

**THE JAVANESE CULTURE AS A SOURCE OF SUHARTO'S
LEADERSHIP: A SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS**

**By
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**Theses Submitted to the College of Law, Government, and
International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia, in Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor Philosophy**

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis is based on my original work except for quotations and citations which have been duly acknowledged. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted for any other degree at UUM or other institutions.

TOTOK SARSITO

Date: 4 March 2010

DEDICATION

To:

My beloved wife:

Hj. Sarwanti

My beloved children:

Jessica Puspadayasari, Oscar Prameshwara, and Marissa Ayu Kusuma

My son in law:

Tejo Pramono

"May Allah Subhanna Wataalla always bless us. Amien ya rabbal alamien."

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Javanese Culture as a Source of Suharto's Leadership: A Socio-Political Analysis

ABSTRACT

Great General Suharto who had managed to rule the country for more than 32 years, used and manipulated Javanese cultural values and philosophy as the 'guidance', for his personal and in official duties. According to Suharto, a number of traditional Javanese thoughts in the form of guidance or '*pituduh*' and prohibition or '*wewaler*', when practiced, would make the Indonesian people have noble and generous mind or '*ber budi bowo leksono*', that is one who is really good as the essence of goodness or '*becik sajatining becik*'. Suharto's strong commitment and spirit to the practice of these Javanese traditional teachings were based on his belief that it would not be difficult for Indonesian people to improve their consciousness as the nation of Indonesia in their state, government and social life on the basis of Pancasila should they understood the Javanese cultural values and philosophy. This study is meant to critically analyze how these noble Javanese traditional teachings, particularly in politics, were practiced by Suharto in his personal capacity and official duties. This analysis is based on theoretical framework that culture occupies important role in determining human behavior and social change and that it is culture that should be taken into account in the last instance to explain human behavior and social change. In his personal life, the practice of Javanese traditional teachings was meant to make him a good Javanese having capacity to receive '*wahyu*' or '*guidance*' from God Almighty particularly for ruling the country. And in his official duties it was meant to convince the people that all decisions and policies he had taken were always socially just and philosophically correct because they were based on very highly respected values and philosophy so that they could be accepted or legitimate; and secondly to create a just and prosperous society based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as mandated by the Proclamation of the 17 August 1945 through a well-organized development movement. In order to achieve these goals, Suharto always attempted to concentrate power as most Javanese kings usually did by implementing the doctrine of '*dwifungsi ABRI*', creating GOLKAR as a vehicle for his political goals, merging the numerous political parties into two major parties, imposing policy on mono-loyalty to all civil servants, and practicing anti-criticism and anti-opposition policy in order to weaken or even neutralize his political opponents. To give constitutional basis for the Javanese cultural values and philosophy to be implemented by all Indonesian people as guidance for their state, government, and social life Suharto formulated the P-4 or "*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*" (Guidance for the Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila) and inserted a number of Javanese traditional teachings into it. These traditional teachings were also inserted into the "*Doktrin Kepemimpinan ABRI*" or the Indonesian Armed Forces Leadership Doctrine adopted by the ABRI..

Budaya Jawa Sebagai Sumber Kepemimpinan Suharto: Sebuah Analisis Sosio-Politik

ABSTRAK

General Besar iaitu Suharto yang telah melaksanakan pemerintahan sebagai presiden selama lebih dari 32 tahun, menggunakan dan memanipulasi nilai-nilai pembudayaan dan falsafah Jawa sebagai panduan samada untuk kepentingan peribadi atau didalam melaksanakan pemerintahan. Beliau percaya bahawa beberapa pemikiran Jawa tradisional yang berbentuk panduan atau '*pituduh*' dan larangan atau '*wewaler*' apabila dilaksanakan akan menjadikan bangsa Indonesia '*berbudi bowo leksono*' iaitu berperilaku bijak dan murah hati atau '*becik sajatining becik*' iaitu baik dalam arti yang sesungguhnya. Suharto mempunyai komitmen dan semangat yang tinggi untuk melaksanakan nilai-nilai pembudayaan dan falsafah Jawa didasarkan pada kepercayaan bahawa tidak sulit bagi bangsa Indonesia untuk memperbaiki kesadarannya sebagai suatu bangsa Indonesia dalam kehidupan negara, kerajaan dan sosial berasaskan Pancasila sekiranya mereka faham tentang nilai-niali pembudayaan Jawa. Kajian ini dimaksudkan untuk menjelaskan secara kritikal bagaimana nilai-nilai pembudayaan dan falsafah Jawa, terutamanya didalam bidang politik, telah digunakan oleh Suharto samada dalam kehidupan peribadi mahupun dalam corak pemerintahan. Analisa ini berasaskan kepada kerangka kerja teoritikal yang menjelaskan bahawa budaya memainkan peranan penting dalam menentukan tingkah laku manusia dan perubahan sosial. Kebudayaan patut diberikan penekanan contohnya dalam menentukan tingkah laku manusia dan perubahan sosial. Di dalam kehidupan peribadi, amalan nilai budaya Jawa membawa makna agar beliau menjadi orang Jawa yang baik yang mempunyai martabat untuk menerima '*wahyu*' atau panduan dari Tuhan terutamanya dalam melaksanakan pemerintahan negara. Dalam melaksanakan pemerintahan, amalan budaya Jawa bermaksud untuk meyakinkan rakyat bahawa semua keputusan yang telah diambil secara sosial adalah adil dan secara falsafah adalah benar karena telah diasaskan oleh nilai falsafah yang tinggi maka rakyat wajib menerimanya; dan kedua, untuk membentuk masyarakat berasaskan pada Pancasila dan Undang-undang Dasar 1945 sebagai mandate daripada Proklamasi 17 Ogos 1945 melalui gerakan pembangunan. Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut, Suharto telah selalu berusaha untuk memusatkan kekuasaannya seperti yang dilakukan oleh raja-raja Jawa sebelumnya dengan cara menjalankan '*doktrin dwifungsi ABRI*', mendirikan GOLKAR sebagai kereta untuk mencapai tujuan politiknya, menggabungkan semua parti politik yang ada menjadi dua parti politik besar sahaja, memaksakan kebijakan '*mono-loyalty*' bagi seluruh kaki tangan kerajaan, melaksanakan kebijakan anti kritik atau anti-oposisi guna melemahkan dan atau menguasai lawan-lawan politiknya. Untuk memberikan dasar konstitutional bagi amalan nilai-nilai pembudayaan dan falsafah Jawa, Suharto merumuskan P-4 atau '*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*' dan memasukkan nilai-nilai pembudayaan dan falsafah Jawa kedalamnya. Nilai-nilai pembudayaan dan falsafah Jawa juga dimasukkan oleh Suharto ke dalam '*Doktrin Kepemimpinan ABRI*'.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certification of Theses Work	ii
Declaration	iii
Dedication	iv
Permission to Use	v
Abstract in English	vi
Abstract in Bahasa Malaysia	vii
Acknowledgement	viii
Table of Contents	xi
List of Abbreviations	xiv
CHAPTERS:	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background	
1.2. Problem Statement	6
1.3. Objective and scope of the study.....	7
1.4. Research Questions.....	8
1.5. Significance and contribution of the study	
1.6. Theoretical framework	9
1.7. Research methodology	12
1.7.1. Methods of data collection	
1.7.2. The informants	13
1.7.3. Data analysis	15
1.8. Limitation of the study	16
1.9. Literature review	
1.10. Structure of the thesis	21
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INDONESIAN POLITICS .	23
2.1. Introduction	
2.2. Political constellation after the independence	27
2.3. The birth of the Guided Democracy	35
2.4. The emergence of Sukarno-the Army-the PKI Alliance	39
2.5. The outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement	43
2.6. The birth of the New Order	50
2.6.1. An order for crushing and eliminating the PKI	58
2.6.2. An order for overthrowing the Old Order	62
2.6.3. A constitutional order	61
a. Implementation of the 1945 Constitution	
b. Implementation of Pancasila as the state principal and philosophy	65
2.6.4. An order of development	67

2.7. Strategy for promoting the New Order	71
2.8. Summary	78
3. JAVANESE CULTURE	80
3.1. Introduction	
3.2. Fundamental characteristics of Javanese political culture	82
3.2.1. Javanese concept of man	83
3.2.2. Javanese concept of environment	86
3.2.3. Javanese concept of power	90
3.2.4. Javanese concept of king or leader	94
3.3. Legitimacy in the Javanese culture on politics	98
3.4. Summary	108
4. JAVANESE CULTURE AS GUIDANCE FOR SUHARTO'S LIFE	110
4.1. Introduction	
4.2. Life of Suharto	113
4.3. Exposure to Javanese values	115
4.4. The way to achieve the ideals of life	119
4.5. People's perception on Suharto	125
4.6. Differences and similarities between Sukarno and Suharto	138
4.7. Debates on Suharto's Javanese character	144
4.8. Legitimacy for Suharto's leadership	151
4.9. Summary	160
5. THE JAVANESE CULTURE IN THE ARMED FORCES	162
5.1. Introduction	
5.2. The ' <i>dwifungsi</i> ' doctrine of the ABRI	171
5.3. The implementation of the ' <i>dwifungsi</i> ' doctrine of the ABRI	180
5.4. The use of Javanese culture for managing the ABRI	185
5.5. Summary	195
6. JAVANESE CULTURE IN GOLKAR, POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC SERVICES, AND IN PANCASILA AS THE SOLE GUIDING IDEOLOGY OR PHILOSOPHY	197
6.1. Introduction	
6.2. The establishment of GOLKAR	202
6.3. The simplification of political parties	211
6.4. The mono-loyalty policy for the civil servants	216
6.5. The anti-critique and anti-opposition policy	222
6.6. Pancasila as the sole guiding ideology	225
6.7. The Javanese culture in Pancasila Democracy	237
6.8. Summary	252
7. CHALLENGING POLITICAL OPPONENTS	253
7.1. Introduction	
7.2. Challenges from his critics	254
7.3. Challenges coming from those who questioned about succession	
7.3.1. The case of Sawito Kartowibowo	257

7.3.2. The case of Ali Sadikin	260
7.3.3. The case of Petition 50	261
7.3.4. The case of Jaelani Naro	267
7.3.5. The case of Suryadi	268
7.3.6. The case of Megawati Sukarnoputri	269
7.3.7. The case of Abdurrahman Wahid	272
7.3.8. The case of Permadi	273
7.3.9. The case of Sri Bintang Pamungkas	274
7.3.10. The case of Amien Rais	279
7.4. Summary.....	282
8. CONCLUSION AND AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .	284
8.1. Introduction	
8.2. Conclusion	
8.2.1. Characteristics and sources of Javanese culture	
8.2.2. The influence of Javanese culture in shaping Suharto's leadership	288
8.2.3. Javanese culture and legitimacy of Suharto's leadership	290
8.2.4. Challenging political opponents	293
8.3. Agenda for further research	296
BIBLIOGRAPHY	299

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	: <i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> (the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
AMPERA	: <i>Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat</i> (the Mandate of the People's Sufferings)
BAKORSTANAS	: <i>Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional</i> (National Stability Coordinating Board)
BAPILU	: <i>Badan Pemenangan Pemilu</i> (Body to Guide the General Election)
BERDIKARI	: <i>Berdiri di Atas Kaki Sendiri</i> (Self Reliance)
BKR	: <i>Badan Keamanan Rakyat</i> (People Security Body)
BPUPKI	: <i>Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> (Investigation Body of the Prepatory Attempts for the Indonesian Independence)
BTI	: <i>Barisan Tani Indonesia</i> (the Indonesian Peasant Front)
CGMI	: <i>Central Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> (the Central Movement of Indonesian Student)
CONEFO	: Conference on the New Emerging Forces
DEPERNAS	: <i>Dewan Perancang Nasional</i> (National Planning Council)
DPA	: <i>Dewan Pertimbangan Agung</i> (Supreme Advisory Council)
DPR-GR	: <i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong</i> (Mutual People Representative Council)
ELS	: <i>Europeesche Lagere School</i> (Elementary School)
FDR	: <i>Front Demokrasi Rakyat</i> (People Democratic Front)
G-30-S/PKI	: <i>Gerakan 30 September/PKI</i> (the Thirtieth of September Movement of the PKI)
GANEFO	: Games of the New Emerging Forces
GBHN	: <i>Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara</i> (Broad Lines of the State Policy)
GERWANI	: <i>Gerakan Wanita Indonesia</i> (the Indonesian Women Movement)
GOLKAR	: <i>Golongan Karya</i> (Functional Group)
HBS	: <i>Hogere Burger School</i> (Senior High School)
HMI	: <i>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam</i> (Islamic Student Association)
IPKI	: <i>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> (Association of Supporters for the Indonesian Independence)
KNIP	: <i>Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat</i> (the Central Indonesian National Committee)
KINO	: <i>Kelompok Induk Organisasi</i> (Basic Organizational Unit)

KODAM	: <i>Komando Daerah Militer</i> (Military Area Command)
KODIM	: <i>Komando District Militer</i> (Military District Command)
KOGAM	: <i>Komando Operasi Ganyang Malaysia</i> (Operation Command for Crushing Malaysia)
KOKARMENDAGRI	: <i>Korps Karyawan Departemen Dalam Negeri</i> (Corps of the Civil Servants of the Interior Ministry)
KOLOGNAS	: <i>Komando Logistik Nasional</i> (National Logistic Command)
KOPKAMTIB	: <i>Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban</i> (the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
KOPMA UNS	: <i>Koperasi Mahasiswa Universitas Sebelas Maret</i> (Student Cooperative of the University of Sebelas Maret)
KORAMIL	: <i>Komando Resort Militer</i> (Sub-district Military Command)
KORPRI	: <i>Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia</i> (Corps of the Civil Servants of the Republic of Indonesia)
KOSGORO	: <i>Koperasi Serba Usaha Gotong Royong</i> (Mutual Aid All-Purpose Cooperative)
KOSTRAD	: <i>Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat</i> (the Army Strategic Reserve Command)
KOTI	: <i>Komando Operasi Tertinggi</i> (the Highest Command of Operation)
KOTRAR	: <i>Komando Tertinggi Retooling Alat Revolusi</i> (the Highest Command for Retooling the Revolution Instruments)
KNIP	: <i>Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat</i> (the Central Indonesian National Committee)
LEKKRA	: <i>Lembaga Kesenian dan Kebudayaan Rakyat</i> (the People Arts and Culture Institution)
LEMHANAS	: <i>Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional</i> (National Defense Institute)
LITSUS	: <i>Penelitian Khusus</i> (Special Investigation)
MALARI	: <i>Malapetaka 15 Januari</i> (The Fifteenth of January Calamity)
MANIPOL	: <i>Manifesto Politik</i> (Political Manifesto)
MASYUMI	: <i>Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia</i>
MKGR	: <i>Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong</i> (Mutual Aid Family-based Council).
MUI	: <i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars)
MPRS	: <i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara</i> (Provisional People Consultative Assembly)
NASAKOM	: <i>Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis</i> (Nationalist, Religious Groups, and Communist)
NEFO	: The New Emerging Forces

NEKOLIM	: <i>Neo Kolonialis dan Imperialis</i> (New Colonialist and Imperialist)
NGO	: Non Governmental Organization
NU	: <i>Nahdhatul Ulama</i> (Islamic Scholars Association)
OLDEFO	: The Old Emerging Forces
P-4	: <i>Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila</i> (Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila)
PANCA AZIMAT	: The Five Magic Charms of the Revolution
REVOLUSI	
PAN	: <i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (National Mandate Party)
PANDU HW	: <i>Pandu 'Hisbul Wathan'</i> (the Hisbul Wathan Boy Scout)
PANGKOKAMTIB	: <i>Panglima Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban</i> (the Commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
PARKINDO	: <i>Partai Kristen Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Christian Party)
PARMUSI	: <i>Partai Muslimin Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Moslem Party)
PARTINDO	: <i>Partai Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Party)
PEMUDA RAKYAT	: People Youth
PDI	: <i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PELITA	: <i>Pembangunan Lima Tahun</i> (the Five Year Development)
PERTI	: <i>Persatuan Tarbiyah Islam Indonesia</i>
PETA	: <i>Pembela Tanah Air</i> (National Home Defense)
PNI	: <i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
PPP	: <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party)
PKI	: <i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Communist Party)
PSI	: <i>Partai Sosialis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Socialist Party)
PRRI	: <i>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia</i> (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
REPELITA	: <i>Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun</i> (the Five Year Development Plan)
RPKAD	: <i>Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat</i> (Regiment of Army Para Command)
RRI	: <i>Radio Republik Indonesia</i> (the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia)
RT	: <i>Rukun Tetangga</i> (Neighborhood Community)
RUSI	: Republic of the United States of Indonesia (<i>Republik Indonesia Serikat</i>)
SAPTA MARGA	: The Seven Pledges
SBI	: <i>Serikat Buruh Indonesia</i> (the Indonesian Labor

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Indonesia is an archipelago consisting of almost 17,000 islands, stretching from Sabang in the west to Merauke in the east. It has about 216 million people, made up of more than 200 ethnics each with its own culture. The most dominant group are the Javanese who make up more than 47 percent of the population of Indonesia. Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has been governed consecutively by five presidents: Sukarno or popularly called Bung Karno (a Javanese civilian, 1945-1966, passed away in 1970), Suharto or popularly called Pak Harto (Javanese, a retired army great general, 1966-1998, passed away in 2008), Bacharuddin Jusuf (B.J.) Habibie (Bugese, a civilian, 1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid or popularly called Gus Dur (Javanese, a civilian, 1999-2001, passed away in 2009), Megawati Sukarnoputri or popularly called mBak Mega (Javanese, a civilian, 2001-2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudoyono or popularly called SBY (Javanese, a retired army general, 2004 until the present time). Among them, Suharto was the longest serving President.

As a true Javanese, Army Great General Suharto,¹ the second president, had managed to govern Indonesia for almost 32 years, from 1966 to 1998. However, when his last term of office had just started he was forced to step down by a very powerful reform movement following a worsening economic and

¹ In Indonesia there were only three Army Great Generals or '*Jendral Besar TNI*' and all of them have already passed away. Those Army Great Generals were Great General Sudirman (1916-1950, Javanese), Great General Abdul Harris Nasution (1918-2000, Batak), and Great General Suharto (1921-2008, Javanese).

political crisis in the country. After he stepped down from office on 20 May 1998 Vice President, Bacharuddin Jusuf (B.J.) Habibie, became the new president.

Although he had to step down with no honor, his ability to have remained in power for almost 32 years has surprised many. Suharto managed to rule the country for more than three decades by placing the military forces, police as well as the civilian bureaucracy under his own tight control; creating a solid and monolithical political party called '*Golongan Karya*' or GOLKAR (the Functional Group) as his political vehicle to reach the masses and maintain power; merging the numerous political parties into only two major parties: '*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*' (PDI) and '*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*' (PPP) with PANCASILA or the Five Principles² as the sole guiding ideology for every political party to rule the country; controlling tightly the mass media either printed or electronic media; mobilizing conglomerates to finance his programs of national development; and most of all by using and manipulating the Javanese culture as the source of legitimacy for almost all his decisions and policies.

Unlike his predecessor, Sukarno, who came to power during the era of the independence from the Dutch colonial rule; Suharto came to power during the time of political chaos following the failure of the coup attempt called the Thirtieth of September Movement masterminded by the PKI or '*Partai Komunis*

² PANCASILA or the Five Principles which was first introduced by Sukarno in his speech on '*Lahirnya Pancasila*' or the Birth of Pancasila conducted before the meeting of '*Dokuritzu Zyunbi Tyoosakai*' or '*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*' (BPUPKI) established by the Japanese occupation forces was then formally formulated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution into: (1) '*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*' or Believe in one God, (2) '*Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab*' or Just and civilized humanitarianism, (3) '*Persatuan Indonesia*' or a United Indonesia, (4) '*Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan*' or Democracy guided by wisdom through consultation and representation, and (5) '*Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia*' or Social justice for all the Indonesian people.

Indonesia' (the Indonesian Communist Party) when on the 1st October 1965, six senior army generals were seized and killed during an armed attack led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri, one of the officers of the '*Tjakrabirawa*' Regiment or the palace guard, who was identified to be very close to the PKI. Those killed were General Ahmad Yani (Minister of the Army Commander), Major General Suprapto (Deputy II), Major General Haryono (Deputy III), Major General S. Parman (Assistant I), Brigadier General D.I. Panjaitan (Assistant IV), and Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomihardjo (prosecutor general of the Army). General Abdul Harris Nasution who was the Coordinator Minister of Defense and Security, one of the targeted generals, was able to escape from the armed attack, but his daughter was shot and died in hospital along with his aide, First Lieutenant Piere Tendean.

Due to the vacuum in the military leadership, Major General Suharto who was at that time the Commander of the '*Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat*' or KOSTRAD (the Army Strategic Reserve Command) decided to take control of the military forces and began to play an important role in the national political scene. Convinced that the coup attempt was designed to seize power of the state by force and that the PKI was definitely behind it (Elson, 2001:101), General Suharto immediately decided to take strong action against it. But, he soon met serious problems. President Sukarno, who was at that time physically with the Thirtieth of September Movement's leaders, made an announcement that he had temporarily assumed direct leadership of the armed forces and had appointed Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro to carry out the army's daily tasks (May, 2001:134).

Although disappointed with the President's decision to appoint Major General Pranoto to carry out the army's daily tasks, Suharto however bravely issued two public statements, ignoring the President's announcement. Brian May, in his book "*Indonesian Tragedy*" (2001), regarded the two public statements made by Suharto as "the beginning of Suharto's confrontation against Sukarno" (May, 2001:134), a kind of power struggle for the position of the most prominent leader of the country. In the first statement Suharto asserted that he had assumed temporary leadership of the army. The army, navy, and police force, had agreed to cooperate in overcoming the counter revolutionary deeds' of the 30 September movement. And in the second statement he named the six abducted generals and also said that Sukarno and Nasution were safe and that the army's leadership was for the time being in Suharto's hands (May, 2001:134).

In his power struggle against Sukarno, though he had a chance to depose the president from his power by using his military forces as requested by some of his friends, Suharto rejected that idea. Why did Suharto reject the use of force to immediately take over the leadership of Indonesia and instead preferred using slow, careful, and systematical process as well as in a legal and constitutional way? According to Harold Crouch in his book "*The Army and Politics in Indonesia*" (1978): "The hesitancy of Suharto and the senior generals in taking decisive action to dismiss the president was reinforced by their traditional Javanese values which gave them a sense of propriety that inhibited them from humiliating an honored elder" (Crouch, 1978:199). Harold Crouch's assertion was reinforced by Major General Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara's testimony, one of Assistants for the Minister of the Army Commander who was so much

close to Major General Suharto. Once, on 26 February 1966, Major General Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara urged Major General Suharto that he could not be silent in facing President Sukarno. Answering to the question raised by Major General Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara, Suharto said: "I understand what you mean. But you do not understand the guiding principles of the Javanese. For example, there is a saying '*Sabdo Pandito Ratu*', which means, more or less, that you must not oppose the King" (Elson, 2001:129).

Suharto's commitment to uphold highly respected or noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy in his power struggle against President Sukarno continued to go on until he was elected president, replacing Sukarno. As the president, Suharto often referred to some Javanese cultural values and philosophy as justification for his arguments and policies, particularly when confronting his political opponents. He even adopted some noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy as guidance for his and the people's life. Not only that, as the second president of Indonesia, Suharto was also regarded by many Western scholars as often behaving as if he was a Javanese king or even the last Javanese Sultan.

A critical comment to Suharto's statement relating to his intention to step down from his power was also given by Benedict R. Anderson. Commenting to President Suharto's speech on 19 October 1997 responding to the GOLKAR's Executive Council or '*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat GOLKAR*' which again nominated him as president for the seventh term, that "if the people no longer believed in him then he would place himself within the succession philosophy of the Javanese shadow puppet theatre, '*lengser keprabon, madeg pandhito*' (to step down as king and become a priest)," Benedict R. Anderson commented:

“Suharto’s speech can certainly be read as the words of a king in serious trouble, looking for a way to retain power. From Suharto’s words we can see that he really has no ideas of a presidency. The concept ‘president’ is hollow, illusory. Whereas the concept of ‘king’ seems to him to fit with Javanese culture and tradition” (Indonesia, No. 54, April-June, 1998:12).

1.2. Problem statement

Despite being unknown and only coming to prominence after the Thirtieth of September Movement (1965) and subsequently as president of Indonesia, Suharto went on to rule the country for more than three decades, a record he has created. How did he manage to rule the country of 216 million people, well known for natural disasters and calamities, severely lacking in food and finance for such a long time? It has been suggested that Suharto was able to use and manipulate the Javanese culture in all aspects of his administration as the source of his legitimacy to rule the country.

Studies and writings put forward by both local as well as foreign scholars suggest that Javanese culture had always been an important source of power to Java. Javanese Kings and Sultans had always resorted to this. President Suharto is no exception. However, these studies and writings do not reveal why, how and to what extent Suharto used and manipulated the Javanese cultural values and philosophy as guidance and legitimacy for him to rule the country for more than three decades (1966-1998).

Thus, this study is undertaken to critically explain why, how and to what extent Suharto succeeded in mobilizing the Javanese culture to legitimize his leadership to rule for more than three decades.

1.3. Objectives and scope of the study

The general objective of this study is to critically explain why, how and to what extent Suharto manipulated Javanese culture, values and philosophy as guidance to legitimize his rule of the country for almost 32 years. More specifically, this study is to determine how Suharto used or manipulated Javanese cultural values and philosophy in order to get legitimacy for his leadership over the New Order regime which he established no sooner after the Instruction Letter of 11 March (SUPERSEMAR) was issued in 1966, particularly in undermining his political opponents. The specific objectives of the present study are as follows:

- 1.3.1. To identify the fundamental characteristics of the Javanese culture;
- 1.3.2. To examine sources of the Javanese culture;
- 1.3.3. To investigate the extent to which the Javanese culture had influenced and shaped the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto, particularly in the ABRI, GOLKAR and other two political parties, as well as civil servants;
- 1.3.4. To explore how far the leadership of Suharto was successful in the use of the Javanese culture to remain in power;
- 1.3.5. To explain to what manner the Javanese culture has facilitated the leadership of Suharto in an attempt to weaken/neutralize his political opponents.

1.4. Research questions

Based on the objectives of the study as mentioned above, this research attempts to examine:

- 1.4.1. What constitute the fundamental characteristics of the Javanese culture?
- 1.4.2. What are sources of the Javanese culture?
- 1.4.3. To what extent did the Javanese culture influence and shape the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto, particularly in the ABRI, GOLKAR and other two political parties, as well as civil servants in particular and society in general?
- 1.4.4. To what extent was legitimacy of the leadership of Suharto dependent on the manipulation of the Javanese culture?
- 1.4.5. In what manner did the Javanese culture facilitate the leadership of Suharto in the attempt to weaken or neutralize his political opponents?

1.5. Significance and contribution of the study

Javanese culture is a dominant culture. It has been in existence since the beginning of Javanese history. It has been used in the past by both the kings and rulers to govern Java and also by Sukarno, to further his political ambitions as the first president of the Republic of Indonesia. As a dominant culture, it often influences every political elite whether Javanese or non Javanese in making decisions and policies. By understanding what Javanese culture is and why, how and to what extent Suharto used and manipulated it as the source of legitimacy of his decisions and policies, it will help us understand better the nature of Indonesian politics.

Since the Javanese culture plays important role in Javanese people's lives, describing and explaining Indonesian politics could only be carried out appropriately if we understand well the culture of this dominant race, the Javanese.

1.6. Theoretical framework

This research is based on Parsonian functionalism and neo patrimonialism. Arief Budiman in his article on "*The Student Movement in Indonesia: A Study of the Relationship Between Culture and Structure*" in Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 6, June 1978, stated that:

"Culture occupies important role in determining human behavior and social change" and that "it is culture that should be taken into account in the first instance to explain human behavior and social change. One cannot merely look at observable or measurable behavior in explaining human action (as the behaviorist does); rather one has to see what the actor really wants to say with his behavior, the (symbolic) meaning that the actor understands his behavior to have" (Arief Budiman, 1978:609).

He further explains that "as an individual, the actor is not isolated. He lives in a society that influences his life very much. Thus the symbolic meaning of his behavior should be sought not only in his individual psychological realm, but also, or even primarily, in the value system of the society in which he lives. The social dimension of the individual's symbolic meaning is what Geertz calls 'culture'; it is inside as well as outside the individual" (Arief Budiman, 1978:609). "Each society as a cultural unit, living in a harmony governed by a dominant value system, is a unique entity" (Arief Budiman, 1978:610).

This thesis is based on the argument that culture as value system could be used by its owners as guidance for their social and political actions. Very often, in order to be accepted and even not to be sanctioned by other members of society, someone has to behave on the basis of certain value system which has been found to be effective and socially acceptable. Even, the society in which he lives will usually appreciate someone who is always willing to behave in accordance with the value system highly respected by the members of the society.

Basically, this thesis attempts to analyze how Javanese culture as value system was used and manipulated by Suharto as guidance for his political actions so that people would accept his policies as they would think that the policies based on the value system which is highly respected by the society, particularly by Javanese. In other words, by showing that his policies had always been based on highly respected Javanese cultural values and philosophy, Suharto believed that people would accept the policies to be legitimate.

The statement above is reinforced by the notions of Karl Jackson who has posited that “the Indonesian political system is based on Javanese concepts of power and social organization” and that “culturally determined patrimonial relationships between patrons and clients persist in Indonesia from pre-colonial Java and continue to shape the Indonesian politics and social structure” (Jackson, 1978: 34). Philpott also argues that “Javanese cultural performances have been used to frame Indonesian politics” (2000, pp. xii-xiii), and that “a Javanese sultan and Javanese values have been used to explain Suharto’s style of rule” (2000, pp. 78-82).

“Neo-patrimonialism refers to a regime type in which the chief power holder’s arbitrary will intermesh with legal-rational organizations. The arbitrariness is dictated by the imperative that patrons and patriarchs must collect booty to support their clients and enhance their status. The claim over spoils results in conflict within organizations. The consequent rent-seeking behavior undermines economic rationality and slows down economic development” (Samsul I. Khan, 2008:3).

Explaining what is meant by ‘patrimonialism’ or ‘neo-patrimonialism’ Harold Crouch in his article on “*Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia*” (World Politics, 1979) has said that:

“Most traditional polities had patrimonial features. In a patrimonial state, the ruler’s power depended on his capacity to win and retain the loyalty of key sections of the political elite. Lacking sufficient coercive capacity to enforce acceptance of his rule, the ruler sought to win voluntary allegiance by satisfying the aspirations – especially the material interests – of his supporters through distribution of fiefs and benefices in exchange for tribute and loyalty. The government was able to rule in the interests of the elite without taking much account of the interests of the masses because the latter were poor, socially backward, politically passive, and kept in check by the regime’s military forces. Politics thus took the form of a struggle within the elite itself, among rival factions and cliques that were concerned principally with gaining influence with the ruler who determined the distribution of the rewards of office. The ruler was able to maintain his authority by preserving the balance among competing cliques. As long as the masses remained politically quiescent, and rivalries within the elite were contained so that they did not threaten its basic unity of interest, the patrimonial system could continue indefinitely” (Crouch, 1979:572).

Acceptability or which is often called legitimacy occupies important place in history of political ideas or philosophy. For many writers, including Max Weber, legitimacy has played important role (Wolfe and McCoy, 1972:70). According to Weber, the questions of legitimacy of power are closely related to

the problem of people's obedience to the ruler. As said by Max Weber: Very often people are willing to obey the ruler, sometimes the willingness of people to obey is bigger than the ruler wants. If people really obey the ruler, the power of the ruler can be called legitimate or acceptable (Wolfe and McCoy, 1972:221).

1.7. Research methodology

This study is primarily based on *qualitative* research. *Qualitative* research is concerned with an individual's own accounts of attitudes, opinions, motivations and behavior. As such *qualitative* research is more concerned with aspects of meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things (Hakim, 1987:26; Bogdan and Taylor, 1975:4 as already cited by Mohammed Mustafa Ishak, 1999:12-13).

This study attempts to approach this problem by examining the existing secondary sources as well as by examining the primary sources such as interviews and documents obtained through library research. These data were then analyzed by using various inter-related concepts and theories on Javanese culture and legitimacy as analytical tools.

1.7.1. Methods of data collection

As stated earlier, this study is based on primary and secondary data collection. During the fieldwork data collection from 1 March 2008 to 10 November 2009 in Indonesia, a total of 19 respondents have been interviewed (a detailed list of respondents is attached in the bibliography). Most interviews were conducted as informally as possible, in order to create an acceptable and more

relaxed atmosphere. A set of important questions was developed to guide the interview. Questions were asked and adapted according to the position and the response from the respondents and follow-up probes were made where and when it was appropriate and useful in getting further clarification and extended information. This method of interview was used because it led to the gathering of additional information about various aspects, be they historical or contemporary, which are pertinent to this study.

Most interviews were tape-recorded with prior consent from the respondent. Transcripts of each and every interview were then prepared. Not all of the materials gathered through the interview were incorporated in the thesis, but they have enabled the researcher to gain valuable insights, ideas and an understanding of the various issues related to Javanese culture. Apart from in-depth interviews, primary data were also obtained from a number of policy speeches by President Sukarno as well as President Suharto or Ministers as well as from several relevant government reports, documents, and laws passed by Parliament. As far as the aspect of gathering secondary sources are concerned, theses and dissertations, conferences and seminars papers, journals, books, magazines and newspapers were examined.

1.7.2. The informants

The selection of the informants was done according to several different criteria such as position/status, expertise, experience, as well as their relation to Suharto. Their selection was based on the assumption that they could provide both specific information as well as a general perceptions on aspects related to


key research questions. The total of 19 informants interviewed was divided into five main categories according to their social background, namely:

1. *The political, bureaucratic, and intellectual category:* This includes persons who are still active or retired either as politician, senior government servant, or intellectual, but at least know well about Suharto or having close relations to Suharto. There were 5 respondents interviewed under this category and all of them happen to be politician, bureaucrat, and intellectual at the same time.
2. *The military and bureaucratic category:* This includes retired military officers who used to posit important position in the government of the New Order and who knew well Suharto. There were 2 respondents interviewed under this category.
3. *The intellectual elite category:* This refers to people with special knowledge, namely experts and academics who have been involved in research and writing on various aspects of Indonesian politics and society. Some of them were even practicing Javanese traditional teachings. There were 5 people interviewed under this category.
4. *The businessmen category:* This includes persons who have been successful in their business, and having very good relation with Suharto. There were 2 people in this category.
5. *The general public category:* This refers to people coming from different backgrounds, such as national and international NGO activists, owner or manager of 'pesantren', worker, and retired journalist. There were 5 people in this category.

1.7.3. Data analysis

Data analysis is done by using case study strategy focusing on the synthesis involving selective library research and research finding related to the problem which is being researched. After the data needed obtained (**data collection**) than they are selected in order to find the focus (**data reduction**). After that, the obtained data which have been abstracted are shown in the organization of information enabling them to be summarized (**data display**). From the data display we could conclude the relation among the phenomenon observed through the process of verification, discussion or replication in other term of data (**conclusion drawing**).

These three analysis component could be done together with data collection at various cycles. In this kind of analysis, researcher moves among the three components together with the data collection during the process of data collection. After **data collection**, we move to **data reduction**, **data display** and **conclusion drawing**. The model of analysis is called **Interactive Analysis Model** and could be drawn as follows:



Source: H.B. Sutopo. (1988). "Pengantar Penelitian Kualitatif," Surakarta: Pusat Penelitian UNS, p. 43.

1.8. Limitation of the study

This research is limited to the use or manipulation of Javanese culture, particularly culture, by Suharto in order to gain political legitimacy from the people to rule the country.

The difficulties that the researcher found was to find out informants who used to be close to Suharto, either as members of his cabinet, government officials of the New Order, military commanders, spiritual teachers, or even families, who were willing to be interviewed. Due to certain reasons, some informants who used to be close to Suharto to help him in developing his spiritual life and to assist him in establishing, promoting, and maintaining the New Order regime had to be left behind.

1.9. Literature review

President Suharto and his New Order regime have become interesting subjects of study by both local as well as foreign scholars. The way he emerged to the national political stage and his leadership style which was so much influenced by Javanese culture and tradition have invited a number of scholars to do researches on the New Order regime he had established. In this chapter, literature related to the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto and Javanese culture would be reviewed.

The involvement of the PKI and its affiliated organizations in the 'Thirty September Movement' had been interpreted differently, at least by the Indonesian army themselves and the 'Cornell Paper'. Mary S. Zurbuchen said that there are five different scenarios that can be distilled from the literature on

1965: first, the killing of the generals was entirely conceived and carried out by the PKI and its sympathizers; second, the attempted coup was the result of an internal armed forces struggle; third, General Suharto was the coup's actual instigator, or at least influenced, manipulated and distorted the killing of the generals, for his own ends; fourth, President Sukarno allowed or encouraged disaffected officers to act against others said to be part of a secret Council of Generals; and fifth, foreign intelligence operations were involved in an attempt to oust the left-leaning Sukarno from his influential role in Indonesia and among the Third World nations. Some accounts combine more than one of these scenarios (Zurbuchen, 2002:566).

Based on the Indonesian army version which had managed to gain universal public acceptance, identifying the PKI as the '*dalang*' (puppet master or mastermind), a number of scholars have attempted to explain comprehensively the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement leading to the collapse of the PKI and its all affiliated organizations, the fall of Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime, the emergence of Suharto into the national political stage and the establishment of the New Order regime dominated by the army with Suharto as the prominent leader.

O.G. Roeder (1970), as for example, describes the success of Suharto in smashing the Thirtieth of September Movement masterminded by the PKI in a surprisingly short time, not only by the arm of his soldiers but also by the active co-operation of militant groups throughout the country. Roeder also explains how Suharto met Sukarno and his loyal supporters who stubbornly refused to ban the PKI on a nation-wide scene or to purge the state apparatus and even ordered the

formation of what was so called '*Barisan Sukarno*' or the Sukarno Front in order to counter the anti-communist Pancasila Front which was emerged immediately after the abortive coup (Roeder, 1970).

Harold Crouch attempts to explain the way the army under Suharto crushed the Thirtieth of September Movement, banned the PKI and its all affiliated organizations, removed President Sukarno from power, established the 'New Order' regime under his own leadership, and attempted to gain political support from the elites and masses by introducing the dual function doctrine of the ABRI and the establishment of GOLKAR as Suharto's political vehicle (Crouch, 1978).

Nawas B. Mody (1987), on the other hand, describes the power struggle among the three prominent forces, Sukarno, the Army and the PKI as having many characteristics of the traditional '*wayang kulit*' (puppet shadow play). He also describes the strategy used by Suharto in order to win his power struggle against Sukarno and his political opponents within the armed forces.

Brian May (2001), on the other hand, prefers depicting the beginning of Suharto's confrontation against Sukarno in his capacities of President for Life, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Great Leader of the Revolution, and Mandatory of the MPRS. While R.E. Elson (2001) describes Suharto's confidence that he held the important military cards and was preparing to play them for all they were worth, particularly in his power struggle against Sukarno for the position of the most prominent leader of the country between the two leaders.

And then the way Suharto kept controlling the armed forces for his political interests by unifying and depoliticizing the military, purging the army both leftists and Sukarnoists, reorganizing the armed forces, taking so much power and authority away from the services and concentrating it in armed forces headquarters has been depicted by Salim Said (1998).

Meanwhile, in depicting the nature and future of civil-military relations in Indonesia, Terence Lee (2000) asserts that the Indonesian armed forces' involvement in politics is epitomized by the '*dwifungsi*' doctrine. '*Dwifungsi*' which was endorsed as a doctrine for the armed forces in 1966 and given constitutional standing when it was passed as a state law in 1982 is regarded by Lee as an assertion that is legitimate and necessary for the Indonesia armed forces to take both military and non-military roles (Lee, 2000). By referring to Harold Crouch's and S.E. Finer's opinion, Terence Lee identifies some factors making the Indonesian military involved in politics; the military's orientation and the failure of successive civilian government (Crouch), and the confluence of internal and external factors (Finer).

David Bourchier (1998) has labeled 'depoliticisation' as a political strategy employed by the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto. Depoliticisation began in the early 1970s through three methods that the New Order power-holders employed to consolidate their political position. Firstly the new government undermined the autonomy of groups that could provide substantial opposition because of their mass support in society. Secondly the New Order elite used their position as military-bureaucratic office holders to enrich themselves and their cronies, ensuring continued support through what has been

labeled a system of patrimony (Crouch, 1979; Robinson, 1986). Thirdly, Suharto purge both the military and the bureaucracy of possible opposition, removing any internal opposition to his rule and appointed loyal individuals, often military officers who were reliant on his support, to important government and military positions (Bourchier, 1996:151; Crouch, 1978:221-244; Ricklefs, 2001:349).

The strategy of political emasculation was further pursued around the 1971 and 1977 elections in ways that reached further into Indonesian society and strengthened the political hegemony of the New Order regime and, in particular, the position of its election vehicle, GOLKAR. In 1970 the government announced that government employees must observe ‘monoloyalty’ to the government, preventing bureaucrats from joining political parties except GOLKAR. The doctrine of the floating mass, a term coined in 1971, emphasized that Indonesia’s rural and working classes were not to be distracted from the task of state-ed development with political involvement in parties (Anderson, 1990:115). Another barrier to political participation was the 1975 banning of all political party branches below regency level except for a few weeks before elections, effectively preventing them from forming into mass organization capable of challenging the government (Crouch, 1978:272). The political emasculation of Indonesian society attempted to bar political discussion from everyday life in New Order Indonesia, including in cultural and artistic expression. Themes and expression considered ‘political’ were frowned on, banned and sometimes resulted in detention and even death.

Keith Loveard (2005) prefers depicting the Javanese society who believes that Suharto survived as long as his nation’s leader through the grace of God.

Although he was a Muslim, many people saw him for most of his rule as a mystic who drew his power from the '*wahyu*' or spiritual grace of the traditional deities of Java.

1.10. Structure of the thesis

This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 outlined the profile of the study which includes the general introduction of the thesis; the problem statement; the objectives and scopes of the study; the methodology of the research, the theoretical framework, and literature review. Chapter 2 discusses the background of the Indonesian political history beginning from the Dutch colonial rule of Indonesia to the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement when Suharto came to prominence and then established the New Order regime under his leadership. Chapter 3 explains the Javanese culture in general and the Javanese culture and its characteristics in particular. Chapter 4 explains how Suharto, as an army general as well as a true Javanese, had always attempted to carry out the principles of Javanese culture both in his personal life and in his office duties. Chapter 5 critically evaluates how Suharto placed the armed forces as the main pillar of the New Order regime under his leadership and put it under his own control by using and manipulating Javanese culture in order to legitimize his rule. Chapter 6 evaluates how Suharto established GOLKAR as his political vehicle and put it under his own control, emasculated the political parties, and prevented civil servants from joining political parties by using and manipulating Javanese culture. Chapter 7 describes how Javanese culture has been used and manipulated by Suharto in challenging his political opponents. And, finally

Chapter 8 highlights the salient points of the thesis in the concluding remark as well as suggesting some of the prospective areas for future research as an extension of this study.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INDONESIAN POLITICS

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is designed to describe the dynamics of the Indonesian politics begining from the Dutch colonialism (1619-1942) which finally put the archipelago into one colonial political entity named the Netherland East Indies, intercepted by the British rule for a couple years (1811-1816) and the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) to the birth of the independent Republic of Indonesia (1945) with all power struggle among the elites for dominating position, mounting to the outbreak of the Thirthieth of September Movement (1965) and the emergence of Suharto as the prominent leader of the New Order regime (1966).

Before proclamation of its independence (17 August 1945) Indonesia was under the Dutch colonialism for more than three centuries. During the pre-colonial era, Indonesia was divided into dispersed and separated autonomous small kingdoms and traditional communities. The Dutch first came to Indonesia for spices in Moluccas. After their quest for Indonesian spices to sell on the European market at big profit, the Dutch established the East India Company (VOC) in 1602. And, in order to secure the trade monopoly of the spice islands, the Dutch carried out a policy of ruthless exploitation by "divide and rule" tactics, paralyzing the indigenous inter-island trade, like that between Makassar, Aceh, Mataram and Banten, as well as overseas trade, reducing Indonesia to an agricultural country to supply European markets, and adopting an open-door policy toward the Chinese in order that they could serve as middlemen (or

'pedagang perantara') in their trade with Indonesia (<http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo /indonesia/pro-history.htm>).

The Dutch Government had a firm grip on the vital territories of the country after the nationalization of the VOC in 1799,¹ forcing people in those territories to surrender their agricultural produce to the Dutch merchants, and renaming Sunda Kelapa Batavia as the capital of the Dutch Administration in Indonesia.

Oppositions from indigenous rulers to the Dutch colonialism flourished, such as from Sultan Agung Hanyokrokusumo of Mataram who sent his troops to attack Batavia in 1629, Sultan Hasanuddin of Goa who waged a war against the Dutch in 1666, Prince Trunojoyo of Madura in 1680, and also a Chinese rebellion in Jakarta which was suppressed in 1740. All oppositions were defeated by the Dutch.

From 1811 to 1816, Indonesia fell under the rule of the British East India Company (1811-1816).² Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles was appointed Lieutenant Governor General of Java and dependencies. But, under a convention signed in London on 13 August 1814, the British ruler agreed to return all Dutch colonial possessions dating from 1803 onwards to the Dutch Administration in Batavia. Soon the Dutch intensified their colonial rule, sparking widespread revolts to seize freedom, such as: Thomas Matulessy, alias Pattimura, staged a revolt against the Dutch in the Moluccas (1816-1818); Prince Diponegoro of Mataram led the Java War from 1825 until 1830; Tuanku Imam Bonjol led the Padri War

¹ Mismanagement and corruption forced the VOC into bankruptcy and on December 31, 1799, all its territories in Indonesia were taken over by the Dutch Administration in Batavia.

² Holland was occupied by France during the Napoleonic wars in Europe, making the Dutch Administration in Batavia have to deliver its rule to the British East India Company.

in West Sumatra, while Teuku Umar headed the Aceh War in North Sumatra (1873-1903); King Sisingamangaraja of the Bataks revolted against the Dutch in 1907; and an attempt by the Dutch troops to occupy Bali in 1908 was repelled by King Udayana. Revolts were also erupting in Goa, South Sulawesi, and in South Kalimantan, etc.

When all these regional wars of independence failed, Indonesian nationalists began thinking of a more-organized struggle against the Dutch colonialism. A number of organizations were founded, such as '*Boedi Oetomo*' or the Noble Conduct (1908) by Dr. Sutomo who was greatly influenced by Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo and supported by Gunawan and Suradji; '*Sarekat Dagang Islam*' (SDI) or the Association of Moslem Merchants (1912) by Haji Samanhudi and others which was then renamed '*Sarekat Islam*' (SI) or the Islamic Association (1921) under the leadership of H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, Haji Agoes Salim and others; a progressive Moslem organization of '*Muhammadiyah*' (1912) by K.H. Akhmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta for the purpose of social and economic reforms; '*Partai Indonesia*' or the Indonesian Party (1912) by Douwes Dekker, later named Setiabudi, with Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Ki Hajar Dewantoro; '*Partai Komunis Indonesia*' or the Indonesian Communist Party (1920) by Semaun, Darsono, Alimin, Muso and others after splitting from SI; '*Taman Siswa*' (1922) by Ki Hajar Dewantoro; '*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia*' or the Indonesian Students Association (1924) by Drs. Mohammad Hatta, Dr. Sukiman and others; '*Partai Nasional Indonesia*' or the Indonesian Nationalist Party (1927) by Ir. Sukarno, Mr. Sartono, and others, etc.,

During the Second World War, after their attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii,³ the Japanese forces managed to conquer several Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia. The Japanese forces then took over the rule of Indonesia after the Dutch colonial army surrendered in March 1942. They began their propaganda campaign for what they called "Great East Asia Co-prosperity".

During the Japanese occupation, Sukarno-Hatta appeared to cooperate with the Japanese authorities in order to further the cause of Indonesia's independence. The Japanese ultimately gave in to allow the red-and-white flag to fly as the Indonesian national flag and to recognize "*Indonesia Raya*" as the national anthem and Bahasa Indonesia as the national language. They also facilitated the establishment of "*Dokuritzu Zyunbi Tyoosakai*" or "*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*" (BPUPKI) the task of which was to formulate the state basis and ideology. In one of its meetings, Sukarno whose name became more popular delivered a speech introducing Pancasila as the state basis of the independent Indonesia.

After persistent demands, the Japanese finally agreed to place the civil administration of the country into Indonesian hands. This was a golden opportunity for nationalist leaders to prepare for the proclamation of Indonesia's independence. The Republic of Indonesia first saw light on 17 August 1945, when its independence was proclaimed just days after the Japanese surrender to the Allies. Pancasila became the ideological and philosophical basis of the

³ The Japanese navy conducted a surprise military strike against the United States' naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941. The attack sank four U.S. Navy battleships and damaged four more. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, and one minelayer, destroyed 188 aircraft, and caused personnel losses of 2,402 killed and 1,282 wounded (<http://www.answers.com/topic/attack-on-pearl-harbor>).

Republic, and on 18 August 1945 the Constitution was adopted as the basic law of the country. Sukarno became the first President and Chief Executive, and Mohammad Hatta, the first Vice-President of the Republic. On 5 September 1945 the first cabinet was formed.

2.2. Political constellation after the independence

During the days after the proclamation of the independence, President Sukarno had become the central and necessary figure of the country. He was even regarded as the symbol of a united nation in a situation of potential anarchy. In fact, “Sukarno became the one unquestioned focus of authority” (Legge, 1972:209). After being elected president (18 August 1945), Sukarno created a cabinet which was responsible to him as provided by the 1945 Constitution. On the other hand, the ‘*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*’ (KNIP) or the Central Indonesian National Committee with 135 members was formed (29 August 1945), intended to be an advisory body to the president.

As the president, Sukarno relied heavily on his Vice-President Hatta, leaving many details to him while he directed his own talents to the task of mobilizing support. This division of labor was sensible, but it had important consequences for Sukarno’s position (Legge, 1972:210). Later Sukarno was involved in some differences with his colleagues on some particular issues of policy, making his authority intercepted. Influenced by a typically Javanese accommodation to it, Sukarno by his willing co-operation with Vice-President Hatta and the leaders of the KNIP was able to contain the competition of power and influence. Through this kind of accommodation the center gravity of

government shifted dramatically at the expense of Sukarno, particularly when the KNIP established itself as a central forum within which a national consensus could be expressed, making no government could move without its support. The KNIP quickly became the parliament of the republic after being granted co-legislative power with the President (Vice-Presidential Decree of 16 October 1945).

Then, with the new authority, the KNIP issued a decision (October 1945) encouraging the formation of competing political parties,⁴ the function of which would be to express the views of their members within the KNIP (Legge, 1972:211-212). Following this official call, a number of political parties such as the Masjumi, the PNI and the PSI soon emerged into surface, followed by other smaller political parties, such as the PKI, marking the birth of the Indonesia's multi-party system. These developments, although accepted by Sukarno, was against his preference. Spirited by the Javanese philosophy of 'rukun' or harmony, Sukarno would have preferred bringing all sections of opinions into the one organization, a single state party, as he had attempted to do in the late twenties and again in the early thirties (Legge, 1972:212).

During the month of October 1945 criticism of Sukarno's Cabinet began to crystallize around the personality of Syahrir. In his pamphlet, '*Perjuangan Kita*' or Our Struggle (November 1945) Syahrir vigorously attacked those who had worked with the Japanese, including Sukarno. Although Syahrir was convinced that Sukarno was the leader of the nation, that he was the authentic leader of the revolution and that there could be no Republic without Sukarno, he

⁴ The formation of political parties was meant to show to the world that Indonesia was not a 'baby doll' of the Japanese, but an independent democratic country.

criticized Sukarno's government as being vulnerable and lacked standing in the eyes of the world.

His solution, as embodied in a proposal of the KNIP Working Committee of 11 November 1945, was to separate the position of president from that of chief executive. It was suggested that, though the constitution provided for a presidential system of government, the president should, as a matter of policy, agree to accept only cabinet which commanded the support of the KNIP. Through this change of constitutional convention the position of president would become largely ceremonial, while power would rest with a prime minister and a cabinet controlled by the representatives of the nation gathered in the KNIP (Legge, 1972:213). This proposal was accepted by Vice-President Hatta while President Sukarno was away from Jakarta. Vice President Hatta then asked Syahrir to form a new government. Once again, Sukarno's supremacy over national politics was diminished.

The new cabinet under Prime Minister Syahrir (from the PSI) was prepared to negotiate with the Dutch. But this cabinet soon met a number of challenges particularly from the military units as well as from the Dutch. In 1946, the Dutch managed to regain control over Java and Sumatra. And in the mid of 1946, the Dutch began to establish federal and autonomy states which then became members of the United States of Indonesia. In July 1947, after the signature of the Linggarjati Agreement, Prime Minister Syahrir decided to resign and was replaced by Amir Syarifuddin (the PSI). And in January 1948, after the signature of the Renville Agreement, Syarifuddin's cabinet fell down and was

replaced by another cabinet led by Hatta. Hatta's cabinet was composed mainly of ministers of the Muslim Masjumi and the nationalist PNI.

After resigning, Amir Syarifuddin established what was called '*Front Demokrasi Rakyat*' (FDR) or the People Democratic Front consisting of '*Partai Sosialis*', the Pesindo, '*Partai Buruh*' or the Labor Party, '*Partai Komunis Indonesia*' (PKI) or the Indonesian Communist Party, and '*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*' (SOBSI) or the Central Organization of the Whole Indonesian Labor. They opposed to the government headed by Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta. On 18 September 1948, after the return of Muso (a Communist activist) from his long exile in Moscow, the FDR together with the PKI launched a coup by occupying Madiun (the Madiun Affairs) and assassinating a number of government and political elites. They then announced the formation of a new government, but this rebellion was soon successfully crushed by '*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*' (TNI) or the Indonesian National Army.

After crushing the Madiun Affairs, the Hatta's cabinet soon met other challenges. In December 1948 the Dutch launched a second military action by occupying Yogyakarta, the capital of the Republic. The Dutch managed to arrest the President and Vice President and then exiled them to Bangka. With the help of the United Nations Security Council and the United States a conference called the Round Table Conference was held in Den Haag between August to November 1949. This conference produced a compromised political settlement in which the two parties agreed to establish the Federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI), 27 December 1949. Sukarno was sworn in as

President and Mohammad Hatta was chosen as Prime Minister of the RUSI, and the Constitution of the RUSI was also enacted. But the RUSI lasted only 7 months. It was then replaced by the Unitary States of the Republic of Indonesia (the Second Republic). On 17 August 1950 the Constitution of the RUSI was replaced by the Provisional Constitution of 1950.

The enactment of the RUSI Constitution which was then followed by the Provisional Constitution of 1950 was regarded by Kahin, as the beginning of the 'Liberal Democracy' period (Kahin, 1964:204). In this period power was in the hands of the parties. Parliament was an institution of some authority, and the power of the chief extra-parliamentary political actors, President Sukarno and the army, was effectively limited (Kahin, 1964:204).

As the institution of authority, the temporary parliament of 234 members was dominated by the two largest parties, '*Majelis Sjuro Muslimin*' or the Masjumi with 47 seats and '*Partai Nasional Indonesia*' or the PNI (the Indonesian National Party) with 35 seats. The other much smaller parties were '*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*' or the PSI (the Indonesian Socialist Party) with 15 seats and '*Partai Komunis Indonesia*' or the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) with 14 seats. In 1952 a conservative Islamic religious and social organization which had been a constituent of the Masjumi announced the establishment of '*Nahdatul Ulama*' or the NU as a political party, separating from Masjumi, and withdrew its 8 parliamentary representatives from the Masjumi group.

On the other hand, the PKI which was still weak in organized support, following its defeat at Madiun in 1948, began to grow up rapidly from 1952

onward. In the Elections 1955, the composition of the parliament members changed significantly for the PKI's favor. The PKI managed to become the fourth largest party. In the newly elected parliament of 260 members, the PKI managed to gain 39 seats, while the PNI and Masjumi 57 seats and the NU 45 seats. Though the PKI had managed to emerge as the fourth largest party, it was always standing outside the cabinet.

Depicting the political conditions during the era of the 'Liberal Democracy', Kahin further explained:

"In addition, a large number of smaller parties were able to wield power. In order that a cabinet have a working majority, it was usually necessary for it to include the representatives of many parties. Sharp conflict frequently arose between the parties of the coalitions, and between different factions inside these parties, and when tensions became high the effect was often align the President and the army (or some part of it) with each opposing forces. No less than seven cabinets (Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman, Wilopo, Ali-I, Burhanuddin Harahap, and Ali-II) held office between December 1949 and March 1957, none as long as two years" (Kahin, 1964:205).

In fact, during the time of the Liberal Democracy, Indonesia was trapped into continuing crisis, threatening the unity of the country. President Sukarno who at the very beginning did not agree with the decision to encourage a multiplicity of parties then announced his own concept – the President's Concept or '*Konsepsi Presiden*' – for the solution of Indonesia's ill. First of all he suggested the formation of what he called a '*gotong royong*' or mutual help cabinet, representing all the major parties (the Masyumi, the PNI, the NU and the PKI). He argued that the PKI was now a too important element to be excluded from power. Secondly he proposed the formation of a National Council under his

own leadership, which could deliberate upon the broad lines of national policy. The National Council was not to be a party body, but was to be representatives of functional groups – workers, peasants, intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, religious organizations – Muslim, Protestant, Catholic – the armed services, youth organizations, women's organizations and also the regions of the country (Legge, 1972:283-284).

Of the major parties only the PNI and the PKI were in favor. Masjumi was opposed, so was the NU. The NU was firm in its opposition to the idea of bringing the PKI into the government (Legge, 1972:285-286). Meanwhile, a number of territorial commanders such as Colonel Achmad Hussein from Central Sumatra, Colonel H.N. Ventje Sumual from Sulawesi and Colonel Barlian Simbolon from South Sumatra who preferred the return of Hatta (who resigned from his position as Vice-President in 1956) to his office opposed the President's concept by staging a coup. In spite of the opposition, Sukarno went on with his concept. In response to these coups, President Sukarno did agree to the proposal of Major General Abdul Harris Nasution (Chief Staff of the Army) that a State of War and Siege should be declared over all Indonesia (Legge, 1972:286). The State of War and Siege was declared by President Sukarno immediately after the resignation of the second Ali Sastroamijojo cabinet on 14 March 1957.

According to J.D. Legge in his book on "*Sukarno: a Political Biography*," this declaration had established both President Sukarno and the army as the major forces in the Indonesia's political scene. Legge also said that "the declaration of a State of War and Siege served the political purposes of the army, but Sukarno still had room to maneuver" (Legge, 1972:287).

With the resignation of the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet and the help of the army, President Sukarno had more chance to realize his concept, minimizing the role of the party. He created a cabinet called '*Kabinet Karya*' or Working Cabinet headed by Djuanda, an engineer and non-party figure (9 April 1957). Though the majority of ministers were members of parties, they were chosen and had accepted office as individuals. Government policy therefore did not depend on party consent. The cabinet main strength was drawn from the PNI and the NU who supplied four members each. Masjumi refused to allow any of its members. Two members were close to the PKI in sympathy.

Not long after the cabinet was created, Sukarno established the National Council consisting of 45 members, including the representatives of the PKI. Both the cabinet and the National Council were still not suitable with the interest of Sukarno which in his Conception wanted to establish a four-legged cabinet, consisting of the PNI, the Masyumi, the NU, and the PKI, as well as the establishment of the National Council as the competitor of the parliament as the source of power for Sukarno. But, as the Prime Minister, Djuanda decided that the cabinet was still responsible to the parliament in line with the Provisional Constitution of 1950, while the National Council functioned as an advisory body.

In the end of 1957 tension mounted. The hope for resolution faded away when: (1) in November 1957 a group of young Muslims made an attempt to assassinate President Sukarno, and (2) the General Assembly of the United Nations rejected the draft of resolution on West Irian. The two incidents made President Sukarno angry toward the West. He then decided to take over the West Irian from the Dutch through military action.

Responding to the two incidents, radical actions were made by labor unions using the government's name by taking over all properties owned by the Dutch in Indonesia. An exodus of the Dutch to the Netherlands occurred. Worrying the vital companies would fall into the hands of Communist, on 13 December 1957 Major General Abdul Harris Nasution enacted Martial Law giving rights to the army to take over all the Dutch companies from the labor unions. Through the martial law, the army managed to place their officers to occupy the management of the companies taken over from the Dutch, making the position of the army stronger particularly in civilian affairs. Major General Nasution and his colleagues managed to gain control over administrative and political affairs.

In January 1958 leaders of the Regional Councils made a meeting, attended by the Masjumi and the PSI leaders. They then announced an ultimatum demanding that Djuanda cabinet resign and be replaced by Mohammad Hatta or Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. If rejected, a government would continue to be established. On 15 February 1958 '*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*' or the PRRI (the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) was established in Padang, headed by Syafruddin Prawiranegara as Prime Minister. Responding to the establishment of the PRRI, in March-April 1958 the central government took military actions and managed to crush the rebellion.

2.3. The birth of the Guided Democracy

A big political change occurred during the last two years after the army succeeded in appointing a number of officers into the management of companies

taken over from the Dutch. With the outbreak of civil war, Major General Nasution and other territorial commanders manipulated the Martial Law in order to control civilian and political administration. The victory of the army over the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) had enhanced the army's prestige.

On the other hand, the parties which used to be powerful were demoralized and lost their influence. All parties had already lost their prestige as the result of the President's condemnation to the Liberal Democracy or '*democracy of 50 plus one and the sickness of the parties*'. Of the four political parties that emerged from the 1955 election, only the PKI was still vigorous and respected. But the PKI had been the target of the army. Until mid 1958 parliamentary government still existed. The parliament which was formed in 1955 still held meetings, but the power had been challenged by the National Council appointed by President Sukarno as well as the Martial Law under Major General Nasution.

In 1959, backed by the army, President Sukarno and his cabinet accepted the army proposal on the concrete form of the Guided Democracy or '*Demokrasi Terpimpin*'. They asserted that political reform had to be conducted in the framework of the return to the 1945 Constitution (which had been abolished formally in 1949, but theoretically in November 1945). After being unable to persuade the Constituent Assembly or '*Dewan Konstituante*' to adopt the proposal, President Sukarno eventually stipulated the enactment of the 1945 Constitution through the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959, ending the debate on the state ideology of Pancasila and marking the beginning of the Guided

Democracy in place of the Parliament or Liberal Democracy which had been regarded as unsuitable to the national identity.

The Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 made the alliance between President Sukarno and the army more visible, making the position of the army much stronger than before. As said by J.D. Legge:

“Perhaps the biggest political chance of the two year period was a rapid increase in the power of the army (or its loyal sections). The army had been able to place many of its officers in executive and supervisory position in the enterprises taken over from the Dutch. With the outbreak of civil war, Maj. Gen. Nasution and his territorial commanders had begun to make extensive use of their martial powers to exercise control over civilian administration and political affairs. And by its victory over the PRRI, the army had gained very great prestige” (Legge, 1972:212-213).

“Conversely, the parties which had been powerful in the previous eight years now largely demoralized and without influence. All of these parties had lost prestige as a result of the President’s denunciations of Liberal Democracy, ‘50 per cent plus one democracy’, and ‘the disease of parties, parties, and still more parties’ (Legge, 1972:213).

By the decree the system of government was changed from parliamentary to presidential system, with Sukarno as the President as well as the Prime Minister and Djuanda was appointed the First Minister. While remaining to assume the Chief Staff of the Army, Major General Nasution was appointed the Minister of Defense and Security. Of the 37 cabinet members, seven of them were military officers. In his decision Sukarno also changed the National Council into the Advisory Council and established a new body called the National Planning Council or ‘*Dewan Perancang Nasional*’ given the task to create the blue print of Indonesian socialism (Legge, 1972:214). The Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 was formally called ‘the Rediscovery of Our Revolution’ or

'Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita' a kind of rejection to the mistaken road taken by the previous governments since the year of 1949. In his state speech of 17 August 1959 President Sukarno interpreted the change as the State Political Manifest or *'Manifesto Politik Negara'* which was then popularly called 'MANIPOL'.

Since 1959 political limits were imposed. In August 1960 the Masjumi and the PSI were dissolved, and in 1962 their leaders were arrested. In June 1960, after rejecting the budget proposed by the government, the parliament was dissolved, a mutual parliament called Mutual People's Representative Council or *'Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong'* (DPR-GR) was formed (24 June 1960) the members of which were appointed by the President, consisting of 130 party representatives, and 153 functional group representatives. In August 1960 a National Front or *'Front Nasional'* was established in the hope that the cooperative relationship among parties, groups, and individuals could be made in order to support the MANIPOL or *'Manifesto Politik'* (the Political Manifest).

The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly or *'Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara'* (MPRS) was formed in 1959, comprised 616 members. The more compact Supreme Advisory Council or *'Dewan Pertimbangan Agung'* (DPA) was likely to be more important for practical purposes. To these two bodies, President Sukarno added others for ad hoc purposes. The most important one was the National Planning Council or *'Dewan Perancang Nasional'* (DEPERNAS) the task of which was to prepare the blueprint for Indonesia's economic development under the Guided Democracy (Legge, 1972:312). In November-December 1960 an inaugural meeting of the MPRS

under the 1945 Constitution was made. This meeting then endorsed the Development Plan drafted by the National Planning Council or '*Dewan Perancang Nasional*'.

2.4. The emergence of Sukarno-the Army-the PKI Alliance

As a result of the two year crisis, both the army and President Sukarno had grown up in power. The President was even admired for his role in the politically popular decision to initiate the take-over of Dutch property. His stronger enemies, the leaders of the Masyumi and the PSI had been defeated.

After the parliament was dissolved in 1960, an anti communist reaction grew up. A group coming from the Masyumi, the PSI, the NU, the IPKI and other anti communist parties formed the League of Democracy protesting the dissolution of the parliament and demanded the return to parliamentary system. The League got informal support from a number of regional military commanders and though Nasution did not give support to the League, he did not take any action against the movement. But President Sukarno showed his opposition and eventually banned the League.

In July 1960 '*Harian Rakyat*' or the People's Daily (daily newspaper owned by the PKI) issued an article criticizing the previous government. The article appreciated Sukarno but making Prime Minister Djuanda and the military elites as the objects of criticism. The army harshly reacted. The Jakarta military commander banned the '*Harian Rakyat*' and demanded that the polit-bureau of the PKI including Dipa Nusantara (D.N.) Aidid be interrogated. Not long after that the regional military commanders of South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, and

Sulawesi banned all activities of the PKI, President Sukarno sought to reverse these moves but his success was limited.

In August 1960 '*Harian Rakyat*' was allowed to be republished but the anti communist movement in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi could not be prevented. The end of 1960 the ban was lifted but the military commanders continued to place the PKI under their control.

On 25 July 1960 in his speech before the anniversary of the PNI President Sukarno launched an attack on political party leaders who suffered from '*communista phobia*'. In August 1960 he appointed D.N. Aidit and Nyoto to the executive of the National Front and in the following month, September 1960, President Sukarno named Aidit as one of the Indonesian delegation members to the United Nations accompanying him. But at the end of 1960 President Sukarno began to canvass the possibility of bringing the communists into a 'NASAKOM' cabinet – a cabinet which would represent the main streams of the Indonesian revolutionary forces as Sukarno had always intended since he was a student (1926): '*Nationalist, Religious Groups, and Communist*'.

These incidents gave an illuminating illustration of the way Indonesia's balance was maintained. President Sukarno and the army each had their distinct areas of initiative within which they were not easily coerced. But even within those areas their powers were not unlimited; each side had to move warily, and might feel it prudent to give way a little in the face of pressure. But of course for Sukarno the mere existence of the PKI was an important element in his maintaining his independence in the face of army pressure (Legge, 1972:324).

In March 1962 President Sukarno included two prominent communist leaders, D.N. Aidit and M.H. Lukman, into the State Leadership Consultative Body or '*Badan Konsultatif Kepemimpinan Negara*', bringing them equal to the status of cabinet members but having no executive responsibility. The PKI managed to campaign in order to dismiss anti communist officers as a part of retooling process. The pro-PKI movements were meant to weaken the preponderant position of the anti communist elements in the army leadership. July 1962 General Nasution was promoted from the position of the Army Chief Staff to the new position, the Chief Staff of the Armed Forces, and was replaced as army leader by Army Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani who was regarded by Sukarno more pliable. Army General Nasution retained the defense portfolio in the government, but Sukarno's intention was clearly to remove him from his main base of strength as an army commander, Army Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani of course was no pro-communist; his attitude to the party was little different from that of Nasution, and army agreement on the central question was far more important than the division and rivalries within military ranks. Nonetheless the division was important enough to give Sukarno opportunity to play upon them as he did in July 1952. The President, the army and the PKI were thus, by 1960, the dominant forces in the political constellation and the history of Guided Democracy is in great measure the history of a shifting balance between the three (Legge, 1972:319).

In the face of army hostility to the party Sukarno readily assumed the role of its protector. In September 1959 the army attempted to prevent the PKI from holding its annual congress. Sukarno reversed the decision and gave a public

demonstration of his attitude by attending the congress and giving an address. In March 1960, when selecting the new mutual or '*gotong royong*' parliament, Sukarno safeguarded the PKI's position by giving it thirty seats as against the PNI's forty-four seats and the NU's thirty six; he also gave it additional representation in the lists of functional representatives. But Sukarno, according to Arnold Brackman, had no intention of putting the PKI into power and if Sukarno were to push from the scene the odds on the whole was that the power of the army rather than of the PKI was likely to flow into the void (Legge, 1972:321).

Herbert Feith depicted the Sukarno-army-PKI balance as a triangle of forces, gradually changing in shape. At first Sukarno and the army were the main elements, more or less equal to each other. Then Sukarno, by his manipulative skill, using on the one hand the PKI's need for protection and on the other the army's hesitancy and its uncertainty of purpose, was able to secure a central and pre-eminent position, holding the other two forces in balance, as it were, beneath him. Then the triangle again changed shape with the army corner slipping down and the PKI's rising closer to the level of Sukarno apex (Legge, 1972:21-322).

By 1963 the PKI appeared stronger than before, certainly, and the army less strong or at least unambiguously under the control of a cohesive anti-communist leadership. But, the national political constellation changed drastically when on the early morning of 1 October 1965, through a group of armed movement which named itself the Thirtieth of September Movement or '*Gerakan Tiga Puluh September*' (G-30-S/PKI) headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri, an army officer of the palace guard which was popularly called '*Resimen Tjakrabirawa*', the PKI failed to seize power from the legitimate

government under President Sukarno. Not only were the PKI and its all affiliated organizations nullified from the national political arena, President Sukarno who had always protected the PKI and its all affiliated organizations were also removed from power, making the triangle of forces (President Sukarno, the army, and the PKI) drastically collapsed.

2.5. The outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement

A few hours after the kidnap of the six generals, a special statement was released in the radio informing that the Thirtieth of September Movement headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri, a battalion commander in the Cakrabirawa palace guard, had arrested members of the 'Council of Generals' which was said to have brought troops from West, Central, and East Java to Jakarta to carry out a coup on about 5 October, and that action had been taken to prevent such a coup. The statement also asserted that the movement was originally a movement within the army directed against the 'Council of Generals', and that a 'Revolutionary Council' would be established in Jakarta followed by provincial and lower level Revolutionary Councils in the regions which would carry out President's Sukarno's policies, such as the 'Five Magic Charms of the Revolutions' or '*Panca Azimat Revolusi*' (consisted of 'NASAKOM', PANCASILA, MANIPOL/USDEK, TRISAKTI, TAVIP and BERDIKARI) and an independent and active foreign policy opposed to the 'NEKOLIM' or Neo Colonialist and Imperialist.

A decree which was issued in the names of Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri as commander of the Thirtieth of September Movement was broadcast

announcing that: 'all power in the Republic of Indonesia' had passed to a Revolutionary Council which would hold authority until elections could be held, and that the cabinet was placed in 'demissionary' status, meaning that the ministers were permitted to carry out only routine activities. Two other decisions of the Movement were also broadcast. The first decision announced the names of the forty-five members of the Central Revolutionary Council. The second decision announced that all military ranks above that of lieutenant colonels had been abolished and that all noncommissioned officers and privates who participated in the movement would be promoted (Crouch, 1978:98).

Responding to the statement broadcast, the air force commander, Air Marshall Omar Dhani, issued an order of the day, stating that the Thirtieth of September Movement was carried out a purge within the army in order to protect and safeguard the Revolution and the Great Leader of the Revolution against CIA subversion. He also declared that the air force "has always supported and will continue to support all progressive-revolutionary movements" (Crouch, 1978:98).

Facing such a critical situation and hearing that Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani was missing, Major General Suharto, the Commander of the Strategic Reserved Army Command or '*Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat*' (KOSTRAD) who was often appointed by Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani to represent him, quickly took charge of the army (Crouch, 1978:130) in his own initiative and began to mobilize forces to crush the Thirtieth September Movement (Crouch, 1978:132). He then ordered that all troops be confined to barracks and that none should move without his explicit orders (Crouch, 1978:130).

Suharto soon understood who was behind the movement for he had long known who Lieutenant Colonel Untung was. According to Suharto, Untung had been a disciple of the PKI figure Alimin since 1945, and there was, moreover, no such thing as a Council of Generals or '*Dewan Jenderal*'. He said: "In my views this is not merely a movement to confront the so-called Council of Generals, but something rather different. They have organized a coup to seize power of the state by force. And the PKI is definitely behind it" (Elson, 2001:101). Based on his evaluation, he argued that the Thirtieth of September Movement should be opposed not just because of its attack on the generals, but also because it threatened the state and the ideology of Pancasila.

Suharto suspected that the air force was somehow involved in the kidnapping after the air force commander, Air Marshall Omar Dhani, made a radio statement supporting the movement and rejecting to accept Suharto's authority (Crouch, 1978:130). After calculating to see which troops were loyal to the Movement, Suharto immediately took further action to counter attack the Movement.

Then after managing to absolutely control the city's key points by cleansing the palace area from the troops under the command of the Thirtieth of September Movement he gave order to Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo (the Commander of RPKAD) not only to take over the RRI or '*Radio of the Republic of Indonesia*' and the telecommunication facilities which had been occupied by the Thirtieth of September Movement before, but also to begin preparations for an assault upon Halim air force base.

Once the RRI was in his hands, Suharto broadcast a statement, announcing that counter-revolutionary movement had kidnapped six generals including the army commander, Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani, and that the formation of the Revolutionary Council was a coup against President Sukarno, and that he had taken over command of the army, navy, and police to crush the Thirtieth of September Movement, and that he was then able to control the situation both at the center and in the region, and that the army was united (Crouch, 1978:99).

But, his radio statement was actually against the President's order who had decided to temporarily take over the leadership of the army, to appoint Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro to carry out daily tasks in the Army, and to order all troops increase their alertness, return and remain at their posts and only move when ordered. Replying that the president's order could not be implemented while operations were still in progress and the fate of the missing generals were still unknown, Suharto who had known before that President Sukarno was at Halim together with the leaders of the coup attempt also gave additional instruction to President Sukarno's adjunctant, Colonel Bambang Wijanarko, that the President had to be taken away from Halim air force base immediately because he had already made preparation to attack the air force base which had been used as the headquarter of the Thirtieth of September Movement.

Responding to Suharto's request, President Sukarno eventually decided to leave Halim air force base and went to Bogor palace by car about midnight. Not long after Sukarno had left Halim air force base, Suharto ordered Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo to take over Halim air force base. The leaders of the

Thirtieth of September Movement who had made the air force base as their headquarters disappeared from the base, symbolizing the failure of the coup attempt.

The occupation of Halim paved the way to the discovery of the six generals. Two days later, the six generals who had been kidnapped were found dead, and the bodies were thrown into a narrow old and unused well called 'Lubang Buaya' (Crocodile Hole), located within the limits of the air force base, the site of an air force training center where members of PKI-affiliated youth and women's organizations had been given military training. In his radio speech following the discovery and exhumation of the bodies, Suharto pointed toward both the air force and Communist involvement in the murders.

The outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement had made Suharto aware that he had to play important and decisive role in order to prevent the country from falling down into the hands of the Communist. In order to win support and sympathy from the people, Suharto had successfully explained to all Indonesian people that the Thirtieth of September Movement was the PKI's plot designed to overthrow and take over the legal government from President Sukarno and finally to change the state ideology of Pancasila with other ideology of Communism. In Suharto's perspective, by assassinating the six top army general, taking over the legal government from President Sukarno, and changing the state ideology of Pancasila with other ideology of Communism, the PKI had been militarily against the principle of peaceful transfer of power, politically against the 1945 Constitution, ideologically against the state ideology of Pancasila, and culturally against the Javanese principle of '*rukun*' or '*harmony*'.

Due to that wicked plot the PKI was therefore eligible to be crushed and even eliminated from the national political map.

By showing the PKI brutality to people as the bodies of the kidnapped and assassinated top army generals were lifted from the old and unused well of Lubang Buaya, Suharto was easily able to get support and sympathy, particularly from Javanese and Muslims. Anti-communist Pancasila fronts were immediately established, supported by the army, designed to assist the army to fight against the PKI and its all affiliated organizations or even eventually against President Sukarno.

Commenting to the quick response to the Thirtieth of September Movement taken by Suharto, Akbar Tanjung stated that Suharto had been really aware of the maneuvers which had been conducted by the PKI long before to the Movement broke out:

“Before the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement, the PKI had been given a number of chances by President Sukarno to conduct political maneuvers. The PKI utilized the momentum in order to take over the legal power. The PKI even echoed the jargons that the country had already been in old pregnant and that the cities had been surrounded by the villages. For ripening the situation for revolution, other political jargons were also used by the PKI in order to corner its political rivals, such as ‘*HMI anak Masyumi*’ (HMI is a son of Masyumi), ‘*Ganyang kaum kapitalis birokrat*’ (Crush capitalist bureaucrats), ‘*Petani anak revolusi*’ (Peasants are sons of revolution), etc. These political maneuvers at the end mounted to the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement in which the PKI was clearly involved.”⁵

Answering to the question why Suharto was not targeted by the Thirtieth of September Movement to be assassinated, Akbar Tanjung said:

“It was quite right that as the Commander of the Strategic Reserve Army Command or ‘*Pangkostrad*’ at that time, Pak Harto was not so much

⁵ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 200).

publicly known. Even though many people knew that he used to be the Commander of Mandala, Pak Harto was a military leader who was not so active in political dynamics. It was Pak Yani who was popularly known as the Army Chief Staff as well as the Army Commander and periodically and intensively communicated with Bung Karno and always attempted to prevent the PKI from conducting political maneuvers. Consequently in the Thirtieth of September Movement he and with other senior army generals became the target of assassination by the PKI. Pak Harto was not.

But, as a senior military leader, Pak Harto also posited an important and strategic position. He was the Commander of the Strategic Reserve Army Command or '*Pangkostrad*', and when the Thirtieth of September Movement broke out his leadership and military intuitions emerged. As the Commander of the Strategic Army Command he took a number of strategic actions in order to prevent or to block the Thirtieth of September Movement from succeeding in taking over the legal government. He immediately took over the army leadership, announced to public that there had been a rebellion masterminded by the PKI, and took proper actions in order to crush the Thirtieth of September Movement and eliminate all of those who were involved in it.”⁶

Suharto's open defiance of Sukarno marked a crucial shift in the balance of Indonesian politics. Before 1 October 1965 the army leaders had consciously worked to undermine some of Sukarno's policies but always within a framework that recognized the supremacy of the president. His commands were interpreted and twisted to suit the army's purposes and, in the case of contrast with Malaysia, his policies were secretly sabotaged. But on 1 October 1965, Suharto blatantly disobeyed Sukarno's instructions. Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro's appointment was ignored, and Suharto issued a veiled command to the president that he should leave Halim air force base for he had already made preparation to attack the air force base. In other words, as depicted by Harold Crouch, “the relationship between the president and the commander of the army that had

⁶ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

prevailed through most of the Guided Democracy period ended on 1 October 1965" (Crouch, 1978:134).

Although at the end, on the condition that he was given responsibility for the restoration of security and order, Suharto agreed to accept the president's order of the previous day, according to which Sukarno himself took formal command of the army and appointed Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro to carry out the daily tasks of the commander (Crouch, 1978:137), political gap between Suharto and President Sukarno continued to grow wider.

As for example, while in facing the coup attempt President Sukarno appealed for calm and restraint and promised to provide a political settlement; Suharto deliberately fostered a highly emotional atmosphere in which the dominant theme was the call for revenge. With the backing of General A.H. Nasution and other senior generals, Suharto was determined to conduct a purge of all whom they regarded as involved in the assassination of the six generals and they considered it essential; that they, rather than the president, should be in control (Crouch, 1978:137). Sukarno, on the other hand, hoped to limit the repercussion of the coup attempt as much as possible. He even tried to give refugee to Brig. General Suparjo and Air Marshall Omar Dhani, but he could do little to prevent the purge of both and other army and air force officers directly associated with the Thirtieth of September Movement (Crouch, 1978:137).

2.6. The birth of the New Order

In responding to the Thirtieth of September Movement and its impact, Suharto was in different position from that of President Sukarno, not only on the

problem of the army leadership, but also on how the PKI had to be treated. Suharto regarded the PKI as the puppet master or mastermind of the coup attempt, he insisted on dissolving the PKI and its all affiliated organizations. He even wanted not only “to eliminate the PKI from the nation’s life” (Elson, 2001:123), but also to ban Marxism, Leninism and Communism. But, they were all rejected by Sukarno.

Sukarno’s rejection to dissolve the PKI was based on his belief that the PKI had already made contribution and sacrifices for freedom. As the consequence of his political preference, he kept advocating the existence of the PKI, defending his policy of ‘NASAKOM’ and calling for the continuation of the Indonesian Revolution. Showing his antagonism towards Suharto, Sukarno made a statement that the Thirtieth of September Movement headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri who had kidnapped and assassinated the six top army leaders “was something ordinary and normal in a revolution and a ripple in the ocean of revolution” (Elson, 2001:122).

In spite of President Sukarno’s rejection, no sooner after the submission of the Instruction Letter of 11 March which was popularly called ‘*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*’ (SUPERSEMAR) from President Sukarno to Major General Suharto on 11 March 1966, Suharto dissolved the PKI and its all affiliated organizations and banned Communism, Marxism-Leninism to be taught in every region of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia on 12 March 1966.

President Sukarno was willing to issue the ‘SUPERSEMAR’ only after being conveyed by the three army generals (Major General Basuki Rahmad, Major General Mohammad Yusuf, and Major General Amir Mahmud), that

Suharto was ready to overcome the problem of security if the president gave him the task. In the Instruction Letter of 11 March or ‘SUPERSEMAR’ President Sukarno ordered Suharto “to take all measures considered necessary to guarantee security, calm, and stability of the government and revolution, and to guarantee the personal safety and authority of the President/Supreme Commander/Great Leader of the Revolution/Mandatory of MPRS in the interests of the unity of the Republic of Indonesia, and to carry out all the teachings of the Great Leader of the Revolution” (Crouch, 1978:189).

Even after the MPRS (5 July 1966) accepted and confirmed Suharto’s 12 March 1966 of decision to dissolve and ban the PKI, the Marxism, Leninism, and Communism, Sukarno remained echoing the Old Order policy which was based on what he called the ‘*Panca Azimat Revolusi*’ or the ‘Five Magic Charms of the Revolution’ which he seemed not to be concerned with Suharto’s unsatisfaction. In his state speech on 17 August 1966, Sukarno still strongly remarked:

“Why were we supreme in the past? ... We were supreme because the entire nation and all revolutionary groups were united. They were united a bearers of the ‘Panca Azimat Revolusi’ which consisted of the Pancasila, ‘NASAKOM’ or Nasasos or Nasa-whatever, MANIPOL-USDEK, Trisakti and Berdikari. These were the teachings of Indonesia’s history. There are some people who don’t want to learn from history, who even want to cut themselves off from our history. That can’t be done. They will fail. I am your Great Leader; that as what the MPRS said; I am your leader. Follow my leadership, follow all my instructions, and God would bless the Indonesian Revolution under my leadership” (Crouch, 1978: 206-207).

On his other speech of September 1966, President Sukarno even mocked the MPRS which had already decided to ban Marxism and Communism by saying:

“I advised the members of the MPRS that if they decided to ban Marxism, Leninism, Communism, I would laugh..... I now say without beating about the bush, I am a Marxist. I have said that since the year 28 I am a nationalist, I am religious, I am a Marxist --- Marxism is contained in my heart” (Crouch, 1978:207).

And, in order “to counter the anti-communist ‘Pancasila Front’ which was emerged immediately after the abortive coup, Sukarno ordered the formation of (what was so called) the ‘*Barisan Sukarno*’ or the Sukarno Front” (Roeder 1970: 41).

Sukarno’s position to remain advocating the PKI and continuing his policy of ‘NASAKOM’, which was then regarded by Suharto as the deviance of the state basis and philosophy of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, eventually made Suharto come to the conclusion that “Sukarno had to be replaced, perhaps by himself, but that the process had to be managed slowly, carefully, and systematically, and in a legal and constitutional way” (Elson, 2001:143).

The issue of ‘SUPERSEMAR’ was regarded by Suharto not only as a historical milestone of the utmost importance for the safety of the people, the country and the nation, but also the beginning of the struggle of the New Order (Dwipayana & Ramadhan KH 1989:174); and it was not “a means to obtain power and a tool for staging a veiled coup” (Crouch, 1978:139) as many people had already charged. While his wife, Mrs. Tien Suharto, commented that the ‘SUPERSEMAR’ had evolved into the historical milestone of a reborn nation (Elson, 2001:139); the DPR-GR in its memorandum of 9 June 1966 stated that the ‘SUPERSEMAR’ became “the key to a new page in the history of the Indonesian Revolution, and constitutes the point of return to the true and pure

basic objectives of the Revolution as sought by the Proclamation of Independence of 17 August and laid down in the Preamble and the Body of the 1945 Constitution" (Elson, 2001:139).

Therefore, after dissolving the PKI and its all affiliated organizations, "a strategy to replace Sukarno in a slow, careful, systematic as well as constitutional process" (Elson, 2001:143) was arranged. On 21 June 1966, the MPRS decided to "adopt and confirm the policy of the president ... that is laid down in the Order dated 11th March 1966 addressed to Lieutenant General Suharto." According to Elson, "passage of this decree was the most basic task of the MPRS, since it raised the status of 'SUPERSEMAR' from an authorization of the president which, naturally, he could revoke at any time, to a decision of the highest body of the state, which the President could not overrule" (Elson, 2001:143).

On 25 July 1966 the new-27-member AMPERA (*'Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat'* or the Mandate of the People's Sufferings) Cabinet was announced with the major tasks was to stabilize politics and economy. In this cabinet, Sukarno was still posited the president but Suharto moved rapidly to strip away the institutions and policies of the Old Order. He abolished many old state bodies which had no constitutional basis but which had served to embellish Sukarno's grip on power, including the National Front, KOTI or '*Komando Operasi Tertinggi*', KOGAM or '*Komando Ganyang Malaysia*', KOTRAR or '*Komando Tertinggi Retooling Alat Revolusi*', KOLOGNAS or '*Komando Logistik Nasional*', and others (Elson, 2001:145).

Then, at the beginning of February 1967, Suharto decided to approach Sukarno with a final offer. Still holding the highest and respected Javanese

cultural values and philosophy, he suggested President Sukarno that he should follow the example of the wise '*King Habiyoso*' in the '*wayang*', who entrusted his kingdom to his sons and retorted to the mountains to mediate but was available to sons for consultation whenever his sons faced difficulties. Rejecting the offer, Sukarno sent a confidential letter to Suharto on 8 February 1967 offering to announce that he was entrusting Suharto with the daily leadership of the government while he retain the state leadership and the right to determine the broad outline of the government leadership in order to uphold the Pancasila revolution. But, Suharto rejected (Crouch, 1978: 215-216).

After the rejection, the parliament then met and passed a resolution calling for a new MPRS session to dismiss the president. As the president's prospect grew darker, Suharto proposed that he retain the presidency on the condition that he declared himself incapacitated. As a Javanese once again Suharto wanted to show that he had no ambition to be the president, he agreed to accept the responsibility only because Sukarno was no longer capacitated and wanted him to replace him. But, Sukarno refused to make such a declaration. On 20 February 1967 Sukarno agreed to transfer the authority of the government to Suharto who would be obliged to report on the implementation of the transfer whenever it was felt to be necessary.

And on 8 March 1967, the special session of the MPRS was opened. The decision declared that "President Sukarno has not been able to carry out his constitutional responsibilities and that President Sukarno has not been able to implement the sentiments and decisions of the MPRS." It therefore "bans President Sukarno from taking part in political activities until the general

elections and withdraws the mandate of the MPRS from President Sukarno and all government authority as regulated by the 1945 Constitution.” It then appointed General Suharto as Acting President and also provided that the settlement of the problem involving Dr. Ir. Sukarno would be left in the hands of the acting president. “A clarification was added as an appendix stating that the meaning of government authority was the same as that in the constitution so that President Sukarno is thereby replaced by General Suharto as Acting President of the Republic of Indonesia” (Crouch, 1978:218).

General Suharto was sworn as Acting President by the speaker of the MPRS, General Nasution, on 12 March 1967. And, on 21 March 1968 he was formally full president after the Fifth General Session of the MPRS appointed him as the second president of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. After his dismissal, Sukarno, was put under effective house arrest until he died on 21 June 1970.

His position as full president paved the way for him to achieve his political visions, that was conducting a total correction toward all deviances of the past history of the nation done by the Old Order regime either by practicing the Parliament or Liberal Democracy as well as the Guided Democracy in order to establish a new page of the nation and state of Indonesia called the New Order.

Explaining what the New Order meant, in his first state speech before members of the MPRS on 16 August 1968, Suharto clearly stated:

“The New Order was born with the deep commitment to re-straighten out the history of the nation’s and state’s journey, based on the philosophy and moral of Pancasila and through the road as guided by the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, the New Order is a total correction toward all kinds of deviances of our past history since the year of 1945 to 1965.

The New Order also maintains and even strengthens the correct and straight things of the experiences and result of our history in the past. And due to that, the New Order is actually a total correction towards us. A total correction towards our faults for the good of us. These total corrections include the way of thinking as well as behavior, covering our spirit and actions, which we will return back to the purity of our Independence goals, to the pure and consistent implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution" (Ensiklopedia Politik dan Pembangunan Pancasila, 1988:265-266).

Explaining what the New Order wanted to do in the following era, Suharto further stated:

"With such a historical background, the New Order in the first part is the order loving and struggling for democracy; not Liberal Democracy, neither nor People Democracy ala people's democracy in socialist countries, but democracy of Indonesia, Pancasila democracy and democracy based on the 1945 Constitution, democracy which is carried out based on the Constitution....

Shortly it can be concluded that the New Order is a constitutional order as well as development order. Constitutional life as well as development becomes '*loro-lorong atunggal*' (the two sides of the same coin) which cannot be separated Therefore two themes or our principle problem met and carried out by the New Order are how we are able to understand and implement the constitutional life and how we are all able to understand our rights and duties demanded by our independence goals that is to carry out just and broad development for all most people" (Ensiklopedia Politik dan Pembangunan Pancasila, 1988:265-266).

The total correction as stated by Suharto was not limited in eliminating the PKI and its all affiliated bodies and overthrowing Sukarno from power, but also involving correction of deviations in every field of life, such as ideology, politics, government, mental attitude as well as the way how the nation worked.

As stated by Suharto in his state speech of 16 August 1969:

"The New Order was not only the order to crush the rebellion of the PKI, not only the order to overthrow the Old Order, but also a total correction of all deviations occurred in the past time. The total correction was not

only in the fields of ideology, politics, and government; but also in our mental attitude and the way we work" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1969).

From the statements made by Suharto relating to the characteristic of the New Order, we can conclude that the New Order was actually meant as: an order for crushing and eliminating the PKI, an order for overthrowing the Old Order, a constitutional order, as well as a development order.

2.6.1. An order for crushing and eliminating the PKI

It could not be ignored that the primary enemy of the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto was the PKI and its all affiliated bodies or organizations, such as '*Pemuda Rakyat*' (PR) or the People Youth, '*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*' (GERWANI) or the Indonesian Women Movement, '*Barisan Tani Indonesia*' (BTI) or the Indonesian Peasant Front, '*Central Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*' (CGMI) or the Central Movement of Indonesian Student, '*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*' (SOBSI) or the Central Organization of the Whole Indonesian Labor, '*Lembaga Kesenian dan Kebudayaan Rakyat*' (LEKKRA) or the People Arts and Culture Institution, etc. The failure of the Thirtieth of September Movement has become a momentum for Suharto to destroy the PKI forces at any place and any level in order to excise them from national political life. According to Suharto, the PKI and its affiliated bodies or organizations had no more right to live on the earth of Nusantara which always upheld the highest values of Pancasila.

The deviation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution done by the Old Order, which was implemented in the form of the teachings of revolution pumped into the people through indoctrination, had resulted the backwardness of the nation's economy. The process of deterioration in every field of national lives was in line with the efforts of the PKI to ripen the situation as its preparation for rebellion blown up in the end of 1965. The aim of rebellion, according to Suharto, was clear not only to overthrow the legitimate government or to assassinate brutally the army leaders, but also to replace Pancasila with another state principle, Communism.

The PKI was crushed not only because of its involvement in the Thirtieth of September Movement, but also of its role as the puppet master or mastermind of the coup attempt. In Suharto's conviction, the Thirtieth of September Movement was not only an attempt to take over the legitimate government, but also an action betraying Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in order to employ a basis for the state other than Pancasila, that was Communism. As asserted by Suharto on the fifth anniversary of 'SUPERSEMAR' in 1971: "The aim of the PKI in 1965 had been the same as in 1948, to change Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in order to replace them with another system" (Elson, 2001:176).

Suharto further asserted that "efforts to employ a basis for the state other than Pancasila or deviations in implementing it will bring catastrophe to the whole nation, as the bitter experience of the past demonstrates" (Elson, 2001:174). The New Order was a regime which was established in order to prevent Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution from being deviated or even changed

as well as to implement Pancasila (either as the state ideology or philosophy) and the 1945 Constitution originally and consistently.

At the beginning of the New Order, not only were the PKI and its all affiliated organizations throughout the nation dissolved, the ideology of Marxism and Communism were also banned by the MPRS. But, the dissolution of the PKI and the ban of the ideology of Marxism and Communism were not the end of the New Order's struggle against the PKI. The fight against communism continued to go on since, according to Suharto in his statement made in early 1967, "the remnants of the PKI are still intending to mount a coup, and that the communists 'will always take opportunity ... to achieve their goal', including infiltrating anti communist organizations" (Elson, 2001:176). And, in order to attack the PKI, three actions had to be taken: "physical destruction of PKI remnants, national unity of purpose, and raising the standard of living" (Elson, 2001:176) by carrying out development movement.

In Suharto's mind, the early New Order faced three major challenges: economic improvement, the development of a political system based upon the principles of the 1945 Constitution (which included a healthy democracy, the rule of law *[negara hukum]*, and constitutional system), and combating the continuing threat of communism (Elson, 2001:168). Therefore, the task of combating the threat of communism would never end.

During the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto, in order to prevent the ideology of communism from being reemerged, an instrument of '*Penelitian Khusus*' (LITSUS) or (Special Investigation) was installed. Under the coordination of the '*Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*'

(KOPKAMTIB), LITSUS was implemented in order to prevent the civil servants and military institutions from being infiltrated by the remnants of the PKI.

2.6.2. An order for overthrowing the Old Order regime

The New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto was a regime struggling for overthrowing the Old Order regime which was charged of having deviated the state ideology and philosophy of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Describing the deviances of the Old Order regime, Suharto in his state speech of 16 August 1970 stated that in the years of 1960 to 1965, Pancasila was gradually changed into 'NASAKOM', ideological grouping emerged into surface in the life of political parties, democracy based on Pancasila was changed into the Guided Democracy which was in reality closed to the system of dictatorship, the teaching of an un-finished revolution had gradually resulted the principle of 'the end justifies the means' (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1989).

Suharto further asserted that "on behalf of the purpose of revolution, by using the symbols of revolutionary and with the law of revolution, the basis of order, organizational principles and management principles of economy, were gradually thrown away. Economic affairs were ignored so that our nation was plunged into a very bad state in the world" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1989).

In foreign affairs, "our foreign policy was changed into a confronting foreign policy and supported only one block, so that we implemented foreign policy based on the axis of Jakarta-Hanoi-Beijing and on the other hand isolated

ourselves by getting out of the UN.” And starting from 1966, “a new page which was called the New Order was opened in order to fill up the independence” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1989). From the time on, Suharto strongly remarked: “We will not return to the era of Liberalism, and we will not return to the era of Guided Democracy. The teachings of ‘NASAKOM’, law of revolution, glamorous politics and so on were already left behind since 1966 and must be left behind forever” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1989).

2.6.3. A constitutional order

a. Implementation of the 1945 Constitution

Describing the political conditions in the era of the Parliament or Liberal Democracy and the Guided Democracy, in his state speech of 16 August 1968, Suharto stated that due to the enormous number of political parties, there was no political stability in the era of the Liberal Democracy. In this unstable politics, the government changed very often making it unable to formulate national development plans and implement them in a relatively short time. And then, in the era of the Guided Democracy, the authority was centralized on the only one hand and there was no effective control coming from anyone, resulting the emergence of the practices of power abuse and the death of the people’s initiatives. This condition had given enormous and prosperous opportunity for the PKI’s movement which not only hampered the effort of development but also threatened the existence of Pancasila.

The success of the nation to overthrow the physical forces of the PKI and the unconstitutional practices had given opportunity for the nation to renew the

lives of the nation which was democratic and constitutional based on the purity of Pancasila, as the fundamental instrument for the nation to achieve the independence's goals, achieving the just and prosperous society by implementing planned and phased developments.

Healthy democratic life was the primary condition for dynamic national stability. But, healthy democratic life required discipline. Meaning, the people's will and opinions had to be well-arranged and transferred through the agreed procedures. Without stepping through these kinds of procedures, the freedom would only mean disorder.

In his state speech of 16 August 1988, Suharto strongly remarked that the New Order was not only a constitutional order but also a development one. According to Suharto, there were two themes or principle problems met and carried out by the New Order. The two themes were how the constitutional life could be understood and implemented and how the rights and duties demanded by the goal of the independence - that was to carry out development justly and evenly for the most people - could be correctly understood (Ensiklopedia Politik dan Pembangunan Pancasila, 1988:265-266). The year of 1966 was regarded by Suharto as a new page of history that was the birth of the New Order, a new era for purifying the goals of the independence, for re-straightening the road of the history and for implementing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1989).

In fact, Suharto had made Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the political legitimacy for the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto. His commitment to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution originally and

consistently was placed on a high position among others. As stated by Suharto in his state speech of 16 August 1976, the New Order had already wanted to build up the nation and state orderly and eternally, a strong and prosperous nation by committing to uphold and implement the 1945 Constitution.

The implementation of the 1945 Constitution had to be upheld honestly, safeguarded by the President, by the MPR, by the DPR, by the Supreme Court, and by the Advisory Body, by the Finance Body, by all social and political forces, by all people. If the 1945 Constitution was not implemented truthfully, the national stability which became the important precondition for national development would of course be hampered; and in the end the development itself might be hampered. The hamper of the development would make us far way from the goals of the independence.

The 1945 Constitution had already given guidance on the stable framework of the national and state lives as well as the clear direction. The 1945 Constitution reaffirmed that the sovereignty was laid on the people's hand and carried out fully by the MPR. The MPR the members of which were representatives of the political forces and representatives of the regions – elected by the national election – had the task to formulate '*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*' (GBHN) or the Broad Lines of the State Policy and elected President and Vice President for the duration of five tears.

Suharto said that the President was the mandatory of the MPR in order to carry out the GBHN stipulated by the MPR. Conducting the Five Year-Development was actually meant to implement the GBHN stipulated by the MPR

as the holder of the people's sovereignty. And, carrying out general elections periodically was actually the realization of the people's sovereignty.

President had to carry out the GBHN stipulated by the MPR. Whereas the DPR could and had to supervise all policies taken by the president. For that purposes, the DPR was given the system of supervision so that the supervision could be done effectively, such as the right of budgeting, the right of agreeing the laws and so on. And if the DPR, the members of which were also the members of the MPR, thought that the President had already acted against the GBHN stipulated by the Constitution or by the MPR, then the MPR could call for a special session in order to require the president's responsibility.

The chance to evaluate the president would finally be stipulated by the session of the MPR five years later, a new MPR which has just elected in the election. In this session, the President is obliged to give responsibility as stipulated in the GBHN. The evaluation would decide whether he is still eligible to retain the mandate from the people's representatives to become President/Mandatory of the MPR in order to carry out the new GBHN for the following five years.

b. Implementation of Pancasila as the state principle and philosophy

In relation to the state principle of Pancasila, Suharto asserted that this regime had a mission to build up Indonesian society not only to be developed but also to be socially just based on the state philosophy of Pancasila. In order to achieve the mission, the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto

committed to carry out the state philosophy of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution originally and consistently.

In his state speech of 16 August 1971, Suharto explained that the most powerful force for establishing the New Order was the loyalty of the people to Pancasila. In 1965-1966 people power grew up everywhere together with ABRI to crush the PKI only because they wanted to defend Pancasila, because people knew that the ultimate goal of the PKI rebellion was to replace Pancasila with other state principle. These people did not want Pancasila to be replaced with other state principle. Then these people also managed to overthrow the Old Order for the Old Order had been proved to have deviated Pancasila from its purity (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1971).

According to Suharto, without the people's belief in Pancasila it was impossible to crush the PKI rebellion, which used to be known as the strongest political party and in the end of 1965 almost managed to achieve its superiority. The Old Order which had been long centralizing the state authority only on the one hand was also able to be defeated because of the people's belief in Pancasila (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1971).

Suharto further asserted that as the national ideology which was supported by the people and deeply rooted in the soul of the Indonesian people, Pancasila was the most precious capital and the biggest power particularly at the time where the nation had to meet every danger threatening the unity of the nation. According to Suharto, the national ideology was not only needed at the time to meet the danger, but it was also needed at any time as the people's guidance for achieving the national goals. The national ideology was, therefore, an important

part of the national defense in every field of politics, economy, social, security and defense (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1971).

Based on his belief in Pancasila, Suharto was strongly committed to implement the national ideology of Pancasila in every field of daily life: in economic development, in political development, in the state life, in foreign policy, etc. His commitment to implement the national ideology of Pancasila did not mean that Pancasila had already been mirrored in all fields of daily life. "But, we are now moving to that direction," said Suharto in his state speech on 16 August 1971. He even further stated that: "With the national ideology of Pancasila as our basis, we are going to build the ordered and dynamic nation and state life as the principle of the constitutional system, democracy and rule of law" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1971).

2.6.4. An order of development

According to Suharto, the New Order was an order of development. Both "the constitutional and the development orders are like 'the two sides of the same coin' or '*lоро-lоронинг атунггал*', one could not be separated from the other" (Ensiklopedia Politik dan Pembangunan Pancasila, 1988:265-266). In President Suharto's view, the New Order had five key goals: political stability including the conduct of foreign policy; general elections; the restoration of order and security; the reformation and clearance of the state apparatus and economic stability with the first five year development plan (Ensiklopedia Politik dan Pembangunan Pancasila, 1988:265-168).

In his state speech delivered on 16 August 1968, not long after he was sworn as the second president replacing Sukarno, President Suharto said: "Until this present time most of Indonesian people still heavily struggle for their daily life. They remain requiring better jobs. They remain requiring good income, enough food and shelter, schools for their children, healthy housing, and insurance for the elders. They remain requiring physical and non physical needs" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1968).

According to President Suharto, "a struggle for fulfilling the independence is really a special thing. Therefore, the theme of the Indonesian struggle is a struggle for liberating people from poverty. The struggle is then a hard work for development because the people's welfare and prosperity could only be achieved through broad development. And, all attention and capability must be focused to this broad development on every field of life" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1968).

President Suharto further explained that "the nation main problem met by the nation at the time is to fulfill the independence with development" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1968). In the previous time since 1959 there had been a practice for centralizing power on the one hand. Without effective control from anyone, centralized power had caused large and negative effect, such as the abuse of power and the death of social initiative, giving the PKI big chance to grow up prosperously that hampered not only the effort of the state development but also the existence of Pancasila as well as the human rights abuse.

During the Old Order regime, “politics was functioned as the commander.” Because politics was always used as the commander, everything either good or bad was measured by using the interests of the groups. Evaluation and management of problems which were merely perceived from political motives ignoring objective and appropriate calculations or considerations would only hamper every effort for fulfilling the independence, causing the people’s baptism and degrading the people’s welfare and prosperity (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1968).

However, every effort to promote the people’s standard of living and prosperity could not be achieved in very short time. What the only one to do was to quicken the process of the development execution through the best and appropriate development plans (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1968).

Based on what Suharto’s arguments, ‘*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*’ (REPELITA) or *the Five Year Development Plan* was then introduced as the solution for promoting the condition. According to Suharto, the execution of the Five Year Development Plan could only be done by mobilizing the nation’s available resources and strength, and the Five Year Development Plan of 1969 would be the first phase of the long trail of national development to execute (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1968).

According to Suharto, the society which was going to be build by the New Order was to be society based on Pancasila, in which the nations citizens would live in harmony and tolerance with one another by ignoring those things that divide them; the New Order was an order of Pancasila Democracy placing

the people's interests above the interests of group or individuals. "The New Order pursues institutionalization and rejects individualization, meaning that the press should relate political news prioritizing the interests of the people, the country and the state above the private interests of leaders, like we have experienced in the period of the Old Order" (Ensiklopedia Politik dan Pembangunan Pancasila, 1988:161).

According to Suharto, development in every field should be carried out in order to build a new society. Explaining what kind of new society he wanted to build, President Suharto in his state speech on 16 August 1970 remarked:

"Yes, this total correction has to be conducted to ourselves; because the present condition was the inheritance of the bad past time, and most of us were part of that inheritance.

Yes, only by bravely correcting ourselves, could we develop our own bright future.

We have to establish a new society, with a new face, with a new spirit, on the philosophical basis of Pancasila.

We want to make our Republic of Indonesia a place of housing for a big family of Indonesian nation; in which all of us would feel at home; all of us would feel peaceful spiritually and safe physically, enthusiastic in developing our talent and proud of our prestation, our rights are protected and with our consciousness to carry out our obligations as responsible citizens.

We have to build up a new society, which is more democratic, more rational, more tolerant and more open, appreciating work and its result.

We have to develop an ordered and dynamic national stability, either in the field of politics, of economy or of social.

Shortly, as Suharto asserted, "the development which was being executed was the development designed for creating accomplished Indonesian individuals and for all Indonesian society" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1972).

2.7. Strategy for promoting the New Order

Of course, it was not easy for Suharto to promote the New Order in order to meet what he had already formulated. In promoting the New Order which he had already established, Suharto met a number of heavy problems. The first problem that Suharto had met was the inexistence of stability, either in politics, security, or in economy. The New Order emerged to surface from a declined political order characterized by political as well as armed conflicts among the three competing forces, Sukarno, the army and the PKI, making the life in social and politics unstable. The practice of the 'Guided Democracy' and the introduction of NASAKOM by Sukarno had already created tensions at every level of society, within the armed forces, political parties, bureaucracy, and other mass organizations. The success of the army to win the conflict enabled Suharto to conduct political renewal not only in the armed forces, but also in the political parties, the bureaucracy, and other mass organizations. But, as a true Javanese, Suharto insisted that this political renewal be conducted on the basis of the Javanese concept of life which always stresses on the principle or '*rukun*' or harmony, '*urmat*' or respect, '*kekeluargaan*' or family-ness, '*musyawarah dan mufakat*' or discussion and consensus, '*gotong royong*' or mutual assistance; and rejects the Western concept of 'opposition' which Suharto regarded as unsuited to the national identity or personality. Only through such kind of political renewal, tensions within society could be eradicated, national stability could be achieved, and national development could be carried out successfully in order to bring welfare to the people as mandated by the founding fathers.

The establishment of the New Order was meant to conduct the political renewal by implementing what was so called the dual function doctrine of the armed forces or '*Doktrin Dwifungsi ABRI*', creating GOLKAR as a vehicle for his political actions, simplifying the numerous political parties into two major parties, imposing the policy of mono-loyalty to the civil servants, and practicing anti-criticism and anti-opposition policy.

The second problem that Suharto had met was the problem of ideology. During the era of the 'Guided Democracy', the ideology of '*Panca Azimat Revolusi*' or the Five Magic Charms of the Revolution (NASAKOM, PANCASILA, MANIPOL-USDEK, TRISAKTI, and BERDIKARI) which was also known as '*Sukarnoism*' had already been very popular to be the identity of the Old Order regime under the leadership of Sukarno. In order to eliminate Sukarno's influence, Suharto decided to replace this ideology. For its replacement, Suharto then began to develop another democracy called the 'Pancasila Democracy', characterized by the ideology of Pancasila' as formulated in the P-4 or '*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*' (Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila) which was so much influenced by noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy as deeply understood by Suharto. Suharto went back to the noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy for he not only knew them better rather than Western political theories, but he also totally believed in the rightness of these noble values and philosophy.

And, the third and uneasy problem that Suharto had met in promoting the New Order was the problem of how Sukarno, the former president, had to be treated. Though his power as the President, the Supreme Military Commander,

the Great Leader of Revolution and the Speaker of the Indonesian People⁷ had been imputed by the ‘SUPERSEMAR’ or ‘*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*’ (the Instruction Letter of 11 March), due to his strong charisma, Sukarno still had powerful and loyal supporters. Any wrong step in treating Sukarno would cause bad faith for Suharto whose star was just becoming brighter.

As the emerging leader, at the beginning of his rule, Suharto also met problems of legitimacy. Although, after the failure of the Thirtieth of September Movement, Suharto managed to take over control of the military leadership, he rejected to use decisive force to overthrow Sukarno whose power and influence had begun to decline. He was aware that Sukarno was a great and charismatic leader and still had strong loyal and fanatical followers.

“Due to his rapport with his people, his gift of personal magnetism and his power of oratory, Sukarno had even been placed by observers among the great charismatic leaders of the twentieth century” (Legge, 1972:10), Sukarno was also seen by the Javanese as possessing ‘*kesaktian*’, the supernaturally derived power inherent in a Javanese leader. In the perspective of the messianic tradition of peasant society, Sukarno was also regarded as the ‘*Ratu Adil*’ (the Just Ruler) whose task was to bring order, to restore harmony and to reunite the kingdom after a time of turmoil, to re-assert the parallelism between the harmony of the terrestrial order and that of the cosmos. Social upheaval and the erosion of custom by colonial rule and capitalist penetration had created the conditions in

⁷ In March 1967 MPRS or “*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*” (the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly) through an extraordinary meeting elected General Suharto the Acting President. As the Acting President, he gradually imputed the authorities of Sukarno as the Head of State, the President, and the Supreme Commander of the Military Forces. He was then appointed President on 27 March 1968.

which Sukarno could appear as an ordained savior or '*satriyo pininigit*' (hidden warrior) within a traditional world view.

While, as a charismatic leader, Sukarno's resources of his legitimacy were quite abundant; Suharto, on the other hand, felt that he did not have got so much resources of legitimacy as Sukarno did. His ability to control the army and the mandate presented by Sukarno in the form of 'SUPERSEMAR' or the Instruction Letter of 11 March were regarded as not enough to be resources of legitimacy for his leadership. As a true Javanese, Suharto still needed others. So, he had to go back to the Javanese traditions, particularly how the Javanese perceive about politics in general and power or authority in particular. In other words, Suharto wanted to use and manipulate Javanese political culture as other sources of legitimacy for his political leadership, particularly in facing his political opponents.

Therefore, Suharto was always very careful in formulating policies on the ex-first President Sukarno by still keeping tightly the Javanese philosophy. As for example, when students went to the streets protesting and forcing President Sukarno to step down, he asked Suharto in Javanese language: "*Harto, Jane aku iki arep kok kapake?*" (Harto, what are you really going to do with me?). Still showing himself as a true Javanese, Suharto answered politely: "My president, I am a son of a poor farmer. But my father always keeps asking me to honor old man. I am always reminded to be able to honor old men" (Dwipayana and Ramadhan, 1989:165). In Javanese culture it is popularly called: '*mikul dhuwur, mendhem jero*' or to carry high and burry deep.

When he became '*Panglima Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Tata Tertib*' or PANGKOKAMTIB (the Commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), Suharto often contradicted with President Sukarno who still wanted to defend the idea of NASAKOM (Nationalist, Religion, and Communist) and rejected to dissolve PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). Since October 1965 till March 1966, Suharto had met Sukarno more than eleven times. In every meeting, Suharto always kept his attitude as a puritan Javanese. Even when Sukarno was angry, he was always calm and patient and kept remembering the Javanese philosophy of '*sura dira jayaningrat lebur dening pangastuti*' or the bravery, power, and greatness in the world could be defeated by our devotion to God (Dwipayana and Ramadhan, 1989:167).

According to Akbar Tanjung, what Suharto's treatment to Bung Karno was based on the reference of Javanese traditional teachings:

"From the relationship between Pak Harto and Bung Karno it could be clearly seen that Pak Harto did not take immediate and drastic action particularly in relation to the existence of Bung Karno. Although at that time there had been lots of political pressures coming from public, particularly students, asking Pak Harto to immediately take action against Bung Karno, Pak Harto preferred using the philosophy of '*sabdho pandito ratu*'. The students had charged Bung Karno of having created the situation and condition enabling the PKI to launch the 'Thirtieth of September Movement' by giving lots of chances to the PKI. These chances or opportunities were then utilized by the PKI to launch a coup in order to take over the legal government and to change the state ideology of Pancasila with other ideology, Communism.

Bung Karno might have been inspired by his own concept which he had created when he was still young, that was the concept of NASAKOM. According to him, Indonesian national power could be divided into three forces: nationalist, religious group, and communist. Bung Karno strongly believed that if the three national forces could be united then the Indonesian nation and state would be very strong. But, Bung Karno fully

neglected the reality that there were many factors making the three forces unable to be united.

Let alone when we saw it in the context of religious groups and the communist. It was quite clear that both the religious groups and the communist could not be blended. But, it was Bung Karno's opinion. He had such an idea making him reject any request to take action against the PKI. He even remained giving a chance to the PKI to still exist and develop. Although Pak Harto had always reminded him and urged him to take action against the PKI, Bung Karno remained rejecting. However Pak Harto still did not take any direct action to Bung Karno. He might have been inspired by Javanese philosophy that someone was not allowed to show in public his political ambition.

It might have become the reason why Pak Harto did not take immediate action against Bung Karno. Even once when Pak Harto did nothing to him, Bung Karno asked Pak Harto: "Harto, what are you going to do with me?" and Pak Harto answered that he wanted 'to carry high and burry deep' or '*mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*' as his father always taught him. It was meant that at every action and behavior as a leader Pak Harto was always inspired by Javanese culture or always used Javanese culture as his reference. It could be seen from the way he treated Bung Karno until Bung Karno finally delivered the "Instruction Letter of 11 March" which was popularly called the 'SUPERSEMAR'. Of course this letter of order was issued after Pak Harto had long communicated or made a number of dialogues with Bung Karno. From what Pak Harto had done to Bung Karno, we could come to the conclusion that Pak Harto was a firm leader. He had the consistent attitude particularly in strengthening Pancasila. Therefore after receiving the 'SUPERSEMAR' Pak Harto immediately dissolved the PKI.⁸

Suharto treated Sukarno properly, even after Sukarno was no longer president or after he had passed away.⁹ He always kept the principle of '*mikul dhuwur, mendhem jero*' (to carry high and burry deep) though in 1968 he placed Sukarno in a political quarantine. In order to show his commitment, after Sukarno died he took a number of policies, such as: burying Sukarno in Bendo Gerit

⁸ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

⁹ Sukarno was no longer president since 27 March 1968 after the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) elected General Suharto the second President replacing him. He passed away on 21 June 1970 and was buried in Bendo Gerit cemetery, Blitar, close to his mother's tomb.

cemetery in Blitar close to his mother's tomb (1970), renovating his cemetery to make it more representative and attractive as well as easily visited by many people (1979), building the statues of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta at a place where on 17 August 1945 the two proclamation heroes read the text of the Indonesian Proclamation (1980), giving the name "*Sukarno-Hatta International Airport*" to the new international airport in Jakarta (1985), and determining Sukarno-Hatta as the heroes of Proclamation (Dwipayana and Ramadhan, 1989:246-247).

Relating to General Suharto's statement delivered to Bung Karno that he wanted to carry high and burry deep or '*mikul dhuwur, mendhem jero*', Professor Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono gave his testimony:

"Once, when I was in Yogyakarta, an adjoint of President Suharto called me, telling me that Pak Harto wanted to see me. When I met Pak Harto, he said: "As a Javanese, the meaning of honoring an elder person or a person who has served to the country is '*mikul dhuwur, mendhem jero*' (to carry high and burry deep). I want to have the tomb of Bung Karno renovated. Are you, Pak Kamdani, willing to help me?" I answered: '*Insyaallah*'. He then showed me the design of the renovation made by the Governor of East Java, Sunandar Priyosudarmo. Commenting to this design, Ibu Tien Suharto even said: "How could we carry high and burry deep or '*mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*' if the renovation is only like '*gubug*' (hut or shelter in rice field). If we want to renovate the tomb of Bung Karno, by using 'gold' is even not bad." But Pak Harto answered, "Do not use gold. We have to pay attention to the state budget."¹⁰

Professor Sukamdani further asserted that the renovation was finished in 1979. When it was inaugurated, all Bung Karno's children were invited, but none was present except Ibu Wardoyo. This renovation was commented by many people that it was full of Suharto's political interests. Before dying, Bung Karno had ever requested to be buried at Batu Tulis, Bogor. But, due to political

¹⁰ Interview with Professor Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono, Jakarta, 10 October 2009.

considerations, this request was rejected by Pak Harto. Professor Sukamdani finally made a strong remark that whatever many people had commented, the fact was that “by renovating Bung Karno’s cemetery, Pak Harto and Ibu Tien had showed to public how great they honored Bung Karno as the Hero of the Proclamation.”¹¹

2.8. Summary

The proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945 has become a new phase for power struggle among the Indonesian elites for dominating position. Sukarno who became the central figure of the country and was even regarded as the symbol of a united nation for the time being was marginalized, and his position was replaced by Syahrir, the architect of the liberal or parliamentary system replacing the presidential system as legislated by the 1945 Constitution.

The failure of the liberal or parliamentary system (popularly called Liberal Democracy) to maintain political order made Sukarno introduce his concept of Guided Democracy. Backed up by the army, Sukarno declared the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959, stating the reenactment of the 1945 Constitution and the dispersion of the Constitutional Council. Being threatened by the army whose political influence tended to be more powerful, Sukarno promoted the PKI as the other center of power. The alliance among the three power centers, Sukarno, the army, and the PKI became to emerge, leading to the irresolvable conflict between the two power centers, the army and the PKI. The paramount of the conflict was the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement.

¹¹ Interview with Professor Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono, Jakarta, 10 October 2009.

The success of Suharto to crush the Thirtieth of September Movement had given him a chance to play important and decisive role in Indonesian politics not only to eliminate the PKI from the national political map, to remove Sukarno from power, but also to establish and promote the New Order regime which he regarded as a constitutional as well as development order for achieving the goals of the independence as formulated by the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution.

CHAPTER 3

JAVANESE CULTURE

3.1. Introduction

Every society has its own culture for supporting the life of its members. A discussion on culture is actually a discussion on topic related to human being's creations, either visible or invisible. There are too many definitions of culture, such as: culture "includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (Chilcote, 1994:178), culture "embraces all the manifestations of social habits of the group in which he lives and the products of human activities as determined by these habits" (Chilcote, 1994:178), or culture is "a complex of ideas, values, norms, regulations, and others; or a complex of patterned behavior activity of people in a society; or articles made or created by people" (Koentjaraningrat, 1974:15).

When we speak about culture we refer to two different things, untouchable or invisible and touchable or visible. Something untouchable includes "knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, social habits, way of life, learned problem solutions, ideas, values, norms, regulations, patterned behavior, etc.;" while something touchable includes "capabilities, products of human activities or action, the distinctive achievement of human groups including their embodiments in artifacts, goods or articles, etc." All the things are the products made by man or group of man in a society in order to meet the need of those people or groups of people. Because every culture was born and developed in order to meet the need of people or groups of people, it is always maintained,

developed and defended by those people or groups of people (Haviland, 1988:331).

Since people's needs are always changing from time to time due to the changes of time and condition, culture needs to be developed, evaluated and revised in accordance with the growing needs. Every culture is then claimed to possess capability to change and develop in order to accord with the conditions or to change its perception on the existing condition (Haviland, 1988:331).

This thesis is going to discuss culture in the form of "knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, social habits, way of life, learned problem solutions, ideas, values, norms, regulations, patterned behavior, etc." which individual or group of individuals usually use for the basis of their orientations toward political system. In Western terminology, this culture is popularly called "political culture."³

In other words, Javanese culture which is related to Javanese's attitudes toward politics and their role within the political system is called Javanese political culture. This culture includes their orientations toward three levels: the

³ Political culture is a particular pattern of orientation to political action. According to Gabriel Almond, "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political action" ... which is popularly called "political culture" (Chilcote, 1994:179). A nation's political culture is public attitudes toward politics and their role within the political system.

While Almond, Powell, Strom and Dalton in their book of "Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework" (2004) said: "to understand the tendencies for present and future behavior in a nation, we must begin with public attitudes toward politics and their role within the political system – we call a nation's political culture" (Almond et.al., 2004:56). According to Almond and Verba, "political culture of a society refers to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluates of its population" (Chilcote, 1994:179).

Almond, Powell, Strom and Dalton also explain that "a nation's political culture includes its citizens' orientations toward three levels: the political system, the political and policymaking process, and policy outputs and outcomes." (Almond et.al., 2004:57) The *system* level involves the citizens' and leaders' views of the values and organizations that comprise the political system. Do citizens identify with the nation and accept the general system of political regime? The *process* level includes expectations of how politics should function, and individual's relationship to the political process. The *policy* level deals with citizens' and leaders' policy expectations from the political regime. What are the political regime's policy goals and how they to be achieved?

political system, the political and policymaking process, and policy outputs and outcomes. The system level involves the Javanese citizens' and leaders' views of the values and organizations that comprise the political system. Do the Javanese citizens identify with the nation and accept the general system of political regime? The process level includes expectations of how politics should function, and the Javanese individual's relationship to the political process. The policy level deals with the Javanese citizens' and leaders' policy expectations from the political regime. What are the political regime's policy goals and how are they to be achieved?

Javanese culture cannot be separated from the concepts of how Javanese people perceive man, environment, and power. The Javanese concept of man, environment, and power have already influenced Javanese people in perceiving politics, particularly the way how a Javanese has to be involved in power struggle against others. This chapter would explain the three Javanese concepts of man, environment, and power and their relation with legitimacy needed by a king or a leader of a state or a country dominated by Javanese tribe.

3.2. Fundamental characteristics of Javanese culture

Javanese culture, including political culture, cannot be separated from its sources, the literatures or writings written by the Kings and philosophers from the Javanese kingdoms, such as '*Serat Wulang Reh*' written by Sri Paku Buwono IV (King of Kasunanan Surakarta Hadiningrat); '*Serat Centhini*' written by Sri Paku Buwono V (King of Kasunanan Surakarta Hadiningrat); '*Tri Dharma*' written by Pangeran Sambernyowo (King of Pura Mangkunegaran); '*Serat Wredatama*' and

'Serat Tripama' written by KGPAA Mangkunegoro IV (King of Pura Mangkunegaran); *'Cipta Hening'* written by Mpu Kanwa; *'Dewaruci'* written by Yasadipura I; *'Serat Paramayoga'*, *'Pustaka Raja Purwa'*, *'Aji Pamasa'*, *'Cemporet'*, *'Jokolodhang'*, *'Wirid'*, *'Witaradya'*, *'Barathayudha'*, and *'Kalathida'* written by Ranggawarsita; *'Jayabaya'*, *'Nitisastra'* and *'Suluk Sela'* (all anonyms), etc. (Siti Hardiyati Rukmana, 1993:199-203).

Most of these teachings contained the philosophical values, giving moral basis for Javanese people's lives, particularly in responding to many different phenomenon, such as: how people have to position themselves in relation and communication with God as the Creator, with other people, with other different creatures as well as with their environment. There are at least three concepts possessed by the Javanese, the concept of man, of environment, and of power which then would influence the Javanese culture on politics.:

3.2.1. The Javanese concept of man

Fachri Ali in his book of *"Refleksi Paham Kekuasaan Jawa Dalam Indonesia Modern"* (1986) has said that due to the influence of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, Javanese people perceive man as a spiritual human being. From Buddhism, the Javanese adopted a concept of man in the form of hierarchy: *"morally and mystically, men are not equal"* (Fachri Ali, 1986:2). From the belief that *'men are not equal'* they then classify men into two groups: *'wong cilik'* or peasants and *'priyayi'* or aristocrats. *'Wong cilik'* is a group of people with lower social and economic status, and *'priyayi'* or aristocrats are a group of people with higher social and economic status (Fachri Ali, 1986:1). *'Priyayi'* or

aristocrats function as the contributor of culture and philosophy, which becomes guidance for '*wong cilik*'. While '*wong cilik*' or peasants, on the other hand, function as the contributor of agricultural products needed by '*priyayi*' (Fachri Ali, 1986:1).

From Islam, the Javanese people adopted the concept describing that men were created from two elements, '*jasad*' or '*tubuh fisik*' or physical body, and '*ruh*' or spirit (Fachri Ali, 1986:3). Javanese people translated the two elements as '*mudah*'. The physical body consists of four elements: '*air*' or water, '*udara*' or air, '*api*' or fire, and '*tanah*' or soil. While the spirit consists of four elements which become the manifestation of God himself (Fachri Ali, 1986:3). These four elements are '*nur*' or light, '*raksa*' or authority, '*nafsu*' or impulse, and '*budi*' or mind (Fachri Ali, 1986:2). Harun Hadiwijono in his book "*Kebatinan Jawa*" described these elements into five, '*nur*' or light, '*rahsa*' or feeling, '*roh*' or spirit, '*nafsu*' or impulse, and '*budi*' or mind (Hadiwijono, p.17).

The dependence of '*wong cilik*' on the '*priyayi*' according to Javanese is particularly based on the socialization of belief values perceiving '*priyayi*' as to have a circle of mystical and magical light (Fachri Ali, 1986:5). This spiritual power flows out and then goes down from the kingdom's water spring and gradually this spiritual power becomes less when, through bureaucracy, reaches the lower level and in the end flows weak to the peasants staying at the lowest level (Fachri Ali, 1986:5).

Meanwhile, based on their belief in Islam, Javanese society were distinguished by Clifford Geertz, in his book of "*The Religion of Java*" (1960), into three varieties of Javanese Islam: '*Abangan*', or Javanist Muslim, tradition

was described as a syncretic blend of animist, Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic elements that was predominant among the mass of rural Javanese. ‘*Santri*’ tradition was identified as a more orthodox variant of Islam, especially widespread among merchants and wealthier peasants. Finally, ‘*priyayi*’ tradition was identified as an elite heritage strongly influenced by the Hindu-Buddhist values of earlier Javanese courts and linked to Java’s traditional gentry and the administrative bureaucracy that replaced it in the modern era (Geertz, 1960:5-6).

Although Clifford Geertz’s typology on Javanese society was quite helpful in understanding Javanese society, several points had been noted by Robert W. Hefner. In his article of “*Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java*,” Hefner stated:

“First, Geertz’s use of term ‘*priyayi*’ does not conform to Javanese usage; where the term refers top a distinction of social class (*priyayi*, or aristocrats, as opposed to ‘*wong cilik*’, or common people), not religious culture. Some ‘*priyayi*’ have been devout Muslim. Second, and related to the first point, the distinction between Javanist and orthodox Muslims tends to cut across classes rather than neatly correlate with them. Hence there are peasants and aristocrats who are ‘*santri*’, and others who are ‘*Javanist Muslims*’. A close correlation of class/economic status and religious orientation is found among merchants, however, who, as throughout Indonesia, tend to be more orthodox Muslims. The whole issue of religion and class is complicated, moreover, by regional variation” (Hefner, 1987:533-534).

Robert W. Hefner further asserted that in light of this fact, in discussing about Javanese society and Islam he preferred using a term like ‘*Islam Jawa*’ or Javanese Islam, ‘*kejawen*’ or roughly, Javanist, or ‘*agama Jawa*’ or Javanese religion (cf. Kuntjaraningrat, 1985:316), to refer to the so called ‘*abangan*’ population (Hefner, 1987:533).

3.2.2. The Javanese concept of environment

In the eyes of the Javanese people, environment is not merely an objective reality. The physical reality which they see is also a part of the universal phenomenon. Universal means that reality of life, which they could perceive, is fully attached to things that they could not perceive (Fachri Ali, 1986:8).

For the Javanese people, the environment where they live is very important. This becomes the basis for their life encircling the individual, society, and nature. All elements are integrated with the supernatural universe. The survival of life fully depends on the environment. People have to maintain the regularity of their environment. The achievement of life coordinated between man and nature has been the dream of the Javanese people. The unity or harmony has been understood as the harmonious relationship between '*jagad gedhe*' or macro cosmos and '*jagad alit*' or micro cosmos. The unity of these two cosmoses has been the final destination of the Javanese people (Fachri Ali, 1986:8).

Both the two concepts, the concept of man and the concept of environment, are reflected in their social relationship as well as their real political life, the relationship which always stresses on the principle of '*rukun*' or harmony, "an interest trying to avoid open conflict," and the principle of '*urmat*' or respect (Fachri Ali, 1986:8).

The main purpose of the principle of harmony is to maintain harmony of society (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:86). Hildred Geertz in her book of "*The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization*" (1989) said that "the proper expression of respect (what the Javanese refer to as showing '*urmat*' of feeling '*sungkan*' or '*pakewuh*' or reluctant) is based on the traditional

Javanese view that all social relationships are hierarchically ordered, and on the moral imperative to maintain and express this mode of social order in itself" (Hildred Geertz, 1989:147).

Hildred Geertz further explained that "the determination to maintain the performance of social harmony to minimize the overt expression of any kind of social and personal conflict, is based on the Javanese view that the emotional equilibrium, emotional stasis, is of highest worth, and on the corresponding moral imperative to control one's own impulses, to keep them out of awareness or at least unexpressed, so as not to set up reverberating emotional in others" (Hildred Geertz, 1989:147).

Hildred Geertz also said that "the cluster attitude centering on '*urmat*' or respect is a guide to social behavior in many different contexts - toward government officials, in the schools, in the political parties, in relationship among neighbors, among others" (Hildred Geertz, 1989:147). This harmonious social relationship has been the obsession of either '*wong cilik*' or "*priyayi*." The Javanese would feel sick if they are in confrontation. The social pressure of confrontation and also the sensitivity toward reaction to other people make the Javanese people always try to avoid being aggressive or taking ethical initiative (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:87). Javanese people often refer to their group and tradition and also to their traditional leaders whenever they reflect and evaluate their own life (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:87-88).

Franz Magnis Suseno on his writing of "*Etika Sebagai Kebijaksanaan Hidup: Catatan Tentang Struktur Etika Jawa*" explains that the principle of '*rukun*' (harmony) together with the principle of '*urmat*' (respect) overrides the

other principles regularizing their social relationship (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:90). Because of these principles, individual feels obliged to place his own interest and right as the second priority in order to maintain their social harmony, even if needed they have to throw far away those interests and rights (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:90).

Suseno has said, the principle of '*rukun*' forbids Javanese people to take position, which could cause conflict. Not only conflict caused by his own individual interest is forbidden, the cause of conflict itself is also principally avoided (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:90). Every action which could cause conflict has been perceived by Javanese people as negative action, even if the conflict is shown on behalf of honesty, loyalty, justice, or preparedness to help (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:90).

Suseno describes the relationship between the principle of '*rukun*' and the principle of individual right as follows: "Javanese people firstly determine not their right which could not be claimed, but their duty which they have to do which of course implicate other people's rights. Their duties are not perceived from men who own right, but from the side of all village people: the duty should be done on behalf of the village harmony" (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:64-65).

Suseno has also stated that the principle of '*rukun*' or harmony is not the fundamental principle, the principle that could not be found in other norms. The principle of '*rukun*' is related to the interaction, that is to forbid open conflict, while the inside attitude is not forbidden" (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:91). Suseno further explained that the principle of '*rukun*' is

not always relating to consciousness. '*Rukun*' or harmony only requires that all individual appearance and social conflict be avoided to emerge. Hildred Geertz called this principle as 'harmonious social appearance' (Hildred Geertz, 1989:146). The condition of '*rukun*' has highly emotional values for Javanese. All manifestation of conflict is perceived as something unexpected so that Javanese often withdraw themselves from his right than taking risk from being openly hit with others (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:87). They tend to reject other people's proposal openly. This position was chosen since they were still in their early years (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:89). Behind this tendency there is a perception among Javanese that 'balanced emotional statement' would grow in them moral and social strength, while 'disrupted emotional condition' is perceived by Javanese as dangerous (Franz Magnis Suseno and Reksosusilo, 1983:90).

It is important to believe many words or idealizing that could be listened from the mouth of '*priyayi*' or aristocrats on the basis of the principle of '*rukun*' or harmony. For '*wong cilik*' or peasants, '*rukun*' means "a hard headed modus vivendi" achieved through the give and take process among people with their own individual interest. '*Rukun*' is the method of conflict resolution among individuals with different interests. Therefore, Clifford Geertz in his book of "*The Religion of Java*" (1960) translated '*rukun*' as 'traditionalized cooperation' (Clifford Geertz, 1960:61).

3.2.3. The Javanese concept of power

The third concept is about power. As mentioned above, the social and political relationship of the Javanese people is decided by the concept of human being and environment. The two concepts then develop two important principles called '*rukun*' or harmony and '*urmat*' or respect. The two principles become the Javanese guidance in behavior and action. In political life, all the concepts and principles together with the third concept, that is power, play important role.

In his writing of "*The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture*" published in a book of "*Culture and Politics in Indonesia*" edited by Claire Holt (1972), Benedict R. O'G. Anderson said that "the central problem raised by this conception, by contrast with the Western political theory, is not the exercise of power but its accumulation. Accordingly, a very considerable portion of the traditional literature deals with the problems of concentrating and preserving power, rather than with its proper uses" (Claire Holt, 1972:8). Anderson also explained four different Javanese aspects of power as follows:

1. *Power is concrete*: Power exists, independent of its possible users. It is not a theoretical postulate but an existential reality. Power is that intangible, mysterious, and divine energy which animates the universe;
2. *Power is homogeneous*: All power is of the same type and has the same source. Power in the hands of one individual or one group of people is identical with power in the hands of any other individual or group;
3. *The quantum of power in the universe is constant*: In the Javanese view, the cosmos is neither expanding nor contracting. The total amount of power within it, too, remains fixed. Since power simply exists, and it is not the product of organization, wealth, weapons, or anything else – indeed precedes all of these and makes them what they are – its total quantity does not change, even though the distribution of power in the universe may vary;
4. *Power does not raise the question of legitimacy*: Since all power derives from a single homogeneous source, power itself antecedes

questions of good and evil. It would be meaningless to claim the right to rule on the basis of differential sources of power – for example, to say that power based on wealth is legitimate, whereas power based on guns is illegitimate. Power is neither legitimate nor illegitimate" (Claire Holt, 1972:7-8).

Shortly, different from European and American concept which perceives power as the only secular and abstract quality and as a relation among people, closely related to and inside of those who use it, having moral implication for those people, therefore a ruler has to possess other conditions of quality related to that power (Koentjaraningrat, 1985:128-129). Hence, most Javanese see power as something concrete, homogeneous, constant in total quantity, and without inherent moral implication as such (Claire Holt, 1972:8). Power is regarded as a powerful and sacrificed energy, being concrete in the environment of human being, and outside of those who use it. The use of power is automatic and there is no moral implication and no conditions of quality for those who use it. A Javanese king or leader would think that what he needed is the resources of power (such as '*Kris*' coming from the king palace) so that he would possess something identical to that power itself and he would automatically rule the people (Koentjaraningrat, 1985:128-129).

But, according to Koentjaraningrat, power as a powerful and sacrificed energy is only a symbolic one. The superpower character is an important condition, but not the most important one. A king or a leader has to consider all other components of power needed by universal and qualitative leader, such as: having capability in coordinating, in finishing jobs or activities, in resolving conflict, in cultivating, in speaking, in going to war, in collecting wealth, in

magical power, in exercising physical power, as well as in carrying out religious activities (Koentjaraningrat, 1985:133).

Leadership continuity based on heredity must be reinforced by the belief that the heredity coming from the goddess so that his legitimacy is based not only on powerful but also magical heredity. King is regarded as having magical light or 'wahyu' from God or having superpower energy. Weber called the character of magical energy as charisma (Koentjaraningrat, 1985:136). Legitimacy based on charisma is important in order to maintain the continuity of leadership, but other components of power that was capability to exercise physical power and to organize many people by sanction system remained important. The king's legitimacy is reached by behaving in accordance to the ideals and belief possessed by most people. A king must be just, generous, and wise (Koentjaraningrat, 1985:137).

On the other hand when depicting the concept of power in Javanese culture, Arief Budiman in his writing on "*The Student Movement in Indonesia: a Study of Relationship between Culture and Structure*" (*Asian Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 6, June 1978) asserted that "the concept of power in Javanese culture is different from that commonly held in the West ... which considers power to be abstract - merely a word generally used to describe a relationship" and that "the Javanese believe power to be concrete, existing independently of its possible users. Power is that intangible, mysterious, and divine energy which animates the universe. To a certain extent, power manifests itself in the '*pusaka*', or sacred articles with magical power inherited by the Sultan" (Arief Budiman, 1978:615).

Relating to what so called '*pusaka*' as the manifestation of power possessed by the Sultan, Arief Budiman made a clear explanation that:

"These '*pusaka*' are essential part of the Sultan's authority: without them, it is believed, a Sultan cannot enjoy the faith and loyalty of the people and thus he cannot rule over the state. But the '*pusaka*' without a human being functioning as a Sultan cannot express their harmony and prosperity to the people.

In this position, the Sultan acts as a link between the cosmic power and the mundane world. It is power which chooses him as its agent. Thus, "each word of his Sultan is not just a word from a human being who happens to have the power of the state; it is also a word from the heavenly world" (Arief Budiman, 1978:615-616).

For the Javanese, power is not merely related to authority to act possessed by a ruler, but it is also related to something more magical. Arief Budiman said:

"Power affords the ability to give life. If power is in the hands of the right person, nature and society will be in total harmonious order. If not, the power will slip out of the ruler's hands, no matter how hard he tries to keep it. Power is the ability to maintain a smooth tautness and to act like magnet which aligns scattered from filling in a patterned field of forces. Thus the signs of a lessening in the tautness of a ruler's power and of a diffusion of his strength are seen in the manifestation of disorder in the nature world – flood, eruptions, and plagues – and in inappropriate modes of social behavior – theft, greed, and murder.

One should bear in mind that in Javanese thought, there is no reciprocal effect between declining power and the appearance of these undesirable phenomena. Antisocial behavior arises from a rule's declining power but does not cause his decline. Therefore, a ruler who has once permitted natural and social disorders to occur finds it particularly difficult to reconstitute his authority. A Javanese ruler will try to institute preventive measures whenever he senses impending disorder; hence there is a strong tendency to become an authoritarian ruler" (Arief Budiman, 1978:616).

When talking about criticism which was often regarded by the ruler as able to endanger the political and security stability, Arief Budiman stated that in this kind of political culture, criticism could not be freely delivered. He said:

“How can social criticism exist in this kind of political culture? Interestingly enough, the culture has mechanisms for expressing criticism. First, criticism is possible if presented as a half serious joke, often by the clowns in the ‘*wayang*’ performance or puppet theatre. Secondly, a more serious or aggressive criticism can be presented by the ‘*resi*’, the hermits, and sages.

The rest usually reside in isolated caves or on lonely mountainsides removed or withdrawn from the society in order to cultivate clairvoyance, study the secrets of the cosmos, and prepare themselves for death. Their typical role is to diagnose decay within the kingdom and to give warning of the impending downfall of the dynasty.

Since the rest have no worldly interests, a ruler who harmed or killed a ‘*resi*’ would reveal to the people that he is dominated by personal passion. Since the ‘*resi*’, the withdrawal from society and politics, or in Benda’s words the absence of ‘material advantages’, is an essential element in his prestige and hence his power. But while Benda’s intellectual drive their power from the moral and ethnical realm, the Javanese ‘*resi*’ derive prestige from the mystical world of power itself” (Arief Budiman, 1978:616-617).

Based on the above arguments, Arief Budiman finally concluded that Javanese culture on politics strongly emphasizes the absence of interest in political activity. The ruler has the legitimate authority to put down any person or group which opposes him on the basis of personal interest – and of course heavenly power aids the ruler. Suppression of such a person or group is seen as revealing and augmenting his power. But, if suppression is directed against the ‘*resi*’ who have no personal interest, this is taken as a sign of the center’s impending disintegration” (Arief Budiman, 1978:616-617).

3.2.4. The Javanese concept of king or leader

Based on the above concept of men, environment, and power, most Javanese perceive their king as the exponent of micro cosmos of kingdom. A

Javanese king is the only medium relating micro cosmos of the world with the condition of macro cosmos. He is regarded as “the mediator between people and their God and identical to God, generally the goddess of ‘*Wisnu*’ possessing magic power of the goddess.....making his decisions cannot be debated and also unlimited” (Fachri Ali, 1986:27). In people’s eyes, a Javanese king is the legitimate king who possesses power to execute peace or war. He is not only the commander of war but also the representative of God on the earth (Fachri Ali, 1986: 27). In the 15th century, after the coming of Islam, sultan was perceived as “a man who was awarded kingdom with absolute political, military and religious power. ...the power in politics and in religion was identical” (Fachri Ali, 1986: 27).

The Javanese concept of king was influenced by the combination between the teachings of Islam and Hindu-Buddha. These influences had enriched, reinforced, and perpetuated the concept of ‘*raja*’ or ‘*ratu*’ or king. ‘*Raja*’ or king was perceived as “*wenang murba wisesa*” (possessing power to present reward and punishment) or the power of the king was absolute descended from the power of God the Creator (Fachri Ali, 1989: 27-28). A Javanese king governed not only the state and its property, but also all people and their lives (Solopos, 2004:62).

The above statements were reinforced by G. Moedjanto. In his book of “*The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture*” (1986), Moedjanto has asserted that the power of the kings of Mataram was indeed great. It was so great, especially from their subjects’ point of view, that they were often described as the owners of everything in the world; not only the owners of a country or of

property, but also the owners of one's very life" (G. Moedjanto, 1986:102). He further said that in the world of wayang, such a king was described as '*gung binathara, bau dhendha nyakrawati*' (celestially grand; maintaining the law and rulling the world). Usually he was also considered as wise, portrayed in the words '*ber budi bowo leksono, ambeg adil paramarta*' (pure-hearted and full of justice for all creatures). Such great power and wisdom were always hoped for by the kings and their subjects" (G. Moedjanto 1986:102-1030).

Although possessing great authority, there were limitations that had to be kept by a king. As depicted by '*Surat Wulangreh*':

"In exercising power, a king had to keep the law of justice, so that people would follow him. People who did not follow him or rejected to follow his order would be regarded as being against God, the Creator. A Javanese king could not behave arbitrarily in exercising power. The king had to possess the characteristic of '*berbudi bowo leksono hambeg adil para marta*', meaning the king had to be able to maintain order and security to people. The king had to be '*wicaksana*' or wise in exercising power or able to keep order and security ('*anjaga tata tentreming praja*') or to keep people to live peacefully" (JB. Meinsma, 1941).

"The king has to be someone who could punish but also someone who could enforce order as the manifestation of justice for the people and state" (Solopos, 2004:63).

As the representative of God the Creator on the earth, a Javanese king was requested to possess ability to achieve the guidance of God the Creator by '*semedi*' or to learn knowledge of the God's wills or to predict the future popularly called '*neges karsaning hyang ingkang murbeng pandalu*' (trying to understand what really God's wills were). The God's wills were never seen clearly, but indirectly in the forms of '*perlambang-perlambang*' (symbols) or '*pasemon-pasemon*' (secret informations). '*Perlambang-perlambang*' were used

as the media of communication not only between God the Creator and the created, but also between men and other human beings indirectly (Fachri Ali, 1989:30).

A Javanese king had to do so in exercising power for the relationship between the king and his people or '*kawulo*' was not impersonal but personal. People or '*kawulo*' was regarded as a part of his family. Through the socialization process of values defending the position and the king's power, people always obeyed the king. The relationship between the king and his people was formulated in the concept of '*jumbuhing kawulo gusti*' (the unity between the lowest or the subordinates and the highest or the superior) (Fachri Ali, 1989:29). The unity between the lowest (subordinates) and the highest (superior) was only possible to be achieved if there were a number of ties between general aspects and God. The concept of '*kawulo gusti*' was also colored with the belief of '*nasib*' or '*pinesti*' or '*tinitah*' (faith), leading to the birth of Javanese social status, '*kawulo*' or '*wong cilik*' and '*penggede*' or '*priyayi*' (Fachri Ali, 1989:29).

The concept of '*kawulo gusti*' described not only the relation between the subordinates and superior, but also the dependency between these two different elements. Although these two different elements were separated, they finally formed two aspects of the same thing.

Regularity and harmony were the Javanese's obsessions, leading to the birth of power phenomenon regarded as being concrete, homogeny and indivisible. For most Javanese, it was more important for a king to always concentrate and defend his power rather than use it appropriately. In the eyes of

'kawulo' or *'wong cilik'* a Javanese king had to concentrate his power in order to maintain peace and order. The king or ruler who was unable to concentrate power would fail to maintain peace and order. The greater the power that the king or ruler could concentrate, the greater the people would appreciate it. In other words, the king or ruler who could ‘spit fire’ or *'idu geni'* would be regarded as the great king or ruler.

Unlike Western democracy, which perceives phenomena of power based on the Social Contract theory, meaning power possessed by a ruler is only a contract between the ruler and the people, so that both the king’s and the people’s rights and obligations are then written into a document called the constitution. The Javanese concept of power only regulated the people’s obligation but showed no consideration for their rights. Even when Javanese king conducted bad or improper manner, people did not have any rights to protest or to oppose him.

For most Javanese, the emergence of new leaders during the time of political turmoil or *'goro-goro'* is always perceived as a common phenomenon. Every political turmoil or *'goro-goro'* would give birth to a *'satriyo piningit'* (a hidden warrior or a hidden candidate of leader) who at the end would become a *'Ratu Adil'* or a just ruler sent by God the Creator to restore peace and order as well as to bring welfare and prosperity for the whole people.

3.3. Legitimacy in the Javanese culture on politics.

Theoretically, legitimacy in Javanese politics is not necessary. So far as the king has the character of *"berbudi bawa leksono, hambeg adil paramarta"* and is able to maintain order and peace and to bring welfare for the benefit of the

people, people will never question the legitimacy of the king. However, legitimacy or “acceptability” and “adequacy” for every political decisions made by any political leader are still important. Alan Wolfe and Charles A. McCoy in his book on *“Political Analysis: An Unorthodox Approach”* has said:

“There are countless aspects to political decisions: When was it made? What procedures are used? Were the facts? Were they effectives? Who opposed it? Were there any amendments? Why was amended? Was the change an improvement? And so on, an so on. In other words, it is possible to study almost anything about political decision....

Faced with this complexity and multiplicity of factors, we will concentrate here on two crucial aspects of the decision making process – acceptability or will the people in the system comply with the decision? and adequacy or will the decision effectively deal with the problem for which it was designed?” (Wolfe and McCoy, 1972:70).

Acceptability or which is often called legitimacy occupies important place in history of political ideas or philosophy. For many writers, including Max Weber, legitimacy has played important role (Wolfe and McCoy, 1972:70). The questions of legitimacy of power, according to Weber, are closely related to the problem of people’s obedience to the ruler. As said by Max Weber: Very often people are willing to obey the ruler, sometimes the willingness of people to obey is bigger than the ruler wants. If people really obey the ruler, the power of the ruler is able to call legitimate or acceptable (Wolfe and McCoy, 1972:221).

Max Weber further stated that a man obeys decisions made by the ruler due to three reasons: *tradition* (accepting decisions because the decisions are always accepted), *charisma* (accepting decisions because of magnetic power and outside quality from the decision maker), and *legality* (accepting decisions because the decision making body which is publicly agreed wants the decisions are accepted) (Wolfe and McCoy, 1972:70-71).

1. *Traditional legitimacy* is based on “an established belief in sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them;
2. *Charismatic legitimacy* is based on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns of order revealed or ordained by him;
3. *Rational-legal legitimacy* is based on a belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.

Meanwhile, Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene in their writing of “*Introduction to Political Science*” (1983) said that legitimacy has the meaning “as far as the people regard state and institution, personnel, or their policies is right and morally acceptable” (Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene, [translation], 1988:58). As far as the power is regarded legitimate by the people in order to ease the implementation of the political regime then every attempt to power to legitimize is something fair (Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene, [translation], 1988:58).

Unlike Max Weber, Rodee and his friends said that political legitimacy is based on many types of doctrines, such as: the Right of God Doctrine, Power means Rightness Doctrine, and Social Contract Doctrine (Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene, [translation], 1988:34-43).

Based on the Right of God Doctrine, tribal power is mostly based on tradition. However, new institutions of kingdom of course need new concepts in order to legitimize their actions. Therefore politics is then merged with religious belief, because there is no harder and persuasive sanctions for the King instead of God’s will. The perception that the power holder is goodness appointed as God’s representatives on earth has legitimized the power of the King and making it

unable to be questioned as well as to be debated. Challenging the King means challenging the power of God. By that way the Kings then perceive themselves as the ancestor of the first King, appointed by God, therefore all dynasty has stamp made by paradise (Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene, [translation], 1988:34-35).

The doctrine of power means rightness came from the teaching of Plato in his book of "Republic." Justice or rightness does not have any meaning at all except from the interest of the strong part. Effective power is legitimate power. Everyone who owns power to rule could make statement that his power to rule is legitimate. The follower of this doctrine more focuses his attention on the problems of political stability. The loose of power means the loose of legitimacy to rule. The power itself legitimizes itself (Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene, [translation], 1988:36-39).

Meanwhile the social contract doctrine supported strongly the principle concerning democracy and people sovereignty. For most individuals has ability to make rational decisions for his own interest, they are able to evaluate whether the political regime policy is right or wrong, measured from their appropriate needs. To look for private interest will not bring human beings into sharp conflict among them (Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene, [translation], Christol, Anderson and Greene, [translation], 1988:40).

According to social contract doctrine if political regime is no longer serving their people's interests, they would be challenged, even overthrown. Why? Because the political regime has been against the social contract which becoming the only basis of legitimacy for its existence. The political regime is

regarded to break the social contract if they have been against the people's rights, particularly the human rights including rights of life, freedom, and private ownership (Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene, [translation], 1988:41-42).

The advantage of legitimacy for those exercising or seeking to exercise power is obvious, as said by Rousseau in his *The Social Contract*: "The strongest man is never enough to be always master unless he transforms his power into right and obedience into duty" (Rush, 1992: 55).

Meanwhile, Almond and his colleagues argue that the legitimacy of the political system also provides a foundation for a successful political process. When citizens believe that they ought to obey the laws, then legitimacy is high. If they see no reason to obey, or if they comply only from fear, then legitimacy is low (Almond, Powell, Strom, and Dalton, 2004:57). Citizens may grant legitimacy to political regime for different reasons. In a traditional society, legitimacy may depend on the ruler's inheriting the throne or on the ruler's obedience to religious customs, such as making sacrifices and performing rituals. In a modern democracy, the legitimacy of the authorities will depend on their selection by voters in competitive elections and on their following constitutional procedures in their actions. In other political cultures, the leaders may have their claim to legitimacy on their special grace, wisdom, or ideology which they claim will transform citizens' lives for the better, even though the political regime does not respond to specific demands or follow prescribed procedures (Almond, Powell, Strom, and Dalton, 2004:58-59). The basis of legitimacy defines the fundamental understanding between citizens and political authorities (Almond, Powell, Strom, and Dalton, 2004:59).

At the end, Robert A. Dahl in his book on “*Modern Political Analysis*” (1976) says that: “Leaders in a political system try to ensure that whenever political regime means are used to deal with conflict, the decision arrived at are widely accepted not solely from fear of violence, punishment, or coercion but also from a belief that it is morally right and proper to do so. A political regime is said to be legitimate if the people to whom its orders are directed believe that the structure, procedures, acts, decisions, policies, officials, or leaders of political regime possess the quality of rightness, propriety, or moral goodness – the right, in short, to make binding rules. Leaders in a political system try to endow their actions with legitimacy” (Almond, Powell, Strom, and Dalton, 2004:60).

Based on the above theory of legitimacy we could summarize that all decisions including political decisions made by a ruler need not only acceptability or legitimacy and accuracy in order that the decisions would be obeyed and complied by the people, but also adequacy in order that the decisions would be able to effectively overcome the problem to which the decisions are made. Acceptability or legitimacy could be required differently, according to the characteristic of society. In a traditional society, legitimacy may depend on the ruler’s inheriting the throne or on the ruler’s obedience to religious customs, such as making sacrifices and performing rituals. In a modern democracy, the legitimacy of the authorities will depend on their selection by voters in competitive elections and on their following constitutional procedures in their actions. In other political cultures, the leaders may have their claim to legitimacy on their special grace, wisdom, or ideology which they claim will transform citizens’ lives for the better, even though the political regime does not respond to

specific demands or follow prescribed procedures (Almond, Powell, Strom, and Dalton 2004:58-59). The basis of legitimacy defines the fundamental understanding between citizens and political authorities (Almond, Powell, Strom, and Dalton, 2004:59).

In Javanese traditional society the position of the king was really very important. From the Javanese point of view, only certain human beings were able to occupy the throne. As a ruler who possessed the basis of '*dewa raja*', who acted as the representative of God, whose power was absolute, a king was not a common man. These concepts of king as mentioned above had made not everyone be able to be the king. Only those possessing certain characters were entitled to be appointed as a king.

Based on such arguments, a king needed legitimacy in order to be accepted as ruler. In the Javanese culture, legitimacy needed by a king could be in the form of heredity, legality, '*pusaka*' or heirloom, '*wahyu*' or '*pulung*' or '*ndaru*', good and brave behaviour or '*satria*', and other mystical stories (Mudjanto, 2002:83-87). The more resources that a king possesses, the stronger the legitimacy of the king would be.

In Javanese tradition, there was no clear rule for succession. Therefore, at every succession a problem often emerged (Mudjanto, 2002:62). Although in Javanese tradition there was a rule of '*trah*' (*trahing kusuma, rembesing madu, wijining atapa, tedhaking andana warih*) or blood relation, stipulating that someone's position or social status would be based on the rule of '*trah*', meaning higher social status required higher '*trah*' or the level of '*trah*' would sort out

someone's social status (Mudjanto, 2002:67); there was no guarantee that the king would be from those whose '*trah*' or blood relation was the highest.

'*Trah*' or blood relation or heredity was important, but this did not always mean that only someone whose father was a king was entitled to be a king. It was still possible for someone to be a king if at least he had a descendent of '*bangsawan*' or became a '*bangsawan*' due to his marriage relationship or others. But, in order to do that, legality coming from the incumbent king was usually needed. As for example, although Joko Tingkir or Hadiwijoyo was not the son of Sultan Demak, he became the legitimate king of Pajang after being appointed by Sultan Trenggana, his father in law. Also, although Sutawijaya or Panembahan Senapati was only an adopted son of Sultan Hadiwijoyo, he became the legitimate king of Pajang replacing his adopted father for he had a testament from Sultan Hadiwijoyo that he was appointed to replace the incumbent sultan (Mudjanto, 2002:5).

So, it could be concluded that legality was still needed for someone who occupied the throne, although it sometimes made another problem of succession. For example, Aryo Penangsang, the son of Pangeran Seda Lepen (Sultan Trenggana's elder brother), was disappointed with the appointment of Joko Tingkir as the Sultan, replacing his uncle, Sultan Trenggana. He thought that after Sultan Trenggana died, the throne of Pajang should have been his, not Joko Tingkir's. He began to launch his opposition to Sultan Hadiwijoyo or Joko Tingkir, but then he was able to be defeated and even killed by Sutowijoyo, the adopted son of Sultan Hadiwijoyo, assisted by Ki Gede Pemanahan, Ki Penjawi and Ki Juru Martani.

However important it was, legitimacy coming from heredity is not enough. As for example, when Pangeran Puger (who was then became Paku Buwono II, King of Mataram) was involved in political confrontation or power struggle against his nephew, Amangkurat III (son of Amangkurat II, King of Mataram and an elder brother of Pangeran Puger), he tried to get other legitimacy from a number of sources:

First, he made a statement to people that he had managed to get '*wahyu*' or '*pulung*' from his elder brother, King Amangkurat II. G. Mudjanto in his book entitled "*Suksesi Dalam Sejarah Jawa*" (2002) explained:

"At night, (while Pangeran Puger and others were keeping awake before the corpse of Susuhunan Amangkurat II), a magical event occurred, the genital of Amangkurat II suddenly erected and, from the top of it came out a bound of light. The only one who saw the bound of light was Pangeran Puger. He then sucked the erecting genital, and the bound of light disappeared and got into the body of Pangeran Puger. After being sucked then the genital of Amangkurat II stopped erecting. The inclusion of the light into the body of Pangeran Puger was regarded as the descendent of '*wahyu*' from Susuhunan Amangkurat II to his younger brother, Pangeran Puger" (Mudjanto, 2002:75).

Second, although all of the '*pusaka*' or heirloom possessed by the kingdom were brought away by Amangkurat III (the ousted King) out of karaton, in order to calm his followers, Pangeran Puger said that not only did he still have '*Kyai Plered*' and '*Kris Mahesa Nular*', he still also had '*Masjid Demak*' and '*Astana Kadilangu*' (the tomb of Sunan Kalijaga). As said by Mudjanto:

"All Mataram's heirlooms had been brought by Sunan Kendhang or Amangkurat III. Knowing that all Mataram's heirlooms were brought by Amangkurat III, his followers became worried because it was impossible for a King who was in power without having heirloom. Actually Pangeran Puger still had '*Kyai Plered*', the spear which was ever used to assassinate Aryo Penangsang, and '*Kris Mahesa Nular*'. Pangeran Puger got the two

heirlooms from his father, Amangkurat I, when he was ordered to return back and to take over Karaton Plered from the hand of Trunojoyo.

In order to calm his followers Paku Buwono I made a statement that the real heirlooms of the Javanese were only two, they were '*Masjid Demak*' (Mosque of Demak) and '*Astana Kadilangu*' (the tomb of Sunan Kalijogo in Kadilangu). The other heirlooms could be brought by the enemy, but as long as they still had these two, Masjid Demak and Astana Kadilangu, there was nothing to worry. 'Only two heirlooms were the heirlooms of Tanah Jawi', said Paku Buwono I trying to calm his followers" (Mudjanto, 2002:83).

Third, Pangeran Puger also got legitimacy from the bad behavior of his nephew, Amangkurat III. When Amangkurat III was in power, he had made lots of unjust decisions, making people unhappy. A number of Bupati and pangeran (royal family) disliked the behavior of their King, Amangkurat III, and then gave support to Pangeran Puger (Mudjanto, 2002:85).

Fourth, Pangeran Puger was described as having spiritual or mystical power coming from '*Tenung Walondo*'. Mudjanto said:

"The other magical event occurred in the form of '*Tenung Walondo*'. During the night Amangkurat III was praying. He stayed outside the palace. Suddenly a high, big, black and odd man came to him. This man introduced himself as '*Tenung Walondo*' and said that the purpose of his coming was to meet the King of Mataram.

Maybe because of being afraid, Amangkurat III said that the king of Mataram was not staying in that palace but in the other palace. He pointed out to the house of Pangeran Puger. After that the odd man went to Pangeran Puger's house. Pangeran Puger was then also staying outside of the house. '*Tenung Walondo*' said to him that someone had told him that the king of Mataram was staying in the house of Pangeran Puger. Puger soon understood it. He thought that it was the God's will that he would become the king of Mataram, because the king of Mataram Amangkurat III himself had already rejected. With his braveness he asked Tenung Walondo to go away. The story of '*Tenung Walondo*' described the transfer of the 'wahyu' of karaton from Amangkurat III to Paku Buwono I because he had already told '*Tenung Walondo*' that he was not the king of Mataram" (Mudjanto, 2002:85-86).

Fifth, in order to improve his legitimacy, the writer of '*Babad Tanah Jawi*' explained the superiority of Pangeran Puger. One of them was his ability and bravery to defeat Captain Tack, a Dutch army officer, who tried to fight against Trunojoyo but then was killed by Trunojoyo. Pangeran Puger was also said as having good behavior or '*berbudi bowo leksono, ambeg adil parama arta*' (meluap budi luhurnya, dan berperilaku adil terhadap sesama). He was quite different from Amangkurat III. As said by Mudjanto:

"In order to promote the legitimacy of Paku Buwono I, the writer of the history particularly '*Babad Tanah Jawi*', told the other heroic struggle of Pangeran Puger. Among them was his bravery and ability to fight against and to defeat Captain Tack. '*Pujangga Mataram*' also made legitimacy for Paku Buwono I. He was described as a man who behaved like '*satria*' who had the character of '*berbudi bowo leksono, ambeg adil paramarta*'. It was characterized by his willingness to punish his own daughter Raden Ajeng Lembah. He also gave reward to his subordinate whose wife made love with Pangeran Adipati Anom who then became Amangkurat IV" (Mudjanto, 2002:86).

3.4. Summary

Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political action, which is popularly called as political culture. Political system is a system of authoritative allocation of societal values, consisting of both rewards and punishments.

Orientation is considered towards predisposition of political action and decided by factors such as: tradition, historical memories, motives, emotions, and symbols. Political culture includes ideology, beliefs and value system. Like other societies, Javanese people also possesses pattern of orientation towards political actions, either cognitive, effective, or evaluative orientation. Javanese's

perceptions on man, environment, and power have already influenced their orientations.

Unlike Western people who perceive politics and power as abstract, that is the product of interaction among people. Javanese people perceive politics and power as something concrete. Power is regarded embedded to a certain magical power that is often called '*pusaka*'. Those who manage to gain this '*pusaka*' would be able to become a legitimate ruler.

Javanese people perceive their king or leader as mediator between micro cosmos and macro cosmos. He is regarded as mediator between people and their Supreme God and identical as God or '*Dewa*' like '*Wisnu*', making his decisions absolute and cannot be debated. Javanese king is a legitimate king who possesses authority to make war and peace. He is not only the commander of war but also the representative of God the Creator on the earth. Sultan is regarded as someone presented kingdom with absolute political, military, and religious power. Political power and religious power are identical.

Although possessing great power, there are limitations that must be maintained by a king. '*Surat Wulangreh*' has told that in exercising power, a king has to maintain justice so that people would follow him. People who do not obey the law or reject to obey the king's order would be regarded as against the Supreme God. But, the king has to posses the character of '*berbudi bowo leksono hambeg adil paramarta*'. Meaning, the king has to be wise and able to maintain peace and security, or to maintain that people could live peacefully. The king is not only someone who could punish, but also someone who could implement order as the manifestation of justice for the people and state.

CHAPTER 4

JAVANESE CULTURE AS GUIDANCE FOR SUHARTO'S LIFE

4.1. Introduction

For most Javanese “to be Javanese means to be a person who is civilized and who knows his manners and his place” (Geertz 1961; Mulder 1978; Koentjaraningrat 1985). The individual serves as a harmonious part of the family or group. Life in society should be characterized by ‘*rukun*’ (harmonious unity). The principle of ‘*rukun*’ or harmony together with the principle of ‘*urmat*’ or respect guide Javanese social behavior outside the family. Everyone should know his or her place and duty, honoring and respecting those in higher positions, while remaining benevolent towards and responsible for, those in lower positions.

In order to achieve ‘*rukun*’ or harmony, “all overt expressions of conflict should be avoided. Unlike Western culture, which regards individualism and group belonging as mutually exclusive, most Javanese consider the two intimately related (Mulder 1978). Mutual assistance and sharing of burdens or ‘*gotong royong*’, within both the family and the community, should reflect the concept of ‘*rukun*’ (Mulder 1978; Koentjaraningrat 1985). Harmony and unity are complemented by social hierarchy.

The Javanese values of respect and the maintenance of social harmony or ‘*rukun*’ are basic principles of normative and moral guidance for social interaction within both the family and the community..... This respect is also reflected in Javanese social behavior in other contexts, such as the workplace, schools, and political organizations. The strong emphasis on ‘*rukun*’ or social

harmony has marked the typical Javanese as inexpressive, avoiding social and personal conflict.

Javanese cultural values virtues that contribute to harmonious social integration. Ideal human-virtues include obedience to superiors or '*manut*', generosity, avoidance of conflict, understanding others, and empathy (Geertz 1961; Koentjaraningrat 1985; Franz Magnis Suseno 1988) (<http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unubooks/uul3se/uu13seb.htm>). Someone who does not understand these Javanese principles of life as mentioned above will be considered '*durung Jawa*' (not yet Javanese) or '*durung ngerti*' (does not yet understand) (<http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu13se/uu13se09.htm>) and they are eligible to be educated or punished. On the other hand, someone who understands well and takes these principles as guidance for his life will be safe and very much honored, appreciated and acceptable to be a leader. Therefore, someone who knows well about these principles of Javanese life will always try to be a true Javanese by adopting these Javanese teachings as guidance for his life and the practice of these teachings would give added values to his role and position in society.

Suharto whose awareness on Javanese culture had grown up since he was young understood the above notion and had always been committed to honor and practice the teachings inherited by the Javanese ancestors. He adopted these noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy taught by the ancestors (some of them were in the form of '*petatah-petitih*') as '*pituduh*' or guidance and '*wewaler*' or prohibition not only for his individual life but very often also for his rule of the country.

Due to his strong commitment to the practice of Javanese culture particularly in ruling the country, over the years many Western scholars have portrayed Suharto as an almost archetypical Javanese Sultan, driven by a philosophy of kingship that stretches far back into Java's colonial past (Review Essay, December 2000: 281). Although all what they have portrayed could not always be fully agreed, many Indonesian political elites and scholars have given their views on how Suharto practiced Javanese cultural values and philosophy in his personal life as well as in the affairs of state, or how Suharto's style of leadership was influenced by Javanese cultural values and philosophy.

Ginanjar Kartasasmita, in his article on "*Pikiran Modern Dalam Pribadi Jawa*" which is published in a book on "*Diantara Para Sahabat: Pak Harto 70 Tahun*" (1991) has asserted that "It is clear that Pak Harto is a Javanese, and Javanese 'adat' (customs) and culture have influenced the style of his leadership. As for example, Javanese philosophies have often been used by him in order to explain the background of his policies. This is the different characteristic of Pak Harto's leadership. Pak Harto never posits himself far away from the Javanese identity although the way he is thinking is always modern. The Javanese philosophy has already given the deep meaning of all his thought and policies" (G. Dwipayana and Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, 1991: 188).

This chapter is designed to clarify whether Suharto really practiced Javanese cultural values and philosophy as guidance and prohibition for his individual life and in ruling the country, how Javanese cultural values and philosophy were practiced by Suharto, and whether by practicing these Javanese values and philosophy Suharto was able to get legitimacy from people. In order

to get a clear and sophisticated elaboration of the problems, opinions of some competent informants regarding some particular issues were also used besides other primary data.

4.2. Life of Suharto

As a son of a poor farmer coming from a small village and having no land to cultivate,¹ Suharto was never imagined that someday he would be able to become president of a big country called Indonesia, consisting of more than 17.000 islands with 216 million populations. He was almost equivalent to Hayamwuruk, a great king of Javanese kingdom, Majapahit, who was able to rule for almost 38 years. Only after becoming president, Suharto was then regarded by many people as 'an extraordinary meteor emerging from Kemosuk' (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:29).

One day, Suharto's own father, Kertosudiro who had been divorced with his wife Sukirah, took Suharto from his mother and brought him to Wuryantoro, Wonogiri. There he left his beloved son with his younger sister, wife of Prawirowiharjo. Since that time, due to certain conditions, Suharto had to move from one school to another, first from Puluhan (Godean) to Pedes (Kemosuk) then to Wuryantoro, and moving again to Tiwir (Kemosuk) and then going back to Wuryantoro. After finishing his lower school, Suharto entered primary school or *Schakel School* in Wonogiri. But, due to a certain school regulation, Suharto

¹ G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H. in a book of "Soeharto: *Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya*" or "Soeharto: My thoughts, words, and deeds" wrote that Suharto was born in Kemosuk, Godean, Yogyakarta, on 8 June 1921, from a village common woman called Sukirah. His father, Kertosudiro or Kertorejo, was a poor farmer with no land to cultivate working as an 'ulu-uluh', a man who was in charge in irrigation in village area. Not long after he was born, Suharto's parents were divorced. His mother, Sukirah, then married Atmopawiro.

had to go back to Kemasuk and finished his school at Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta.

After finishing his *schakel* school of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta, he went back to Wuryantoro to apply for a job, and was hired as a clerk at a village bank. He then attempted to find a job in Solo but failed. He then decided to apply for KNIL or '*Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger*' (the Royal Dutch Army). Because of his school background, he was accepted in *Kortverband* and joined military training in Gombong. He managed to be the best graduate and began his service on 1 June 1940. He was first located in Battalion XII in Rampal, Malang (Elson, 1991:8).

Not long after becoming soldier, the Dutch surrendered to Japan. Suharto decided to abandon his uniform and fled back to Wuryantoro. Unable to find job in Wuryantoro, he moved to Yogyakarta and tried to learn typing and fell ill with malaria. Once recovered, on 1 November 1942, Suharto availed himself of an opportunity to join the police force. He was appointed assistant to the Yogyakarta chief of police, apparently at the rank of *Keibuho* (assistant inspector) (Elson, 1991:9).

Suggested by his Japanese chief of police, Suharto sought to join the PETA or '*Pembela Tanah Air*' (1943). Upon his acceptance into the PETA, he was one of only two selected from 500 applicants, Suharto was sent on a platoon commander's (*shodancho*) course, which he found quite difficult. At the end of Japanese occupation of Java, the 24 year-old Suharto was no more than a moderately promising member of a ragged volunteer army (Elson, 1991:10). However, Suharto continued his military carrier by entering the BKR or '*Badan*

Keamanan Rakyat' (the People Security Body) which then became the TKR or '*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*' (the People Security Army), and at the end became the TNI or '*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*' (the Indonesian National Army).

4.3. Exposure to Javanese values

While he was in Wuryantoro, Wonogiri, young Suharto met a number of persons, such as his uncle Prawirowiharjo (who then became his adopted father) and Kyai Daryatmo, with whom he learnt a lot about life and its values which most Javanese people or Javanese Muslims usually practiced. According to young Suharto, as a '*mantri pertanian*' his adopted father, Prawirowiharjo, had already taught him how to be a tough and creative farmer. He taught him spiritual training as well such as fasting on Mondays and Thursdays and sleeping under the edge of their house's roof. Prawirowiharjo also recommended that young Suharto sleep near '*pawuhan*' or a rubbish hole. But, to his adopted father's recommendation as stated by young Suharto himself, he was unable to do so because it was not easy to sleep at a place of decaying rubbish that gave off an odor. '*Pawuhan*' is a rubbish hole usually located in the back or the front yard of old Javanese houses. It was made by the owner into which the owner threw their rubbish away and then burnt.

Whereas, from Kyai Daryatmo, who was at that time a famous village '*mubaligh*' (muslim teacher) as well as a member of the Indonesian National Committee of Wonogiri (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Wonogiri*), young Suharto learnt about religion of Islam and the Holy Al Qur'an. From Kyai Daryatmo, young Suharto also learnt the meaning of '*samadi*' or '*semedi*' and '*kebatinan*'.

'Samadi' or 'semedi' is "to learn knowledge of God Almighty's wills or to predict the future." This activity is popularly called '*neges karsaning hyang ingkang murbeng pandalu*' (trying to understand very well what God Almighty's wills are). God Almighty's wills could never be seen clearly and distinctly, but indirectly in the forms of '*perlambang-perlambang*' (symbols) or '*pasemon*' (secret information). '*Pralambang-pralambang*' or symbols and '*pasemon*' or secret information are usually used as the media of communication not only between God Almighty as the Creator and men as the created, but also between men and others indirectly (Fachri Ali, 1989:30).

Since Kyai Daryatmo was also regarded by the village people as a clever man having ability to heal ill persons or '*dukun*', from him too, young Suharto learnt how to serve the village people who came to Kyai Daryatmo asking for traditional medicines. Very often young Suharto helped his spiritual teacher, Kyai Daryatmo, to prepare traditional medicines or herbal for the village people who came to visit him for those medicines. Beside that, young Suharto also joined a Boy Scout organization affiliated to an Islamic organization called '*Pandu Hisbul Wathan*' or people popularly called '*Pandu HW*'.

In short, when he was in Wuryantoro, young Suharto began to learn how to be a true Javanese or a Javanese Muslim. He learnt and practiced not only Javanese philosophy, but also philosophy of Islam. He tried to understand very well the Javanese customs as well as the Javanese way of life. He said: "At that time I was forced to understand and to adopt the Javanese philosophy of life effective in the society surrounding, to understand religion and Javanese way of life" (Dwipayana and Ramadhan, 1989:13). According to young Suharto, when

living with his adopted father, Prawirowiharjo, he began to learn the teaching of the three Javanese prohibitions or the three '*don'ts*' or '*tiga 'aja*', such as: "*Aja kagetan, aja gumunan, lan aja dumeh*" (don't be startled [that is, troubled], don't be surprised, and don't be arrogant'), meaning "you shall not be surprised and amazed of whatever happens on earth, and you shall not be presumptuous of your power."

All what Suharto had done during his early years then became guiding principles of his life, which stiffened him in facing problems which might have shaken him (Dwipayana and Ramadhan, 1989:13). He further explained: "I always remember the teaching of our ancestors: respect for God, teachers, government and both parents. Even after I became President, I have not changed in this matter in the slightest. I hold these teachings in high esteem and I believe in their truth" (Dwipayana and Ramadhan, 1989:13).

What he believed and practiced was then written into a book called "*Butir-butir Budaya Jawa: Anggayuh Kasampurnaning Uri. Ber Budi BowoLeksana. Ngudi Sajatining Becik*" or "Some Items of Javanese Culture: In Search of Perfect Life. Noble and Generous Mind. In Quest of the Essence of Goodness," first published in 1987. This book is a collection of '*pituduh*' (moral guidance) and '*wewaler*' (prohibitions) relating to many aspects of life (such as God the only One God, spiritual, humanism, nationalism, family, and materialism), compiled by the eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, and presented by Suharto to his children to serve as the guidance for their life (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, 1993:vii).

All moral guidances or '*pituduh*' and prohibitions or '*wewaler*' taught by Suharto were actually attributed to the teachings of Islam and also to the teachings of '*Serat Wulang Reh*' (written by Sri Paku Buwana IV), '*Serat Wedhatama*' and '*Serat Tripama*' (both written by KGPAAG Mangkunegoro IV), etc. From '*Serat Wulang Reh*', Suharto adopted the principle of life, such as "*adigang, adigung, adiguna*" (Thomas Wiyasa Bratawijaya, 1987:7), "respect for God, teacher, government and both parents" (Ibid:12), "*ajining diri saka obahing lathi*," (Ibid: 16), "*rukun agawe santoso, crah agawe bubrah*" (Ibid:17), etc. From '*Serat Wedhatama*', Suharto adopted the teachings of "*sembah raga, sembah kalbu.*" From '*Serat Tripama*', some teachings were adopted such as "*melu handarbeni, melu hangrungkebi, mulad sariro hangrasa wani*" (Ibid: 50), "*ber budi bowoleksana*" (Ibid:52), etc. From '*Serat Dewa Ruci*': "*sopan santun, lemah lembut tetapi meyakinkan (ruruh jatmiko), ramah tamah, saleh (susila anuraga) menyenangkan orang lain, murah hati, dapat membedakan baik dan buruk*" (Ibid:64), etc. From the teaching of Sosrokartono, Suharto adopted the principle of "*nglurug tanpa bala, menang tanpa ngasorake*" (an invasion without deploying troops, winning without humiliating). From Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Suharto adopted the principle of leadership of '*Tri Pakarti Utomo*': '*ing ngarso sung tulodo, ing madya mangun karso, tut wuri handayani*'.

Really believing in all what he had written in his book, Suharto asserted: "Man will come to the ultimate end he aspires to, if during his life in the '*alam madya*' – in this world – he leads a life inspired by the nature of the Lord, i.e. to be 'good', in the essence of its meaning. His entire thought, aspirations and speech must be guided by the essence of virtue, his mind noble, his heart

generous or '*becik sajatining becik, berbudi bowoleksono, hambeg adil paramarta*'. To be essentially good means to be good not merely for one own sake but for the sake of others as well" (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, 1993: x).

Suharto further asserted: "Whether or not man will reach his ultimate goal depends on how he makes use of the means the Lord endowed him with, i.e. his five senses, his thought, his feeling, and his two antagonistic passions, one for virtue and other for evil" (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, 1993:x). In other words, if someone wants to succeed in achieving the ideal or ultimate goal of his life, he has to make himself to be a good Javanese, that is someone who is '*becik sajatining becik, berbudi bowoleksono, hambeg adil paramarta*', that is someone who lives by undertaking all guidance and avoiding all prohibitions as taught by the ancestors.

Even, Suharto also said: "Maxims in the Javanese culture, '*pituduh*' or moral guidances, as well as '*wewaler*' or prohibitions, would make it easier for the Indonesians to nurture a noble mind and a generous heart, i.e. to develop oneself to be essentially good, and thus it will be easier as well for him to develop a conscience necessary to lead a Pancasila – based on civic and social life" (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, 1993:x).

4.4. The way to achieve the ideals of life

According to "*Serat Wedhatama*," in order to become the ideal type of Javanese that is someone who is '*becik sajatining becik, berbudi bowoleksono, hambeg adil paramarta*', someone has to learn from Panembahan Senapati that he/she has to be brave of living in a condition of '*prihatin*'. Meaning, he/she must

be willing to study persistently or '*tekun belajar*', he must not know the word of retreat or surrender or '*pantang menyerah*', and he must be tough and love facing difficult or heavy problems or '*ulet dan senang menghadapi persoalan-persoalan yang berat*' (Thomas Wiyasa Bratawijaya, 1987:37).

In order to become a man possessing a simple life disposition or '*hidup sederhana*', someone has to control him/herself by doing a certain thing, which is popularly called '*laku*'. The word '*laku*' could be equalized to attitude, behavior, or character. By cutting down on eating and sleeping or '*cegah dhahar lawan guling/berpuasa*', rejecting funs of life in the world or '*mati raga*', controlling bad passions or '*mengendalikan nafsu angkara murka*', and having self-confidence, all we achieved would make us satisfied and feel closer to God who has complied with all we have requested or '*apa yang dicapai akan mendatangkan kepuasan dan selalu bersyukur atas berkat Tuhan yang telah mengabulkan permohonan kita*' (Thomas Wiyasa Bratawijaya, 1987:37).

Pardi Suratno in his book of "*Sang Pemimpin menurut Asthabrata, Wulang Reh, Tripama, Dasa Darma Raja*" (2006) has also asserted that fasting (cutting down on eating) would make someone having empathy that is someone who could feel other people's suffering. So that when he becomes a leader, he could understand the people's suffering living in poverty. While reducing sleep or '*cegah guling*' would make someone possessing more time to come closer to God Almighty. "*Serat Wulang Reh*" (written by Sri Paku Buwono IV), has told us that a leader has to pay attention day and night for the safety and welfare of his people (Pardi Suratno, 2006:142-143).

Beside cutting down on eating and sleeping, someone is also required to get knowledge. "Knowledge could be attained by studying persistently. By being persistent, tough, and not knowing the word of 'retreating' or '*tekun, ulet dan pantang menyerah*' someone would be able to improve his/her horizon and awareness so that he/she would be able to overcome problems or obstacles occurring to his/her life" (Thomas Wiyasa Bratawijaya, 1987:40).

Guidance from the Lord would only be given to someone who possesses a good character or '*memiliki keluhuran budi*'. According to Thomas Wiyasa Bratawijaya: "Someone who possesses a good character would be given guidance from God Almighty so that he would be able to reject obstacles making him forgotten of himself. He would not be able to be seduced of doing bad actions which could endanger other people either" (Thomas Wiyasa Bratawijaya, 1987:40).

Suharto quite believed in this Javanese traditional teaching that power would come automatically to someone who has a good character such as '*becik sajatining becik, berbudi bowoleksono, hambeg adil paramarta*'. Power or '*wahyu*' from God would only come into a good median. So, in order to get power someone has to improve his personality by conducting a number of '*laku*' or '*samadi*'.

Describing Suharto's behavior in politics, Akbar Tanjung once said:

"Pak Harto never showed his attitude and political behavior that described him as a power seeker. Never did he show such attitude and behavior. His performance showed us that he was not the man of power seeker. This might have been inspired by Javanese philosophy that someone did not have to chase power. For Javanese power was regarded as a gift or a mandate from God Almighty. Therefore Pak Harto never showed his

political attitude and behavior describing that he was a power seeker. He never showed his ambition to chase power.”²

Akbar Tanjung further asserted:

”But Pak Harto always showed his consistency too in using power to what he believed that it was right, particularly in the relation to the problem of ideology and to the problem that power had to be used for the purpose of the people’s interests, not others. It was Pak Harto’s attitude and behavior in using as well as in managing power as what we could see.”³

Once again in showing that Suharto was not the type of power seeker, Akbar Tanjung made another statement:

”We could see from the periodical part of Pak Harto becoming president for long. He was elected as president for seven general sessions of the MPR, from 1968 to 1998. If we saw his long position as president it could be said that there was no other alternative beside him. He was a leader who was regarded as the most appropriate person to be elected as president. And he himself never showed his systematical efforts, let alone open efforts, to defense his position as president.”

”Even at the last term of his position as president, when the GOLKAR stated that the GOLKAR would support him to become president for the following term as stated by Pak Harmoko, Pak Harto immediately asked Pak Harmoko whether it was really the people’s aspiration. He said to Pak Harmoko: *“Please check it first whether the people really still want me to be the president for the following term.”* He even added: *“I have already been TOP, too old, toothless, and too weak.”*

”Responding to the request, Pak Harto at that time did not directly accept what Pak Harmoko had requested, and Pak Harmoko seemed to pay attention to what Pak Harto had said. He then made a formal search in order to know what the people’s real aspirations were. Formally we did not know how Pak Harmoko checked the people’s real aspirations, but as the Chairman of the GOLKAR he of course checked the internal GOLKAR first. And, at that time in 1998, the internal GOLKAR saw no other person who was regarded appropriate for replacing Pak Harto. Then Pak Harmoko went back to Pak Harto and said: *“Pak, I have already checked but still the people want Pak Harto as the president.”* It

² Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

³ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

was then making Pak Harto accept the request to be reelected as president for the seventh time in 1998 as what the GOLKAR had wanted.”⁴

Other ‘*laku*’ or attitude, behavior or character that a true Javanese usually has to do is selecting or calculating good or lucky days or ‘*menghitung hari baik*’, such as to select or calculate the best and appropriate days or times for his/her children’s marriage or ‘*menikahkan anak*’, to calculate in order to look for the best and appropriate day for moving to other houses, usually new houses or ‘*mencari saat yang tepat untuk pindah rumah*’, or to calculate in order to look for the best or appropriate day for travelling or ‘*melakukan perjalanan*’. Geertz had ever said: “The Javanese’s hobby for calculation is maintained so neatly and they believe that these numbers for calculation were inherited by his/her honored ancestors”. Arwan Tuti Artha says: “In Javanese spiritual knowledge, such selection or calculation is meant to avoid disharmony. Basically, most Javanese people prefer living by creating the concept of harmony, equality and balance” (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:11).

Generally, every religion gives guidance to us of which ultimate goal has to be achieved. Religion also tells us that the ultimate goal could almost be achieved, and life in the world will end. But, where the ultimate goals must stop is mostly described abstractly. In order not to miss the way in achieving the ultimate goals, someone usually comes to a ‘*guru sakti*’ (a teacher who possesses supernatural powers) for guidance (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:122).

The guidance is various, each with certain different conditions. Almost every ‘*guru sakti*’ has his own guidance, different from others. As for example,

⁴ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

one guru may give ‘*mantra*’ to them who come to him for guidance and others ask them to do a ‘*semedi*’ (meditation) or ‘*kungkum*’ (soaking their body into a river for certain hours). There are five guidances usually given to those who want to undertake spiritual character (*laku spiritual*), including spiritual guidance, such as: (1) ‘*kungkum ning tempuran*’ (soaking one’s body into water for certain hours in which two or more streams meet), (2) *ngombe banyu pitung sumur* (drinking water from seven wells), (3) ‘*manggon ning omah suwung*’ (living in an empty house), (4) ‘*turu ning tritisan*’ (sleeping under the edge of roof), and (5) ‘*turu ning jugangan*’ (sleeping in a rubbish hole or landfill) (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:24).

In Javanese society, the position of ‘*guru sakti*’ who is popularly called ‘*dukun*’, ‘*paranormal*’, or ‘*Wong pinter*’ (a man possessing ability to give solution to those who need) is quite important and strategic. Such kind of practice is called ‘*klenik*’ giving grey color as well as magical power. From the modernist point of view, the world of ‘*klenik*’ is quite interesting. The world of ‘*klenik*’ is very abstract and absurd, but the existence could not be rejected by anybody.

According to Probosutejo, Suharto’s half brother: “The knowledge of ‘*klenik*’ or the knowledge of ‘*kebatinan*’ or spirituality is taught by whispering or speaking in very low tone. All knowledge are taught to one and then transmitted to others, from the ancestor of our nation to our children and grandchildren. Such knowledge is usually taught in a very quiet place such as cemetery or remote mountainous area. Javanese kings often visited the tombs of their ancestors, including their families and parents” (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:16-17).

4.5. People's perceptions on Suharto

Suharto had been perceived by many people in many different ways. As for example, Suharto was said to practice a number of Javanese spiritual traditions. Arwan Tuti Artha in his book of "*Dunia Spirirual Suharto*" (2007) said that "as a Javanese, an army, and a leader of the state, Suharto's life was always with calculation. As a Javanese, he had the commitment to maintain harmony. In the army he applied discipline, regularity and an established organization. As the leader of the state, he behaved as if there were no other leaders, except himself" (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:9-10).

Although he was a commoner coming from a poor family with an educational background not as high as his predecessor, Sukarno, Suharto had been regarded as a very lucky man. He took control over the military forces, crushed the 'Thirtieth of September Movement' masterminded by the PKI, unseated President Sukarno, and then became an acting president, none wanted to know who he was. Few people knew about his background, except he was a Javanese. But, Suharto managed to become an example of the history, a commoner who could reach the highest position of the republic. Retired Army Great General Suharto who was able to rule the country for more than 32 years, could even be equalized to Great King Hayamwuruk who was able to rule the Javanese kingdom of Majapahit for almost 38 years. It was believed by many people that it was because he was a man of high intelligence who had got a '*pulung*' or '*wahyu*' or '*wangsit*' from God Almighty.

But, General Suharto was an unusual commoner. He could not have been able to possess great power if he had not done '*nglakoni*' as many Javanese also

do. Why did this ‘*pulung*’ or ‘*wangsit*’ or the throne of presidency come to him? It was no a secret at all that Suharto had a thousand ‘*dukuns, paranormals, wong pinters*’ or spiritual teachers. Suharto was regarded as a man having a strong feeling and being very much consistent. The role of ‘*dukun*’ or ‘*guru sakti*’ or ‘*wong pinter*’ was felt and trusted, particularly by most Javanese (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:31).

Onghokham in his book of “*Dari Soal Priyayi sampai Nyi Blorong*” (2002) has said: “Suharto always fasted on the day before 17 August or on the other important days and he loved being surrounded by heirlooms or ‘*benda-benda pusaka*’ coming from ancient time in order to borrow their magical power” (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:32). Fasting or ‘*puasa*’ (not eating, not sleeping, and abstaining from sexual intercourse) was identical with ‘*laku prihatin*’. By fasting, he hoped that God Almighty would fulfill his ideals. There are many kinds of fasting, such as: fasting on Mondays and Thursdays, fasting on the day of someone’s birth, fasting for 40 days long, fasting for 24 hours long or ‘*ngebleng*’. ‘*Laku prihatin*’ by doing the fasting is various depending on the teacher’s guidance (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:32).

Giving comment to what Suharto had already done particularly in developing his own personality by practicing a number of Javanese traditional teachings as taught by his guru, Retired Army Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo stated:

“From his birth to his death, Suharto’s status is still unclear. But, the clear fact is that he used to live in a Javanese circumstance influenced by ‘*budaya karaton*’ or the kingdom culture. Due to this ‘*budaya karaton*’ Suharto might have got ‘*warisan*’ or inheritance coming to him therefore since he was a child, Suharto had already had ambition. His ambition to

develop himself might have also been motivated by his unclear status. This was done for compensation to his unclear status. Since he was a child Suharto had no longer lived with his parents. He lived together with his mother's younger brother (Sudwikatmono's father, a successful businessman in the era of the New Order). He had never got any formal Western education. It was quite different from Sukarno. Therefore, since he was young Suharto always attempted to find out his strength for life in the Javanese circumstances. He developed his personal strength by learning and practicing '*limo kejawen*' or knowledge of Javanese life and its all aspects.⁵

Explaining what the meaning of '*ilmu kejawen*' or knowledge of Javanese life and its all aspects was, Retired Army Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryahadiprojo (who used to be close to Suharto and once was appointed by President Suharto as the Governor of LEMHANAS or '*Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional*' [National Defense Institute] and then the Ambassador for Japan) further stated:

"We all already know that the strongest aspects developed in '*ilmu kejawen*' or knowledge of Javanese life and its all aspects is the aspect of intuition. The principal difference between the Western and the Javanese tradition is that in the Western tradition the dominant aspect developed is ratio, whereas in the Javanese tradition the dominant aspect developed is intuition or at least the balance between ratio and intuition. Therefore it was not so peculiar to us when we often heard that since he was young Suharto loved doing the study of life and its all aspects by visiting a number of '*guru*' or 'spiritual teachers.' Though he had been appointed the Commander of the Regional Military Division of Central Java, on certain days Suharto together with his '*gurus*' or spiritual teachers including Sujono Humardani kept practicing the tradition of '*kungkum*' (soaking one's body) in a river water somewhere close to Semarang, the capital of the Central Java Province.

Basically, due to his talent or the line of his ancestor, Suharto had personal strength or power. His intellectual was also strong. He was a man who was easy to learn, fast learnt, therefore he was able to develop his personality very fast. From what he had done, Suharto was then deeply influenced by that the knowledge of Javanese life and its all aspects or '*ilmu kejawen*'.

⁵ Interview with Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryahadiprojo, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

Beside '*ilmu kejawen*', Suharto was also very much influenced by Islam because since he lived together with his uncle in Wonogiri, he already studied about Islam with Kyai Daryatmo, a prominent Muslim teacher or '*ustadz*' in a village of Wonogiri, making his matured personality develop very fast. It was quite clear that his Western knowledge was less but it was then compensated with his '*ilmu kejawen*' or knowledge of Javanese life and its all aspects that are centered on the strength of intuition."⁶

It was believed too by many people that Suharto's excellent performance was located on his wife's '*tusuk konde*' or a kind of pin used for rolling her hair (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:120). His wife, Siti Hartinah or popularly called Ibu Tien, had become the medium for the coming down of '*wangsit*' or the guidance from God Almighty. But, an hour after Ibu Tien died on 28 April 1996, the '*tusuk konde*' vanished. According to mystical message, the '*tusuk konde*' could only be found at the '*petilasan*' of Panembahan Senopati, Banglampur (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:120), a place where Panembahan Senopati, King of Mataram, conducted his '*samadi*' and then managed to get the first '*wangsit*' or '*wahyu kraton*' before becoming the first king of Mataram kingdom.

According to Damarjati Supajar, a professor in philosophy from University of Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, as a very popular king of Mataram, Panembahan Senopati was a great man who had the capacity to conduct the highest level of meditation or '*samadi*', therefore he was able to make sexual intercourse with the universe."⁷

Though he did not give the answer whether the people's belief was true or false, in commenting to the people's belief in the supernatural power possessed by Ibu Tien Suharto's '*tusuk konde*', Damarjati Supajar made a statement:

⁶ Interview with Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

⁷ Interview with Professor Damarjati Supajar, Yogyakarta, 10 November 2009.

“I could not understand why he (referring to a prominent leader in Yogyakarta) intended to run for president candidate for the Presidential Election 2009 without asking me for consultation. But, it did not matter to me. Later on I found out that the one who strongly urged him to run for president candidate was his own wife. I was told too that his wife urged her husband to do so because she had already managed to keep or to possess the *‘tusuk konde’* from Ibu Tien Suharto. It is popularly believed too that someone who manages to keep or to possess *‘tusuk konde’* from Ibu Tien Suharto would then be followed by *‘wahyu kepresidenan’* or supernatural power for being president given by God Almighty. And, by possessing this *‘wahyu’* he would then be easily able to be elected as president.”⁸

Since it was thought to be secret, Damarjati Supajar was not willing to explain in detail when and how the wife of the prominent leader from Yogyakarta had managed to get this *‘tusuk konde’* from Ibu Tien Suharto.

Unlike Sukarno who was a descendent of *‘bangsawan’* (aristocrat), Suharto was a commoner. But, his marriage with Siti Hartinah, a descendent of *‘Javanese bangsawan’* from Solo, on 26 December 1947, raised his social status. Siti Hartinah, who was then popularly called Ibu Tien, was a daughter of KRMT (*Kanjeng Raden Mas Tumenggung*) Sumoharyomo who belonged to the family of King Mangkunegoro from Surakarta (Abdul Ghafur, 1994:124-125). Her father used to work as Wedana in Wuryantoro, Wonogiri, for a couple of years and had good relationship with Suharto’s adopted parents, Prawirowiharjo and his wife.

This social status would then become important element for Suharto particularly during his power struggle against his political opponents, particularly President Sukarno, a charismatic leader with many resources of legitimacy. As already mentioned earlier, Suharto was able to gain *‘wahyu’* due to his wife, Ibu Tien. It was predicted by many people that Suharto would soon step down from

⁸ Interview with Professor Damarjati Supajar, Yogyakarta, 10 November 2009.

the throne of presidency after his wife, Ibu Tien, died on 28 April 1996. The reason was because he had already lost the ‘*wahyu*’ or ‘*pulung*’ or ‘*wangsit*’ attained through the medium of ‘*tusuk konde*’ owned by Ibu Tien. Nobody knew whether this prediction was true. But, the fact was that about two years after the death of Ibu Tien, Retired Army Great General Suharto had to step down from his throne of presidency which according to Suharto himself as ‘*lengser keprabon, madheg pandhito*’ (to step down as king in order to be a priest). Suharto declared himself to cease to be president on 20 May 1998.

Mohtar Mas’oed, a professor in political sciences from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta (who used to become the Dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences) commented that the use of terminology ‘*lengser keprabon, madheg pandhito*’ or to step down as king and become a priest showed us that for long Suharto had already regarded himself not as a president but as a great king or ‘*ratu gung binathoro*’. When he was interviewed, Mohtar Mas’oed stated:

“The terminology of ‘*lengser keprabon, madheg pandhito*’ or to step down as king and become a priest was only used for kings, Javanese kings. For president, it is used the terminology of to resign. In every democratic country in the world, the terminology of ‘*lengser keprabon, madheg pandhito*’ could not be found. It is really a Javanese terminology.

“When expressing something Pak Harto often used Javanese concept, such as the fish can be caught without making water dirty or ‘*entuk iwake ojo buthek banyune*’. What made us quite surprised was when Pak Harto used the words ‘*nang, ning, nung, neng, nong*’. It was Javanese symbols that I do not understand. Pak Harto emerged to surface by introducing Javanese teachings, making politics more clearly understood.”⁹

⁹ Interview with Professor Mohtar Mas’oed, Yogyakarta, 23 August 2009.

According to some people, beside '*tusuk konde*', Suharto also managed to get '*kembang Wijayakusuma*' or flower of Wijayakusuma which was taken from the island of Nusakambangan close to Cilacap and it was then brought to Cendana, the residence of the Suharto's. By this '*kembang Wijayakusuma*' was Suharto's power supported (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:121).

In order to get guidance from God, Suharto also often communicated with many different "*dukun*" or "*kyai*" or spiritual teachers, someone possessing '*ilmu linuwih*' or high level knowledge. But, when a historian by the name of Ong Hok Ham asserted that one of Suharto's guru was Sudjono Humardhani, the founder of CSIS (the Center Studies of International Security), Suharto strongly rejected and even said that reversely he was Sujono Humardhani's teacher. Suharto even equalized himself to '*Semar*', a significant character in the world of '*pewayangan*' which is very dominant in the life of Javanese, either culturally or spiritually (Arwan 2007: 118). According to the belief, '*Kyai Semar*' was born from '*endhog jagad*' or an egg of the earth, broken itself together with two other oldest creatures in the world, '*Batara Guru*' and '*Togog*' (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:118).

Tuti Sumukti said that '*Semar*' is one of the oldest creatures. '*Semar*' is the descendant of one Goddess in the mythos with the greatest power. For Javanese, the goddess in '*pewayangan*' is usually described as man. This goddess could only be contacted by meditation or '*semedi*' or by climbing up the mount of cosmos" (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:118).

Some of his '*gurus*' gave Suharto '*jimat*' or '*amulet*' for perpetuating his power. Others gave him four big dragons for avoiding '*santet*' or '*tenung*' or

black magic. Beside fasting, Suharto also loved collecting heirlooms in the form of 'kris', 'tombak' (spears), and others coming from the ancient time in order to borrow their magical powers for concentrating his power (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:32). According to Ki Juru Bangunjiwo or Sugeng Wiyono, the writer of a book on "*Misteri pusaka-pusaka Suharto*" or Mistery of Suharto's Heirlooms, "Suharto possessed almost every kind of 'kris'. Once after his death all those 'kris' would be presented by his children to Keraton Yogyakarta, but it was rejected." Sugeng Wiyono further said:

"For more than 32 years ruling the country, Pak Harto had lot collections of 'pusaka' or *heirlooms* in the forms of wood, paintings, kris, spears and other sharp weapons, sticks and others..... Thousands of 'pusaka' (heirlooms) have now been kept at the Museum of 'Taman Mini Indonesia Indah' or TMII, a museum founded by Ibu Tien Suharto. And some of them are now kept in Cendana, the residence of Soeharto's children" (<http://www.rumahleo.com/index.php/beranda/artikel/61-keluarga-ingin-titipkan-pusaka-soeharto-/>).

"A number of Suharto's heirlooms were quite excellent (extraordinarily perfect). One of them was a kris called 'Kanjeng Kiai Sengkelat' from Solo. This 'kris' was created in the era of Majapahit kingdom (1466-1478) at the time of King Prabu Kertabumi or Brawijaya V. The maker of this 'kris' was Empu Supo Mandrangi" (<http://www.surya.co.id/web/Umm-Politik/Tutut-cs-Ingin-Titipkan-Pusaka-Soeharto.html>).

In Javanese's belief, "kris" is regarded as having mystical nuance. 'Kris' is also regarded as having magical power and important role in every spiritual business. As a weapon for killing, Javanese people who prefer maintaining harmony regard 'kris' as an instrument having magical power which can be used to guard his journey of life. There are many different 'kris', such as 'kris' for achieving, promoting and maintaining power; 'kris' for achieving peaceful life, 'kris' for maintaining dignity, etc." (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:119).

Suharto also conducted an activity of '*klenik*', directing him to be someone who was always full of calculations. He was always careful and stayed alert. He believed that everything which was always calculated in order to see the positive and the negative would end better. Elson has said that "Suharto was always careful and in an alert. He was only interested in his own future. He would stay more alert when he joined a certain group. He had to be sure that this group would win. He was very pragmatic" (Tempo, 17 Maret 2002).

Relating to such calculations, Mohtar Mas'oed stated too that in politics Suharto was also a man with full of calculations. He further said:

"In that meaning Javanese conservatism was used. It is always like that. As for example, before doing something Pak Harto's action was quite clear. Before acting he prepared the legal formal instrument. Bung Karno was not opposed but he prepared instruments in order to trap him. It was a local conservatism. In the East hemisphere it was called Asian values. Lee Kuan Yew often used those values too."¹⁰

Suharto himself also conducted an activity of '*nglakoni*', such as fasting, cutting down on eating and sleeping, not leaving the ancestors traditions such as carrying out '*selamatan*' for his family. M.C. Ricklefs has asserted that "Suharto believed in '*klenik*' very much which only acknowledged Islam in a more esoterically form and law of religion had small power. In this world Suharto found spiritual peace which could explain the style of his calm leadership for years" (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:14-15).

Among five guidances that he had to do, such as '*kungkum ing tempuran*, *ngombe banyu pitung sumur*, *manggon neng omah suwung*, *turu ing tritisan*, *turu neng jugangan*' (soaking his body in the river water, drinking water taken from

¹⁰ Interview with Professor Mohtar Mas'oed, Yogyakarta, 23 August 2009.

seven different wells, staying in an empty house, sleeping under the edge of house roof, and sleeping in a rubbish hole) only the guidance of sleeping in a rubbish hole Suharto had never done (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:124). Since, in Javanese tradition, all these spiritual activities are usually done secretly, all what Suharto had done was not publicly known. Although it does not always guarantee that someone who conducts such kinds of spiritual activities would succeed in winning election, up to this present time such kinds of spiritual activities are also done by some people who run for a certain position in the government.

It had been reported too that Suharto also often visited a number of sacred places for '*semedi*' or meditation, such as Gunung Selok and Gunung Strandil, both are located in Cilacap (Arwan Tuti Artha, 2007:114). He also often visited the tombs of the ancestors or '*ziarah kubur*' including both his own parents and parents in law. In Javanese tradition, '*ziarah kubur*' or even maintaining the tombs of the ancestors is good to do. By doing so, someone would be able to get spiritual power from the ancestors (Sukamdani, 2009:15).

In relation with the benefit of '*ziarah kubur*' or even maintaining the tombs of the ancestors, Sukamdani, a successful businessman who was very close to President Suharto and his wife, Ibu Tien Suharto, made an important testimony. He said that the success of GOLKAR in the 1971 election could not be separated from the spiritual effort conducted by Suharto. In his interview Sukamdani asserted:

“Once, as the daily chairman of the Mangadeg Foundation of Surakarta or '*Yayasan Mangadeg Surakarta*' headed by Ibu Tien Suharto and Pak Harto became the advisor, I told Pak Harto that as the new president he

needed ‘spiritual power’. As the descendants as well as people of the late Pangeran Sambernyowo, King of Mangkunegoro I, we had to pay attention to the landslide of Astana Mangadeg, the tomb of King Mangkunegoro I. The Astana Mangadeg needed to be renovated. Pak Harto immediately gave his agreement. We began to conduct total renovation of the Astana Mangadeg in 1970 and the renovation was able to be finished in 1971, before the 1971 election was carried out.”¹¹

Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono further asserted that once he asked Pak Harto to inaugurate the renovated Astana Mangadeg in order to get ‘mental spiritual power’ through the charisma of the national hero, Pangeran Sambernyowo or King Mangkunegoro I. The inauguration was carried out on the day of Pak Harto’s 50th birthday, 8 June 1971, by unveiling the cover of ‘*Tugu Tri Dharma*’ or Tri Dharma Monument. Tri Dharma was the teaching of King Mangkunegoro I consisted of ‘*rumangsa handarbeni handuwensi*’ or having sense of belonging, ‘*wajib melu hanggondeli*’ or having responsibility for defending our common properties and interests, and ‘*mulat sarira hangrasa wani*’ or having bravery to continually conduct self evaluation in order to know how far we have already defended our common properties and interests. This teaching then became the basis of our service in the government. There were also other commitments such as ‘*Tiji tibeh, mati siji mati kabeh, mukti siji mukti kabeh*’ (one dies all would die too, one becomes successful all would become successful too) and ‘*hanebu sauyun*’ (always belonging to one group). The philosophy of Tri Dharma was then adopted by Suharto as one of the ‘*Doktrin Kepemimpinan ABRI*’ or the Armed Forces Leadership Doctrine.¹²

¹¹ Interview with Professor Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono, Jakarta, 10 October 2009.

¹² Interview with Professor Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono, Jakarta, 10 October 2009.

Sukamdani further stated that a surprise occurred in the following morning when President Suharto inaugurated '*Pasar Klewer*' or Klewer Market in Solo,¹³ which was regarded as the symbol of physical and material development. In his speech of inauguration, Pak Harto, was able to explain to public clearly and distinctly the Long-term Development Plan of 25 Years or '*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang 25 Tahun*' and the Short-term Development Plan of 5 Years or '*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Pendek 5 Tahun*'. This inauguration occurred a few weeks before the election of 3 July 1971."¹⁴

Describing Suharto's behavior as a Javanese as well as military leader, Retired Army Major General Sutarto Sigit who used to be the Chief Staff of the Regional Military Division of Jakarta and once appointed the Ambassador of Thailand stated:

"One principle which Pak Harto always consistently kept was that he never easily surrendered. When he took over power from Bung Karno, he faced lots of problems. Based on that principle, with his own bravery he managed to resolve the problems successfully."

"Pak Harto took the Javanese principle of '*panca po manunggal*' as the guidance. '*Panca*' is five, '*po*' is every value beginning with the word 'p', and '*manunggal*' means 'unity'. Firstly, he wanted to be a '*pandito*' or priest, but unsuccessful. Pak Harto himself was OK, but due to the circumstances as well as his family, Pak Harto failed to be a good '*pandito*', making him so materialistic. Secondly, he had to be '*pengayom*' or protector. In this case, Pak Harto was almost successful, some were protected, and others were not. It was understandable since at that time we still had a number of threats coming from Darul Islam, PKI, Dutch, and others. Thirdly, he had to be '*penata*' or manager. He was really a good political as well as economic manager. As a manager, Pak Harto was better than Bung Karno. Fourthly, he had to be '*pamong*'. As a '*pamong*' Pak Harto was also successful. He was a good '*pamong*' for

¹³ '*Pasar Klewer*' is a famous and traditional textile (particularly batik) market located in Solo. In the beginning of the New Order, this market was renovated by President Suharto.

¹⁴ Interview with Professor Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono, Jakarta, 10 October 2009.

peasants, fishermen, and all the poor. To them, Pak Harto was concerned very much. And, fifthly, he had to be '*pangreh*' or leader. As a leader, Pak Harto was also successful."¹⁵

Retired Army Major General Sutarto Sigit who used to be a commissar of one state company under General Sumitro, and is now a businessman further asserted:

"According to me, Pak Harto had failed to become a '*pandito*' or priest due to his family. Pak Harto loved his family very much. He never disappointed his family. He said: "*Do not disappoint your family. It would make it weak.*" In Javanese, '*keluarga iku aja digawe serik jalanan agawe ringkiah keluarga*'. This principle was then used by his children and his friends for their own benefit."¹⁶

According to Retired Army Major General Sutarto Sigit who once had an experience with Ibu Tien Suharto for he was unsuccessful in requesting Queen Sirikit from Thailand to attend the opening ceremony of the 'Taman Mini Indonesia Indah' as Ibu Tien Suharto had wanted, said:

"According to my opinion, Pak Harto became so materialistic due to Ibu Tien's influence. His children were also like that. It was so pity. Pak Harto had the principle: "*Do not disappoint your family. In order to protect your property, you are allowed not to say the truth.*" This is called '*dora sembada*'. Pak Harto was in dilemma, due to his wife and children.

At that time many people said that Ibu Tien wanted to priorities her heritance. Pak Harto's opponents said that she was only a daughter of Wedana, not even Bupati. Look, before dying, she built a palace like that. She wanted to place herself as the blue blood. It was not so good for Pak Harto. Some people also said that Pak Harto became like that due to the '*wahyu*' owned by Ibu Tien, not by Pak Harto. After Ibu Tien died, Pak Harto soon fell down too.

There was a belief too that Tommy might not be hurt. If he were hurt, Pak Harto would have got into trouble. It was really a pity. Since Pak Harto

¹⁵ Interview with Major General Sutarto Sigit, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

¹⁶ Interview with Major General Sutarto Sigit, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

had the principle that his family could not be hurt, his children and friends tried to get benefit from it.”¹⁷

4.6. Differences and similarities between Sukarno and Suharto

Although both Sukarno and Suharto were Javanese, the two great leaders were different. Either their social status or their educational background was different. While Sukarno was a descendent of ‘bangsawan’ or aristocrat for his father, Sukemi Sosrodihardjo, was a ‘bangsawan’ from Java, and his mother, Idayu Nyoman Rai, was a descendent of brahmana from Bali. Suharto, on the other hand, was a commoner for his father, Kertosudiro or Kertorejo, was a poor farmer and his mother, Sukirah, was a simple village woman.

Their different social status seemed to have influenced their education. As a son of a teacher, Sukarno managed to enter higher education. Beginning from lower school of 5 years in Mojokerto (1914), Sukarno then went to the ‘Europeesche Lagere School’ (the ELS) in Mojokerto too and finished in 1916. After that he went to the ‘Hogere Burger School’ (the HBS) in Surabaya and finished in 1921. Even, after finishing his HBS, Sukarno had a chance to continue his study in Europe, but due to financial problems and his mother’s rejection he then decided to go to the THS or the ‘Tenische Hogere School’ in Bandung. During the time of the Dutch colonization very limited number of native people was able to enter such a prestigious Dutch school.

His educational background had driven Sukarno to meet Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, chairman of the SI or ‘Sarekat Islam’ who became the central figure of Indonesian nationalism at that time. In Tjokroaminoto’s home, Sukarno

¹⁷ Interview with Major General Sutarto Sigit, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

stayed and then often met a number of prominent movement leaders coming from different backgrounds and ideologies who often had a meeting at Tjokromaninoto's home, such as Agus Salim, Soewardi Soeryaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantoro), Hendriek Snevielt (a Dutch, the founder of the Indies Communist Party which then became the PKI) and his assistants such as Adolph Baars, Semaun, Muso, and Alimins.

From Tjokroaminoto Sukarno learnt a lot of things, particularly about leadership and oratorship. Sukarno was very impressed with Tjokroaminoto's leadership model that had been regarded as having capacity to unite many different elements of society such as conservative and modern Islam, Marxist, Javanese Moslem, etc. and also the way Tjokroaminoto had a speech in public which was then making him a brilliant as well as attractive orator. Special from Alimin, Sukarno began to learn about Marxism or Communism.

His relationship with those prominent national movement leaders still continued until he went to the THS. When he was in Bandung, Sukarno met other national movement leaders such as Earnest F.E. Douwes Dekker and Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo. He also met Tan Malaka, representative of the Commintern for Southeast Asia, whose ideas very much influenced Sukarno's way of thinking, particularly in his struggle against the Dutch.

Sukarno's capability in managing organization, writing, and oration grew up together parallel with his more important role which he played in many activities for the Indonesian independence. In the year of 1915 he joined a youth organization of Surabaya that was called '*Tri Koro Dharma*', which was established in 1915, which in 1918 was changed into the '*Jong Java*'. In this

youth organization Sukarno began to be deeply involved in organizational activities, to train himself to write articles for the '*Oetoesan Hindia*', and to develop his public speaking capability, which then often attracted his audiences. In the end of 1920, he established the PNI or '*Partai Nasional Indonesia*' (the Indonesian National Party) and he was elected the chairman of the party.

His involvement in discussions and debates particularly on Indonesian difficulties which were often held by prominent leaders, made Sukarno's attitude and behavior as a pioneer of independence begin to emerge. From reading books, his knowledge on Western political thoughts developed. Besides being close to the philosophy of Hegel, Immanuel Kant, Rousseau, and Voltaire, Sukarno also understood very much democratic theory of Thomas Jefferson, Fabian socialism, and Marxism. Great names such as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Dalton, Mazzini, and Garibaldi were quite familiar to him, particularly in relating to his struggle freeing the oppressed from the oppressor. With his experiences Sukarno was able to emerge as a brilliant orator as well an ideologue that was able to formulate '*Marhaenism*' and also dug and formulated Pancasila which then became the state ideology. After the proclamation of the independence, Sukarno was elected the first president of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

On the other hand, Suharto whose social status was very low could only go to lower school. As many people also did, after finishing his '*schakel school*', Suharto had to find a job. He even moved from one job to another job for, without working, he could not support his life. In the beginning he worked as a village bank clerk in Wuryantoro, then joined the KNIL, '*shodanco*', the PETA,

the BKR, the TKR and then the TNI. Different from Sukarno, when he was a student, Suharto was never involved in any political debates or discussions like Sukarno. He had never met any prominent national movement leaders either. He had never got any formal Western education and learnt little about Western political thoughts like Sukarno had done. Almost all the men he met in his early life, such as Prawiroharjo, Kyai Daryatmo, Sumoharyomo, etc. were close to Javanese traditional teachings.

As the nation leaders, Sukarno and Suharto possessed different perspective, particularly on how to progress his nation. Sukarno was more outward-looking, improving social and political environment first in order to improve the quality of life of every person. While Suharto was more inward-looking, starting from improving the quality of individual in order to achieve his life ends in order to realize people life in harmony.

Based on such a different perspective, the style and strategy adopted by the two leaders were also different, even though both of them had the same Javanese blood flown in themselves. As a prominent leader of national movement, a writer as well as a brilliant orator who learnt very much about Western political theories, in leading people Sukarno preferred to changing environment first in order to free people from oppression, so that they could live much better, either as individual or as group. For that purposes, Sukarno regarded independence as the golden bridge through which people could reach their demands.

But, independence which had been reached was unable to change society as he wanted. This could be seen from the instability of politics occurred since

the proclamation on 17 August 1945 till the end of the Liberal Democracy. According to Sukarno, political instability threatened the unity of the unitary state of Indonesia occurred because the people's mind, particularly political elites, had not been freed from the domination of colonialism of the Western democracy. In order to free them, a revolution had to be continued. The Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 marking the end of the Liberal Democracy and the beginning of the Guided Democracy based on the principle of '*musyawarah untuk mufakat*' or discussion for deliberation was regarded by Sukarno as the "Rediscovery of Indonesian Revolution." Sukarno had stated although Indonesian independence had been reached, Indonesian revolution had not yet finished. For that purpose, Indonesia had to go back to its rail of revolution and that revolutionary activities had to go on.

Since then, Sukarno never stopped talking about revolution of human being and stressing on the importance of thinking revolutionary in order to shock the established institutions, in order to demolish and rebuild, to build the world anew. For the success of revolution Sukarno posited himself not only as the president, but also as the Great Leader of the Revolution whose task was to stipulate the goals of revolution as well as to formulate the revolutionary ideology as the guidance which had to be followed by all leaders and people of Indonesia. Here Sukarno seemed to stress on changing the environment rather than to better the condition of individuals.

Related to Javanese culture, Sukarno did not talk too much about it, except he described the day of his birth which was on the same day of the eruption of Mount Kelud (Legge, 1972:17). According to Javanese people,

children who were born on the same day of the big events usually would become great men in the future time. The principle of '*musyawarh untuk mufakat*' as formulated in Pancasila was also regarded by Sukarno as a part of highly respected values, particularly for the Javanese. But actually Sukarno's ambition to unify all existed elements of society having different backgrounds of ideology, was a realization of Javanese culture which always dream of life on the basis of '*urmat*' or respect and '*rukun*' or harmony.

On the other hand, due to his life condition and experiences, in leading the nation, Suharto preferred stressing on the betterment of attitude and behavior of every individual like what he had always done in order to achieve the ultimate goals of his life, including the promotion of wealth. Unlike Sukarno, Suharto was neither an orator nor an ideologue nor a political thinker. He was a soldier as well as a true Javanese. As a soldier, Suharto was a practical worker who had often got jobs from his superior in order to finish. His good understanding on highly respected or noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy which he then formulated into '*pituduh*' or guidance and '*wewaler*' or prohibition including all aspects of life, also his belief in the rightness of the highly respected or noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy had been the guidance for Suharto to make himself to be a leader having the character of '*becik sajatining becik*' (good in the essence of goodness), '*berbudi bowoleksana*' (noble and generous mind), and '*hambeg adil paramarta*' so that he would be able to carry out his tasks and obligations as well.

Also, unlike Sukarno who always attempted to develop his political thought as the ideology of the nation, Suharto thought that the problem of the

nation foundation and philosophy had already been final, that was Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. According to him, for the Indonesian people there was no other problem except how to execute or to carry out both Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in original and consistent manner. And, in order to carry out or to practice Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in original and consistent manner what the Indonesian people needed was to understand Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution correctly and appropriately by using the guidance which he had wanted to create and enact in 1978: the P-4 or '*Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*' (Guidance for the Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila).

4.7. Debates on Suharto's Javanese character

Many informants agreed with the notion that Javanese cultural values and philosophy had been used and manipulated by Suharto as guidance not only for his life but also for ruling the country. However, Amien Rais, a professor in politics from Gadjah Mada University and also a prominent politician who happened to be the founder as well as the Chairman of the National Mandate Party or '*Partai Amanat Nasional*' (PAN) and once in the Presidential Election 2004 became one of the presidential candidates, opposed it. According to Amien Rais:

“Suharto was a controversial person who often showed us his two different and opposite sides. On the one side he was a polite and friendly figure so that some people called him the ‘smiling general’, but on the other side he performed his brutal face that had the nerve to kill. And because of that his grey area of Suharto’s role in politics was so large.”¹⁸

¹⁸ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 August 2009.

Meanwhile, Tri Wiratno, a scholar who practices Javanese teachings, has once said: “In governing the country Pak Harto always used highly respected Javanese cultural values for his guidance and prohibition. He always practiced Javanese leadership.” Tri Wiratno further asserted that:

“As a leader who always practiced Javanese cultural values, Pak Harto preferred not much talking. It was different from Bung Karno. He always paid attention to other people, willing to listen to other persons. In making policies he always took the principle of ‘*amot momot*’ or listening to all people to understand their demands and then trying to accommodate them into his policies. He did not mind someone questioning his policies. If they did not make any trouble, Pak Harto would never fight against them.”¹⁹

But, as asserted by Tri Wiratno, “in practicing these Javanese cultural values, he met a number of obstacles, coming from his friends, subordinates, and even families so that not all values could be implemented smoothly.”

The other informant, Agus Dodi Sugiartoto, an NGO activist from Solo, has also said:

“I agree that Pak Harto always used cultural symbols, such as Javanese language and behavior in governing Indonesia. Javanese influences in social and political development were very significant. The introduction of Javanese teachings such as: ‘*Ing ngarso sung tulodo, ing madya mangun karso, tut wuri handayani*’, ‘*mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*’, ‘*hasto broto*’, etc. referred to us how strong influences of the Javanese in the era of Suharto’s government were. In the era of Pak Harto, Indonesian people were in the process of Javanization.”²⁰

But, unlike Tri Wiratno, Agus Dodi Sugiartoto asserted that Suharto did not totally use those values and philosophy. He used them only the skin, meaning Javanese cultural values and philosophy were used by Suharto only as a tool for manipulating people. He said:

¹⁹ Interview with Dr. Tri Wiratno, Solo, 10 March 2009.

²⁰ Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

“..... Javanization approach during the era of Pak Harto was only in the skin. Javanese culture was used only as a tool for manipulating Javanese people. Javanese philosophy and culture were only used their skin, not the content. As for example, how Pak Harto treated Bung Karno at the end of his power. In public Pak Harto always said that he wanted to carry high and burry deep or ‘*mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*’, but in reality Pak Harto’s treatment to Bung Karno was very different from the Javanese philosophy and culture of ‘*mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*’. Sukarno was even treated inhumanly, far from the substance of the Javanese philosophy.”²¹

Like Tri Wiratno and Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Bambang Marsono, a scholar as well as an entrepreneur who lives in Jakarta and has now been involved in practical politics (he is one of the chairmen of the DPP Partai Hanura and ran for parliament member in the 2009 election, but failed) has also said that:

”Pak Harto was the one who had capability to practice Javanese teachings and philosophy. He was able not only to defense his power for more than 32 years but also to become the central figure of the country. At the beginning of his government many people were doubted of Pak Harto’s capability for the way he spoke was so much different from Bung Karno. Whereas many people were dreaming that only a man like Bung Karno was able to lead the country.

In many things Pak Harto could be an example, as for example when many people wanted his advice or guidance. His capability in implementing Javanese culture in the government was quite spectacular. His span of control was too large but he was able to control his power easily. All depended on his ‘fathership’ character or sifat ‘*kebapakan*’. Pak Harto became the central figure and people always called him ‘*Bapak Suharto*’ or Father Suharto.

We were proud of his capability in stimulating people’s emotion. He created an image that his family was a harmonious family and needed to be used as example. It was the best example of family, though in reality his family was not so good as he had been imagined. But when he was still alive his family was imaged as if it were harmonious. It was often broadcast by TV how harmonious was the family of Pak Harto..... The tradition of kissing in public done by parents with their children or by

²¹ Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

someone with his/her close friends, etc. (*'cipika-cipiki'* or *'cium pipi kanan, cium pipi kiri'*) was popularized by Pak Harto.”²²

Admiring the success of Suharto to rule the country for more than 32 year, Bambang Marsono even stated that “Suharto’s leadership could be adopted as management strategy for organization, business and government.”

The same opinion was also given by Balidi Dwijopranoto, a retired worker in a sugar factory in Solo and now is serving as the Head of Rukun Tetangga (RT), the lowest government level. According to him “Pak Harto remained maintaining Javanese culture for his wife, Bu Tien, was still the descendent of King Mangkunegoro from Solo. He kept using Javanese culture as guidance for his own life. When he was in power, Pak Harto kept upholding the Javanese cultural values, such as the philosophy of wayang kulit.”

Suharto’s commitment to use Javanese culture as guidance for his life could be seen from what he had done. As further asserted by Balidi Dwijopranoto:

“Pak Harto often talked about Javanese culture such as *‘mikul dhuwur mendhem jero’*, particularly in thinking about the country. Pak Harto kept the philosophy of *‘mikul dhuwur mendhem jero’* in treating Bung Karno for Pak Harto was someone whose heart was good. He did not bring Bung Karno into trial for he thought Bung Karno was a leader whose experience was broad and the people always honored him very much.”²³

M. Adib Ajiputra, a businessman who used to be the chairman of the UNS Student Cooperative (KOPMA UNS) and once got scholarship from Supersemar Foundation headed by Suharto and then became the chairman of the KBA-PBS UNS or ‘Keluarga Besar Alumni Penerima Beasiswa Supersemar

²² Interview with Professor Bambang Marsono, Jakarta, 10 March 2009.

²³ Interview with Balidi Dwijopranoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

Universitas Sebelas Maret' gave us his opinion on Suharto. As one of 'Pioneer Youths' or '*Pemuda Pelopor*' who often met Suharto, Adib Ajiputra once said that:

"Pak Harto was really a man who absolutely upheld Javanese culture and philosophy. What I admired was how he really honored Javanese '*adat*' as well as highly respected (noble) Javanese values. That was reflected from the way he had a dialogue with us almost every year and gave us guidance. Once at Tapos he taught us about the life principle of '*selaras dan seimbang*' or harmony and balance. He reminded us always to live in harmony and balance with the universe and not to forget our own noble culture."²⁴

Like Amien Rais and Agus Doddy Sugiartoto who disagreed that Suharto had practice noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy, Tejo Pramono, an activist of international NGO, Campesina (Jakarta), which was committed to rising the level of life of peasants also stated that:

"Suharto did not behave like a good Javanese, but with his iron fist he forced all people to say that he was a good Javanese. People were forced to admit that he was a noble Javanese, and people were not given access for information about Suharto's bad political behavior."²⁵

According to Tejo Pramono, Suharto attempted to reach power not only by using the Javanese philosophy, but by using military forces. He said: "He created an image (remember that imaging is lying) that he was good, but in reality he was so cruel. Under the mounted gun, people were asked to say that Suharto could say '*sabdo pandhito ratu*' or the king could not be opposed."

The Javanese cultural values and philosophy were practiced by Suharto in different ways. These practices could be seen from what Suharto had done when Suharto had to fight against the Thirtieth of September Movement masterminded

²⁴ Interview with Drs. Adib Ajiputra, Solo, 10 March 2009.

²⁵ Interview with Tejo Pramono, SP, Jakarta, 10 March 2009.

by the PKI, to unseat Sukarno from his presidency, or to struggle against his political opponents. Relating to Sukarno, Tri Wiratno once said:

“In treating his former leader, Sukarno, Pak Harto also practiced the Javanese philosophy of ‘*mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*’. The philosophy of ‘*mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*’ or to carry high and to bury deep means that our ancestors have to be honored, their good reputations have to be respected, and their faults have to be secretly maintained. Bung Karno was not trialed in order to carry high and to burry deep. But in spiritual concept this philosophy means that after dying, the corpse will be buried deep, and the soul will go upwards to meet the Creator. In facing such experience someone has to do ‘*laku prihatin*’, always doing goods and never hurt anybody.”²⁶

Since in Pancasila Democracy there was no room for opposition, what Suharto had done in relating to the critiques and oppositions was commented by Tri Wiratno as in accordance with the Javanese cultural values and philosophy of ‘*rukun*’ or harmony, ‘*urmat*’ or respect, ‘*tepo sliro*’ or mutual understanding, etc. According to Tri Wiratno: “Both criticism and opposition were the Western concept. They were not suitable with the Javanese concept.” The other concept used by Suharto was the leadership concept of kraton, ‘*lengser keprabon madheg pandhito*’. As said by Tri Wiratno, “when he stepped down as president, Pak Harto absolutely implemented the leadership concept of kraton, ‘*lengser keprabon madheg pandhito*’ or stepping down from his power in order to become a sage.”

Bambang Marsono, on the other hand, has said that in order to get legitimacy for his government, he exploited Pancasila. Pancasila had been formulated by Suharto in accordance with his own will. Through the P-4, Suharto had attempted to insert Javanese cultural values and philosophy into Pancasila.

²⁶ Interview with Dr. Tri Wiratno, Solo, 10 March 2009.

Pancasila was used as the other source of legitimacy for his government. As asserted by Professor Bambang Marsono:

“Pak Harto was able to exploitate Pancasila in order to strengthen his position. Bung Karno was the digger of Pancasila. Pak Harto was the implementator. Both Sukarno and Suharto were the two sides of the same coin. It was uneasy not to trust them. Pak Harto was regarded as the one who was the most consistent Pancasilaist man. The more people who became Pancasialist men, the stronger position of Pak Harto would be. These men seemed as if they were loyal to Pancasila, but in reality they were loyal to Pak Harto.

Pak Harto always had strong reason to connect all what happened in the universe with Pancasila. The Javanese philosophy of life, *‘ing ngarso sung tulodo, ing madyo mangun karso, tut wuri handayani’*, is so familiar to almost people. Even non Javanese understands very well about this philosophy. It showed us that Pak Harto had very strong philosophical power.”²⁷

Relating to opposition, Professor Bambang Marsono also said that in accordance with the principle of harmony and balance, opposition was unsuitable with the Javanese political life. He said: “For Pak Harto, opposition was unconstitutional. The idiom of unconstitutional had become a very heavy burden for everyone. All had to be done through constitutional procedure. If it was against this constitutional procedure, it would be punished.”

According to Bambang Marsono, a good Javanese who understands Javanese *‘ungguh-ungguh’* or ethics will never show his/her *‘pamrih’* or interests to public. Neither did Suharto. In order to not to show his interest of becoming president, he created a procedure for presidential election. He did not nominate himself as the candidate, but the MPR asked him to be nominated as the candidate. As asserted by Bambang Marsono as follows:

²⁷ Interview with Professor Bambang Marsono, Jakarta, 10 March 2009.

”In many things Pak Harto used Javanese philosophy, as for example when choosing someone or his subordinates. Even when the parliament had to elect the president, what perceived by many people was that the MPR went to meet Pak Harto asking him whether he was still willing to be reelected as the president. It was quite spectacular. This very spectacular system of election was then broadcast by the media. It was Pak Harto’s strength. On the other side Pak Harto used Javanese philosophy smartly, he used communication science well. When he was asked by the MPR, people thought as if he were demanded by the people. Those whose opinions were different could do nothing.”²⁸

Almost the same as relating to Suharto’s treatment to Sukarno, Bambang Marsono clearly stated that:

“Pak Harto was very smart in using Javanese cultural philosophy. When Sukarno died, he kept upholding the philosophy of ‘*mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*’. Before dying, Bung Karno wanted to be buried at Batutulis, Bogor, but Pak Harto rejected. According to Suharto, since Bung Karno was born in Blitar, it was better to burry him at Blitar, close to his late mother. People from Blitar would be very happy if Bung Karno was buried there. In Javanese tradition, it is common to burry someone who dies at his native town or village where he was born. Pak Harto was right..... In order to eliminate the bad image, Suharto decided to have a big burial military ceremony for Sukarno. For most Javanese it was a very spectacular ceremony.

When trying to take over power from Sukarno, Suharto was very smart. He asked his generals to meet and persuade Sukarno to deliver the SUPERSEMAR to him. This transfer of power could be done smoothly without any bloodshed. Suharto managed to get the SUPERSEMAR and the army did not move.”²⁹

4.8. Legitimacy for Suharto’s leadership

Many people believed that Suharto was able to get legitimacy from people due to his guidance he had already practiced.

Balidi Dwijopranoto has also stated that Suharto could be regarded as ‘*satriyo piningit*’. He said:

²⁸ Interview with Professor Bambang Marsono, Jakarta, 10 March 2009.

²⁹ Interview with Professor Bambang Marsono, Jakarta, 10 March 2009.

“Pak Harto could be regarded as ‘*satriyo piningit*’ for he always thought the faith of ‘*wong cilik*’ (poor people). With ‘*wong cilik*’, he was always good. He always worked hard for the progress of the country.

According to wayang story, ‘*satriyo piningit*’ is someone who has additional capacity or capability to fight against crimes. Pak Harto could be regarded as ‘*satriyo piningit*’ for he was able to crush the crime done by the PKI. People regarded him ‘*satriyo piningit*’ for he struggled for the progress of the people. I believe that Pak Harto was someone who always thought the faith of the people.”³⁰

Balidi Dwijopranoto eventually stated that as an individual as well as president, Suharto always practiced the teachings of Javanese culture, such as doing what so called ‘*tirakat*’. He said:

“I think Pak Harto’s *tirakat* was good. Since he was a king, his *tirakat* had to be good. He spoke what he thought important. If it was good, he would say good, if it was bad, he would say bad. If he met poor people, he would speak soft Javanese language, not rough Javanese. When speaking with peasants or lurah, he would speak Javanese.

Pak Harto did not like someone who did not understand ‘*unggah-ungguh*’ or ethics. Every man should be polite.”³¹

According to Balidi Dwijopranoto, due to his ‘*tirakat*’ Suharto was able to reach power, replacing Sukarno. Balidi Dwijopranoto further asserted:

“Pak Harto became president by election. It was not Pak Harto’s will, but it was the people’s will, the Indonesian people. Pak Harto did not run for president by himself. He was nominated as the candidate by the MPR.

According to Javanese culture the most important for someone who wants to become a king is his ‘*tirakat*’. The king was always someone whose ‘*tirakat*’ was great. So does the president, without ‘*tirakat*’ and struggle, someone could not succeed in becoming president. The term might have been wahyu or whatever. Pak Harto could be said as ‘*satriyo piningit*’ for he got ‘*wahyu*’ and elected by the people or the MPR to become president.

³⁰ Interview with Balidi Dwijopranoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

³¹ Interview with Balidi Dwijopranoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

Pak Harto managed to become president for he got '*wahyu*' and did a lot of '*tirakat*'. Pak Harto was the man who did a lot of '*tirakat*' and always upheld and maintained Javanese culture. Compared with Bung Karno, Pak Harto talked using Javanese culture more often than Bung Karno did.

Perceived from what they had done, Bung Karno and Pak Harto were almost the same. Pak Harto was a son of a poor farmer. Pak Harto knew Javanese culture better than Bung Karno for he was born in Yogyakarta, close to the kingdom of Yogyakarta, and his wife was a descendent of Mangkunegoro. Pak Harto managed to become president for he got a '*wahyu*' from Ibu Tien and also from Pak Harto himself. Both of them were intertwined. President could be a descendent of king, he could also be a commoner, the most important one is he has a *wahyu*. '*Wahyu*' and personality are important. In order to get '*wahyu*', someone has to do a lot of '*tirakat*'.

'*Pusaka*' is not important, but he has to be close and honor God Almighty. '*Pusaka*' is only a transmitter. In the past time, '*pusaka*' was important. But all depended on God Almighty."³²

Balidi Dwijopranoto did not question the legitimacy of Suharto for he was a man who managed to possess the conditions needed by most people to become president. Balidi said:

"Pak Harto could totally be accepted as the president for two reasons. The first was he always used Javanese culture as guidance for his life. The second was he could lead and progress the people of Indonesia.

All who disobeyed the government, particularly criminals, were crushed. Through '*Petrus*' or '*pembunuhan misterius*' (mysterious assassination)³³ Pak Harto managed to crush the criminals so that the condition was secured. President could do anything including crushing the criminals and the country enemies. Pak Harto was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and all orders had to be executed. If it was not like that, people would do whatever they liked. Nowadays the criminals were going on. In the era of Pak Harto, the condition of the people was calm.

Pak Harto was regarded as the father of Indonesia. Poor people only knew that Pak Harto was the father of development, the president of the poor,

³² Interview with Balidi Dwijopranoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

³³ In the early 1980s, Suharto instructed the security commanders to take a shock therapy by kidnapping and assassinating those who belonged to criminal gangs in order to reduce the number of crimes.

and the security was good. People could buy everything. Poor people were calm. As the father he had to be honored. Those who disobeyed could be punished or at least were given information that he really was the father of development who managed to make people secured.

In the items of Pancasila we could find the Javanese philosophy of '*tepo sliro*' or '*kumo-kumo*' (empathy). '*Musyawarah*' or deliberation and '*ing ngarso sung tuladha, ing madya mangun karsa, tut wuri handayani*' are really Javanese. Pak Harto really understood such cultural values. Pak Harto was really a good Javanese.

When he was president, Pak Harto wanted to become a true Javanese. He wanted to make Indonesian people good, willing to give contribution in any form.

Pak Harto was the man who knew well the way of Javanese life, '*tepo seliro*', '*sopan santun*', making Indonesian people happy. For he was really a true Javanese, he could become the example for Javanese people.

'Srengenge kembar' means there are two existing kings, like in Solo nowadays. It could not be accepted but in reality there are existed. One of them has to step down. Since both of them are equally strong, therefore in order to avoid conflict, they are both accepted.”³⁴

Believing that doing '*tirakat*' was important precondition for someone who wanted to reach his noble ideals, Suharto often advised others, including the young, to practice it. Adib Ajiputra, a pioneer youth (*'Pemuda Pelopor'*), who every year met Suharto at Tapos stated that every time Suharto met the young's he never forgot to advice them that in carrying out their life they used only their brain or rational. If they only used their brain, they would be unable to solve their life problems for their brain was really limited. The most important one, according to Suharto, was to use their feeling. Adib Ajiputra stated: "Pak Harto always understood every problem not with his brain but with his feeling. Therefore, the most important for everyone to do is always to maintain his/her feeling in order to make his/her feeling responsive to every problem." According

³⁴ Interview with Balidi Dwijopranoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

to Suharto, the best way to maintain someone's feeling was by doing '*tirakat*' or '*laku prihatin*' or '*tapa brata*'. As asserted by Adib Ajiputra:

"Because Pak Harto was a man who always upheld the Javanese values and philosophy, he told us that as young generation we had to understand '*ilmu prihatin*' by conducting '*topo broto*' etc. He also reminded us always to remember our ancestors who had given contributions to our country by visiting their tombs including the king's tombs.

Pak Harto advised the young's that the journey was still far away. They had to provide themselves by living in the condition of '*prihatin*'. The implementation of '*prihatin*' in Javanese culture were various, such as fasting on Mondays and Thursdays, praying at the midnight, or living in a very bad condition, etc.

He told us that the past leaders or kings such as Joko Tingkir always lived in the condition of '*prihatin*' so that they were able to get '*wahyu*', or '*kewahyon*' or possessing magic power."³⁵

Talking about Suharto's legitimacy, Adib Ajiputra strongly stated that as the President of the Republic of Indonesia, his legitimacy was unquestionable. Adib Ajiputra even regarded Suharto not only as president but also as '*raja gung binatoro*' or the Great King.

"He was not only a leader but also someone who was able to bring peace and prosperity to people. He was regarded the great king or '*raja gung binatoro*'. Many people really regarded Pak Harto as the Great King.

As a Javanese he often used Javanese terminologies when speaking. What he often delivered to people was that our nation was a great nation due to highly respected values taught by the founder of the nation, including all kings who had given us principles for life such as Gadjah Mada to Sultan Agung and Bung Karno."³⁶

On the other hand, when talking about what Suharto had done when he had to fight against the PKI which attempted to overthrow the legal government

³⁵ Interview with Drs. Adib Ajiputra, Solo, 10 March 2009.

³⁶ Interview with Drs. Adib Ajiputra, Solo, 10 March 2009.

and to replace the ideology of Pancasila with other ideology of Communism, Balidi Dwijopranoto asserted:

“Gestapu (‘Gerakan 30 September’ or the Thirtieth of September Movement) could be regarded as ‘*goro-goro*’ or political turmoil. ‘*Goro-goro*’ which was masterminded by the PKI had made Indonesia worse. Pak Harto managed to crush the ‘*goro-goro*’. The SUPERSEMAR was delivered to Pak Harto, though it was doubted by some people. In my opinion, if the SUPERSEMAR had not been existed, it would have been very strange.

Bung Karno was a bit failed particularly to prevent the G-30-S/PKI from being broken out. He was unable to maintain order and security. He might have been betrayed by the PKI.

Bung Karno introduced NASAKOM. In the era of NASAKOM the PKI became the side which was benefited. The goal might be the same but the PKI was benefited and in the reality the PKI then launched a rebellion which could be crushed by Pak Harto.”

I am really happy seeing Pak Harto became president. He always showed us his Javanese personality. He liked to maintain the Javanese culture. If everyone likes to maintain Javanese culture and understands ‘*unggah-ungguh*’ or ethics very well, he will never talk without facts or ‘*waton omong*’ but always talk with facts or ‘*omong nganggo waton*’. Someone who regards himself a true Javanese must be like that. But, because of change, someone sometimes loses these ‘*unggah-ungguh*’ or ethics.”³⁷

Tri Wiratno who also practices the Javanese teachings very much believes in the notion that Suharto managed to become president for he possessed ‘*wahyu*’ (*pulung*) or magical power. Explaining about this belief, Tri Wiratno asserted:

“Pak Harto must have possessed ‘*wahyu*’ or ‘*pulung*’ or magical power. In Javanese life, ‘*wahyu*’ or ‘*pulung*’ could only be achieved by spiritual ways. Such kind of ‘*wahyu*’ is really existed. This ‘*wahyu*’ has to be achieved and will not automatically fall into someone’s hands. They way to reach ‘*wahyu*’ is by ‘*laku prihatin*’ such as fasting, visiting the tombs of ancestors (usually during midnight) or soaking one’s own body into a river far away from the crowd. In order to get ‘*wahyu*’ someone has to do ‘*samadi*’ in a quiet place. By doing such kind of ‘*samadi*’, guidance

³⁷ Interview with Balidi Dwijopranoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

from God Almighty in the form of ‘*wahyu*’ or ‘*pulung*’ will come and enter to his body.”³⁸

According to Tri Wiratno, Suharto possessed not only ‘*wahyu*’ or ‘*pulung*’ but also ‘*pusaka*’ or ‘*piyandel*’ or heirloom. He further said that: “I absolutely believe in the notion that Pak Harto possessed ‘*pusaka*’ (*piyandel*) or heirloom which was not always possessed by everyone, something like ‘Kris’ or others. Such ‘*pusaka*’ or heirloom was needed for it was important for a leader like Suharto.”

“As the president Pak Harto could not be separated from his guru or kyai or intellectuals or those who had brilliant mind. It was made as if Pak Harto could become president because of ‘*wahyu*’. Anyone who wanted to replace him would get trouble since it was told that Pak Harto was someone who had ‘*wahyu*’ or ‘*pulung*’ so that it would not be easy to compete him. Many intellectuals, ‘*ahli samadi*’, and ‘*ahli tirakat*’ regarded that Pak Harto had managed to get ‘*wahyu*’.

“We could not be separated from spiritual problems. Though we don’t believe it, we believe in spiritual phenomenon. It was difficult to say that we don’t believe in spiritual stories. Though it was against our belief because of our different background of science, it was difficult for us not to believe it. How could we not believe it if in reality they experienced it though we did not?”³⁹

Unlike others, Agus Dodi Sugiartoto has his own opinion. Suharto practiced the Javanese cultural values only as a tool for hegemony. Agus Dodi Sugiartoto further argued:

“The Javanese teachings and philosophy were only used by Suharto as a tool for hegemony of the majority, the Javanese. Pak Harto knew well that Javanese would die if he was appeased. The tactic and strategy used by Pak Harto were to influence first and then to rule them. In order to do that he used the Javanese teachings and philosophy of Javanese as the media.

³⁸ Interview with Dr. Tri Wiratno, Solo, 10 March 2009.

³⁹ Interview with Dr. Tri Wiratno, Solo, 10 March 2009.

The opinion that Pak Harto was a Javanese Sultan was only used by his loyal followers to make personal-cult to Pak Harto.”⁴⁰

Like Tejo Pramono, Agus Dodi Sugiartoto also stated that Suharto had misused noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy. These noble values were merely used by Suharto for building hegemony. As said by Agus Dodi Sugiartoto:

”The concept of king and the Javanese philosophy were not translated in accordance with the content of Javanese philosophy. Javanese concept was used as the instrument of hegemony toward the majority of Indonesian, the Javanese. As for example, philosophy of harmony was translated that someone was forbidden to launch critiques, or was not allowed to be an opposant. All people had to be in conformity. Harmony was translated as conformity.”

”The philosophy of harmony was deviated and used as political instrument, making it against the principles of human rights, ‘*Bhineka Tunggal Ika*’ and democracy. The head of family could not be opposed and the existence of other leader was not tolerated, making the emergence of new leaders impossible.”⁴¹

According to Agus Dodi Sugiartoto, in his attempt to maintain, promote, and demonstrate power, Pak Harto did not use noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy as his guidance, but military strategy. He said:

”In the era of Pak Harto, the model of state power used by Suharto was militerism (pretorian). Government was under the hand of the military and power was concentrated on the one hand. In the era of Pak Harto, the pretorian concept was used. There is similarity with the model of power in the kingdom era, the king of which does not want the twin suns to emerge. Like in pretorian state, political parties were eliminated. The existence of political parties was only a symbol (of democracy). Opposition was curbed and media was controlled. LITSUS or Special Investigation, clearance for environment, etc. Were installed. Social, political, and economic power were seized and centralized on the military leaders. The position of minister, governor, mayor/bupati, camat and lurah were occupied by military members. Economic power was held by

⁴⁰ Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

⁴¹ Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

military generals of Pak Harto. As for example, Pertamina was in the hand of Pak Harto's close friend, General Ibnu Sutowo.”⁴²

Agus Dody rejected the notion that Suharto managed to gain power due to certain conditions, such as he was able to marry Ibu Tien, to gain '*pusaka*' and '*wahyu*', to have the character of '*ksatria*', and to possess an irrational but great story of '*Serangan Umum 1 Maret*' or a Public Attack of 1 March. He said:

”It was the success of hegemony awareness resulted from the long and untransparent power. Uncritical common people were slept by this false awareness, as if the source of Pak Harto's power came from '*wahyu*' which had been in accordance with the Javanese dream, the emergence of satriyo piningit. Hegemonic awareness was used as the instrument for influencing people in understanding power, which in the end making personality-cult toward the ruler emerge.”

”The story of Nyai Roro Kidul with Panembahan Senopati is the story disseminated with the purpose of building mystical awareness of his followers or common people, so that belief and personality-cult could emerge. What the previous kings of Java had done was attempted to be imitated and applied by Pak Harto and his followers.”⁴³

P-4 was regarded as an instrument for Suharto to insert Javanese political culture in the national political life. But according to Agus Doddy:

”The principle of deliberation and concensus was used by Suharto as another way of perpetuating his power, the main problem was Suharto disagreed with the idea of dialogue, criticism, different opinion or different decisions. The practice of '*musyawarah dan mufakat*' then became very anti-democracy. Javanese philosophy was interpreted and translated in accordance with Suharto's interests. This interpretation then became the instrument of Suharto to rule Javanese people.”⁴⁴

At the end, Agus Dodi Sugiartoto and Tejo Pramono concluded that the legitimacy enjoyed by Suharto was not achieved by penetrating his '*wahyu*',

⁴² Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

⁴³ Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

⁴⁴ Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

'pusaka', or the status of 'satriyo piningit' or the likes, but by manipulating Javanese culture and using totalitarian and military approach.

4.9. Summary

Based on his belief that only someone whose entire thought, aspirations and speech were guided by the essence of virtue, whose noble mind, and whose heart generous or '*becik sajatining becik, berbudi bowo leksono, hambeg adil paramarta*' would easily be able to achieve his ideals of life, than Suharto always tried to be a good Javanese. In Suharto's belief, only such people could be closer to the Supreme God and were easily be able to get '*wahyu*' discerned by the Supreme God.

But, in order to be a good Javanese, someone had to do a '*laku*', such as cutting down on eating and sleeping, rejecting funs of life in the world, controlling bad passions, and having self-confidence. Other '*guru sakti*' even requested someone to do a '*laku*' in the forms of soaking one's body into water for certain hours on a place where two or more streams meet, drinking water from seven wells, living in an empty house, sleeping under the edge of roof, and sleeping in a rubbish hole or landfill. In fact, Suharto almost had done all what the '*guru sakti*' had requested. He believed that because of which he was able to get power from the Supreme God.

Javanese political culture does not talk about division of power. Almost Javanese political thinkers only talk about how to be a good Javanese or how to be a good leader. Since power comes from the Supreme God, they don't talk about legitimacy or even about division of power, such as legislative power,

executive power and judicative power like Western political thinkers have described. Javanese political thinkers also do not talk about how a king has to be appointed or elected. According to Javanese philosophy, it is not easy to be a king. They only talk about what a king has to do in order to be a good king or '*Ratu Adil*' (a Just King). For most Javanese, obedience of people could be reached only if the king could not only maintain peace and security, but also provide enough food, clothes, and shelters for his people. The king is also expected to be '*ber budi bowo leksono, hambeg adil paramarta*' and '*wenang murbowaseso*' (to give rewards for those who always obey the laws and to give punishment for those who are against the laws).

As a true Javanese, President Suharto always tried to keep tight these principles. He even wanted all Indonesian people, particularly the political elites or leaders, to have such kind of character. Therefore, in facing his political opponents, Suharto always tried to show that all what he had done had been based on highly respected Javanese philosophy of life. Those who were against such a philosophy would be regarded as someone who was '*waton suloyo*' or someone who put his personal interest first and the public interest later. It was against Pancasila.

Almost every informant agrees that during he was in power Suharto used Javanese cultural values and philosophy as guidance for his life and for ruling the country. But they have different opinion on how these values and philosophy were practiced and for what purposes Suharto practiced them. Some informants said that due to his strong commitment to noble values and philosophy of Javanese culture, Suharto managed to get strong legitimacy from people. While

others said that noble values and philosophy of Javanese culture were used by Suharto only a tool for manipulation or for hegemony. Despite all the odds, Suharto managed to be in power for more than 32 years because of his authoritarian and militaristic approach he used.

CHAPTER 5

JAVANESE CULTURE IN THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI)

5.1. Introduction

This chapter explains how Suharto, as an army general as well as a true Javanese, placed the armed forces, particularly the army, as the main pillar of the New Order regime that he established and promoted and how Javanese culture was used and manipulated by Suharto in order to perpetuate his control over the armed forces to meet his political interests.

The New Order regime of Suharto emerged in the aftermath of the Thirtieth of September Movement (1965) which brought down the triangular system of politics involving of President Sukarno, the PKI and the armed forces. Led by General Suharto, the armed forces managed to win the struggle for power. Suharto was not only able to crush the Thirtieth of September Movement, to excise the PKI from national political life, and unseat President Sukarno from power, but he also established a new regime called the New Order regime.

From most Javanese point of view, the Thirtieth of September Movement was a kind of '*goro-goro*' or political turmoil. In a story Javanese '*wayang*' or pseudo puppet, '*goro-goro*' is one of the episodes telling us how evil tries to ignite turmoil in order to overthrow the king and take over the throne. The story usually ends with happy ending when a '*satriyo piningit*' or a hidden warrior emerges in order to defeat and even kill the evil or the bad.

This story describes that in any political turmoil, a '*satriyo piningit*' would surface. This '*satriyo piningit*' according to Javanese tradition is actually

sent by God Almighty to restore peace, order and security. '*Satriyo piningit*' would then become a '*Ratu Adil*' or a Just Ruler who could maintain peace, order, and security as well as to bring welfare and prosperity for the people. During the time of political turmoil, many leaders usually try to become '*satriyo piningit*' but only one would finally succeed in doing so. Since Suharto was the one who could quickly take over the army leadership after six top army leaders including General Ahmad Yani were kidnapped and killed, and then mobilized forces to crush the Thirtieth September Movement (Crouch, 1978:132) and then brought order to restore peace, and security as well as in bringing welfare and prosperity to the people, he was therefore regarded by many people, as well as Suharto himself, as the '*satriyo piningit*'.

Therefore, from Javanese political perspective, the struggle for power during the time of political turmoil involving the good versus the bad or the evil could be depicted as the struggle for power between Suharto as the '*satriyo piningit*' representing the good and the PKI and its all affiliated organizations (who had attempted to take over the legitimate government) representing the bad or the evil. This power struggle continued to go on, involving Suharto as the '*satriyo piningit*' on one side against President Sukarno the incumbent ruler - who used to be regarded as '*Ratu Adil*' (Legge, 1972:11) on the other side. The Javanese' belief in Sukarno as '*Ratu Adil*' has been depicted J.D. Legge in his book on "*Sukarno: A Political Biography*" (1972:10-11) as follows:

"More important was the fact that he (Sukarno) fulfilled their expectations of what a leader should be, and in this sense the roots of his power lay deep within the soil of the Javanese tradition, a tradition which he was able to tap at various levels. His Javanese subject saw him as possessing '*kesaktian*', the super-naturally derived power inherent in a leader. Again

he could draw on the messianic traditions of peasant society, appearing as '*Ratu Adil*' (the Just Ruler) whose task was to bring order, to restore harmony and to-reunite the kingdom after a time of turmoil, to re-assert the parallelism between the harmony of the terrestrial order and that of the cosmos. Social upheaval and the erosion of custom by colonial rule and capitalist penetration had created the conditions in which a Sukarno could appear as an ordained savior within a traditional view."

There were conflicting debates relating to whether Suharto could be regarded as the '*satriyo piningit*' or the hidden warrior. Akbar Tanjung, for example, asserted:

"In the perspective of Javanese political culture the sudden emergence of Pak Harto into the national political arena could be regarded as the '*satriyo piningit*' or the hidden warrior. As an army leader, Pak Harto had never been publicly known before and suddenly, when the state was in danger due to the outbreak of the coup masterminded by the PKI, he came up to public. He then took a number of actions and managed to save the nation as well as the country from the danger. Due to this proper reason most Javanese then regarded him as the '*satriyo piningit*' or the hidden warrior."¹

According to Akbar Tanjung, Suharto was regarded as a '*satriyo piningit*' or a hidden warrior for a certain reason:

"Before the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement Pak Harto had not been so much involved in the national political arena. But with the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement, with his political, military, and leadership intuitions he soon took over the army leadership and then conducted military actions in order to fight against the Thirtieth of September Movement masterminded by the PKI as well as to eliminate all of those who were involved in it. He then restored peace and order so that the situation could be well controlled by him. He also conducted development movement in order to bring welfare and prosperity for the people."²

Akbar Tanjung's opinion was supported by both Tri Wiratno and Sri Bintang Pamungkas. But, according to Tri Wiratno and Sri Bintang Pamungkas,

¹ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

² Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

not only Pak Harto, Bung Karno could also be regarded as '*satriyo piningit*'. '*Satriyo piningit*' is depicted by Tri Wiratno as an unknown figure who nobody knows where he comes from. He is usually a descendent of '*bangsawan*', or a king or a great man but it is never told before. As a '*satriyo*' or warrior, he is always going somewhere in order to get knowledge and then meets a sage. He is then married with a beautiful girl or '*wanita ayu*'. '*Ayu*' means '*memayu hayuning bawana*' or having capability in maintaining order and security of the world.

Describing the position of Sukarno and Suharto as '*satriyo pininigit*', Tri Wiratno asserted:

"Like Sukarno, Pak Harto could also be regarded as a '*satriyo piningit*'. While Sukarno emerged as a '*satriyo piningit*' at the beginning of the 20th century, Suharto emerged as a '*satriyo piningit*' at the end of 1965, after a '*goro-goro*' or a political turmoil caused by the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement."

"Pak Harto was also an unknown person. His biography is still debatable. When he was still a child he was sent by his father to Wonogiri to live together with his uncle. In other words, he was hidden. There he learnt a lot about Javanese life with his adopted father and about Islam with Kyai Daryatmo. He was then married with Siti Hartinah, a beautiful woman who was still a descendent of King Mangkunegoro I. What he learnt and experienced then became his capital for him to lead the country."³

On the other hand, by referring to the prediction made by Raden Ngabehi Ronggowarsito⁴ on the emergence of '*Ratu Adil Herucakra*', Sri Bintang Pamungkas stated that from the Javanese traditional perspective there are seven

³ Interview with Dr. Tri Wiratno, Solo, 10 March 2009.

⁴ Raden Ngabehi Ronggowarsito or Bagus Burhan who was born in Surakarta on 15 March 1802 was a great writer from Karaton Surakarta. He had a lot of writings such as '*Serat Kalatidha*', '*Serat Joko Lodhang*', '*Serat Sabdo Jati*', '*Serat Sabda Tama*', '*Serat Wedharaga*', '*Serat Wirid Hidayat Jati*', '*Serat Suluk Saloka Jiwa*', '*Serat Suluk Sapabalaya*', '*Serat Suluk Pamoring Kawulo Gusti*', '*Serat Suluk Sukma Lelana*', '*Serat Paramayoga*', etc. (<http://lurahkadipolo.multiply.com/journal/item/25>).

different types of '*satriyo piningit*', namely: (1) '*satriyo kinunjoro murwo kuncoro*', (2) '*satriyo mukti wibowo kesandung kesampar*', (3) '*satriyo jinumput sumela atur*', (4) '*Satriyo lelono wuto ngitari jagad lan tapa ngrame*', (5) '*Satriyo piningit hamong tuwuh*', (6) '*satriyo boyong pambukaning gapura, gelar klasa tanpa hanglenggahi*', and (7) '*satriyo pinandhito sinisihan wahyu ratu*'.⁵

According to Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Sukarno could be regarded as "*satriyo kinunjoro murwo kuncoro*" or a leader who was often jailed (*kinunjoro*) for his activities to liberate the nation from colonization and then was able to become a famous world leader (*murwo kuncoro*), while Suharto could be regarded as '*satriyo mukti wibowo kesandung kesampar*' or a leader who was wealthy (*mukti*), influential and honored by so many people (*wibowo*) but always blamed for every bad conditions (*kesandung kesampar*).⁶

Sri Bintang further asserted that the other leaders such as B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputeri, and Susilo Bambang Yudoyono were also regarded as '*satriyo piningit*' but in different type.

"Habibie was regarded as '*Satriyo jinumput sumela atur*' or a leader who was not elected by the MPR (*jinumput*) and only for a certain period (*sumela atur*). Abdurrahman Wahid was regarded as '*Satriyo lelono wuto ngitari jagad lan tapa ngrame*' or a leader who could not see but liked traveling around the world (*lelono*) and was also very religious (*tapa ngrame*). Megawati was regarded as '*Satriyo piningit hamong tuwuh*' a leader who emerged with a sudden (*pinigit*) bringing charisma from her ancestor (*hamong tuwuh*). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was regarded as '*Satriyo boyong pambukaning gapura, gelar klosa tanpo hanglenggahi*' or a leader who manages to create something new, but has no prestation. And the next leader will be '*Satriyo pinandhito sinisihan wahyu ratu*'.⁷"

⁵ Interview with Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

⁶ Interview with Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

⁷ Interview with Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

But, unlike Akbar Tanjung, Tri Wiratno, and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Agus Dody Sugiartoto disagreed with the notion saying that Suharto was a '*satriyo piningit*'. According to Agus Dodi, Suharto's power had no relations with '*wahyu*' or '*satriyo piningit*' or the like. He said:

"Pak Harto's power was reached through a sophisticated and modern management of tactic and strategy. His power was not reached by using an approach of '*alon-alon waton kelakon*' or slow but sure, but it was reached by using very rational and strategic coup and modern tactic. In political language, Pak Harto used 'a creeping coup strategy'. Step by step, Sukarno and his followers were marginalized or even sent into jail, and at the end by the SUPERSEMAR Sukarno's power were taken over. Nowadays many people were aware and began to question the content of the SUPERSEMAR as well as the existence of the original one."⁸

Agus Dody Sugiartoto further stated:

"In the openness, modern and democratic era, model of personality cult and mysticism coming from '*wahyu*' or the emergence of '*satriyo piningit*' like Pak Harto have been wiped out. People now become more critical in perceiving the pattern of power."

"How could Pak Harto be regarded as a king possessing '*wahyu*' or '*satriyo piningit*' when it was known that he had stolen money from the country? Can a corrupted leader like Pak Harto be regarded as '*satriyo piningit*'? When he was in power, many policies taken by Pak Harto were actually against the noble Javanese teachings. This is the dark side of Pak Harto."⁹

Agus Dodi Sugiartoto's opinion was supported by Tejo Pramono. According to Tejo Pramono, Suharto was able to rule the country for more than 32 years only because of his totalitarian and military approach he had practiced not by anything else including '*wahyu*' or '*satriyo piningit*'. By concentrating power on his own hands, he made the sole interpretation of Pancasila and the

⁸ Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

⁹ Interview with Agus Doddy Sugiartoto, Solo, 10 March 2009.

1945 Constitution and then forced this interpretation to be the law which all people had to obey. Tejo Pramono said:

”The main problem was that Suharto’s regime was totalitarian and militaristic. All people under Suharto were asked to obey the law and the 1945 Constitution as interpreted by Suharto and his militaristic regime, otherwise they would be sanctioned.”

”In reality, Suharto and his government including the military followers were against the constitution. After taking power Suharto issued the law on forestry, oil and gas, foreign investment, the core of which was to give chances to foreign and big companies to rule Indonesian natural resources. It was quite clear that such policies were against the constitution, particularly Chapter 33, and also against the soul and spirit of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila.”

”In politics, power concentration will be taken by any leader if there is instability. Suharto’s leadership was unconstitutional and against the constitution. The competition for power could be done only on the basis of the constitution, but the interpretation of the constitution could only be interpreted by Suharto.”¹⁰

However, whatever the people debated on Suharto as ‘*satriyo piningit*’, the fact was that as an army general who had never come up before in the national political arena, Suharto suddenly managed to become a prominent and powerful leader challenging President Sukarno, the most charismatic leader of the country, and other political figures who had been involved in or sided to the Thirtieth of September Movement.

While the PKI was blamed for its attempt to take over the legitimate government and then to change the ideology of Pancasila with their own ideology, President Sukarno was blamed for his introduction of the Guided Democracy and policy of ‘NASAKOM’ or ‘*Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis*’ (Nationalist, Religious Groups, and Communist), making Indonesia trapped into

¹⁰ Interview with Tejo Pramono, SP, Jakarta, 10 March 2009.

serious social, political and economic crisis. The introduction of the Guided Democracy and the policy of 'NASAKOM' were regarded by Suharto as deviation of the state ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In his state speech on 16 August 1970, President Suharto strongly asserted:

"What happened in the years of 1960 to 1965?

Our ideology, Pancasila, step by step was changed into 'NASAKOM'. Democracy based on Pancasila was changed into Guided Democracy which practically went closer to the dictatorial system.....

The teachings of an un-finished revolution step by step gave birth to the attitude of the end justified the means.....

By the reason for the interests of revolution, with the revolutionary slogans, with the revolutionary laws, the basis of order, the principles of organization and entrepreneurship, the principles of economy, step by step were left behind.

The problems of economy were ignored, making our country turn to be the country with the worst economy in the world.

Thank God, we could overcome the rebellion, and the most important one, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution could be saved and Pancasila still keeps alive and stands still" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1970).

But, facing the PKI and its masses, the biggest communist party in Asia, was quite risky. Beside the party was supported by elements of armed forces and militias, in some instances it was backed by President Sukarno himself. A delicate and sophisticated strategy was of course needed in order to defeat these forces. One was trying to win the people's sympathy and support by blaming the PKI as the '*dalang*' or puppet master of the Thirtieth of September Movement, the political turmoil or '*goro-goro*' which had attempted to take over the legitimate government from President Sukarno and to change the state ideology of Pancasila with other ideology, bringing the country into a dangerous crisis.

Suharto also faced a problem in his attempt to unseat President Sukarno from the presidency. President Sukarno was a charismatic leader, coming from a

'ningrat' family. He was a very well-educated and broadly-minded leader, having so many loyal or even militant followers. Many Javanese even regarded President Sukarno as '*Ratu Adil*' or a Just Ruler, holding a '*wahyu*' to rule. As the President, the Mandatory of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly or the MPRS, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the Great Leader of the Revolution, and the Mouthpiece of the People's Sufferings, President Sukarno was an influential figure, nationally or internationally, admired by so many people (the old as well as the young). His capacity in oration had made many people very much idolize him.

In order to cope with these heavy problems Suharto used the armed forces in order to crush the Thirtieth of September Movement, to eliminate the PKI and its all affiliated organizations, to unseat President Sukarno from his presidency, and then to establish and promote the New Order regime characterized by military-civilian alliances of varying compositions such the armed forces, student movements, Muslim and Christian groups, civil servants, and intellectuals.

In this new regime which he had established, Suharto then placed the armed forces or '*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*' (ABRI) on a very important and strategic position, based on the doctrine of '*dwifungsi*' or dual function. The doctrine of '*dwifungsi ABRI*' was actually an instrument for Suharto to concentrate power as most Javanese always dream.

5.2. The '*dwifungsi*' doctrine of the ABRI

The role of the armed forces as the main pillar of the New Order having both defense-security function and social-political function was publicly declared

in what was so called '*doktrin dwifungsi ABRI*' or the dual-function doctrine of the armed forces. The dual function or '*dwifungsi*' of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) was a doctrine placing the armed forces not only as an armed tool of the state but also as a functional group. This doctrine was established on the basis of legitimacy in the era of revolution which did not differentiate the civilian domain and military domain like the Western tradition which separates the function between military and civilian. The 'military function' is to carry out the task of defense and security popularly called 'military function', while 'civilian function' or 'non military function' is carried out by the civilian. Even, in Western democracy, the military is subordinated under the civilian supremacy.

Based on the domain which did not differentiate the civilian and the military function, Suharto then promoted the dual function doctrine on the assumption that "the situation of the military members in Indonesia is very different from that of the military in Western countries. In Indonesia, the military has two functions, as an armed tool of the state and as a functional group for achieving the purpose of the revolution ... thus ABRI takes an active part in political life in the framework of the mutual help or '*gotong-royong*' system customary with our forefathers for thousand years" (Elson, 2001:149).

However, the '*dwifungsi*' doctrine of the ABRI and its idea that the military should play a social and political role did not originate with Suharto's New Order. During the era of Liberal Democracy, particularly after the take over of Dutch owned companies by the army in 1957, following the outbreak of rebellions outside Java and with the increase of anti foreign business campaign

by the PKI,¹¹ such kind of function was introduced by General Nasution in order to protect the non military interests of the army. In her article on “*The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia*” (*Asian Survey*, Vol. XL, No. 4, July/August 2000) Terence Lee explains:

“Since independence, the Indonesian military (the army in particular) has involved itself in politics to varying degrees... As in its intervention during the war for independence, the army this time ‘saved’ the nation from impending crisis by putting down the ‘Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia’ or PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) and ‘Piagam Perjuangan Semesata’ or PERMESTA (Universal Struggle Charter) rebellions. These revolts were crushed after the martial law came into effect throughout the archipelago” (Lee, 2000:694).

The key consequence of this intervention, according to Terence Lee, was the “penetration of military officers into political, administrative, and economic functions” (Lee, 2000:694). And, in order to justify the army’s continued role in these areas, Army Chief-of-Staff Major General A.H. Nasution, speaking in Magelang in November 1958 at the first anniversary of the National Military Academy, formulated the concept of ‘*Jalan Tengah*’ or Middle Way. He contended that the army’s role in Indonesian society was to be neither just a “civilian tool” as in Western countries nor a “military regime” that dominates state power as in Latin American countries. Rather, it was to operate as one of many forces in society, literally, a force for the struggle of the people (*kekuatan*

¹¹ When political tension mounted in the end of 1957, a group of young Muslims made an attempt to assassinate President Sukarno and the General Assembly of the United Nations rejected the draft of resolution on West Irian. Responding to these incidents, radical actions were made by labor unions using the government’s name by taking over properties owned by the Dutch in Indonesia. Being worried that these vital companies would fall into the hands of Communists; on 13 December 1957 Major General Nasution enacted Martial Law giving rights to the army to take over all the Dutch companies from the labor unions. Through the martial law, the army managed to place their officers to occupy the management of the companies taken over from the Dutch, making the position of the army stronger particularly in civilian affairs. Major General Nasution and his colleagues managed to gain control over administrative and political affairs.

perjuangan rakyat), which works together with other people forces (*kekuatan rakyat lainnya*). As such, the army must be “granted an opportunity to participate in the government on an individual basis and to make use of their nonmilitary skills in helping develop the nation Officers must be permitted to participate in determining economic, financial, international and other policies. Therefore, they must have a place in all institutions of the state” (Lee, 200:695).

The introduction of the Middle Way concept by Nasution was actually a compromise between Sukarno and the military. Sukarno moved away from supporting parliamentary politics, and the military under Nasution began to assert its own anti-democratic views more forcefully by blaming disorder, instability, and the ongoing regional revolts on ‘cow-trading politics’ or ‘*politik dagang sapi*’. He also rejected the Western European model, proclaimed that soldiers would not become the ‘dead tools’ of government, and reiterated his Middle Way doctrine which stressed the military’s right to participate in policymaking at the highest level, in such areas as state finance, economic planning, and representation in the more Indonesian political order under the system of Guided Democracy that both Sukarno and Nasution were pushing for (<http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/cty-AJXCH4A.htm>).

During the New Order regime this concept of ‘*Jalan Tengah*’ or Middle Way was then redefined and reformulated by Suharto into what was so called ‘*Dwifungsi ABRI*’ or the Dual-function of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia the purpose of which was to give legal or constitutional basis to the involvement of the armed forces in politics which began to flourish at all levels of the government. Following the success of the army to crush the PKI and its

affiliated organizations, to remove President Sukarno from power, and to establish the new army dominated regime, the role of the army in politics at every level of government (local, provincial and central administration) became unavoidable.

The doctrine of '*dwifungsi*' which had been reformulated by the second Army Seminar in August 1966 at '*Sekolah Staff dan Komando Angkatan Darat*' or SESKOAD (the Army Staff and Command School) in Bandung then became the ideology of the ABRI in functioning both as a defense and security as well as a social-political instruments. This seminar that can be regarded as "a new watershed in the army's political thinking" (Gunn in Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 8, August 1979:753) concluded:

"If at first the Army had only a limited role in its activities in the civil field, later the Army was forced to expand its role. All the people's hopes for well-being are focused on the Armed Forces in general and the Army in particular (as agents of national integration, political stability and modernization; so for the Armed Forces there is only one alternative to implement the aspirations of the people – the Armed Forces have an interest in the formation and shaping of a responsible government which is strong and a government which is progressive" (Sundhausen as cited by Mody, 1978:127-128).

The ABRI who had succeeded in saving the nation from the communist threat in 1965 always saw itself as "the guardian of national security, which is defined to include not only external threats but also internal subversion of various kinds, and as the principal defender of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila" (Mackie and MacIntyre in Hull Hill, 1994:23). Due to its important and strategic position in the national political life, it is imperative for the ABRI to be given

right to play its broader role, not only in defense and security matters but also in social and political affairs.

The dominant as well as decisive role of the armed forces in politics could not be separated from the ideas of Suharto about political stability. Political stability was regarded by Suharto as the precondition for economic development. Political stability was then adopted by Suharto as the first priority of his Development Cabinet program continuing the program of the previous AMPERA (Mandate of the People's Sufferings) Cabinet. In his state speech delivered on 16 August 1968, Suharto explained that as already stipulated by the MPRS, the programs of the Development Cabinet included:

1. To create political and economic stability as the pre-condition of the implementation of the Five Year Development Plan or '*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*' (REPELITA) and the General Election;
2. To formulate and to carry out the Five Year Development Plan;
3. To carry out the General Election on the basis of TAP MPRS No. XLII/MPRS/1968;
4. To restore order and security of society by crushing all the remnants of the G-30-S/PKI and every undermining, deviation and betrayal of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution;
5. To continue the betterment and cleansing the whole state apparatus from the central level to the local one (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1968).

Unlike Sukarno who attributed the Indonesian underdevelopment to the legacy of imperialism and directed development policy towards overcoming the political obstacle as a means of releasing the country's economic potential by placing politics as the prior instrument for economic development, Suharto reversely put economics as a key to his political goals. His strong commitment to development was then inaugurated in the name of his first cabinet he made up as soon as he was appointed president, the 'Development Cabinet'.

In the logic of Suharto, as already stated in his state speech on 16 August 1968, the national problem met by the nation at the time he resumed power was to give meaning to the independence with development. Most Indonesian people, as he argued, still heavily struggled for their daily life. They required better jobs, good incomes, enough food and shelters, schools for children, healthy housing, and insurance for the elders. In short, people required physical and non physical needs. Therefore, the struggle for the independence was really the struggle for liberating people from poverty. Since the people's welfare and prosperity could only be achieved through the conduct of a broad development, all attention and capability of the nation had to be focused on this great task.

But, the conduct of a broad development or 'the struggle to free people from poverty' could only be done on the premise of stability which had to be based upon the spirit of the 1945 Constitution. Successful development, as Suharto argued, was premised on securing political stability, and that the ideological battles and sloganeering so characteristic of the Old Order needed to be left in the past; 'they were of no use and only caused confusion' indeed. The problem of ideology is not an issue and can no longer be questioned because our ideology is clear, Pancasila. Narrow ideology had become a source of tension and contention in earlier periods (Elson, 2001:175).

Based on what had already happened to Indonesian people in the past, Suharto concluded that "one of the nasty experiences causing the failures of development was the lack of good and healthy political stability," and that "the success of crushing the PKI and undemocratic and unconstitutional practices gave chances to Indonesian people to renew their democratic and constitutional

lives based on original Pancasila as an instrument to achieve the nation's ideals, that is a just and prosperous society by carrying out development which is well planned and divided into some phases" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1968).

Stability either in security and politics, therefore, became a prerequisite for the conduct of development. In pursuing, maintaining, and promoting such stability, the role of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia or ABRI as 'the key to stability' was quite important and even very strategic. History, as said by Suharto in his state speech in 1968, had placed the Indonesian Armed Forces as a stabilizer in realizing the national struggle and the dual function of ABRI was one part of the implementation of democracy based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

After remarking that as the key to stability the Armed Forces or ABRI had two functions, either "as an instrument of the state defense and security or a functional group and social-political force," Suharto strongly reiterated:

"In realizing political stability, the position and role of ABRI is really great, not only as the state defense and security instrument but also as a social-political force. In order to carry out the tasks, ABRI is continually promoted into what so called Integration of ABRI, either physically or mental-ideologically.... Because, without a united ABRI, without ABRI which is always loyal to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, it is impossible for ABRI to carry out its functions as the stabilizer and dynamist, and also it is impossible for ABRI to carry out either strategically or technically its tasks as the state instrument of defense and security" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1970).

Responding to elements of society who were worried that the dual function doctrine of the Armed Forces or '*doktrin dwifungsi ABRI*' would give birth to the emergence of militarism in Indonesia, President Suharto strongly

asserted that in implementing its role and position ABRI would always obey all laws and regularities, the constitution as well as the democracy, and placed itself at the same level as other social-political forces. Therefore, he said:

“There is no need for people to be doubted that the role of ABRI in the state and government affairs will push aside and diminish the opportunity of other forces or civilians to act, because our way of life has been based on the spirit of ‘*gotong royong*’ (mutual help). Although, at present time, there are many officers occupying non-ABRI position, the existing effective law in Indonesia is not military law, nor the law which deviated from the constitutional regulations” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1968).

Promising that the ‘*dwifungsi ABRI*’ or dual function doctrine of the armed forces would never give birth to militarism as worried by civilians, Suharto further stated:

“With the basis of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila containing in ‘*Sapta Marga*’ (Seven Pledges) and ‘*Sumpah Prajurit*’ (Soldier’s Oath), ABRI wants and always asks other forces in society, either political parties or functional groups, to secure and implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. ABRI will always work together with all people because ABRI belongs to all people” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1970).

From what we have already discussed earlier, we can conclude that the ‘*dwifungsi*’ doctrine of the armed forces which ascribed to the military an increasing socio-political role was developed by focusing on the theme of ‘development’, the ideological hallmark of the New Order. The army claimed that civilians failed either to develop Indonesia or to give it stability, and that only the army could act as a ‘motor of development’, being gifted with discipline, organizational unity and a sense of purpose and modernity, far in advance of that possessed by any other group.

Based on the assumption that development could only be achieved if there was stability and vice versa, the army believed that it alone can guarantee both ‘development’ and ‘stability’. This was the rationale for the ‘*dwifungsi*’ doctrine of the armed forces or ABRI, the ideological cornerstone of the New Order. “The commonest formulation of this argument is that in so far as the army functioned under the Pancasila democratic system, it necessarily assumed the role of ‘stabilizer and dynamist’ of the community” (Mody, 1978:128).

5.3. The implementation of the ‘*dwifungsi*’ doctrine of the ABRI

The ‘*dwifungsi*’ doctrine of the ABRI was constitutionally implemented after it was included into ‘*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*’ (GBHN) or Broad Lines of the State Policy. In it the ‘*dwifungsi ABRI*’ was regarded as the basic capital of development. This position was then strengthened by the enactment of Law no. 20/1982 on the principles of the State Defense and Security, Law no. 2/1988, and Law no. 1/1989.

In order to implement the doctrine of ‘*dwifungsi ABRI*’, Suharto used two organs, the ‘*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*’ (KOPKAMTIB) or Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order and the Sociopolitical Affairs Section or ‘*Bagian Sosial dan Politik*’.

KOPKAMTIB was first established in late 1965, no sooner after the outbreak of Thirtieth of September Movement. Its original function was to purge from the government and the armed forces Indonesian Communist Party [PKI] members and others suspected of complicity with the communists. By the late

1960s, that task had been largely completed. However, a major change in the status of security and intelligence occurred as a result of the 1985 military reorganization. Prior to that time, the foremost intelligence agency was the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB), which focused primarily on mounting internal security operations and collecting intelligence data. But, it was then developed into an organ the task of which was to maintain and promote stability in security for the purpose of realizing the existence of national stability as the main condition for the success of '*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*' (REPELITA) or the Five Year Development Plan in particular or '*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang*' or the Long Term Development Plan in general.

KOPKAMTIB could be regarded as the heart of the New Order power, coordinating a number of intelligence bodies from BAKIN to intelligence bodies at every section of ABRI. Even in some cases regarded as potentially threatening the political and economic stability, KOPKAMTIB was able to squeeze into the civilian authorities, including the institution of ABRI itself. KOMPAMTIB was the core of the Indonesian government at the existence of martial law. By early the 1970s KOPKAMTIB had become a large and powerful body that concerned itself with the activities of every political and social organization in the nation; its powers of interrogation, arrest, and detention were not subject to the regular criminal justice system.

Commenting to the great authority of KOPKAMTIB, Police General Hugeng Imam Santosa, the ex-Head of National Police, acknowledged that KOPKAMTIB possessed authority to give order to the police in conducting the

process of interrogation, arrest, and detention which was not regulated by the existing national regulation (Wikipedia Indonesia).

As the heart of the New Order power, Suharto always put KOPKAMTIB under his own control. At the beginning of its establishment, KOPKAMTIB was under his command (May 1965 to November 1969). He was then replaced by military officers who he regarded to be loyal to him, such as General Maraden Panggabean (November 1969 to March 1973) and General Sumitro (March 1973 to January 1974). In 1974 after the MALARI riot, through the KEPPRES No. 9/1974 (Presidential Decision), KOPKAMTIB was taken over by President Suharto and placed as a military organization under the government which could not be controlled by society. Suharto once again headed KOPKAMTIB from February 1974 to April 1978, and replaced by Admiral R. Sudomo (April 1978 to March 1983), and General Leonardus Benny Murdani (March 1983- September 1988).

In 1988, KOPKAMTIB was dissolved and replaced by '*Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional*' or BAKORSTANAS (National Stability Coordinating Board) which was headed by the Commander of the Armed Forces. Though it was stated that the main goals of BAKORSTANAS were to restoring, maintaining, and promoting national stability, all functions which used to be done by KOPKAMTIB were still conducted BAKORSTANAS.

The armed forces (ABRI) are organised on a 'territorial basis' in units over the entire country roughly parallel to government structures, acting as local

agents for the central security system.¹² Under the '*dwifungsi*' doctrine known, the military assumed a significant sociopolitical as well as a security role. The unique element of *dwifungsi* was the military's second role as a social-political force. This very broad charter formed the basis by which military personnel were assigned throughout the government to posts traditionally filled in other countries by civil servants or politically appointed civilians. Most prevalent of these assignments for active-duty and retired military officers were as provincial governors, district heads, legislative members, numerous functionaries within civilian governmental departments, and as ambassadors abroad.

The territorial command supervised the activities of a network of military watchdogs running parallel to the civilian bureaucracy down to the kabupaten (regency) level, starting with the regional command or Kodam (in Java covering a single province, elsewhere often more than one) and reaching the district command or Kodim. At the provincial level the military commander chaired a 'four-in-one' committee including the civilian governor, the police chief and the chief prosecutor. While combat-ready troops were held in fighting formation other personnel were deployed in the 'territorial' structure, where they were supposed to monitor political and social development and prod the civilian counterpart where necessary. Soon after 30 September 1965 Suharto extended the network in Central and East Java, setting up sub-district commands (Koramil) below the Kodim level and even stationing non-commissioned officers in the

¹² The organization of the armed forces at the lowest level of government ('*Desa*' or '*Kalurahan*') is called '*Bintara Pembina Desa*' or BABINSA; at the level of district ('*Kecamatan*') is called '*Komando Rayon Militer*' or KORAMIL; at the level of city ('*Kota*' or '*Kabupaten*') is called '*Komando District Militer*' or KODIM; and at the provincial level is called '*Komando Daerah Militer*' or KODAM.

villages. After the coup attempt these military posts almost inevitably came to dominate local politics, given the need to secure military permission for travel, meetings, sermons and publications (McDonald, 1980:94).

Through these instruments, the dominant role of ABRI was implemented in almost every field. As for example, based on the Law of Political Parties and GOLKAR which could be promulgated through national consensus ABRI did not participate in the election but, as the compensation, it was given seats in the DPR and the MPR. The number of military officials who sat in the DPR as well as the MPR was quite significant as shown in the following figure:

Number of seats of the DPR and MPR and its allocation to ABRI

Year	DPR	ABRI	%	MPR	ABRI	%
1972-1977	460	75	16.3	920	230	25
1977-1982	460	75	16.3	920	230	25
1982-1987	460	75	16.3	920	230	25
1987-1992	500	100	20	1000	151	15.1
1992-1997	500	100	20	1000	150	15
1997-2002	500	75	15	1000	113	11.3

Source: Edited from “*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (MPR): Sejarah, Realita, dan Dinamika.*” Sekretariat Jendral MPR-RI 2007 (<http://www.mpr.go.id/upload/Flash/selayang%20pandang%20tanpa%20foto.swf>).

From the table above we could conclude that in the period of 1972-1977 to the period of 1982-1987, 75 (16.3%) out of 460 DPR members were given to ABRI; and 230 (25%) out of 920 MPR members were given to ABRI. Then in the period of 19987-1992 to the period of 1992-1997, 100 (20%) of 500 DPR members were given to ABRI; and 151 (15.1%) of 1000 MPR members were

given to ABRI. This proportion was not only quite by chance, but it was for the purpose of preventing the 1945 Constitution from being altered.

The other implementation of the '*dwifungsi*' doctrine could also be seen in the dominance of military officers in occupying political or civilian positions such as ministers, governors, '*bupatis*', mayors, etc. For example:

- In national level, in 1966 → 12 of 27 cabinet members were coming from ABRI, and there were 75 members of ABRI becoming members of parliament. The number ABRI who became ministers increased to 13 in 1973.
- In regional level, in 1968 → 68 percent governors were military, 59 percent '*bupatis*' were military. In 1970 → 92 percent governors were military. Whereas in 1968 there were 59 percent of '*bupatis*' coming from the military.
- In 1973 military members who became ministers increased to 13, 400 military members were positioned at the national level, 22 of 27 governors were occupied by military members. Until the year of 1982, 89 percent strategic positions relating to civilian affairs at the national level were occupied by military members.
- After the election of 1987, 80 percent members of DPR from ABRI Faction and 34 senior military officers became members of DPR through the GOLKAR.
- And then, 120 military members managed to be elected chairman of regional the GOLKAR and almost 70 percent representatives of regions in national congress of the GOLKAR coming from military members. The number of ABRI faction in the DPR increased from 75 to 100. The increase number was regarded inappropriate for the total number of ABRI was only 500,000 (0.3 percent of the total number of Indonesian people) but the acquired seats they got was 20 percent (Cholisin, 2002 and Pakpahan, 1994).

5.4. The use of Javanese culture for managing the ABRI

In managing the armed forces Suharto was also very much influenced by Javanese cultural values and philosophy. His strong commitment to penetrate Javanese traditional teachings into the whole life was acknowledged by lots of his ex-subordinates. As for example, Admiral Sudomo in his article on "*Menerapkan Falsafah Bangsa*" published in a book of "*Suharto Diantara Para*

Sahabat" (1991) has stated that in ruling the country, Pak Harto always penetrated philosophy of leadership based on the nation's culture. The teachings such as '*nglurug tanpo bolo, menang tanpa ngasorake*' (an invasion without deploying troops and winning without humiliating) and '*rumangsa bisa nanging ora bisa rumangsa*' (You shall not only be able to think that you are smart, yet unable to feel) had been implemented by him everywhere, either in his daily life or the life of the country. Almost every time he practiced those teachings. "Frankly speaking, I learn a lot from the philosophy in which he believes. There are lots of national political problems which I have to handle by practicing these teachings" (G. Dwipayana and Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, 1991:299).

His idea of stability as prerequisite for the movement of development might have been also influenced by the ideas of Javanese on regularity and harmony. 'Regularity and harmony' were the Javanese's obsessions, leading to the birth of power phenomenon regarded as being concrete, homogeny and indivisible. For most the Javanese, it was more important for a king always to concentrate and to defend power rather than to use it appropriately.

The most important thing for a Javanese ruler is to maintain his monopoly of power. In the eyes of '*kawula*' or '*wong cilik*', a Javanese king has to concentrate power in order to become a powerful '*Ratu Adil*' (Just Ruler) who has the capability to maintain peace and order and then to bring welfare and prosperity for the people. The greater the power the king could concentrate; the more the people would appreciate it. In the other word, most Javanese would appreciate a ruler who could 'spit fire' or '*idu geni*', or a ruler who has the capability to control or influence his ruled or subordinates. To a really powerful

person, wealth, influence and acknowledgement accrued by themselves without his having to move a finger. To the Javanese, a king who craves money has lost his essential orientation, and the people expect him to lose his power accordingly.

For the Javanese, stability could only be maintained if people uphold the principle of '*rukun*' (harmony) and '*urmat*' (respect). In short, '*rukun*' demands that all signs of open conflict be avoided. The Javanese sense of hierarchy also requires everyone, in speech and behavior, to show proper respect or '*urmat*' to those with whom one comes into social contact. Ideal human-virtues include obedience to superiors or '*manut*', generosity, avoidance of conflict, understanding others, and empathy (Geertz 1961; Koentjaraningrat 1985; Magnis Suseno 1988) (<http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unubooks/uul3se/uu13seb.htm>). People in higher positions should be respected. They should be addressed in a respectful way and listened to politely. They must never be interrupted or, even less, contradicted. Those in lower positions should be treated with benevolence as a sense of responsibility for their welfare. A leader is responsible for the safety, prosperity and dignity of his or her followers (Magnis, 2005:219).

The ideal of '*rukun*' forbids open confrontation, opposition, the utterance of sharply conflicting views or the intransigent advancement of one's own point of view or interests. '*Musyawarah*', friendly joint deliberation, should always end in '*mufakat*', consensus, where everybody is prepared to give a little. One must never put oneself into a position where one is the 'odd man out'. Respect for hierarchy implies that one has to accept what people in authority say and do. One is not allowed to interrupt, to oppose, to make one's standpoint known if it differs. In the Javanese conception, behaving in a '*rukun*' and respectful or

‘urmat’ way will in the end always pay dividends since the community will live in harmony and be free from disturbances (meaning in stability), and individuals are protected and provided for by their community and their leaders.

In the Javanese perspective, the ‘dwifungsi ABRI’ doctrine or the dual function doctrine of the armed forces was actually an instrument used by Suharto to concentrate his power. But, before the armed forces could be used as the instrument for concentrating power, he had to make it powerful and always under his own control. What Suharto had done then created the political structure of the New Order as ‘a steeply-ascending pyramid’. R. William Liddle in his writing of “*Suharto’s Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions*,” presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Guelph, June 1984, has stated that “the political structure of the New Order as a ‘steeply-ascending pyramid in which the heights are thoroughly dominated by a single office, the presidency. The president commands the military which is ‘*primus inter pares*’ within the bureaucracy, which in turn holds sway over the society.” (Liddle, 1984:71).

During the time of Guided Democracy, the armed forces had been infiltrated by the PKI, creating internal conflict within the armed forces. The assassination of the top army leaders was the paramount of the internal conflict within the armed forces. In order to make it more powerful and under his own control, by using his position as the undisputed leader of the army, no sooner after the crush of the Thirtieth of September Movement, Suharto purged the army of both leftists and Sukarnoists and after accomplishing this task he began to extend the purge to the other services.

Then in 1967 Suharto started to reorganize the armed forces by downgrading the services' chiefs of staff; eliminating power to command troops; disbanding intelligence, planning, budget, and political sections; and reducing the size of elite troops. Salim Said said, "by taking so much power and authority away from the services and concentrating it in armed forces headquarters, Suharto succeeded in unifying and depoliticizing the military and putting it under his control as minister of defense/armed forces commander in 1969" (Salim Said in *Asian Survey*, Volume XXXVIII, No. 6, June 1998, pp. 536).

In order to make the military always under his own control, Suharto played his cards very well. Inspired by the Javanese philosophy on 'the emergence of the twin sun' or '*munculnya srengenge kembar*', Suharto was always alert and would act as promptly as he could in order to prevent such '*srengenge kembar*' or 'the twin sun' (potential competitor who once would threaten his dominant position) from emerging. Therefore when what was so-called 'the New Order militants' like General H.R. Dharsono, General Kemal Idris, and General Sarwo Edhi Wibowo,¹³ wanted to develop their own ideas about the New Order independent of him, Suharto immediately got rid of them.

A really Javanese cultural approach was also taken by Suharto when he had to cope with the conflict between General Ali Murtopo and General Sumitro. In the early 1970s, these two of his most important lieutenants entered the stage

¹³ These officers had once dominated the all-Java Commanders and been Suharto's main source of support in his struggle for power against Sukarno in the early days of the New Order. Although they backed Suharto, these officers - especially H.R. Dharsono of the West Java Siliwangi division, which itself was known to be allied to activists from the banned Indonesian Socialist Party - had also developed their own ideas about New Order politics, independent of Suharto (Salim Said in *Asian Survey*, Volume XXXVIII, No. 6, June 1998, pp. 536).

as competing forces. The conflict between General Ali Murtopo¹⁴ and General Sumitro¹⁵ was actually a clash between two strong personalities in their competition to be closer to the center of power. In the eyes of Suharto, though these two generals were his loyal officers, one day they could become potential threat for his position.

Commenting the way how Suharto coped with the internal conflict within or outside the armed forces, Sri Bintang Pamungkas stated that Suharto always used Javanese cultural values in understanding phenomenon of power. Due to his capability in managing power, Suharto managed to be in power for quite a long time. He was very smart and had a very sharp vision, particularly in identifying potential powers. If he felt that these potential powers threaten or endanger his own position, he would never hesitate to eliminate them. But, Suharto was never confrontational. He would usually promote another power when he had the capability to balance this dangerous potential power, and when they were in weak position, Suharto would eliminate both or coopt one of them into his power.¹⁶ In this way, the potential but dangerous forces would never be able to consolidate their power, making Suharto never meet any powerful threat and able to be in power for more than 32 years.

According to Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Suharto used this kind of strategy in coping with the conflict between the two competing and potential powers, General Ali Murtopo and General Sumitro in 1974. He also used the same

¹⁴ General Ali Murtopo occupied no significant military position but was always on call as a political operator and adviser together with other members of a small group of confidantes known collectively as his Personal Assistants.

¹⁵ General Sumitro was the Deputy Armed Forces Commander and Commander of the Operational Command for Restoration of Security and Order or KOPKAMTIB.

¹⁶ Interview with Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

strategy when he was in conflict with General Leonardus Benny (L.B.) Murdani in 1988-1993. Suharto promoted General Sudharmono in order to balance the potential but dangerous power, General L.B. Murdani.¹⁷ With the elimination of these potential but dangerous powers, Suharto could regain his full personal control over the armed forces.

General Leonardus Benyamin Moerdani who was popularly called Pak Benny was President Suharto's loyal officer at least from the decade of 1970s till the end of 1980s. When he was the Commander of the Armed Forces, he made a big mistake, making Suharto's attitude toward him changed drastically. Feeling sure that the armed forces were under his control and that he had been close to and trusted by Suharto for many years he made a statement relating to the business of Suharto's children. Adam Schwartz said: "*He attempted to advise Suharto on his children's business affairs.*"

In Javanese tradition, it is taboo for a subordinate to publicly criticizing his superior. Therefore, Suharto appeared to have resented the advice and apparently saw it as an indication of Murdani's confidence in his own strength as an officer who had succeeded in building up an independent power base inside the armed forces (Salim Said in *Asian Survey*, Volume XXXVIII, No. 6, June 1998, pp. 539-540).

However, Murdani was still critical to Suharto though he was no longer the Commander of the Armed Forces. In his article on "*Benny Moerdani: yang*

¹⁷ Following another GOLKAR electoral victory in the 1982 elections, Suharto consolidated his control over the military even further in 1983 by appointing General L.B. Murdani as the armed forces commander replacing General Muhammad Jusuf. Not long after the promotion, L.B. Murdani implemented a massive rejuvenation of the officers' corps. With L.B. Murdani as commander of both the armed forces and KOPKAMTIB, Suharto was in strict control of the political system.

60% *Itu Urusannya Pak Harto*" published in the daily news of Sinar Harapan, Daud Sinyal (a journalist) wrote that, when he was the Minister of Defense and Security, Murdani made a statement relating to Suharto who just began his sixth term of power by saying that it was his last term of power. When requested to give reason, Murdani only stated: "*Iya kan, cukup. Masak setelah 25 tahun masih terus*" (That's right. It's enough already. How come after 25 years he would continue to be in power). And when asked how the succession would proceed, he answered that there had to be a common awareness and Suharto had to take part in making preparation for such a succession (<http://www.sinarharapan.co.id/berita/0408/30/sh05.html>).

This kind of strategy taken by Pak Harto was regarded by Sri Bintang Pamungkas as a reflection of the Javanese concept of power, that power could not be divided and that the emergence of 'the twin suns' or '*srengenge kembar*' would never be allowed to happen. Therefore, before the other sun or potential power came up, with his capability Pak Harto would promote another sun or another potential power which would balance it so that the other potential power would never emerge. This strategy was really inspired by Javanese traditional philosophy.¹⁸

According to Sri Bintang Pamungkas, on the one side Pak Harto had the capability to identify every signal shown by another person who had potential power to become a ruler. But, on the other side he also had the capability to create another power which could balance the other power so that it became

¹⁸ Interview with Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

impossible to emerge as a real and effective power. By doing that Pak Harto would never directly confront this potential power.¹⁹

The other instrument used by Suharto to put the armed forces under his own control was in the form of ideology. Influenced by Javanese traditional teachings, Suharto imposed a doctrine to the armed forces called '*Doktrin Kepemimpinan ABRI*' or the Leadership Doctrine of the Armed Forces. In this doctrine, Suharto inserted a number of noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy to become guidance for all military leaders.

Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo in his interview on 6 October 2009 made a statement that in the ABRI we have produced eleven (11) principles of leadership. It was conducted in the year of 1970. All these eleven leadership principles of the ABRI were taken from Javanese philosophy and were strongly influenced by Pak Harto's ideas. These principles asserted that an army leader must always be:

“(1) ‘taqwa’ or to strongly believe in God Almighty, (2) ‘ing ngarso sung tulodo’ or to set example when in a front position, (3) ‘ing madyo mangun karso’ or to stimulate when in the middle, (4) ‘tut wuri handayani’ or to support when at the rear, (5) ‘waspada prabu wisesa’ or to be alert to any possible threats and willing to remind his subordinates on any threats, (6) ‘ambeg parama arta’ or to prioritize every good thing, (7) ‘prasojo’ or to be simple, (8) ‘satya’ or to be loyal, (9) ‘gemi nastiti’ or to be careful and economical, (10) ‘bloko’ or to be honest, and (11) ‘legowo’ or to feel relieved.”²⁰

Explaining more clearly about the eleven principles of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo further asserted that these eleven principles of the armed forces leadership began to be used in

¹⁹ Interview with Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

²⁰ Interview with Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

1970 when Pak Harto's stars were becoming brighter and the Armed Forces or the ABRI was in the process of integration.²¹ And, in this process General Sayidiman happened to be appointed as the Chief of the Joint Personnel, the first joint personnel officer with the task of integrating the Armed Forces (the ABRI). It was said that the problem of leadership at that time was a very important issue. Therefore, this issue was selected by General Try Sutrisno as the topic of a seminar held in the SESKOAD in 1970s.

There were other Javanese teachings which had also been adopted as the principles of the armed forces leadership, though Suharto had never stated in public. According to General Sayidiman, these other Javanese teachings were related to the doctrine of war, guiding an army who wanted to go to war, taught by a medical doctor Sosrokartono (the brother of Raden Ajeng Kartini, the women hero). These teachings were:

1. *anglurug tanpa bolo tanpa gaman, ambedah tanpa perang tanpa pedang, menang tanpa mejahi tanpa nyakiti, tanpa wenang tan ngrusak ayu tan ngrusak adil, yen unggul sujud bhkati marang sesame* (to deploy war without using weapon; to defeat enemies without war or without weapons; to win without killing, hurting, raping, or destroying justice; when becoming the winner always honors everyone);
2. *angluhuraken bangsa kita, tegesipun nyebar wineh budi Jawi, nggampilaken margining bangsa, ngupaya papan panggesangan* (to carry high the dignity of the country, meaning to spread out the noble Javanese teachings; to make the country able to develop in order to maintain peace and order and to bring welfare to the people);
3. *sinau basa tegesipun sinau melu susah melu melu sakit tegesipun sinau ngudi rasa lan batos, sinau ngudi kamanungsan* (to learn means to be involved in suffering, to be involved in suffering means to learn the meaning of humanity);
4. *murid gurune pribadi guru muride pribadi, pamulangane sangsarane sesami, ganjarane ayu lan arume sesame* (student is his own teacher,

²¹ Interview with Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

teacher is his own student; all the teachings would benefit all for the glory of all);

5. *anggelar pemandeng tegseipun ngringkes pemandeng, ambuka netra tegesipun anutup netra, angukup kabeh tegesipun hanyandak siji* (to observe all things meaning to concentrate our mind, to open eyes meaning to close eyes, to take all meaning to take only one);
6. *durung menang yen durung wani kalah, durung unggul yen durung wani asor, durung gedhe yen durung ngaku cilik* (we could not say we are the winner if we never have any bravery to be the loser, we could not say we are the best if we never have any bravery to be the worst, we could not say we are the biggest if we never have any bravery to be the smallest).²²

According to Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryahadiprojo, Pak Harto had been influenced very much by the philosophy of doctor Sosrokartono, and the influence of doctor Sosrokartono's philosophy to the leadership of the armed forces was also really very great.

5.5. Summary

Suharto managed to be in power for more than 32 years due to his capability to concentrate power on his own hands. Concentration of power had become the main concern of every Javanese traditional ruler. By imposing the doctrine of '*dwifungsi ABRI*', Suharto managed to place the armed forces or ABRI as the main pillar of the New Order regime, functioning as both 'defense-security' and 'social-political' instrument. His success to put the armed forces under his own control strengthened his position as an unchallenged leader of the country. With the doctrine of '*dwifungsi ABRI*', the armed forces were able to occupy almost all important civilian positions of the country for the interests of

²² Interview with Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryahadiprojo, Jakarta, 6 October

Suharto, smoothing the implementation of the development programs which had become the main concern of the New Order regime.

Due to his strong commitment to the Javanese culture, Suharto always took the Javanese traditional teachings as the guidance for managing the armed forces. Inspired by the Javanese culture, particularly in politics, Suharto always attempted to concentrate power by placing the armed forces under his own control. By imposing the Javanese philosophy as the Armed Forces Leadership Doctrine and preventing any potential power which could threaten his dominating position in the armed forces from emerging, Suharto managed to perpetuate his rule for more than three decades.

CHAPTER 6

JAVANESE CULTURE IN GOLKAR, POLITICAL PARTIES, THE CIVIL SERVICES, AND IN PANCASILA AS THE SOLE GUIDING IDEOLOGY

6.1. Introduction

This chapter explains how Suharto, as an army general as well as a true Javanese, established GOLKAR and put it as a vehicle for his political goals, emasculated political parties, imposed mono-loyalty policy to the bureaucracy, practiced the anti-criticism or anti-opposition policy, declared Pancasila as the sole guiding ideology for all social and political forces as well as how Javanese culture was used and manipulated by Suharto in order to perpetuate his control over GOLKAR, political parties and the bureaucracy to meet his political interests.

As always stated by Suharto the New Order was as an order for crushing and eliminating the PKI, an order for overthrowing the Old Order, a new constitutional order, as well as a development order. Therefore after managing to crush the PKI and to overthrow the Old Order headed by Sukarno, the next step that Suharto committed to do was to build a new regime based on the implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution originally and consistently. The main aim of the New Order was to realize the ideals of the independence as already promoted by the founding fathers through development in all fields, particularly in economy.

When it came into being, the New Order inherited a crisis situation in economic policy which brought the Indonesian economy to the brink of catastrophe. During the Sukarno era, underdevelopment was commonly attributed to the legacy of imperialism, so that development policy was directed towards overcoming the political obstacles as a means of developing the country's economic potential. Politics accordingly took over as the prior instrument for economic development (Rudner, 1976:249-250). In such a situation, people were divided into a number of different groups, each with its own narrow ideology (NASA-KOM). They were even urged by Sukarno to be competitive in implementing 'MANIPOL-USDEK' as already introduced by Sukarno, making them being involved in almost daily acute and risky conflict. Due to such kind of crisis, national unity based on the Javanese principle of '*rukun*' and '*tulus*' or harmony and sincere was unable to be achieved.

Suharto later turned around so that economics became a key to his political goals. He launched a development movement in order to improve the performance of the Indonesian economy (Rudner, 1976:249-250). But, according to Suharto, development movement required preconditions such as strong commitment of all elements of the nation to development as well as stability in all fields of life either politics, security, or economy. In order to promote stability, deregulations in the life of social and politics had to be taken. These deregulations were conducted on the basis of what Suharto's premises.

Being convinced that political parties created during the era of liberal democracy had failed to bring about stability and harmony in social and political relations, even after it was given an opportunity to work for twenty years (Rasyid,

1994:205), Suharto decided to promote GOLKAR or 'the functional group' not only as a vehicle for his political goals but also for organizing the existing social and political forces in society. He preferred using GOLKAR as a functional group to political party on the basis that this concept of representation was more suited to the Javanese tradition.

Julian M. Boileau (1983) as already cited by Ryaas Rasyid has ever stated that 'the idea of functional groups' representation' had existed even before Indonesian independence (such as the pattern of representation introduced under the Dutch colonial parliament or '*Volksraad*' in 1918 and under the Japanese or '*Chuo-Sang-In*' during World War II). While political party representation was introduced only after the attainment of independence in 1945, the idea of 'functional groups representation' originated from the Javanese cultural setting (Rasyid, 1994:205), and David Reeve (1985) has stated that it was rooted in the thoughts of Ki Hadjar Dewantara, a Javanese radical nationalist pioneer of the 1910s, which promoted 'collectivism' and 'the family principle' as the basic values for inspiring the formation of Indonesian political institution (Rasyid, 1994: 205-206).

Therefore, while he promoted GOLKAR, he emasculated political parties by emerging them into two major parties only (the PDI and the PPP) with Pancasila as the sole guiding ideology. The main goal was of course to bring all social and political forces in society to become members of '*Keluarga Besar Bangsa Indonesia*' or 'the Big Family of the Indonesian Nation' (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1976) under his own leadership. The principle of '*kekeluargaan*' or family principle had become Suharto's concern in

promoting the New Order regime, in which the leader had to be the father of his subordinates, in which the principle of leadership '*ing ngarso sung tulodo, ing madyo mangun karso, tut wuri handayani*' (one has to set example when in a front position, to stimulate when in the middle, and to support when at the rear) should be taken as guidance for every leader. Society which Suharto wanted to build was 'a just and prosperous society based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution', in which all different opinions had to be resolved through the principle of '*musyawarah untuk mufakat*' or discussion and consent (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1977), in which '*keselarasan*' or harmony had to become the essence of democracy, individualism had to be rejected but '*kegotong-royongan*' or mutual cooperation had to be promoted, and freedom of speech could only be expressed if it was based on responsibility for public or common interests (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1978).

Election could become a big match for all competitive great ideas and plans on development, but it could not become a fight among political forces. Only by this way could dynamic stability be developed. Stable meant there would be no '*kegelisahan*' (worry and fear) and '*kegoncangan*' (social or political disturbance). Dynamic meant new and fresh ideas benefited for development would emerge (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1976). In Javanese terminology, such kind of society is popularly called '*masyarakat sing adil lan makmur, toto tentrem karto raharjo, gemah ripah loh jinawi, subur kang sarwo tinandur, murah kang sarwo tinuku*' (a just and prosperous society; peaceful, healthy and wealthy; everything everyone grows would be fertile, everything everyone buys would be cheap).

Therefore, when in July 1966 the MPRS called for general election to be held by 5 July 1968, but then rescheduled it to be held on 3 July 1971, Suharto felt doubted whether he could carry out what the MPRS had wanted, but then he accepted on the condition that “the New Order election should be very different from those of the late 1950s” (Elson, 2001:148). Three conditions were then introduced by Suharto in order to guarantee that the New Order would become the winner of the elections: (1) that the elections would not be ideological in nature, (2) that measures needed to be taken in order to hamstring the existing party system in order to make the Pancasila forces victorious in the General Elections, and (3) that “the role of the Armed Forces in politics needed to be recognized” (Elson, 2001:149).

Suharto did not want the ideology of ‘NASAKOM’ as already introduced by Sukarno at the time of Guided Democracy to reemerge. As he once stated in his state speech in 1983: “If each group has its own ideology then we will go back to the era of ‘NASAKOM’ as we experienced in the past, with its all tragedy. To re-establish the situation like ‘NASAKOM’ - even though the element of communism has already disappeared - will mean to reinstall a time bomb which sooner or later will surely blow up” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1983).

In place of “‘NASAKOM’”, Suharto then committed to implement Pancasila (as the national ideology owned by all Indonesian people) originally and consistently in order to carry out development, particularly economic development, to enhance people’s welfare. Based on his commitment, he then decided to improve the existing political system which used to be dominated by

ideological conflict among political parties. Though the existing political parties were still allowed to participate in the election, Suharto always put them into control either organizationally or ideologically. Suharto allowed the existed political parties to contest the elections foreshadowed for 1971 only as “a recognition of the deep roots they enjoyed in society and his fear that their abnegation would cause serious social unrest” (Elson, 2001:183).

On the other hand, in order to guarantee that the Pancasila forces would be victorious in every election, he established GOLKAR as a vehicle for his political actions and interests, merged the numerous political parties only into two major parties, and imposed mono-loyalty policy on the civil servants that forbade them to give their vote to no political party except GOLKAR.

6.2. The establishment of GOLKAR

During the era of Guided Democracy, the national elite were sharply divided along ideological lines, and the masses were partially mobilized. Harold Crouch in his article on “*Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia*” (World Politics, 1979) says that “the rise of the PKI meant that political competition could not be centered purely on a struggle over the allocation of appointments and opportunities for material benefit within the elite, but involved basically contrasting conceptions of the social and political order” (Crouch, 1979:575). According to Crouch, the PKI’s successful mobilization of mass support – especially during the latter phase of Guided Democracy – forced its rivals to mobilize their supporters. As result, the intra-elite struggle for power became enmeshed with political competition among the masses; conflicts between

opposing sections of the elite could no longer be settled by means of political shifts, but involved apparently irreconcilable interests throughout the nation" (Crouch, 1979:575).

Crouch further argues that "the army's accession to power and repression of its opponents, however, helped to restore conditions favorable to 'patrimonialism'. By eliminating communists, left-wing nationalists, and Sukarnoists, army leaders achieved harmony among the elite.... And the post-coup massacres were followed by steps to emasculate the remaining political parties and depoliticize the masses" (Crouch, 1979:575).

In order to depoliticize the masses, a number of actions were conducted by the new military dominated government headed by Suharto, such as: the massacres that followed the attempted coup of 1 October 1965; the elimination of the PKI, the dismissal of President Sukarno in 1967, and the purge of the remaining political parties by forcing them to accept leaders whom the new government regarded as amenable.

And, in order to gain support from the masses and to put them under control, the new military dominated regime under Suharto established '*Golongan Karya*' or GOLKAR (the Functional Group), not as a party but as a 'socio-political force' functioning as the machinery for Suharto's political actions. Though its function was quite the same as other political parties, Suharto preferred calling GOLKAR a 'socio-political force' for the purpose of discrediting other political parties which in the past had become the source of national conflict and division. While GOLKAR was promoted as the vehicle for

Suharto's political actions, other political parties were 'emasculated' and masses were 'depoliticized'.

The embryo of GOLKAR was '*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*' or SEKBER GOLKAR (Joint Secretariat of the Functional Groups). On 20 October 1964, a number of organizations created by the army for the purpose of to balance the political movement of the PKI, such as '*Badan Kerja Sama* (BKS) *Pemuda Militer*', '*BKS Ulama-Militer*', or other organizations such as '*Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia*' or SOKSI, '*Koperasi Simpan dan Tabungan Gotong Royong*' or KOSGORO, and '*Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong*' or MKGR agreed to join together into what was so called SEKBER-GOLKAR.

When it was founded, around 60 organizations consisted of workers, youths, women, scholars and students, media, farmers and fishermen joined in. But, the influence of SEKBER GOLKAR became stronger after the military managed to win the struggle for power among the political elites in post 1965. And when Suharto took over the power from Sukarno, an attempt to simplify the organization within GOLKAR was made. Though this step was not easily made, at the end of 1969 SEKBER GOLKAR was reorganized into three '*Kelompok Induk Organisasi*' or KINO (Basic Organizational Units), such as KINO KOSGORO, KINO SOKSI, KINO MKGR, and KINO Ormas Hankam. This simplification was meant to be a step for preparation to the 1971 election.

Backed up by three institutions such as (1) '*Badan Pemenangan Pemilu*' or BAPILU (Body to Guide the General Election) influenced by Major General Ali Murtopo (Head of 'OPSUS' or the Special Operation Agency), (2) '*Korps*

Karyawan Kementrian Dalam Negeri' or KOKARMENDAGRI (Corps of the Civil Servants of the Ministry of Interior) who obligated all civil servants of the Ministry of Interior to draw their loyalty to political parties and selected GOLKAR, and (3) local military commands from KORAMIL (at sub-district level), KODIM (at district level), to KODAM (at provincial level), GOLKAR eventually managed to win the 1971 election. According to Leo Suryadinata, "in this period GOLKAR began to function as an electoral machine guaranteeing the dominant position of the military in politics" (<http://m.kompas.com/news/read/data/2009.03.25.08103467>).

In order to win the every election, GOLKAR launched a strategy. GOLKAR was then transformed into a de facto 'state party' as it consisted of three components, namely military (Channel A or 'ABRI'), bureaucracy (Channel B or 'Birokrasi'), and non-civil-servants (Channel G or 'GOLKAR'). The combination of these three channels was then known as '*Keluarga Besar GOLKAR*' (the GOLKAR's Big Family). The structure was akin to a command system, ranging from the national level up to the provincial levels. All civil servants had to pledge their loyalty to GOLKAR. It is thus understandable why GOLKAR was then able to exercise political hegemony for almost three decades. During initial stages of the New Order, the military establishment and Suharto were one, and Suharto became the Mentor or '*Pembina*' that directly controlled GOLKAR. All appointments had to meet with his approval. It was only later that Suharto and the military began to diverge, and the former decided to utilize GOLKAR as his own personal vehicle.

Suharto's tight control over GOLKAR was also conducted by installing military officer as the chairman of GOLKAR. From the beginning of its establishment, GOLKAR was always headed by military general, namely: Brigadier General Ishak Djuhartono (1964-1969), Major General Suprapto Sukowati (1969-1973), Major General Amir Murtono (1973-1983), Lieutenant General Sudharmono (1983-1988), and Lieutenant General Wahono (1988-1993). The first civilian to be elected chairman was Harmoko (1993-1998). After that, GOLKAR was always headed by civilian, such as: Akbar Tanjung (1998-2004), Jusuf Kalla (2004-2009), and Aburizal Bakrie (2009-present).¹

Suharto's tight control over GOLKAR has been acknowledged by Harmoko himself who became the Chairman of GOLKAR in the period year of 1993-1998. Harmoko was elected Chairman of GOLKAR in '*Musyawarah Nasional V*' or MUNAS V (the Fifth National Meeting) which was opened by President Suharto in October 1993. He was the first civilian chairman of GOLKAR to be elected. In his speech, the Minister of Religion Affairs, Munawir Sjadjali, on behalf of the acting coordinator of 'Dewan Pembina' or Consultative Body recommended that the participants of MUNAS elect the pair candidate of Harmoko-Ary Mardjono as the Chairman and Secretary General of GOLKAR for the term of 1993-1998 (Harmoko, 2009:36).

The appointment of Harmoko to be the first civilian chairman of GOLKAR was of course under Suharto's recommendation. As stated by by

¹ Under the leadership of Akbar Tanjung, GOLKAR was changed into 'Partai GOLKAR' and for the first time 'Partai GOLKAR' participated in elections without being facilitated by the government. In the Elections 1999 conducted by President Habibie, Partai GOLKAR's gain of vote dropped drastically. It only managed to gain second position under the PDIP.

Munawir Sjadjzali answering to the questions presented by journalists at the press conference after the meeting was over, the appointment of Harmoko was not his personal proposal, but it had been the decision of all members of ‘Dewan Pembina’ that had already been consulted to and agreed upon by the Chairman of ‘Dewan Pembina’ (Harmoko, 2009:37). This statement shows us how powerful Suharto was as the Chairman of ‘Dewan Pembina’ or mentor of GOLKAR. Ryaas Rasyid depicted Suharto’s domination over GOLKAR as follows:

“At the top level, the fact that Suharto holds both the highest office in government as the President and the most powerful position in GOLKAR as the Chairman of the Supervisory Council confirms the integration of leadership between the state and GOLKAR. This pattern applies hierarchically down to the district level. While it does not directly make GOLKAR crucial in the process of recruitment into any position in governmental structure, it nevertheless provides a great opportunity for government leaders to reach the people” (Rasyid, 1994:209-210).

The connection between Suharto and GOLKAR was regarded by Ryaas Rasyid as being mutually beneficial. “Suharto’s political power as head of state and government, as well as his popularity and skill of leadership are undoubtedly crucial in enabling GOLKAR to maintain its majority position. On the other hand, GOLKAR’s majority position is determinant in ensuring the continuation of Suharto’s leadership and the political legitimacy of his regime” (Rasyid, 1994:210-211).

But, when the composition of the new Central Leadership Body was criticized by a number of experts and journalists because of the number of government officials’ children in Harmoko’s team, such as Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana and Bambang Trihatmodjo (President Suharto’s children), Tantyo AT Sudharmono (a son of Sudharmono, Ex-Vice President), Bambang Sugomo (a

son of Yoga Sugomo, Ex-Chief of BAKIN), Herry Alamsyah (a son of Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, Ex-Coordinator Minister of Social Welfare), Ais Ananta Said (a son of Ali Said, Ex-Attorney General), Bobby Suhardiman (a son of Suhardiman, Chairman of SOKSI), Indra Bambang Oetojo (a son of Lieutenant General Bambang Oetojo), Ponco Sutowo (a son of Ibnu Sutowo, Ex-President Director of Pertamina), Harmoko frankly stated that as the elected Chairman, he was not in the position of electing. The team had already been composed by an elected body before the Chairman was elected. Harmoko himself did not belong to the elected body. It was just the same as the previous compositions; someone who was elected the Chairman had to accept the decision made by the elected body as the final decision. That was the rule of the games enacted in GOLKAR (Harmoko, 2009: 47).

What was stated by Harmoko was also reinforced by a statement made by Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono. He said:

“As the chairman of the ‘*Dewan Pembina*’ or the Consultative Body, Pak Harto had the right to compose the Central Leadership Board of GOLKAR, the strength of which was based on three elements, that was element A or ‘ABRI’, element B or ‘Bureaucracy’, element G or ‘GOLKAR’ or society, consisting of a number of KINOs. During the campaign the element G or ‘GOLKAR’ would be standing in the front line, after the election was over then the element B or ‘Bureaucracy’ would be in the front line, and when there were crucial problems then the element A or ‘ABRI’ would be in the front line. For the purpose of stabilization of the government, this organization was really quite neat. But for those who wanted American or Indian democracy, the democracy developed by Pak Harto was unsuited. For Pak Harto, arguing would not be benefited for the people who were still poor and unable to eat.”²

In the 1971 election, ‘*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*’ or ‘SEKBER GOLKAR’ was able to win spectacularly, 62.8 percent equivalent to

² Interview with Professor Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono, Jakarta, 10 October 2009.

227 seats in the parliament, while the NU won only 18 percent (58 seats), and the PNI won 6.93 percent (20 seats). This composition totally altered the political map created by the 1955 election which used to be dominated by the PNI, the Masyumi, the NU and the PKI. After its successful strategy in the 1971 election, SEKBER GOLKAR was then changed into GOLKAR and became the ruling party for along time until they were defeated by '*Partai Demokrasi Perjuangan Indonesia*' (PDIP) headed by Megawati Sukarnoputeri in the 1999 election.

Due to its political sophistication and the strengths of its political network GOLKAR was always able to win the elections carried out from 1971 to 1992. Even in the 1987 election, GOLKAR was able to win 73.17 per cent. In outside Java such as Sulawesi, GOLKAR even managed to win more than 90 per cent. In order to win the 1971 election it was rumored, for example, that '*bupatis*' and '*mayors*' had been assigned 'quotas' of 30 percent to be mobilized for the GOLKAR (Crouch, 1978:265).

The victory of GOLKAR was backed up by three pillars, such as the military or 'ABRI' (Channel A), the bureaucracy or 'Birokrasi' (Channel B), and the technocrat or civilian or 'GOLKAR' (Channel G). Thashi Shiraisi in his article on "*Dukuh: A GOLKAR Village*" stated that the military institution and bureaucracy guaranteed the existence of top-down political participation by creating controlled political stability which then made the technocrats able to carry out economic development.

The superiority of GOLKAR as the hegemonic party could be seen in the percentage of votes gained by GOLKAR in every election (1971-1997) as follows:

The Percentage of Votes in the Elections 1971-1992

NO.	PARTIES	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992
1.	PPP	25.50 %	26.70 %	27.78 %	15.97 %	17.00 %
2.	GOLKAR	59.04 %	56.07 %	64.30 %	73.17 %	68.10 %
3.	PDI	09.48 %	07.79 %	07.88 %	10.87 %	14.49 %

Source: Harmoko. (2009). *“Quo Vadis Golkar: Mencari Presiden Pilihan Rakyat,”* Jakarta: Kintamani Publishing, p. 92.).

Vote Gain of Political Parties and GOLKAR in the Elections 1977-1997

NO.	PARTIES	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
1.	PPP	18.743.491	20.871.880	13.70.428	16.624.647	25.340.028
2.	GOLKAR	39.750.096	48.334.724	62.783.680	66.599.331	84.187.907
3.	PDI	5.504.757	5.919.702	9.384.708	14.565.556	3.463.225

Source: Suara Merdeka. *“Kampanye dari Masa ke Masa (2): Intimidasi, Politik Buldozer, dan Monoloyalitas.”* Semarang: 14 March 2004 (<http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0403/14/nas6.htm>).

In short, Suharto had already developed a hegemonic party system, in which GOLKAR had become a hegemonic party under his own tight control. As the ‘state party’ during the era of Suharto (1968-1998), GOLKAR dominated the Indonesian politics, making the political system a hegemonic party system. Two other parties, namely ‘Partai Persatuan Pembangunan’ or PPP (the Development Unity Party) and ‘Partai Demokrasi Indonesia’ or PDI (the Indonesian Democratic Party) were forced to accept a minor role. The strength of GOLKAR was overwhelming and there was no opportunity for opposition parties to share, let alone assume power (Suryadinata in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.29, No. 2, 2007:233-234).

GOLKAR not only benefited by its structure (ABRI, bureaucracy, and non military or civilians) but also by the arrangement made by Suharto that other political parties were not allowed to have committee at the municipal level,

except GOLKAR. In relating to such arrangement, Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono stated:

“The arrangements made by Pak Harto enabled him to be in power for almost 32 years. Usually, someone who is very long in power tends to corrupt. People surrounding him then will always ask him to be in power forever. Many said if Pak Harto had stepped down from power as he once ever stated, or *‘lengser keprabon madheg pandhito’*, he would have been honored. But, he decided not to step down for the people surrounding him always forbade him to do so. They said that Pak Harto could not be *“tinggal glanggang colong playu”*. Too many people tried to flatter or to appease him very much. They said if Pak Harto had left the political arena, people would have been disappointed and angry. Pak Harto might have been moved and then decided not to step down, making Bu Harto disappointed.”³

Karim DP once wrote that after being appointed president, Suharto was backed up not only by ABRI but politically also by GOLKAR. In other words, GOLKAR had become Suharto’s political party (<http://www.progind.net/>). Due to such kind of condition it was not too peculiar to say that ‘Suharto, the New Order and GOLKAR were one’, meaning: Suharto was not only the New Order but also GOLKAR, and the New Order and GOLKAR was Suharto.

6.3. The simplification of political parties

In his book of *“Indonesia under Suharto”* (1987) Nawaz B. Mody stated: “In dealing with civilian organizations, Suharto’s policies were aimed at controlling political parties, ensuring their docility and preventing them from emerging as a threat to military rule” (Mody, 1987:150). A number of instruments were made by Suharto for controlling the political parties. These instruments included: (1) to simplify the number of political parties, (2) to

³ Interview with Professor Sukamdani Sahid Gitosarjono, Jakarta, 10 October 2009.

conduct '*Penelitian Khusus*' or 'LITSUS' (Special Investigation), (3) to stipulate Pancasila as the sole philosophical basis for all social-political organizations, and (4) to reject the idea of opposition in the Indonesian political system. All changes in social and political lives made by the New Order were told as the rearrangement in social and political lives as said by Suharto:

"Nowadays rearrangement in all social and political lives is still going on. It is clear that the old order which before 1966 grew up improperly could not respond to the needs for development. People were divided into a number of different groups with narrow ideology. Teachers, public servants, workers, peasants, fishermen, students, youths, intellectuals, were split up into organizations which actually became the instruments of political parties. Consequently our society was divided into small groups directly involved in practical politics, making our attention to development be forced backwards and activities of development were neglected. Therefore rearrangement in all social and political lives is a must. Barriers may be met, but we have to go on" (President Suharto's State Speech 16 August 1968).

Although in his first state speech on 16 August 1968 President Suharto recognized that "political party is one of important instruments for democracy" and that "the existence of democracy is characterized by the existence of political parties in a state" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1968), Suharto, like Sukarno, truly believed that political parties often became sources of conflict endangering national stability. Convinced that political instability occurred during the Liberal or Parliamentary Democracy and the Guided Democracy was often caused by the existence of the too many political parties in national political life, each with its own different ideology, Suharto then introduced his idea of simplifying number of political parties. He suggested that all political parties be regrouped into two groups, 'Spiritual group' and 'Material group'.

What Suharto suggested was then stated in his first state speech on 16 August 1968. He asserted:

“During the liberal era, particularly due to the existence of the too many political parties, our government was often changed in relatively very short time. Based on this kind of condition, of course no government was able to have enough chance to formulate good action plan and to carry it out in a appropriate time” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1968).

“Consolidation of our political life is still going on. In order to make our political life more effective and in order to strengthen the union as well as the unity of the nation we have already attempted to regroup all parties into two groups based on program priority – Spiritual group and Material group – without eliminating each own political party personality” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1968).

When Suharto’s idea of simplifying number of political parties was introduced, not all political parties responded positively, some even showed their opposition. However, after the 1971 election precisely in 1973, in order to guarantee that disruptive competition would not occur, the political party system was restructured and simplified by government fiat, forcing the nine existing traditional parties to regroup into two electoral coalitions, one on a spiritual basis and the other on a material basis. The four Muslim parties (NU, PARMUSI, PSII, and PERTI), despite their historical, ideological, sectarian, and leadership differences, were joined together in the United Development Party or ‘*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*’ (PPP); and the Christian and secular parties (the PNI, Partai Katholik, PARKINDO, IPKI, PARTINDO, and MURBA) were uneasily united in the Indonesian Democratic Party or ‘*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*’ (PDI). The desired result was to further weaken the existing political parties. The Political Parties Bill of 1975 completed the process of reconciling the parties to

the requirements of Pancasila Democracy. So, beginning in the 1977 election the number of political parties which participated in the election was only two parties (the PPP and the PDI), plus GOLKAR or '*Golongan Karya*' (an association of a number of functional groups such as SOKSI, KOSGORO, MKGR, etc.).

But, this regrouping of the existed political parties from ten to two was not enough. This did not guarantee that political parties would no longer endanger the political stability as preconditioned by Suharto for carrying out national development. To make political parties no longer become a threat to the development of Pancasila Democracy, Suharto strongly stated that "political parties should be responsible for becoming instrument of healthy democracy and giving the shape of healthy democratic development" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1968). He further asserted that:

"Once again I would like to remark that political awareness does not mean fanaticism of groups or narrow outlook of groups. Political awareness is awareness of responsibility of living in an independent state, awareness together to participate in solving problems, awareness together to carry out programs for the purpose of progress in order to achieve the nation's and state's progress. By doing this, political parties were not merely instrument for collecting followers or supporters, were not merely instrument for winning the election, were not merely instrument for seeking power either" (President Suharto's State Speech, 16 August 1968).

In order to meet what Suharto wanted, control over political parties had to be conducted by Suharto by the instrument of 'LITSUS'. As for example, in order to make political parties not so critical to the government, a regulation giving the government the right to interfere in political parties particularly in recruiting their leaders was made. This first occurred to the PNI and the PARMUSI.

In the case of the PNI, Suharto stated:

“Especially in the life of political parties during the New Order, we have already noted a various number of progresses. We still remember the life and relationship among political parties which were full of suspicion in the years of 1966, 1967, and 1968. Until the PNI – the old and big party – was frozen (by the government) in order to give a chance to the party to cleanse itself. But, thank God Almighty at the end the party was able to be cleaned and properly accepted by groups of forces in society until now” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1968).

And in the case of the PARMUSI, Suharto also stated:

“We have also already noted a number of progresses in the field of political parties. This could be seen from the recognition of the new party – Partai Muslimin – as an association of many Islamic organizations which have not yet possessed channel for articulating their aspiration. The birth of Partai Muslimin would make clear that we could consolidate and give more effective forum in the life of our political parties” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1968).

By conducting ‘LITSUS’ these two political parties and GOLKAR as well as other mass-organizations could be controlled effectively. As for example, in the beginning of the New Order the government interfered in the formation of the new leadership of the PNI and the PARMUSI. The government rejected the candidates for the new leadership of the two parties used to be involved in the past military rebellions such as the ‘Thirtieth of September Movement’ and the ‘PRRI-PERMESTA’.

Another instrument for controlling political parties and other mass-organizations was also taken by Suharto in 1983, when the MPR declared Pancasila as “the sole philosophical basis or ‘*azas tunggal*’ for political parties and other socio-political organizations, as well as for the state as a whole” (Mackie and MacIntyre in Hill 1994: 15). In Suharto’s word, the adoption of

Pancasila by the parties “will facilitate the prevention of conflict among various political groups which in their efforts to attain their respective goals may causes clashes detrimental to national unity and integrity” (Mackie and MacIntyre in Hill, 1994: 15).

6.4. The mono-loyalty policy for the civil servants

The military elite remained deeply suspicious of the civilian bureaucracy for its past radical party affiliations. Yet because military rule required a basis of support from the bureaucracy, there resulted certain ambivalence in the political role accorded to officialdom. Civil service ranks were purged of party members, and in anticipation of the 1971 general election all officials were obliged to join the military-sponsored SEKBER GOLKAR, an organization of functional groups. To harness bureaucrats to rulers’ politics, a corporate organization of civil servants was established, ‘*Korps Pegawai Negeri*’ (KORPRI), under the direction of the military Minister of Interior, General Amir Machmud (Rudner, 1976:256).

Sri Yuniarti, a researcher from LIPI, in his writing on “*Politisasi Pegawai Negeri: Akibat Kebijakan Massa Mengambang*” (1997) has stated that ” big problem met by the New Order under Suharto at the beginning of its power was to maintain political stability for the continuity of economic development. For that purpose the government needed an effective bureaucracy which was responsive to the government’s will. It was because the bureaucracy inherited by the Old Order regime was ineffective and very much politicized (became the

political object of political parties)" (<http://www.tempointeraktif.com/ang/min/01/53/kolom1.htm>).

According to Sri Yuniarti, the New Order regime under Suharto regarded that the past conflict and instability in the country were not only caused by the existence of ineffective and very much politicized bureaucracy, but also by the existence of political parties. She further stated that "the government by political parties and the involvement of political parties in the government were regarded by the New Order regime under Suharto as the nightmare of the past and needed to be avoided" (<http://www.tempointeraktif.com/ang/min/01/53/kolom1.htm>). And, "in order to support the idea of achieving political stability and economic recovery, the New Order regime thought it was important to establish a non partisan group having commitment toward the idea of development. For that purpose GOLKAR was established. And, in order to make GOLKAR an effective locomotive for the government it was then designed to have capability of winning the 1971 election" (<http://www.tempointeraktif.com/ang/min/01/53/kolom1.htm>).

As a new institution GOLKAR would not have been able to win the election if it had not been supported by the military and assisted by the bureaucracy. Therefore, in order to guarantee the victory of GOLKAR, the Minister of Interior, Lieutenant General Amir Mahmud, issued regulations. As said by Yuniarti:

"In order to smooth the process of GOLKAR consolidation with the target of winning the 1971 election, a bureaucratic group dominated by Amir Mahmud issued a regulation in order to move political parties aside from bureaucracy. The process of cleansing the bureaucracy from political parties was done by enacting regulation of Interior Minister (Permendagri) No. 12/1969 and Government Regulation (PP) No. 6/1970. By using these two instruments the anti party attitude in bureaucracy was

established and the mass basis as the source of political support for the political parties was uprooted. The sterilized bureaucracy from political parties and the removal of political attribute in the bureaucracy made the civil servants have no other choice except joining into GOLKAR" (<http://www.tempointeraktif.com/ang/min/01/53/kolom1.htm>).

These two regulations made by Amir Mahmud were then strengthened by the issue of the Presidential Decision (Kepres) No. 82/1971 on the establishment of '*Korps Pegawai Negeri Republic Indonesia*' (KORPRI) or the Corps of Civil Servants of the Republic of Indonesia as the only organization for all civil servants. In its establishment it was implicitly stated that the KORPRI was one of GOLKAR pillars, beside the KINO's or '*Kelompok Induk Organisasi*' (such as KOSGORO, SOKSI, and MKGR) and ABRI. This statement was then reinforced by the agreement which was always reiterated in every National Meeting (MUNAS) of KOPRI that the political aspiration of KORPRI members would be channeled through GOLKAR (<http://www.tempointeraktif.com/ang/min/01/53/kolom1.htm>).

What Yuniarti has stated was also supported by Charles Victor Barber from 'World Resources Institute'. According to Barber, not only had political party's influence been removed from bureaucracy, but military men were also inserted into it. In his writing on "*New Order State Capacity: Growth, Strengths, and Weaknesses*" (1997) Charles Victor Barber stated that:

"Suharto inherited a weak and demoralized civil service in 1966, which he further gutted in order to root out leftist elements. Within the remainder of the civil service, the regime moved to ensure loyalty with the establishment of a single national Corps of Civil Servants of the Republic of Indonesia (KORPRI). Military men were inserted into key bureaucratic positions. The bureaucracy grew rapidly, from perhaps 600,000 in 1965 to 1.6 million in 1974, to over 3 million in 1986. By the late 1970s, military appointees held half the cabinet positions, over two-

thirds of the governorships, and 56 percent of district-head positions. Within the bureaucracy, 78 percent of director-generals and 84 percent of ministerial secretaries were military appointees" (<http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/state/indon/indon2.htm>).

It has been recognized that the implementation of mono-loyalty policy at the beginning of the New Order has contributed to the existence of stability and general capability of the government to enable a government supported by bureaucracy to carry out development in every field. This was difficult to do under the Old Order in which bureaucracy had been split into a number of different political affiliations.

Charles Victor Barber further asserted that the political ferment of the Sukarno years fragmented the bureaucracy into factions. Suharto moved quickly to remould the bureaucracy into a tool to establish heightened political control and to carry out his ambitious development plans. Having come to power with the backing of a diverse coalition of anti-Sukarno forces, Suharto quickly moved to centralize power. He eliminated the influence of most of these groups over politics and the bureaucracy. He created a permanent place for the civil service on the political arm of the regime: '*Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia*' or KORPRI was established as an all-encompassing civil servants' organization parallel to GOLKAR, the ruling political party. With loyalty assured -- and revenues from oil and timber flowing in -- the civil service received greater funding, and expanded rapidly. Higher levels of education gradually improved the skills and overall capacity of the civil service, while vast infrastructure development facilitated its penetration into the countryside. Both Laws on Regional Government (stipulated in 1974) and Laws on Village Government

(stipulated in 1979) consolidated the bureaucracy at those levels” (<http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/state/indon/indon2.htm>).

Through the Regulation of the Minister of Interior No. 12/1969, civil servants were not allowed to be members of political parties, but they were obliged to support GOLKAR. This regulation was then reinforced by the establishment of the KORPRI, the only one organization for all civil servants, in the year of 1971. The Minister of Interior always occupied the chairman of ‘Dewan Pembina KORPRI’.

In the context of Indonesia, bureaucracy had not been neutral for along time since the era of Sukarno to the era of Suharto. During the two eras, bureaucracy was often made as a tool for political interests. In the era of Sukarno there were segregations of departments. For the period 1950-1959 the ministries of interior and agriculture were dominated by the PNI; the ministry of religion was dominated by the Masyumi and the NU; the ministry of foreign affairs was dominated by the PSI and the PNI. In the period of 1959-1965 every civil servant had to be member of one existing political party which had in the character of ‘NASAKOM’. Politization of bureaucracy made the recruitment influenced by the loyalty of the candidate to a certain political party (<http://www.sinarharapan.co.id/berita/0701/16/opi01.html>).

”Suharto had to get rid the bureaucracy of party influence in order to use it to carry out his policies. It was a classic case of government from above. The bureaucracy was moulded into an instrument of control. The first party against whom Suharto acted was the PKI” (Moldy 1987:216). Another method involved increased militarization of the bureaucracy. This was done skillfully since

Suharto visibly, at least, appeared to be decreasing the military's role. (Mody, 1987:218).

Suharto's enforcement of mono-loyalty can be described as 'conscription'. Since the Ministry of Interior was the PNI's main base, Amir Machmud as the Minister of Interior organized the existing civil service organizations into one, encompassing all civil servants. (Mody, 1987:219-220). "Initially Regulation No. 6/1970 was restricted to the Ministry of Interior. Similar organizations developed in most departments to prevent civil servants from maintaining double loyalty to outside forces. Major General Munadi specifically stated that he wanted the Ministry of Interior to free itself of political parties, especially the PNI for whom it had been a traditional stronghold. Pressures to join '*Korps Karyawan Departemen Dalam Negeri*' or KOKARMENDAGRI increased as election approached. Even village heads were urged to join though theoretically they were neither paid nor appointed by the government. Some officers implemented Regulation No. 6 to ban village administrators from being affiliated to political parties" (Mody, 1987:221).

Amir Machmud announced that civil servants in the Ministry of Interior could be loyal to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the government programs. If they failed to do so they would be dismissed. Numerous reports also came in of government employees and village chiefs being forced to sign forms declaring their withdrawal from political parties and joining 'KOKARMENDAGRI'. Civil servants were 'instructed' to sign statements stating that they would punch GOLKAR symbol in election" (Mody, 1987:221).

6.5. The anti-critique and anti-opposition policy

The other instrument was made by Suharto in order to perpetuate his rule was to minimize critique by rejecting the idea of opposition. In his state speech on 16 August 1967, Suharto stated:

“Indeed the life of Pancasila Democracy does not know a group of opposition as usually known in the system of Liberal Democracy; Pancasila Democracy is only knowing ‘discussion for reaching consensus’ through the representatives either in the DPR or the MPR. However, Pancasila Democracy is always upholding highly human rights and the democracy rights of every citizen the use of which is always served for the broader interests, for the interests of society, of people, as well as of the state” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila, 1976: 61).

And then, in his speech before the National Meeting I of GOLKAR (MUNAS I -GOLKAR), held on 4 September 1973, Suharto further asserted that in stipulating and looking for solution of every problem, the principle of discussion or ‘*musyawarah*’ had to be used. But, once a common decision had been made up no one and no group was allowed to reject the decision. Suharto also stated that ‘Pancasila Democracy’ required honesty. He said, “Without honesty and goodwill then Pancasila Democracy could never work” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila, 1976: 61).

Explaining the mechanism for expressing opinion, Suharto made another statement by saying that in Pancasila Democracy it did not mean that differences in opinion had to be eliminated. Beside it would be against the natural law, the death of different opinion meant the end of fresh opinion for improvement. The problem was that different opinions did not have to be sharpened, even used for

pressure threatening other parts. “As a big nation consisting of pluralism and unity, we might not slip into sharpening different opinions among people. If this happened, sooner or later this would hamper and endanger the unity and solidarity of the nation. Actually difference in opinion is something normal. But it must be considered that the differences were not something to be crushed or challenged but to be closer and met through the mechanism of ‘*musyawarah*’ and ‘*mufakat*’ or discussion in order to reach consensus” (President Suharto’s State Speech on 16 August 1977).

‘*Musyawarah*’ and ‘*mufakat*’ meant that differences opinion could be discussed and solved in the spirit of ‘*kekeluargaan*’ or family spirit until an agreement satisfying all parties was achieved. There would be no absolute winner and no absolute loser. In *musyawarah* and *mufakat* the winner was the rational and the national interests (President Suharto’s State Speech on 16 August 1977). The concept of ‘*kekeluargaan*’ or family principle was an important element of the governmental rationality of the New Order regime. Showing that the Indonesian nation belonged to ‘*Keluarga Besar*’ Suharto stated that the three contestants of the election (the PDI, the PPP and GOLKAR) were brothers in the Big Family of the Indonesian nation. They were the New Order’s components that already accepted and highly upheld Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1976). Bourchier as cited by David Jones (2005) depicts the spirit of ‘*kekeluargaan*’ as one of ‘organic wholeness, harmony, stillness’ (Bourchier, 1996:164). Elsewhere, Bourchier gives a more critical description of ‘*kekeluargaan*’ as ‘a word with overtones of stasis, patriarchy and a feudalistic ‘known thy place’ traditionalism (Bourchier,

1998:204). The basis of '*kekeluargaan*' is an idealized model of traditional society drawn from Dutch '*adat*' scholarship.

'*Kekeluargaan*' became a state model for Indonesian society in three different locations. Firstly, *kekeluargaan* establishes relationship within the family. The standard text for indoctrinating schoolchildren, 'Pancasila Moral Education' (PMP), states:

"In the family there is a feeling of mutual consideration and empathy. The father works in the interests of the whole family. Your mother cares for your father and all the children. Often your father puts the needs of his family above his own needs. He postpones buying himself shoes because he has to buy your schoolbag. It is the same with your mother.... Father and mother see you and the interests of the family as more important than their own. How happy is a household with such a mother and father" (Bourchier, 1996:234).

A second location is in the community. '*Kekeluargaan*' reflects the notion that the traditional (and therefore authentic) Indonesian community operates without conflict and in a state of balance. Leaders are spiritually united with their communities and everyone cooperates in a spirit of community mindedness and family-ness (Boucher, 1977:162). The third location is the nation-state. '*Kekeluargaan*' became the guiding principle of the state's relationship to society. The most obvious manifestation of 'family principles; at the national level is Suharto's title as the Father of Development or '*Bapak Pembangunan*'. According to Heryanto, this title emphasizes a natural authority and over-all order (Heryanto, 1988:20).

6.6. Pancasila as the sole guiding ideology or philosophy

After issuing the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959, Sukarno then became an authoritarian ruler with almost unlimited power in his hands. As the Great Leader of the Revolution/the Supreme Commander of the Military Forces/President for Life/the Mouthpiece of the People's Sufferings, Sukarno had become a figure whose words had to be accepted by all sections of the people. His ideas written and spoken were then compiled into what popularly came to be called '*Panca Azimat Revolusi*' (Five Magic Charms of the Revolution), consisted of (1) NASAKOM or 'Nationalism, Religious Groups, and Communism'; (2) '*Pancasila*' or the Five Principles (Believe in God, Nationalism, Humanism, Democracy, and Social Justice); (3) 'MANIPOL-USDEK' (the 1945 Constitution, Socialism of Indonesia, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Personality of Indonesia); (4) 'TRISAKTI' (sovereign in politics, self-reliance in economic, and Indonesian identity in culture); and (5) 'BERDIKARI' or self-reliance. '*Panca Azimat Revolusi*' was also known as '*Sukarnoism*'.

The '*Panca Azimat Revolusi*' or the Five Magic Charms of the Revolution which contained not only Javanese cultural values and philosophy but also Western political ideas (particularly Marxism and Leninism) then became the identity of the political regime headed by President Sukarno. This political regime was popularly called by Suharto as 'the Old Order regime'.

The political regime established by President Sukarno could not be separated from the Western political ideas, particularly Marxism-Leninism. The idea of NASAKOM was not only strictly attached to the regime but also to the

character of Sukarno. Once, when speaking before the Congress VI - PKI (16 September 1959) Sukarno asserted:

“Brothers and sisters, the man standing before you is regarded by some people as a peculiar man. I myself confessed that, I am a mixture, a mixture of three characters, nationalist, socialist, and Muslim. These three characters are mixed in me. Some people are even astonished how Sukarno could be a Muslim for he has ever said that he is a historical-materialist. Yes brothers and sisters I have repeated it many times: I am really an historical-materialist. How come could I become a Muslim who believes in God, who does the praying, who does the fasting, etc.”
[\(http://solindo.wordpress.com/2008/03/09/kongres-vi-pki-16-09-1959/\)](http://solindo.wordpress.com/2008/03/09/kongres-vi-pki-16-09-1959/).

The theory of Marx and Lenin, such as historical-materialism, dialectical-materialism and revolution, had been used by Sukarno as a tool for analyzing the history of colonialism and imperialism as well as a tool for uniting all revolutionary forces in their struggle for independence. Sukarno further asserted:

“..... I am a historical-materialist! Historical materialism is a science, a method for understanding history. A method for analyzing history telling us that all ideas, ideology and others in a certain period are determined by social-economic conditions.... Historical materialism is a science and I am one of the followers of this theory and, therefore, I am a historical-materialism. Well, if you hear from me that I am not only a nationalist, but also a socialist, and a Muslim then, in order to understand my complexity, you, brothers and sisters, must remember this theory, historical-materialism”
[\(http://solindo.wordpress.com/2008/03/09/kongres-vi-pki-16-09-1959/\)](http://solindo.wordpress.com/2008/03/09/kongres-vi-pki-16-09-1959/).

Relating to NASAKOM, Sukarno argued that in order to carry out the Indonesian revolution all revolutionary forces consisting of nationalist, religious groups, and communist had to be united. Not only was NASAKOM united, but it became the spirit of all Indonesian people. In his state speech opening the mass-meeting of Indonesian peasants (20 July 1965), Sukarno urged all Indonesian people to make NASAKOM their spirit:

“..... that the Indonesian Revolution could be finished only if all Indonesian people are tightly united, that NASAKOM will not only be seen as a phenomena of unity, but I also want all peasants, all workers, all volunteers, all military officers to say: NASAKOM is my spirit, NASAKOM is my spirit, NASAKOM is my spirit! Only by making NASAKOM is our spirit, we would be able to really continue our Revolution so that what all our people have demanded us do would be able to be achieved” (<http://anton-djakarta.blogspot.com/2008/11/pidato-bung-karno-nasakom.html>).

Sukarno’s belief in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism had not changed even a millimeter. Though his political position had been cornered, once when responding to the banning of the Marxism-Leninism by the MPRS, Sukarno in his state speech on 6 September 1966 asserted:

“Beforehand, I advise the members of the MPRS (the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly) that if they decided to ban Marxism, Leninism, Communism, I would laugh.... I now say without beating about the bush, I am a Marxist. I have said that since the year 28, I am a nationalist, I am religious, and I am a Marxist... Marxism is contained in my heart” (Crouch, 1978: 207).

Regarding himself as a nationalist, Islamist, and Marxist, he also identified himself as a revolutionary leader who struggled not only for the independence of Indonesia but also for liberation of all nations in the world from the oppression of neo-colonialist and imperialist, he then declared his policy ‘to Crush Malaysia’ which he regarded as the project of NEKOLIM, and established closer relationship with a number of Communist countries, such as China, Vietnam, and North Korea through the so called policy of Jakarta-Hanoi-Beijing-Pyongyang Axis. His protection to the PKI and his confession that he was a Marxist were regarded by his political opponents as against the Indonesian

culture and personality, benefiting the PKI, and making the state and country trapped in a national tragedy.

The elements of Javanese culture attached to the identity of the regime could be traced from the idea of Guided Democracy. According to Sukarno, Guided Democracy was based on the principles of '*gotong royong*' (mutual cooperation) and '*musyawarah untuk mufakat*' (deliberation and consensus) which had been very familiar to Javanese society, replacing the parliamentary or liberal democracy. Sukarno began to popularize the principle of '*gotong royong*' (a genuine Indonesian or even Javanese term) in his speech of the Birth of Pancasila. According to him the first two principles of Pancasila, 'nationalism and internationalism' or 'nationalism and humanitarianism', could be pressed down into one, called 'socio-nationalism'. And then the principles of 'politico-economic democracy' and 'social justice' could be pressed down into one too, called 'socio-democracy'. And so what were originally five has become three: 'socio-nationalism, socio-democracy and belief in God'. But these three could again be gathered together to form one principle. In establishing an Indonesian state all should be responsible; 'all for all'. Sukarno further stated: "Therefore, if I press down five to get three, and three to get one, then I have a genuine Indonesian term – '*gotong royong*' [mutual cooperation]. The state of Indonesia which is to establish should be a state of mutual cooperation. How fine that is! A '*gotong royong*' state!" (Legge, 1972:186).

Explaining the principle of '*musyawarah untuk mufakat*', Sukarno asserted: "Liberal democracy was a Western import, unsuited to Indonesia's needs - a mere fifty-per-cent-plus-one democracy. Indonesia's traditional

procedures by contrast were based on deliberation and the search for a consensus" (Legge, 1972:3). "What was needed was not liberal democracy but guided democracy and he himself was the obvious guide" (Legge, 1972:3). According to former foreign minister Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Sukarno began to believe that he had been 'chosen by providence' to lead the people and 'build a new society' (Ide Anak Agung, 1973:251–252).

Sukarno further argued that "liberal democracy allowed the coercion of minorities by mere majorities" which "was not the Indonesian way" (Legge, 1972:283). He then claimed that he had found "an alternative mode of reaching decisions at the heart of Indonesian society – within the village assembly. These decisions were made only after prolonged and careful consideration. As long as a substantial minority remained unconvinced by a proposal deliberation would continue until, at length, under the guidance of a leader, a consensus was reached. These distinctively Indonesian procedures of deliberation and consensus – '*musyawarah untuk mufakat*' – together with leadership, allowed all views to be considered and were tolerant of minority feeling; they should thus be the model for the nation. Liberal democracy was based on conflict – the procedures of deliberation and consensus would promote harmony" (Legge, 1972: 283).

Sukarno regarded 'Panca Azimat Revolusi' as the teachings of Indonesia's history. He said: "Why were we supreme in the past? ... We were supreme because the entire national and all revolutionary groups were united" (Crouch, 1978: 206-207). According to Sukarno, these people were united as bearers of the Panca Azimat Revolusi. He warned: "There are some people who

don't want to learn from history, who even want to cut themselves off from our history. That can't be done. They will fail" (Crouch, 1978:207)

Sukarno absolutely believed in the rightness of all his teachings such as NASAKOM as well as MANIPOL-USDEK. According to Sukarno, the rightness of all his teachings was proved by the five protections given by God. In his state speech in 1962, he said:

“Five times people have tried to kill me, and five times God Almighty has given me His protection.

.....
For me myself – besides thanking God Almighty – it has strengthened my conviction that it may a justification of God Almighty that the basis of my leadership to the Indonesian Nation, that everything I have given to the Indonesian Nation, every “ism” I have given to the Indonesian people, the way in which to unite the Indonesian people, the way how others with me mobilized the Indonesian people, the way in implanting self-help in the Indonesian people, in short all policy I have given to the Indonesian Nation, has got the approval of God Almighty, because God Almighty has for 5 times given me His protection.

.....
Because of that I have become more determined, I have become more convinced that the unity of the Indonesian Nation is right, that the deed for achieving independence can only be done with the ‘bundelling’ of all Revolutionary forces, that the Political Manifesto is right, that USDEK is right, that the Indonesian Socialism is right, that everything I have given to the Indonesian Nation is, according to my conviction, right.

.....
This gives me strength. And therefore, I invite you again for so many times this evening, let us march on. On the basis of MANIPOL, on the basis of USDEK, on the basis of the Indonesian unity, which has its spindle of NASAKOM (Nationalist, Religious Groups and Communists), on the basis of our entire struggle, on the basis of self-help. In short only if my conviction is right, only if we keep going on we have done so far, on the right path, only then we shall achieve what has been entrusted by the people to us that is, full independence of Indonesia, free and independent from Sabang to Merauke, in the form of an Unitarian State of the Republic of Indonesia, with a just and prosperous society, and having friendly relations with all nations in the world.

.....
That one of the aims of the Revolution must be socialism. Socialism must be one of the bases of a rightful Revolution” (President Sukarno’s State Speech, 20 May 1962).

Sukarno had positioned himself not only as a part of Indonesian Revolutionary forces, but also as the Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution.

“Brothers and sisters, since I was 25 years old, I have been working hard for unity of revolutionary forces for this Indonesia (*ammenbundeling van revolutionaire krachten*), in order to unite all isms, groups, revolutionary powers within the Indonesian nation. And nowadays I am still doing it with the mercy of God Almighty. As the Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution, as the head of the state, as the Supreme Commander of the Military Forces, I must not only be standing on all groups, but also trying to unite all these groups.

Either group ‘Nas’, or group ‘A’, or group ‘Com’. Brothers and sisters, our present independence is the result of respiration and blood of ‘Nas’, ‘A’ and ‘Com’. Never say that this independence was only the result of ‘Nas struggle’, or ‘A struggle’, or ‘Com struggle’.

No. Since I was very young, I saw all these groups were struggling hard for the Indonesian independence. I am myself a ‘Nas’ (nationalist), but I would never say that this independence is only the result of ‘Nas struggle’. I am also religious, could be included into ‘A’, ‘Is that right pak Saifuddin Zuhri?’ I am even regarded by the Muslim World as a ‘Hero of Islam and Independence’. But, in the name of God Almighty, I will never say that this independence was the result of my struggle” (<http://cristalborneo.blogspot.com/2009/01/bung-karno-sumbangan-dan-pengorbanan.html>).

Like Sukarno, after being elected president, Suharto also rejected the parliamentary or liberal democracy which, according to him, was unsuited to the Indonesians, endangering the position of Pancasila as the state basis, and threatening the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. In his state speech on 16 August 1969 Suharto asserted:

“In the era of liberal democracy phenomena and opinion to change the state basis of Pancasila with another basis emerged, the character of the unitary state was forced aside by narrow regional character, the spirit of unity was defeated by interests of conflicting groups. As the consequence, the government became up and down causing instability” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1969).

But, unlike Sukarno, the second President Suharto on the other hand also criticized the Guided Democracy of Sukarno in 1959. According to him, although the 1945 Constitution had been reenacted as the basis for the Guided Democracy, a number of deviations had been made by Sukarno particularly in implementing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In his state speech on 16 August 1969 Suharto asserted:

“In 1959 we returned to the 1945 Constitution. But, what a pity in this period deviations in implementing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution occurred. While we were not united in 1950-1959, while we were not absolutely loyal to the basis and goals of the independence, the PKI which was basically anti-Pancasila had a chance to build up its great forces. We thank God that we were able to cease the Old Order deviations and the rebellion of the PKI at the end of 1965” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1969).

These deviations were described by Suharto in his state speech on 16 August 1970 as follows:

“What happened in the years of 1960-1965? Our ideology of Pancasila step by step was replaced with the ideology of NASAKOM..... Democracy based on Pancasila was changed into guided democracy which was practically closer to the dictatorship system..... The teaching of unfinished revolution step by step produced the attitude of ends justify the means..... Under the pretext for the purpose of revolution, with the revolutionary slogans, with the law of revolution, then the principles of order, the principles of business and organization, the principles of economy, step by step were left behind. Problems of economy were ignored, making our country become the country with the worst economy in the world” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1970).

Not only that, Suharto also criticized Sukarno’s policy of ‘*Ganyang Malaysia*’ or ‘Crush Malaysia’ and the policy of Jakarta-Hanoi-Beijing-Pyongyang Axis. In his state speech on 16 August 1970, President Suharto

further asserted: “Free and active foreign policy was changed into foreign policy of confrontation and sided to the interests of a certain bloc, making us adopt the policy of Jakarta-Hanoi-Beijing-Pyongyang Axis, and on the other side isolated ourselves by getting out from the member of the United Nations” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1970). According to Suharto, “Many kinds of incorrect teachings of revolution were pumped through long and systematical indoctrinations. The negative effects that we felt - a part of which is still going on – were backwardness in economy, social and political disorders, disobedience of the law and rules, inefficient state apparatus, and the worst one as evaluated by the MPR was moral and mental degradation” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1970).

In Suharto’s opinion, “the degraded process of the nation life at all fields was in line with the attempts of the PKI to ‘ripe the situation’ as its preparation for rebellion which broke out in 1965. The goal of the rebellion was quite clear not only to overthrow the legal Government, not only to kill the top Army leaders, but also To change the state ideology of Pancasila with another state ideology” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1970).

In short, Suharto regarded that during the era of the Liberal Democracy as well as the Guided Democracy a number of deviations had occurred making the Indonesian people trapped into continuing crisis, preventing them from carrying out development in order to achieve a just and prosperous society based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution or *‘masyarakat adil dan makmur berdasarkan Pancasila dan UUD 1945’*. In order to stop these deviations, total correction to both Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy had to be made

through the establishment of the New Order regime who had a strong commitment to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution originally and consistently. Suharto further asserted that:

“Since the year of 1966 we opened a new page of history, characterized by the birth of the New Order. This essence of this new age is: to purify the independence goals, to re-straighten out the road of our history, and to reenact Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

The New Order does not only mean to crush the rebellion of the PKI, to overthrow the Old Order, but also to correct totally all deviations occurred till the present time. This total correction is not merely in the field of ideology, politics, and state affairs, but also followed by total correction on mental attitude and the system we work.

All kinds of rebellion could no longer be allowed to happen; all kinds of deviation toward the basis of 1945 struggle could no longer be allowed to occur. By the New Order we must be able to normalize the situation, so that we could immediately develop this nation in order to satisfy the results of the independence with common welfare” (President Suharto’s State Speech, 16 August 1969).

Explaining what kind of democracy he wanted to build up, Suharto stated that “the application of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution to every part of the life of our nation will be guarantee of the continual growth and welfare of our nation” (Elson 2001:228). Based on his belief, for the replacement of the previous democracies, Suharto decided to establish what was so called ‘Pancasila Democracy’ which, according to him, was the most suited to Indonesian people to carry out national development for achieving a just and prosperous society based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Once Suharto made a statement:

“..... In developing political life, we could not go backwards. We could not return to Parliamentary Democracy or Guided Democracy which had failed to support national development. On the contrary, we were looking ahead to improve the application of Pancasila Democracy in parallel with achieving a more developed stage from our development in general” (Elson 2001: 228).

According to Suharto only in Pancasila Democracy could the Indonesian people implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution originally and consistently enabling them to carry out national development in order to fulfill the national independence as ordered by the founding fathers. While Sukarno developed Guided Democracy characterized by the '*Panca Azimat Revolusi*' or the Five Magic Charms of the Revolution, Suharto who was not only anti Liberal Democracy as developed in the Western Bloc countries but also anti People Democracy as developed in the Eastern Bloc countries, on the other hand, preferred developing Pancasila Democracy characterized by his commitment to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution originally and consistently. Pancasila was adopted as the ideology of the New Order regime for a certain reason as stated by Suharto:

“Pancasila consists of noble values born and grown up from our history and culture for centuries, a culture placing ‘keselarasan’ or harmony as the key of men’s happiness. It is a culture based on consciousness that at the end men’s happiness will depend on the achievement of harmony between men and their God, between men and the universe, between men and their society, between progress in life from all appearances and progress in spiritual life. Noble values are now felt to be more suitable with the needs and challenges of the modern society” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila, 1976: 20-21).

But, in order to be useful and meaningful, Pancasila had to be implemented and practiced. According to Suharto:

“Pancasila is not merely a slogan which has to be echoed. Pancasila is not the state foundation and philosophy which is to be sacral in the document of the 1945 Constitution; but Pancasila must be implemented or practiced. Without being implemented or practiced, whatever the state foundation and philosophy we are using, whatever concept we are creating will not

be useful and meaningful" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976:95).

And to make all sections of society able to comprehend and implement Pancasila originally and consistently, guidance was needed. For that purpose Suharto then formulated what was so called the P-4 or '*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*' (Guidance for the Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila) which was also popularly called '*Eka Prasetya Panca Karsa*' or one strong commitment or promise to carry out the five principles of Pancasila. All elements of society had to comprehend and implement Pancasila for, according to Suharto, "there is no doubt at all for us of the rightness of Pancasila for the good, the happiness and the safety of our nation life" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 80) and "for us Pancasila is life and death problem of the Indonesian people" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 95). But, Suharto further stated that, "the awareness of possessing Pancasila is not enough. We must understand and comprehend what Pancasila is and attempt to implement it in our daily lives" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 81-82). Beside that, Pancasila had to be adopted by all social and political movements as their sole foundation or '*azas tunggal*'.

In the logic of Suharto:

"The state of Indonesia belongs to the young state in the line of all states in the world. But the nation of Indonesia was born from old history and culture, through the glorious era of previous kingdoms such as 'Sriwijaya', 'Majapahit', and 'Mataram' which was then experiencing colonization for more than three and half centuries. And, eventually, in the year of 1945 our nation managed to proclaim their independence after struggling against the extremely wicked colonials, all experiences have formed our identity. This identity was then stipulated as our way of life,

our philosophy of Pancasila...." (Pandangan Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976:9-10).

In explaining what Pancasila actually was, Suharto further asserted: "Pancasila was actually not born spontaneously in 1945; but it was born through a long process, ripened by the struggle history of the nation, seeing the other nation's experiences, inspired by great world ideologies, and remained rooted in the nation's identity and ideals" (Pandangan Suharto Tentang Pancasila, 1976:10).

According to Suharto, "Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution had been proven by history many times. The more time they have been proven, the clearer the rightness they have shown us as the only one answer to the problems and challenges met by the people of Indonesia. Because of the rightness, every one and group attempting to change or to replace Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution must end with its own destruction" (Pandangan Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 11).

6.7. The Javanese culture in Pancasila Democracy

While Sukarno used the '*Panca Azimat Revolusi*' or the Five Magic Charms of the Revolution which was so influenced by Marxism-Leninism as the identity of the Old Order regime, Suharto on the other hand used 'Pancasila' the interpretation of which was so influenced by Javanese cultural values and philosophy as the identity of the New Order regime which he had already established replacing the Old Order one. As a strong political and military leader as well as a true Javanese whose understandings on Javanese cultural values and

philosophy were so extraordinarily well, his attitude and behavior had influenced the life of the country.

Akbar Tanjung, who once became one of Suharto's ministers, the Chairman of GOLKAR, and the Speaker of the DPR, has commented:

“Yes, it was really true. Pak Harto's ideas were so much influenced by Javanese culture. In the context of Pancasila it was clear that his ideas of the P-4 were original ideas coming from Pak Harto. These original ideas were sourced from no other philosophy except from his understandings on Javanese culture. He said that with Pancasila, we did not only try to defend Pancasila, we did not only try to save Pancasila, but if we want to defend and save Pancasila, the best way to do was to practice Pancasila. Therefore the P-4 was then formulated and adopted as the guidance for all elements of society in practicing Pancasila.”⁴

“In order to practice Pancasila, some items of P-4 were then formulated. From these items we could deeply learnt the real essence of a Pancasilaist man, that was a man who was able to control him/herself in his/her relations with other men, in relations with his/her environment, in his/her relations with the nature, and in his/her relations with God Almighty. These kinds of idea were of course inspired by Javanese culture. It was quite clear that in practicing and actualizing Pancasila, Pak Harto was so influenced by his perception as a Javanese. I was quite important for a Javanese to create harmony, the sameness, balance and. That was the essence of the P-4.”⁵

“When we heard Pak Harto's ideas what always became references of his ideas were Javanese or a number of leaders whose background were Javanese. The principles of leadership such as 'Ing ngarso sung tulodo, ing madyo mangun karso, tut wuri handayani' or 'Melu handarbeni, melu hangrungkebi, mulat sariro hangroso wani' were all inspired by the characters of Javanese leadership. We could see such characters in Pak Harto. It was quite clear too that Pak Harto never showed his eagerness to seek power. Such character was also inspired by Javanese culture.”⁶

Bambang Marsono has said:

“Pak Harto was able to exploit Pancasila in order to strengthen his position. Bung Karno was regarded as the digger of Pancasila, and Pak Harto was the implementor of Pancasila. Both Sukarno and Suharto ere

⁴ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

⁵ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

⁶ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

the two sides of the same coin. They could not be easily separated. Pak Harto was regarded as the most Pancasilaist man. Lots of Manggala, the man who was regarded as the Pancasilaist man, were produced. They were not only loyal to Pancasila but also to Pak Harto.”⁷

Retired Army Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo agreed to the notion that in ruling the country Suharto had already used Javanese culture as the identity of his power. He said:

“From the very beginning Javanese culture had been used by Suharto as an instrument to convince people that he was a good leader..... Since he had no occasion to get formal Western education, he then laid down everything on Javanese culture.”⁸

“Once Suharto was issued to be a son of an aristocrat from Yogyakarta kingdom. But when he was issued like that, he got madly angry. He preferred being regarded as a son of a poor farmer from Kemosuk. What he had done was even extraordinarily great. It was so strange why he rejected the assumption that he was a son of a ‘bangsawan’ from Yogyakarta. He might not have been placed under the subordination of Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX.”⁹

“For his own interests, what he had done was really great, until he eventually dug a hole for himself. He fell down due to his own actions. He was so pity to his own children. He had opportunity to think of his children which he should not have done. If he thought only his own interests, he might have controlled his children. But, he could no longer control his children. I did not put the blame on him. Each one has his/her strengths and weaknesses. Why was he born like that. Even he was born like that then he became like that. It became one entity of life of Suharto’s life.”¹⁰

Amien Rais, the former Speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly or ‘*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*’ (MPR), once also stated that:

“There were a number of similarities among the autocrats in Asia. But you are right that every autocrat will always try to find out the root of

⁷ Interview with Professor Bambang Marsono, Jakarta, 10 March 2009.

⁸ Interview with Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

⁹ Interview with Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

¹⁰ Interview with Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

culture as well as politics of his regime. As for example Saddam Hussein from Iraq tried to find out the root of culture of his regime not to Islam but to the kingdom of Nebuchadnezzar. Then Anwar Sadat from Egypt also tried to find out the root of culture of his regime not to Islam either but to the tradition of Pharaoh, meaning Egypt was a big nation which was able to reach the golden era in the kingdom of Pharaoh. Also Shah Reza Pahlevi from Iran wanted to find out the root of culture of his regime to the golden era of Persian emporium in which the golden peacock throne was regarded as the throne of the Persian emporium. And Suharto also tried to find out the root of culture of the New Order regime to Pancasila. He then made Pancasila as the identity of the New Order regime under his own leadership. Pancasila was then declared as the formal guidance for all Indonesian people, as '*weltanschauung*', as the way of life, as the perfect basis for life, as the source of laws, as the source of the Constitution, but then he himself deviated all what he believed to be right.”¹¹

Commenting Pancasila which was used by Suharto as the identity of his power, Amien Rais who is now the chairman of the Party Consultative Body or '*Majelis Pertimbangan Partai*' of the PAN or '*Partai Amanat Nasional*' further asserted:

“Pancasila had been used by Suharto as a pseudo religion. The Training of P-4 costing trillions of rupiah was held in order to support his political actions. As pseudo religion, he then identified himself as the manifestation of Pancasila. He equalized his interests as the same as the interest of the state. But it was not the monopoly of Suharto. Louis XIV from French also did the same by introducing his doctrine of ‘*le stat semoya*’ or the state is me.

When he was in power, every critique launched to the state by his political opponents was always regarded by Suharto as the critique upon him. And Pancasila democracy which he had built was actually incorrect democracy for it was against the two principles of democracy. He pressed them by saying that Pancasila Democracy did not know opposition; Pancasila democracy did not know demonstration. Both opposition and demonstration were the main pillars of democracy.”¹²

¹¹ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 August 2009.

¹² Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 August 2009.

In spite of his statement that: “As a Pancasila man I don’t want to force my opinion on Pancasila to the Indonesian people. What I want is that my opinions which I have expressed Could be responded by Indonesian people as well as the world of science, as the guidance and comprehension of Pancasila which is needed to be stipulated by the MPR after it had been totally agreed by all of us” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 94), the interpretation of Pancasila as formulated in the P-4 or ‘*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*’ was so much influenced by Suharto’s understandings on Javanese cultural values and philosophy.

Unlike Sukarno who often cited Western political theories in explaining the problems met by the people and the solution for overcoming the problems, in interpreting Pancasila, Suharto almost never cited Western political theories at all. He preferred using domestic resources. The Javanese principles of life such as the principle of ‘*kekeluargaan*’ or family principle, ‘*gotong royong*’ or mutual assistance, ‘*tepa sliro*’ or sensitive, ‘*tenggang rasa*’ or tolerance, ‘*aja dumeh*’ or ‘you shall not be presumptuous’, Tri Dharma (‘*melu handarbeni, melu hangrungkebi, mulat sariro hangroso wani*’), were inserted by Suharto into the interpretation of Pancasila.

As a true Javanese whose wife was a descendant of King Mangkunegoro I, Suharto also advised further that in order to achieve the highest goals, “we need to arm ourselves with the philosophy of serving to the nation and state taught by a national hero, Pangeran Sambernyowo or King Mangkunegoro I, called ‘*Tri Dharma*’ or the three contributions.” The ‘*Tri Dharma*’ consists of:

“The first Dharma is ‘*Rumangsa handuwensi*’ or having sense of belonging. From this consciousness then comes up the second Dharma, ‘*Wajib melu hangrungkebi*’ or having responsibility for defending our common properties and interests. And in order to be able to carry out the first and the second Dharma, we need the third Dharma, ‘*Mulat sariro hangroso wani*’ or having bravery to continually conduct self evaluation in order to know how far we have already defended our common properties and interests” (G. Dwipayana and Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, 1991:95).

Explaining the first principle of Pancasila, Believe in on God, Suharto stated: “The principle of Believe in on God refers to the Indonesian nation’s recognition toward the existing God Almighty” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 26). In other words, “the principle of Believe in one God reflects our nation’s character who believes in the other life in the hereafter. This belief makes us attempt to reach noble values which would pave the way for achieving the better life in the future” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 27).

Suharto further asserted that “our country is not the country based on religion, it is not a country based on the only one religion either” ... “the state is obliged to guarantee the freedom for believing in his own religion and serving on the basis of his own religion. Therefore it has been the obligation to the government to give chances and to push the growth of the healthy religious life in this country” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 27-28).

“In implementing the philosophy of Pancasila, the implementation of the religious life must be able to bring the unity and union of all Indonesian people, must be able to realize the values of just and humanism, must be able to make our democracy life healthy, which all would bring the Indonesian people to achieve

justice and prosperity as well as happiness for the whole nation" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 29).

As for examples, in interpreting the principle of just and civilized humanity Suharto stated:

"Basically the principle of just and civilized humanity wants to posit humankind in accordance with their character of God's creature.... The character of mutual respect will make us having the great feeling of '*tepo seliro*' or helpful and the great felling of '*tenggang rasa*' or tolerance; it is not the extreme character or grudge. With this character justice, calmness, harmony, and unity of our society would emerge" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila, 1976:39)

The principle of a just and civilized humanity means we place all humankind on honored and proper place in accordance with their position as God's creature. Therefore we could better control ourselves so that we won't be cruel or tyrannical; either due to our political power, intelligence or property. This principle will enable us to possess great feeling of '*tepo seliro*' or helpful, the great feeling of '*tenggang rasa*' or tolerance and to be far away from the character of '*aja dumeh*' or you shall not be presumptuous" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 90).

"Promoting production is for happiness and for promoting the dignity of men; not the contrary, men will only be the instrument of production disgracing their dignity..... goals of development, stimulus to develop and the ways how to develop must be based on the ideals of making men live in accordance with their dignity" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 41)

"But placing material as the only basis of men's happiness is not right. The development we are carrying out must also attempt to reach harmony between physical progress and spiritual welfare. It is because "Men's life will not be safe if they only want to achieve materials only.... It is also important to achieve harmony between men and their society" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976:41)

"From the legal aspect Pancasila does not need to be questioned for Pancasila has been remarked in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. By the remark we have already stated and promised ourselves that Pancasila is our way of life and philosophical basis of our state. Pancasila will guide us and each of us to achieve the goals of our lives physically or spiritually" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 81).

“Fully realizing that placing material as the only foundation for men happiness is not right, the development we are carrying out is to reach harmony between physical progress and spiritual progress. It is because ‘the life of men will not secure if the men merely reach something material only...” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976:42-43).

Beside that it is also attempted harmony between men and their society based on the universal character of men, that is the will to defend their lives and attempt to reach the better lives.

Pancasila Democracy is democracy, people sovereignty spirited and integrated with other principles (of Pancasila). Meaning that the usage of someone’s democratic rights must be followed by responsibility to God Almighty in accordance with his/her own religion, must hold up highly human values in accordance with ‘*martabat*’ or dignity and ‘*harkat*’ or character of men, must guarantee and strengthen the unity of nation, and must be utilized for implementing social justice. Pancasila is started from the ideas of ‘*kekeluargaan*’ or family system and ‘*gotong royong*’ or mutual assistance” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila, 59).

The attitude of Pancasila men: “individual interests will be harmonized with their responsibility as members of society, meaning the obligation towards society should be more prioritized than their individual interests. Individual interests will end when they have to begin their responsibility as members of society” (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila, 1976:44).

While in Guided Democracy Sukarno introduced the principles of ‘*musyawarah untuk mufakat*’ (deliberation and consensus) and ‘*gotong royong*’ (mutual assistance) as the representation of Javanese cultural values and philosophy, in Pancasila Democracy Suharto introduced a number of the Javanese principles of life, such as ‘*kekeluargaan*’ (family principle) and ‘*gotong royong*’ (mutual assistance).

“Pancasila Democracy is not determined by the ‘total number of vote’, or by ‘force of power’, but by ‘*musyawarah untuk mufakat*’ or discussion and consensus as the product of wisdom. No one group can be a priori defending or forcing his/her will or stance.... It is clear that Pancasila Democracy rejects dictatorship, either individual dictatorship, group dictatorship, class dictatorship, or military dictatorship; It is also quite

clear that Pancasila Democracy rejects liberalism, rejects majority dictatorship towards minority" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 60).

Responding to those who often openly criticized or opposed his policies, President Suharto made a statement that:

"Pancasila Democracy does not know opposing group such as known in liberal democracy; Pancasila Democracy only knows '*musyawarah untuk musafakat*' or discussion and consensus through representatives in the DPR as well as the MPR..... However, Pancasila Democracy still upholds human rights and democratic rights of every citizen, but the usage of which must be served to the larger interests, society, people and the state" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 61).

"Though Pancasila Democracy does not know opposition system, it does not mean there is no freedom. In accordance with the teaching of Pancasila, freedom needs to be developed; not only because Indonesian society is a democratic society, but freedom is needed in order to build creativity for development" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 61).

".....in the life of Pancasila Democracy there is still an honored place for the right of express and different opinion. But there must be the same honored place for responsibility. Our responsibility is to maintain national unity and to maintain common security, to carry out development in order to create better future, to grow up the life of the nation and state based on Pancasila for the stronger life. Different opinions could be competed with argument, not with forces" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila 1976: 63).

"The '*azas kekeluargaan*' or the principle of family system important to develop in the life of modern society, either in the field of politics, economics and social; which without this principle the struggle for life in modern society would very often make men meet other men, nation meet other nation, in a competition or a battle which could deteriorate the level of men itself. This principle would guarantee the existence of harmony between individual interests and interests of society. This principle could also prevent the weaker from being exploited by the stronger, either through economic or political exploitation" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto Tentang Pancasila, 1976:59-60).

"As an army officer, he was involved in the struggle and battle for the continuity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and for the defense of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. As the leader of the New

Order he came up with the commitment of saving Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution from dangerous situation, straightening and purifying its implementation. And as the head of the state he had attempted heavily to implement Pancasila society through development movement" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto tentang Pancasila, 1976: 1-2)

"Pancasila is not merely the problem of law and order or rule of the games instead. Pancasila is a way of life, awareness and moral ideals covering the soul and character which have been deeply rooted in the Indonesian nation. Therefore, it must be long live and" (Pandangan Presiden Suharto tentang Pancasila 1976: 4-5)

In relating to the problem of leadership, the P-4 adopted the Javanese philosophy of leadership formulated by Ki Hajar Dewantoro, the founder of Taman Siswo. According to the P-4, the characteristics of Pancasila leadership are formed by behavioral principles of leader as follows: (1) '*Ing ngarso sung tulodo*' meaning all character and behavior of a leader must be in accordance with the existing norms so that all his/her subordinates make him/her as a pattern or example and are willing to follow; (2) '*Ing madya mangun karso*' meaning a leader must be able to motivate and stimulate his/her subordinates' commitment and spirit to create and work; (3) '*Tut wuri handayani*' meaning a leader must be able to push and motivates his/her subordinates and gives them self-confidence. With such principles of leadership it is hoped that people progress could proceed safely and democratically (Bahan Penataran P-4 di Perguruan Tinggi 1995/1996:182-183).

Commenting to the Training Program of the P-4 for all elements of society, held by the New Order regime under the leadership of President Suharto, Amien Rais further stated:

"I think the P-4 was fundamentally mistaken. Because as an ideology it was man-made. A man made ideology could not compete with God-made

religion. By regarding all items of the P-4 as the character of nation, it was really funny. In this character no items asked the importance of honoring both father and mother. While in religion honoring parents is an important character.”¹³

“But more than that, Suharto was really a Javanese who behaved as if he knew very well Javanese culture. According to my opinion Suharto was a man who actually did not know about Javanese culture. When did he learn Javanese culture? What we know is that he was a person coming from a poor peasant family who then became a soldier, having his carrier in the army. I truly believe that he did not understand any books written by Javanese ‘pujangga’ or Javanese authors. I truly believe that all what he had cited came from social community which was then regarded as Javanese culture. The words such as ‘nglurug tanpo bolo, menang tanpo ngasorake’ were actually only ‘petatah-petith’ which he adopted from social community.”¹⁴

“His understanding in Javanese culture and philosophy was actually very shallow. If he learnt very much that someone could be rich without property or ‘sugih tanpo bondho’, he would not have established his economic empire for his children or he would not have established his ranch of Tapos with dozens of hectares by marginalizing small peasants or he would not have established ‘Bukit Suharto’ in East Kalimantan, etc. If he regarded Javanese culture as guidance, and if the guidance was correct, this regime would not have caused calamity.”¹⁵

Like Amien Rais who regarded Suharto as having made mistakes in launching the Training Program of the P-4, Retired Army Major General Sutarto Sigit who had participated in such training and even became the chairman of the group also said:

”It was right that the P-4 was so much influenced by Javanese cultural values and philosophy. Once, when I took part in the training of the P-4, many questions were delivered to me why so many Javanese terminologies were used. They felt unhappy for the did not know Javanese. I think it was the weakness of the P-4 Training Program (Program Penataran P-4).

One of the weaknesses of the P-4 was too much ‘ilmu kejawen’ was inserted into it, making many people who did not know Javanese

¹³ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 August 2009.

¹⁴ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 August 2009.

¹⁵ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 August 2009.

unhappy. The other weakness was that the reality was different from what they have discussed inside the classroom. Some of them even once said to me: "*Pak Tarto, what have been taught in the classroom is really very good, but the reality outside the classroom it is quite different. What all the 'Manggala' (prominent lecturers) have said is different from that of the reality.*"

The other weakness of Pak Harto was not only in the field of the P-4, but also in giving the names as well as doctrines which were not all accepted for these doctrines were using Javanese even old Javanese language, making so many people think that Pak Harto wanted to carry out Javanization for Indonesia. It was really correct."¹⁶

Suharto further clearly stated that Pancasila was not only a slogan declared to public, Pancasila was the basis of the state philosophy which would not only be sacred in the document of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Pancasila must be comprehended and implemented. Without being comprehended and implemented, whatever the state philosophy used and whatever the conception made would be no use and mean nothing.

According to Suharto, in order to be easily comprehended and implemented, Pancasila was needed to be explained into simple and clear formulations. These simple and clear formulations were hoped to become life guidance for '*setiap manusia Pancasila*' or every Pancasila human being. Suharto wanted these formulations became the latest ones in order to prevent Pancasila from being interpreted wrongly like the previous one, such as Pancasila was interpreted as the same as "NASAKOM". The formulations of Pancasila were made into what so called the P-4 or '*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*' (Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila).

¹⁶ Interview with Major General Sutarto Sigit, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

This guidance for thorough understanding of Pancasila was also called '*Eka Prasetya Panca Karsa*', meaning every citizen or group of citizens had to possess a strong commitment not only to adopt Pancasila as the sole foundation but also to comprehend and implement Pancasila originally and consistently. Pancasila had then to be adopted by all elements of the Indonesian nation, including political parties and mass organizations, as their sole philosophical basis or '*azas tunggal*'. In his state speech of 16 August 1982 before the Plenary Session of the DPR, Suharto stated that: "All social political forces, particularly political parties which remained using principle other than Pancasila must make a statement that the only one principle used is Pancasila" (Analisa 1983-3:234).

Therefore, it is restated that the New Order was in another thing an order of the people's, nation's and state's life which was based on the implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution originally and consistently. The New Order was born with the strong commitment to re-straighten the road of the nation's and state's history based on the philosophy and moral of Pancasila and through the straight road as guided by the 1945 Constitution" (Analisa 1983-3:240).

But, what Suharto had stated was criticized by Amien Rais. In his interview Amien Rais argued that in reality Suharto was against the 1945 Constitution. This could be seen in the case of the president reelection.

"As the president, Suharto had actually been against the 1945 Constitution. He was against almost all chapters of the Constitution. But, ironically he always kept saying that he had already carried out the 1945 Constitution originally and consistently.

He defended the 1945 Constitution and made it sacral only for perpetuating his power. As for example, the chapter saying that 'president

could be reelected' should have been logically interpreted that 'president could be reelected only once' for the word of 'reelected' was different from that of 'elected for life'. If it had been the same as 'reelected for life' then the formulation would have been different. But, Suharto made his own interpretation. According to him, the word 'president could be reelected' would depend on the MPR whether they wanted to reelect or not. No limitation could be made. It was the right of the MPR."¹⁷

Amien Rais further asserted that Suharto had already made fatal mistakes, but it could not be understood why elements of society only agreed. Suharto was able to establish a system in which all people who sat in the institution were full of yes men and yes women. He stated:

"Imagine, there were 1000 members of MPR in the era of Suharto, but none of them was brave enough to say no. Therefore the MPR orchestra from time to time always said yes and yes. Even a dramatic, ironic and even sarcastic thing occurred when Harmoko, the speaker of the MPR, was going to his chair of the leadership. Before sitting down, hundreds of the MPR members chorused together 'agree'. Meaning, it was actually without meeting all would agreed.

"So when we looked for references of history, the mistakes of Shah Reza Pahlevi from Iran, of Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat from Egypt, of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, of Syghman Rhee from Korea, of Idie Amien from Uganda, of any other autocrats and dictators in the world, the mistake was that all people had shared agreement and they never said 'no' for what their autocrat or dictator had wanted. Even in the era of Pharaoh, why Namrud became Namrud, because his people had no bravery to say 'no'. Those who were daring to say 'no' were only Musa and Abraham. People usually just made self-adjustment toward the power. Though the life is tough, such a phenomenon of the history would occur everywhere. People always tend to conduct self-adjustment toward the authoritarian or dictatorial power. So did in Indonesia."¹⁸

However, what Amien Rais has argued was rejected by Akbar Tanjung, who used to be close to Suharto and to become on of Suharto's cabinet. Commenting to the great debate on the president reelection. Akbar Tanjung has his own argumentation:

¹⁷ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 October 2009.

¹⁸ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 October 2009.

“I have an experience to hear how Pak Harto interpreted the mandate of the 1945 Constitution relating to the position of president. According to Chapter 6 of the 1945 Constitution: *‘The term of president is 5 years and it could be reelected’*. I have ever heard from Pak Harto when I happened to be the minister, but I have forgotten whether it was minister of youth and sports (Menpora) or of housing (Menpera). ‘It is right that the 1945 Constitution says that the term of president is 5 years, and it could be reelected. It could be reelected means it would depend on the people. If the people think that the incumbent president is appropriate to be reelected, it would be the right of the people to decide. But, the term of president is formally 5 years. However if the people want the incumbent president to be reelected, the incumbent president would do nothing except to accept what the people want’, said the President.”¹⁹

Unlike Amien Rais, Akbar Tanjung further argued:

“From what he had explained to us we could draw a conclusion that he actually understood well the Constitution that the term of president was 5 years, but with the existence of terminology that the incumbent president could be reelected then it would depend on what the people wanted. *‘It would depend on the people’s need. If they regard the incumbent president is still needed, if the people still want the incumbent president to be reelected for the following term, he could be reelected, even for many times. But the term of president is still 5 years’*. It was Pak Harto’s opinion on the term of president as I myself ever heard.”²⁰

Based on Suharto’s statement, Akbar Tanjung then concluded that Suharto was a leader who always highly appreciated the Constitution and he was also the leader who highly appreciated the people’s aspiration. His statement of “if the people still want” meant that he placed the people as the subject who had the right to decide. He was not in the position of a power seeker but he was only in the position of carrying out the task for 5 years as mandated by the constitution. But, if the people still want him, he will remain continuing his tasks as the president.²¹

¹⁹ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

²⁰ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

²¹ Interview with Dr. Akbar Tanjung, Jakarta, 15 July 2009.

6.8. Summary

As a ruler, Suharto needed people's support for legitimacy. To meet his interests, Suharto then established GOLKAR as a political vehicle for his political goals. But to make it effective and always successful in every election, GOLKAR was placed under his own control and given a number of privileges which were not given to the other political parties. In order to guarantee the superiority of GOLKAR, Suharto also imposed a policy of political party simplification and mono-loyalty of the civil services.

Unlike Sukarno who blended the Javanese philosophy with Western philosophy such as Marxism-Leninism and used it as the ideology as well as the identity for his regime, Suharto on the other hand totally used Javanese cultural values without citing any Western values as the ideology as well as the identity of the New Order regime. By doing this, he hoped he could easily get legitimacy from the people to rule the country.

CHAPTER 7

CHALLENGING POLITICAL OPPONENTS

7.1. Introduction

In his power struggle to gain, promote and maintain the New Order, Suharto met a number of challenges from his political opponents, including the PKI and President Sukarno himself. Suharto began to be involved in power struggle against the PKI no sooner after the outbreak of the Thirtieth of September Movement. And this power struggle continued to occur when he met challenges from President Sukarno, particularly when he attempted to ban the PKI and its all affiliated organizations and to neutralize the Old Order led by Sukarno. Suharto decided to unseat President Sukarno for he regarded Sukarno as having deviated the state ideology and philosophy of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and failed to bring welfare and prosperity to the people as the realization of the independence

After the New Order regime had been installed, Suharto met a number of political challenges criticizing his policies and even demanding that he resign from power. These challenges came from his former-alliances and other political opponents like Ali Sadikin, Sawito Kartowibowo, Suryadi, Jaelani Naro, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, and the Petition 50.

In his power struggle against his political opponents, Suharto laid his real power that he had acquired after he managed to take over control of the army and crushed the Thirtieth of September Movement as well as the PKI and all its

affiliated organizations, based on his belief in the noble values and philosophy of Javanese culture. In his rhetoric against his political opponents, Suharto often cited a number of Javanese political values and philosophy for justification. By citing the highest Javanese cultural values and philosophy he, on the one hand, wanted to justify his policies on certain aspects and, on the other hand, to blame his opponents that they had already conducted actions against the noble values and philosophy of the Javanese culture. In this way, he believed that his political opponents would be weakened or even neutralized.

This chapter explains a number of political challenges met by Suharto during his power struggle for promoting and maintaining the New Order and how he used and manipulated Javanese cultural values and philosophy in order to weaken and even neutralize his political opponents who had critically challenged him.

7.2. Challenges from his critics

According to Suharto, in leading or commanding his subordinates, he never forgot the Javanese principles as the guidance for his work. He had said that in his eyes, all his subordinates be treated equally. All his assistants worked on the basis of their own task and function: “And to them I explained the principles of my work as the guidance: *Ing ngarso sung tulodo, ing madya mangun karsa, tut wuri handayani*” (One has to set example when in a front position, to stimulate when in the middle, and to support when at the rear) (Dwipayana and Ramadhan, 1989:429).

To his assistants coming from different ethnics (such as Javanese, Batak, Arab, Sundanese, Bugese, and others), Suharto always advised that they should willingly to carry out the Javanese principles of life. Almost all his close friends appreciated his principles as reflected in a book entitled "*Diantara Para Sahabat: Pak Harto 70 Tahun*" (1990) or "Among the Close Friends: Suharto at the Age of 70 Years." Among of the close friends were Sudharmono (the former-Vice President), Feisal Tanjung (the former-Chief Commander of ABRI), Ali Alatas (the former-Minister of Foerign Affairs), Harmoko (the former-Minister of Information), Ismail Saleh (the former-Minister of Secretary of State), Ginanjar Kartasasmita (the former-Head of National Planning Board), etc.

Basically, there would have been no problems for anyone who was willing to accept his pattern of leadership. But, for those who tried to challenge his principles, Suharto would not hesitate to impose heavy sanction. For examples, as a result of a banner insulting the President by student activists saying '*Seret Presiden ke Sidang Istimewa MPR*' or 'Drag the President to the Special Meeting of the MPR or the People's Consultative Assembly', 21 student activists were charged and imprisoned for six months jail. The judge argued that the word of '*seret*' or drag the head of the state was a humiliation, as he had said: "If what they meant was to ask the president to appear before the Special Meeting of the MPR, there would be other more polite words that they could use" (*Tempo*, 28 May 1994: 41).

The other example was about the criticism to purchase the battleships from former East-Germany. Hearing that one of the battleships, KRI Teluk Lampung, was nearly sink on its way to Indonesia because of storms in the Gulf

of Biscay, France, TEMPO, one of the leading magazines in Jakarta, wrote: "Could the accident be used as the indicator that the former-East Germany battleships' sophistication - the price of which was still debated - was appropriate to be doubted?" (Tempo, 11 June 1994:23).

Responding to the sharp criticism particularly launched to B.J. Habibie, the Chairman of the Purchasing Team, President Suharto made a strong statement: "The men who only half understood about the battleships then made a statement, making the situation worse, and played off against each other, causing suspicious condition, endangering the stability" (Tempo, 18 June 1994:22). He also said, threatening all suspected: "We could not let them rest. If they are unable to be reminded, they will be taken into action" (Tempo, 18 June 1994:22).

Suharto further explained that many countries were interested in purchasing the former-East German battleships. But, Kanselir Helmut Kohl from Germany wanted Indonesia to purchase them. President Suharto said: "I was advised that the purchase was done silently between Kanselir Helmut Kohl and me. Not too many people knew it" (Tempo, 18 June 1994:22). Since TEMPO kept criticizing the purchase of the former-East German battleships, the Minister of Information withdrew its SIUPP or '*Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Press*' back (in June 1994),¹ making it ceasing all its publication and circulation. TEMPO was charged by the government of disseminating false information, being vindictive and playing off against the other, endangering the national political and security stability.

¹ Every press publication had to possess SIUPP or '*Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Press*' (Business License for Press Publication). During the New Order regime the license became the instrument for controlling media.

7.3. Challenges coming from those who questioned about succession

Due to the military pressure from a number of army generals, on 11 March 1966, President Sukarno had to deliver a letter which was popularly called SUPERSEMAR or '*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*' (the Instruction Letter of 11 March) to Suharto. The letter gave the right to Suharto to take over a number of the president's authorities, making the end of the Old Order regime headed by Sukarno and the beginning of the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto.

Since Suharto's election as the Acting President (March 1967) till his resignation from power in May 1998, there had never been any succession in the national leadership. For seven consecutive elections (1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997), Suharto was automatically nominated by the MPR as the only one candidate for president and succeeded in being elected. Despite his success, there were still lots of attempt challenging the concept of succession as formulated by Suharto.

7.3.1. *The case of Sawito Kartowibowo*

Sawito Kartowibowo (1932) was a government official of the Agriculture Department in Bogor, who retired in 1968. For a long time, Sawito had been involved in the practice of Javanese mysticism, an activity trying to find spiritual power through meditation and self discipline (Liddle, 1978:103). Once, in 1978, he confessed to the public that when he was doing a meditation on top of Mount Muria at Jepara, Central Java, he got a '*wangsit*' or spiritual guidance from God Almighty in the form of ray of light which pierced the earth, telling him that "the

state life needed to be improved.” According to the ‘*wangsit*’ or spiritual guidance he had got, Sawito Kartowibowo had the mandate to deliver a message to President Suharto informing that for the safety of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia he had to transfer his power peacefully to the former Vice President Mohammad Hatta (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sawito_Kartowibowo). Sawito then claimed himself as having the right to be president of Indonesia, replacing President Suharto (Liddle, 1978:103).

In the mid of 1976, he prepared three controversial documents relating to very sensitive political issues, such as: (1) a letter transferring power from Suharto to Bung Hatta called ‘*Pernyataan Pemberian Maaf Kepada Almarhum Sukarno*’ (Statement of Forgiveness for the Late Sukarno), (2) a critical statement toward the existing social and economic condition called ‘*Menuju ke Arah Penyelamatan*’ (Towards the Salvation), and (3) a statement charging Suharto of having failed to live simply and by allowing his family and cronies to enrich themselves and acting contrary to the people’s belief in the presidential oath called ‘*Mundur Untuk Maju Lebih Sempurna*’ (Retreat in Order to Advance More Perfectly) (Narto 1978:17).

He then contacted a number of prominent leaders, such as Mohammad Hatta (the former-Vice President), Hamka (Chairman of MUI or ‘Majelis Ulama Indonesia’), Kardinal Yustinus Darmoyuwono (Chairman of MAWI or ‘Majelis Wali Gereja Indonesia’), T.B. Simatupang (Chairman of PGI or ‘Persatuan Gereja-gereja Indonesia’), R.S. Soekanto Tjokrodiatmodjo (the former-Chief of National Police who happened to be his father in law) in order to gain their support as well as signature to five letters of statement that he had prepared in

advance. While, others only agreed to put their signature on one of the five statements, Hatta put his signature on three of them only

Because of Sawito's political activities, Navy Marshal Sudomo, the Chief Staff of KOPKAMTIB, charged Sawito Kartowibowo of being a traitor who tried to carry out a palace revolution (Narto, 1978:17). Sawito Kartowibowo was also charged of belonging to the left wing of the Indonesian National Party headed by Ali Sastroamijoyo and Surachman (popularly called the PNI-ASU). The PNI-ASU was charged of having close relation to the PKI or the Indonesian Communist Party, for Surachman, the General Secretary of the PNI-ASU, was proved to be the secret or undercover cadre of the PKI planted into the PNI-ASU (Liddle, 1978:103).

The judge then charged Sawito Kartowibowo of conducting subversive political activities in order to overthrow the leadership of President Suharto. Because of his un-constitutional political action, he was sentenced to 8 years in jail, which was then reduced to 7 years. But then in the year of 2000, Sawito Kartowibowo was released from jail after being pardoned by President Abdurrahman Wahid, and his rights as a citizen and civil servant was also rehabilitated (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sawito_Kartowibowo).

Commenting to what he had already done, some people said that Sawito Kartowibowo was mentally ill (Narto, 1978:19). S.K. Trimurti, a prominent women leader as well as a national hero, regarded Sawito Kartowibowo as a person who conducted action courageously without prudence or in Javanese it is popularly called '*kaduk wani, kurang duga*' (Narto, 1978:19). Ali Murtopo told

to the press that the Sawito affairs was '*a prahoro ana ing wijikan*' or 'tempest in a teapot' (Liddle, 1977:103)

7.3.2. *The case of Ali Sadikin*

The case of Retired Navy Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin took place in 1977 as a reaction to his replacement as the Governor of Jakarta. Two students from University of Indonesia ran a campaign through the streets in Jakarta wearing T-shirt with the slogans: '*Sadikin for President*' and '*He's the Best*'. This campaign was implicitly carrying a message or idea that competition for running president was healthy for the development of Indonesian democracy (Liddle, 1978:183). Though his name was mentioned, Retired Navy Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin just kept silent. This quiet response fatalistically endangered his position as the Governor. Not only was his name not on the list of president nomination, but his political carrier also came to an end. He was charged of behind the idea of opposition. On behalf of the President, General Widodo said that "the idea of opposition was an attempt to undermine and threaten the national stability and unity" (Liddle, 1978:183).

Commenting to the sanction given to Retired Navy Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin, Amien Rais said:

"I don't agree with the concept of '*tumpas kelor*' or killing all opponents. Rather I agree that Suharto only wanted to marginalize his competitors. There were differences between Sukarno and Suharto, both of them were dictators, both of them were anti-democracy. Sukarno had never closed his competitors' economic tap, but Suharto totally closed his opponents' economic tap. As for example, when Ali Sadikin began to oppose him, he was never able to get credit from any bank for all banks had been warned by Suharto not to give credit to him. On the other hand, though Pak Natsir was Sukarno's rival, every time the Independence Day was celebrated, he

was still invited by Sukarno to come. He came and said hello to Sukarno and Sukarno shook his hands.

Suharto was different from Sukarno. When he hated someone, he then closed his opponents' economic tap, he never again said hello to them, and if possible he would sweep away all his opponents far away from him. It might have been due to the Javanese behavior, but the foolish or stupid Javanese behavior.”²

7.3.3. *The case of Petition 50*

Once, in the mid of 1970's a discussion group called '*Brasildi*' (Brawijaya, Siliwangi, and Diponegoro) consisted of a number of retired military generals from the three divisions: East Java, Central Java and West Java was established . The Brawijaya Division (East Java) was represented by GPH Jatikusuma, Sudirman and M. Yasin; the Diponegoro Division (Central Java) was represented by Munadi, Brotosewoyo and Iskandar Ranuwiherja; and the Siliwangi Division (West Java) was represented by Kemal Idris, Akhmad Yunus Mokoginta, Akhmad Sukendro, Daan Yahya and A. Kawilarang. As the political weather grew hotter prior to the election of 1977, this group often conducted meetings, discussing and evaluating intensively the situation and issues.

And then initiated by General Widodo (the Army Chief Staff) '*Brasildi*' was changed into '*Fosko TNI AD 1978*' or '*Forum Studi dan Komunikasi Angkatan Darat 1978*' or Communication and Study Forum of the Army 1978. This forum which was headed by Retired Army Lieutenant General GPH Jatikusumo grew more intensive and productive, producing a working paper stating that “the existing political situation was unhealthy. The General Session of the MPR in 1978 was like a war zone. ABRI had not placed itself upon all

² Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 October 2009.

different groups.” This forum also sent a message to President Suharto that student’s voice had to be listened.

The members of the forum were becoming more energetic after the former-Regional Commander of Siliwangi, Major General HR Dharsono, was appointed the General Secretary of the forum. They often launched heavy criticism on GOLKAR, questioning the direction of the Dual Functions of ABRI. General Widodo who was then unable to control ‘*Brasildi*’ eventually dissolved the ‘Fosko TNI AD 1978’ in May 1979, but let the retired generals establish a new organization called ‘*Forum Komunikasi dan Studi Purna Yudha*’ (FKS Purna Yudha) or Communication and Study Forum for Retired Officers.

In July 1978, together with other prominent leaders such as Bung Hatta, Sunario, Achmad Subardjo and the former-members of Fosko such as Ali Sadikin, Azis Saleh, Hoegeng Imam Santoso and AY. Mokoginta, AH. Nasution established a foundation called ‘*Yayasan Lembaga Kesadaran Berkonstitusi (YLKB)*’. Between August-September 1979, in their meetings with the DPR, the YLKB launched criticism that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution had not been implemented correctly.

Responding to those political maneuvers, President Suharto in his speeches on 27 March 1980 (before the participants of ‘Rapim ABRI’ or the Armed Forces Leadership Meeting in Pekanbaru) and on 16 April 1980 (in the anniversary of Kopassanda in Cijantung, Jakarta) reminded the senior officers of ABRI that there would be a group attempting to replace Pancasila with other ideology. President Suharto said that since he did not want any armed conflict, if he was forced, it was better to kidnap one of the 2/3 members of the MPR who

wanted to change Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution to make the quorum unable to be achieved. In his speeches, President Suharto also rejected the negative issues directed to him and his family.

Suharto's speeches invited strong reaction from a number of prominent leaders such as Ali Sadikin, Hoegeng Imam Santoso, and Aziz Saleh from the YLKB. They then had a meeting with AY. Mokoginta and M. Yasin from the FKS Purna Yudha. On 5 May 1980 they initiated a petition called '*Surat Keprihatinan*' or Letter of Concern or Apprehension, signed by 50 persons. The petition was then popularly called '*Petisi 50*' or the Petition 50 and the date of 5 May 1980 was regarded as the birth of '*Kelompok Petisi 50*' or the Petition 50 Group. Among those signed the petition were: Retired Navy Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin (former Governor of DKI Jakarta), Retired Police General Hoegeng Imam Santoso (former National Police Chief), and Chris Siner Key Timu (former student activist).

The petition was positively responded by 19 members of the DPR (from the F-PP and the F-PDI) who then submitted a number of questions to the government. On 14 June 1980, the questions submitted by the DPR were sent to the president by the Speaker of the DPR, Daryatmo. And on 1 August 1980, through the Minister of State Secretary, Sudharmono, President Suharto answered these questions by reading the transcript of the president's speeches either delivered in the Armed Forces Leadership Meeting in Pekanbaru or during the anniversary of 'Kopassanda' Regiment in Cijantung, Jakarta (<http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/11/20/0029.html>).

However, though as the head of the state Suharto had already answered the questions, Ali Sadikin and his colleagues regarded that the problems had yet to end. They continued launching criticism against President Suharto. For example:

“In the end of 1996, Working Group of ‘*Petisi 50*’ (consisting of Ali Sadikin, HR Dharsono, Natsir, etc.) questioned the problem of ABRI either as social and political forces or as defense and security forces. In the letter sent to the DPR-RI, this anti-Suharto group protested the Chief Staff of the Army, General Hartono. The Working Group of ‘*Petisi 50*’ demanded that the position of General Hartono be reconsidered for, as the top leader of the Army, he had made a statement that every member of ABRI was actually a GOLKAR member and therefore he was obliged to get order or guidance from the Chairman of GOLKAR.

According to the ‘*Petisi 50*’, General Hartono’s statement had made all people confused for he had blurred the fundamental position and primary function of ABRI either as the instrument of the state or the fundamental implementation in defense and security. According to the ‘*Petisi 50*’, the reality seen by the people during the New Order was just the same as what the Chief Staff of the Army had said.

The statement made by the Army Chief Staff corrected the special relations between the ABRI and the GOLKAR. This was against the fundamental position and primary function of the ABRI as the instrument for protecting all people. The statement made by General Hartono was also against the meaning, soul, and spirit of ‘*Saptamarga*’ and ‘*Sumpah Prajurit*’ which could not be separated from the messages of the founding fathers of the ABRI, that: “*The ABRI is the state instrument. The ABRI is apolitical. The politics of the ABRI is the politics of the state. The ABRI will not involve in political arena.*”

According to the ‘*Petition 50*’, the statement made by General Hartono was not in line with the goals, soul, and spirit of the New Order in order to restore or maintain the people’s sovereignty. The Seminar of the TNI-AD II in 1966 in Bandung had already stated that the Army had to be aware of the national interests and had to be willing to put aside the group’s interests. The leadership of the ABRI/TNI-AD was not always leading social forces themselves, but submit the leadership to the people’s leaders, so that all forces would develop and having capacity based on their own capacity.

The ‘*Petition 50*’ then urged the DPR-RI or the People’s Representative Council to request explanation to the government through the Commander

of the ABRI about the statement made by the Army Chief Staff, General Hartono. Since the statement was against the meaning, soul, and spirit of 'Saptamarga' and 'Sumpah Prajurit' the DPR-RI should ask President Suharto to reconsider the position of General Hartono as the Army Chief Staff"

(<http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1996/03/29/0073.html>).

And then another sharp criticism was also lunched by the 'Petisi 50' on 6 March 1998, urging the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to reject President Suharto's accountability speech and pleaded with them not to reelect the 76-year-old president. According to this 'Petition 50 Group', "it's not only because he (President Suharto) has failed to make himself truly accountable for things which should be delineated but also because he has been in the post for more than two terms" (<http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/03/09/0013.html>).

This highly vocal group which comprised many former senior government and military figures also strongly claimed that:

"First, Suharto's accountability address should have been delivered to the Assembly of 1992-1997, not to the Assembly of 1998-2004, since it was the former assembly that gave him the presidential mandate; and second, the content of the speech was disparaged because it failed to answer various issues concerning the state governance over the past five years. Instead, it was like the government technical explanation on certain activities"

(<http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/03/09/0013.html>).

They contended too that "the speech should have accounted for and explained what they claimed to be abuses of power as a result of corruption, collusion, nepotism and monopolies." And, given these considerations, the statement also said that "President Suharto's accountability speech of March 1 cannot be considered an accountability address but instead only an official

technical explanation" (<http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/03/09/0013.html>).

On account of this, the '*Petisi 50*' then asked the People's Consultative Assembly to establish a special commission to examine the omitted elements of Suharto's speech, and suggested that, given his age, incumbent Suharto should be noble and say that he did not wish to be reelected for a seventh consecutive term (<http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/03/09/0013.html>).

As a way of answering and co-opting some of that criticism, President Suharto himself called for more openness and debates. The press was somewhat freer, and as a result the voices of these men, like Slamet Bratanata, former Governor Ali Sadikin of Jakarta and two retired army generals, AH. Nasution and HR. Dharsono, are being listened to with more care, and their call for President Suharto to step down has not gone unnoticed.

However, in responding to the criticisms launched to him, the position of President Suharto was quite clear. He said: "I don't like what the so called the '*Petition 50*' have done." He further stated: "They thought as if their opinions were the only correct ones. They regarded that they knew, but basically they did not know Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution." Based on his conviction, Suharto gave sanctions to some activists of the '*Petisi 50*' composing of former military officers, politicians, academics and students and demanding greater political freedoms. The Indonesian media suppressed the news and the government placed restrictions on the signatories. After the group's 1984 accusation that Suharto was creating a one-party state, some of the leaders of the '*Petisi 50*', including H.R. Dharsono, were sent into jail.

Responding to the sanctions, Slamet Bratanata, one of the '*Petisi 50*' leaders and a former Minister of Mines, added that "their complaints were not allowed to be published. They could not get passports, their telephones were tapped and few would dare to do business with them." Even after a four-month trial in 1986, HR Dharsono, an important ally of Suharto against the Communist in 1965, was found guilty on charges that he had somehow helped incite Muslim rioting in Tanjung Priok in 1984. In the riot of Tanjung Priok 1984, a lot number of Muslim activists were shot to death. And at the end of the trial, he was sentenced to more than 5 years for subversion (<http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1990/12/21/0004.html>).

7.3.4. *The Case of Jaelani Naro*

In 1987, Jailani Naro, the top leader of the PPP or '*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*' (the Union Development Party), decided to nominate himself for Vice President, competing with Retired General Sudharmono, the top leader of the GOLKAR (Functional Group). The decision stimulated controversy and difference of opinion. Some people said that Jailani Naro's nomination for Vice President was absolutely legal. While others said that this nomination was against the existing national consensus.

Responding to Jailani Naro's political maneuver, President Suharto made a statement: "Naro was a man who only knew his right, but he did not know his obligation" (Tempo, 2 September 1989:19). He also said that: "As the Vice Chairman of the DPR/MPR, Jailani Naro should have understood clearly the

valid procedures of the vice presidential election. But, in reality, he objected to obey the national consensus" (Tempo, 2 September 1989:19).

Knowing that President Suharto was unhappy or even angry at his political maneuver, Jailani Naro decided to withdraw his nomination particularly after being pressured by his own party. But, due to his political blunder, two years later (1989), his political carrier came to an end and his position as the party top leader was taken over by Ismail Hassan Metareum. His replacement was of course under the influence of President Suharto.

7.3.5. *The Case of Suryadi*

During his campaign in May 1992, Suryadi, the top leader of the PDI or '*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*' (the Indonesian Democratic Party), made a statement that the presidential term should have been limited only for two terms of election. He wanted the limitation to take into effect from the presidential term of 1993-1998 (Tempo, 23 May 1992:14).

As the top leader of the PDI, Suryadi publicly restated the idea in Surabaya, Malang and Amuntai. Even in his political campaign in Amuntai, he made a strong statement: "The leadership of the president must be evaluated. For the last five years, has he had led the country well? If the answer is yes, he has been good and just, we will considerate to reelect him" (Tempo, 23 May 1992: 14). But, in order to avoid open conflict against Suharto, he further said that his proposal was not meant to keep Suharto from being reelected. He said: "We were lucky that our two presidents were brilliant ones. The limitation of presidential term was meant to take effect after Suharto" (Tempo, 23 May 1992:15).

Suryadi's idea made Suharto very angry. Responding to Suryadi's proposal, Suharto made a statement before the delegates of the KOSGORO: "Don't be a man who wants to interfere the Constitution of 1945. Because it has been said in the constitution that the presidential term is five years and after that he could be reelected. That is all going back to the People's Consultative Assembly (whether they want to reelect the incumbent president or not)" (Tempo, 24 July 1993:28).

7.3.6. The case of Megawati Sukarnoputri

At the 1993 National Congress at Medan (21-25 July 1993), Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of Sukarno) was elected as the Chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party, one of the two political parties recognized by Suharto's New Order regime. This result was never recognized by the Government and they continued to push for Budi Harjono, their candidate for the Chairpersonship to be elected. A Special Congress was held in Surabaya (2-6 December 1993) where the Government expected to have Budi Harjono elected, but Megawati once again emerged victorious. The victory was consolidated when the PDI National Assembly (Munas) ratified the results of the Congress (22 December 1993). President Suharto who felt disappointed with the result of the election was just willing to meet her as the new PDI top leader of 1993-1998 a few weeks later.

As the chairperson of the PDI, Megawati Sukarnoputri was increasingly critical of Suharto's regime. In response, Suharto backed a co-opted faction led by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Suryadi and began to rally a political movement in

order to sack Megawati. Supported by 15 among 27 members of DPP PDI and also by the Minister of Home Affairs, (Retired Army General) Yogie S. Memet, and the Top Military Commander, General Faisal Tanjung, Suryadi's close-alliance, Fatimah Ahmad, initiated a congress to elect a new other top leader of the party. According to her and her supporters, the position of Megawati as the top leader of the party was only temporary because she was elected the Chairman through a National Assembly, not Congress. They argued that the top leader of the party should have been elected through the Party Congress, not National Assembly. Although it was rejected by Megawati, the Congress went on in Medan (20-23 June 1996) where Megawati was not invited. Attended only by anti-Megawati members and with the Government's backing, the Congress re-elected Suryadi, a former Chairperson, as PDI's Chairperson. Megawati refused to acknowledge the results of this congress and continued to see herself as the rightful leader of PDI.

No sooner was Suryadi re-elected chairperson, he began threatening to take back PDI's Headquarters in Jakarta. This threat came true during the morning of 27th July 1996. That morning, Suryadi's supporters (reportedly with the Government's backing) attacked the PDI Headquarters and faced resistance from Megawati supporters who had been stationed there ever since the National Congress in Medan. In the ensuing fight, Megawati's supporters managed to hold on to the headquarters.

A riot then ensued, followed by a crackdown by the Government. The Government would later blame the riots on the People's Democracy Party (PRD).

Despite being overthrown as Chairperson by Suryadi and the Government, the event made Megawati famous, bringing her both sympathy and popularity.

PDI was then divided into two factions, Megawati's faction and Suryadi's faction. Megawati's faction had wanted to participate in the 1997 Legislative Elections, but the Government only recognized Suryadi's faction. In the 1997 Legislative Elections, Megawati and her supporters threw their support behind the United Development Party leaving PDI to languish with only 3% of the votes.

In October 1998, after Suharto's fall, Megawati declared the formation of PDI-P, adding the suffix *perjuangan* (struggle) to differentiate her faction of PDI from the Government backed one. Megawati was also elected as the Chairperson of PDI-P as well as being nominated for President in 1999.

Megawati was forced to step down because of two reasons. Firstly, Megawati rejected to end the conflict between Latief Pudjosakti (supported by Governor Basofi Sudirman) and Sutjipto (supported by Megawati) both of who claimed as the legal PDI top leader of the East Java. Megawati had been charged of ignoring the president's advice recommending that all the conflicting parties in PDI commit to Pancasila in perceiving the existing political development. Suharto said: "In practicing Democracy of Pancasila, everybody had to give priority for the achievement of discussion and consent (in order to end the conflict) rather than by majority. Majority is not always achieved by voting" (Kompas 12 July 1996). Secondly, PDI under Megawati had conducted a political blunder by nominating Megawati as the candidate for president replacing Suharto on the presidential election of 1997. Once Aberson Sihaholo, one of the PDI

leaders, said that Megawati was appropriate to be nominated as the presidential candidate for the presidential election of 1997, replacing President Suharto.

7.3.7. The case of Abdurrahman Wahid

Prior to Muktamar NU in Cipasung, West Java, the renomination of KH Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur as the Chairman of Tanfisdzah PBNU was hampered by a number of people who disliked his leadership. One of the men was Slamet Effendi Yusuf, Chairman of Ansor who had close relation to GOLKAR, who said that as an executive Gus Dur was so busy with his own programs and his ideas were too high to reach (Gatra, 26 November 1994:23).

Suharto did not like Gus Dur because of some reasons. In a book of "*Nation in Waiting*" written by Adam Schwarz, Gus Dur had stated that Suharto was a foolish man. Gus Dur was also suspected of collaborating with Megawati, and charged of being an opposition. Gus Dur himself rejected this charge by saying: "It was too foolish opinion. When did I involve in demonstration, or other action opposing the president, or making very foolish statement? All my statements were fundamental ones. I don't feel to be an opposition. I just want the government to be controlled" (Gatra, 26 November 1994:30). Although Gus Dur rejected all the charges, the New Order regime kept trying to promote Abu Hasan to take over the leadership of NU. But, the government's attempt eventually failed. Gus Dur was still elected the Chairman of NU in its 29th Muktamar in Cipasung, December 1994.

As soon as he was elected, Gus Dur applied for an audience with President Suharto, but failed. Only after approaching the President's children,

Bambang Trihatmodjo and Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, could the meeting between Gus Dur and the President took place, that was in Mukernas Rabithat Ma'ahif Islamiyah in Ponpes Zainul Hasan Genggong, Probolinggo, East Java, in December 1996.

The meeting with the President could only happen after Gus Dur promised to flatter Megawati not to continue bringing the government before the judge because of its decision recognizing Suryadi as the legal party top leader, replacing Megawati. Gus Dur tried to convince Megawati that such a confrontation with the government institutions would be useless. "The longer, the wider," said Gus Dur (Tempo, 2 December 1996:22).

7.3.8. *The case of Permadi*

Permadi, a well known paranormal and the former-Chairman of "*Yayasan Konsumen Indonesia*" or Indonesian Consumer Foundation, was arrested and interrogated by the judge because of his statement relating to succession. In an interview by Ahmad Toha Mansyur, a journalist from UNISI Radio, Yogyakarta, Permadi made a prediction on the succession of 1998. He said that because of the conjunction between the Satluns and the Neptunes, there would be a desolation of people and nature in 1997, causing succession or even revolution. He was also convinced that Majapahit would reemerge and Megawati Sukarnoputri, the top leader of PDI, would become president. The victory could be achieved because of two things, the implementation of Sukarno's thoughts and the application of the ancestor's technology (Gatra, 25 March 1995:22). Permadi also criticized the leadership of Suharto and slandered a number of ministers, such as BJ Habibie

and Harmoko. He even charged PDI of Suryadi of betraying Sukarno (Gatra, 25 March 1995:22).

He repeated the statement in a panel discussion held by students of Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta (20 April 1994). In the discussion attended by around 700 participants, among them were the former Minister of Home Affairs Rudini, Amien Rais, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, and Harsudiyono Hartas, Permadi talked vocally without any limit, making the Chief General Staff of the Indonesian Military Forces, General Soeyono, really very upset (Gatra, 25 March 1995:22).

Talking about succession, Permadi said that the transfer of power through any mean, including revolution, would occur before 1998 (Gatra, 25 March 1995:22). He said that in the Election, he would not elect any party, such as GOLKAR, because GOLKAR was worse than PKI, a party that had carried out an unsuccessful rebellion in 1965 (Gatra, 25 March 1995:22).

7.3.9. The Case of Sri Bintang Pamungkas

On 5 March 1997, the Chairman of PUDI (Indonesian Union Democratic Party) Sri Bintang Pamungkas together with Julius Usman (Chairman) and Saleh Abdullah (Secretary General) were investigated by the Supreme Judge and later imprisoned due to his letter of Idul Fitri sent to all high level government officials and social leaders (1997). The letter said: "In the name of God, the agenda of PUDI: (1) Rejecting Election 1997; (2) Rejecting Pak Harto as the president 1998-2003; (3) Preparing the New Order for Post Suharto 1998. Actually God

would not change the faith of one nation if they were not willing to change their own faith (QS: 13: 11)" (Gatra, 15 March 1997:25).

Answering to journalists asking him about the investigation Sri Bintang said that he was given 15 questions. All about the PUDI and the letter of Idul Fitri which he had made. The investigation, as said by Bintang, went well. He could answer all of questions well. "I could reject all questions charging me," said Sri Bintang.

According to Bintang, he was actually not confirmed by the Supreme Judge. But he offered himself to be investigated. "According to my analysis, the outbreak of issue on Idul Fitri letter was caused by certain people wanting to manipulate for certain political purposes. I don't want it to happen. Therefore I took initiative to give clarification to the Supreme Judge," added Bintang.

The investigation was done after Bintang had a telephone call from Gatot Hendararto around 08.00 A.M. Gatot asked Bintang to choose, to be formally called or to voluntarily come to the Supreme Judge in order to give explanation on the PUDI and the letter of Idul Fitri he had made. Sri Bintang chose to voluntarily come to the Supreme Judge. Gatot, according to Sri Bintang, then invited him for lunch at the Arirang Restaurant on Jalan Mahakam, Kebayoran Baru, South Jakarta, not far away from the Supreme Judge office.

Responding to what Bintang had done, the Commander of ABRI, Gen. Feisal Tanjung stated: "It was better to submit every dissatisfaction to the members of the DPR." Answering to the questions of journalists before joining the cabinet meeting on economic, finance, and development supervision at Bina Graha on 5 March 1997, Gen. Feisal Tanjung added: "*Demokrasi itu lewat Wakil*

Rakyat. Jangan seenak udel-nya saja. Ada aturan semua, bukan 'seenak udel-nya' saja" (Democracy has to be through the people representatives. They can not do whatever they like)." Sri Bintang Pamungkas was charged of being one of those who had done whatever he liked.

The Supreme Judge as well as the Head of "*Panwaslakpus*" or the Central Committee of Election Monitoring, Singgih, also made a statement to journalists that the judge was investigating the statement made by Sri Bintang to boycott the election. He said: "*Maunya itu bagaimana. Sebagai warga negara yang baik itu kan semuanya mempunyai hak dan kewajiban, mematuhi ketentuan hukum dan perundang-undangan yang berlaku*" (What he wanted to do? As a good citizen, he has the right and obligation to obey the effective law and regulations).

The Minister of Court, Oetojo Oesman, made a confession that he did not receive the letter of Idul Fitri sent by Bintang to all high level government officials. Responding to what Bintang had done, he commented: "*Saya tidak terima itu. Tetapi yang dilakukan Bintang Pamungkas itu, jelas tindakan yang negatif yaitu untuk menghambat jalannya kewajiban dan memotong hak warga negara untuk berpartisipasi dalam Pemilu*" (I did not receive such a letter. But what Bintang Pamungkas has done is clearly a negative action designed to hamper the obligation and to cut the right of citizens to participate in the Election) (bdm/bw/ppg/cc).

On the other hand, trying to advocate Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Bambang Wijoyanto (an NGO activist) said that it was true that PUDI was preparing a new order: "Bintang is preparing a new draft for replacing the Constitution 1945. The

Constitution prepared consists of 139 articles. Many of them giving protection to Human Rights.” According to Wijoyanto, “what PUDI has done is something we do not need to worry” (Gatra, 15 March 1997:24). But, General Feisal Tanjung, the Commander of ABRI, regarded what Bintang had done as an attempt to overthrow the legal existing government, though it was rejected by Bintang (Gatra, 15 March 1997:24). Bintang was investigated by the Judge and later imprisoned after an inauguration of ‘*Asrama Haji Donohudan*’, Boyolali, President Suharto made a strong statement that he would really hit strongly or “*gebuk*” anyone trying to be unconstitutional and against the law (Gatra, 15 March 1997:24).

In his statement in front of ulama, santri, and candidates of hajj in Asrama Haji Donohudan, Boyolali, as the head of the state on 1 March 1997 President Suharto asserted that he had to carry out all decisions made by the people through their representatives in the MPR. “Therefore, I would not do anything improper. If I do something improper, I must have been unseated by the MPR through the Special Session.”

Suharto also stated that he only carried out the mandate given by the people. He would only carry out what had been stipulated by the MPR. Therefore, if he was regarded unable to carry out the mandate, he would be pleased if the people unseat him through the Special Session of MPR. “*Saya tak keberatan. Kalau rakyat menghendaki Pak Harto turun, akan saya terima, demi kepentingan rakyat, dan konstitusi. Tapi semua itu harus konstitusional; kalau tidak, akan saya gebuk, karena melanggar konstitusi*” (I do not mind being unseated. If people want Pak Harto to resign, I will accept it, for the sake of

people and the constitution. But all must be constitutional; if not, I will hit bitterly with big stick whoever trying to be in-constitutional) (<http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1997/02/28/0127.html>).

The word 'gebuk' or hitting with big stick bitterly was always used by Suharto when some generals backed up by the Petisi 50 disseminated an issue of succession. This issue was developed into an issue of military coup and got hotter in 1989 when President Suharto paid a visit to Beograd, Yugoslavia. In the plane Suharto made a strong statement: "*Biar jenderal atau menteri yang bertindak inkonstitusional akan saya gebuk*" (Whoever they are, be military generals or ministers, if they are doing un-constitutionally, I will bitterly hit them) (http://www.gatra.com/2004-06-28/versi_cetak.php?id=40012).

The term of 'gebuk' is usually Javanese. In Javanese tradition, parents who want to punish their children usually use a number of punishment: 'slenik, jewer, keplak, gitik, gebuk'. The punishment in the form of 'gebuk' is the heaviest one and it is usually used when the parents have become very angry. Bintang Pamungkas stated:

"I think when using the word 'gebuk' Pak Harto was really very angry. The word 'gebuk' was first used for military officers, and then for me though it was not explicitly naming me. I then tried to understand why Pak Harto was so angry at me. It seemed to me that Pak Harto was madly angry for when he was in Dresden, Germany, he happened to be hit by someone using a roll of newspaper. But, at that time I was no at Dresden. I had heard before that he would be demonstrated."³

Giving more information about Suharto's visit to Germany, Sri Bintang Pamungkas further stated:

³ Interview with Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

“He canceled his visit to Weinmar for the Major rejected him, worrying that the citizens would treat him improperly.

When he was walking to the Museum of Dresden, someone hit his umbrella and then his ‘*kopiah*’. Being treated like that, as the great king, he got really angry.”⁴

7.3.10. The Case of Amien Rais

Before Suharto stepped down from power, Amien Rais had often made lots of statements criticizing the president’s policies. Due to these statements, certain elites of ICMI⁵ who had close relation with Suharto had a headache. As the Chairman of the ICMI Board of Expert, Amien Rais often disappointed the ICMI elites through his controversial statements, such as his statement on the contract of gold and cooper mining made by the Government and PT Freeport in Irian Jaya. Amien said that this contract was against the Constitution of 1945 for it made the national wealth siphoned away to other countries. He also said that the development carried out by the regime had widened the gap between the rich and the poor, making the number of poor become greater (Gatra, 1 March 1997:36). And, in order to maintain its harmonious relationship with the President, ICMI advised Amien to resign from his position in ICMI. The elites of ICMI worried the controversial criticisms would weaken the influence of ICMI over Suharto.

But, his resign from ICMI did not make Amien Rais stop criticizing the regime. Although, talking about succession was very taboo, in his speech before

⁴ Interview with Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Jakarta, 6 October 2009.

⁵ In December 1990 a group of Muslim intellectual held a symposium called National Symposium of Indonesian Muslim Intellectual in Malang, opened by President Suharto and established ICMI or ‘*Ikatan Cendekian Muslim Indonesia*’ (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). BJ. Habibie was elected the first president of the association.

the delegates of Tanwir Muhammadiyah in Surabaya (1996), Amien made a critical statement on national succession, making the elites of Muhammadiyah very upset. They worried the government would regard Amien's statement as Muhammadiyah's formal stand and, in the end, it would endanger the harmonious relationship between Muhammadiyah and President Suharto.

What they were worried was reasonable since the harmonious relationship between the New Order regime and Muhammadiyah had been going on for long time. As the President of Muhammadiyah, AR. Fachruddin, had ever said that once together with other Muslim leaders (KH. Rosyidi and KH. Hamka), he celebrated the day of '*syawalan*' with President Suharto and sat close to him. While they were talking with the President, KH. Rosyidi said to him, "You look so intimate with Pak Harto?" Then he answered, "What's the matter being close to the President?" (Tempo, 15 December 1990:60).

Amien Rais seemed not to care about the objection. In 1997, in Surabaya, he made another statement by mentioning six criteria for the presidential candidates in presidential election of 1998: that the national leaders should be able to carry out the constitutional orders, committed to poor people, committed to build good governance, able to maintain national unity and cooperation, willing to protect the national resources from foreign interests, and able to minimize the existing social gap or the gap between the have and the poor (Gatra, 5 July 1997:44).

Amien Rais also underlined that in the era of openness, those six criteria had to be implemented openly. He said: "Up to now, our national succession only opens one door, meaning only the position of vice president is opened for more

than one candidate. But the position of president is opened for only one man" (Gatra, 5 July 1997:44).

The criteria proposed by Amien were quite contradictory with the criteria proposed by Rapim GOLKAR or the Board Meeting of GOLKAR (October 1996), that the candidates should be coming from the New Order exponents who had managed to cristalize the dreams of the New Order, and that they had to be well known, either nationally or internationally. These criteria made by Rapim GOLKAR were almost the same as criteria stated by President Suharto in an interview by the Nikkei Chief Editor, a Japanese economic newspaper, on 13 August 1996 (Gatra, 5 July 1997:44).

Lukman Harun, one of Muhammadiyah leaders who had very close relation to Suharto, criticized Amien's criteria. He was upset with the statement made by Amien and said that it was not the formal stand of Muhammadiyah and that Muhammadiyah had never made criteria for the candidates of president and vice president because it was not the authority of Muhammadiyah. Lukman Harun added that: "In Tanwir Muhammadiyah in Surabaya (1993) and in Banjarmasin (1996), Amien Rais had ever requested that Muhammadiyah propose criteria for president and vice president candidates. But, the request was rejected by all the delegates" (Gatra, 5 July 1997:44).

Responding to Lukman's criticism, Amien said, since he was the President of Muhammadiyah, what he had said was about the aspiration of Muhammadiyah. He further said: "But don't be forgetful, most members of Muhammadiyah are rational and democratic. So, once the MPR stipulates the

GBHN and national leadership, Muhammadiyah would always ‘samina wa athona’ or we listen and we obey” (Gatra, 5 July 1997:44).

Explaining his experiences how Suharto had already treated him as his political opponent, Amien Rais said:

“I am a lecturer of UGM, but Suharto actually did not like me. For a couple of years the telephone of my home often rang up. Since my wife and children were the ones who were very calm, though the telephone always rang up, they never complained. Then I remembered, once as a member of Muhammadiyah I was nominated for the member of KOMNAS HAM or ‘Komisi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia’ (National Commission for Human Rights). But my name was then dropped by Suharto. Also when I was nominated for the member of the MPR as regional representative, my name was also dropped by Suharto.”⁶

Giving more information about Suharto’s treatment upon him, Amien Rais further asserted:

“Suharto’s attention to me reached the top when he wanted to unveil me to be the chairman of PP Muhammadiyah. According to authentically information, Suharto had already contacted BAKIN to make analysis whether I could be stepped aside through Muktamar Muhammadiyah 1995 in Aceh. Even one of the members of the PP Muhammadiyah was given a message to unseat me from Muhammadiyah.

And, during the reform movement, Suharto tried to aim at me through legal way. But the attorney general did not have enough proves. Then before riots occurred in May, I got a lot of threats which for common people would be very scarred. That was about Suharto.”⁷

7.4. Summary

In his power struggle for promoting and maintaining the New Order Suharto had met a number of challenges, coming from the PKI, President Sukarno, and others criticizing his policies on certain aspects as well as questioning the problems of succession. In challenging his political rivals or

⁶ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 August 2009.

⁷ Interview with Professor Amien Rais, Yogyakarta, 9 August 2009.

opponents Suharto never forgot to adopt the highest and respected Javanese cultural values and philosophy.

In facing Sukarno, Suharto adopted the Javanese philosophy by treating Sukarno not only as his leader or superior but also his own father. As his own father, Suharto always tried to practice the philosophy of '*mikul dhuwur, mendhem jero*' or to carry high and to burry deep, '*sabdbo pandito ratu*' or the king cannot be opposed, '*suro diro jayaningrat lebur dening pangastuti*' or the evil will eventually be defeated by the good, etc. Though he was different from him, Suharto prevented himself from disgracing Sukarno openly.

In facing his other political opponents criticizing his policies, Suharto always referred to the Javanese philosophy of '*musyawarah*' or discussion and '*mufakat*' or deliberation. Every action against this philosophy would endanger the principle of '*hormat*' or respect and '*rukun*' or harmony which had been the obsession of most Javanese.

In facing his political opponents questioning the problem of succession, Suharto always referred to the Javanese cultural philosophy that someone was not allowed to step forward before his/her leader. He/she had to wait for what his/her leader wanted to do, whether to keep or to step down from his power. Those who were bravely against this philosophy would be regarded as having improper behavior and therefore was eligible to be opposed.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION AND AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

8.1. Introduction

A number of studies and writings made by scholars have argued that in ruling the country Retired Army Great General Suharto had used and manipulated Javanese cultural values and philosophy as guidance for his personal and official duties. However, these studies and writings were done separately and the search of the literature did not reveal any published studies explaining why, how, and to what extent Suharto used or manipulated Javanese cultural values and philosophy as guidance for his individual and state life that enabled him to rule the country for more than three decades. This study was conducted to answer those questions. This concluding chapter returns to the research objectives raised in the first chapter, and presents the major arguments and findings of the thesis.

8.2. Conclusion

8.2.1. Characteristics and sources of the Javanese culture

Javanese life is influenced by Javanese concepts of men, environment, and power. According to Javanese perception, men are basically not equal. They are divided into '*wong cilik*' or peasants and '*priyayi*' or aristocrats. Each has its own function and their relationship is interdependence, but the social position of '*priyayi*' is higher than that of '*wong cilik*'. '*Priyayis*' function as the contributor of culture and philosophy, while '*wong ciliks*' function as the contributor of

agricultural products needed by '*priyayis*'. This concept makes their power relationship unequal too, paving the way to the emergence of undemocratic or even authoritarian ruler in the Javanese society.

Javanese also perceive the environment where they live as the basis for their life, encircling the individual, society, and nature, all of which are integrated with supernatural universe. Based on their belief that the survival of their life will depend on the environment, they then come to the conclusion that regularity of their environment has to be maintained. Most Javanese always dream of the harmonious relationship between '*jagad gedhe*' or macro-cosmos and '*jagad alit*' or micro-cosmos, and the unity between these two cosmoses becomes the final destination of most Javanese people.

Javanese social relationship as well as their real political life are then influenced by these two concepts of men and environment, the relationship of which always stresses on the principle of '*rukun*' or harmony and '*urmat*' or respect. In order to maintain 'harmony' someone has to put his own interests or '*pamrih*' under the others'. Based on such concept, opposition is considered an improper behavior. Opposition is regarded as unsuited to the Javanese identity which always tries to place the principle of '*kekeluargaan*' or family-ness and '*gotong royong*' or mutual assistance as the basis for organizing Javanese community as well as the nation-state. '*Kekeluargaan*' and '*gotong royong*' which reflect that the traditional Javanese community operates without conflict and in a state of balance then become the guiding principle of the state-relationship to society.

In perceiving power the Javanese believe that the characteristics of power are concrete, homogenous, constant, and without inherent moral implication. So, according to the Javanese perception, what needed by a person who wants to become a leader or a king is the resources of power in the form of '*pusaka*' or heirlooms or sacred articles with magical power such as '*kris*', '*tombak*', '*precious stones*', '*tusuk konde*', and others. Someone who manages to possess enough resources of power would automatically rule the people. But, Javanese people also believe that a leader or a king is always someone who possesses magical heredity coming from the goddess as well as magical light or '*wahyu*' or '*pulung*' descended from God Almighty. Those who have such kinds of condition then would be able to become legitimate or charismatic ruler possessing power to present reward and punishment or '*wenang murba wasesa*' or absolute power descended from God Almighty. In seeking power, someone does not only rely on people's support through elections but also on supernatural power in the form of '*pusaka*' or heirlooms, '*wahyu*' or '*pulung*' or magical light, etc. People's support through elections will follow suit after these supernatural power is attained.

According to the Javanese's belief, anyone could achieve the ideal or ultimate goals of his/her life such as to possess '*pusaka*' or heirlooms, '*wahyu*' or '*pulung*' or magical light as guidance descended from God Almighty only if he/she has the character of '*becik sajatining becik, berbudi bowo leksono, ambeg adil paramarta*' or 'to be good in the essence of goodness, to be noble and generous mind, and be able to maintain order, security, and justice' (*Serat Wedhatama*). And, to enable him/her to succeed in achieving the ideal or ultimate

goals of his/her life, he/she has to be brave to live in a condition of '*prihatin*', such as willing to study persistently or '*tekun belajar*', never knowing the word 'retreat' or '*pantang menyerah*', being tough and happy in facing difficult problems or '*ulet dan senang hati menghadapi persoalan-persoalan berat*'. In order to be such kind of man, one must be able to control himself by doing a certain thing or '*laku*' such as cut down on eating and sleeping or '*cegah dhahar lawan guling*', control bad passions or '*mengendalikan nafsu angkara murka*', and having self confidence. A gift from the Lord would only be given to someone possessing '*budi luhur*' or good character.

In Javanese society, '*guru sakti*' or a teacher possessing supernatural power plays important role to guide someone who wants to achieve his/her ideal or ultimate goals. This '*guru sakti*' will usually give '*mantra*' or magical words, '*azimat*' or amulet, and also ask his students to undertake spiritual meditation or '*semedi*' by soaking their body in the river water or '*kungkum*', drinking water coming from seven different wells or '*ngombe banyu pitung sumur*', living in an empty house or '*manggon ning omah suwung*', sleeping under the edge of roof or '*turu ning tritisan*', and sleeping in a rubbish hole or landfill or '*turu ning jugangan*'. Almost all these kinds of '*laku prihatin*' and '*semedi*' or spiritual meditation was practiced by Suharto since he was a child in order to develop himself as a good Javanese having the character of '*becik sajatining becik, berbudi bowo leksono, hambeg adil paramarta*' as well as very strong intuition in perceiving the universe with its all phenomenon.

These noble Javanese values and philosophy consisting of almost all life aspects (such as God as the Only One God, spiritual, humanism, nationalism,

family, and materialism) as taught by a number of different spiritual teachers and philosophers, such as Sri Paku Buwono IV (*Serat Wulang Reh*), Sri Paku Buwono V (*Serat Centhini*), Pangeran Sambernyowo or Sri Mangkunegoro I (Tri Dharma), Sri Mangkunegoro IV (*Serat Wedhatama* and *Serat Tripama*), Mpu Kanwa (*Cipta Hening*), Yasadipura I (*Serat Paramayoga*, *Pustaka Raja Purwa*, etc.), Ki Ranggawarsito (*Jayabaya*, *Nitisastro*, and *Suluk Sela*), Ki Hajar Dewantoro (*Tri Pakarti Utama*), Sosrokartono, etc. very much influenced Suharto's political attitude and behavior. These teachings which consisted of '*pituduh*' or guidance and '*wewaler*' (prohibition) were then compiled by Suharto into a book the title of which is "*Butir-butir Budaya Jawa: Anggayuh Kasampurnaning Urip, Ber Budi Bowo Leksono. Ngudi Sajatining Becik*" (Some Items of Javanese Culture: In Search of Perfect Life, Noble and Generous Mind, and in the Quest of the Essence of Goodness).

8.2.2. Influence of Javanese culture in shaping Suharto's leadership

As someone who never got any formal Western education but understood well and absolutely trusted the rightness of highly respected or noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy taught by his ancestors, Suharto had always tried to live in accordance with those '*pituduh*' or guidance and '*wewaler*' or prohibition. The practice of noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy particularly in politics was conducted by Suharto both for his own personal and the state interests, shaping his policies on almost every field, particularly in promoting the New Order as well as in challenging his political opponents.

Suharto's vision in establishing the New Order regime was to create a '*Pancasila society*' or 'a just and prosperous society based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution' as mandated by the Proclamation of the 17 August 1945 Independence. In order to reach this vision, stability and development became the central and important issues. In Suharto's mind, the success of development would be very much dependent on the people's strong commitment to carry out development and the existence of national stability (either political stability, security stability, or economic stability) which would enable people to focus their thought and ability on development.

Suharto's idea on stability could not be separated from the Javanese ideas on regularity and harmony. Regularity and harmony were the Javanese's obsessions, leading to the birth of power phenomenon regarded as being concrete, homogeny and indivisible. For most Javanese, it was more important for a king to concentrate and to defend power rather than to use it appropriately. In the eyes of '*kawula*' or '*wong cilik*', a Javanese king had to concentrate power in order to maintain peace and order and then to bring welfare and prosperity for all people. The king who was unable to concentrate power would be regarded as a weak king and would fail to maintain peace and order. The greater power that the king could concentrate; the more people would appreciate it.

In his attempt to concentrate power, deregulations in both social and political lives had to be conducted by implementing the doctrine of '*dwifungsi ABRI*' or the dual function doctrine of the armed forces, creating GOLKAR as a vehicle for his political goals, simplifying the numerous political parties by merging them into two major political parties, imposing mono-loyalty policy to

the bureaucracy, and practicing the anti-criticism or anti-opposition policy in order to weaken and even dominate his political opponents. All of these policies were meant to promote and maintain dynamic stability as precondition for development.

And then, in order to give constitutional basis for the Javanese traditional teachings to be implemented as guidance in both individual and state life, Suharto imposed the policy of Pancasila as the sole guiding ideology or philosophy for all social and political forces and formulated what was so called the P-4 or '*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*' (Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila). In this formulation, a lot number of noble Javanese teachings such as '*musyawarah untuk mufakat*' (discussion for deliberation), '*serasi, selaras dan seimbang*' (matching, harmonious, and balanced), '*ing ngarso sung tulodo, ing madyo mangun karso, tut wuri handayani*'; the principle of '*kekeluargaan*', the idea of 'no-opposition' etc. were inserted into the items of the P-4. And, it was quite understandable that the training program of the P-4 which had to be participated by all elements of society was then often regarded by many people as the program of Javanization for the Indonesian nation and state. But, not only into the P-4, had Suharto also inserted a number of noble Javanese teachings into the '*Doktrin Kepemimpinan ABRI*' or the Armed Forces Leadership Doctrine.

8.2.3. Javanese culture and legitimacy of Suharto's leadership

In facing the rebels, it was very easy for Suharto to get people's support in his attempt to crush the Thirtieth of September Movement by depicting the

Movement as a coup attempt to take over the legitimate power from President Sukarno and to replace the state ideology of Pancasila with another ideology, Communism. In Javanese old conception of power, punishment liable for someone who had been daring to launch a coup or to create instability was death penalty. As for example, once Panembahan Senapati, King of Mataram, by himself killed Kyai Ageng Mangir (his own son in law) who had tried to challenge or oppose his rule.

Due to such kind conception, most Javanese were very tolerant when Suharto had just let lots of communist activists be killed in 1965s. Almost no criticism was either launched when he once again let those who had created social disorder endangering stability (either in security, politics, economic, or social) be assassinated through a security operation which was so called '*Petrus*' or '*pembunuhan misterius*' (mysterious assassination) in 1980s.

In order to get sympathy from people, particularly Javanese, Suharto pretended as if he were not so interested in becoming president, because in Javanese conception of power, interest or '*pamrih*' would only weaken someone's capability in accepting power. As already said by Frans Magnis Suseno:

"In the Javanese view, the greatest danger to the power of a ruler does not come from the outside, but from '*pamrih*', his own inner weakness. '*Pamrih*' means to be driven exclusively by narrow egotistical interests. Why would '*pamrih*' weaken a ruler? Because it means that he concentrates on the outer world instead of the place from where real power flows, the inner metaphysical reality. To really powerful person wealth, influence and acknowledgment accrue by themselves without his having to move a finger. Thus, to the Javanese, a king who craves money has lost his essential orientation, and the people expect him to lose his power accordingly" (Magnis in Journal of South Asian Studies, 2005:220).

The ‘SUPERSEMAR’ was delivered to him not by his own will, but by Sukarno himself after being suggested by the three generals, sent by Suharto. When he was elected acting president, there was a dialogue between Suharto and his colleagues showing that this kind of plan was not Suharto’s will but the will of the MPRS. Even in every reelection for president, the Speaker of MPR would go to meet him asking him whether he was still willing to be reelected as president for the following term. It was taboo for him to nominate himself for president.

Except dying, the most honorable driving for a king was to step down according to Suharto was to follow the Javanese philosophy of *‘lengser keprabon, madheg pandhito’*. Therefore when trying to unseat President Sukarno, Suharto suggested Sukarno that he follow the way king Abiyoso had taken, *‘lengser keprabon, madheg pandito’*. In Javanese *‘wayang’*, Abiyoso was the King of Astina and grandfather of the Pandawa and Kurawa who in his old age retired from his king and became a sage. Although Sukarno rejected the suggestion, at least Suharto had already shown to public that he wanted to treat Sukarno properly based on the noble Javanese philosophy or that he wanted to win the struggle without humiliating President Sukarno. He actually wanted to practice the Javanese philosophy of *‘menang tanpa ngasorake’* or winning without humiliating.

Even in October 1997 when he himself was urged to step down by student movements, he also wanted to follow the same Javanese philosophy by making a statement that for weeks became the political talk of Indonesia. He said that he

would never cling to the presidency that he would readily step down if the people no longer wanted him. In order to give credence to this assertion Suharto also used an expression that he would ‘step down as king in order to become a sage, giving advice to his children’ or *‘lengser keprabon madeg pandita’*. But, unfortunately he was unable to realize what he had wanted.

8.2.4. Challenging political opponents

When Suharto came to power, he inherited an unstable condition, making economic development unable to be conducted and the ideals of the 1945 proclamation unable to be achieved. The practice of Guided Democracy and the introduction of NASAKOM by Sukarno to political life had created tensions at all level of society, the armed forces, political parties, bureaucracy, mass organizations, and others. Based on such arguments, Suharto concluded that renewal in political life had to be conducted, but it had to be done on the basis of Javanese traditional concept of life which always stressed on the principle of *‘rukun’* or harmony, *‘urmat’* or respect, *‘kekeluargaan’* or family-ness, *‘musyawarah dan mufakat’* or discussion and consensus, *‘gotong royong’* or mutual assistance, and rejected the Western concept of ‘opposition’ which was regarded as unsuited to the national identity and personality. According to Suharto, only through such kind of political renewal tensions within society could be eradicated, national stability could be promoted, and at the end economic development could be carried out successfully in order to bring welfare to the people as already mandated by the founding fathers.

In challenging his political opponents, Suharto tended to use this Javanese traditional concept of life as reference and justification. In facing criticisms toward his policies, Suharto always took straight actions, showing that criticism or opposition was unsuited to the Pancasila Democracy. Opposition was not in the dictionary of the Pancasila Democracy, so it must be crushed before it could endanger the stability and threaten his authority. Open criticism or criticism launched publicly was regarded against the personality of the nation. In Javanese culture:

“The most important thing for a Javanese ruler is to maintain his monopoly of power. Nothing should happen in his sphere of power except through his metaphysical mediation. Unrest, dissatisfaction, criticism and natural catastrophes all mean that the ruler is not able to concentrate all available power in himself. The same is the case when there is opposition to his policies or when a revolt breaks out. If this happens, the ruler must do two things. On the one hand, he should mediate and use other appropriate means to access the invisible inner world of power more effectively. On the other hand, he has to eliminate his rivals before they concentrate enough power to be able to challenge him. There are several possible ways of dealing with opponents. If the rival is weak, the king can just ignore him, because the weak opponent will wither away anyway. If he is strong, the king can try to co-opt him and thereby make his power subservient to the king’s own power. If this is not possible, the king has to liquidate the challenger” (Magnis in Journal of South Asian Studies, 2005:220).

Suharto knew very well that most Javanese highly appreciated the principles of respect or ‘*urmat*’ and harmony or ‘*rukun*’. He then brought these two principles as well as the principle of ‘*kekeluargaan*’ into political life by demanding that people put their ‘*pamrih*’ or interests under public interests and resolve their differences through mechanism of ‘*musyawarah untuk mufakat*’. Suharto would immediately challenge every attempt designed to threaten all these principles.

During the era of the New Order political and security approaches were still used by Suharto for challenging his political opponents, including the remnants of the PKI, the pro-Sukarno followers, the anti-Suharto groups, etc. Security approach was done by introducing the policy of '*Dwifungsi ABRI*' or the Dual Functions and '*LITSUS*' or '*Penelitian Khusus*' (Special Investigation). Political approach was done by merging the numerous political parties into two major parties and imposing the policy of mono-loyalty for civil services, including state apparatus. Ideological approach was done by stipulating Pancasila as the sole guiding ideology for all social and political organizations. Economic approach was done by introducing '*REPELITA*' or '*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*' (the Five Year Development Plan) as arranged by the GBHN or '*Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*' (the State Broad Guidelines). And cultural approach was done by inserting a number of highly respected or noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy into the items of the P-4 so that they could be implemented as guidance for the state, government, and social life.

As the President of Indonesia, Suharto had treated the country and the state as a big Javanese family. He placed himself not only as the leader or the King of the country, but also the father of the big family. He was even called the '*Bapak Pembangunan*' or the Father of Development. In a feudalistic Javanese family, the father was not only the figure that had to be respected, but also whose words spoken had to be accepted as the guidance for all members. Open criticism against him would not be allowed, let alone the critiques tend to corner the father. Such criticism is regarded as improper behavior and against the Javanese philosophy of '*hormat kalawan Gusti, Guru, Ratu lan wong tuwo loro*' (always

respecting God, teacher, King and the two parents). As a father, Suharto felt obliged to maintain such the tradition. Therefore, he not only objected to the concept of opposition, but also the concept of freedom of expression when it was talking about sensitive issues, particularly issue of Suharto's leadership as well as of national succession, for, he thought, all the concepts were not matched with the Javanese way of life.

Based on this belief, Suharto felt that he had the legitimate right to warn any member of the big family of the Indonesian nation not to take any action against the principle of '*urmat*' or respect for it could endanger the principle of '*rukun*' or harmony which had become the ultimate goal of the Javanese, making the life of politics, security, and economy unstable, threatening the movement of development. To those who paid no attention to his warning, he would not be reluctant to give sanction either by marginalizing them from any social, economic, and political activities, or by hitting them strongly or '*gebuk*', usually in the form of arresting, investigating and even sending them into jail.

8.3. Agenda for further research

Studies on local contents of society have been growing significantly in recent years despite the new interests in social science concerning ideas of postmodernism, globalization, and market liberalization, as well as on regional political and economic cooperation. Since Javanese people have become the majority of the Indonesian population, Javanese culture continues to be crucial and constitutes one of the most prominent features of the Indonesian politics.

This study has examined the principal aspects of the Javanese culture, the characteristics and sources of the Javanese belief system which influenced Suharto's leadership style in the era of the New Order. The use and manipulation of Javanese culture by Suharto has been criticized by Sri Sultan Hamengkuwono X, the respected Javanese Sultan from Yogyakarta. In a seminar held in Jakarta, as reported by the Jakarta Post (Wednesday, 11 June 2002, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X made a statement that:

“Javanese traditions were deliberatively misused by politician in the corrupt New Order regime to maintain power for over 30 years, prompting a nationwide antipathy against the Javanese culture and community..... Therefore, the Javanese needed to introduce counter culture similar to renaissance to restore the tainted image of the Javanese culture. Such renaissance could start by restoring the original meaning of Javanese terms or idioms that had been used by the New Order for their political interests (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/11/06/soeharto-abused-039javanese-culture-maintain-power039.html?1>).

Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X who is also the Governor of Yogyakarta, further asserted:

“During the New Order the ruling politicians had intentionally exploited Javanese symbols and idioms to create centralistic political culture and structure in the country..... Consequently, the Javanese community is blamed for greatly contribution to the development of the New Order culture which was full of corruption, collusion and nepotism..... The dominance of the Javanese culture was obvious under former president Suharto's leadership as it covered all dimensions of life in the country ranging from politics and economy to education” (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/11/06/soeharto-abused-039javanese-culture-maintain-power039.html?1>).

Based on such criticisms as well as realizing that a number of Javanese cultural values and philosophy are still tightly kept as guidance and prohibition by most Javanese, far more research needs to be carried out in this area,

particularly to examine how these kinds of culture could strengthen the system of democracy in the life of Indonesian politics.

It is also imperative that the relevance of the Javanese cultural values and philosophy which influences the life of Indonesian politics is further investigated, particularly the relevance of the Javanese cultural values and philosophy to the life of the young generation. It has been the elders' concern that some numbers of noble Javanese cultural values and philosophy have already deteriorated, making the young generation unable to understand correctly the essence of the life of the universe with its all phenomenon.

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