Authority (LIA) in 2006, with a mandate to manage financial assets of the State, including the Oil Reserve Fund. Customs administration was reformed and a large taxpayer’s office was established. The budget presentation was consolidated and a macro fiscal unit was initiated. Public enterprises were privatized and

one-third of public employees were laid off (African Development Bank, 2009, p. 5).

2. *Regulatory reforms*: These reforms were aimed at achieving greater regional integration and trade liberalization including harmonization of the financial regulations, statistical framework, and payment and settlement systems with other Maghreb countries. In this context, certification requirements for trade with these countries were simplified. For example, custom duties on all imports were eliminated and earmarked import fees were introduced. Some progresses had also been made in improving the economic and financial statistics through strengthening of national accounts and price statistics and improvements to the quality and timeliness of macroeconomic data (African Development Bank, 2009, p. 5).
3. *Monetary policy reforms*: The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) took measures to enhance the monetary policy framework and to tighten monetary conditions. It introduced its own certificates of deposit in May 2008, raised interest rates by 50 basis points, and increased reserve requirements from 15 percent to 20 percent (African Development Bank, 2009, p. 6).

In 2004, the U.S. oil companies were allowed to resume their operations in Libyan and U.S. commercial banks and other financial service providers were able to participate and support these operations. Consequently, top executives from Occidental Petroleum, ConocoPhillips, Marathon Oil, and Amerada Hess visited Tripoli and the companies resumed their operations.

In May 2004, the NOC announced its first shipment of oil to the U.S. in over 20 years. Several months later, in January 2005, Libya held a licensing round. License awards were based on a new fourth-generation exploration and production sharing agreement (EPSA IV). Under this revised formula, contracts were awarded based on competitive bidding instead of by closed negotiations. International companies carried all exploration and appraisal costs as well as training costs for Libyan nationals during a minimum exploration period of five years (Bahgat, 2006, p. 156).

Thereafter, capital expenses for development and exploitation and operating expenses were borne by NOC and investor according to their primary agreement. Competition was intense with an average seven bids per block for 15 blocks in five basins. “Three U.S. companies – Occidental Petroleum Corp, ChevronTexaco Corp, and Amerada Hess International Ltd – won interests in 11 of the 15 blocks” (Bahgat, 2006, p. 156).

As a result of normalized its relations with the U.S., the oil-rich country was finally open to the international market and big investments were made on a global scale. In this regard, he revealed that Libya began investing abroad mainly through a US\$70 billion sovereign wealth fund set up in 2006 and called the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) (Waldie, 2011). Similarly, this revelation was also collaborated when Wallechinsky & Brinkerhoff claimed that;

LIA invested about US\$53.3 billion in assets around the world. As of June 30, 2010, Goldman Sachs held US\$182 million in Libyan assets and JPMorgan Chase held US\$171 million. The U.S. hedge fund, Och-Ziff received US\$329 million to take care of. In addition, more than US\$290 million of Libyan state money was on deposit in various HSBC accounts and another US\$275 million was in an HSBC hedge fund. The Royal Bank of

Scotland managed US\$110 million in private equity funds for the Libyan regime, and the French bank Société General handled US\$1.8 billion in three investment funds (Wallechinsky & Brinkerhoff, 2011).

LIA also owned major holdings in such American companies as General Electric (US\$217 million), Pfizer (US\$143 million), AT&T (US\$135 million), Occidental Petroleum (US\$80 million), Caterpillar (US\$34 million), Halliburton (US\$34 million), ExxonMobil (US\$24 million), United Technologies (US\$20 million), Citigroup (US\$20 million) and Honeywell (US\$13.5 million). The LIA also held US\$2 billion in bonds in the U.S., including US\$953 million worth of U.S. Treasury bonds, US\$500 million with Bank of New York, US\$20.5 million in bonds with Bank of America and US\$18 million with General Electric Capital (Peston, 2011).

The banking sector in Libya constituted five state-owned commercial banks and an increasing number of domestic specialist banks. All banks in Libya are under the direct control of the Central Bank. Libyan investment abroad is monitored by the Libyan Arab bank. However, in 2003, two banks were established by the private sector, namely the Commercial Bank for Development and the Tourism Development Bank. In addition, Libya received offers from international financial institutions to take control of Libyan investment in stock exchanges, particularly in North Africa and the Gulf as well as in the European financial centers. Furthermore, “Libya is considering the introduction of a credit system and other banking arrangements accompanied by the necessary provisions to facilitate the quick transfer of money and other transactions” (Moussa, 2009, p. 163).

Libya also considered a proposal made by the Islamic Bank of Qatar regarding the idea of establishing “the Libyan House of Funds” as an Islamic Bank and the establishment of an insurance company that operated according to the Islamic principles of “Sharia” (Moussa, 2009, p. 163). The country also took the first steps towards establishing its own stock exchange. This move was imitated by the Central Bank, which for the first time opened an office to register the sale of shares. In this regard, “a committee was established to draft the legal framework for the proposed money market in order to meet the requirements of the sales of shares on offer in the context of the privatization program” (Moussa, 2009, p. 163).

Renewed ties with the U.S. clearly contributed to Libya’s economic growth, allowing the regime to implement various initiatives such as the Wealth Distribution Program. This project was launched in March 2008, with the intention to re-distribute oil wealth to the people so that they can directly purchase certain services. This project was valued at 3.3 billion Libyan Dinars, or roughly US\$2.6 billion, although the exact amount actually distributed remains unclear (International Monetary Fund, 2009).

This initiative saw leaps in state salaries, an important factor given the regime’s use of employment to co-opt various factions, distribute privileges, and ensure its grip on power. Between 2004 and 2008, salaries jumped from US\$3.445 billion to US\$7.890 billion (International Monetary Fund, 2009).

Meanwhile, Libya has improved its infrastructure since 2003. Although the focus was mainly housing, infrastructure improvements also occurred in roads linking the Libyan cities together. “The government, primarily through the Housing

and Infrastructure Board program, also intends to build 150,000 homes and apartments to deal with population growth, as well as to take up 146 infrastructure projects worth an estimated US\$50 billion” (MEED, 2010).

In order to boost bilateral trade and economic and investment relations, it is necessary to know the way to exploit positive factors to their full and limit resistance force to find out the common basis to bring back benefits for the people of Libya and the U.S. Trade and investments relations are a common ground and the positive side of the relations between the two countries, because both countries found that economic can be used for achieving normalized relations between them.

7.1.3 Defense and security relations

In the context of the U.S. - Libya Military Cooperation, Washington assisted Tripoli’s efforts against Islamist insurgents, primarily via military training aimed at improving the capacity of Libya’s anti-terrorism units in 2008. The reason of this assistance was due to the common interests of both countries in the war against terrorism. In this regard, the Bush administration allotted US\$350,000 under the International Military Education and Training program to enhance the training of Libyan officers, including specific courses on counter-terrorism (Blanchard, 2009, p. 1). The Bush administration also requested US\$300,000 in terrorism assistance from the State Department’s Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs fund (Blanchard, 2009, p. 9).

Meanwhile, “the Obama administration requested an additional US\$1.1 million, including US\$500,000 for counter terrorism and border security assistance

as well as improvements to the Libyan air force and coast guard” (Blanchard, 2009, p. 9). In January 2009, the Pentagon signed a “non-binding statement of intent” to develop military ties (Blanchard, 2009, p. 10).

After the U.S.- Libya normalized relations, the military cooperation between both countries continued to improve through several other fronts. For instance, the U.S. agreed to provide small amounts of money for training programs. Such efforts were very useful to Libya to take the opportunity to purchase more of this assistance from Washington if it wished to do so (Blanchard, 2009, p. 8). This was a particularly important issue because Libya’s training and planning capabilities remained poor, and thus limiting the effectiveness of its forces (Blanchard, 2009, p. 8).

On the other side, the UK also agreed to offer Libya security assurances and to strengthen their mutual security relationship in an effort to encourage other countries to follow Libya’s lead in abandoning its chemical and nuclear weapons programs (Nguyen, 2006). Thus, on June 26, 2006 in Tripoli, British Junior Foreign Minister Kim Howells signed a “Joint Letter of Peace and Security” with his counterpart, Libyan Secretary for European Affairs Abdullati Obaidi. The letter pledged that the UK will seek UN Security Council action if another state attacks Libya with chemical or biological weapons. The UK also pledged to aid Libya in strengthening its defense capabilities. So, both states pledged to work jointly to combat the proliferation of WMD. According to Howells, “this mutual commitment will serve as an example to other states that there is a route back into the

international community and the advantages of Libya's WMD decision" (Nguyen, 2006).

Furthermore, through his state visit to Libya on July 25, 2007, "French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed a memorandum of understanding on nuclear energy cooperation with Libyan leader Qadhafi. The agreement outlines a plan for the eventual construction of a nuclear desalination plant in Libya to make salty water drinkable as well as improving energy resources of Libya" (Nguyen, 2006).

7.2 The Regional Level

As shown in Chapter Two, Libya rests on the periphery of three worlds-namely Arab, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Its location has given it some flexibility as to where it will play a regional role. In fact, the Libyan leadership during Qadhafi's era had a different vision for Libya's role in promoting Arab-African ties and its call for African Unity- through the Arab League- became more apparent in the early 1990s. The reason behind this push was primarily due to the increasing global threats and challenges to the region. Furthermore, growing internal challenges led Libya to call for a greater Arab-African Union. Libya believes that a strong Arab League will only be achieved within the scope of an AU and greater Arab-African cooperation.

This belief stems from the importance of Africa as a strategic and security dimension crucial for the Arab region. This Libyan stance was clear in its 1998 call for integrating the Arab League with the AU as a step to promote cohesion in the face of global challenges. In 2001, Amman Summit members of the Arab League

accepted Libya's proposal for the establishment of an AU (but not within the framework of the Arab League) (Zenbou, 2010, p. 220).

Even after Arab league joined the AU in 2002, Libya remained committed to calling for reform and restructuring of the Arab League's mechanisms. Libyan discourse on this aspect called for the need to modernize and face contemporary challenges through the creation of strong Arab-African alliances, both politically and economically. "This stance was clearly portrayed in various Arab Summits. In the March 2003 Summit in Sharm al-Shaikh, Libya put forward a proposal to restructure the League's mechanisms in a way that would lead to a strong Arab-African entity capable of confronting contemporary challenges, particularly the ones targeting the African continent and its natural resources" (Haridi, 2004, p. 3).

In the Arab League Summit in Tunisia 2004, "Libya threatened to withdraw from the League if other members insisted on opposing the development of the League's mechanisms in a way that would allow it to end internal conflicts over political issues and confront potential challenges" (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 193). Again, in 2005 Summit in Algeria, Libya suggested the need for Arab-African cooperation in resolving the Middle Eastern conflict and confronting globalization, Libya also called for an Arab stance towards these issues and the need for Arab relations with other global and regional alliances. In the Khartoum Summit of 2006, "Libya supported the League's decision to back the AU's forces in Darfur as a method to remove international forces from Arab and African soil and as a way of solving internal conflicts within the scope of the AU without external interference" (Zenbou, 2010, p. 221).

Libya's efforts to strengthen Arab-African ties and to achieve regional security under Qadhafi were clear in the continuous calls by Libya for Arab League members within the Asian continent to join the AU. "Libya made these calls again in the Damascus Summit in 2008 in the light of the increasing threats by global powers and their scramble for control over the region" (Zenbou, 2010, p. 221). Libya believed that amalgamating the Arab League and the AU as a prime opportunity for Arab states to strengthen their economic and political role, especially within the climate of increased global threats and the Arab weakness to overcome the challenges of globalization.

The AU was important for Libya's foreign policy. Tripoli perceived its creation as a great success for contemporary Libyan diplomacy, given a much-needed positive impression of a new Libyan role in Africa. Furthermore, the Union gave great significance to Libyan policy in all fields. The Union also allowed the Libyan regime greater scope to deal with Western nations, particularly the U.S., France, and Great Britain, to discuss Libya's role in Africa. Noticeably, since the Union's creation, Libya was able to resolve many issues that have been stalled for several years, including the West's stance towards Libyan policy. Libya was also able to restore its relations with various states, including the Great Britain in 1999. In 2001, dialogue between the U.S. and Libya commenced and 2003 Libya began restoring ties with several states and EU. "In September 2003, the international sanctions on Libya were lifted and in 2004, Libya restored diplomatic ties with the U.S. As a result in 2006, Libya was removed from the U.S. State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism" (Corera, 2006, p. 232-240).

Such steps helped Libya to restore economic ties and relationships with the West. Undoubtedly, “Libya sought to protect its national security through its efforts in establishing the AU which in turn helped Libya to return to the international scene after an absence of over 30 years; during these years, a period of instability and fear was experienced due to the global pressure on Libya” (Zenbou, 2010, p. 232). Zenbou (2010) argues that, “the AU changed the Libyan policy and made it more flexible in dealing with regional and international issues. This can be attributed to the fact that Libyan policymakers had a sense of greater security within the newly founded AU as it was a more powerful entity on the global scene than was the OAU, because the former became more effective and keeps pace with the political, economic and social developments” (Zenbou, 2010, p. 233).

Thus, it can be said that due to the considerable ability to penetrate the international scene resulting from membership of the AU, the Union in turn acquired greater importance in Libyan foreign policy. Through the Union, Libya was able to achieve its primary goal (African Unity) that it had decided upon since the Revolution. Libyan policy-makers believed that Arabs must support the creation of African Unity in order to achieve their national security. “This was evident in the change of Libya’s global role, which happened only after the Union’s creation and resolved issues that was on hold for over three decades. In this juncture, he argued that through the AU Libya played a greater role in Africa and was welcomed by international organizations such the UN which appreciates Libya’s role in Africa” (Zenbou, 2010, p. 233).

Libya realized that without the AU, there could not be Arab national security or African stability. Therefore, Libyan policy was concerned with achieving its objectives by building a strong AU with stature and prestige among the international community. Libyan diplomacy achieved further success in the 13th AU Summit in Sirte in 2009 that achieved important steps in relation to the institutions of the AU. This summit transformed the African Union Commission (AUC) into the African Union Authority (AUA). The most important components of this authority are the common defense, foreign policy, and foreign trade. During this summit, the African Common Defense Council and the African External Border Protection Agency (African Frontex) were also established. This indicated the significance of Africa within the Libya's foreign policy (African Union, 2009). "Libya aimed to bring Africa into line with other continents, which have a strong voice because of their strong regional organizations as well as the right of veto at the UN. Libyan policy-makers believe this will protect the African continent from the domination of major powers" (Zenbou, 2010, p. 233).

In 2009, Libya held the Presidency of the AU and the Arab Maghreb Union. It was also a member of the UNSC in at that time, and since September 15, 2009 until September 14, 2010, Libya held the annual chairmanship of the UN General Assembly. Libya became a very active regional power. It strongly supported the Community of Sahel Saharan states (CEN-SAD), a Libyan-founded institution aimed at reinforcing political cooperation in the Sahel region. It launched mediation efforts in various national and regional conflicts in sub-Saharan countries such as Mali, Chad/Sudan, Mauritania and Sudan/Darfur. In parallel, Libya developed ambitious

investment projects in the African continent in such sectors as tourism, and banking and the distribution of oil products, air transport, and mining.

Libya invested a large amount of finances into Africa. The most prominent of its investments was done by the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP), which invested up to US\$35 billion. While there was a risk in making such finances on Africa, Libya still placed most of its investments in Africa despite the political instability and lack of security was only part of Libya's efforts on the continent.

Undoubtedly, Africa's richness in resources makes it one of the wealthiest continents (Saleem, 2007, pp. 334-338). In turn, these resources made it appealing for the ambitions of external actors and thus a concern for Libya policy. It was evident through the official rhetoric of Libya's policy that it wholeheartedly believed that if Africa's wealth was used wisely, then it can reap benefits for the citizen of the continent. Libyan policy-makers were also aware of the foreign hegemony over Africa's resources and that this was a result of the absence of effective African institutions that were able to promote the well-being of the African people.

Such reasons prompted Libya to concentrate its economic efforts on the continent. As a result, the LAP was founded by government decree number 15, 2006 with a capital of over US\$5 billion (LPM Decision, 2006). This was in addition to the US\$25 billion invested by Libya as part of the Arab Corporation for African Investments and other mediums. These funds all came under the newly established LAP (Badr, 2000).

The aims of the LAP were to strengthen Libya's economic presence within Africa, to improve Arab-African relations, and to confront the challenges of external actors.

The former Libyan Prime Minister, Shukri Ghanem declared that the purpose of this portfolio was to strengthen and unite Libyan investments under one authority to be able to deal effectively with other companies and thus compete strongly in the international markets. The LAP was also given complete independence of action, and all bureaucratic hurdles were removed to allow it to achieve its aims (LPM Decision, 2006).

The LAP's capital was spread between portfolios, bonds, and investments in firms such as the African Investment Corporation, the Arab Corporation for Foreign Investment, the Libyan External Bank, the Oil Investment Corporation, and the Long-term Investment Portfolio. In this regard, it revealed that "the LAP aims to centralize Libyan investment, especially in financial investments and global stock market's portfolios and use these profits in direct investment in Africa with an emphasis in improving economic development within the continent" (Libya: Africa Investment Portfolio, 2007).

The LAP also invested in bonds in a number of local and international banks including the CEN-SAD Bank (BSIC) and the Libyan Foreign Bank. Indeed, "one of the aims of the LAP was to provide capital for African investments in various fields such as hospitals, property, forestry, wood, metal, agriculture, fishing, aviation and oil. The LAP also aims to improve output and production in African states" (Libya: Africa Investment Portfolio, 2007).

Libyan policy indicated that one of the aims of establishing the Oil Libya company was to compete with Western and Chinese firms, i.e., to seek to control the petroleum industry within Africa. This company successfully managed the pipeline

project between Kenya and Uganda (Hitimana, 2008). Despite the cost and complexity of such a project, Oil Libya could win the contract in the face of competition from Western and Chinese firms.

The LAP also invested in the telecommunication sector through a 60 percent share in RascomStar-QAF (RSQ) with the aim of spreading telephony, the Internet, and television services to other parts of Africa that are yet to be penetrated. The firm dramatically spread across Africa and continually aimed at acquiring new markets across the continent (United Nations, 2005, p. 17). By investing in this firm, Libya hoped to become an important player in the telecoms sector and compete with Western companies in this field in Africa.

The LAP also owned the African Airlines firm, which was established as a result of the Libyan government decree number 35, 2006 with the purpose of providing aviation services both domestically and internationally. In this connection, Zenbou states that “the airline flies to over 40 destinations, including most African states as well as many international destinations, including London, the USA, Australia, Japan, Russia and several others, which had previously been unreachable by many African airlines” (Zenbou, 2010, p. 202). “This initiative as he further emphasized Libya’s eagerness to participate throughout the development process of Africa and thus compete with foreign states and fill the strategic voids that would otherwise be captured by Western states” (Zenbou, 2010, p. 203).

In terms of the Libyan relations with the European Union (EU), there were undeniable advantages in strengthening cooperation with Libya. From an economic point of view, both parties claimed important interest for cooperation. In the 21st

century, the EU, like its member states, is largely dependent on foreign oil and natural- gas. Libya's most important natural resources are its oil and natural-gas reserves that dominate its economy.

In this connection, it was stated that, "A 2005 estimate put the country's proven oil reserves at 39 billion barrels and its natural- gas reserves at 52 trillion cubic feet. Moreover, the EU is Libya's most important trade partner: an estimated 70 percent of foreign trade is done with EU member states. The primary destinations of exports in 2003 were Italy (39 percent), Germany (13 percent), Spain (13 percent), Turkey (7 percent), and France (6 percent). In 2004, Libya exported an estimated US\$15.1 billion worth of products, and is forecasted to export US\$15.7 billion in 2005" (Library of Congress. n.d.).

To enhance its relations with Libya, besides health and migration sectors, the EU also offered market access to Libya in fisheries and agricultural products and cooperation in tourism (Zafar, 2009, p. 141). From a political point of view, the partnership was also beneficial for both parties. Libya is on the periphery of the EU, it can therefore play a very important role in securing the external borders of the EU. Although it is not the only country that acts as a buffer zone between African migrants and European states, it can help control the migration flows through its territory (Zafar, 2009, p. 132).

One of the most important implications of the normalized U.S.- Libya relations in 2006 on the regional level was the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya on August 30, 2008. According to the Italian former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, "the accord ends forty years of misunderstanding, and it was a complete and moral acknowledgement of the damage inflicted on Libya by Italy during the colonial era" (Ronzitti, 2009, p. 125). Berlusconi also expressed his regret for the colonial period in very strong terms. "In the name of the Italian people, as head of the government, I feel it my duty

to apologize and express my sorrow for what happened many years ago and left a scar on many of your families” (Ronzitti, 2009, p. 125).

The treaty aimed at recompensing Libya for damage incurred during the colonial era. Under the accord Italy, will pay US\$5 billion in compensation for colonial misdeeds during its decades-long rule of Libya. The accord will provide US\$200 million a year over the next 25 years through investments in infrastructure projects in Libya. In addition, the treaty also allowed Italian companies to set up more business in Libya and a project to clear mines dating back to the colonial era to take place. Simultaneously, Italy expected in return to win energy contracts and for the Tripoli government to toughen security measures, including joint maritime patrols, to stem the flow of illegal migrants (Ronzitti, 2009, p. 126).

7.3 The Global Level

Following Libya’s agreement on WMD, then President Bush Jr. announced that, “Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the nations” (Bush, 2003). In addition, Qadhafi received several “rewards” including high-level visits from Western leaders (e.g., former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair in March 25, 2004, Italy’s former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi in October 1, 2004, former France President, Jacques Chirac in November 24, 2004, and former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder in September 4, 2004).

In the later stages of normalization with the U.S., Libya saw a full return to the world stage. On October 16, 2007, Libya gained a non-permanent seat on the Security Council and the Libyan diplomat, Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki was elected as

the President of the sixty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly on June 10, 2009 along with Qadhafi's election as the President of the African Union on February 2, 2009. "In its own neighborhood, Libya emerged as a champion of regional organizations, including the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), that it leads" (Hochman, 2009, p. 1).

Libya also saw high-level visits by the U.S. officials such as then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on September 5, 2008. In this respect, Moss (2010) argues that Libya's prominence in international forums was not solely attributable to the U.S. ties. For example, Tripoli was chosen to chair the UN Human Rights Commission in 2003, prior to the breakthrough with Washington. Because some states such as Italy and various African governments actively pushed Libya's candidacy (Moss, 2010, p. 12).

The new found prominence had both external and internal benefits for Libya. According to the former Libyan ambassador to the UN Giadallah A. Ettalhi, the Security Council seat was "very significant" externally. "It means we are back to normal, at least from the perspective of others" (Hochman, 2009, p. 31). Lavish praised from prominent officials such as former President Bush Jr. who characterized the decision to abandon WMD as "wise and responsible" (Roberts, 2003). Furthermore, the U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who declared that "Libya provides an example...We hope that other countries under the IAEA investigation take note" (AFP, 2008), also contributed to Libya's reintegration into the international system.

Despite the various problems and limitations noted previously, Washington engaged Tripoli in multilateral forums when dealing with issues on which Libya had some expertise. In particular, the U.S. sought to capitalize on the country's preeminent role in Africa. Although then Secretary Rice did not travel to Libya until late 2008, several senior U.S. officials focusing on Africa made consistent visits during the normalization period, even when the process was encountering some obstacles. Among the more high-profile visitors were then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer in March 2006. Presidential Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios, and then Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte in 2007. Washington had even periodically praised Libya for its actions. In August 2009, Gen. Scott Gration, then special envoy to Sudan, publicly stated that he was "very impressed and very grateful" to the Libyans for their role in attempting to unite rebels in Darfur (Moss, 2010, p. 15).

7.4 Conclusion

As shown throughout this chapter, the impact of the U.S.- Libya normalized relations in 2006 can be seen by the level of cooperative relations through the re-establishment of the relations in many aspects. These aspects are divided into three categories namely bilateral, regional, and global relations.

To expand further, the impact of the bilateral relations can be noticed through four areas namely diplomatic, economic, defense and security. The diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Libya evolved to fully renewed relations in the instance of the first exchange of ambassadors since 36 years ago. Moreover, in the

economic area the normalized relations put an end to the economic sanctions on Libya and to its economic isolation, which led to noticeable economic and political openness on Libya in many productive resources including structural reforms, regulatory reforms, monetary policy reforms and financial and banking sector reforms. Additionally, in the security and defense aspects, the U.S.- Libya relations rapidly expanded to include the defense and security cooperation.

The regional side came as the second aspect on the impact of the normalized U.S.- Libya relations, whereby Libya engaged in the process of re-development of joint Arab action effectively through instigating to strengthen Arab-African relations. Moreover, the U.S. gave Libya a real opportunity to play significant roles at AU, by giving a strong motive to accelerate and take advantage of the Libya's wealth for investment in the African continent and to go as far as to reach out to the European side.

In terms of the global impact of the normalized U.S. - Libya relations, Libya restored its position at the international arena. As a result, it gained a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in 2007, and the former Libyan diplomat, Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki was elected as the President of the sixty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this study was to examine the factors that led to the U.S. - Libya normalized relations in 2006. In examining the factors, this study utilized the rational actor model (RAM) of foreign policy decision making as a theoretical framework for the study. This theoretical framework enables us to see the central considerations behind the normalization decision more clearly and in their proper setting. Furthermore, RAM highlights the essence of the decision-making process itself that holds that foreign policy decisions are made in such a way as to maximize benefits while minimizing costs.

As its starting point, this examination leads to inquire on a brief overview of historical and contemporary U.S. - Libya relations and an examination of the causes of the complex relations between the two countries since Libyan independence on 1951 until the beginning of normalization phase in 2003.

Accordingly, the study demonstrates several political factors leading to the U.S.- Libya normalized relations. Firstly, in terms of diplomacy, it could be argued that diplomacy is a great tool to solve a long history of tense relations between the two countries. For instance, secret negotiations between the U.S. and Libya were crucial element in resolving their outstanding problems and thus meeting the common interests between them. So, the important role played by the UK as a third party in these negotiations was clear, plus a direct supervision of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi on the progress of these negotiations to overcome the difficulties

encountered in multi-stage that helped to achieve the U.S.- Libya normalized relations in 2006.

With respect to leadership factor, no doubt that the Qadhafi's control over the course of events in Libya played a prominent role in taking crucial decisions at the right time in order to reach what is believed to be an honorable settlement for his people and his country. On the other side, the U.S. presidential system enabled a number of Presidents to deliberate over the Libyan case. Some of them understood the environment and culture of Libyan society and knew how to deal with it. Others did not even care to know it. It is evident that the President Bush's decisions after the events of September 11, 2001, starting with the invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of Iraq, the difficulties faced by the U.S. forces in Iraq, and the U.S. desire to improve its image in the Arab region and in the world, led then President Bush to take a flexible policy towards Libya. The U.S. wanted to deliver the point to the globe showing that America will punish rogue states and reward cooperating states like Libya.

In fact, the media played varying roles in the history of U.S.-Libyan relations. Indeed, it can be stated that the Arab Nations such as Libya, Syria, and Iraq were negatively painted as terrorist countries by the Western and U.S. media. Moreover, the media were more concerned in covering the September 11 attacks, the war against terror, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the occupation of Iraq. Hence, it can be concluded that the positive role of the media came not by shining lights on the U.S. and Libya negotiations; however, it came because of its absence from those negotiations.

Furthermore, the study also examined the economic factors that played a role in the U.S.- Libya normalized relations, including oil and sanctions. It is evident that in the first days of the Qadhafi's regime in 1969, the economic relations strained between both countries due to the Libyan oil policy that nationalized foreign oil companies operating in Libya, which took place in 1970s. The strain increased when Ronald Reagan took office as a President of the U.S. He ordered American oil companies to withdraw from Libya, resulting in a decrease of production, which influenced Libya to integrate in the new world order and the international market since it had no technological equipment that could be used for extracting oil and its transportation.

The study further demonstrates that the cumulative effect of the U.S. and UN sanctions was to set the conditions for Libyan behavior change. Libya's isolation at the end of the Cold War and its need for economic growth were important in playing a role to normalized relations. On the other hand, the pressure the U.S. government put through from the American oil companies that had the desire to go back to Libya to reduce the magnitude of losses incurred in the last three decades where they were producing more than million barrels a day and to preserve their previous privileges in Libya. In this context, it must be stated that the American oil companies returned to Libya on 2006.

To clarify the issue, the study also examines the security factors that played a vital role in the U.S. - Libya normalized relations as well. These factors include terrorism, WMDs, and the Libyan attitude towards Israeli. In terms of terrorism, the U.S. accused Libya of supporting international terrorism. However, Libya argued

that the American perception of terrorism was used to serve U.S. political objectives. However, Libya differentiated between supporting freedom movement such as the one staged by the Palestinian people for their homeland and supporting terrorism.

Consequently, it is obvious the different perspectives on terrorism were one of the main factors influencing the U.S. - Libya relations, especially during the Carter administration. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration viewed the former Soviet Union as a supporter of international terrorism and therefore, considered all countries friendly to the former Soviet Union as supporters of the terrorism as well. Moreover, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 constituted a real opportunity for a political rapprochement between the two countries. While supporting terrorism was one of the many reasons leading to deteriorating the U.S.- Libya relations, without a doubt, Libya's decision to renounce terrorism and its cooperation with the U.S. in its anti-terrorism war, were the most important factors leading to the U.S.- Libya normalized relations.

Virtually, the study demonstrates that all steps taken by the Libyan Government to improve its relations with the U.S. did not achieve the desired results, but Libya's announcement to abandon its nuclear programs was a decisive factor in the U.S.- Libya normalized relations. Libya announced that the arms race will neither serve its security nor the world's. The U.S. also want to send telegrams to other governments possessing or even thinking to get WMD, emphasizing that the weapons do not bring influence or prestige. Instead, they only bring isolation and other unwelcome consequences. Thus, other leaders were invited to make a wise and reasonable choice to renounce WMD programs in order to improve relations with the

U.S. and the international community as a whole. The U.S. considered the normalized relations with Libya as specific incentives to such states.

Furthermore, this study suggests that the Arab-Israeli conflict was another particularly pointed source of tension between the U.S. and Libya. Libya remained distinctly opposed to negotiations and reconciliation with Israel throughout the Cold War era and the 1990s, promoting the armed struggle as the only viable means to end Israel's occupation of territory it captured from neighboring Arab states in 1967. However, the decline in Libyan support for armed Palestinian action was an important factor in creating common ground between the U.S. and Libya, especially post-September 11, 2001. Moreover, the Qadhafi's initiative for a "one-state solution" based on reconciliation between the Israeli and the Palestinian people within a single state refers to the Arab-Israeli conflict that no longer serves as the backdrop of tensions in U.S. - Libya relations.

Finally, the study also proves that there is a linkage among the political, economic, and security factors and the U.S. - Libya normalized relations in 2006. In reality, the success of the normalized relations was a result of intertwining of all these factors together through their influences on policy-makers in both countries to take flexible attitudes to settle outstanding issues between the two countries. Accordingly, it can be argued that, the most decisive factor leading to the U.S.-Libya normalized relations in 2006 was Libya's abandonment of its quest for nuclear program.

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