THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOUTHERN
BORDER PROVINCES ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER
(SBPAC) IN MANAGING THE DEEP SOUTH CONFLICT
IN THAILAND 2006-2012 AN ORGANIZATIONAL
APPROACH

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
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ABSTRACT

The unrest situation in the Deep South of Thailand is said to be very difficult to resolve. The government has tried various policies but the situation remains volatile. This is due to the diversity, pluralistic and cultural differences amongst the people in Deep South of Thailand. The objective of this study is to examine and analyze management strategies of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) in administrating the Deep South of Thailand from 2006 to 2012 using an organizational approach. The study is divided into three parts. The first part focused on the political strategies which include peace negotiation, diplomatic offensive, healing process and enhancement of the role of religious leaders. The second part discussed on the educational strategies pursues by the SBPAC such as an integration of an Islamic education into Thai educational system, rebuilding education in conflict-affected areas and bridging education with peace. The last part analyzed the socio-economic strategies that include farming and fishery program, marketing of an agricultural products, financial assistance and international economic collaboration. The data for this study were collected from both primary and secondary sources and analyzed using qualitative method. The primary sources include documents, SBPAC's annual reports and press release. In addition, the researcher analyzed the outputs of the SBPAC policy-makers relating to the research topic such as speeches, official correspondences and decisions of the organization relating to the management of the conflict in the Deep South. Interviews with knowledgeable people, prominent political and/or religious leaders, key stakeholders as well as the SBPAC's officials were also conducted. The secondary sources included books, journal articles, newspapers and reliable websites. The study revealed that the SBPAC's strategies have not been very effective in resolving the conflict in the region due to its intrinsic structural predicament. The organization has been given a huge task that was to bring peace and stability into the decade-old problems in the region but with minimal or even limited authority. In addition, the frequent changes of government in Bangkok created political instability in the country as a whole. These frequent changes of guards in the center have far-reaching implications to the SBPAC's management capabilities in dealing with the conflict.

Keywords: Deep South of Thailand, Educational Strategies, Political Strategies, Socio-economic Strategies, Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center.

ABSTRAK

Keadaan pergolakan di Selatan Thailand dikatakan sangat sukar untuk diselesaikan. Kerajaan telah cuba pelbagai dasar tetapi keadaan masih tidak menentu. Ini adalah kerana kepelbagaian, majmuk dan perbezaan budaya di kalangan rakyat di Selatan Thailand. Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji dan menganalisis strategi pengurusan Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) dalam mentadbir Selatan Thailand 2006-2012 dengan menggunakan pendekatan organisasi. Kerangka teoritikal ini memberi tumpuan kepada empat aspek termasuk matlamat sebagai organisasi, struktur, strategi, kapasiti dan kekangan. Kajian ini dibahagikan kepada tiga bahagian. Bahagian pertama memfokus kepada strategi politik termasuk rundingan damai, kesalahan diplomatik, proses penyembuhan dan peningkatan peranan pemimpin agama. Bahagian kedua membincangkan strategi pendidikan dilaksanakan oleh SBPAC seperti integrasi pendidikan Islam ke dalam sistem pendidikan Thai, membina semula pendidikan dalam kawasan konflik yang terjejas dan merapatkan pendidikan dengan keamanan. Bahagian terakhir menganalisa strategi sosio-ekonomi yang melibatkan pertanian dan perikanan, pemasaran produk pertanian, bantuan kewangan dan kerjasama ekonomi antarabangsa. Data kajian diperoleh daripada sumber primer dan sekunder yang dianalisa menggunakan kaedah kualitatif. Sumber primer mengandungi dokumen, laporan tahunan SBPAC dan kenyataan akhbar. Sebagai tambahan, penyelidik menganalisis dapatan daripada laporan tahunan dasar SBPAC yang berkaitan tajuk kajian seperti petikan ucapan, surat-surat rasmi tentang keputusan berkaitan dengan konflik di Selatan Thailand. Temubual dengan mereka yang mempunyai pengetahuan tentang bidang yang dikaji sama ada orang politik dan/atau pemimpin agama, pihak pemegang tara (stakeholders) termasuklah pegawai SBPAC. Sumber sekunder yang dianalisis termasuk buku, artikal jurnal, surat khabar dan laman sesawang yang dipercayai. Kajian ini mendedahkan bahawa strategi SBPAC telah tidak begitu berkesan dalam menyelesaikan konflik di rantau ini kerana masalah intrinsik struktur. Organisasi ini telah diberikan satu tugas besar yang membawa keamanan dan kestabilan ke dalam masalah beberapa dekad lamanya di rantau ini, tetapi dengan kuasa yang minimum atau terhad. Di samping itu, kekerapan bertukar kerajaan di Bangkok menyebabkan wujud ketidakstabilan politik di negara ini secara keseluruhannya. Kekerapan perubahan dan pertukaran kerajaan pusat mempunyai implikasi kepada keupayaan pengurusan SBPAC dalam menangani konflik tersebut.

Kata kunci: Selatan Thailand, Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, Strategi Pendidikan, Strategi Politik, Strategi Sosio-ekonomi.

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List of Abbreviations/Notations/Glossary of Term

ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ARF	Asian Resource Foundation
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
BOI	The Board of Investment
BRN	Barisan Revolusi Nasional
	National Liberation Front
BRN-C	Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate,
	National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate
CFS	The Child-Friendly School
ECER	East Coast Economic Region
EU	European Union
GMIP	Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani,
	Patani Islamic Mujahidin Group
GMP	Good Manufacturing Practice
HACCP	Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points
ICG	International Crisis Group
IEAT	Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
ISESCO Organization	Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural
ITP	Integrated Transformation Program
KPI	The Office of Peace and Governance- King Prajadhipok Institute
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NESDB	National Economic and Social Development Board
OBEC	The Office of the Basic Education Commission

OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OTCSEPC	The Office of the Teacher Civil Service and Educational Personnel Commission
OTOP	One Tambon One Product
PAOs	Provincial Administrative Organizations
PCC	The Patani People Congress
PNM	Village life quality development
PNP	Development of the Project
PULO	Pattani United Liberation Organization
RTP	Royal Thai Police
SBPAC	Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
TAOs	Tambon Administrative Organizations
CPM 43	Mixed Commanding Unit between Civilians, Police and Military Officials Number 43
UN	The United Nations
UNDP	The United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UPPC	United Pattani People Council.
VSU	Village Security Unit

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

Bloody violence has surged in the Deep South of Thailand since the early 2004. Bombings and murders have almost become a daily occurrence with indistinct solution (Chalk, 2008). For example in 2004, the rebel executed e.g. several attacks on military and police installations, armies, and public facilities (schools, markets, shops, entertainment centers, and health centers) in the provinces of Pattani Yala and Narathiwat (Dorairajoo, 2004). Insurgency is a usual occurrence in the Deep South provinces : Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. Many target assassinations were directly Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists who was allegory a stead as an informant or an undercover agent for the state authorities. The deceiving and coordinating attacks were continuously occurred through the use mobile phones and internet signal. Insurgent has light weapons and explosive devices (IEDs) (Liow & Pathan, 2010).

Additionally, various factors such as ethnic identities, cultural diversities, and religions have intensified the conflict in the Deep South. Diversity dilemmas were particularly noticeable in population in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat where their local lifestyles, traditions, languages, cultures and religions are unique. The majority of local populations struggles due to for Malay and Thai Muslim(Advisory Council on Strengthening Peace, 2008: 15).

The origin of the current Malay Muslim insurgency against the Thai government could be traced in the past during the reign of Sultan Tengku Abdul Kadir when he was deposed and consequently replaced by the King Rama V's in 1902 (Shukri, 1985;

Human Right Watch, 2007). The majority population of the region consist approximately 80 percent of ethnic Malay where the Sultanate of Pattani ruled the area in 1902. The violent situation has been increasing, thus it brings widespread famine and unfairness towards Malay Muslims during World War II under Field Marshal Phor's administration (Naratwong, 2008:105).

Since 1960s, the separatist movements have been operating in the Deep South of Thailand. They have transformed in the last few decades. Below are some of the major groups, which have continued to be activity involved on violent attacks against the Thai government and its agents. First, the National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate known as *Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate* (BRN-C). This faction established in the early 1960s with the main aim to fight for an independent Pattani State. This faction is part of BRN that actively involved to help this group to seek for an independent Pattani State.

Although it is the largest and best organization of the armed groups in the region, however BRN-C focused on political organizing and recruitment in Islamic schools. Second, the Pemuda. It was a youth separatist movement which was a part of BRN-C controlled and prepares to sabotage, attack with a bomb and shoot. The third major group of separatist movement in 1995, Afghanistan veterans established the GMIP Pattani Islamic Mujahidin Group or known as *Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani* which aimed to support the independent Islamic state in Deep South of Thailand.

Lastly, in 1995, the New PULO as offshoot of PULO was established. It is the smallest, but an active armed group, dedicated and committed to fight to achieve an independent state (International Crisis Group, 2005: i). This consequently led to the gradual deterioration of the situation in the predominant Muslim provinces of Southern since 2004.

The conflict situations in this region become unpredictable due to the lack of policy continuity. This state of affairs is due to the political instability in the country resulting for the frequent changing of Bangkok governments. These in turn have also resulted into frequent changing of the SBPAC's leadership as every newly formed Bangkok governments appointed different the director of the organization. Worst of it, none of the appointed directors of the SBPAC are native of the region and therefore, they are detached or disconnected from the local community. In fact, the Malay Muslims considered SBPAC's leaders as strangers or even naive. It seems that it is very difficult for former to accept the latter as part of them. In this regard, Sombon strongly argues that the Thai government cannot solve the problem in the Deep South unless they confirm authority or power to the Malay Muslims to rule themselves within the framework of the country's constitution (Ahmad Sombon, Interview by author 2012).

The critical situations have been reduced when people had been gone more opportunities to take part in Thai politics during 1990s. In 2004, the situation became more violent again after the three following major outbreaks. On 4 January 2004, around 100 insurgents attacked the 4th Development Battalion at the Fort of Krom Luang Narathiwat Ratchanakarin, in Ban Pi Leng, Joh I Rong District, Narathiwat Province. The attackers killed four Buddhist soldiers, seizable 413 light infantry weapons, and burned 22 schools (Funston, 2008:5).

Since that notorious incidence, violence has continuously intensified. The hidden reason partly related to the government's misunderstanding on the special factors of the South (Melvin, 2007). Second, on 28 April 2004, insurgents attacked government offices in three southern border provinces that resulted 106 fatalities. These symbolic attacks

claimed 32 lives at the KreuSeh Mosque in Ban Tan Young, Lu Loh village, Muang district, Pattani province, which marked the anniversary of the Dussongyor treason in 1948. The Dussongyor treason was a violent clash between Thai government officials and a group of Thai Muslim ethnic Malays on 28 April 1948 (Smart News, 2011: 11).

Third, on 25 October 2004, the trigger occurrence exploded claimed more than 3,000 lives. The villagers protested at the Tak Bai police station in Narathiwat Province to call for the emancipation of six innocent village guards. Soldiers interfered, killed six protestors and arrested 1,300 people, who were sent to the Pattani Province in the Fort of Ingkayutaboriharn Barrack by trucks. On the way, 79 detainees died from suffocation caused by overcrowding (Wheller, 2010: 11). These caused shock and outrage, and provoked a major insurgency in the Deep South.

During 2005 and 2006 the conflict intensified. The insurgents continued their violent attacks against the Thai government and its agent. Between June 2005 to July 2005, the insurgents decapitated nine Buddhist Monks. In October 2005, the insurgents killed one monk and two temple boys in Pattani. In November 2006, the reaction of the kind incidents, 200 Buddhist villagers from Narathiwat and 40 Buddhist villager from Yala escaped to nearby temples and for a year, most of them remained there. Funston, however, argued that despite of all these Malay Muslims remained the main victims of the violence and in fact, they have still felt being discriminated by the government (Funston, 2008: 6).

After the coup on 19 September 2006, the new Thai government had done nothing to resolve the conflict. Brutality had reached its peak in March 2007, use the

insurgents ambushed and executed nine Buddhists commuters in a gangland-style execution. Then, the insurgents also decapitated people in the first half of the year. The assassination of the people always occurred in this region. They killed number of teachers and burned schools during 2006 to 2007 (Funston, 2008: 5).

A series of attacks had become more serious. Beginning the 1st half of 2007. On 9 May 2007, seven soldiers were killed as the result of o roadside bomb. On 31 May 2007, there were 12 soldiers death and on 15 June 2007, there were seven soldiers death. An increase in deaths from the conflict since 2004. According to official statistics the conflict killed over 400 soldiers in 2004, in 2005, there were approximately 500 soldiers, in 2006, there were approximately 900 soldiers, and in 2007, there were approximately 870 soldiers. The total death will approximate 3.000 until 2008 (Bangkok Post, 2008). The insurgents killed approximately 70 schoolteachers and administrators and they torched over 200 schools. From January 2004 to November 2010, there were at least 4,122 fatalities and an estimated 7,255 injured people badly affected in Southern Thailand (Smart News, 2011: 11).

As disclosure above, the various factors had contributed to the cause of the conflict and emerged huge problems in the Deep South of Thailand. The separatist movements have progressively developed and transformed their actions in attacking their targets in the area since 1960s. This condition caused the high cost in educational and economic areas. Moreover, the relations with communal were under strain at last.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the political, socio-economic and educational strategies management of the SBPAC in addressing the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand from 2006 up to 2012, using organizational theory. The SBPAC holds pertinent goals to resolve the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand. Planned and systematic strategies have been developed which comprised of raising social economic statues (SES) of the Deep South's population and to foster them better quality of work life. The implementation of internal and external investments and strengthening the community comfort as well as distributing community justice under the law and maintaining a community security in accordance with human rights are some examples of the approaches taken by the SBPAC.

The unrest situations in the Deep South of Thailand are proved to be very difficult to resolve. There are numbers of violence occurred constantly. Although the government tries to initiate various policies to stabilize the situations by establishing agencies and then monitor so as to control the region, but the situations still remain volatile. There are suspected influential factors that have contributed substantial effects on conflicts. For example, the inability of the central authority to distribute equitably its resources to its people could lead conflict to outburst. A comprehensive study is considered timely for the researcher to identify and uncover the possible potential factors which are prone to the occurrence of the conflicts in the Deep South.

The conflict in the Deep South of Thailand is directly related to a political-based problem, which causes from various factors whether identity crisis, historical narratives, educational imbalance, centralized government system and so on. Moreover, political

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approaches used as negotiable instrument to overpower disagreement and conflict (Daft, 1986: 399, Daft, 2001: 188). Therefore, the Thai government cannot only utilize the security measures but it needs to comprise all others significant measures in solving the conflict. Peace negotiation is one of significant instruments which have great impacts on decision-making that is applied to reach desired goal. Gale and Buchholz (1987) had mentioned that Strategic Political Management could promote a potential organization for enhancing the increase in production and advantage over competition. In order to gauge the strength and beneficial impacts through political measures, peace negotiation will be another landmark for the study to explore.

Human intelligence is influential and powerful to stimulate the community in the Deep South to prosper and grow. Good academic standard derived from the education system was considered vital for employees to support the organization in pursuing final goals (Hayeehma, 2009: 37). A planned, updated and systematic educational strategy is a basic tactic that would bring creativity, initiation and development across any segments of organization (Hodge *et al.*, 2003: 98). The Deep South comprised of multiple diversity and pluralistic people and culture difference that needs to be identified, attended and addressed their needs and necessities as one of the getaways for conflict to resolve. Thus, the educational strategies become another important aspect for the study especially the Pondok System among the Malay Muslims who holds a majority of population in the Deep South.

Socio-economic strategies are the essential planning and development of organization that might ensure the struggling to stay afloat and sustainable in long term. The economic framework is important and has a crucial impact on organization.

Furthermore, the economic state, such as currency fluctuation, unemployment and cost of workers, might affect the competitive advantage, thus the organization has to create socio-economic strategy to survive.

Apart from that, there are number of constraints that hinder the SBPAC in achieving its desired goal of peace, stability and prosperity in the Deep South. These include: lack of supportive officials from local communities operating its organization effectively and accomplishing its goals and strategies successfully. They occur and affect in various procedures of work, therefore, it is important for the SBPAC to learn closely and be wiser about its constraints in the deep details.

The supportive staff played important roles to translate and implement vision, mission and goals of the SBPAC. Most of the SBPAC's officials come from other regions of Thailand. This phenomenon could lead to limited access and holistic understanding of the true characteristics and cultural diversity of the local people in the area. Thus, human relation is considered central to the attainment of goals of the SBPAC and failure to address the humanistic approach will create conflicts and retard the speed of the SBPAC operational activities in the Deep South.

The critical aspect of ineffective project management system will be another focal point to conduct for this study. Many of the projects are considered unsuccessful because the organization does not have effective monitoring and evaluation methods. Thus, the current method of evaluation will be judged and correctional and remedies will be imposed. Through the study, the SBPAC will be able to locate the loopholes, correct them and reevaluate them to assess the successes and failures of the projects.

1.3 Research Questions

This study has several questions. These include:

1. What are the political, socio-economic and educational strategies of the SBPAC in managing the conflict in the Deep Southern of Thailand?

2. Have these strategies been consistent with its goals? Are there any changes in the SBPAC's strategies, and if there are, how do these changes affect its goals, capabilities and resources?

3. Have these strategies been effective? Are the SBPAC's strategies and resources compatible?

4. What are the constraints being faced by the SBPAC in its adoption of its strategies?

5. How do these constraints affect the SBPAC's goals and strategies?

1.4 Research Objectives

1. To examine the political, educational and socio-economic strategies of the SBPAC in managing conflict in the Deep South of Thailand.

2. To examine and analyse the strategies being adopted by the SBPAC in its quest of resolving the conflict in the Deep South.

3. To discuss the changes of the SBPAC's strategies, if it has, and analyse how these changes affect its goals, capabilities and resources.

4. To evaluate the effectiveness of the SBPAC's strategies.

5. To discuss the constraints being faced by the SBPAC and understand how these constraints affect its organizational goals and strategies.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study is important for several reasons. First, we have entered an area where conflicts have become the critical issue for a modern society, therefore this study found out the different strategies used by the SBPAC in managing conflict. Then, perhaps, this research study may enhance knowledge on contemporary political systems, relations among states, non-state and sub-state actors, organizational approaches, conflict management theories, identity and cultural politics as well as how they relate to conflict. Last, the findings of the research would contribute into the conflict management campaigns on conflict mitigation and thus creates long-term conflict mitigation and reconciliation, and increase social responsibility. It may also provide a model of conflict management in resolving conflict in the region not only for Thai Government (the national, provincial and district level), but also for some other conflict settings.

1.6 Literature Review

This section is divided into two parts. Part one reviews conflict management, in general. The other part specifically discusses the management conflict in Deep South of the region. It is important to note here that in order to avoid repetitive discussions; the theory of organization will be discussed in the proceeding section on the theoretical framework.

1.6.1 General Literature Review on Conflict Management

With the downfall of the Berlin Wall and the eventual collapse of the former USSR, which consequently led to the end of the Cold War gave rise to a popular belief that the

United Nations (UN) would at last be able to make significant development towards its strategic goal of maintaining international rule of law and that the diffusion of the principles of human rights, market economics and democracy would promote its aims of freedom and progress or development. This optimism, however, has been marred by an outbreak of violent separatist conflicts, more specifically, in the last quarter of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. These violent outbursts are global phenomena that can be found almost everywhere and, therefore, need urgent, strong resolve by the international community within the framework of the UN.

The global destructive effects of violent separatist and other communal conflicts have certainly its human and social consequences (AbdelSalam, 2004: 1). These are global phenomena which have mainly exacerbated the gross reality of underdevelopment and poverty in most of the countries in the volatile regions of Asia, Africa and South America.

In his book entitled "Conflict Analysis," Nicholsom argues that conflict starts when individual group of people have action with different objectives (Nicholsom, 1972: 8). This was echoed by Coser and Deng when they argue that conflict as the situation that more than two groups have the aim in the same way, however there are divergence of role that may lead to a great controversy (Coser, 1956; & Deng, 1996: 220).

This means that people could commonly hold different opinions that naturally would lead to the existence of conflict in every part of the world. This can also be said that the conflict exists in normal human relations. Similarly, they believe that when the majority of two groups have considerable disagreement about something and the interest is incompatible with each other then conflict would arise (Amer & Keyuan, 2011: 3;

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Elfatih, 2004: 1). However, this conflict could be eased away through understanding (Zartman, 1991: 299).

Having said that, perhaps, it is important to note that there are many influential factors that have a substantial effect on conflict. For example, the inability of the central authority to distribute equitably its resources to its people could lead to conflict. Such phenomenon would likely cause violent reactions from any individuals or groups who may perceive as victims of such economic deprivation. In this connection, they assert that the major cause of conflict come from humanity and social context (Brown, 2005 & Murshed, 2002: 387-388; Elfatih, 2004: 1). With this, they conclude that this phenomenon has been serious issue that people in society must deeply concern about the progress of culture, society, politics and economy (Brown, 2005 & Murshed, 2002: 387-388).

Similarly, some scholars reveal that the cause of conflict begin with the fundamental problem or political topic that is divergence of interest in society, different perception of discrimination, central authority, different opinion and explanation of right, equity and fairness, either in the degree of the international, regional or national levels (Stedman, 1991& Yakubu, 2005: 406).

However, some argue that conflicts may cause from the problem of poverty, migration, human right, economical and political ideology (Conversi, 2004 & Yakubu, 2005: 406; Askandar, 2000: 20; Askandar 1996). Some causes of conflict are related to economic inequality and lack of political dispensation (Gurr, 1989: 13, 100-1). For example, when people are concerned about the difference between things that they get and things that are really get from their society (Schock, 1996: 101). This economic inequality may occur in the deep feeling of people (Gurr, 1989: 13).

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Economic inequality is important in human societies and it is basic in theory of relative deprivation. For this reason, he believes that economic inequality could not stimulate sense of self-determination and independence (Elfatih, 2004: 1). With this, Elfatih persuasively argues that one of the reasons that lead to the emergence of independence movements is due to an unfair treatment from other groups which consequently lead to political violence (Elfatih, 2004: 1 & Schock. 1996: 110).

However, Toft argues that the main cause of conflict is related to problems of ethnic integration. This argument was based on studies of ethnic conflict and minorities (Toft, 2003: 34). Gurr (2000) found that different political perspective in the past and present could motivate separatist movements. Separatist movements tend to arise during volatile times of transition or crises, when minorities have strong emotion of ethnic and religious identity, face oppression from the government, and are restricted in their political activities.

It is widely accepted that the oppression of working class is about exploitation, discrimination, travesty and inequality. The economic exploitation could lead to grievances and discontent within group. It also could lead to simplistic struggling with consideration over organizational and ideological factors. Therefore, the rebels facilitate class struggle in relation to the background of history stimulate people by using situation of social changing, political conflict and coup (Shock, 1996: 102 & Balam and Veseth, 2001). This argument seems to assert that primarily, exploitation, discrimination, travesty and inequality can trigger grievances and dissatisfaction.

1.6.2 Conflict Management in Deep South of Thailand

In general, there are several writings on the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand. Most of these researchers discussed the reasons why the secessionist conflicts have occurred. However, this study analyzes works that deal with the strategies management of the Thai government through the SBPAC in their quest to address the conflict in the region. The magnitude of the conflict and violence between the Thai government and secessionist groups has been increasing, thus, a sizeable number of writings have emerged.

Some scholars indirectly suggest the Thailand government, in general, and the SBPAC, in particular to look into a more comprehensive approach in resolving the conflict in the Deep South of the country. In this regard, the government in Bangkok can take measures to develop their new counter-insurgency to make a situation equal or fair again in political, economic and cultural areas (Croissant, 2007: 14). He seems to suggest that the Bangkok government needs to know one of the most common causes of conflict in this area and how to specifically address them so as to settle them for good.

Similarly, Morgan and others argue that there are several factors that cause the latest outburst of violent ethno-religious (Conteh-Morgan, 2004; Taras and Rajat Ganguly, 2002; Horowitz, 2000; Riggs, 2002; Fearon and David. D. Laitin, 2003; Askandar, 2000: 19). They emphasized several structural components such as the marginalization of social and economic areas, the differences of religious between the local community, and the historical background of the people. The impacts of these structural components conflict between ethnic communities.

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This analysis holds the view that "structural" components (historical concerns, religious differences, and social & economic marginalization) have resulted due to the Malay Muslims' grievances and a latent crisis in inter-ethnic relations. Ramikrishna, however, argues that the drift toward aggression is caused by their measures are strongly supported by environmental groups which allow the insurgency to develop (Ramikrishna, 2005: 145-169). As a result, Albritton forcefully argues that in order to overcome the conflict in the region, the Bangkok government should change their strategies through an introduction of decentralized system and promisable future insurances economic development (Albritton, 2005: 171-172).

Indeed, Thailand made significant strides in 2004 toward what Likhit Dhiravegin called "one of the most revolutionary changes in Thai history." Carrying out constitutional requirements for government decentralization, the government of Thailand applied elections for Tambon (sub-district) councils, Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAOs), as well as executive chairmen of Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAOs). In some cases, these elections were won by constituencies who opposed administrative practices of the bureaucracy, especially administration of community forests in Chiang Mai and fisheries in the South.

Buasri and Deesuankoke reveal that Malay Muslims have the desire to resolve their problems without the official authorities 'hand (Buasri and Deesuankoke, 2006: 195). This means the Malay Muslims wanted to sort their problems through the recommendations and findings of an elder or Chao Kote. This traditional system has been practiced by other Thai societies like the Northeastern people, which include parents, monks, and the elderly. Most teenagers do not get use to this term, Chao Kote,

but they seem to know other word instead, for example Por Yai / Mae Yai. When villagers face their problems, the first person that they would consult would be the elder in the family.

However, if the problem cannot be resolved, they may ask the assistance from the police. Perhaps, a typical example of this kind is the Muang Fai management system, which is organized by users themselves, which has been in function for more than 700 years. A community organization consist of various sizes of reservoirs, and a committee and Kae Muang Kae Fai in which the community nominate the supervision, coordination, and allocation of benefits through a fair, simple and accountable system of water management.

In his article, entitled "The Politicization of Ethnic Sentiment in Southern Thailand," Taya found that:

> the politicization of ethnic sentiment is by product of structural inequalities ... which play an important role in intensifying the conflicts. As a result, the Malay Muslims established their own ethnic associations which are responsible for development of strong group identification which has led to the emergence of secessionist groups... that threatens the core values of the Kingdom of Thailand (Taya, 2011: 149-161).

It seems there is an increase magnitude of an escalation of the conflict mainly due to the social grievance of the people of the Deep South of the country, which causes an endless bloodshed in the region. In this regard, they point out that the Tak Bai suffocation ... a possible effect or result of an action of Thai government namely the Southern Muslim communities have a new sense of solidarity to fight the central government (Jitpiromsri and Sobonvasu, 2006).

Thus, based on this argument, perhaps it is safe to say that the objective of some rebels and insurgents in the south of Thailand is not to separate from Thailand, but rather

to fight against the actions of central government officials. This is because there are strong feelings that the Thai justice system is unfair because of racial prejudice and the loss of identity in Malayu Pattani (Askew, 2007: 100). Moreover, the cause of the southern Thai conflict is deeply rooted in the deteriorating relationship between government and society. Local distrust also happened between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims. Geographical location is one of the main factors of conflict (Askew, 2009: 86).

The southern provinces are very far from the capital city; Bangkok, making it difficult to obtain accurate information from the government and difficult to understand the different culture of the 'Deep South'. This region is very similar to neighboring Malaysia in terms of social, cultural and religious aspects. Therefore, it will almost certainly have a closer relationship with Malay people than with Thai people. The conflict in the region is very complex one. It depends which side we stand for. So in this connection Boonnag say that the political history of Pattani has been referred to as a "discrepancy of perspectives," or two sides of the coin, because it depends on the perceptions between the Thai government and Pattani (Boonnag, 2003: 35).

1.7 Theoretical Framework

In analyzing the SBPAC's strategies in addressing the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand, the researcher has adapted the organizational approach. There are many theories that are useful in examining this research study. For instance, the system which based on a conception of a political phenomena as a system of interrelated and reciprocally regulated patterns of actions and orientations that cluster together in equilibrium and have certain needs for maintenance and survival (Scarrow, 1969: 59). Easton assumed that there are certain basic political activities and processes

characteristics of all political systems, even though, the structural forms through which they manifest themselves and they do vary considerably in each places and in each age (Easton, 1965: 61). The system approach, however, has been criticized for its excessive concerns with the persistence and survival of political systems. Similarly, functional approach is one of the major theoretical perspectives in sociology. It is also based on a conception of a political phenomenon as a system of interrelated and reciprocally regulated patterns of actions and orientations that cluster together in equilibrium and have certain needs for maintenance and survival (Scarrow, 1969: 59). Functional approach emphasizes the consensus and order that exist in society, focusing on social stability and shared public values to achieve stability. Almond Gabriel, in his functional approach utilizes the concept of political system (Gabriel, 1960: 4).

The researcher, however, believes that the organization theory is the most suitable one. Organizational theory is "the study of how organization function work and how they affect and are affected by the environment in which they operate. Understanding how organizations operate, nevertheless, is only the first step in learning how to control and change conflict by applying the organizational approach." Indeed, the studies of organizations have gained currency due to extreme usefulness in people's daily business life. In this juncture, he argues:

> that the study of organizations have acquired paramount importance because of the roles that organizations play in shaping destiny of millions of people. Therefore, we have sought to examine and identify the general nature of such organization's goals, strategies, capabilities, constraints and structures. Indeed, the organizational theorists have aims such as, trying to make peace between the warring factions; making prosperity; and achieving social justice in the community (Taya, 2006: 20; Hall, 1982: 26).

Taya quoted Barnard as defining those organizations as "systems of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons" (Taya, 2006: 20; Barnard, 1938: 73). Daft also defines organizations as social communities that have target and are designed in order to have corporative activities in any systems and thus get involve with environment (Daft, 2001: 5). This definition seems to suggest that organizations are dynamics and have their own specific goals or objectives to achieve. Another scholar also argues that "organizations as a social units (or human groupings) deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals. Corporations, armies, schools, hospitals, churches, and prisons are included; tribes, classes, ethnic groups, and families are excluded" (Etzioni, 1964: 3). Additionally, organizations can be defined as social units composed of individuals and they are specifically created for the pursuit of certain objectives. The above-mentioned assertions were also echoed by Scott when he says:

> that organizations can be defined as collectivities ... that have been established for the pursuit of relative specific objectives on a more or less continuous basis. It should be clear, however, that organizations have distinctive features other than goal specificity and continuity. These include relatively fixed boundaries, a normative order, authority ranks, a communication system and an incentive system which enables various types of participants to work together in the pursuit of common goals" (Scott, 1964: 488).

However, organization is not only a grouping of individuals, but also a number of functions that are brought together alongside individuals. The concept of goal is another basic element of this definition; the term, "productive relationship", simply implies that the individuals and functions are brought together for the objective of producing goods or services. When the above definitions are evaluated carefully, it is obvious that there are certain common elements in the definitions of different scholars regarding the

concept of organization. These common elements are a grouping of individuals, deliberate establishment or construction, and the accomplishment of specific goals. Refer to the above common elements, we will define organizations as "social units or human groupings deliberately established for the accomplishment of specific objectives." Ministries, corporations, universities, hospitals, schools, political parties, prisons, associations etc; are organizations in this sense.

According to the *Diagram 1.1,* it shows the diagram of theoretical framework for organizational approach. The composition of theoretical framework in this research can be divided into four parts: Goals, Structures, Strategies, and Capacities and Constraints.

1.7.1 Organizational Goals

An organizational goal is "a desired state of affairs that the organization attempts to reach" (Etzioni, 1964: 6). The goal of organizational efforts has a result or end point. This aim will influencing the design of organization. Currently, an organizational goal seems becoming more complex and even complicated. It is difficult to find organization that has only one goal. It would be interesting to determine the definition of goal.

The aim of organizational is defined as the declaration of organization that set up the targeted goal which organization have to attain (Hodge et al., 2003: 54). The organizational goal is extremely a vital part of organization. There are two purposes that make organizational goal important. First, goals express the objective and make the organization remain existence. If there is no goal, then an organization does not necessarily to exist. Second, if organization carries out the goal, it will be a profit on organization such as legitimacy, direction, motivation, guidelines, certainty and criteria of performance (Daft, 1986: 93-95).

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Many types of goal existed in an organization. The organizational goals are divided into two groups, an official goal and an operative goal (Hayeehma, 2009: 30). The operative goal is easier to understand and can be measured than official goal (Daft, 1986: 99). The official goal is the formal aim that organization has to achieve and it is written commonly in policy framework or annual report and is also widely publicized. Additionally, the official goal is normally related to legitimacy of organization (Daft, 1986: 95). It is generally believed that official goal stress on wide tactics and the objective of official goal is establishing the guideline of regulation, for instance, publicizing new product into new market (Hodge et al., 2003: 55).

Another types of goal is operative goal, which is a basic task of organization. Such goal has to be carried out in order to lead an organization to reach its official goals. The operative goals are the real perform of organizations that need to operate properly in organization (Hayeehma, 2009: 31). In addition, the operative goals involve with operational action in a short period of time. The operative goal might be able to preserve the whole organizational goal to gain more earnings (Daft, 1986: 96-99). The operative goals are precise job and it is quite restricted goal of organization. The purpose of operative goal is the guideline of individual action, for instance, creating job descriptions in all departments of organization (Hodge et al., 2003: 54-55). Each operative goal is overall action, resource, marketing, worker improvement, innovation and productivity (Daft, 1986: 97-99).

1.7.2 Organizational Structure

Organizational structure is "the formal system of task and authority relationships that control how people coordinate their actions and use resources to achieve organizational goal" (Child, 1977: 8). The first aim of organizational structure is control. In achieving organizational goal, the people have to control their actions and in motivating people, they have to achieve the goal of organizational. One of way the facilitates effective to coordinate and to motivate people is a compatible structure. The structure of organizational also grows to manage and change the process of organizational design. By organizational structure this means "the distributions, along various lines, of people among social positions that influence the role relations among these people" (Blau, 1974: 12).

The organizational framework should be designed with the aim to coordinate with all workers in all departments, and to describe duty, responsibility and relation within organization (Daft, 1986: 215). The organizational structure can be divided into two types vertical and horizontal linkage that most of organizations have to mix with these systems, and it is the responsibility of the leader to find the suitably mixed structure of the organization. First, vertical linkage is applied to control the performance of organization and allow coordinated alteration from the top to bottom of the hierarchical level (Daft, 1986: 217). This structure is about centralized system, which the workers have to do all of specific activities under the desired goal and guideline and control by the higher position in organization (Daft, 1986: 217; Daft, 2001: 36; van Dam and Marcus, 2007: 379). This linkage is designed to promote a greater efficiency in the system and there are numerous regulations and tough hierarchy. It would appear that the

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achievable leadership is extremely essential to ensure the successful task and targeted goal of organization (van Dam and Marcus, 2007: 379).

Moreover, many structural tools, such as regulation and scheme, hierarchy and information system reach the vertical structure. The normal information is provided to the staff member by rules and plan devices from the top level. Thus, when minor problem exist, the workers will be able to know how to deal with it. Hierarchical referral is the chain of command system, for example, if the workforce cannot deal with problem, they have to report up to the next level in the hierarchy. After that, the solution should be publicized to the lower employee. Finally, the vertical information systems are composed of official information, occasional report and computer system. The information systems tend to make the effective system of coordination between the top and bottom of the hierarchy (Daft, 2001: 36).

In addition, several influential factors can affect the vertical linkage such as cost, personal factor, management and society. Cost factor can lead to achievable operation and high productivity. Personal factor includes responsibility, decision-making power and variety. Organizational management factor should be effective and the leader should have innovative vision. Lastly, social motivation, such as, personal health and safety measures (van Dam and Marcus, 2007: 380)

Second, the horizontal structure is designed for learning relation to the coordination and communication, between the horizontal organizations to achieve unity of cooperation (Daft, 2001: 36). All of the staffs in every part of organization should pay considerable attention with their assignments, otherwise lack of concentration on task might cause unsuccessful goal (van Dam & Marcus, 2007: 380). This structure is decentralized system that is horizontal communication without strict hierarchy. There is

a tendency for face-to face communication between all of the staffs in the department (Daft, 2001: 36). It seems that the key point of horizontal linkage is that all of the staff member should communicate, coordinate and control across the organization (Daft, 1986: 217). The main objective of this linkage does not only describe duty in the same hierarchy, but also find the comprehensible task within the department (van Dam & Marcus, 2007: 380).

There are many system devices that can lead to successful horizontal linkage (Daft, 1986: 218; Daft, 2001: 36). For example, computer network can facilitate the communication between the workers in the bottom level with the exclusive manager via computerized information systems (Daft, 2001: 36). Additionally, a working group is the most important part in horizontal structure. An effective working team is empowered to coordinate activities in organization over a long period of time and to create innovative products or development projects.

1.7.3 Organizational Strategic Management

An organization's strategy is "a specific pattern of decisions and actions that the managers or leaders take and use the organization's core competencies to achieve a competitive advantage and outperform competitors" (Chandler, 1962: 73). Stakeholders created the value as a strategy to develop an organization. Through its strategy, a competitive advantage is gained through the use and development of the core competencies. The result is the increasement of scarce resources in its environment. "Organizational strategy allows an organization to shape and manage its domain, to exploit its existing core competencies and develop new competencies that make it a better competitor for resources" (Jones, 2001: 201).

Zaman defined strategies as the systematic relationship between capacity and final goal (Zama,1990: 8.) Robbins and Barnwell had expressed a similar view of strategic definition as the decisive action on using essential resource in order to achieve the ambitious objectives and long-term goal of the organization (Robbins and Barnwell, 1998: 105). Therefore, it is almost certain that capabilities of staffs in organizational system and available resources are dramatically influenced by organizational strategies to accomplish the specific objectives.

In this research, there are several types of organizational strategies, they are political, educational, and socio-economic strategies.

1.7.3.1 Political Strategies

A political strategy is one of the important organizational strategies that refer to the set of strategic actions, which are designed to advertise the political interests in organization. Political organization has a great impact on decision-making that is applied to reach desired goal. Moreover, politics is used as negotiable instrument to overpower disagreement and conflict (Daft, 1986: 399, Daft, 2001: 188). Strategic political management could promote a potential organization for enhancing the increase in production and advantage over competition (Gale & Buchholz, 1987: 39). The definition of political organization is the action in organization to evolve, obtain, and use authority and available resources to get one individual result within unclear situation (Daft, 1986: 399, Hodge et al., 2003: 319). Because of conflict and argument are inherent in organization and inevitable, therefore, it is quite possible that political strategy is a process to overcome disagreement when the regulation and experiential learning cannot be achieved (Daft, 1986: 403, Daft, 2001: 188).

However, political procedure would be the downside and upside of power (Daft, 2001: 188). In addition, there are alternative factors that might bring political strategy to be successful. For example, personal charisma of leader can make the staffs in organization attain the desire goal. Not only the effective leader is crucial, but also the degree of support all of staff member in all segments is of paramount importance to make the organization significant progress continuously (Hayeehma, 2009: 35). Additionally, the external factor such as surrounding environment seems to stimulus initiation and innovation of member in any organizational system.

1.7.3.2 Educational Strategies

Human resources are the main section in organization, especially a good educational standard and thus, educational strategy is a basic tactic that would bring creativity, initiation and development across any segments of organization (Hodge *et al.*, 2003: 98). The human intelligence is influential and powerful to stimulus the evolution of organization to move forward effectively. Not only the education of the leader, but also good academic standard from all of the employees makes the organization pursue a final goal (Hayeehma, 2009: 37). For example, an organization in the innovative business and modern technology field, the organization should hire highly educated people from high-standard academic institutes (Hodge *et al.*, 2003: 98).

1.7.3.3 Socio-Economic Strategies

Socio-economic strategies are the essential planning and development of organization that might ensure the struggling to stay afloat and sustainable in long term. The economic framework is important and has a crucial impact on organization. Furthermore,

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the economic state, such as currency fluctuation, unemployment and cost of workers, might affect the competitive advantage, thus the organization has to create socio-economic strategy to survive. (Hodge et al., 2003: 96). In addition, organization is a part of society, so it seems that it is organization responsibility to make it sustainable by focusing on business approach and environmental action. For example, Starbucks made commitment to social responsibility by developing the satisfaction of customer, involving with society and environment (van Dam & Marcus, 2007: 61-62). There are several factors that could maximize the effectiveness of socio-economic strategies, for instance, investment, modern technology, and financial income (e.g. tax) (Hayeehma, 2009: 36).

1.7.3.4 Organizational Capacities and Constraints

In competitive technological world, organizational capacities and constraints are important to reflect how successful organization is, how it can survive and sustain for a long term and how to reach its goal. The effective organizations rely on their activities and the need to realize the capacity and constraint in any sections of organization. The possibility exists of high capacities seem to carry out properly within its strategies.

1.7.3.4.1 Capacities of the Organization

Barney defined organizational capacities as the potential of system that can cooperate and utilize their available resources in organization (Barney, 1991: 51). They can also define as the capacity of organization which is related to tangible or intangible capacities that can operate activities in organization in order to develop the performance (Maritan, 2001: 514). In addition, they are classified into two groups; tangible capacities and intangible capacities. The organizational capacity that might result in competitive

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advantage is marketing strategy and technological capability (Ulrich and Lake, 1991: 77-78). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1107) defined dynamic capabilities as the company procedure that can be able to use as resources and can make market changing. The tangible capacities include strategy, finance and technology, whilst intangible capacity is leadership.

Firstly, strategic capacity, the key question is how the organization be capable for competitive advantages and has sustainable ability to overcome competitive companies, which are the fundamental factors that can lead to a successful organization (Lee, 2001: 324-25). It means that the organization can produce remarkably distinctive product or offer a good service that able to satisfy the customer than the other rivals. In brief, the customers are satisfied that the organization can give the competitive advantage to them than the other counterparts. It is generally accepted that the key factor of successful strategy is finding the new acquisition of capabilities and learning from the past experience.

Secondly, financial capacity has been increasing important part in organization because of changing financial markets and products. This capacity is related to individual knowledge of finance that has ability to choose the right product in the right position, plan the financial set-up and give a good advice sometimes (O'Donnell & Keeney, 2009: 2). Financial capacity is defined by HM Treasury as the following: "Financial capability is a broad concept, encompassing people's knowledge and skills to understand their own financial circumstances, along with the motivation to take action.

Financially capable consumers plan ahead, find and use information, know when to seek advice and can understand and act on this advice, leading to greater participation in the financial services market" (HM Treasury, 2007: 19). According to HM Treasury

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(2007: 7), the beneficial development of financial capability can decrease the debt and welfare; increase the saving money and being effectiveness, innovation, and globalized competition.

Finally, technological capacity, it is the crucial principle for organization to survive in the modern world. The definition of technology has expounded, as "Technology is the term used referring to the work performed by organization Technology refers to the knowledge, tools, machines, information, skills, and material used to complete tasks within organizations, as well as the nature of the outputs of the organization" (Hodge et al., 2003: 142).

In the modern world, it is generally accepted that the majority of organizations use technology to perform. Technological capacity is one of the crucial parts of organization (Arnold and Thuriaux, 1997). Moreover, technological innovation may also help people in different part of the world to communicate with each other and do their work effectively. The expansion of communication networks has been influentially affected on technological capacity in organization.

Van Dam and Marcus have drawn attention to the fact that internet technology has been of paramount importance to globalization world since the end of the 1990s. Electronic markets have been spread through the modern world, thus, everyone can access the public information and perform activities via the network (Van Dam & Marcus, 2007: 52-53). Technological capacity can leads to effective organization and being survival of any organization. It would appear that organizations have to provide effective technology and maintain the technological system in order to create the superior product or best service (Hodge et al., 2003: 97).

Leadership is one of the intangible capacities. The leader of organization should have wide vision, be articulating with self-confidence and always support all of members both inside and outside the organization. In addition, the leaders can empower all of the workers under their commands and support the workers to achieve their work (Van Dam & Marcus, 2007: 229). On this basis, it can be concluded that successful organization is the outcome and this can reflect the effectiveness of leadership in all parts of the department (Ulrich & Lake, 1991:85). However, the effective leadership not only depends on ability and education, but also in life experience (Van Dam & Marcus, 2007: 229).

Unity of workforce in organizational workplace is one of concerned issue. Disunity may lead to chaos, which could occur disruptive functioning of organizational system, while unity would be a fundamental factor for pursuing a final goal smoothly. Therefore, it can be deduced that disunity may lead to ineffective activities, whereas unity is a strong strength of successful organization (Hayeema, 2009: 44).

1.7.3.4.2 Constraints of the Organization

Constraints in organization are inherent in all of procedures of performance. Therefore, it is the crucial need for organization to carefully learn and understands it in details. These include variable factors like policies, regulations and modern technologies. In the terms of policy, it is "a plan of action adopted by an individual or social group it was a policy of retribution a politician keeps changing his policies, through a line of argument rationalizing the course of action of a government."

A decision or sets of decisions are example of policy. Principle or protocol in a policy is used to guide decisions in achieving rational outcomes. A statement of intent in

a policy can be implemented as a procedure or protocol. The Board of or senior governance body within an organization adopted policies whereas senior executive officers developed and adopted procedures or protocols. Subjective and objective decision-making can be used to assist policies. Senior management is assisted by policies in subjective decision making so that the relative merits of a number of factors before making decisions must be considered, such as, work-life balance policy.

In contrast, objective decision-making can be assisted by policies. It operations in nature and it can be tested objectively, for example the policies of government, private sector organizations and groups, and individuals. The examples of policy namely presidential executive orders, corporate privacy policies, and parliamentary rules of order. Rules or law different from policy. In law, behaviors can be prohibited or law can force somebody to do something (the payment of taxes on income is required by a law). In policy, actions toward those that are most likely to achieve a desired outcome can be guided by policy (FAO-UN, 2013).

One of example of vertical or horizontal policy are substantive and administrative policies. It needs some responsibilities for its implementation. The normal or traditional way in policy decision is the criteria of vertical policy. A single organizational structure develops vertical policy and broad overarching policy is due to begin in general sometimes called corporate or framework. The head office is a place to make a decision and as a guide to the next decisions in organization.

Regional or strategically policy can be developed at the regional level where the national decisions can be part of the regional level with a specific context. Finally, operational decision-making can be guided by the regional policy. The contrary view is done by horizontal policy. Two or more organizations developed policy which has one

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the ability to control the situation. Parts of an organization or among organizational components creates horizontal or integrated policy that are similar in hierarchical position (Smith, 2003).

Regulation is a legal restriction basically. Administration secretarial agencies promulgate the regulation with the help of rule making where a risk of permit or a fine as a support. It has distinction to constitutional or case law. For example: attempts to control market entries, prices, wages, pollution effects, employment for certain people in certain industries, standards of production for certain goods and services are made by the regulation. An example of an outcome of inferior legislation is a regulation. In order to put into practice most important part of legislation properly uses regulation or in the regular accomplishment of the most important part of legislation as a factor up-and comint at some stage. Primary or delegated legislation establishes the following a process of the promulgation, monitoring, and enforcement of rules (David & Cisternino, 2009)

Limits or constrains a right, creates or limits a duty, or allocates a responsibility are created by regulation. The forms of regulation, such as, a government authority promulgated many forms legal restrictions; many parties are bound by contractual obligations; an industry has self-regulation such as through a trade association, social regulation, co-regulation, third party regulation, certification, accreditation or market regulation. In its legal sense, primary legislation and judge are significantly different from regulation.

"Regulation mandated by a state attempts to produce outcomes which might not occur, produce or prevent outcomes in different places to what might occur, or produce or prevent outcomes in different timescales than would occur. In this way, regulations

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can be seen as implementation artifacts of policy statements. Common examples of regulation include controls on market entries, prices, wages, development approvals, pollution effects, employment for certain people in certain industries, standards of production for certain goods, the military forces and services. The economics of imposing or removing regulations relating to markets is analysed in regulatory economics" (David & Cisternino, 2009).

Regarding modern technology, nowadays technology is created by us, but we are also created by technology. Today, in tremendous leaps and bounds has been advanced by technology. Science applied to practical purposes as a definition of technology. A teaching model is supported by networks that provides students the opportunity to learn by solving problems. The students are helped by technology in their search for knowledge and solutions. Students access to materials can be provided by the World Wide Web such as scientific journals and up-to-date research data that can take years for textbooks to offer.

Our society can use computer in general. People have computer at home that is connected to the Internet as a description of modern countries life. Students can take many advantages in an online world. Their work can be shared with others around the world, access are provided to various cultures and perspectives that they would not encounter in everyday experiences. Our lives are changed by modern technologies and the economy to grow and assisted by the technology. New challenges have been also given to us for problem solving. The world's fastest with the high-tech industry growing manufacturing industry. Millions of new businesses and jobs has been created. In addition, the work in all kinds of businesses and industries have been speeded by high-

tech devices. Work faster and easier are made by high technology. The economy to grow has been helped by the high-tech industry (Brown & Marin, 2009).

The usage of machines as a part of modern technology for future better living. For example, the act of improving in communication will be advantageous through email, phone fax and many others. Computer can improve the transportation by air, train or car. People develop modern technology within the last few years. For example, the system of computer uses modern technology such as Windows 10 and Microsoft's new operating system. Our life can be improved by technology, nevertheless, there are also problems and hard choices that would occur.

A new problem has also been created by modern technology. The environment is changed by technology. For example, "it is not easy to balance economic growth and protection of the environment. The manufacturing of electronics parts uses thousands of poisonous chemicals. In the past 30 years, these chemicals have polluted the ground and water near the electronics factories. In addition, many workers have become sick after being around these materials. Electronic products have also created a huge problem of poisonous waste. Most people throw away their old televisions and computers, the harmful chemicals poison the ground and water. Today, this kind of E-waste is the fastest growing waste problem in the world" (Shane & Albert, 2008).

The theories of organizational approach that mentioned above are all essential in comprehending the organization characteristic and how it can work effectively. Each theory contributes to understanding of particular dimension of an organization. It would be interesting to analyze an important theoretical framework (e.g. strategies, structure and limitation) that can be seen from *figure 1.1*. Thus, this is the whole concept of

organization that could be useful to look at the different perspective of organizational approach.

Diagram 1.1 Components of the Organizational Approach

(Source: Adapted from Taya, S. L. (2006: 45). The Strategies and Tactics of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Southern Philippines, 1994-2005: An Organizational Approach. Ph.D. Thesis at International Islamic University Malaysia: IIUM Gombak Malaysia)

1.8 Research Methods

As pointed earlier, the purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the political, socio-economic and educational strategies management of the SBPAC in resolving the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand from 2006 up to 2012, using organizational theory. It is a qualitative study. Data collection of this study relies on document study, using both primary and secondary sources.

The primary sources include the SBPAC Annual Reports (Annual Report by The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center from 2007 up to 2012), policy statements (The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Act, 2010 was published on Government Gazette, Volume 107, 80 a, on 29 December 2010 and Policy Statement of The Council of Ministers Delivered by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to The National Assembly 2008), speeches (Prime Minister Surayut, November 2, 2006), and press releases.

Interviews with prominent and knowledgeable people were also conducted. These prominent and knowledgeable people include provincial governors, head of security forces, prominent scholars of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. The data gathered here is carefully analyzed, interpreted and explained under two focal factors of the study, which are, history of conflict in Thailand and their implications on the present condition, and conflict management by Thailand Government in political, economic and social factors. These interviews were conducted in an unstructured manner. Informants came from all relevant southern agencies; including representatives of the people of southern Thailand were also interviewed. This cross-sectional approach helped us to examine key questions about strategies management as well as current conflicts related to local

representation, identities and interests in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. It is expected that this approach can be used to better understand the southern Thai conflict.

Nowadays, Social Science and other relevant disciplines pay more attention to qualitative research methods. Because of this method can answer to the problems that occur in today's society. However, this approach seeks to understand the behavior and social interaction in a natural context and understand things in the aspect of the actor. It accepts subjectivity of the community and analyzes the stories and social life of a person's actions that change into conditions of time and circumstances. In theory, quantitative and qualitative researches utilize observation methods to decode the workings of social, cultural, and legal process.

Quantitative research is designed to test the hypotheses, factors would be considered to assess quantitative research design including external validity. If the data are of high quality in the first place, a qualitative analysis will only show valid results. Nevertheless, qualitative research usually tries to answer a question rather than to test the hypotheses. Qualitative researchers examine continuous social processes, these processes produce study reports or artifacts and talk to people who involve or are influenced by being studied process. A high quality study will produce valuable and multi-faceted knowledge of particular phenomena (Hall, 2005)

Qualitative research is a pattern of systematic observed inquiry within meaning Shank (2002). Members of the Qualitative research community agree to definite that systematic means planned, ordered and public. Meaning of experimental is a kind of inquiry is based on the world of experience. Researchers attempt to understand how others comprehend their experience is to inquiry. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) mentioned that an interpretive and naturalistic approach are also qualitative research: "This means

that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them". This study employs qualitative research method.

This thesis involves sustained periods of fieldwork in Southern Thailand. Data collection and empirical analysis were undertaken using qualitative methods including interviews, observations and the review of primary documents as pointed earlier. For the gathering of qualitative data in predominantly Muslim provinces of southern Thailand, police officers, military officers, administrative officers, religious leaders, local leaders, ordinary people, and those accused in terrorism cases were also interviewed. In addition, elite interviews with experts, specifically with those who have experienced in or are related to the finding of a solution to terrorism in the three southern border provinces of Thailand. As for location and sites for field research, the area ruled by the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) and Mixed Commanding Unit between Civilians, Police and Military Officials Number 43 (CPM 43) is the focus, consisting of Patthani, Yala and Narathiwat Provinces.

A large part of the research on this topic was carried out in Thailand (Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat) in 2011-2012. Official documentation was sourced from selected Thailand ministries, other important institutions which have a close relation with the government in formulating their policies, and non-governmental organization, covering:

1. The Office of Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) at Yala. The SBPAC is a unique department directed by the Prime Minister's public policy driving rather than a military driving force. The SBPAC emphasizes unity and ability to integrate public administrative efficiency.

2. Provincial office of Patani Province.

The governor's office is known in English as the Provincial Hall, in Thai: SalaKlangChangwat. This is invariably a multi-story, white, rectangular building, in the 'Thai' style. In front, it has a parking area, a statue of King Chulalongkorn (the fifth King of the royal dynasty, who was responsible for the modern Thai administrative structure), and a flag pole with the Thai flag flying. These provincial halls are usually located in a government sector, near the centre of the capital, along with several other provincial level government instrumentalities, for example the provincial law courts.

3. Provincial office of Yala Province.

Yala is one of the three 'deep south' provinces of Thailand, abutting Malaysia, and one of the four provinces of the Kingdom with a Muslim majority. It is located on the west coast of the Malaysian peninsular, 800 kms south of Bangkok. The provincial hall is found near the city centre, in conjunction with several other governmental buildings, and surrounded by a small park, which contains the City Shrine.

4. Province office of Narathiwat Province.

The province of Narathiwat is one of the three 'deep south' provinces of the Kingdom of Thailand, hard up against the Thai/Malaysian border. The provincial hall is located outside the city, to the north. Here, an entirely new set of government buildings is being constructed. This is rather surprising. Narathiwat is not an overly prosperous region, nor one with a growing population, yet there is an extensive building program underway.

5. Pattani forum

It is a non-profit organization that assembly by NGO workers, academics, authors, and former student leaders to work for creating a conducive atmosphere for a

precise and meaningful discussion about the normality of the conflict in Malay-speaking area in South of Thailand and how to address and resolve these issues at most.

. Pattani Forum collaborate with young blood leaders in community and activists in the Malay-speaking area in the South of Thailand to speak out the issues considered important to the citizen in stubborn area throughout civic participations, advocacy, and deeply analysis of the dynamics of the region and of the continuous conflict. The concept is to persuade the Thai society and the state that the road to peace and peaceful coexistence must be firmly rooted in the acknowledgement that the Malays in the south of Thailand has a historical and cultural identity of their own and that their narratives do not sabotage Thailand's statehood.

6. Prince of Songkla University (PSU)

PSU is the first university in the South of Thailand and comprise of five campuses where offer various academic courses consistent with the communities' need. PSU endeavor to pursuit researches' excellent, providing academic services to surrounded communities as well as taking enthusiastic role in preservation of national arts and cultural legacy, particularly what appertain to Thai southerner. For over-forty-year existence since 1967, within the stated vision of becoming a leading research-oriented university in Asia and the primary role of producing very capable graduates, providing excellent academic services and enthusiastically regarding in preservation of arts and cultural national legacy. Many objectives of Prince of Songkhla University have been accomplished.

7. Centre for the Studies of Conflict and Cultural Diversity in Southern Thailand (CSCC)

The Centre for the Studies of Conflict and Cultural Diversity in Southern Thailand (CSCC) has been recently established by a batch of researchers in the Prince of Songkla University which surveyed among Thai southerners living in border provinces. Supported by the National Research Council, this research project's objectives were to develop more and more understand locals' attitudes to social, economic, and political conditions in the violence-struck region.

8. The Central Islamic Council of Thailand at Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkla

This organization manages Islamic teaching and other activities related with Islam. It discusses on conflict, for example Moro conflict and peace. It also supports Islamic education at Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Finally, it makes collaboration with the other organizations to increase the economic and social living standard of the people in the area.

9. Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center

Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center has been handled by a Commissioner General; the Royal Thai Police (RTP) is conducted and commanded by the Prime Minister. RTP's main functions are to 1) provide security guard to His Majesty the King, Her Majesty the Queen, the Heirs to the Throne, members of the Royal Family, the Regent, Royal Representatives, and Royal Guests; 2) give direction and supervise the operation of all police officers to ensure quality of service and compliance with the laws; 3) prevent and suppress crime; 4) maintain public order and national security; 5) assist the public; 6) perform other activities stipulated by Thai law;

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7) fulfill assigned activities of law enforcement by the Prime Minister in supporting national development. There are 230,000 officers on duty militantly

The RTP is separated in six broad groups which are 1) Special Operations: Office of Royal Court Security Police; 2) Crime Prevention and Suppression: Metropolitan Police Bureau, Provincial Police Regions and Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center; 3) Crime Prevention and Suppression Support: Central Investigation Bureau, Narcotics Suppression Bureau, Special Branch Bureau, Immigration Bureau, Border Patrol Police Bureau, Office of Forensic Science, and Office of Information and Communication Technology; 4) Education: Police Education Bureau and Royal Police Cadet Academy; 5) Services: Police General Hospital; 6) Command and General Staff: Office of Police Strategy, Office of Logistics, Office of Human Resources, Office of Budget and Finance, Office of Legal Affairs and Litigation, Office of Police Commission, Office of Inspector General, Office of Internal Audit, Office of Police Secretary, Foreign Affairs Division, Public Affairs Division, Office of National Police Policy Board, Police Aviation Division, Disciplinary Division. The RTP's headquarter is located in Bangkok.

10. CS Pattani Hotel

CS Pattani is the number one hotel among hotels in the three southern border provinces. It was designed under the concept of integrating the magnificent local arts and cultures of the charming Pattani. The hotel was bombed on March 16, 2008 which 2 persons were killed and 14 injured. The attacks continued on Tuesday, July 31, 2012 with two bombs exploding at the CS Hotel.

11. Khok Pho Police Station

Khok Pho Police Station is located in Khok Pho district, Pattani province,

southern Thailand. The district originally belonged to Nong Chik district, formerly be a district in provinces of Pattani Kingdom. The district was established by separating from Nong Chik district.

12. Pattani Fisheries College

The Ministry of Education approved the establishment of Pattani Fishery College in 1991. However, there were some problems regarding the land and the budget. In 2004, the Cabinet approved the land for construction. The College was successfully built with the cooperation of educational administrators, local leaders, religious leader, the public and private sector. It is the only college of OVEC that teaches and provides educational service in the areas of agriculture and fishery to the people in the 3 southern border provinces of Thailand.

13. Pattani Industrial and Community Education College

The college provides students the participating opportunity in a structured Industrial Training Programme, which endeavor not only providing the opportunity for students to apply knowledge that they have learned and expand their knowledge whilst supplying with the priceless on-job experience, but also extends an opportunity to experience first-hand the business of the industry with challenges and expectations.

14. Entrepreneur Association of the deep south of Thailand

15. Village Chief at Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces

16. Yala Rajabhat University

The university composes one of the higher education systems in Thailand. They were previously recognized as *Rajabhat Institutes* and primarily as the teachers college system. Most of main provinces in Thailand have established this kind of teacher collage and generally easier to gain admission than the "public universities". Most Rajabhat

Universities offer graduate degree programs, and some offer doctoral degree as well. These institutions are equivalent to polytechnics where have promoted to be universities in the UK, and encounter a similar challenge corresponding to the prestige of older institutions, the word "Rajabhat" may protect them from criticism and upgrade their status.

17. Thammasat University

A leading international academic institution in Asia that desires resolving Thailand's problems within moral commitment for the greater good of society. Its missions are: 1) provide identical educational chance on social sciences, humanities, science and technology and health sciences. The entired courses concentrate on graduate study and international programs which produce graduates who are competent, committed to fairness, democracy and the public's interests; 2) develop necessary knowledge and useful for the country's development with an emphasis on practical research and integrated studies; 3) provide academic services and disseminating knowledge to the society focusing on academic services for sustainable development and provide chances to the disadvantaged in society; 4) upgrade and support the Thai way of life, art, culture and values and accentuate the benefits of living by the philosophy of sufficiency economy, democratic values and social fairness; 5) improve management efficiency adhere to the principles of good governance to ensure integrity, quality, efficiency, accountability, transparency and accountability, taking into account the participation of personnel as well as efficient use of resources.

18. Yarang District

Yarang is a district in Pattani Province. The previous district office was located in Ban AnoBulo, Tambon Yarang. Due to the previous location was yearly flooded then

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on February 10, 1930 the office has been moved to Ban Bin Ya Limo. The present office was opened on September 22, 1996. Yarang is surrounded by following neighboring districts are Raman and Muang Yala of Yala province, Mae Lan, NongChik, Muang Pattani, Yaring, Mayo and Thung Yang Daeng of Pattani province.

19. Triamsuksawittaya School of Pattani

It is an elementary school belongs to the chairman of Islamic Pattani.

20. Royal Thai Army

The Royal Thai Army is responsible for protecting its sovereignty. It is the oldest and largest office of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. In 1874 the army was formed, partly response to new security threats following the Bowring Treaty with England, which opened up the country for international trade.

The Royal Thai Army is commanded by the Commander of the Royal Thai Army. The current Commander is General Udomdej Sitabutr, who was confirmed by royal appointment to take over the top position effective September 9, 2014. The Headquarter is located at Ratchadamnoen Nok Road in Bangkok, Thailand.

In addition to these primary sources, secondary sources include newspapers (Bangkok Post), magazines, journals (Songkhlanakarin Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities) and some useful books (Che Man, W. K. (1990). Muslim separatism: the Moros of the Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand) were consulted.

1.9 Organization of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one, introduction, is the introductory chapter which provides an outline of the nature of the study. It discusses the conflict in the world generally and Thailand particularly, problem statement, research questions, objectives and significant of the study, scopes and limitation of the study, literature review, research methodology, and structure of the research.

Chapter 2 briefly discusses the historical background of the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand.

Chapter 3 describes the SBPAC which promote the development work, the policy of peace-strengthening, the elimination of injustice, and the promotion of the people participation in solving the problems of the Southern Border Provinces, including the promotion of the right understanding to foreign countries. This chapter discusses the SBPAC in more details, which includes foundation and structure.

Chapter 4 presents the political strategies of the SBPAC in managing conflict in the Deep South of Thailand, encompassing peace negotiation, diplomatic offensive, healing process and an enhancement of the role of religious leaders. The SBPAC has been re-strategizing its political strategies, following the enforcement of the Southern Border Provinces Administration act on 30 December 2010, which covers all districts in the five southern border provinces, namely Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, and Satun.

Chapter 5 highlights the educational strategies of the SBPAC in managing conflict in the Deep South of Thailand. These included: an integration of an Islamic education into Thai educational system, rebuilding an education in a conflict-affected area and bridging education with peace. Indeed, education has been advocated as one of

the best ways to improve the situation in the area, covering rebuilding education from the conflict area and whole school development.

Chapter 6 examines the socio-economic strategies of the SBPAC in managing conflict in the Deep South of Thailand, including farming and fishery programs, marketing of an agricultural products, financial assistance and international economic collaboration.

Chapter 7 demonstrates the discussions on the overall effectiveness of the SBPAC strategies in resolving the conflict in the Deep South of the country.

Chapter 8 concludes the results of the investigation and provides contribution of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

This chapter discusses the historical background regarding hierarchical Kingdom of Thailand's governance protocols beginning from Sukhothai period and ended during the Rattanakosin Period. Historical perspectives and researches have addressed that Thai government faces specific constraints and challenges with rise of political movement and the as well as the Muslim separatist groups. Thus, the critical problems in the south of Thailand (border regions) were identified as they were found dictinct from other regions that should be given prime priority as attention. The roles Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) which has been established were found incapable to curb or minimize deep south conflicts by separatists although many projects were introduced for the community economic development. Dilemma and struggles among Muslim communities were addressed either to initiate for independence of Pattani, or the choice to follow and support the Kingdom of Thailand.

The Southern Thailand has historically competed with an external region in the north and various states and empires in the south. The flashback of historical evidence of the Sukhothai period shows that the Pattani Kingdom has had a long relationship with the Siam. The history of resistance in Pattani needed to set up, which also narrates current struggles for autonomy and identity. The great King Rama V has given the Pattani Kingdom autonomy before the political and governmental system has been reformed. During Sukhothai period in 1257 A.D. (1800 B.E.), on the old stone inscription (Silajaruk in Thai) written that all territories from Nakhon Sri Thammarat

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down to the Malay peninsula, Melaka and even Singapore belonged to Siam since the reign of King Ramkamhang the great (Fraser, 1960: 18-19). The Pattani Kingdom was basically autonomous, thus they avoided paying tribute (sending golden and silver flowers) in every three years to Siam.

During the Ayutthaya Period (1569-1767) the trade firstly led Islam into Siam. The Ayutthaya Kingdom had developed the power while Islamic trade was dominant in Southeast Asia, especially in the Malay world. This trade was assigned to play an important role pushing the first wave of Islamization in Southeast Asia. At that time, the Siam had the eclectic and practical political structure. The major components, Brahmanism from an earlier Mon-Khmer culture, Tai Hinayana Buddhist practices and beliefs have been blended. The large numbers of non-Buddhists and non-Thais who remain influential roles in the political and economic structures further illustrate Ayutthaya's pragmatism and eclecticism.

By the time Ayutthaya Kingdom was weaken or during major power transitions between kings, Pattani Kingdom always struggled for its own autonomy (Burutphat 1976: 67; Nakmaung 1995: 113). Finally, Pattani Kingdom remain be ruled by Ayutthaya Kingdom during 1569 –1767 A.D. until Burma claimed sovereignty over Ayutthaya Kingdom in 1767, and granted Pattani independence, which lasted until the Thonburi Period (Malulem, 1995: 53).

The Islamization of Pattani had displaced many elements of the Hindu-Buddhist culture, and the Muslim religious elites had dominated the Kingdom's sociopolitical system. By 1511 the Siam (Kingdom of Thailand) recovered its governmental power over Pattani Kingdom and signed a treaty with the Portuguese, giving the latter exclusive rights to the profitable Chinese and Japanese trade conducted at the port of

Pattani (Thompson, 1941). At the same time, during the Ayutthaya period the Portuguese had conquered Malacca (Provencher, 1982: 144).

Hostility between the Kingdom of Thailand and Pattani occurred in 1636 over the refusal of the Pattani queen to pay the annual tribute to the King of Thailand during Ayutthaya period. Consequently, in 1786 and 1832 rebellions against the Thais occurred. Due to this latter rebellion resulted that Thai military forces had smashed these all rebellion (Fraser, 1960). Until 1901, the Pattani Kingdom, which most of present-day Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces used to be a part of, possessed a large degree of autonomy, even in external affairs, as a vassal state under the Thai kings (Fraser, 1960).

In 1909 the four northern Malay states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis had been took over by the British, this encouraging further Thai centralization, with taxation, education and, eventually, language being brought under varying degrees of Thai control. Although these moves stirred Malay-Muslim irredentists' aspiration, it was not until the turbulent years of the early 1930s that they were fully awaken. Following the military's overthrow of the Thai monarchy in 1932, a modified concept of popular sovereignty emerged which increasingly came to define citizenship not so much in terms of political obedience but on the basis of national unity. Stressing evermore-state centralization and the need to rapidly assimilate outlying ethnic groups, the new integrationist push was to have a decisive impact on the local administrative sector in Pattani (Christie, 1996; Forbs, 1989; Leifer, 1996; Pitsuwan, 1985; Stockwell, 1979).

For example, the former local governmental structure, which allowed some autonomous Malay political represented, had been replaced by a simpler and more centralized system, and the three provinces of the Pattani region (Pattani, Yala, and

Narathiwat) were placed under direct control of the Ministry of Interior of the Thai government.

During the Rattanakosin Period (1767 – 1910), around the 16th and early 17th centuries, the Pattani Kingdom was strengthened continuously as important European trading center. However, Pattani's commercial stature dramatically declined after the year 1622, because both the British and the Dutch had abandoned their factories in Pattani Kingdom to promote their trading competition interests elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Fraser, 1966).

Resistance against the central control and the independence struggle continued into the Rattanakosin period in 1791 A.D. It was an important turning point for the Pattani Kingdom during the reign of King Rama I, when the Pattani Sultan tried to stage a rebellion for independence from the Thai Kingdom (Malulem, 1995 : 54). In 1808, during the King Rama I period, the war between Pattani and Siam had taken place. When Siam overcame and governed Pattani, the state is divided into seven cities, namely Pattani, Yala, Yaring, Ra-ngae, Ra-man, Sai-buri and Nong-jick. By 1902, these seven cities were annexed to the Siam by King Rama V. After the widespread of political and governmental reformation, the central government had lost control of the seven administrative cities, which were abolished and replaced by Monthon Pattani (Salae, 2004: 245; Wongted, 2004: 250 & Croisant, 2007: 2).

In the reign of King Rama VI, he acknowledged that these border regions were distinct from other regions and it should be treated with special care (Boonnag, 2003: 93). In order to eliminate the critical problem in the south of Thailand, the public policies were applied and guided by King Rama VI. For instance, fair tax policies and positive attitudes from state officials in terms of understanding diverse cultures were

introduced. Additionally, state officials were expected to work honestly and treat local people equally (al-Fatani, 1994: 77).

During the rise of Nationalism (1910 – 1957) in 1909, the Thai and British governments signed the Anglo-Thai Treaty demarcated the territories between British Malaya and Thailand. Subsequently, according to the contract the Pattani Kingdom was completely annexed as a part of Thailand (Dook, 1999: 154-155; Harrison, 1967: 21).

Another effect of this situation was that the last ruler of Pattani State, Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamarudin lost his political power, and Thai government accused him of disobedience, then he was arrested and imprisoned for 10 years in Pitsanulok, a province in the north of Thailand. After negotiations with the Governor General of Singapore, Sir Frank Swethenham, Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamarudin was granted a royal amnesty on condition that he has been strictly prohibited to engage in any political activities. He sought refuge in Kelantan Malaysia because relationship between Muslims and royal families in the states of Pattani and Kelantan (in northern Malaysia) was well established (Suhrke, 1975: 192).

Later, he contacted his partisan and some of religious leaders in southern Thailand for instigation of conspiracy between the southern people against Thai Government officers to free the Pattani State, such case can be seen in the Numsai Rebel. On 24th-31st of January 1922, thousands of people in Numsai village (Mayor district, Pattani province) have fulfilled the requirement of independent of Pattani. The rebellious leader had persuaded the local residents against the authority by ignoring the tax payment. Moreover, these people were strived to expel Thai government, but Thai government was able to control the situation. When Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamarudin died in 1933 (Pitsuwan, 1985: 57), his youngest son, Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen,

proceeded the intention of separating Pattani from the Kingdom of Thailand to emancipate Pattani Kingdom. Thus, the political concept of an independent Pattani Kingdom was spread by Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen throughout the Muslim world (Jory, 2007: 262).

After political reforms in Thailand in 1932, Pattani was separated into three provinces: Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. The public policies of General P. Pibulsongkram were a major cause of conflict between the government and Muslim people in this region (von Feigenblatt, 2009: 584). These policies were based on nationalist ideologies which aimed to assimilate all the people in this region to become 'Thai', including the Muslim population. The Islamic communities resented towards the government. These policies had a significant effect on religious teaching and livelihood. For example, in 1941 there was regulation that Buddhist images were to be put in all public schools (Horstmann, 2008: 58).

Malay Muslims traditions, including dress, language and Islamic names were restricted, and public services were not provided if there was any resistance (Fraser, 1966: 51). All of these actions caused resentment in the Deep South of Thailand. Muslim communities in the region faced a painful dilemma, and were caught between struggles for the independence of Pattani, for the protection of religious and cultural identity, and the imperative to follow and support the Kingdom of Thailand.

An important milestone was reached in 1947, when Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir proposed seven requirements of independence for Pattani to the Thai Government (Islam, 1998: 444). First, Muslim people should have authority to govern, and the government should be elected by people who were born in Pattani, Naratiwat, Yala and Satul. Second, the Muslim population should be a majority of 80 percent. Third, the

official language should be both Malay and Siamese. Fourth, the Malay language has to be used in primary schools. Fifth, Muslim people should be enforced by Muslim law and go to Muslim court. Sixth, all of the revenue and income derived from these four districts should be retained and to be spent in these areas. Seventh, Muslims can participate in all political activities. Regarding to these seven requirements, Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir was charged for inciting a rebellion and arrested three years later and was killed in Songkhla, southern Thailand. This was one of the major causes of the progressing separatist movement in Thailand (Khunthongpet, 2005: 87).

Thailand's Conditions (1957 – 2012) during the Field Marshal Thanom Kittikhachon's government from 1959 to 1973, the nationalist policy was maintained, and many Muslims in southern provinces of Thailand continued to feel like second class citizens as before. During this period, it was generally accepted that extrajudicial killings were common place (Rahimmula, 2004: 105). Muslims were left necessarily but to fight against the political system, thus the origin of modern separatist movements could be traced to the end of World War II.

In 1978, the Thai government's national policy focused on political stability in the three southern provinces, paying special attention to Muslim communities. Both, the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) and the Mixed Commanding Unit between Civilians, Police and Military Officials Number 43 (CPM 43) were created in 1981, holding an important role in state-society relations in local levels in the south (McCargo, 2006: 43). From historical trace, it is clearly found that Thai government faces specific difficulties and challenges.

The Thai military regime supervised by Field Marshal P. Pibul Songkhram during the 1930s, commenced a set of policies proposed at the forcible assimilation of

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Muslims. Wearing of western-style trousers was made an alternative for men, and using Malay dialect and adopting Muslim names are prevented. Additionally, Shari'ah law (Islamic law) was laid aside in favor of the Thai Buddhist laws of marriage and inheritance (Forbes, 1982). Great deals of displeasures were originated among the Muslim population of Thailand.

By the end of World War II, the government tried to adopt a more conciliatory stance towards Muslims in the South. However, marginalization and suppression under the control of Thai officials, state interferences into Muslim civil society, and the absence of Pattanian political participation had contributed to mutual antagonism between both sides. This antagonism erupted on 28 April 1948, in a pivotal event known as the Dusun Nyiur incident- a violent clash between Thai police and Muslim Pattanians that left an estimation of 1,100 Muslims and 30 policemen were killed and set the stage for the rise of more militant Muslim separatist groups (Islam, 1982).

In 1959, the first Muslim separatist group, BNPP (Barisan National Pembebasan Pattani), was founded by Tuanku Abdul Kade, an heir to the ruling chieftain of Pattani Kingdom, who lost influence over the Kingdom when the royal decree had been issued by King Rama V the great for abolishing all positions of the ruling chieftains of all towns in the southern border provinces. The armed resistance did not begin until 1960 when Thailand had been ruled by Field Marshal Sarit Thannarat (Primer: Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002).

In the mid 1970s the Thai government had employed the enlightened policies that emphasized political over purely military solutions and included, among other actions, granting greater religious freedom, and development of the area combined with

a psychological campaign to successfully suppressed the secessionist movements, even thought the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim separatist groups got the highest point.

However, by the late 1990s, the separatist movement had been revived again because of poverty, crime, and corruption among Thai officials in the south, and some isolated incidents occurred, including the killing of police officers at checkpoints in Yala and Narathiwat provinces in 2000 and 2001. The Thai government incorrectly handled these incidents by transferring all responsibilities for security in the region from the Royal Thai Army's 5th Army Region to the Thai police, because the government perceived the incidents as acts of common banditry.

Nevertheless, after September 11 attack in 2001, and the support from Thailand to the US for making the war on Terror, then the number of rebellion incidents has increased. The increased movement of Muslim separatist groups was confirmed on 4 January 2004, when 30 armed insurgents more had raided an Army depot in Narathiwat Province, this caused the death of four Thai soldiers. After this incident, the Thai government had to beginning rethinks of the renewed Muslim separatism in the south.

Both the scope and coordination of operations point to new dynamics within the traditionally factionalized and ineffectual separatist movement provides an outline of the current dynamics in the spiraling violence. Given contrary reports by intelligence and internal security forces in the South, it is difficult to report the internal characteristics of the groups behind the violence. The violence has been responded by unknown rebel group. However, it is clear that several factions remain the core actors in the insurgency and that there is no central control of the operations of insurgents (Jane's Intelligence Review, 2004).

These groups include BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional), GMIP (Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani) and PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization). Even though any account of these groups has been taken carefully, it seems that the original PULO does not have enough military power on the ground. BNP-BIPP is largely defunct and Bersatuan umbrella organization trying to lose political coordination among separatist groups is believed to have indirect military operations in Thailand. The three remaining dissensions, the largest of the three main factions most certainly is BRN, GMIP may have a wider operations area, and New PULO is supposed to be the smallest(Jane's Intelligence Review, 2004). The following overview gives a crude idea about the main rebel factions that in one or the other way are thought to be relevant for the recent unrest.

The historical origins: far and away the greatest numbers of Muslims are of Malay ethnic origin, although Muslim communities live in almost all provinces of the Kingdom of Thailand. Malay-Muslims do not only live in the country's three Deep South provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, but also in Satun, Songkhla, Trang, Krabi, and Phuket. A recent government-conducted household survey found that in Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani, over 76 percent of the population adhered to the Islamic faith (The Nation, 2004). Since 2001, the current political violence wave in Thailand has not engulfed the entire South, even thought that international pressure coverage has made. It has been limited mostly to three southernmost provinces, Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani. These provinces are the recent violence and insurgency's hot spots, while the rest provinces in the region have been relatively unaffected.

On the other hand, during 2004 to 2012, the Deep South provinces of Thailand have been through several of conflict. Many people were killed by the enduring violence

shows the unsettled mark of deep conflict in the area. Based on the chart below, generally, the incidents of violence have come down in June 2007, the shaping of violent incidents had begun diminish and change into a certain pattern as shown in Diagram 2.1.

Diagram 2.1 Monthly Incidents of Violence in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat

Source: Jitpiromsri, Srisompob. (2012). "The New Challenge of Thailand's Security
    Forces in Southern Frontiers." *International Conference "Civil Society, Politics
    & Development in ASEAN Countries*. Thailand: Hat Yai, Prince of Songkla
    University (PSU). 6-7 September.

Since 2008 onwards, the rebels have tried to sustain the aims of the struggle, which caused the situation in the region rapidly become very intense at intervals. The insurgency in the Deep South Provinces has become a protected war with no sign of ending.

Diagram 2.2 Monthly Casualties of Violence in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat

Source: Jitpiromsri, Srisompob. (2012). "The New Challenge of Thailand's Security Forces in Southern Frontiers." *International Conference "Civil Society, Politics & Development in ASEAN Countries*. Thailand: Hat Yai, Prince of Songkla University (PSU). 6-7 September.

Bombing of public places attacking individuals (such as government's personnel and military, police bases, outposts, checkpoints and other fracture /installations) and killing of innocent have become the feature of the conflict in the region (see Diagram 2.2. and 2.3.).

Diagram 2.3 Monthly Deaths and Injuries comparing with Incident of Violence

Source:Jitpiromsri, Srisompob. (2012). "The New Challenge of Thailand's Security Forces in Southern Frontiers." International Conference "Civil Society, Politics & Development in ASEAN Countries. Thailand: Hat Yai, Prince of Songkla University (PSU). 6-7 September.

Thus, from now and flash back to the origin of relationship between the Kingdom of Thailand and Pattani state had been established since the Sukhothai period as appeared on the old stone inscription. During the reign of King Ramkamhang the great, Pattani state had been basically autonomous, but they rebelled and disobeyed by refusing to pay tribute.

In 1460, Pattani state had been the Malacca's colony, this rising of Malay Kingdom of Malacca made diminishing the power of Siam, Thai – Muslim trade during Ayutthaya period firstly bring Islam to Thailand and this trade had driven the Islamisation in Southeast Asia. And while the Ayutthaya King's power transition made the major became weaken, Pattani state always tried to struggle for its own power. Finally Pattani state still had been controlled by Siam (Ayutthaya Kingdom: 1569-1767 A.D.). In 1767 Burma had taken possession of forcefully over Ayutthaya Kingdom and affranchised Pattani until Thonburi Period (Malulem, 1995: 53). Nevertheless, the rise of the Malay Kingdom of Malacca in the 15th century had affected the diminishing of the Siam power, and by 1460 the Pattani Kingdom become Malacca's colony. During the invasion, the Malays from Malacca settled down at the Pattani Kingdom, to take place the locals, and accompanied with Muslim missionaries who later become the local population. From this period to this day, Pattani Kingdom is characterized as an excellent center for Muslim scholars (Fraser, 1960).

During the Rattanakosin period (1767-1910), the Pattani state had been strengthening constantly by playing an important role as European trading center in no time the Pattani Kingdom's commercial status was rapidly declined by moving out of the British's and the Dutch's factories from Pattani Kingdom. The enmity sparked since the Queen of Pattani denied the annual tribute payment to the Kingdom of Thailand.

History shows us that the leaders of Pattani Kingdom had tried several times to free from Thai King's control but mostly were unable to gain success. After Pattani Kingdom trial it causes several conflicts, terrorist groups in Deep South of Thailand; Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat where used to be the Pattani Kingdom. Many violences have caused many injures and deads. In 1978, Thai government's policy focus on political stability in the Deep South of Thailand, so Thai government announce the 1st National Stability Policy in the Deep South of Thailand (1981-1997).

Then 3 years later, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center or the SBPAC has been established by the Gen. Pram Tinsulanont's government to play an important role of solving the conflicts in the Deep South via team working of Civilians, Police and Military officials and works in every dimensions that can help the situation better. Even the SBPAC launch many projects that drive the SBPAC strategies to their goal, but the separatists still cause violences.

The geography of Pattani, Yala and Narawat which is one of Deep South provinces of Thailand. Most population is Malay Muslim. The cause of religion might not be a majority cause of the problem in the Deep South of Thailand, although it could be a political tool to provoke the violence. Islamic principles are the ways of life but Thai Government try to separate religion from the way of life and destroy the culture, identity and Malay language.

Therefore, the Muslim leaders used this reason as the contributor in fighting against the Thai state. The majority of local Muslims try to ignore the state control mechanisms that have imposed effect on daily life. In addition, it would seem that the majority of people were treated unequally and disregarded as Islamic. Although a policy

of assimilation has been used to incorporate minority Muslims in the south and eliminate bias against the state, the violent tendencies of this region show few signs of abating.

It would seem that the unrest is related to a sense of injustice, particularly official state discrimination, as well as a lack of understanding of cultural differences and the continued dominance of Bangkok.

CHAPTER THREE

PROFILE OF THE SBPAC

3.0 Introduction

This chapter comprehensively discusses the organizational goals, profiles and structures of 2010 Southern Border Provinces Administration Act (SBPAC). The implementation of this act was in line with the hypothetically targeted objectives to unite people in the improvement of their social economic status. Several strategic plans adopted by the SBPAC for the purpose of attaining economic prosperity for the Malay Muslims community in the Deep South become were addressed. Initiatives and the efforts will be elaborated to specifically enhance the quality of manpower services, strengthening the community comfort through internal and external investments, and distributing community under the law to maintain human rights community security. The participation Non-Government Organization (NGO) which respective roles assigned social was essential to resolve the southern border provinces conflicts and constraints in the Deep South, where the results had revealed some argumentative discussion.

The SBPAC have been founded in 1981, however in 2002 during the Thaksin Shinawatra administration SBPAC was disbanded. Nevertheless, with the assumption of Surayud Chulanont as Thai Prime Minister in 2006, he immediately revived it. This effort gained support from the succeeding administration. Needless to say the administration under Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva proposed the restructuring bill of the SBPAC, with the irresistibly support and finally approved by the Carbinet in October 2009.

Moreover, the National Assembly has approved the bill in November 2010. The 2010 Southern Border Provinces Administration Act's aim greatly is to improve the working integration have done by numerous agencies to develop the three southern border provinces and deal with conflicts effectively and systematical mannerly. This law's strength would be unitedly in operation and evaluation, from the policy-making level up to the implementation level, with the participation of all relevant sectors.

The organization (SBPAC) has been restructured several times until it becomes a juristic or legal entity as a result of an enforcement of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act on 30 December 2010. All entired districts of the three southern border provinces, namely Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat are in forced by this Act. This restructuring was in line with the Abhisit Vejjajiva administration's policy statement which delivered on 30 December 2008. The policy statement stipulated clearly that a new organization would be set up specifically administrative management at the Deep South provinces.

3.1 Organizational Goals

The SBPAC has multiple goals in its quest to resolve the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand. These goals include raising income of the Deep South's population and bringing them a better quality of life by complying with the philosophy of the Sufficiency Economic methodology, improving the quality of official services, improving their economic status through implementing internal and external investments and strengthening the community comfort and secure toward the government by distributing community justice under the law and maintaining a community security in accordance with human rights.

As an example, The SBPAC aims to make a concrete impact on the community by targeting the population's income, rising from 2,100 US Dollars per year into 4,000 US Dollars per year by the year 2012 (Southern Border Province Administrative Center, 2010: 19). The following part will discuss and analyse the objectives of the SBPAC in its effort to address the problems in the region

3.1.1 Social Economic Status (SES)

First, with respect to the first the SBPAC's goal that is to raise or uplift the population's income and thus, bring a better quality of life for the people of the Deep South, the SBPAC has induced the Royal strategy of "Understanding, Acknowledgement and Development". This philosophy has served as the benchmarks of the organization (the SBPAC) in addressing the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand. The Thai government, in general, and the SBPAC, in particular, strongly believes that the Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy that His Majesty the King compassionately confers to Thai people would be the appropriate parameter in achieving economic prosperity in the region. In achieving the appointed goal above, the SBPAC initiated some projects in 2009 that help the financial problems of the community in the region, he asserts (Uthairat, 2010: 19).

Through this scheme, the Thai government through the SBPAC has provided financial assistance for the neediest households. For instance, the organization handed out 5,000 baht to each needy household.

In availing these projects, the local household must be chosen by a community vote. From 2009 up to 2010, at least 59, 098 households benefited from the project, which is mainly covering provinces, 37 districts and 290 villages (Uthairat, 2010: 114).

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The project has given priority to those of elderly households (65 year- old and above), disable, big family (10 members and above) and broken family. In this regard, Uthairat forcefully argues that this major strategic plan has adopted by the SBPAC for the purpose of attaining economic prosperity for the Malay Muslims community in the Deep South (Uthairat, 2010: 19). This optimismwas also echoed by Mr. Thavorn Senniam, Minister of Interior, when he was quoted by National News Bureau of Thailand, 2009 as saying that:

> The SBPAC has mainly responded to drive PNP projects for the purpose of raising local people's incomes so as to have to achieve their economic prosperity and development. He also strongly believes that if their incomes increase, their quality of life will be better and, therefore, the unrest situation would be diminished gradually (National News Bureau of Thailand, 2009).

Former The SBPAC Director, Mr. Pranai Suwannarat, says that PNP projects have helped financially those local communities in conflict-affected areas. These efforts are in line with the noble objectives of achieving quality of life through the application of the Philosophy of Sufficiency Economics by the His Majesty King Bhumibhol of Thai kingdom.

3.1.2 Quality improvement of human resources

Second is to improve the quality of government or public servants. This is basically pertaining to those public servants whom the organization has assigned to serve for the people of the Deep South. It seems that the SBPAC is aware of the paramount significance of human resources that the organization must have due to the complexity of the conflict in the region. Thus, the assigned officers in the region should be competent and qualified enough in their respective given post or job. Consequently, the

SBPAC is carefully chosen officials personnel based on global standard (Uthairat, 2010: 20).

The officer must be a person who understands the Deep South situation and at the same time recognizing people's sensible conditions within the area. He also urges those assigned government officers to meet community satisfaction and rectify perceptions of the people over conflict in the region (Uthairat, 2010: 20). Indeed, the SBPAC has regularly assessed and reviewed the performance of public servants through meeting with religious leaders, political or local government leaders, NGOs, academicians, business community and other groups so as to get feedback from them. Perhaps, the SBPAC believes that attaining people's satisfaction is the key issue for building confidence or trust between the organization and the people of the Deep South.

The SBPAC with the ministry of Foreign Affairs established southern border provinces passport office located in the SBPAC to facilitate or cater the needs of the people living in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. People in the Deep South can use a passport to visit their relatives and works in the neighboring countries. For people of pilgrimage attendance both Thais' Buddhist and Thais' Muslim (200 people a day), are facilitated by the SBPAC around 15 minutes per person. They provide clean water and all facilities needed for attending Hajj so that many people will have a good impression over the government services (interview by Author, 2012).

The organization has tried to assess and reviews public services to show to the people of the Deep South that government is responsive to their needs (interview by Author, 2010). For instance, the SBPAC has developed and set up monitoring system in 37 register offices of Yala, Patani and Narathiwat Province from April to September, 2010. 117,011 people in 37 districts participate in the monitoring machine, showing that

109,751 or 93.8% of the people are satisfied with the official services. The report demonstrates that the District of Takbai is one of the districts where most people are satisfied (98.88 percents), while Narathiwat, Kapho, BanangSata and Sugai Ko-Lok are in the least rank, with satisfaction between 96 – 97 % (Somchai, 2010: 56).

3.1.3 Collaborative involvement of internal and external investments

Third is to recover the economy by implementing internal and external investments. Technology is used in adding value to agricultural products aiming to increase income, enhance job opportunity, develop the potential of people in the area as well as be ready to become part of ASEAN economic community by supporting people in the area to be a trader or an entrepreneur. For example, the SBPAC support at the root of local economy especially industrial crops such as palm, rubber as well as fruits, promoting fishery and so on as an identity of the area by adopting the so-called Thai Monarch's philosophy as pointed earlier.

In spite of the large export of agriculture products, the SBPAC is trying to improve quality of the products by aiming to gain more market share in the market world. Adjusting southern product quality is held since the season began. The product's lifespan is extended after harvest in order to accomplish the SBPAC income target. This will encourage the intrinsic motivation of the households to ensure their product quality. Adding values to products and services, and promoting those as an identity of the Deep South of Thailand are also encouraged.

A special measurement is set as a tool to direct the economy in the Deep South of Thailand and building collaboration and network with Thai Muslims who live in foreign countries, aiming to develop society, education, religion and economy in the

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Deep South of Thailand by educating Muslims to be a tour guide as there are huge numbers of Muslims from Muslim countries travel to Thailand for medication each year.

However, the SBPAC needs to truly understand the real needs of people, their characteristics and abilities, as well as their willingness to develop themselves. Moreover, the SBPAC needs to have an effective evaluation system and use it consistently in order to prevent any failure and develop career for people.

3.1.4 Social justice and community security

Last is to strengthen community comfort and secure toward the government by distributing community justice under the law and maintaining a community security in accordance with human right. Justice administration to people in the area is essential to resolve the southern border provinces problem. Based on people-centered operation, the SBPAC works under its principle of "access, understand, and participate", then open forum for the people to chat and participate over the government actions topics to resolve the people's troublesome and to initiate public consultation. The SBPAC has tried to make sure that people's rights and freedoms are protected, and legal assistance is contributed to everyone. The activities can eliminate social conditions consisting with people divertible characteristics.

The SBPAC has also established social justice administration at the district level (KEADILAN CENTER). The SBPAC attract intelligent network of people to involve in problem decision-making. The administration regarding to public advice, people's right protection, people's freedom defense and public legal aid, can compromise Venue disputes under religious norms. One district owns one administrative office. There are 326 administrative offices act as government monitoring channels. These administrative

offices are located in 4 Deep South provinces; Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Satun) and covered four districts of Songkhla province; Thepha, Chana, Nathawi and Sabayoi.

Additionally, the SBPAC and other relevant government agencies should have serious conversation with religious leaders and community leaders to reduce the tension. However, initiating beneficial conservation with the community, the SBPAC should admit to the truths and be keen to build negotiation and reconciliation. These could help building confident among Malay-Muslims, which will result in better investigations and acquiring intelligence information as well as preventing the insurgents.

Moreover, other organizations such as the Non-Government Organization (NGO) can be given a soft role on the social front in solving conflict in the Deep South. The improvement of social conditions will help to address the grievances of the Malay-Muslims and make less pressure on other Thais and the SBPAC. The involvement of civic groups in providing a balance between hard and soft approaches that is not too security-oriented could build trust with the Malay-Muslims.

The SBPAC aims to make a concrete impact on the community by targeting population income, rising from 2,100 US Dollars per year into 4,000 US Dollars per year by the year 2012 (Southern Border Province Administrative Center, 2010: 19).

3.2 Organizational Structures

Since 2007-2010, the SBPAC organization structure had been revised every year depending on necessity and the evolved situation in this area. Sometimes, the office of the SBPAC decreased and sometimes it increased. As shown in Figure 3.1, the SBPAC was established under the direct supervision of the Office of National Security Council.

It set up as administration and development policies, rules, and cooperated with other offices of the national security, the joint civilian, police and military.

It also guided the Prime Minister and ministry in carrying out two responsibilities: 1) approving the internal and external of national security's policy including military policy, economic policy and other for the ministry to cooperate with security department and other departments to achieve the success of the strategy; and 2) appointing the policy and strategy for short to long-term condition. The committee of The Office of National Security Council consists of the Prime Minister. National Security Council conducted the Security Operations Command.

The Internal Security Operations Command is one of the offices of the Prime Minister. Its main duties are to prevent the internal security against drugs, to protect the border, to create and adopt sustainable and security management, to smuggle through the country resolution, conflict management, news, information and psychology arrangement, which was conducted by the Prime Minister acted as the director of the office of National Security.

The Office of National Security Council is the major organization to integrate, prevent and resolve security problem for restoring peace in the country. The roles of The Office of National Security Council are planning, cooperating, conducting and solving security problem for sustainability in the country based on the democracy under the king's power or force. The Internal Security Operations Command of Region 4 is responsible for the southern province's border arrangement. It controls government agencies related to problem resolution, and increase better life quality and life safety in the community, which aimed to create peace in the area.

The Solutions for Southern Province's Border of the Internal Security Operation Command Region 4 are based on 2 strategies. First, development strategy, the SBPAC is assigned to be the integration center for operation and control. It aims to serve the people in the area with the strategies presented, known as "Understand, Access and Develop" and "The Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy". It operates with the integrated plan/project, based on 5 Southern Border Provinces Development Plan for the systematic and consistent performance in all strategies.

Second, security strategy, the Joint Civilian, Police, and Military Command is assigned to be the integration center for operation and control, which aims to permit the fairness and stability, safety in life and property as well as to stipulate the action plan to prevent and resolve the casualty or terrorism in any forms in order to build the unity. In addition, The Joint Civilian, Police, and Military Command are fully authorized to order the execution of civilian, police, and military operations in accordance with the action plan.

The operation is intended to give the people safety in life and property. It is hope that the people can live and work peacefully. People will not only have the appropriate legal basis equally and fairly but also have faith and trust in the state power. The SBPAC and the committee, known as "The Advisory Council of Peace Building in the Southern Border Provinces", consists of members from all sectors and experts in many fields of the area such as religious leader, community leader, local leader, scholar, mass, public and private sector executive. It responses in providing solution in many dimensions for the Southern Border Provinces, especially in the development of society, economy, politics, administration, justice, security, news, psychology, public health, and resource allocation in accordance with the cultural lifestyle of the people in the area, identifying

problems with the religious and cultural quality, exchanging ideas and promoting the equal rights of the citizens.

Moreover, the Justice Administration Office helps to reinforce peace, justice, and calmness with the peaceful means under the reconciliation principle in the southern border areas, as well as to cooperate with other sectors, to develop the justice system and to remedy the people, who were affected by the conflict in the area. Furthermore, the Justice Administration Office not only helps to protect the rights and freedom of all citizens and develops the laws and justice system in accordance with the environment's contribution to the problems in the particular area, but also to develop the mainstream justice system, restorative justice, and community justice systematically and effectively in accordance with the integrated situation and unity under the context of the SBPAC.

The Justice Administration Office develops the management system to support its mission effectively, builds up the cooperation with all sectors in solving the problems with restorative justice and peaceful means under the rule of law, and ensures the fair process across Thailand with public participation.

Diagram 3.1 The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Organization Structure 2006 -2007.

Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Organization Structure 2006 - 2007

(**Source**: The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Annual Report 2007: 3)

As shown in diagram 3.2, in 2008, the Internal Audit Group was added into the SBPAC chart for efficiency reason. It was responsible for examining overall operation of District Administration Organization transparency and loyalty. While the Human Resources Management Division is responsible for the government's personnel management regarding the pension feat of the year especially for the government officers in the southern provinces area.

Additionally, there are four Deputy Directors under the organization structure. These include soldier, police officer, and executive and specialist person. There are also thirty Assistance Directors, six come from Central Government and twenty-four come from Ministry. Division of Special Affairs is responsible for special mission such as preventing drugs operation, illegal consideration and special developmental project.

Department of Foreign Affairs is responsible to create relations and to coordinate with neighboring countries as well as bilateral relationship to Muslim countries; expand the trade relationship and investment to Muslim countries; coordinate in solving the problem of two different nationalities and the problem of unlawful that escape into the city; solve the employment problems and the employees itself that working in Malaysia; promote and support the operation of government by making coordination in all part of regions and the domestic in Malaysia's border; and strengthen the good relationship of the agencies and workers within the agencies in both countries.

The Department of Policy Coordination Education, Religion, Culture and Sports, consists of three groups, group of education development, group of religion and culture, and group of sport development. First, the group of education development is responsible to enhance and to coordinate education between the responsible office for in and out education system and special education. It focuses on all forms of teaching and

learning that consist of local requirement and operates the special policy that assigned by the supervisors.

Second, the group of religion and culture is responsible for promoting and supporting the practice that is guided by religious principle; coordinating to the offices involved about local religions as well as to coordinating insight of doing Hajj with the department of Religious Affairs. Third, the group of sport development is responsible to promote and to support the youths to be more concern in the sport's area, to support the sport competition among southern provinces and to support the youths to have capability in sport for being excellence athletes.

The Department of Justice Administration's main purpose is to assist the government in achieving its vision of "a safe and just Victoria." This is done by contributing to the administration of civil and criminal justice and public safety, responsible management and regulation of gaming and racing and providing an effective framework for consumer affairs which includes the southern provinces fairly Center, which divides into two groups, one branch is Complaint group and the other one is Legal Consultation group that is responsible for providing the lawyer or law specialist person for law consultation for the people and Justice Director Segment that is divided into 4 groups.

Justice coordination group is an ever-growing coalition of 26 active organizations in the field of transitional justice. Liberty, rights protection and legal help group are a class of rights that protect individuals' freedom from infringement by governments and private organizations, and ensure one's ability to participate in the civil and political life of the state without discrimination or repression. While the Department of Financial is responsible for monetary matters, accountancy and finance.

Central Office provides services to the devices on the local loop. These services include signaling, digit collection, call routing, setup, and teardown. Central office is also responsible for general operation of government office, management, personnel management, operation of the council and internal audit group operation.

The Department of Human Resources Development provides timely and responsive leadership, resources, and services to fully support the State in the recruitment, management and retention of a high-performing work force which consists of two groups. Government officials' improvement strategy group that is responsible for setting up the orientation training for new official, employees of the state, local staff, employees of State enterprise for understanding about the area disturbance situation and the identity of area traditional and culture. The Efficiency of the official improvement group that is responsible for the government and local personnel development.

The Department of Policy Coordinator of Social Psychology is divided into two groups which are group of analyze and evaluate the situation, and group of public social psychology. The first group is dealing with education by analyzing for tendency of the situation, developing relationship, enhancing great understanding, eliminating the condition for the suspicion between the government office and local people, and enhancing the energy of cooperation from the people in order to inform the clue and news of the insurgents in the area and public news. The second group is in charge of strengthening power of public that establishes in and out of style.

Department of Policy and Planning studies and analyzes issues of overall and strategic importance in the global situation and international relations. It develops policies and plans for diplomatic work, drafts of important diplomatic documents and speeches, makes foreign policy pronouncements and coordinates research and analytical

work. There are two groups that are responsible for the following work: the role of Department of Policy Coordination and Monitoring Evaluation are to take responsibility for creating development plan and solving the problem of southern provinces, policy analysis, conversion policy, southern provinces administration and improvement into action; and the Group of southern provinces improvement and solving the problem strategy are responsible for coordinating, providing workshop by setting a Strategy workshop about the southern provinces development, and taking policy of the parliament regarding the security, management and the southern provinces development.

Department of Information and Public Relations is responsible for creating public relation strategic planning of the southern border provinces; spreading the cultural, custom, traditional wisdom and community network to people in this area; broadcasting news and information in an internal and an external area in harmony.

The Department of Policy Coordination of Economic and Social consists of three groups. The first group is Coordination of Economic Development, which functions to gather coordination of plan or project and to accommodate as well as to support the performance of the government or individual office regarding support or investment of the southern provinces individual office. The second group is community coordination of Economic development, which focuses on supporting and coordinating on state enterprise or local development in order for the people to get the extra income and to have a better life under the Sufficiency concept.

The third group is social and life quality development which has main purpose in strengthening performance, increasing efficiency and enhancing the youths and women' quality life in order to be potentially ready to participate in social, economic and politics

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development as well as to integrate it intensely for the operations in the area, coordinating relief assistance and rehabilitation assistance.

The group also provides central information for the welfare for disabled people, the elder people, women, homeless shelter, prisoners, and the people who have other social problems in the southern provinces; increases potential and capabilities of family; strengthens warmth in the family; operates the special target groups such as women, youths and children by instilling the concept and the right value to build the peaceful environment in the specific identities of the area; conserves the environment in order to create potential sources for stability in living; encourages the family to participate in social surveillance in order to protect it from social problems as well as to enhance for gender's equality or to strengthen the family.

Diagram 3.2 The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Organization Structure 2008

Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Organization Structure 2008

(**Source**: The southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Annual Report   2008:
 4)

From Diagram 3.3, in 2009, the SBPAC revised its organization structure and added a new group. The Job Analysis Group, which is responsible for analyzing jobs related to work life in Southern border area, improving and enhancing job skills. The Deputy Director of the SBPAC is divided into three sections; the first one is responsible for military and police, the second one is responsible for academic administration and juristic; and the last one is responsible for public health and social development. There are Assistance Directors of the SBPAC which come from 27 ministry for encouragement and efficiency of work.

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Diagram 3.3 The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Organization Structure 2009

Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Organization Structure 2009

(**Source**: The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Annual Report 2009: 17)

As shown in Diagram 3.4, in 2010, the government was legislated the act of southern border provinces administration. Based on the act, the SBPAC is an extraordinary government sector which has been directly supervised by the Prime Minister and also isn't under the jurisdiction of any particular government agencies.

The Office of the National Security Council worked on the administration and development policies which have to be submitted to the National Security Council and the Cabinet for their approval. This policy will be revised every three years relying on necessity and the related situation, and also will consider of local culture, religion, history, and way of life of southern border provinces and people's opinion before development.

There are 36 members in the Committees of Southern Border Development (CSBD). These committees consist of the Prime Minister as the chairman, one of deputy Prime Minister as vice chairman, Prime Minister's Office Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance, Minister of Commerce, Minister of Foreign Affair, Minister of Tourism and Sports, Minister of Social Development and Human Security, Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Minister of Transportation, Minister of Interior, Minister of Justice, Minister of Labor, Minister of Culture, Minister of Education, Minister of Public Health, and Minister of Industry.

The Deputy Minister of Interior acted as the secretary of the director of government budget. The secretary of The Security Operations Command acted as the advisory and administrative of southern border provinces. The provincial governor acted as the chairman of advisory and administrative council of southern border provinces, and one person from each province who is selected from the council that has worked out three years per term and not more than one term for working. The responsibilities

regarding the developmental strategic, considering project and measuring the budget for the development of the southern border provinces area, are proposed by the SBPAC.

Meanwhile, the arrangement of the designated special area development, as selected by the SBPAC, should be carefully considered. Thus, the provincial governor should recommend the government offices to create developmental plan in the southern border provinces area to conduct and comply the rule and regulation in reducing working procedure for efficiency development, which will offer the way in solving the problems and overcoming disadvantages in southern border provinces area.

The Advisory Council consists of 49 members. They are one person/ province from local administration organization, village headman and village chief, Islamic committee, Imam, Buddhist and other religion, an agent who understands the local wisdom or lifestyle in southern border provinces, school or academic institute, Islamic school and private school of religion, the head of woman group, agent from Chamber of commerce and Federation of Thai Industries who comprehends the economic, labor and agricultural, public relation, newspaper business or broadcasting and less than 5 people non-government officers.

Furthermore, the Advisory Council is responsible for giving advice to the SBPAC for administration and development of the southern border provinces policy, which was done by The Office of the National Security Council. According to article no. 12 of the SBPAC, the annual operation should be examined, evaluated and reported to the secretary and the Prime Minister, thus, the advisory council should acquire true information or opinion from various sources, and give suggestion to the secretary for relocating government officers out of the southern border provinces area. For an urgent situation, the chairman of the council can directly give the command for relocating

people and inform or report to the council afterwards. The advisory council should consider the unjust services from officers in southern border provinces that were reported by the people.

There are four vice-directors of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) who are responsible in conducting the military forces, police, administrative and justice. The Assistance Directors of the SBPAC come from 23 ministries for encoragement and efficiency of work like small cabinet in Southern Thailand.

Diagram 3.4 The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Organization Structure 2010

(**Source**: The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Annual Report 2010: 24)

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3.3 Capacities and Constraints

3.3.1 Capacities

The SBPAC has a number of valuable resources, which can be perceived as its strong capacities in operating its organization and administrating the three Deep South provinces on its roles. These include: The SBPAC's authority over administering and managing strategic developments, sufficient resources, strong intelligent networking, productive working procedure and international credibility. These capacities can be used as tools in achieving its desired goal that is ending the conflict in the Deep South.

3.3.1.1 Authority over Administering and Managing Strategic Developments

In the 2010 Southern Border Provinces Administration Act, the SBPAC is under the supervision of Thai Prime Minister. The act has stated categorically that the organization has full authority and substantial power in administering the Deep South, which mainly focus on community development. In theory, the SBPAC Secretary-General has been given full authority on disciplinary matters to dismiss high-ranking officials including the police. However, the law does not give the SBPAC jurisdiction over prosecutors or judges or over military officers, who remain under the authority of the ISOC (Bangkok Post, 2011). Additionally, the new law gives the SBPAC autonomous powers in managing and implementing strategic development and action plans.

Diagram 3.5 The Budget for Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center

Budget/ Million Bath

1750.00

1663.00

1500.00

663.341

Back Wall

Year 2007   2008   2009   2010

(**Source**: The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Annual Report 2009: 36)

3.3.1.2 Sufficient Resources

The SBPAC has been receiving massive budget annually from the government in developing the three southern border provinces. In fact, the budget has been gradually

increasing every year. For instance, in 2007, the SBPAC received an annual budget of around 23 million US Dollars e.g. (SBPAC annual report, 2009: 36). Although other provinces of the Deep South (Satun and Sonkhla) have received the SBPAC's budget, but such budget is mainly allocated or intended for the three border provinces of the Deep South such as Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala.

In 2008, 2009 and 2010, the SBPAC has received government budget around 50, 58 and 55 million US Dollars respectively to spend in administrating its organization and mitigating problem in the three border provinces. The government has put huge support on the community development by providing money, materials including other resources needed for the development (SBPAC annual report, 2009: 36). In addition, most of community development projects are typically receive 100 percent supports from the government. Therefore, it is very beneficial for the SBPAC in accomplishing its goals as it has huge amount of sufficient resources.

3.3.1.3 Strong Intelligent Networking

The SBPAC has developed an intelligent network that operates under the idea of "the answer is in the village". The network includes a village committee composed of four major pillars (local leader, community leaders, religious leader and natural leader), life quality development team and a graduate volunteering team. All these people and teams were under the dimensions of integration and empowered by overall government sectors that will present a focal point in order to achieve an economic and social development within the community.

This has helped the SBPAC gaining broader access to resources and local communities as well as increasing significant supports, and strengthening the SBPAC's

capacity in implementing its strategies and projects. Moreover, this also helped the SBPAC in managing its work to be more productive which are extremely important in achieving security and development in the region, in particular, and the country, in general.

3.3.1.4 Productive Working Procedure

All of the SBPAC's executive committee is from various ministries of the government. As each executive committee come directly from each ministry, it helps reducing working steps, enhancing better working performance as well as building high productivity. Each executive committee can work directly with its ministry whether on budget allocation, resource management, as well as access to in-depth information. Most of the in-depth information is normally difficult to get it on hand which is very beneficial for the SBPAC to have access to this information. Therefore, the SBPAC can have sufficient resources and reliable information supporting its organization in developing the local communities.

3.3.1.5 International Credibility

The SBPAC has been acknowledged and appreciated by various World organizations like OIC and individual countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and so on. They perceived that the SBPAC has employed accurate strategies in managing the conflict in the Deep South compared to some of neighbors like Myanmar. In order to address the problem in the region, the SBPAC, for instance, has focused on developing community by improving basic facilities and trying to fulfill the needs of people in various aspects like education, economy, etc. It has also tried to avoid using tough policies in resolving the

conflict in the Deep South. Consequently, this brings more solid supports for SBPAC from various world organizations (e.g. OIC) for its quest for peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

Needless to say, the SBPAC as an organization is a credible one, not only locally, but also internationally. It has managed to establish its international integrity and credibility through its soft policy with respect to the issue of the conflict in the Deep South. In this regard, Salleh appreciates the organization (SBPAC) for its comprehensive approach in dealing with the conflict in Southern Thailand (Salleh, Interview by Author 2012).

However, ISOC strongly disagreed and urged the Thai government to adopt military approach because the military believes that only the use of force can bring security in the region (Boonmoung, Interviewed by the author, 2011). Indeed, there has been continued debate on these two extreme opposite approaches. It is a very controversial debate raging not only the Thai policy-makers, but also the Thai community as a whole. If we examine carefully the current political discourse, perhaps we can safely say that both approaches are equally important, but we should more focus primacy on diplomacy and development than force in addressing the conflict in the region.

3.3.2 Constraints

There are number of constraints that hinder the SBPAC in achieving its desired goal of peace, stability and prosperity in the Deep South. These include: lack of supportive officials from local communities operating its organization effectively and accomplishing its goals and strategies successfully. They occur and affect in various

procedures of work, therefore, it is important for the SBPAC to learn closely and be wiser about its constraints in the deep details.

3.3.2.1 Limited authority

Even though it stated on the 2010 Southern Border Provinces Administration Act that the SBPAC has full authority and substantial power in administering the Deep South. However, in practice the organization has limited authority practically. As the Prime Minister sits as a chairman of the SBPAC, all final decision-making will be made by the Prime Minister which will limit the SBPAC authority, as well as participation of people in the Deep South. Therefore, the SBPAC should be definitely independent from the government in order to fully utilize its authority in administering the Deep South effectively.

3.3.2.2 Lack of supportive officials from local communities

The SBPAC is lack of officials who originally from the Deep South provinces as most of the SBPAC's officials come from other regions. This could lead to limited access and concrete understanding of the true characteristics of local people in the area. People in the area are truly understood their characteristics and uniqueness, and really know how to deal with the local communities perfectly. Therefore, the SBPAC should hire more employees from the locals and get them participate more in its operations. This will help the SBPAC to gain better understanding and generate better techniques to win the hearts and minds of people in the Deep South as well as truly serve their needs.

3.3.2.3 Failure to fully utilize cooperation from international organizations

There are various international organizations that would like to help the SBPAC and Thai government in resolving the conflict in the Deep South. However, the SBPAC through the Thai government has not seen the necessary of having their helps. The organization (SBPAC), particularly, and, the Thai government, in general, have treated the Deep South conflict as a domestic problem. As a result, they have rejected any third party involvement in dealing with the question of insurgency in the Southern Thailand because they fear that it may offend ISOC, in particular, and the Royal Thai Armed Forces, in general. The Thai military institution is a very powerful institution in the country. It is very assertive. This can be seen in the history of the country where at least 19 coup d'etat or military takeover occurred and the latest of that was on 22 May 2014 led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha at the time of the writing of this thesis. Thus, that fear is real and not just merely concerned.

3.3.2.4 Security Deterioration

The security situation in Deep South has been deteriorating day by day. The people of the region- including the SBPAC officers, feel insecure. Situations are dangerous especially in remote areas. There are concerns on safety of the SBPAC's officials. Many of the SBPAC's projects are implemented in the areas such as training for career development as well as seminar on various topics regarding to community development. The officials feel insecure and very scared to work in the conflict-affected areas. As a result, many of them finally decided to move back to their home city or other provinces. This is a very serious blow to the organization. Perhaps the organization should establish

strategies that would encourage people to work with the organization as well as incentive reward programs for incredible officials who have made concrete productivity.

3.3.2.5 Ineffective project management system

The SBPAC is lack of an effective project management system. Many of the projects are unsuccessful because the organization does not have effective evaluation methods. The SBPAC has to put more effort in creating reliable evaluation methods and evaluating each project consistently. Consequently, the SBPAC will be able to pin point the loopholes, correct them and reevaluate them to assess the successes and failures of the projects. Through this process perhaps the organization monitor and control will ultimately achieve its desired objective that is a having better quality of life of people in the Deep South.

These are the constraints faced by the SBPAC which obstruct its operations and resulted in unsuccessful and ineffective accomplishment of its goals and strategies. The SBPAC has to critically take them into serious consideration, and find suitable and effective solutions to fix as well as to prevent those constraints constantly. Additionally, the SBPAC has sufficient resources that can be utilized, therefore, the organization should use the most out of those resources to overcome its constraints and better its operations to accomplish its goals and strategies.

3.4 Conclusion

The SBPAC organizational structures, it has been revised many times since it was established in 1981. In 2006, SBPAC was established under the direct supervision of the Office of National Security Council and administrative working and development policies, rules, and cooperated with other offices of the national security, the joint civilian, police and military, and also gave advice to the Prime Minister and ministries to do two responsibilities which were 1) approving of the national security's policy involved internal and external to the ministry; and 2) appointing the policy and strategy in a short to long-term condition.

In 2008, several departments were added to the organization structure such as the Internal Audit Group, Human Resources Management Division, Department of Foreign Affair, etc. In 2009, the SBPAC revised its organization structure again by adding the Job Analysis Group, reducing the Deputy of Director from four sections to three sections instead, and also reorganizing the Assistance Director as well. Moreover, in 2010, the government set the SBPAC apart from the Office of National Security Council. Currently, the SBPAC is an extraordinary government sector which is directly supervised by the Prime Minister.

Furthermore, as the SBPAC is under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister, theoretically, the SBPAC will operate and evaluate harmonize from the policy-making level and upto the implementation level with all relevant sectors. However, practically, the SBPAC does not have full authority but rather follow government policies. As many interviewees mentioned, the SBPAC is just a tool of the government in managing

conflict in the Deep South and acts as a representative of the government. It does not have full authority to control people and empower other relevant government and non-government agencies.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES PURSUED BY THE SBPAC
IN MANAGING CONFLICT IN
THE DEEP SOUTH OF THAILAND

4.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the political strategies pursued by the SBPAC in managing the conflict in the Deep South. The chapter is divided into five parts. Specifically, this study discusses and analyzes peace negotiation, diplomatic offensive, international collaborations, role of religious leaders and healing process as its political strategies in resolving the conflict in southern Thailand.

4.1 Peace Negotiation

The ongoing conflict has claimed more than three thousand lives of Muslim majority in Thailand's southern border provinces since 2004. To date, successive governments have sought to control the violence mainly through the application of enhanced security measures, and by arresting and prosecuting suspected or even potential insurgents. Yet despite some limited successes in reducing the number of violent incidents, the underlying causes of the conflict have not been addressed. Consequently, the Thai state seems suffering from a legitimacy deficit in the region.

Indeed, many Malay Muslims considered the successive Bangkok governments as foreign governments that have usurped their political powers, frequently violated their rights and above all made their economic conditions miserable. With this situation, it is natural for them (Malay Muslims) to seek alternative institution that would give them a sense of self-determination to their political, economic and cultural aspirations. In this

connection, Salleh forcefully argues that many Malay Muslims in the Deep South would like to have a greater control over their own affairs within the perimeter of the Thai Constitution.

It seems that Salleh ruled out independence as a solution to the conflict in the region. In plain language, he (Salleh) is amenable with autonomy as a fair, just, lasting, but practical political solution of the Malay Muslims question. This was also echoed by both Hj. Abdulrahman Daud (Chairman of Islamic Council of Patani Province) and Hj. Hakaria Saleh (President of The Islamic Committee of Songkhla) when they state that... the army cannot solve the problem in the region through the use of force, and therefore, the Thai government through the SBPAC should engage the Malay Muslims, in general, and the Malay Muslim leaders, in particular through some collaborative activities or programs so as to build sense of mutual confidence (Hj. Abdulrahman Daud , 28 Augost, 2012; Hj. Hakaria Saleh, 28 August, 2012).

Perhaps the biggest irony in the push to initiate talks with separatists is that for the past six years, all the so-called "peace makers" have been looking for one man, Sapae-ing Basor. He is the former head of Thamvithya Foundation that runs a network of Islamic schools comprising more than 10,000 students. In December 2004, Sapae-ing was accused by the Government of being the overall of the new generation of militants. In fact, a significant number of insurgents had graduated from the Thamvitya network which made Sapae-ing an easy target. Now the SBPAC have been trying to meet him, not to arrest him but to ask for his endorsement with their peace initiatives.

Sapae-ing's support is deemed important because many mediators have come to realize that any substantive peace initiative will need a person whom the Malay population, as well as the separatist groups, can trust. Exiled separatist leaders, academic

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people, local residents, and religious and community leaders say that Sapae-ing is a sort of spiritual leadership of the Malay Muslims in the Deep South.   His charisma is the most debated topic, but those who know him say his integrity earned him respect from the Malay Muslim community. One of Thai officials who knew Sapae-ing said that "The man doesn't kiss up to the Thais, and that makes many people uncomfortable." The fact that Sapae-ing could not cooperate with the Thais made him a hero among the local Muslims, especially among angry young men who had taken up arms against the state.

According to security official, in several workshops carried out with "vulnerable" you man rounded up by the authorities, the you man often singled out Sapae-ing as the man whom they looked up to despite of the fact that they had neither studied at his schools nor met him in person. Achieving such status comes with a price and enemies, especially when one is a symbol of an identity and narrative that is different from the one constructed by the state. The more the state condemns and demonizes the man, the greater the secretiveness surrounding him.

Recently, more and more government officials are coming to admit that the charges against Sapae-ing were fabricated and added that if he was stood the trial today based on the evidence that the state has against him, he would beat the charge easily. However, after hiding for six years during the relentless attacks from hardliners in the Thai government, it is unlikely that the aging school principal will give the Thai justice system the benefit of the doubt. This is most likely why he refused to meet any of the Thai officials or their representatives in the first place.

There have been suggestions that the charges against Sapae-ing should either be dropped or pushed through the due process system, so that his legal status can be concluded. Doing so may facilitate the peace makers' search for Sapae-ing, one which

reflects that there is a growing understanding that the Deep South conflict is ethnic-nationalist in nature, driven by separatist ideals, not religion. In this respect, it makes sense to talk to a spiritual leader such as Sapae-ing. His whereabouts remains a mystery (Patan, D. 2011).

In light of the shortsighted nature of the so-called peace process since 2005 and considering the international best practice, there is nothing to suggest that the SBPAC has the political power to go beyond the initiated series of secret talks and give an entity to the Mandate in mediating a formal and meaningful peace process. Other movement towards recognizing the separatist movements or their grievances will be extremely unpopular among the public and there is no unity among Thai policy and security lanners about how to move forward.

However, the SBPAC is working to develop a common position among Thai officials and is making plans to reach out to the general population about the conflict. The SBPAC have to understand fully well that the idea of negotiating with the Pattani Malay separatists is not a popular one but for any peace process to be successful, the government will have to cope with the general public namely the Buddhist Majority.

Nevertheless, employing a more meaningful peace process or peace dialogue is moving along slowly but steadily, with more representatives from civil society and government agencies lending their names and expertise to explore various ideas and means that would lead to a sustainable peace process. How meaningful this process development links to the level of trust and confidence between the civil society and the state agencies, namely the National Security Council (NSC) and the military. Indeed, working relations between the authorities and members of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have improved tremendously over the past couple of years, with more and more

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CSO members coming forward to work with the officials on ways and means to achieve peace.

One possible outcome of this is that these relations could become what some security expert call "internal mediation," in which local CSOs function as an interlocutor for the government and the separatist movements. That has yet to occur, but the fact that CSOs and the authorities are talking about it, which is a good indication that preparations for dialogue on the Thai side are moving in the right direction as more and more authorities are speaking and thinking in political term.

On other hand, the separatists do not seem to be in the mood to talk at least not for the time being. Members of long standing separatist groups who have come to the discussion table with the Thai authorities in Langkawi, Bogor and Kuala Lumpur have not been able to create a political platform that agree by all long standing groups and the separatist groups. Ingrained/pronounced/historical rivalries continue to shape their behavior and outlook, and they all call claimed to have BRN-coordinate cadres working with them. In fact, the executive council of the BRN- Coordinate gains effective control over the separatist groups' cell on the ground, counteracts the criminalization of the movement, and establishes an adequate chain of command between the two generations of militants. It is very unlikely they will come to anyone's negotiating table.

On the separatist groups' side, they continue waiting for the old guards to get their side of the house with the hope that they will evolve into a political front that could deal directly with the Thai state. The movement understands very well about the absence of an honest broker, and many suggest that the peace process could do without one as the Thais are committed to peace.

While considerable challenges to initiate a credible peace dialogue remained, the atmosphere for talks in the Deep South has improved considerably over the past couple years. If this atmosphere can spill over into the general population, signaling to the Malays of Pattani that the Thai state is ready to recognize them and understand their grievances. The BRN-Coordinate may yet be able to establish adequate control over the separatist groups and push the other long-standing groups into a united political front. Crucially, to maintain momentum for talks, both sides must remain focused on the long-term goal: real and sustainable peace in the Deep South.

The SBPAC and separatist groups have found it difficult to establish official peace talks. The late 2005 was a time when the leader of the long standing separatist were trying to reinvent themselves as either mediators or representative of the new generation of insurgents, often referred to as separatist groups or fighters in the local Malay dialect. The exiled leaders, sometimes referred to as the 'old guard', were counting on the fact that their contribution to the struggle for an independent Pattani from the late 1960s to early 1990s would guarantee them a seat at the negotiating table.

However, the hope of seeing the old guard evolve into a political front, with the separatist groups becoming their military wing, has not materialized. It is because the exiled of these groups have no unity and the separatist groups do not trust them. They have virtually nothing to show after decades of dealing with the SBPAC.

Beside the issue of disunity and distrust between the separatist groups and old guards, criminalization of the movement is also preventing the most credible among these long standing groups. Crime syndicates with an axe to grind with Thai security officials, and among themselves, have tapped into the younger separatist group fighters to carry out violent attacks including car bombs and hitting soft targets. The

criminalization of the movement, in which the militants sell their service to crime syndicates, has frustrated both Thai officials and the exiled separatist leaders, but they admitted there was not much they could do about it.

According to BRN-Coordinate operative, this problem is hampering his group's efforts to establish an effective command and control with the separatist groups. Until that happens, getting the BRN-Coordinate to any negotiating table will continue to be a pipe dream. The merit of this approach is still debatable, but for the time being it appeared that this is the strategy that the SBPAC and successive governments have adopted.

The evolving series of secret talks enacted since 2005 into an official peace process has also failed because the separatist leaders do not see any real commitment and also lack of unity from the SBPAC. Thailand's political instability has exacerbated this problem, and the prospect of the SBPAC coming to a unified position of the sticky issue of negotiations or talking to the enemies is still nowhere in sight.

However, emphasizing that the atmosphere for dialogue has improved, with civil society organizations (CSO) engaging with Thai officials and laying the groundwork for more substantive talk. As the SBPAC has welcomed these efforts, it was a positive sign. Creating sustained efforts by both sides may yet enable the BRN-Coordinated to consolidate the exiled separatist leaders into a unified political front and convince the separatist groups that it is in their interest to listen to and be influenced by them.

Overall, the response of successive the SBPAC to the conflict in the Deep South has involved a combination of lofty disdain for the region and its people, "especially the Muslim population; a willingness of the military to employ the excessive force; the deployment of royalist rhetoric as a substitute for serious study and analysis; the use of

empty promises on justice and reconciliation; the deployment of vast 'development funds' to little obvious effect; and a complete denial of the political nature of the problem" (McCargo, 2010).

The southern Thai conflict is in the long run has deep historical roots and engages issues of identity. It also threatens to spread across over Thailand's borders by creating tensions with Malaysia and by linking up with global Islamist networks. We might therefore expect the conflict to represent grave challenges to the Thai state. However, it also seems possible that the conflict can be managed and mitigated through competent political management.

The chief among the policy instruments that available to quell the conflict is the central government's encouragement of decentralization. If this argument sounds unduly optimistic, it is worth reminding us that only five years ago the conflict seemed to be following a stable path of declining intensity. It also important to keep in mind how limited is our understanding of the causes underlying this conflict, though this last point can be used either to bolster or to undermine any specific prescription.

Even though the southern Thai conflict is ultimately a political problem, ..."it does not mean that a political solution will easily bring peace to the region. In practice, the militants rarely agree to negotiate over political alternatives unless and until they face substantial and effective pressure from the state security forces. Despite Thai military claims that they are now achieving greater success in curtailing insurgent activities, many observers believe that militant tactics are hardening: developments such as the recent spate of beheadings illustrate the continuing strengths of the movement. A further precondition for a settlement is the emergence of a more explicit command structure behind the violence; the right militants need to be brought to the negotiating

table".

Therefore, this arise the primacy of peace talks or negotiations, not only as a civilized way of ending the conflict, but also as the only practical and workable solution to the issue. Both parties must sit down, discuss issues and hopefully agree on something that is agreeable to both sides, tackle the real causes of the problems and address them justly and squarely. Unless this thing happens, any other attempts will fail. Indeed, the insurgency is mainly fuelled by political frustrations. In this respect, Mccargo & Jitpiromsir have quoted Askew as arguing:

> that the violence has become increasingly intractable, and attempts by the authorities to develop security-based responses have substantially failed thus far. The Southern Thai conflict is at root a political problem, reflecting deep differences of identity. As such, options for developing a political solution to the conflict ought to be urgently explored. One such option is outlined in detail here: negotiation with movement groups who have activity to go against the Thai Government.... (Mccargo & Jitpiromsir, 2008: 403; Askaew, 2008: 79).

Indeed, majority of the Malay Muslims in the Deep South have suggested to the Thai government to settle its conflict with the separatist movements through peace negotiations. However, such peace talks must be substantive. As pointed earlier, the Bangkok government must offer some sort meaningful autonomy within the perimeter of the Thai Constitution. In return, the separatist movements must not insist independence as their ultimate goal.

There must be a need to compromise on the part of both disputing parties in order to achieve just that is lasting, durable, but practical and acceptable to all stakeholders. Indeed, most if not all conflicts require neither political solution, nor military or use of force. Rambo approach seems does not work, not only to the particular

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case of the Deep South, but also in most conflict-situations in the world. These arguments have clearly strengthened when it is argued that in many "separatist" conflicts around the world, ranging from Aceh to Northern Ireland, governance reforms have formed a central plank of negotiations that led to a cessation of violence (IDEA, 2007). Having said that, this does not mean that use of force is of no use. Indeed, in some cases, a use of force was not only effective, but also necessary. Long term-solution needs political solution through peace agreement that would bind both parties to respect both in letter and spirit.

On the face of it, "the reform of governance in the Southern border provinces potentially offers a way of undercutting the separatist movement, addressing the Thai state's legitimacy deficit in the region, and renegotiating relations between the SBPAC and the Deep South. While serious discussion of a political solution for the Southern violence was largely off-limits for the first three years of the conflict, such ideas have been raised more widely since 2007" (Mathichon, 2007: 9).

However, part of the problem was that there has been little public acknowledgement from the SBPAC that the conflict in the South is essentially a political problem, since this would involve recognizing the scale of Bangkok's legitimacy crisis in the region as he pointed out (Hafez, 2003: 85). For instance, former Thai Prime Minister Abhisit has been speaking the language of tolerance, justice and fairness, when the core problem is actually one of power, participation and accountability. Perhaps, the best way to address the conflict in the region is to have better political discourse concerning options for peace building.

Despite the SBPAC insistence that it will not negotiate with separatist groups over the Southern conflict, it is an open secret that various forms of 'dialogue' have

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already taken place. These include talks on the Malaysian island of Langkawi, brokered by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, in 2005–2006; and a meeting in Bogor, Indonesia on 20–21 September 2008, initiated by former Indonesian vice-president Jusuf Kalla (World Report, 2007: 196).

To date, these meetings have made little progress, for two main reasons. First, the representatives of the militants have failed to demonstrate their leadership capabilities. The separatist groups have leadership crisis and thus, they are disunited. They neither speak in one voice nor have control on the ground. In simple term, they have no command control over the insurgents in the region, except their own group or faction.

It is very reasoned that the Thai government through the SBPAC argues that they have difficulties in negotiating with the separatist movements because the former does not whom to negotiate due to the disunity among the latter. For instance, by calling a short cessation of hostilities and it remains unclear whether they really have command control over those insurgents on the ground. A bizarre fake 'ceasefire' declared by some supposed militants on TV Channel 5 (the Army's television station) on 17 July 2008 illustrated the problems surrounding authority and legitimacy of the leadership of the movements who are negotiating with the Thai authorities.

Second, the Thai authorities have brought little to the table, since they refused to discuss substantive questions of governance, autonomy or decentralization. On the part of the Thai authorities, it appears to have been buying of time, perhaps hoping to find ways of coopting those behind the insurgency. Perhaps, there is a lack of readiness, if not sincerity on the part of the Bangkok government to accommodate the demands of the separatist movements in the region.

Basically, the Thai government is ready to share or loss their political and economic clouts in the Deep South. They are hoping that the insurgents perhaps may loss their momentum and might die naturally due to their financial constraints. This belief has collaborated by McCarthy and Zald when they assert that... "Lacking such resources, movements may have little choice but to use their ability to disrupt public order as a negative inducement to bargaining" (McAdam McCarthy & Zald, 1996: 243).

In addition to a lack of political resources, fragmentation between the elected Malay Muslims in the government and armed resistance factions is likely for several reasons. These reasons include the perceived corruption of political structures, the ineffectiveness of local and central factions to devise and implement solutions on the Deep South issues, and the inability for Malay Muslims to work with separatists while operating within the Thai government. Though it has also been documented that many Malay Muslims have little or no faith in the candidates of alternative parties, they did vote overwhelmingly (Tan-Mullins, 2006). However, Malay Muslim participation in voting is condemned by at least one separatist group, as exemplified by the bombing of a polling location in March, 2008 (Bangkok Post, 2008: 21).

There is also evidence that militants condemned any attempts of negotiating with the SBPAC. For instance, one member of the BRN-C was quoted by Human Rights as saying that past negotiations had weakened their movement (Human Rights Watch, 2007). However, some militants have expressed their willingness to participate in negotiations with third party mediation. For example, the Bangkok Post reported that a mediation meeting might have taken place in Geneva in the spring of 2008, possibly with the PULO and the BNPP (Bangkok Post, 2007: 22). However, the Thai government has not officially recognized these talks, nor have they been willing to discuss these

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negotiations in the media.

Despite of their significant differences on negotiation and reconciliation, some leadership of different factions of the movements has expressed their willingness to negotiate with the Bangkok government. They also expressed their readiness to compromise through the acceptance of autonomy, and therefore, not independence as a permanent or lasting solution to the conflict. This means that they are willing to settle their differences within the framework of the Thai Constitution. This is positive development, indeed the Bangkok central government must take advantages. The Thai policy-makers must seize their opportunity so as to put an end permanently the conflict in the Deep South.

In fact, moderate groups may benefit from what McAdam McCathy and Zald dub the "radical flank effect' which describes "one effect that often follow from the presence of 'extremist' group within the same movement as other more 'moderate' (McAdam McCathy & Zald, 1996). In effect, …"the presence of extremists encourages funding support for the moderate factions as a way of undercutting the influence of the radicals. However, in order for the moderate factions to work productively with the government, the central authority must first be at least willing to discern between terrorist insurgents, moderate separatists who might be willing to accept amnesty protection and ordinary citizens who have no direct links to the terrorist insurgency" (McAdam McCathy & Zald, 1996).

Not long after the Yingluck government came into political power exercises, the task of negotiating with separatists was taken away from the NRC and given to Thawee Sodsong, the Secretary-General of the SBPAC. The move essentially ended the NSC's Geneva Process. Thawee reached out to the exiled leaders of the old guard. However, a

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number of Thai officials who have observed the conflict for years, as well as the exiled separatist leaders, think that the Secretary-General of the SBPAC's approach will not work because of his past dealings in the region. Compounding this, the Army dominated before the SBPAC take responsibility of negotiations.

The Secretary-General of the SBPAC's past deeds rubbed people the wrong way when he was send to the Deep South shortly after the January 4, 2004 raid on an army outpost in the south. Many have yet to forgive the manner in which launched a crackdown on suspected insurgents and Islamic teachers. Moreover, it was him who issued the arrest warrant for Sapae-ing Basor, who is seen by many as the key to peace in the south because of the respect of his command in his community. The SBPAC accused Sapae-ing of wanting to be president of a liberated Pattani. In this context, it seems that the SBPAC is seen as a part of the problem rather than a solution to the conflict in the Deep South.

Another part of the problem is the question of trust. Separatist groups have lack of trust and confidence to many of the SBPAC's officials. The former not only has no faith to the peace process, but also to those officials involved in the negotiation. Thus, in March 2012, the former Thai Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra met with a group of about 17 Pattani Malay separatist leaders in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and asked them to help end the conflict. According to participants at the meeting, the former expressed regret to the latter for using hard policy during his term but did not apologize. Instead, he blamed bureaucrats for providing him with wrong information. The meeting was boycotted by the BRN-Coordinate. Two weeks after the secret meeting, the separatist groups carried a series of car bombs. One targeted Yala's business district, resulting in the deaths of 13 people and more than 100 injures (Special Report, 2012).

Another car bomb went off at a parking lot at a Hat Yai hotel about the same time, killing two and injuring numbers of people, many of whom were Malaysian tourists (Special Report, 2012). Nothing meaningful came out of the March 2012 meeting between the SBPAC and the exiled leaders. After that, they have been asking religious leader to act as go-between with the separatist leader, as opposed to local politicians (Special Report, 2012).

At first the BRN-Coordinate explanation over the boycotting of the SBPAC meeting was that the group has not been able to forgive the hard policy from government tactics in the Deep South. Afterwards, the BRN-Coordinate admitted two other important reasons for boycotting the government and they cannot control all of separatist groups. It has yet to agree on a political platform, specifically how far they are willing to go in terms of making concessions to the Thais. The same challenges could be said about the Thai side.

Assuming that the SBPAC can cut a deal with the separatist movements, there is no guarantee that the Pattani Malay's historical narrative will just disappear. This narrative paints the region as an occupied territory and argues that the Malay Muslims have legitimate right to take up arms against the illegitimate occupiers. The emergence of a new generation of insurgents after a relatively quite decade in the Deep South is testimony to the fact that the narrative is as alive today as it was in the late 1960s, when the first generation of armed separatists emerged on the scene to fight against the Thai security forces.

4.2 Diplomatic Offensive

In managing the conflict in the Deep South, the Bangkok government through the SBPAC has engaged with some international entities through diplomatic offensive such as collaborations with Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The main purpose of this strategy is to win the hearts and minds of local community. It implies that the aim is basically to discourage them to support or get involve with any related insurgency activities in the area. In concrete terms, the SBPAC has formulated a political offensive strategy to undercut militant propaganda and demonstrate new thought on the SBPAC.

Since militants have lack of a united and common objectives (which range from a separate Pattani state, to some form of autonomy, or simply a desire to lash out at Thai regulation) in their struggle against the Thai government, this strategy could place them on the back foot and undermine the will of the militants to continue their struggle. In this respect, Patan negatively portrays separatist movements as distinctly a lost motive and minor retaliate an aimless one (Patan, 2012: 57). The future must lie in the middle ground somewhere. Briefly mentioned, the Thai state might consider making some concessions to the distinctive character of the region, and exploring detailed proposals for new ways to let Malay Muslims run their own affairs.

Nevertheless, these proposals would need to create the guarantees on the status and rights of the minority Buddhist and Sino-Thai population, all framed within the current constitutional parameters of Thailand as a unitary state. The road ahead will be difficult, but there seems no other choice to choose. Attempts to deny the political realities underpinning the insurgency by pretending that the "perpetrators of violence" are not engaged in a real struggle against the state are entirely futile. While some violent incidents in the region can be explained as ordinary crime, the great majority cannot. To

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promote spurious development projects as a palliative is doomed to failure, since the primary grievances of the militants are not socio-economic.

4.2.1 The SBPAC and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

As an international organization, OIC consists of 57 member states. The vision of the organization is to establish the diplomatic offensive such as to attempt the collective voice of the Muslim world and to protect a member's interests. Moreover, the progress and prosperity of Muslims have been ensured by the organization. As the largest international organization outside of the United Nations, it has a permanent delegation to the United Nations. The SPBAC has cooperated with OIC countries to help situation in the Deep South where conflict have never stopped.

The OIC secretariat has supported Thai government in their attempt to resolve the conflict in the Deep South. It has worked hard to promote peace and harmony in Thailand's southern provinces and thus, condemned any separatist groups who are perpetrating violence since January 2004, which over 2,600 people have been killed. This consequently, the OIC suggested to the leadership of both disputing parties to set up a form of political front in the Deep South where the OIC can facilitate dialogue between them. In this connection, Patani has quoted the former Secretary General, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu as saying:

> That the former Secretary General, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu stated in a speech before the representatives of Muslim minorities and Member States representatives that since he took over as OIC Secretary General, he devoted a great deal of his time and energy to build closer relations between Muslim minorities outside non-OIC Member States on the one hand and the OIC Member States on the other. He pointed out that Muslim minorities constitute one third of the total number of Muslims across the world, representing an estimated half a billion people. He continued by

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affirming that the elaborate reports which he has submitted to the Islamic meetings at the summit and ministerial levels prominently incorporate Muslim minority issues. He explained that he has dispatched special envoys to a number of countries hosting Muslim minorities over the past years in order to get a first-hand appreciation of the conditions of Muslims, interact with them, and identify their needs. The Secretary General appealed to the OIC Member States to accord greater importance to Muslim minority issues in non-Member States through their bilateral relations with these countries to help these minorities preserve their rights and interests. He further urged the OIC Member States to contribute more effectively in the endeavors of the Group of Experts by showing greater dedication in attending the Group's meetings, granting Muslim minorities the attention they ought to have, and providing them with the required support and assistance (Pattani Post, 2012: 15).

It seems that the Muslim World Commissioners understand the real issues happening in Thailand and accept the SBPAC resolution over the situation. The SBPAC has tried to follow the methodology of national reconciliation in order to create a collaborative development and educational support over the Deep South area by giving the idea that the true Muslim does not engage or resort to violence, hate or fear. Truly Muslim can live with others happily and equally.

The SBPAC has tried to build a strong relationship with OIC, corporate organizations, educational organizations, scientific units and Islamic agents in order to generate an understanding among the Muslims all over the world. The OIC urged the Pattani Malay separatist leaders to form a political front, known as the United Pattani People Council (UPPC) and vowed to help the separatist set up a dialogue process with the Thai government. With the political front in place, the OIC stressed that the Pattani People Congress (PCC) would be conducted, with the goal of obtaining a mandate from the Muslims of Pattani on how to move forward. It was not stipulated if the PCC would

serve as a parliament, with the entity primarily serving as way to give legitimacy to the UPPC (Interviewed by author, 2012).

Although, there is conflict in the Southern Thailand which considering the cause of the unrest, it was proven that it is rooted from socio-psychological problem and other factors as discussed in the earlier chapter which are full of misunderstanding and distrust toward the government; and can cause poverty in the community. The problems were caused by the delayed development, which did not cover the whole community and thus become dangerous conditions to be raised as issues for the unrest.

The problems have long been very sensitive, complicated and were later used to link to other problems such as politic, culture and tradition which affect not only on the people's feeling and the distress, but also affect on the economical, social and cultural development in the southern border provinces. Therefore, the SBPAC has an important role through diplomatic offensive to manage the problem in the area.

4.2.2 International Collaborations

The Thai government through the SBPAC has cooperated with neighboring governments, especially Malaysia on issues of border security and relations between southern border provinces of Thailand and northern states of Malaysia. Indeed, both sides (Malaysia and Thailand) have agreed and have worked hard to develop them. There are efforts to improve their coordination on their respective law enforcement agencies. Both countries have shared their information to establish understanding of the overlapping insurgency and modern terrorist networks.

However, there is a lack of intelligence sharing between the two countries. Perhaps, this is due to some sensitivity of the issue that each country might have serious

implications to their respective domestic affairs. A typical example is the case of dual citizenship. However, some issues (mainly economic issues) that do not clash with jurisdictional issues and does not come in conflict with politically sensitive sovereignty and non-interference norms can be dealt with. The changing of intelligence and information indeed usefully applies a common insurgency and terrorism database.

Needed issue of the additional research is on how Thailand and neighboring countries such as Singapore, on association with the Muslim minority community. The study will start with a concentration on certain laws and administration, then expand into concretely cooperate helping the Southern Thai Muslims to develop according to the Thai context. They can be exposed to other countries where the Muslim minorities have successfully supported to their nation's progress and development. The entired insurgencies are caused mainly from history, political, economic, and educational problems. The history could be as a lesson comprehend the present and predict the future. Regarding previous policy is in opposition to culture and tradition of Thai- Malay citizens of three provinces of southern Thailand was not success, they need to persuade their Islamic way and should be offered political participation by encouraging Muslim culture rights and religious freedom.

The international relationship between neighboring governments, especially Malaysia on border security and economic development issues were resulted in the establishment of the cooperative development policy and religious.

The inherent difficulties to launch the southern Thailand's peace process, even greater challenge of reaching the changing and compromising agreement are probably required the all sides' collaboration if a permanent solution is found, third-party negotiation still seems to have a long-distance success chance than the current military-

led initiatives. As the experience of the Aceh peace agreement, at least in terms of the involvement of outside negotiators, the Crisis Management Initiative led by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari with the subsequent engagement of the European Union and members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to complete the tasks of the Aceh Monitoring Mission-points to one possible approach, and hoping this approach would be accepted by the Thai Government that necessary opening the door to international mediation.

There are main important obstacles in pursuing a productive dialogue or peace negotiations with the Pattani insurgents which may pave away to a durable peace settlement in the region. The structure of the insurgency is a part of it. Whilst the Thai authorities have rejected the idea of third- party negotiation on the conflict, it may be only an outside independent agent can draw the diverse range of insurgent groups together so they could enter a political process. Another issue of particular significance is the role of the Thai military. For mostly Thai Southerners, the Thai security services and their actions in the region still are one of the main grievances.

Therefore it may be difficult, initially to persuade the insurgents to negotiate directly with the army at least. Moreover, for addressing grievances and any durable peace will probably require considerable reform of the Thai security services and independent investigations of their role in human rights violations and into allegations of corruption and complicity with criminality in the border region. Many will keep the eye on the real changes in the military and prosecutions those involved in human rights violations when former Thai Prime Minister Surayud's recent apology for the past actions of the government and the security services is a step forward.

A lasting solution to the problems of Southern Thailand will almost certainly

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require substantial devolution of political authority and the opening up of state institutions in the region to the general participation of Malay Muslims. In turn this will rely on the institutions being democratic and even eventually including political representatives of the current insurgent groups. In this sense, the military junta is an obstacle to a comprehensive peace since it stands in the way of democracy in Thai society.

4.3 Healing Process

Since January 2004, the unrest situation in southern border provinces have seriously affected, not only the life people of the Deep South, but also government officers as well. Both parties have lost the lives of some of their loved ones and caused serious damage to their properties. This situation has continued to unleash to the region as a whole. As a result, people are very nervous and fearful about their insecurity. It seems like people feel that no one is safe from this very violent situation that may occur anytime and anywhere in the region. In this kind of frightening situation, perhaps, the Bangkok government through the SBPAC needs to seriously contemplate the situation and re-evaluate and re-strategize its strategies in its quest to resolve the Malay Muslims question in the Deep South.

This is not easy task. However, for the Bangkok government to succeed it needs to get the support of the Malay Muslim population, in general, and the so-called moderate Malay Muslim leaders, in particular. This is very crucial, indeed, because any attempts by the Thai government without massive support from the people of the region will surely destined to fail. History has shown to us in many cases (e.g. U.S. defeated Iraqi insurgent in Anbal province due to Iraqi Tribal leaders' support etc.) where

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massive support is of paramount significance in resolving conflict or at least defeating enemies.

Therefore, the Thai government needs to engage with the Malay Muslim population and identify those groups or individuals whom they can work with, encourage them to work with the government and bridge the gap by providing them with both material and non-material assistance and let them feel that only government can provide security and economic prosperity. In this context, healing process is of paramount significance in resolving the conflict in the region.

Thus, the healing process is the best way to reduce confliction and hopefully harmony, peace and stability would be achieved in the southern border area provinces. The principle of the healing processing has started when former Prime minister Taksin proposed a committee to look into some issues concerning their grievances more specifically those affected by the conflict (the precept of Prime Minister's Office number 160/2548 on May 3,2005). For instance, the Thai government through SBPAC paid some amount of money to those innocent victims wounded or killed either by bombing, by government or by rebel forces.

This Nation Harmony fund is established and collected money to help family, not only for the people related to the government, but also for all conflict-affected areas in the Deep South of the country who are entitled for it. The healing process has covered those victims affected by the conflict in the region that occurred from January 1, 2004 until at the present time of the writing of this thesis. It is the strategy of the Thai government through the SBPAC for healing people both physically and emotionally in accordance with the international standard. The beneficiaries of the program can be divided into four groups such as the innocent people, public servants, government

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personnel and prisoners.

As pointed earlier, this is very a sensitive issue. Some people have accepted this with good faith. They perceived that the Bangkok government is responsive government that caters the concerns and flights of its citizen. They believe that the Bangkok government is doing it rightly and thus surely win the hearts and minds of the people of the region. This optimism was echoed by Modman, when he says that through this monetary assistance from the Thai government, not only that people can really be helped in their daily life, but also they can start or build small businesses.

Indeed, this can change their economic status if they utilize it wisely. For instance, the same rule of resolution or agreement of Council of Ministers is payment 100,000 baht for dead victims and 80,000 baht for disabled ones. For the governance officers will be paid 500,000 baht for dead victims and 500,000 baht for disabled one (see diagram 4.1 below). The new rule of resolution or agreement of Council of Ministers issued on August 14, 2012 has changed, payment for people who died from 100,000 baht to 500,000 baht and for people who disabled the payment has changed from 80,000 baht to 500,000 baht. This rule obliged after The Council of Ministers accepted and this rule protected dead people and disabled people since January 1, 2004 as well (see also diagram 4.1 below).

Nevertheless, this is nothing but buying the very souls of the victims of the conflict. This will not work because the said money is not used wisely. Some recipients even spent the said for other purpose like hand phones, motorcycle, television and so on instead of spending for its original purpose namely agricultural matters such as fertilizer, seedling and many others. In this regard, Hattah argues:

that the Bangkok government must address the real causes of the

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problems such as identity crisis, historical narratives, educational imbalance and centralized government system. He strongly recommends that the Thai government must win first the loyalty of the Malay Muslims by providing them economic development, quality of education and decentralized form of government so as to determine their political aspirations within the framework of the Thai Constitution.

It seems his argument is not only a logical one but also more importantly, perhaps practical and acceptable, if not this time may be in the near future.

In the process of identifying those victims of the conflict, the government will provide 25% of the above mentioned standard grade payment allotted for them. However, the help will stop immediately if the victim status is not clear. There are three officers who are in charged for this such as chief district officer, chief of police and chief of military. If the three or at least two of the officers in charge agreed on the process to determine the affected victims, then the recipients can receive the full amount within seven days. If one officer or nobody refers to it, then it means no payment or if already paid 25%, it will be stopped immediately with no refund while waiting for adjustment process. If it is true, the government can pay 100 % later.

According to Council of Ministers agreement issued on 31 May 2005 and 14 August 2012, it depicts that 4,224 people consist of the government officers and civilians died during the conflict, 7,618 people injured and 443 people disabled (total 12,285 people) with the total amount of 43,685,326 USD. The healing process for property with 4,144 people, the total amount is 18,284,317 USD. This includes the healing process from 2004-2012 (9 years) with the total amount of 61,969,644 USD.

Diagram 4.1 Healing process for people have been affected by the unrest 2004-2012 (Death, permanent disability, injury, damaged of property)

(**Source**: Center of Healing Patani, Yala, Narathawat and Songkhla, 2012)

In her research entitled, "Evaluate the Healing and Restoration of the Damaged and Affected by Unrest in The Southern Provinces: Narathiwat Province (Sangmanee, 2013), Sangmanee found that the damage caused by the conflict is related to satisfaction with their work, the healing and aid healing pattern level. Satisfactions refer to the care from the government of the state level and remedy of the weaknesses. The rules do not cover all the remedies.

The analysis and synthesis of information for the healing operations, leading to a systematic plan to strengthen the damage as a positive attitude towards healing, and set up a network to share and learn each other's care. Barriers are the rules for paying unequal treatment caused a rift. The remedy showed the same standard. Similarly, from Metta's journal papers (2013), the healing by money is the best way of to heal the conflict victims in the region. The important thing is how to develop their quality of life especially from their occupation and income. For people who had wrongly arrested by the government should be given their right and care about their fairness. For orphans of parents who had adjudged for violating the law, the government does not care of them (Issama-ae, 2012).

Although the healing process is directly for the conflict victims, however the government does not give more attention to them, these people cannot work in their own farm. Because the vendors do not come to buy natural products from these people, thus, the officers should pay more attention to the people in this area through not only money and budget for the healing process.

Assist Piya Kitthavorn, the Deputy Director of the SBPAC, said that the healing process is not only money the important one is mind or emotional healing, education

healing and health care healing which are strategies of the SBPAC for reducing conflict and create harmony in this area.

4.4 Enhancement the Role of Religious Leaders

Malay Muslim community in the Deep South is a very conservative community. Traditionally, they respect their religious leaders. Malay Muslims considered their religious leaders as authorities in all dimensions of their life, more specifically, with respect to the question religious issues or beliefs. This tradition has started since immemorial times. Consequently, the role of traditional religious leaders is crucially important in addressing the conflict in the Deep South. Thus, any attempt of sidelining them in dealing with the conflict in the region would end in futile. The case Sapae-ing Basor as pointed earlier is a typical example.

No wonder why the SBPAC is exclusively and evenly focused its action on religious improvement. May be the leadership of the organization has realized that religious act is important role to resolve the incident and to develop the southernmost. Therefore, a better understanding and harmonizing among different races will be achieved. These can generate a better attitude of people toward government as well can empower them to drive their own community by peace (SBPAC Annual report, 2010: 30)

In fact, one of the SBPAC missions is sustainable religious. The government has restored the temples. The Pilgrimages are promoted to do the religious observances in the Holy land. We enhance people opportunities to complete their believer by traveling and practicing the Hajj pilgrimage in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. People who had joined the

ceremony the government will be promoted as a leader driving "Family integrity program". The SBPAC had awarded the honor to moral family role models. The government had promoted the family accepted by people that they are excluded from drug. The family must devote themselves to community charity.

The SBPAC have supported what it called the decent people and promoted them to attend the Hajj pilgrimage this year more than ever done before. The SBPAC selected decent people from poverty account of various mosques. The fifty righteous people were delivered to Hajj pilgrimage by the flight from Hat Yai International Airport. Moreover the SBPAC will be motivated the morale and encouragement to Buddhists by supporting them to meditate and practice and the original land of Buddhism (India and Nepal). The SBPAC enhance the role of religious leaders by giving them opportunities to attend the seminar of leadership empowerment and to participate in knowledge-exchanged events. These can crates the religious leader in positive attitude toward the government (Uthairat, 2010: 43).

The collaboration from religious organizations is the most important key to solve the unrest situation in Deep South of Thailand. Due to the past violence, the terrorist groups have taught religious dogma distortedly to their adherents and command them creating many disturbances, which are contrasted with the core of dogma, and this created countless detriment. For example in case of the distortedly document "Berjihad Di Pattani" which have found in Grue seh Mosque in 2004, they connected religion, history and ethnic, then create their arrogant adherents into terrorist and create disturbances. It is not only someone's life and properties lost but it destroyed the image of Islam also. Therefore, The SBPAC needs respectable and acceptable experts with their wisdom and knowledge about Islam to solve this unrest.

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The familiarity and trust support the official performance effectively. Collaboratively brainstorm and accept each individual ideas lead to build up the peaceful community called "Gampong Takwa or Community of Faith" where living within following Islamic dogma to family and society based on God courteous. Therefore, they have issued local regulations called "Hugom paga" to be social measure support the religious measure for the people in the community to hold and behave.

The Central Islamic Council of Thailand would be a key organization which coordinated between government and local people such as religious leaders, Ustads or religious teachers, Imam or Islamic priest, university scholar, independent scholar, representatives from other local organizations and local people from many parts which related with Muslim community (Abdulzaku, 2004: 34)

The Provincial Islamic Council is an organization under Islamic Organization Act in 1997, the missions are to advise and give their opinion regarding Islamic to the governor in each province and control the performance of Islamic Council in each mosque and others related with religion. On the other hand, Islamic Council are person whom people in community trust and respect as the religious leader because mostly are Imam or private religious school owner, and they are also act as the spiritual leader that influential to all Muslim performance.

Due to the long-term unrest situation in the Deep South of Thailand, all caused by complicated conflict, especially the government policy which oppose with the local demand and the local people who were unclearly understand of the official performance, thus they feel the enforced laws do not meet their nature, culture and religion. Regarding the aforementioned reasons, the director of the SBPAC would like to have a platform

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that allows people to talk and negotiate peacefully in every Tambon (sub district) known as "the Public Justice Enhancement Center" which coordinated and managed by Islamic leaders who are the main and important to community. They believe that this solution will solve the long-term conflict and will not create misunderstanding between local people and the official.

Thai government has not found suitable methodology to solve the unrest situation and it could take two or three years for peaceful to the restive South. The southern conflict could not be quelled by military operation, it should be improved by justice and social welfare to solve the problem. The military approach is for catching the militants, but could not penalize them and judge their fault, which must be done according to the law.

The public could observe the court in action, and this might eventually help reveal the masterminds behind the terrorist acts. There has been no change in the South recently because of the government has failed to employ peaceful means. After all, the Thai government has to change its attitude toward southern Muslims and treat them as Thai citizens, not push them away as Malay Muslims. Thailand has to nurture "moderate Islam" to replace the hard-line teaching approach influenced by countries in the Middle East whose cultural environment was different from Southeast Asia.

In some countries in the Central East such as Iran, the former President was the religious leader under Islamic dogma politics, economics and society are blended, thus religious leader have to respond to all of these in the same way as Islamic leaders in others countries including Thailand, they realized the same need. Nowadays, they are not only give the advice and opinion but also collaborated in everything they have done, especially solving problem in the current unrest situation (Muzadi, 2006: 19).

In solving the problem need to rely on governmental power, law and the officers which always collaborate very well because of law enforcement could not solve any problem successfully. Beside that, the important thing is the enforcement in their mind and religion.

4.5 Conclusion

The successive governments have adopted security measures as a significant instrument in controlling the ongoing unrest situations in the Deep South of the country. However, they have faced difficulty in improving the unrest situations using the security measures. They also have not found the root causes of the conflict. In addition, many Malay Muslims in the Deep South would like to have better control over their own affair. Therefore, the peace negotiation is perceived as a meaningful instrument that can helps solve the conflict in the Deep South effectively.

The Thai government through the SBPAC has initiated various peace dialogues aiming to get all relevant sectors to a discussion table. Nevertheless, numbers of obstacles have occurred and obstructed the peace dialogues, for instance, the issue of distrust of the separatist groups on the Thai government, many Malay Muslims rely their life heavily on religion, Islam. However, even though they have faced numbers of obstacles but the peace dialogues are moving along slowly and steadily, and have improved considerably.

Moreover, the diplomatic offensive has also been implemented as an instrument to gain the hearts and minds of local community, which could lead to the reduction of the conflict. The SBPAC has worked with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

(OIC) and relevant organizations in order to generate understanding among Muslims and help create peace negotiation between the separatist groups and the Thai government. In addition, the SBPAC has also cooperated with neighboring countries like Malaysia in protecting border and sharing information so that they can create intelligence peace process and reduce the conflict in the Deep South of the country.

Furthermore, the healing process is another instrument that has been used to better life quality of people who have been affected by the unrest situations in the Deep South. The Thai government through the SBPAC has provided resources especially money to these people. This healing process has not been accomplished effectively because many people misuse these money and resources, and has not used them wisely. For better result, the SBPAC should initiate an efficient system in managing the healing process so that these resources will be used wiser and truly helped improve life quality of people.

Besides, as Malay Muslims in the Deep South are very conservative in their religion, therefore, enhancing the role of religious leaders is also very significant. The Thai government through the SBPAC has supported religious leaders with skills and knowledge they needs, and sent decent people to attend the Hajj pilgrimage, in Saudi Arabia. The SBPAC has also collaborated with religious organizations aiming to use these organizations to feast out the right Islamic dogma to Malay Muslims and create the peaceful community.

However, employing any instrument in solving the conflict in the Deep South of the country needs to be steady, consistent, reliable and sustainable with more

collaboration among relevant state agencies, international organizations, private sectors and people in the area. Moreover, the researcher will discuss the result of the political strategies implemented by the SBPAC, relevant government agencies and private sectors in greater details in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES OF THE SBPAC
ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE DEEP
SOUTH OF THAILAND

5.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the educational strategies pursued by the SBPAC in managing the conflict in the Southern Thailand, specifically, in the Deep South of the country. It is primarily divided into four parts. First, it examines the role of education in resolving the conflict in the region. Second, it explains an integration of Pondok/Islamic education system into Thai education system. Third, it analyzes the SBPC's effort on rebuilding education in the conflict-affected Area. Lastly, it discusses the effectiveness/efficiency of the SBPAC's educational strategies

5.1 The Role of Education

The Thai government through the SBPAC believes the paramount significance of the role of education as a contributing factor in managing the conflict in the region. While the 'national security mindset' of the security forces and the Thai administration persists and obstructs cooperative outcomes in fields like education, national efforts are beginning to turn this around. These initiatives are important since they would help create a more conducive environment where Islamic religious education can be used as a peace-building tool.

One example of this is the recent "peace journalism" campaign mounted by government officials, media groups and some leaders of civil societies in Southern Thailand. In this regard, former Deputy Director of the SBPAC, now Governor of

Pattani, Mr. Pramok argues that ... despite the tendency to equate Islamic religious education with insurgency and violence, it would perhaps be wiser to look at various local, national and regional approaches that may create an environment conducive for, facilitates, or even adopts Islamic religious education as a peace building tool (Pramok, Interview by the author, 2012). He further argues that the case of Southern Thailand certainly shows that cooperative outcomes are enhanced through this process (education). This belief was echoed by Parameswaran when he asserts that:

> Islamic religious education is fundamental to understanding the Southern Thailand insurgency, that it can be the solution to facilitating peace efforts or yielding cooperative outcomes. He opines s that "the current primary problem with Southern Thailand in general and Islamic religious education in particular is that both are often viewed through the myopic lens of national security. Since it acquired the provinces, the Thai state has only been involved in Southern socioeconomic development when it feels the region constitutes a national security threat resulting in alternating periods of neglect and heavy-handed crackdowns. Islamic religious education is only a concern when resistance movements flare up" or radical links to the Middle East emerges (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000: np; Parameswaran, 2012: np).

However, some scholars cautioned that although education for peace programs are being promoted and are reaching many thousands (of children) in war-scarred countries, the nature or depth of their impact is less clear (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000: 12). They further clarify that public media are sometimes involved in these processes, specifically to reach out-of-school children and other sectors of the community (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000: 12).

It seems that Bush and Saltarelli (2000) raise some important points since an educational approach will contribute to the development of local peace building capacities and thus, any solution would be unsustainable unless it is built, developed and

supported by stakeholders such as the Thai government (SBPAC), Malay Muslims community and possibly the revolutionary or freedom fighters within the war-torn societies themselves. However, there must be systems or mechanisms for feedback or check and balance as to monitor and constantly update the nature and processes in which the peace program is being implemented because the people need to feel the fruit of peace dividend.

There are possibly three main reasons why the relationship between education and conflict are important. Firstly, education is a fundamental right that should be maintained at all times, even in the most difficult circumstances. This is not simply an ideological statement. Where education is maintained in the midst of conflict, it may provide an important mechanism for the protection of children against abuse (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 9). This entails that education is a basic rights of every individual human beings where all governments must deliver to their own people even in time of war. With, Thai government must ensure that education would be provided to all its citizens including the Malay Muslims in the Southern Thailand.

Secondly, education is an essential tool for human development and eradication of poverty. Children rarely get a second chance at education. Where the opportunity of education has been lost due to conflict, it is not just a loss to the individual, but a loss of social capital and the capacity of a society to recover from the conflict (Smith & Vaux, 2003: 9). Thai children or youth including those in the Deep of the country are the future of the country and therefore, the quality of current education would reflect the quality of its citizens in the future.

Lastly, education can be part of the problem as well as part of the solution. Policies and practices at all levels within the education system need to be analyzed in terms of their potential to aggravate or ameliorate conflict (Smith & Vaux, 2003: 10). We do believe that the state has to actively design its educational policy because educational orientation can be a human capital or burden. In the case of Thailand, having an educated citizen would serve as an asset of the country. They will become future visionaries that would design strategic planning of Thailand so as to be very competitive not only in the region, but also globally.

5.2 Integration of Pondok/Islamic Education System into Thai Education System

The Thai central government believes that education is one of the most important long-term social investments that would bring political maturity, social justice and economic prosperity in the country, in general, and, the Deep South, in particular. Needless to say, the government has been investing heavily in education despite overall budgetary constraints.

Pramook Moonla, the Deputy Director of the SBPAC, states that in order to improve the quality of education in the Deep South of Thailand, the SBPAC has suggested some recommendations to improve school management and performance for the provision of quality school education (Pramook, Interviewed by the author, 2012). For instance, he specifically suggests that schools should practice school-based management to develop their own ways to meet the needs of the students and the goals of quality education. This is, undoubtedly, the responsibility of the school principals and teachers, he points out further (Pramook, Interviewed by the author, 2012). Of course,

this also implies that it will teach our young people to face the challenges and competitions, which lie ahead in the global and knowledge-based economy.

While there is a general agreement on the necessity of an urgent educational changes in the region, but certain strategies and actions need to be planned carefully to ensure that the current programs of educational change on Malay Muslims' educational institutions (Islamic/pondok) will promote and facilitate peace building process in the Deep South. In this regard, Ibrahem argues that though he agreed the idea that educational change can be a possible route for building peace, but he warns that "simply imposing changes upon educational institutions is inadequate because educational changes needs to be done properly since there are lots of sensitivities in imposing such changes on Muslim communities, especially on Muslim educational institutions (Ibrahem, 2006: 128-129). It seems that many (including the government through the SBPAC) have recognized the prevailing educational problems and its far–reaching implications on the conflict in the region.

Thus, a genuine government's reforms, in general and, an educational reform, in particular, must be initiated if the Thai government seriously resolving conflict in the Deep South. Educational institution is one the most effective tools in cultivating a culture of peace and, thereby, develops a sense trust from people to their government. In this connection, Asst. Professor Dr. Warayuth Sriwarakuel believes that:

> …"lack of trust is one of the most fundamental problems in the three provinces in Southern Thailand. He furthers believes that trust inspires participation and empowerment and participation and empowerment lead to peace. Therefore, to build a culture of peace requires the creation of trust, through the cultivation of stable principles and values. One non-violent solution that Warayuth presented was through

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educational... reform in order to address the root causes of the problems in Southern Thailand such as underdevelopment and injustice". He emphasizes that if peace is the goal, then one must first have a paradigm shift that is a fundamental change on our attitude towards other people and issues and this can only be achieved through educational reform (Warayuth, 2006: 75).

With this, the SBPAC together with the academe and civil society have established several programs or projects about what effort that can strengthen research work on peace and development in the Deep South of Thailand. Key Educational Policy of Ministry of Education has been used in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand (The Ministry of Education, 2010).

The purpose of formulating the educational development plan has exclusively used in the southern provinces of Thailand in two aspects. First, it is to improve the quality of education. For example, curriculum has been introduced to integrate Islamic education into the general curriculum in a school. Al-Fatani stated that the government has provided greater educational opportunities for young people in the southern border provinces, so that they would be equipped with both vocational training and religious studies especially Islamic study. The availability of more education and job opportunities of young people in the Deep South will be prevented from being misled by ill-intentioned people.

Second, it is to provide a great learning opportunity for the students in Southern Thailand so that their educational equality and capability will be greatly enhanced compared with those in other provinces of Thailand. In this respect, he claims that the SBPAC believes that education could correct people's way of thought (Somkiet, Interview by the author, 2012). In fact, the SBPAC has struggled to get better

understanding of people and to understand the Muslim's way of life accurately (Interviewed by author, 2012).

Since education is significant to the community perception, the SBPAC has frequently used it as a tool for promoting its programs and activities as well as creating significant impact to the youth living in the areas. In enhancing a quality of education in Southern Thailand, the Thai government through the SBPAC has initiated some relevant projects such as strengthening learning and teaching Thai, developing teachers and learners of Islamic Tadika and Ponoh schools, improving assessment of study achievement and introducing media and technology for teaching assistance.

Realizing that education would encourage people to think rationally and do the right thing, the Ministry of Education has set six education strategies to be implemented in the Deep South of Thailand (The Ministry of Education, 2010). The first strategy seeks to develop the quality of education. Meanwhile, in the second strategy, Islamic studies will be promoted and local residents in Southern Thailand will be able to have Islamic education as they wish. The third strategy seeks to support local private schools, such as Pondok and Tadika.

In the fourth strategy, vocational education will be promoted to enable local residents to earn a living both in Thailand and abroad. The fifth strategy seeks to improve education management and develop provincial and district offices under the Office of Private Education Commission and sub-district offices under the Office of Non-formal and Informal Education into IT centers for communication. The sixth

strategy, education for security seeks to ensure safety for teachers and other education personnel.

The SBPAC has offered annual scholarships, from kindergarten to graduate level, for those whose lives have been disrupted by the unrest. The Ministry of Interior has also carried out a project to send southern Muslim students to continue their studies in various universities. The project was considered as an important measure to tackle southern problems, especially those concerning security, socio-psychology, and economic development. It was intended to provide educational opportunities for young Muslim Thais and upgrade their living standards. Higher educational attainment reduces the risk of political violence by encouraging political participation and channeling conflicts of interest through institutional pathways rather than through the use of violence (Interview by the Author, 2012).

Emphasis is given to the provision of quality education and manpower development as the key to develop the people in Southern Thailand and enhanced competitiveness. The SBPAC aims to provide quality, student-centered, and life-long learning opportunities. Clear indicators will be used to evaluate the performance of both teachers and learners.

5.3 Rebuilding Education in Conflict-affected Area

Meanwhile, there are several arguments on education in the conflict-affected area, namely grievances arise when the gap between people's expectations and their actual situations are worsen (Gurr, 1970: 86). Education can have both a direct and indirect

effect on the grievances that may create political violence. Indeed, this seems to be happening in the Deep South of Thailand. In this regard, he claims that:

> the Thai government policy of education is not so clearly defined and planned, and therefore, it has no longer planning but an ad-hoc action taken by frequently changing of leaders from time to time. More over the educational technocrats are always self-protected and selfish for their interests especially during the time of promotion period. Therefore, they concern more their own interests rather than worry about the educational planning of these private Islamic schools. Moreover they oftenly used to report their negative perceptions towards this kind of private Islamic schools to the central government. Finally, the central governments listen to these educational technocrats who monopolize the source of negative report as correct without questioning to or consulting with those schools' administrators (Dato Omar Tayib, Interview by the author, November 2012).

This situation has far-reaching implications to the conflict in the region. It causes all other problems arisen in the south whether social, economic, cultural and political ones what he called a "chain problem" (Dato Omar Tayib, Interviewed by the author, November 2012). That is why education has been advocated by the Thai government as one of the best ways to improve the situation in the southern border provinces. This policy, however, has failed not only it has not been translated into action, but perhaps the Thai government has imposed a type of education and its system which is alien to the Malay Muslims' culture and religion.

Naturally, the latter has rejected the former's which resulted to the failure of Thai educational policy to solve the educational problem of Malay Muslims in the Deep South. Perhaps, that is one of reasons why the condition of education in the Deep South of Thailand, especially in Pattani and Narathiwat was very poor. For instance, Pattani and Narathiwat were ranked 71st and 75th of 76 provinces, while Yala was ranked 43rd of 76 provinces (Foreign Office, 2012).

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This is to suggest that the Thai government through the SBPAC has to work hard to increase the quality of education in the Deep South of Thailand. Mr.Precha Wetchasat, Director of Education Development Center at Deep South of Thailand and Assistance Secretary of Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, argues that throughout the world, people are viewing education to accelerate the humane social order on the grounds that quality education invests in the young crucial humanitarian values such as equity, tolerance and peace. Progress in education is also taken to be essential for sustainable development; environmental protection; improvement in maternal and child's health; participation in democratic social; and political processes. Education is the single most important contributor to the national economic growth (Interviewed by author, 2012).

The SBPAC is exclusively and evenly focused on actions on religious and educational improvements. Religion and education can act as important role to resolve the incident and to develop the Deep South. The SBPAC focused on regular educational training, at the same time, promoted religious educational training. These projects lead to decrease a condition concerning cultural separations. Complying with the project, people can live their life harmony and unity among their diversity.

Currently, there is a variety of religious-educational institutions in Muslim societies especially in the Southern Thailand. Islamic-secular education in Southern Thailand can generally be divided into three types: *Tadikas, Madrasah, and Pondok.* Tadika are government-sponsored schools, which offers Islamic education in conjunction with the elementary national curriculum. These community-run schools provide Islamic education after school hours or during the weekend for children at kindergarten to primary level.

The local Malay dialect and standard Malay are the languages of instruction. *Madrasah* are the private Islamic schools that may offer secular subjects such as science and math, as well as teaching of foreign languages (like Arabic and English) for elementary up to high school students. The third type which is also considered "deeply intimate with the Malay Muslims" is the *Pondok"* (Medrano, 2007: 57). A *"Pondok* is an educational institution that is typically attached to a *masjid* (mosque) or *balai* (house) of the *tok guru* (head teacher). Malay language is the main medium of instruction in teaching and learning and it typically consists of subjects pertaining to Islamic jurisprudence, *Tauhid,* and interpretation of the holy Qu'ran" (Narongraksakhet 2006: 134-135).

There is no age requirement in order for one to attend "lessons" in a *Pondok,* that's why it is easily accessible to the members of the community. Also, it functions as a venue for community social gatherings. However, compared to other Islamic schools, the *Pondok* is often a contentious topic between the Thai administration and the Malay Muslims. The Thai administration often casts suspicious and mistrust towards the *Pondok* in the Deep South. Negative reactions like these are largely due to the *Pondoks*(1) purported inadequacy to promote "Thainess;" (2) role as an alleged militant recruitment venue, and (3) *tok gurus* commandeer and possibly instigate insurgencies in the region. There are already some 550 traditional *Pondok* schools in Southern Thailand and about half are registered and recognized by the government" (International Crisis Group, 2009 : 3).

There are some other issues concerning teachers and instructors who work in Southern Thailand. Most of them are about safeguarding, providing more funding and

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enhancing capacity of teaching personnel so that they will be more secure financially and professionally and will not want to leave their homes to work in other provinces.

In addition, realizing that education is one of the best ways to improve the situation in the Deep South, the SBPAC was launched to help ease the shortage of teachers in both local state and private schools. This program involved a great number of students in the Deep South attended formal education programs, based on the government curriculum, and at the same time, they also have religious study at local private schools, Pondok and Tadika. For more than one year, the Yala 13 Special Task Force Unit (The Yala 13 Special Task Force Unit under the Fourth Army Area Command's Internal Security Operations Command, Forward in Krong Pinang district, Yala province.) has sent its staff to teach 10 basic education state schools, 5 *Pondok*s, and 34 *Tadikas* under the Traveling Teacher project.

The army teachers provide basic education subjects on Wednesdays with training in scout activities, in addition to other subjects, such as mathematics, Thai language, and computer science. The Yala 13 Special Task Force Unit has also arranged other activities to promote the participation of students and to enhance relations between young people and soldiers. One of the impacts of these activities is the improvement of the landscapes of *Pondok* and various religious places.

Nowadays, education professionals in Southern Thailand have pointed out on developing ways and carrying out reforms to improve the quality of education. Also, the major focus of education policy switched from "quantity" to "quality". For example,

UNICEF (The United Nations Children's Fund) has applied Child-Friendly School (CFS). The Child-Friendly School (CFS) model is simple.

It promotes the operation of schools "in the best interest of the child". Under the CFS model: 1) Educational environments must be safe, healthy and protected, endowed with well-trained teachers, adequate resources and appropriate physical, emotional and social conditions for learning. 2) Children's rights must be protected and opportunities must be provided for children's voices to be heard. All children –including children who are poor, disabled, living with HIV or from ethnic and religious minorities–must be treated equally. 3) Teaching methods should focus on a child-centered approach. 4) Learning environments should encourage children to learn and grow. Lessons for children must include essential life skills that aimed at keeping them safe and built the skills they need to fulfill their potential and contribute fully to society. 5) The CFS model also includes partnerships between schools and the community. Since children have the right to be fully prepared to become active and productive citizens, their learning must be linked to the wider community (UNICEF, 2009).

In 2005, 1,700 scholarships were granted to the students in Southern Thailand. In addition, in the academic year of 2009, up to 10,000 scholarships have already been granted to the students who still need financial support to further their study at the higher level. In 2010, collaborating with the Ministry of Education, 939 affected people by unrest and their heir obtains scholarships from government to attend whether state or private universities.

Moreover, the SBPAC selected youth in the area to have chances to attend Indonesian universities under the Muhammadiyah project. Muhammadiyah followers of

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Muhammad full name: *Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah*) is an Islamic organization in Indonesia. The organization was founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in the city of Yogyakarta as a reformist socio-religious movement, advocating ijtihad - individual interpretation of Al-Qur'an and sunnah, as opposed to taqlid - the acceptance of the traditional interpretations propounded by the ulama. At the moment, Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia with 29 million members (Division of Religion and Philosophy, 2012).

Although Muhammadiyah leaders and members are often actively involved in shaping the politics in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah is not a political party. It has devoted itself to social and educational activities. Meanwhile, over year of 2010, 19 scholarships were funded. The fund expanded into 150 funds in 2011. Beside undergraduate funds, secondary funds were also organized in order to bring 180 people to study in Malaysia (SBPAC's Annual Report, 2010: 45-46).

5.4 Bridging Education with Peace

Moreover, accompanied by the various group of ration, religion, language, notion, culture, and belief, people in the Deep South of Thailand live at the most of their own life based on Islam ethic and norm. The Ministry of Education has been cooperating with the Fourth Area Command and the SBPAC in carrying out a project to develop model Pondok schools at the tambon, or sub-district, level in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and four districts of Songkhla.

Under the project, each tambon in these areas will select a Pondok school to be developed as a model. A target has been set to develop a total of 48 Pondok schools by 2011. Pondok Pesantren is one of the best substantial educational institutions benefit and

essential to the Deep South of Thailand lifestyles. This program of education has promoted the unity of social, such as learning how to work together peacefully, which in turn enables political, economic, and social stability.

Furthermore, the SBPAC together with "Non-Violence International-Southeast Asia" a non-profit organization established 'Building Peace by Teaching Peace' in Pattani. It has aimed to provide assistance to individuals, organizations and governments which seeking non-violent means to bring about social and political change that reflects justice as it has already piloted a project entitled.

Under the program, they developed a peace education program which generally aims to increase understanding and appreciation for non-violent means and utilize people participation for capacity-building, and create and sustain a network that can help in initiating and facilitating the peace process between conflicting parties. Assuming a bottom up/grassroots approach in determining processes and decision-making, the organization is mostly composed of community teachers and other peace stakeholders affected by the conflict in their respective areas.

Building Peace by Teaching Peace program rests on the main objective to develop and to implement a peace-building education and conflict resolution program for children in the informal education sector and out-of-school children in the conflict-affected southern border provinces of Thailand. In addition, it aims to 1) develop a model peace-building education and conflict resolution program for 7-12 year olds in Pattani; 2) develop a peace building education and conflict resolution curriculum and modules; 3) train a team of at least twelve trainers; and 4) monitor and follow-up trainers to conduct workshops for Thai-Buddhist and Islamic school teachers and community and youth leaders in the selected province Pattani.

According to the Thai Education Minister, if teachers are not good enough at teaching, how can we expect good learners? Since teachers play crucial roles in knowledge spreading and experience sharing, the 2nd educational reform has focused on how to help teachers and improve their personal and professional qualities. However, here are some issues concerning teachers and instructors of Southern Thailand. First is a lack of teachers and instructors.

Since there were many teaching positions vacant at schools in Southern Thailand, the Office of the Basic Education Commission (OBEC) and the Office of the Teacher Civil Service and Educational Personnel Commission (OTCSEPC) were shaping policies to encourage more applicants for the teaching position. Cheque Chuay Chart (Government Aid Cheque for Low Income Earners). This cheque, worth 70 US Dollars, has been given to teachers who earn less than 500 US Dollars a month. Second is a teacher's intellect.

New assessment of teachers' intellect should be introduced, at present, the teachers' intellect is assessed by only research or academic work instead of teaching achievement. Therefore, the new assessment should focus on how successful the teachers are in helping their students, not how much research work they do. This new method of evaluation has been introduced in June 2009. Third is a private school teacher's intellect.

Now, the Permanent Secretary of Education is working on how to improve and assess the quality of private school teachers. Welfare for Teachers in Southern Thailand. In case the teachers are killed or maimed in the 'southern unrest' incident, the Ministry of Education will provide financial support for their relatives or family members. The financial support is increased from 570 US Dollars to 17,000 US Dollars.

The last is an educational supervision. Currently, private schools in Southern Thailand are encouraged to initiate educational supervision of all teachers so that their teaching quality will be improved. Project of Returning Teachers to Students. The main reason for this project is that some teachers are asked to do other work besides their teaching, such as administrative or accountancy jobs. Thus, the teachers do not have enough time for teaching preparation. Realizing this problem, the government then conducting the training for 14,532 administrative teachers to help alleviate this burden and enable teachers to spend more time in their classrooms.

Furthermore, the SBPAC also promoted sports as part of education promotion in enhancing skill and knowledge of people. The SBPAC supported local villages', districts', and internationals' sport tournaments. Sport lover communities were set up in order to give them a chance to connect with other communities via the game of volleyball, football, pentangle, muzzle and aerobic. The sport occasions exposed them opportunities to communicate and harmonize with others so that their quality of life will be upgraded, therefore, the battle within the community will be reconciled.

The SBPAC highlighted the sports activities promotion by supporting sport instruments, such as football, takraw and volleyball trophies to government agencies, schools and community sports organization within southern provinces. By coaching sports skills, such as soccer, takraw and volleyball with national coaches, the people learn to create love and unity. They learned to convert leisure time to be benefit to others and to separate themselves from drugs.

The SBPAC also worked in collaborative with 33 districts within 3 provinces to promote love and unity over the area by organizing "youth soccer 3 southern provinces

Rak Thai" tournament. Moreover, excursions activities convey youth attitudes development. The SBPAC uses sports as an intelligent media to connect with the youth over the area of 3 southern provinces. They had a chance to open their world vision to learn new experiences from other regions. By implementing these activities, children are born loved and united by learning to forgive, to make friend and to have fun.

Sport is key medium between youth and community to develop their love and harmony at the same time attracts them to live their life together happily. Grafted and targeted by the government, the SBPAC supports and encourages sport as key mediums to get through community in order to create reconciliation between Thais' Buddhist and Thais' Muslim so that trust and harmony occurred over the area again.

Additionally, in the fiscal year of 2010, the government allocated the budget of 70 million US Dollars for the private schools in Southern Thailand. Private education has played an important role in decreasing demand on the government's financial resources for education, as most private schools/institutions are self-supported, particularly for their capital investment costs. At the level of basic education, the government shares subsidies to students in both state and private schools. Many private schools charge additional fees; private degree-level institutions do not receive government subsidies and have to charge higher tuition fees than the state degree-level institutions that are in receipt of government subsidies.

Free quality education for 15 years, since 70 percent of most schools in Southern Thailand are private, the government has provided free quality education in terms of tuition fees, textbooks, school uniforms and learning materials. Students of private

schools have enjoyed similar benefits to those of governmental schools except tuition fees, which might be higher. However, under this project, the government increased financial support from 60 percent to 70 percent starting from the kindergarten to the high school levels.

Although the government launches the project on free quality education for 15 years from the kindergarten to high school levels as well as vocational and non-formal programs, those who want to advance their education at the diploma or higher degree courses are responsible for paying their tuition fees by themselves. Thus, the Student Loan was established to alleviate such financial burden. The Student Loan, the amount of which has been increased from 870 million US Dollars to 1,200 million US Dollars, has allocated to Islamic banks in Southern Thailand. Those in need of this financial support must come from a poor family with an income of no more than 6,700 US Dollars per year.

Therefore, in terms of the course on Islamic studies in private schools of Southern Thailand, the Education Ministry set a budget of 2.50 million US Dollars for 2010. In 2011, the budget was used 4.80 million US Dollars, and remained at this rate in 2010 according to Mr. Precha Wetchasat. He stated that Islamic religious education is fundamental to understand the Southern Thailand insurgency, that it can be the solution in facilitating peace efforts or producing cooperative outcomes (Interviewed by author, 2012).

The SBPAC strengthen mutual understanding between interpersonal networking groups and push them to be the one of mechanism involving the link of information

from the government to the public. All activities acted as public hearing to reflect the feedback from the community to the government in order to bring back the collaborative solution to the situation over the area. Activities performed supported by government to develop an intelligent network working under the community cooperative assistance creating a strong community and public welfare. The new leadership development activities were set up by the SBPAC, conveyed public networks to promote Muslim intellectuals students role over the community. These private networks created the Southern Border Provinces' peace.

The SBPAC created comprehensive systems for all collaborative groups of religious leaders, officers, students, community network, justice networks, graduated Muslims, women intellectuals, teachers, religion villagers network, spokesman or natural leader to work together in harmonizing way. The SBPAC has promoted Muslim's culture; tradition and sports while better understanding and harmonizing among different races were achieved. These can generate people a better attitude toward the government as well as it can empower them to drive their own community by peace.

5.5 Effectiveness/Efficiency of the SBPAC'S Educational Strategies

Youth graduated under the SBPAC scholarship was motivated or encouraged to work in the Deep South development projects in order to present themselves as role model to the youth within the community. The volunteers participated in problem solving and the project development over their homeland. The SBPAC also set up training activities by knowledge speaker to youth network people to the official test. The purpose of the activity is to increase youth knowledge over the government test techniques for the CSC

office network. People from all sectors were presented as a core mechanism to participate the decision-making over the Deep South problem. They have chances to develop their own society.

However, the SBPAC has struggled for the excellence of community colleges in Southern Thailand, in terms of the role in short-term training, especially for restaurant staffs' trainings, public bus driving trainings and English language trainings. These vocational institutions need to propose courses that they think they can carry out to the Ministry of Education for official approval.

Amin Maoseng is an 18-year-old student attending the Attarkiah Islamiah School in Narathiwat. For many residents of the Deep South of Thailand, the daily strife plaguing their community does not just affect their daily lives but severely affects their ability to succeed in Thai society. The conflict has cast a negative light on southern residents and when they attend school or go to work in other parts of the country they are often viewed with suspicion. As an elected member of the Student Council, Amin has been able to address and change negative stereotypes of southern residents. While attending a national-level student council meeting in Bangkok, Amin realized that other students were apprehensive of him because he comes from the south.

> "Even though I am a Thai citizen like them, I felt very sad because they felt I was different," reports Amin. Yet the forum provided him with the opportunity to explain to the other students the realities of life for southern residents and clear any misgivings that they had.

During the course of the meetings, Amin gained the trust and respect of his fellow students and was eventually elected as vice president of the countrywide student council. Since his return to school, Amin has formed an organization called Love Your Hometown to foster both knowledge and pride among his fellow students in the

historical achievements of their community. Due to his success and leadership skills gained in the student council, Amin plans to attend law school. "I would like to be a lawyer and work in the south; work for the community to educate society on human rights issues, [so] that every citizen has the same rights. Not just as guaranteed in the constitution but as understood by the whole community so they can both protect and promote human rights knowledge."

Amina Samadeng is an 11th grade student from Narathiwat province. Like many students in Southern Thailand, learning the English language skills necessary for higher education has many challenges for Amina. Amina has had very few opportunities to practice speaking with a native English speaker yet she is required to have a high degree of fluency to compete for a limited number of university scholarships. Through hard work and receiving student-centered instruction, Amina has been able to gain a solid understanding of English. But, it was while participating in Foundation-supported English camps that Amina says she really begins to excel and gain valuable speaking confidence.

> "The English camp did not just allow me to improve and practice my English but it was an opportunity to make friends and gain confidence to enter into English-language competitions," says Amina. She has since gone on to win both district and provincial language competitions. Amina is now planning to apply for a scholarship to attend medical school in Malaysia.

5.6 Conclusion

Education is viewed as a key to contribute peace in the Deep South of Thailand. The SBPAC has implemented various educational strategies in strengthening capacity of people in the Deep South, as it perceives that education could create stability of the area and lead to sustainable livelihood. There are numbers of projects carry out by the SBPAC in enhancing quality of education in the area, for instance, Traveling Teacher project, Building Peace by Teaching Peace program, Sport promotion, Granting Scholarship for students in the area and so on.

However, most of the projects are moderately successful and some of them are failed as it because the SBPAC has struggled to get better understanding of people and to understand the Muslim's way of life properly. In addition, the SBPAC has not push much effort on getting people participating in generating educational strategies that suitable with the area and completely serve their needs.

Furthermore, there are threats that affected the SBPAC's educational strategies and its performances which result in unsuccessful of its strategies and projects as follows:

i)   Safety: There are effects of unrest situations on student performance both direct and indirect. Students do not have sufficient time to study at school as the school has to be close when the area is disrupted by the insurgents. And the students are lack of opportunity to have tutorial and to take classes after school hours or during the weekend. They also do not have enough supported materials and tools in learning. Moreover, school teachers feel unsafe and are lack of encouragement for working in the

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area. It affects on their work performance and capacity, and they might move out to different areas where they feel safe and secure, and can have better life.

ii)   Belief, value and misunderstanding: Islamic religious education has huge impact on Muslim's way of life which could result in misunderstanding and losing trust between government and community as well as government and private schools in the area. Therefore, it is very difficult for the government to support and develop the community when there is lack of trust between them. Additionally, Muslims like to educate their children in Islamic religious schools as they teach intensively on Islamic study and Muslim also perceive that study in regular schools could lead to the reduction of Malayu uniqueness. Moreover, Muslim in the Deep South has low income which is one of the reasons why they only send their children to Islamic religious schools in the area rather than send them to other schools in different areas which will cost more money.

iii)   Lack of suitable higher education programs: There are large numbers of higher education institutions in the Deep South of Thailand but those institutions do not have programs that meet the need of people especially on Islamic study. The institutions still perceive that Islamic study is not necessary. Additionally, there is shortage on teachers who have intensive knowledge on Islamic study. Moreover, students who finish high school from this area, they tend to have lack of confidence to continue obtaining higher education. It is because they do not have sufficient fundamental knowledge.

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iv)   Lack of comprehensive curriculum: Curriculum in Islamic religious schools is very narrow in general education. They are more focused on Islamic study. This causes students to have less knowledge on general education which is necessary for them to work in very challenging and competitive work environment nowadays. Moreover, this also results them limited job opportunity as well.

v)   Shortage of talented school teachers on general education: This is resulted from unrest situations occurred in the Deep South. As we know that in the Deep South, education is more focuses on Islamic study. Most of teachers, are from the area, have intensive knowledge on Islamic study. Therefore, there are needs on teachers for general education who are normally come from other parts of the country. These people are not familiar with the area and have more concern on their safety both life and property. Not many people are willing to work in this area, where it is dangerous and have no guarantee of life security. This is the reason why it is so difficult to have teachers for general education as well as to contribute strong education in the area.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATEGIES PURSUED BY THE SBPAC IN MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE DEEP SOUTH OF THAILAND

6.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses and explains the socio-economic strategies of the SBPAC in managing the conflict in the Deep South. In particular, this chapter discusses and analyzes the economic strategies of the SBPAC in resolving the conflict in the region. It is divided into four parts. The first part looks at the Farming and fishery Development Programs. The second part looks at the marketing of agricultural products which include fruit product and OTOP products . The third looks at the financial assistance offered by the SBPAC. This include: Islamic micro-credit support, incentives offered to stimulate investment, village life quality development and PNP Project. Fourth part looks at the village life quality development (PNM). The last part looks at the international economic collaborations of the SBPAC in managing the conflict in Deep South.

6.1 Farming and Fishery Development Programs

The SBPAC focuses on career development, as it believes that this is one of the ways to alleviate people suffering. To achieve this, the organization has built up villages' strong economy and strengthens community finance. Consequently, the SBPAC has implemented a program, which included cattle or rearing animals, farming and fishery development program. For instance, the SBPAC has provided farm materials such as fertilizers, goats, cows, ducks, and chicken and so on for farmers. In addition, some financial assistance or helps have also doled out for the latter. In order to ensure its

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success, the SBPAC has supported necessary materials and skills needed for their career development.

Therefore, the SBPAC officials have emphasized the paramount significance of training for beneficiaries of the program. This claim can be seen when Uthairat stated that the SBPAC has continuously conducted training for the people of the Deep South for their respective economic inclinations or preferences (Uthairat, 2010: 119). Thus, a boat repairing, a fishery machine and a cattle program were introduced as a pilot project to the community in order to support Halal industrial development. In this juncture, the SBPAC has set targets for the cattle, farming and fishery development program as follows:

1. Agricultural perspective, the SBPAC has cooperated with the Department of Land in providing supports to 389 palm oil farmers with the area of 960 acres and 912 rice farmers with the area of 1,613 acres. In addition to that, the SBPAC has also provided 22,663 cattle to farmers both commercial and non-commercial purposes, and support 13,279 poultry (chicken and duck) to people in fishery villages.

2. Fishery perspective, the SBPAC will provide 1,389 modified fishing equipment to the fishermen.

3. Other perspectives, there are needs of people for professional training; the SBPAC targets to support 5,761 people on professional training. Moreover, the SBPAC will also help 10,581 households within 696 villages improve their living condition (SBPAC Annual Report, 2010: 130-131).

6.2 Marketing of Agricultural Products

6.2.1 Fruit products

The SBPAC tries to improve the Deep South fruit quality to meet the world standard in order to deliver the goods to both international and domestic markets. Adjusting southern fruit product quality is held since the season began. The product life extended after harvesting must be accomplished in order to reach the SBPAC income target. It has encouraged households to target intrinsic motivation for taking care their products' quality. In addition, the SBPAC has been distributing the fruit product to the neighboring markets like the City of Kota Bharu, Kelantan, Malaysia. Moreover, the SBPAC also supports fruit caravan to distribute the fruit products to consumers across the country. In this regard, it is argued that the cooperation between farmers and agricultural financial institutions such as Islamic Bank of Thailand can help farmers suffered from depressed agricultural prices and production problems (SBPAC Annual Report, 2010: 127).

However, Saisuk argues that the SBPAC has no sustainable long term strategic plan that would really address the issue of low price and over production specifically during the pick season (Saiksuk, Interview by the author, 2012). He further argues that having a market for raw agricultural product is not sustainable, and therefore, the SBPAC must establish its processing factories and look for new or big market for exporting its processed agricultural product (Saiksuk, Interview by the author, 2012).

It seems Saisuk's argument is logical because usually during pick season due to the high supply, price falls and worse most products just rotten. In addition to that, even farmers can sell their all harvested products, the one benefit most are the middlemen not

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them. Although these are global phenomena, but the stakes in the Deep South are high due to surging conflict or violence in the region.

6.2. 2 OTOP Products

The SBPAC has been distributing the Deep South products under activities named "Southern best product festival." The events were hold in various provinces both domestic and international, such as Malaysia. Products were sold in events such as Halal foods and fruits under the project title "100 shops to 100 millions baht". In this respect, Mr. Eukarin Tuansirias, a head of Pattani Forum Organization stated that the event was very popular and the average income was around 335,000 US Dollars per event (Interviewed by author, 2012).

Following the description of details on OTOP Centre at Pattani, Pattani becomes rich in OTOP goods, with almost 100 products registered. On 27 May 2010, an official inauguration ceremony took place at a group of houses in Malay style designated as the OTOP Center of the southern border provinces, located at the Pattani Songkhla Highway, at Ban Thung Naren, Bang Khao sub-district, Nong Chik district, Pattani province. The OTOP Center has been built with 1.1 million US Dollars budget, with cooperation between the Pattani Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) and the Pattani Provincial Administration, which aimed to market local products and tourism, thus providing an outlet for OTOP goods and agricultural products in the southern region to link with the markets all over the country and around the world (Foreign Office, 2012).

The President of Pattani PAO, Seth Al-Yufri, pointed out that the OTOP Center combined local wisdom and modern production technology, as the largest market for

distribution of distinctive community products in the three southern border provinces, neighboring provinces, and all provinces in other regions. "Our ultimate aim is to make this a true center of OTOP goods for the three southern border provinces, well-known among tourists in general". "Administratively, we focus on the great diversity of merchandise, the cleanliness of products and venues, and good services. Also, this center is the stop over station for all air-conditioned coaches and mini vans, where passengers can rest and perform religious rites, and do shopping for souvenirs at their pleasure" (Interviewed by author, 2012).

6.3 The SBPAC Implementation Principle of Financial Assistance

6.3.1 The SBPAC Islamic Micro-Credit Supports

The SBPAC found that most of the Malay Muslims in the three southern border provinces has lacked of understanding about the Islamic financial system. Consequently, they had not been able to use financial mechanisms to support their own development. Therefore, on 25th August 2009, the cabinet agreed in principle to set up the community-level Islamic Micro Credit institution with branches throughout Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces because the SBPAC was studying how the financial institution should work (Pakkawan, 2009).

The new financial institution will conform to Islamic principles and harmonize with the Muslim way of life. In fact, Many Malay Muslims have benefited from a new Islamic community financial institution approved by the cabinet and implemented by the SBPAC.

Relevant government agencies and state-owned organizations have been told by the SBPAC to give technical, management, and financial support for the operation of

Islamic micro-credit in Thailand. In response to this policy, they provided the staff of micro-credit organizations with knowledge on transactions, accountancy, and welfare arrangements under Islamic system. This credit system benefits local people in various communities, regardless of their faith. Social welfare and other benefits, in terms of education, social services, and the environment also provided for members of Islamic micro-credit plans. Whether this financial mechanism registered as a juristic entity or not depends on the readiness of each community and it should be connected with other Islamic institutions as well, such as Islamic cooperatives and the Islamic Bank (Interviewed by author, 2012).

The government has given full support for the Islamic micro-credit scheme, which is intended to provide financial assistance to the poor and low-income earners, with emphasis on the five southern border provinces. A study was undertaken on an appropriate form and model of Islamic micro-credit to enable communities in the three southern border provinces, which are predominantly Malay Muslims, to have their own financial institutions in accordance with their lifestyle and religious teachings.

The study showed that most villagers in southern border provinces still lacks of knowledge and understanding about transactions and financial mechanisms under the Islamic system, yet they would like to see the establishment of the Islamic micro-credit scheme in their communities. This type of micro-credit has no conflict at all with any faith. Micro-credit is simply the extension of very small loans in order to spur entrepreneurship and development.

Islamic micro-credit is a form of interest-free financing, which is regarded as one of the best and most appropriate ways to empower the poor. As Islamic law prohibits interest charges on loans, the introduction of micro-credit will get around this problem.

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The pilot project on Islamic micro-finance began in Narathiwat before spreading to Yala, and Pattani. An evaluation of the scheme carried out in phases for further improvement.

6.3.2 Incentives offered to stimulate investment in the three southern border provinces

The Office of the Board of Investment (BOI) has a policy offering incentives on a continual basis to investment projects located in the three southern border provinces. The policy was intended to restore the confidence of investors and attract more subsequent investments in the three southern border provinces. To be entitled to the full incentives, the investment projects must be beneficial to social development and security in the area. In the list of incentives, companies investing in the three southern border provinces are eligible for corporate income tax exemption for eight years. After the end of the period, they will be eligible for 50 percent reduction of corporate income tax for five years (Foreign Office, 2012). In addition, they have given double deductions on a number of utilities, including transportation, water, and electricity costs.

In 2010, BOI approved a project proposed by a Malaysian businessman to invest in building a 100-room hotel in Betong district, Yala province, with an investment value of 2.5 million US Dollars (Foreign Office, 2012). The investor wants to operate this three-star hotel in order to accommodate visitors and business people, especially from Malaysia and Singapore. The location of this hotel is only five kilometers from the Thai-Malaysian border. The three southern border provinces have great potential for accommodating investment from Malaysia.

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There are two domestic airports in Pattani and Narathiwat and highways connecting the southern region with Malaysia. The government has a policy to develop the Deep South into a Halal food production center, in an effort to improve the quality of life of local people through economic development. The Industrial Estates Authority of Thailand has selected Pattani as a site for the construction of a Halal Industrial Estate. Pattani is a frontline state leading to Yala and Narathiwat, and through Pattani, it would also be convenient to transport raw materials to the industrial estate.

Thailand and Malaysia recognize the enormous potentials of the global Halal trade and industry and the tremendous opportunities that could bring to their respective private sectors, especially Muslim entrepreneurs. Both countries earlier agreed to join hands in developing Halal foods through joint operations between the southern border provinces of Thailand and northern Malaysia.

6.3.3 Village Life Quality Development (PNM)

The government utilizes Communities' life quality development as a tool to reduce communities' suspicion. Cooperative and integrated with assisting department, the SBPAC aimed to make a concrete impact on the Goals achievement of the Development Plan of five southern border provinces.

PNM is the strategic project supporting village public activities based on community needs. The project approved by the Cabinet, on 7th April 2009, confirmed that the project is a major strategic project, as can be seen from the table 6.1. To be more specific, it is showed from the table that Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani needed more projects when comparing with other provinces in Southern Thailand. The concrete number of projects of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani are 977, 2262 and 1543 which

focused on the field of basic facilities, career support, cultural support, sport support, families strengthening support and CRB operational support. All of the projects in these provinces were occupied nearly 66% of the total projects which supported by PNM (SBPAC Annual Report, 2010). According to Precha Wetchasat as assistance secretary of the SBPAC, 7,600 US Dollars budget transfers to village accounts 7,254 projects were launched by the project and accomplished in 2010 with the collaborative of the 4 pillars namely, the religious leaders, local leader, community leader and a natural leader. Brainstorming of the 4 pillars was entire villages' succession (Interviewed by author, 2012).

Table 6.1 Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla and Satun Operation Outcome

No	Operational type	Yala	Narathiwat	Pattani	Songkhla	Satun	Other	Total
	Operational Outcome of Yala, Narathiwat. Pattani, Songkhla and Satun							
1	Basic Facilities	349	445	523	384	218	466	2,385
2	Career Support	190	291	278	45	99	147	1,050
3	Cultural Support	6	14	19	6	21	17	83
4	Sport Support	19	396	47	184	114	17	677
5	Families Strengthening Support	404	635	668	126	276	365	2,474
6	CRB operational Support	9	481	8	9	44	34	585
	Total	977	2,262	1,543	754	672	1,046	7,254

(Source: Annual Report SBPAC, 2010:108-109)

To achieve the outcome of Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, Pattani and Satun, in 2010, PNM increased award granting, therefore giving the following benefits;

1) To identify the unique village talent

2) Award winner village will be a role model for other villages' development.

3) To provide opportunities and contest attending stimulation by accelerating their performance based on their preferences.

Some of examples of the PNM project: 1) Mosques revitalization in, Moo 4, Tumbon Bagoi, Ramundistric, Yala province. Mr.NiMa Niwae, a Village Chief of Yala Province, stated that Mr.Rosalee Mahamayuso, the village director, collaborate with family members of 95 households to accomplish their effort in finishing the mosque recovery. Everyone is proud of his works for the beautiful mosque. Thus, the people have suitable, convenient and comfortable place to perform their religious activities (Interviewed by author, 2012).

2) The playground equipment project of Balukapalus village Tumbon Balaw in Raman district of Yala province has won the prize in the playground equipment contest. This created a win-win situation where the villagers are happy to see their children's joy. The playground acted as the place for people to exchange their goods and relationship, thus a friendly environment is created.

3) Village Security Unit (VSU) Ban Talo village, Moo 3, Tambon TaloKraiThong, Makaen district, Pattani province. A villager witnesses that since village security were set up and the patrol activities were activated, causing more communities' fun and relationship, as there were chances for the people to meet and greet.

The SBPAC can fix public suffering with the people's cooperation. More than 80 percent of people have better life quality, harmony, unity and trust. These created

comfort environment for the government officers to perform their duties and strengthen the public economy based on the philosophy of Sufficiency Economy. As a result, people had a better life quality and happiness.

Table 6.1 Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, Satun Operation Outcome

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(Source: Annual Report SBPAC, 2010:108-109)

Diagram 6.1 PNM Project

(Source: Annual Report SBPAC, 2010:113)

6. 3.4 PNP Project

PNP project is one of the SBPAC major strategic plans, which aims to build up a strong economy. The project was based on the community identities, cultures and lifestyles. To apply the project, the local household must be chosen by a community vote. The selected households will hold a career of choices, which will satisfactorily fulfill their living. The SBPAC provided them with170 US Dollars budget. This plan has started since 2009 and in 2010, the project had grown from there to 60,000 households covering 4 provinces, 37 districts, and 290 villages. The project gave the most attention to household of elderly who are above 65 years old, the household who are disable, the house with many more than 10 people and the household of divided family (divorce) (SBPAC Annual Report, 2010).

PNP project alleviated people suffering from economic crisis. Sufficiency economic philosophy was introduced to the area. Following by the state law, public participant and martial law was amended to the community in order to create a peaceful and secure environment over the southern province without any condition contributing to violence.

Table 6.2 Outside Agricultural Sector Developments

Outside Agricultural Sector Development						
Province	District	Tumbon	Village	Household Target	Selective Household	Percentage
Pattani	12	104	419	12,309	19,289	63.81%
Yala	8	55	275	7,844	10,813	72.54%
Narathiwat	13	71	368	11,261	18,330	61.43%
Songkhla	4	39	299	8,812	10,666	82.62%
Total	37	269	1,361	40,226	59,098	68.07%

(Source: SBPAC Annual Report, 2010:116-17)

Table 6.2 illustrates clearly the extent to which the PNP is one of the SBPAC master strategic plans created to build a strong economy through the community. PNP developed cattle pilot project such as cattle and goat at moo 7, Parklor Tumbon, Kokpoo district, Pattani province. In addition, Mr. Panu Uthairat, a director of the SBPAC, stated that the SBPAC also provides classes for people who are affected by the unrest situations. Therefore, they can have their own career. For instance, a person who have been affected by the unrest, thanked to the SBPAC for sending her to attain Thais' dessert cooking class named Pathongko. Thus, she can make it possible to continue it as her career, as a result, her salary raises to 400-500 baht a day (Interviewed by author, 2010).

6.4 International Economic Collaborations

6.4.1 Thailand-Malaysia Border Trade

The justice administration to the people in the area is the key point to problem resolution over the southern border provinces. The SBPAC tries to protect people's right and freedom in order to eliminate their anxiety over the situation. Special care was brought to the poverty, effected people, elderly people, and drug's addict so that they can return to their own societies happily. The SBPAC promotes relationship between Thailand and neighbors via corporate investment, trade and tourism in order to correct the neighborhood perception over the situation in Southern Thailand.

The SBPAC has launched a new strategy to boost trade cooperation with Malaysia. It hosted the Lima Dasar Summit/ Business Forum from 24 to 26 September 2010. This forum brought administrators and business people of the southern border

provinces of Thailand and their counterparts from the five northern states of Malaysia closer together. The Lima Dasar Summit took place at the Prince of Songkla University International Convention Center, at Hat Yai campus, Songkhla province, and was attended by governors of the five southern border provinces and state executive councilors of the five northern states of Malaysia.

The event was part of the Lima Dasar 5-5-5 strategy initiated by Thailand, with the use of economic development as a driver to tackle the unrest problem in the Deep South and to improve the living conditions of people in the southern border provinces. Apart from helping to promote better relations with Malaysia, at the government, business, and people levels, the project established a mechanism to facilitate trade and investment cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia, so that they could gain benefits from the framework of the ASEAN Free Trade Area.

The Ministry of Commerce of Thailand hoped that the project would increase border trade between Thailand and Malaysia by 10 percent from 2010 to 2014 (Foreign Office, 2012). It is hoped that the summit and related activities would help economic development and business expansion in the Deep South, especially in the fields of border trade, investment, tourism, education, and the Halal industry. This type of growth would also generate more income for local people and stimulate trade and investment in the Deep South, in addition to restore peace in the area.

Malaysia has reaffirmed her support for the resolution of the problems in the southern border provinces through peaceful ways. Thailand and Malaysia have implemented confidence-building measures under the 3Es Approach, namely education, employment, and entrepreneurship, in order to promote socio-economic development in these areas.

Mr.Mudyusop Maso as vice president of entrepreneur association of the Deep South of Thailand added that Thailand is an important partner of Malaysia. Cooperation between the two countries has continued to increase their activities in economy, education, and the other fields. This cooperation aims to enhance and strengthen relationship between them (Interviewed by author, 2012).

Flanked by seas on both sides, the southern border provinces are connected in terms of trade and transportation with South Asia and other countries in Southeast Asia. Their commercially viable natural resources include marble, lime, oil, and natural gas. The economy in the Deep South, especially Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani, is not very strongly and chiefly depends on the agriculture sector. The growth rate is also lower than other areas, and since 2007, the local investment has faced a slump. The economic problem is considered as structural condition that perpetrators of violence and criminal acts used to persuade local residents, especially their sympathizers, to join them in creating unrest.

Following that, Narathiwat has been set to become a transport and logistics center linking with Malaysia's East Coast Economic Region (ECER), according to the Five Southern Border Provinces Special Zone Development Plan for 2009-2012. In response to the plan, the government of Thailand was developing the Buketa border checkpoint in Narathiwat as a logistics center to accommodate transport and trade with Malaysia and Singapore.

The Friendship Bridge, formerly called "Buketa," is the second bridge across the Golok River linking Ban Buketa in Narathiwat to Bukit Bunga in Malaysia's northernmost Kelantan State. It facilitates the transport of goods and travelers and forms one of the links between the southern border provinces special zone in Thailand and the

East Coast Economic Region in Malaysia. The bridge was opened for service on 21 December 2007.

On 9 December 2009, the Prime Minister of Thailand, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, jointly presided over the ceremony renaming the bridge "Friendship Bridge." The ceremony was part of the program arranged for Prime Minister Najib, who paid an official visit to Thailand from 7 to 9 December 2009. Located in Waeng district, the Friendship Bridge was originally inaugurated in 2007 to mark the 50th anniversary of Thai-Malaysian diplomatic relations. It was the second physical testament to the goodwill and close partnership between Thailand and Malaysia. The first bridge links Rantau Panjang in Kelantan to Golok River district in Narathiwat, also in Pattani.

In celebrating the new name of the second Golok River Bridge, the government of Thailand stated that with more people and goods crossing the border over this bridge every day, both countries were strengthening their connections (Foreign Office, 2012). As friendly neighbors, with shared prosperity and vision for sustainable development, and as fellow members of the ASEAN family, the peoples of Thailand and Malaysia are like relatives who enjoy warm affinities. The Thai and Malaysian Prime Ministers also witnessed the signing ceremony of the Agreement on the Management, Maintenance, and Usage of the Friendship Bridge.

Moreover, the SBPAC supported the product to the Neighboring markets by extending the fruit market supplement into City of Kota Bharu, Kelantan, Malaysia. SBPAC also supported fruit Caravan to distribute the southern product to consumers across the country. In cooperation with farmers and agricultural financial institutions such as Islamic Bank of Thailand helped farmers suffered from agricultural depressed

prices and production problems, for instance, this year, with the issue of Long Kong have been solved by overselling the amount of the product in the market.

6.4.2 The New Route Linking Southern of Thailand to Malaysia

A new route has been built to link Betong district in the southern border province of Yala to Malaysia. The route facilitated goods transportation and shortens traveling time between Thailand and the Malaysian border. According to the Department of Rural Roads, the route has been built as a bypass with four lanes, beginning at Sukkhayang Road and ending at kilometer 134+365 of Highway 410. A scenic viewing point has also been arranged along the bypass to promote tourism in Betong. The 14-million-US Dollars bypass accommodated the growing traffic volume in the city of Betong and was expected to become an economic route to contribute to economic development in the Deep South of Thailand (Foreign Office, 2012).

Yala borders the Malaysian states of Kedah and Perak and it is the only land-locked province in Southern Thailand. Formerly, Yala was part of Pattani province and became a province in 1933. It was a mining region, containing tin and tungsten ore. The city of Yala was awarded an honorable mention in the UNESCO Cities for Peace Prize, 2002-2003. The municipality of Yala, in particular, is recognized for having one of the most beautiful city plans in Thailand.

The Thanto Waterfall is among several tourist attractions in Yala. Surrounded by high mountains, the 20-meter-high waterfall has nine tiers, each of which possesses its own remarkable beauty. Yala hosts the ASEAN Singing Dove Competition in March each year. Joining the competition are dove owners from Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Another unique feature of this province is the presence of a

Sakai tribal village whereby the local residents still lead their traditional lifestyle. The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center has set a target to develop Betong Airport as a commercial airport in the future. The one-billion-baht project is expected to begin in 2013 and will take a few years to complete (Foreign Office, 2012). It will contribute for trading, investment, and tourism development in the Deep South; and will facilitate exports of Halal foods to foreign markets as well.

According to the Development Plan of the Five Southern Border Provinces Special Zone for 2009-2012 (Foreign Office, 2012), Yala is set to become an agricultural and processed agricultural production center, and an agricultural commodity market. The province has a policy to arrange a market for various groups of farmers who have been urged to produce quality products and create brands for Yala. All agricultural goods and processed products will have to be up to the Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) standards certified by the Yala Office of Agriculture and Cooperatives and to pass chemical residue checks by the Yala Provincial Public Health Office. Major cash crops in this province include rubber, oil palm, and fruit, particularly longkong and durian.

6.4.3 Thailand and other Countries

In line with the Guidelines for Cooperation Projects for the Southern Border Provinces issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Partnership Framework with the Royal Thai Government (UNPAF 2007 – 2011), and the SBPAC master plan, the project's overall objective is to enhance community empowerment and public participation in local governance processes in Southern Thailand.

For the capacity development of communities, to be more specific, several ways are used to achieve those goals, such as, strengthening institutional capacity of community-based organizations; enhancing awareness and understanding of media in promoting social cohesion; improving income generation and employment opportunities of communities; enhancing legal awareness and capacity to access effective dispute resolution mechanism for the improvement of relationship between state and communities.

The aim of the SBPAC and UNDP (United Nations Development Project) is to strengthen the institutional capacity of community based organizations and media in promoting social cohesion through various methods.

First, to map the CBOs working in Southern Thailand and existing community projects. For example, capacity assessments were undertaken and action plans were developed for community organizations to take action in promoting social cohesion in partnership with the SBPAC projects, training Local Graduate Volunteers for increasing capacity and supporting community development and disbursing grants through the SBPAC to CBOs/Village Committees working on issues of environment, governance, development, youths and women, and those who are conducting research on the South.

Second, to map the media and capacity building, based on identified gaps, thus the capacity development plan should be settled for media working in Southern Thailand (and those based in Bangkok who report about the South), and provide training for media working in Southern Thailand with cultural and gender sensitivity, and positive thinking.

Third, the SBPAC and UNDP try to improve income generation and employment opportunities of communities. Thus, assessment of vocational training is needed, existing facilities and market are needed to develop the action plan for vocational training and resource mobilization strategy which should be linked to market needs.

Fourth, market and product should be assessed, therefore, the SBPAC should provide technical assistance and advice to the communities on product and market development, product adaptation, processing and marketing as well as provision of TA and advice to communities on product and market development.

Fifth, the SBPAC should enhance legal awareness of local communities and strengthen capacity of the SBPAC to facilitate public local access to effective legal service. The mapping of legal aids structure should be conducted in partnership with the Ministry of justice, the SBPAC, Outreach and public information strategy for legal awareness that should be developed and implemented in partnership with Keadilan Center under the SBPAC and the Ministry of Justice.

Sixth, train paralegals and volunteers. Keadilan Center should try to provide paralegal programs in targeted provinces. Prince of Songkla University and the SBPAC should cooperate for provision of appropriate legal aid for volunteers work

Seventh, establish data collection mechanism. The SBPAC should focus in increasing of the number of lawyers for providing free working with legal aid organizations and conducting capacity assessments and providing technical and financial assistance.

Eighth, strengthen capacity of local administration in participatory planning and budgeting. Stakeholder analysis should be conducted with the review and analysis of framework for local planning and local governance budgetary process in line with the

procedural rules and regulations of the Ministry of Interior, developing methodologies for people's participation in line with Ministry of Interior framework for local planning and introducing community and gender responsive budgeting into local development planning to local government units (Municipalities and TAOs) and Department of Local Administration.

Ninth, Strengthen the local's level of natural resource and natural disaster management. All parties, such as local communities, local authorities and local NGOs should work together to develop initiatives in resolving natural resource and natural disaster management issues, which should be tested in certain areas, then providing analysis and recommendations on gender dimensions in disaster management and conflict prevention to stake holders and Governor's offices.

Tenth, the key government officials should increase knowledge of and exposure to various governance models and practices Commissioning study of governance models and practices. It is suggested that the SBPAC should support series of discussions on governance models, public management and decentralization.

Eleventh, enhanced knowledge and capacities of government officials at the provincial level to provide effective dispute resolution mechanisms, government officials and communities leaders should be trained on dispute resolution structures in mediation, knowledge of relevant laws, human rights, documentation in coordination with the SBPAC and the Governor's office.

The SBPAC with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established southern border provinces passport office located in the SBPAC to facilitate all the people passport duties for people living in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. People use passport to visit relatives and work in the neighboring countries. Mr.Wuthisak Suwan stated that for

people of pilgrimage attendance both Thais' Buddhist and Thai's Muslim (200 people a day), are facilitated by the SBPAC (15 min per person). We serve clean water and all facilities needed for Hajj attending so that they will have an impression over government services (Interviewed by author, 2012).

The SBPAC has made some headway in planning long term economic development. In May 2008, the government endorsed its four year plan to develop an economic zone in the southern border provinces worth 1.7 billion US Dollars, including setting up a Centre for Halal foods and developing the rubber trade (ICG, 2008: 12).

6.5 Conclusion

Socio-economic conditions are one of crucial factors that cause militant organizations and individuals to join terrorist groups. The government perceives the important of socio-economic issue and takes it into consideration. The government has clearly recognized that socio-economic policy could be one of the ways to better the unrest situations in the Deep South of Thailand. Therefore, the government has been creating and generating various socio-economic policies, and assigning the SBPAC and other relevant government agencies to implement those policies in order to use them as a tool to mitigate conflict and improve quality of life of the people in the area.

The SBPAC has taken those policies and implemented them to the people and communities in the Deep South area with kind cooperation from other government agencies and private organizations. In doing so, the government has provided financial supports to various economic activities such as Halal food industry, tourism, agriculture, fishery, etc. Halal food industry is perceived as a very interesting industry for the Deep

South as the areas are full of supply, and the Halal food market in the world is very large and has high potential to grow in the future.

Furthermore, the SBPAC has focused on the concept of community empowerment. It is considered as an effective way to build capability of people and lead to strong community. There are various projects which were created and implemented by the SBPAC such as supporting agriculture supplies and fishery instruments, establishing OTOP Center, employing the philosophy of Sufficiency Economy, Islamic micro-credit program and so on. Each project has its pros and cons, and some of them are successful and many of them are failed. However, the researcher will discuss the result of policies, strategies and projects implemented by the SBPAC and relevant government agencies including private organizations in greater details in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SBPAC'S STRATEGIES

7.0 Introduction

This chapter examines and analyses the effectiveness of the SBPAC's strategies in resolving the conflict in the Deep South of the Royal Thai Kingdom. In particular, this chapter discusses and analyzes the political, economic and educational strategies of the SBPAC as a cornerstone of its strategies in achieving peace and stability in the region, more particularly, in the troubled provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala. In designing its strategies, the SBPAC based it on principles of understand, develop and access as well as sufficient economic philosophy embraced by His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej as pointed out earlier (SBPAC Annual Report: 9-16).

7.1 Political Strategies

The conflict in the Deep South of Thailand is ultimately a political problem, which causes from various factors whether identity crisis, historical narratives, educational imbalance, centralized government system and so on. Therefore, the Thai government cannot only utilize the security measures but it needs to comprise all others significant measures in solving the conflict. Peace negotiation is one of significant instruments.

It is perceived as an effective way to mitigate conflict in the Deep South. Practically, the Thai government through the SBPAC has not been successfully implementing peace negotiation effectively. The SBPAC is lack of understanding of the

complex relationship of culture, ethnicity and religion belief and view of Malay Muslims in the Deep South. Besides, there is less participation from local community in administration; meanwhile, distrust among the separatist group toward the Thai government is also one of the issues that obstruct the SBPAC from successfully implementing the peace negotiation.

It is notable that the Malay Muslims in the Deep South are distinct from Muslims from other regions of the country. Their history and background are more related to Malaysia than Thailand. Many Malay Muslims in the Deep South consider themselves as Malaysian not Thai and they have been inculcated by some of religious leaders to a conspiracy and requirement of the independent Pattani State. These have been rooted deeply in many Malay Muslims minds since 1636 until now. Including, the Thai government used to adopt hard policies with them which made them even more resentment and act against the government. Therefore, many Malay Muslims desire to have greater control or govern their own affairs. It is crucial to take this into consideration.

The Thai government through the SBPAC and all relevant government agencies seems lack of effective political solutions that would address the concerns of all relevant stakeholders. Since the Deep South is distinct from other regions, the researcher perceived that it will be treated differently with special administration. The Malay Muslims shall be granted an autonomy that would be able to run their own affairs in various dimensions and the Thai government could simply act as a supporter. First, cultural dimension, Malay Muslims in the Deep South has their own language which is Melayu. Melayu that can be served as their own official language in the said region.

For instance, Melayu shall be used on all signs in public area along with Thai. Malay Muslims have their own traditional outfit which is different from international outfit. It is suitable to allow all Muslims to wear their traditional outfit regularly rather than international outfit where they can preserve their valuable tradition.

Second, administrative dimension, Malay Muslims in the Deep South shall be able to manage their resources. The special administrative form could be implemented and relied heavily on its characteristics. For example, Pattaya town, Cholburi province, Thailand, has faced problems caused by fast growing of its infrastructure, the population growth, the migration of the population and workforce and also the number of tourists and other components. The growth and development of Pattaya, therefore, is quite specific and different from other local areas. In solving these problems, Pattaya town needs to have special administration governed by the City Manager which considered to be equivalent to the Metropolitan administration. Therefore, the researcher viewed that the Deep South provinces should have special administration rather than regular local administration which does not meet the distinct characteristics of the area (The City Hall of Pattaya, 2012).

However, it must be noted that allowing Malay Muslims to control their own affairs needs to be within the frame of Thailand as a unity state. Additionally, the national security management and international relation have to be maintained under and authorized by the Thai government.

The SBPAC and relevant government agencies should express their willingness to meet and become acquainted with people. The extremely important key factor to

regain trust among them is improving community relation. The SBPAC's officials and organization itself need to be sincere, show their strong commitment to the people and make them believe in its organization, officials and system. They could learn how people in the Deep South live their life, what is important to them and how do they perceive the SBPAC. They could also join in any ceremonies and activities with local communities which will give them better understanding of people on the diversities of lifestyle and culture.

Additionally, the SBPAC and relevant government agencies should have serious conversation with religious leaders and community leaders to reduce the tension. However, initiating beneficial conservation with the community, the SBPAC has to admit the truths and be keen to build peace negotiation. These could help building confident among Malay Muslims which will result in better investigations and acquiring intelligence information as well as preventing the insurgents. Moreover, the Non-Government Organization (NGO) is other organizations that can be given a soft role in solving conflict in the Deep South, at least on the social front. The improvement of social conditions will help address the grievances of Malay Muslims and make less pressure on other Thais and the SBPAC. The involvement of civil society to provide a balance between hard and soft approaches one that is not too security-oriented could be build trust with Malay Muslims.

Beside the peace negotiation, the Thai government through the SBPAC has facilitated collaboration internationally with various organizations such as the OIC and neighboring governments like Malaysia. With the OIC, the SBPAC collaborates with the OIC aiming to use the OIC as a facilitator between the separatist groups and the Thai

government. Nevertheless, the collaboration is limited due to the military security issues. The Thai government has to secure the military security data and be aware of the outsiders. Therefore, the Thai government through the SBPAC has tried to compromise with all stakeholders such as the separatist groups or Malay Muslims in the Deep South. They would like to have better control of their own resources and greater power to govern themselves. Hence, the Thai government should give them more autonomy to take care of themselves on culture, tradition, lifestyle as well as religion whiles the Thai government still have full authority on military security, foreign affair, and education.

The Thai government through the SBPAC has collaborated quite successfully with various international organizations and neighboring governments mostly on education and economy while some issues related to the military security still limited. For instance, the Thai government has cooperated with many Muslim countries like Indonesia and some countries in the Middle East on education. The Thai government has sent numbers of students to study in those countries. Moreover, the Thai government has cooperated very well with Malaysian government on economic development.

Furthermore, the Thai government through the SBPAC has tried to heal people who are affected by the unrest situation in the Deep South by providing them money and resources they needed. It aims to reduce confliction and hopefully create harmony, peace and stability. The SBPAC has not succeeded in healing people as its set purposes. People have not spent the money and resources they received from the SBPAC wisely. The SBPAC needs to critically consider the situation and re-strategize its strategies in implementing the healing process.

From the researcher point of view, the SBPAC could put more support by developing other areas rather than providing money. For instance, in supporting education, the SBPAC shall support scholarships to children in the Deep South until at least they finish Bachelor degree. With the degree, they can have better job opportunity and life, and develop their community aiming to reduce the conflict and to create a peaceful community. Moreover, the SBPAC shall focus more on providing and developing knowledge and skills people needed. This will help generate strong and capable human resources to the community. As a result, people are able to take care of themselves as well as their community, and it can finally build peace and sustain the community.

Religious improvement is one of the issues that the Thai government pay huge attention to as Malay Muslims in the Deep South are very conservative on their religion. Religious leaders have huge impact on people hearts and minds which affect their actions and way of life. The researcher view that the Thai government through the SBPAC has come to the right track and accomplished very well supporting the role of religious leaders. By doing so, young generations and Malay Muslims in the Deep South will have broad view and better understand of their religion and the conflict; they are less likely to get involve with the insurgents. These would help sustain their religion and finally bring peace back to the community.

7.2 Educational Strategies

As part of the strategies, the SBPAC has utilized education as a tool in resolving the conflict in the Deep South of the country. They perceived education as a significant

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instrument to address the root causes of the conflict and build peace into the region. As such, the Thai government through the SBPAC has invested so much effort in designing and implementing educational policies. In addition, other related projects have also been initiated. However, despite of these various educational policies the SBPAC have not been very successful in implementing them effectively because the organization has lack of sufficient management system on educational strategies. For instance, the SBPAC failed in monitoring and updating constantly the processes and results in which the projects are being implemented because there is no specific department designed to monitor such projects.

Similarly, it is true that the government through the SBPAC has supported budget materials and hoping that these could make better education and build valuable human resources in the Deep South, but it has failed to deliver the type of education that is acceptable to the Malay Muslims in the region. It seems that the SBPAC's officials, in particular, and the Thai government's official, in general, are very naïve with respect to the very concerns of the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. In plain word, they do not really understand what have been actually taught at schools especially Islamic religious schools, commonly known as Pondok.

It is true that some Pondoks have indoctrinated their students about their historical grievances against the Thai rulers/governments. For instance, some religious teachers or leaders have taught their students about historical injustice committed by the Thai rulers/governments against the Malay Muslim community. Some of them even went further by encouraging the use of violent strategies and tactics as a way of achieving their ultimate goal that is to liberate the Malay Muslims from the clutches of

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the Bangkok government.

As a result, many students of religious schools have viewed or perceived the Thai governments as foreign governments. Thus, this educational indoctrination has far-reaching implications, not only, to the already troubled region, but also to the country as a whole because this would threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand. In this connection, the Royal Thai Army intelligence unit reported that Pondoks have become fertile recruiting grounds for the armed separatist movements. Indeed, some of the local insurgent commanders are graduated from the religious schools, he pointed out (Srisombat, 2006). Consequently, the SBPAC believes that education in Pondoks, which are supported by the Middle East countries, are security threats. With this, Pondoks have become the main targets and the focus or subject of crack down on insurgency by both military and the SBPAC respectively (Interviewed by author, 2012).

Therefore, the SBPAC has to create an effective management system on education and establish a specific department to be designed to monitor and update continuously each project or program efficiently and effectively. Feedback or check-and-balance will reflect how each project is truly performed, how effective is it, and which projects are worth implemented. Similarly, if there is negligence and failure during the implementing processes, the SBPAC can resolve them promptly and find better options or ways to accomplish its goals.

Furthermore, the education system in the Deep South needs to be reformed. Students in this area are weak on general study which results in insufficient capability of the students to compete with students from other regions as well as less opportunity to

get a good job in a competitive working environment nowadays. Moreover, educational institutions in the area have to lower their education standard in order to serve the students, mostly Muslims.

Not many Thai students from other regions attend the educational institutions in this area; they are afraid of the violence attacks and feel unsecure on their life and property. These cause lack of diversity of students, which result in reducing chances of the students to learn Thai culture, absorb Thai way of life and learn how to live peacefully with Thai.

In addition, the unrest situations also cause the schoolteachers who originally from other regions moving out from the area as they feel unsecured. This also has huge impact on the quality of education in the Deep South as well. For example, the SBPAC has given a number of scholarships to students in the area to study in various universities all over the country and other countries. Most of the students are failed and cannot complete their degree, as they are lack of sufficient knowledge on general study.

In addition, lack of sufficient education system causes low quality of human resources. When people fail in school, they feel depress from both home and school. They try to find their way to get out from the problem, but unfortunately many of them have no way out of it. Consequently, this brought tremendous social problems- ranging from acute poverty to drug related issues. With this, some say that the insurgents normally take advantage of this problem by encouraging these people to join the separatist groups. In this regard, he claims that some militant groups have recruited drug addicts in their ranks and used them to detonate bombs against the government's

personnel and infrastructures (Abdul Rahman, Interview by the author, 2013).

Chochai, however, forcefully argues that militant revolutionary groups usually recruited those "good boys" educated in Islamic schools who are indoctrinated by their respective schools (Chochai, Interview by the author, 2013). It seems that Chochai argument is more plausible because most of those recruits are the graduated/students of Islamic schools pointed earlier. This assertion was echoed by Srirai when he reveals that many of those insurgent arrested by the security forces were educated at Islamic schools known as pondok (Srirai, 2008: ii).

Indeed, this situation requires a real reform in education. However, in reforming the educational system needs to start from kindergarten to higher education level. Thus, the SBPAC has to reform both curriculum and administration dimensions. One in terms of curriculum, the SBPAC should integrate and balance the Islamic study with general study.

Since the Deep South provinces are more similar or connected into Malaysia than Thailand with respect to the political and socio-economic and cultural identities, the SBPAC can learn and adapt Malaysia's curriculum and sign collaborations that possibly encourage students-exchange with Malaysian educational institutions such as Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Universiti Malaysia Perlis (UniMaP) and so on. In addition, the SBPAC should cooperate with Muslim countries like Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia in reforming the education system.

Those countries are well established on education. They teach general subjects including computer, arts, music and inter-culture parallel with religious subject very

well. Moreover, the SBPAC can also implement short courses focusing on vocational education, regulation and law, etc. These short courses are suitable for adult learners especially community and religious leaders. They should be equipped with intensive knowledge on human right, responsibility and profession in order to lead people in their community correctly.

Furthermore, the SBPAC received lack of support from the Malay Muslim community in opening vocational college throughout the Deep South provinces especially local medical college and nursing college. There is a shortage on Muslim women nurses in the area. Moreover, a college teacher is also needed. The SBPAC should encourage people to study on education and work as a teacher as well as contribute to curriculum focusing on language that every students need to take like Malayu, Thai and English.

Other with regard to administration, the SBPAC has failed to establish one organization that directly administers Islamic religious schools rather than using the Educational Service Area Office as regular public school. The SBPAC can adopt administration system from Malaysia as a model to reform the school administration system in the Deep South. Besides, there is also concern on budgetary allocation. The SBPAC should provide equal budget and support to each school in the same level. However, there is must be an effective evaluation system in monitoring how each school spends its budget. The evaluation system must be use constantly in order to have better control over the budget and have better result on each project being implemented.

Additionally, the SBPAC did not support heavily on the schoolteachers in improving their capacities and skilled needed in developing their work performance. SBPAC should support budget and provide courses that meet the need of the schoolteachers. Additionally, encouragement is also important. The SBPAC should also set up incentive award programs as a tool to motivate the schoolteachers to develop their work performance which will result in better education in the Deep South of Thailand.

In short, the SBPAC has not invested so much its effort to pursue sufficient educational strategies and, thereby, achieving them. Thus, the Thai government through SBPAC has not allocated all the needed resources for better education of the Malay Muslims in the region. It seems that they are pre-occupied with their short-term political and economic gains.

The SBPAC as an organization has becoming shortsighted entity. Perhaps, it is imperative for them to realize that a concrete result of their strategic objectives take time at least 5-10 years or even longer. Therefore, the SBPAC has to understand that achieving their strategic objectives require more hard works and patience. Similarly, they have to ensure that the SBPAC's educational strategies being pursued are not only doable, workable, reliable, sustainable, but more importantly, it is acceptable to the Malay Muslim community.

7.3 Socio-Economic Strategies

The SBPAC is aware that the conditions in the region are very conducive environment for the growth of terrorism due to acute problems on education. These phenomena have

been a source of growing militancy/terrorism in the region. In response, the SBPAC has initiated educational developments and consequently implemented various projects in order to better education that would bring economic prosperity in the Deep South.

However unfortunately, many of these projects did not address the root causes of problems of education in the region because most of them were perceived by the Malay Muslims as a threat to their socio-cultural identity rather than as opportunity. As a result, they rejected those imposed developments. In this juncture, he lamented that the SBPAC's policy has suffered institutional memory due to its lack of policy continuity (Vetchasat, Interviewed by the author, 2012).

Perhaps, this setback is expected because most of the projects are short-term projects (one year) that gave benefits not to the people of the Deep South, but rather those some corrupt government officials who pocketed the said public funds intended for the development of the region. Therefore, the SBPAC has not invested these public funds effectively.

It seems that the SBPAC's officials are more concerned on budget allocations rather than fixing the very root causes of the economic problems in the region. Many of them misused the funds for their personal gains. These corrupt practices are rampant and known to the public. As a result, the Malay Muslims have lost their trust and respect to the SBPAC's officials. The former perceived the latter as corrupt, insensitive and undeserving leaders.

In fairness to the SBPAC, there are also some various obstacles obstructing them in promoting economic activities in the region. The unrest situations in the Deep South

have proved to be stumbling block in the SBPAC's effort in realizing its programs. For instance, the organization established a center of Halal food industry in Pattani. The project was postponed and not completed due to the unrest in the region. Others, however, put the blame on corruption as other contributing factor plus the ineffectiveness of the SBPAC's management system.

The SBPAC has failed to implement this project more effectively as Thailand has high potential on producing agricultural goods and contributing Halal food products to the food market world. The researcher suggested that the SBPAC should cooperate with domestic educational institutions, government and non-government organizations. They also equally need to collaborate with foreign Muslim countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam. Perhaps, these countries can provide technical assistance and support in terms of knowledge and technology, which could help better the Halal food quality as well as improve the SBPAC's management system. For instance, there is the Halal Science Center at Chulalongkorn University. This center is an instructional center and network of laboratories dedicated to maintaining the standards of Halal food.

Similarly, there is always problem on over-demanded of fruit products in the Deep South provinces. The SBPAC has adopted various solutions to solve this problem but the problem has never been completely covered. The SBPAC has focused on the end results, product overflowed. The SBPAC should understand and recognize the actual demand and customer behavior of fruit products in the domestic and international fruit markets. Then, the SBPAC should cooperate with other relevant organizations in managing and marketing the fruit products to the fruit market.

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In doing so there are various questions that need to be answered as followed; 1) what kinds of fruit products should be produced? 2) how much should the fruit products be produced each year? 3) what are techniques and technologies needed in cultivating the fruit products? 4) what are techniques and technologies necessary in preserving and storing the fruit products after harvesting? 5) where should the fruit products be contributed? 6) how much should the fruit products be priced in both domestic and international market? These questions need to be answered including other relevant questions necessary in solving problems of the fruit products. The SBPAC can possibly work with educational institutions and private sectors in doing research and finding solutions that can truly answer those questions thoroughly. Significantly, the SBPAC have to work based on the potential of the people and their needed otherwise the SBPAC will never be successful.

The SBPAC has also not been successful in implementing the development programs which aimed to alleviate people's suffering, build up villages' strong economy and strengthen community finance such as agricultural animals and instruments, modified fishing equipment, professional training, etc.

As mentioned by many interviewees, the SBPAC is lack of evaluation system. The SBPAC has not monitored participants of this program intensively. Some of the participants are successful while many of them do not see the important of this program. These may be questioned that is the program really serves the need of the people. On the other hand, Muslims normally live their life very simple. They rely their life heavily on religion and do not see the important of objects necessary for their living. They put less effort trying to improve their life quality.

Moreover, they are also lack of intensive knowledge and skills needed in developing their career even though the SBPAC already educate and train them. They still cannot do it on their own. For example, the SBPAC provides cattle and poultry to farmers expecting that they can grow and breed them, and turn them into a career. The results are not as expected. They do not know exactly how to cultivate them, and the SBPAC has not supported them promptly and does not have an effective evaluation system. Finally, all of those animals are disappeared and the instruments are neglected.

However, the SBPAC need to truly understand the real needs of people, their characteristics and abilities, as well as their willingness in developing themselves. Moreover, the SBPAC needs to have an effective evaluation system and use it consistently in order to prevent any failure and truly develop career for people.

The SBPAC has been moderately successful in promoting OTOP products. Many of local products have been developed, and sold all over the country and other countries. The SBPAC has put much effort developing OTOP products by employing modern production technology, marketing techniques, etc. However, the researcher found that people still are unable to produce and develop the OTOP products at the household level. They are lack of intensive knowledge and skills. The SBPAC should seriously educate people and provide them with an intensive training on various subjects such as product development, technology, marketing and so on. By doing so, the people will have strong fundamental knowledge and be able to develop products on their own.

Furthermore, cooperating with educational institutions can significantly help better OTOP products and build strong foundation for people. For example, Tak and

Phitsanulok province, Thailand, have faced problem on banana over-demanded. They have developed various kinds of products from banana supported by government organizations and educational institutions. They have found new technology in preserving bananas, and innovated new products, product presentation and packaging. In doing so, they can reduce the problem and add value to their products. For instance, dried banana coated with a honey glaze used to sell at 1 US Dollar per box. After improving its quality, design and packaging, the price is raised up three times. Currently, dried banana coated with a honey glaze is sold at around 3 US Dollars per box (Lohasriskul, 2012: 87).

The SBPAC has implemented the philosophy of Sufficiency Economy aiming to create well-balanced and sustainable development. A Sufficiency Economy Learning Center was established as a place where people can learn proper cultivation, fishing farming and other subjects. Trainings on various subjects are also provided at low cost or free of charge. In addition, PNP project was launched adopting the philosophy of Sufficiency Economy. This project aims to develop household life quality by initiating the livestock, agriculture and fishery development. Theoretically, these projects are very effective in terms of creating well-balanced and sustainable development. However, practically, it is very difficult to implement these projects successfully and have sufficient outcomes.

The SBPAC has not accomplished these projects effectively. These projects rely on the philosophy of Sufficiency Economy which is contrast with current living style of people. Capitalize system has played an important role on the people's life style. The four requisites for people comfort do not meet the needs of people any more. The people

need to have telephones, computers, cars and so on to live on. The people need to make more money than before to purchase those items.

Following the philosophy of Sufficiency Economy is a great way to sustain local communities, however, it take time to get a concrete result. The people are often lack of patience. For example, the PNP project has provided cattle to local people aiming that they can grow the cattle and breed them. Nonetheless, it takes too long to grow and breed the cattle; therefore, the local people consume them instead. Consequently, the SBPAC has not successfully implemented these projects. The SBPAC has to find essential strategies that have concrete impacts on the people and encourage them to truly see the benefits of these projects. However, the SBPAC needs to have lots of patience, put much efforts as well as continue generate concrete strategies to successfully accomplish these projects.

This project supports village public activities based on community needs focusing on basic facilities, career support, cultural support, etc. At the beginning, the SBPAC faced difficult time instructing people of the main purposes of this project. The SBPAC allocated budget to local communities aiming to develop their community in various aspects but they only used the budget mainly on religious development like Mosques renovation. Afterward, the SBPAC has generated new techniques in balancing budget.

The SBPAC has allocated budget into portions and specifically address each portion for each development plan, for example, 30 percent of the total budget is allocated for basic facilities' development, 20 percent of the total budget is allocated for career support, etc. Consequently, the SBPAC has achieved better outcome. Currently,

the SBPAC still pursues better techniques in implementing this project, creating comfort environment, and building better life quality for people.

The SBPAC has successfully enhanced economic development toward networking with neighboring countries like Malaysia. There is not only cooperation on economic activities between Thailand and Malaysia but also education and other fields aiming to promote socio-economic development in the area. Various developments have been established such as a transport and logistics center; the government built the Buketa Bridge to facilitate goods from Thailand to Malaysia as well as a new route linking Yala province with Malaysia.

These projects have generated prosperity to local communities, built strong relationship among collaborative countries, created equal economic opportunity, strengthened numbers of population and workforce migration as well as tourists, and also reduced conflict in the three southern border provinces.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This study examined and analyzed the political, educational and socio-economic strategies of the SBPAC in managing the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand using organizational approach. Thus, it is concretely deliberated the strategies pursued by the organization in addressing the conflict in the region. In terms of political strategies, this study found that assimilation's policy of the SBPAC which emphasizes an integration of the Malay Muslims into the mainstream Thai community seems not really workable or effective political strategies. Indeed, such controlled-oriented measures of political integration in the Deep South have only invited grievances from the Malay Muslims against the Bangkok government.

These (grievances) have consequently fuelled militancy and resistance in the Deep South, in particular, and the country, in general. Perhaps, it is important to note here, that the Malay Muslims in the Deep South are different from other Muslims in other regions, but it seems the SBPAC has failed to take cognizance on it. Thus, addressing the question of the Deep South, there is an urgent need for the SBPAC and the Thai Government to take cognizance of the political culture and history of the Malay Muslims in the region. Perhaps, this can be done through granting them an autonomous government within the framework of the Thai constitution so as to allow them to determine their own affairs. By doing so, it will prevent any break-up of the Thai society or any serious on the territorial integrity of Thailand as sovereign nation-state. Thus, people of the Deep South may have their government, but they have to be under Thai

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law and local ministries, and have to be controlled by the Thai government. Part of taxes collected from people in the Deep South shall contribute to the national treasure, but most of the taxes have to spend for the greater profit of people in the region.

Additionally, the SBPAC should build strong relationship with Malay Muslims aiming to gain trust and create kind cooperation in mitigating the conflict. Adopting diplomatic offensive and collaborating with various international organizations are perceived as the great instruments to build better understanding among Malay Muslims towards the Thai government, to improve capabilities of the people in the Deep South aiming to develop the local community which shall generate better quality of life for the people, and to finally reduce the conflict and bring peace, stability and prosperity to the Deep South of the country. However, many people of the Deep South have perceived the SBPAC and other government agencies including some relevant organizations are not seriously addressing their concerns. In this juncture, the latter has to show and prove their seriousness in addressing them.

With respect to the educational strategies, the SBPAC has tried to impose Thai educational system on the Malay Muslims by incorporating the Pondok or Islamic educational system into the mainstreams Thai educational system. Some people of the region accepted it, but others refused to do so because they perceived that such initiatives might dilute their cultural education and identity and fear that these might have far-reaching effects to their children and the generation to come. It is of no doubt that educational reform is extremely required in the Deep South, but the SBPAC has to consider the sensitivities of the people of the region.

It is true that the SBPAC has tried to initiate a type of education and its system that would help better the conflict, but they have to understand the unique characteristics of Malay Muslims in the Deep South and their needs in order to design and implement the type of education that really address their needs. Thus, a balanced education that is a combination of Islamic and general studies that would cater their educational needs have to be considered by the SBPAC. This is a paramount significance for the Malay Muslims in the region simply because it is in the line with their religious or cultural beliefs.

So understandably, the current educational system pursued by the SBPAC has failed to address longstanding issues in the region and therefore, need to be relooked or strategized so as to meet or achieve its noble objective that is the conclusion of the conflict in the Deep South of the country. It seems this is a wakeup call for the SBPAC to initiate or make a good rapport with Muslim countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and some countries in the Middle East and then build strong collaboration with them. Malaysia has notable educational system that the SBPAC can utilize as a model in reforming the educational system in the Deep South.

With regards to the SBPAC's socio-economic strategies, the organization has implemented various economic development projects aiming to improve the economic conditions in the region. Nevertheless, some of the development projects have not implemented successfully due to various factors. These factors included lack of long-term economic strategies, lack of marketing strategies, lack of sufficient training and corruption. For instance the Thai government through the SBPAC has not provided sufficient knowledge and intensive training for people in the region in order for them to create a self-immunity system.

Moreover, a corrupt practice is another factor causing failure in implementing the projects. Some of the SBPAC's officers misused the allocated budget for their personal gains instead of benefits of the people in the region. This causes loss of trust and respect among the people toward the SBPAC's officials, and less motivation for them to participate in any project which finally causing failure in implementing those projects and building economic prosperity.

Generally, the study demonstrates that the political, educational and socio-economic strategies of the SBPAC have not been very effective in achieving its desired goal that is to solve conflict so as to achieve better quality of life of people in the Deep South. Indeed, the SBPAC realized and understood clearly that the root causes of the unrest situations must be addressed. The organization also realized the unique characteristics of Malay Muslims in the Deep South are contributing factors for the conflict and therefore, any policies designed and be implemented must recognize them.

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