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MULTILATERALISM AND THE HEGEMONIC POSTURE OF A REGIONAL POWER: A CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA, 1960-2015

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A Thesis submitted to the College of Law, Government and International Studies in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Universiti Utara Malaysia

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ABSTRACT

This study examines Nigeria's multilateral policy vis-à-vis its hegemonic position in Africa since 1960. It evaluates the extent to which Nigeria can be considered a regional hegemon in Africa and how such hegemonic status has been pursued through multilateral institutions. Thus, the study identifies those areas where Nigeria has demonstrated its hegemonic roles in multilateral institutions. The study employs qualitative method of data collection and found that Hegemonic Stability Theory, Regional Security Complex Theory and Role Theory are the most suitable of all theories that can adequately explain Nigeria's multilateral policy in relation to its regional hegemonic posture in Africa. This is discovered through triangulation of qualitative data sources which included semi-structured interviews, focus-group interviews, elite interviews, documentary analysis, archival sources, speeches, reports, journal articles, textbooks, and newspapers. The study shows that Nigeria dominated African political terrain through the following roles: decolonisation, dismantling of apartheid regimes in southern African countries, capacity building, peacekeeping, democracy promotion and financing the regional multilateral organisations. Thus, in achieving the aforementioned, the study shows that there are external and internal factors that dictated Nigeria's multilateral policy since independence. Some of the factors identified by the study are security, economics, neighbours, extra-African powers, geography, military preponderance, population and financial capability. This study also evaluates the multilateral policy of Nigeria and discovered there are areas where success has been recorded while there are also some aspects where failure has been noted. The historical overview of the post-independent Nigerian foreign policy suggests that Nigeria's multilateral policy received a boost in the 1970s under General Gowon and General Olusegun Obasanjo. This was as a result of the civil war that ravaged the country for three years (1967-70). Overall, the study has contributed to intellectual debates on the role of regional power in regional governance. It has also shed light on the exercising of hegemonic role at regional level through multilateralism. For further research agenda, the study recommends there is need to employ unilateralism and bilateralism in the foreign policy of Nigeria to study the country's regional hegemonic posture in Africa.

Keywords: Multilateral Policy, Regional Power, Hegemony, Foreign Policy, Nigeria.

ABSTRAK

Kajian ini meneliti dasar multilateral Nigeria dan kedudukan hegemoninya di Afrika semenjak tahun 1960. Ia menilai sejauh mana Nigeria boleh dianggap sebagai hegemon serantau di Afrika dan bagaimana status hegemoni tersebut telah dilaksanakan melalui institusi multilateral. Oleh itu, kajian ini mengenal pasti bahagian-bahagian di mana Nigeria telah menunjukkan peranan hegemoni di dalam polisi multilateralnya. Penyelidikan ini menggunakan kaedah pengumpulan data secara kualitatif dan mendapati bahawa 'Hegemonic Stability Theory', 'Regional Security Complex Theory' dan 'Role Theory' merupakan teori-teori yang paling sesuai dan dapat menerangkan polisi multilateral Nigeria secara menyeluruh yang berkaitan dengan pendirian hegemoninya di rantau Afrika. Ini didapati melalui sumber-sumber data kualitatif triangulasi termasuk temubual separa berstruktur, temubual kumpulan berfokus, temubual elit, analisis dokument, bahan/sumber arkib, ucapan-ucapan, laporan-laporan, artikel dan jurnal, buku teks dan surat khabar. Hasil dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa Nigeria telah mendominasi politik Afrika melalui beberapa peranan berikut: dekolonisasi, penghapusan rejim apartheid di negara-negara selatan Afrika, pembinaan kapasiti, pengekalan keamanan, promosi demokrasi dan pembiayaan organisasi multilateral serantau. Oleh itu, untuk mencapai semua yang telah disebutkan, kajian menunjukkan terdapat faktor-faktor luaran dan dalaman yang menentukan dasar multilateral Nigeria semenjak mencapai kemerdekaannya. Sesetengah faktor yang dikenalpasti daripada kajian adalah keselamatan, ekonomi, kejiranan, kekuasaan tambahan Afrika, geografi, peningkatan ketenteraan, populasi dan kemampuan kewangan. Kajian ini juga menilai dasar multilateral Nigeria dan menemui bahagian-bahagian di mana kejayaan telah dirakamkan, di samping beberapa kegagalan yang telah dikenalpasti. Sepintas lalu mengenai sejarah dasar luar pasca kemerdekaan Nigeria mendapati dasar multilateral Nigeria telah mendapat kekuatan pada tahun 1970 di bawah Jeneral Gowon dan Jeneral Olusegun Obasanjo. Ini disebabkan oleh peperangan saudara yang membinasakan negara tersebut selama tiga tahun (1967-1970). Secara keseluruhannya, kajian ini telah menyumbang kepada perdebatan intelektual terhadap peranan kuasa serantau di dalam tadbir urus serantau. Ia juga menerangkan pelaksanaan peranan hegemoni pada peringkat serantau melalui pendekatan multilateral. Untuk agenda bagi kajian lanjutan, kajian mencadangkan keperluan untuk menggunakan pendekatan unilateral dan bilateral di dalam dasar luar Nigeria bagi mengkaji pendirian hegemoni serantau negara tersebut di Afrika.

Kata Kunci: Dasar Multilateral, Kuasa Serantau, Hegemoni, Dasar Luar, Nigeria.

DEDICATION

I hereby dedicate this thesis to my parent, Alhaji Shafii Oladimeji and Oladimeji Hassanat Aweke, my wife, Oladimeji Tawakalt Oyeyemi, my children, Oladimeji Hiqmat Omolayo and Oladimeji Shafii Anuoluwa and my friend, Aderibigbe Akeem.

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In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	Africa Caribbean and Pacific
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRODAD	African Forum and Network on Debt and Development
AMF	African Military Force
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRM	African Peer-Review Mechanism
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BP	British Petroleum
CCT	Concentric Circle Theory
CEAO	Communaute Economique de l' Afrique de l' Oust
CFA	Communautte FrancaisAfricaine
CFO	Commonwealth and Foreign Office
ECOMOG	Ecowas Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOSAP	Ecowas Small Arms Control Programme
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EPG	Eminent Person Group
ESMC	ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee
FAN	Forces Armees du Nord
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FGI	Focus Group Interview
FMG	Federal Military Government
FNLA	National Front for The Liberation Of Angola
FROLINAT	National Front for the Liberation of Chad
GATT	General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Cooperation
GWOT	Global War On Terror
HSGIC	Head of State and Government Implementation Committee
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MAD	Mutual Assistance Defence
MNCs	Multinational Coorporations
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPLT	MouvementPopulairepour la Liberation de Tchad
NA	Nigeria Army
NAF	Nigeria Air Force

NAFTA	North Atlantic Free Trade Area
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCBWA	National Congress of British West Africa
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NICs	Newly Industralised Countries
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NIF	National Islamic Front
NIIA	Nigeria Institute of International Affairs
NN	Nigeria Navy
NPC	Northern People Congress
NPFL	National Patriotic Front for the Liberation Of Liberia
NSWFP	Nigerian Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party
NTUC	Nigerian Trade Union Congress
NYM	Nigerian Youth Movement
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organization For Economic Cooperation And Development
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDF	Popular Defence Force
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PZ	Patterson Zocconni
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SAU	Small Arms Group
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
STABEX	Système de Stabilisation des Recettesd'Exportation
SWA	South West Africa
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
TACs	Technical Aids Corps Schemes
UAC	United African Company
UBA	United Bank for Africa
UNAMID	United Nations Mission In Darfur
UNAMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission
UNO	United Nations Organisation
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes
UNPOA	United Nations ProgrammeOf Action
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTC	United Trading Company
WAEC	West Africa Economic Community
WAI	War Against Indiscipline
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisations

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

….First, it is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all
nations and participate actively in the work of the United Nations Or-
ganisations (UN) to lead African cause (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa[1],
United Nations General Assembly, (UNGA), 1960).

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The independent states within the international system started to evolve mechanisms

to solve global conflict by the beginning of 20th century. In this way, the League of

Nations was formed which subsequently replaced by the United Nations (UN). The

formation of these two global multilateral institutions was the product of global

hegemons who saw it as their responsibility to maintain global order in the areas of

peace, security, and commerce (Ruggie, 1992:568). Since the formation of the UN in

1945, states have been cooperating together to solve some transnational security is-

sues like terrorism, child trafficking, drug trafficking, environment and illegal arms

trafficking (Abbott & Snidal, 1998:4).

It needs to be stressed that the decolonization process of the 1950s and 1960s

greatly multiplied the number of independent states in the international system; the

result of which was the proliferation of regional and sub-regional multilateral institu-

tions. Some of these regional and sub-regional multilateral institutions were spon-

sored by regional hegemons and powers to cater for the specific needs within the re-

gional sub-system (Yansane, 1977:38). Where regional power did not sponsor, it be-

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[1]The Prime Minister emphasized Nigeria's stance of embracing multilateralism in its foreign policy
making in the UN General Assembly in its Inaugural lecture in New York in 1960.

came the key player in such regional multilateral body. The decolonization process of the late 1950s and early 1960s affected all parts of the globe where colonialism became institutionalized and in this manner, Nigeria attained its independent status on October 1st 1960.By the time Nigeria gained its independence from Britain, it was admitted as 99th member of the UN and the multilateral global institution became an important aspect of Nigerian foreign policy making (Falola & Heaton, 2008:258; Chibundu, 2003:2).

Nigeria is a large country in the West African sub-region, which covers approximately 356,668 square miles (Bach, 2007:302). The spatial dimension of Nigeria's location is more complicated. Nigeria is bounded to the north by Niger Republic; in the northeast by Cameroon and Chad; in the south by the Gulf of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean; and in the west by the Republic of Benin (See **Figure 1.1** below).

Figure 1.1: Map of West African Countries

All the immediate neighbouring countries with Nigeria are francophone and this implies that the cultural, political, and social terrain of West African sub-region is very complex. Nigeria occupies 14th position in terms of its landmass and the most popu-

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lous country with 15.98 percent of the entire African population. The latest official projection by the World Bank estimated that Nigeria has over 177.5 million people, which makes it the seventh largest in the world (World Bank, 2015). In the whole of Africa, Nigeria is by far the most populous and it is the largest black nation in the world. In the West African region where Nigeria naturally resides, its population constitutes 60% of the 16 countries and 50% of the manufacturing sector (Oladimeji & Ahmad, 2015:91). In Africa generally, Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been the largest in the entire continent with $502 billion (Tetenyi, 2014). These enormous human and material resources thus make Nigerian leaders to see the country as potential leader in Africa and this leadership aspiration was activated immediately after the attainment of independence. According to Timothy Shaw (1983:2),

> Nigeria has always been primus inter pares in black Africa, but with the advent of changes in the global political economy in the 1970s as well as with the ending of its own civil war, Nigeria became ever more indisputably Africa's leading state. Its claim to being the natural leader of the continent is reinforced by the emerging character of its political economy.

The earliest attempt by Nigeria to demonstrate its leadership role in Africa was under the UN when Portugal claimed Angola as one of its provinces (Chibundi, 2003:3). Nigeria, represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the UNGA, Jaja Wachukwu, repudiated the claim that "Nigeria will never accept the fiction that any inch of an African territory could be considered as an integral part of a metropolitan European country; indeed Nigeria will never accept the twist…" (Wachukwu, 1961). Also in 1961, Nigerian Minister of Labour, Mr. J.M. Johnson sponsored a resolution to compel the South African racist regime to quit the International Labour Organization (ILO), which received support from other African members of the ILO (Chibundi, 2003:5). Nigeria's leadership role was also displayed in 1960 at the UNGA when

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France claimed Algeria as an extension of its territory. The Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister strongly challenged the claim and declared that "Nigeria will not support that one million French settlers should claim predominance or pre-eminence over nine million Algerian nationals" (Wachukwu, 1961). The Nigerian stance in the UN in this case rendered the French claim useless in the UNGA in 1960.

Financially, Nigeria contributed 14,785,572 pounds sterling to the peacekeeping operation in Congo between 1960 and 1964 (Adigbuo, 2013:13). Nigeria also contributed one million dollars to the UN to defray the cost of operation in Congo despite being a newly independent state in the multilateral body (Adigbuo, 2013:13). This leadership posture became more obvious when Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister was appointed as Chairman of the Congo Advisory Committee to assist the Secretary-General of the UN on the possible ways to put an end to the Congo crisis (Chibundi, 2003:6).This position made Nigeria the "spokesperson" of black race in the UN (Falola & Heaton, 2008:250). This shows that Nigeria leaders have assumed the leadership position in Africa immediately after independence. This position is further buttressed by a member of parliament, E.C Akwiwu, in 1966, where he stressed that, "it is necessary that those whom we stand a chance of leading should be able to look up to Nigeria as senior brother, an elder brother that is capable of looking after their affairs and is very interested in their well-being" (Quoted in Adebajo, 2002:44). The UN, the foremost global multilateral institution, recognized Nigeria's leadership posture in 1960s by given preference to its position on African issues like apartheid in Southern Africa, decolonisation, racism, and conflicts. On the issue of Congo, the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa declared in the UNGA in 1960 that,

> Nigeria is prepared to make its experience available and to send technical expert to assist in planning and development for the future under the UN. We can also lend professors and teaching staff from the time to give short courses and lectures, and I assure you that many quali-

fied Nigerians are eager to take part in such work during their school and college vacation (see appendix III).

Such was the extent of Nigeria regional leadership in the UN in the 1960s. Apart from the official declarations from policy quarters, Nigeria has been demonstrating its hegemonic posture by leading campaign on the issues like decolonization, apartheid, and racism within African continent. In 1961, Nigeria hosted the Lagos Conference of African and Malagasy Heads of states which later metamorphosed to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (Chibundi, 2003:7). The Charter of the organization was drafted by a Nigerian, Dr. Teslim Elias, the Attorney-General of Nigeria at the time. In 1961, Nigeria also played a leading role in the events that led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961 (Falola & Heaton, 2008:384).

In addition, General Joseph Garba was the President of the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly between 1989 and 1990 which culminated in intense debate on the issue of Apartheid in South Africa and Namibia (Gamabri, 2005:187). Lake Chad Basin Commission and River Niger Authority were also initiated by Nigeria in 1964 to settle the dispute that may arise in the joint use of Lake Chad and River Niger water with its concerned neighbours (Bande, 2010:188). By 1975, Nigeria sponsored the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to integrate the economy of the West Africa region to the global economy. To further enhance and promote its regional hegemonic posture in Africa, Nigeria under the leadership of Foreign Affairs Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, established the "Concert of Medium power" also known as Lagos Forum in 1987 (Salami,

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2013:140). The concert was attended by many countries[2] from all parts of the globe and its first meeting convened in Lagos, Nigeria in 1987 (Bach, 2007:303).

The leadership posture of Nigeria in Africa remains the same since independence and this has been achieved mainly through various strategies like multilateralism, unilateralism, and bilateralism. According to Meierding (2010:12) "Nigerian leaders have restrained their local ambitions and used international institutions to achieve and reinforce the state's regional preeminence. This foreign policy strategy has persisted across regime types." Patrick & Forman (2002:203) also submitted that Nigeria became the second largest contributor of military personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations in 2000 which represented 12 percent of all the UN peacekeeping forces around the globe in that particular year. In 2009, Nigeria's contribution to United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) constituted 25% of Africa's contribution. It contributed 3,895 (3,337 troops, 547 police and 11 military observers) of the total personnel of 12,881 (Moller, 2009:15). This regional leadership posture continued in Liberia and Sierra Leone where Nigeria masterminded the formation of ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to end the seeming state collapse in Liberia. Given Nigeria's preponderance in material and human resources relative to other African countries, Nigeria has been a force to reckon with in social, political, economic, and military affairs in Africa.

Various studies have been conducted on Nigerian foreign policy and international organisations and some of these works have not really delved into core issue of how such multilateral organisations have been employed in the leadership posture of Nigeria in Africa. Thus, Mailafia (2010) in its article, "*Prometheus as Good Samaritan: Nigeria's Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance since Independence",* explores how multilateral organisations

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[2] Countries in attendance are Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Switzerland, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

have been used as a medium of assisting countries in Africa. The article does not really focus on Nigeria's leadership aspiration but on financial assistance to needy African countries. In addition, Adetula (2005) in "*Nigeria and the African union*" only concentrates on AU as a means through which Nigeria has been displaying its leadership aspiration in Africa. Such concentration on AU cannot be used to confirm the theoretical precept of hegemony in Nigeria's foreign policy given the "newness" of the organisation. Another scholar who have done a related work is Bande (2010) whose article, *"Multilateral Water Organisations and Nigeria's National Interest: Lake Chad Basin Commission and Niger Basin Authority",* explores Nigeria's participation in the formation of multilateral organisations to regulate water resources among the neighbouring countries. Such work is also very narrow in approach and does not approach the issue from the hegemonic point of view. To have a broad overview of Nigeria's employment of multilateralism in its leadership aspiration in Africa, therefore, this research intends to fill the research vacuum.

In essence, the purpose of this study is to examine, analyse, and assess Nigeria's regional hegemonic posture in Africa in relation to multilateralism-the strategy that has occupied a central place in Nigeria's foreign policy since 1960 (Adeniji, 2005:2). Doing this will help knowing more about Nigeria as a regional hegemon in Africa and it will further contribute to the existing work on regional hegemons in international politics. In order to establish a pattern of behaviour in Nigeria's regional hegemonic posture vis-à-vis multilateralism, the study covers Nigeria's activities since 1960. The choice of the period rest on the fact that Nigeria's leadership role in Africa started immediately after the attainment of independence in 1960 and such aspirations continue to receive a boost from Nigerian government through multilateralism. This approach will help to generate theoretical underpinning that informs the

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behaviour of regional hegemon like Nigeria in international organisations-the most important avenue through which Nigeria implement its strategy of multilateralism in enhancing its leadership posture in Africa.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Regional powers have always been seeing as important actors dominating events in their respective regions most especially in the area of regional governance (Prys, 2010:1). According to Patrick & Stewart-Ingersoll (2010), Prys (2010), and Meierding (2010) Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey are unanimously considered to have belonged to this group. Regional power in essence is identified by relative material preponderance in relation to other regional members (Moller, 2010). Some of these regional powers assume greater role in the maintenance of security and order within their respective regions. The assumption of this responsibility by virtue of role conception transforms some of these regional powers to regional hegemon (Prys, 2010).In carrying out some of the regional responsibilities, regional hegemons resort to diplomatic mechanisms like unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism.

However, the influence of regional hegemons in multilateral institutions has attracted little attention among the scholars, especially in relations to Nigeria (Meierding, 2010:6; Pry, 2010:22; Nolte, 2009:894; Hurrel, 2005)). Their global structural position and foreign policy preferences made them to be analytically distinct from traditional "Middle Powers"-a term formerly reserved for countries like Australia, Sweden, and Canada (Meierding, 2010:6; Holbraad, 1984:57). Some of these regional powers have become prominent international actors in economic and political issues; and understanding their foreign policy preferences and behaviours is

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vital (Tetenyi, 2014:4; Nolte, 2010:889). Countries like Brazil, China India and South Africa have begun to attract the attention of scholars, Nigeria, in contrast, is under-researched in relation to multilateralism and leadership aspiration in Africa (Meierding, 2010:6: Nolte, 2010: 883). Thus, the central issue to be investigated here therefore is how Nigeria has been displaying its hegemonic role in Africa and most importantly in West Africa through the strategy of multilateralism. This research intends to fill this research gap by examining in detail Nigeria's strategy of multilateralism in relation to its hegemonic position in Africa since independence. Those factors that render multilateralism inevitable are also crucial to this study. Doing research on this, it is believed, will serve as a compendium to the study of Nigeria's role in international institutions and hence its regional hegemonic posture in Africa.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the light of the above, this research therefore attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What is the background of multilateralism in Nigeria's foreign policy?

2. How does Nigeria exhibit its hegemonic posture through multilateralism?

3. Why Nigeria adopts the use of multilateralism in relation to its regional hegemonic posture in Africa?

4. What is the outcome of Nigeria's multilateralism vis-à-vis its regional hegemonic posture?

1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study are:

1. To explore the place of multilateralism in Nigeria's foreign policy.

2. To examine the issue-areas where Nigeria demonstrates its regional hegemonic presence through multilateralism.

3. To assess the factors that dictate multilateralism in Nigeria's regional leadership posture.

4. To evaluate Nigeria's multilateralism in relation to its hegemonic posture in Africa.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This research examines the place of multilateralism in Nigeria's foreign policy and Nigeria's engagement with regional and global multilateral institutions in relation to its hegemonic posture. It seeks to establish a pattern of behavior in the multilateral policy of a regional power like Nigeria. Doing this will yield reliable information on the impact of regional power in the regional politics and hence in the global arena. In terms of policy prescription, therefore, this research could help in identifying areas where regional power like Nigeria can be of assistance in charting the course of peace and stability in the global arena. Conceptually, this research contributes to conceptual clarification of multilateralism in Nigeria's foreign policy. It also provides theoretical understanding of the impact of regional hegemon in regional governance. Various scholars on Nigeria's role in international organizations have carried out many Studies; there are few cases of attempt to explore the multilateral dimension in the hegemonic posture of Nigeria. In this way, the research contributesto existing literature on the role of regional hegemon, especially Nigeria, in the international institutions.

Therefore, this research eventually contributes to intellectual debates on the role of regional powers in the regional governance. In addition, the historical explo-

ration of Nigeria's employment of multilateralism in its regional hegemonic pursuit will shed light on the theoretical underpinnings that inform the behaviours of regional or local hegemon in the multilateral institutions. This research exactly toes the line that German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) has been doing in order to understand the role of regional powers in regional governance.

1.6 **SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

The study dealt with Nigeria in its relations with the international organizations as one of the channels of Nigeria's multilateralism. It seeks to evaluate multilateralism as a strategy and instrument to propagate Nigeria's hegemonic posture in African. The scope of the study is limited to Nigeria's multilateral engagement towards its foreign policy in relation to its hegemonic posture. It adopts an eclectic approach by examining thoroughly the multilateral undertakings in Nigerian foreign policy between 1960 and 2015, which is lengthy enough to provide a patterned behavior of Nigerian foreign policy towards multilateral institutions. Thus, internal and external imperatives for this patterned behavior are considered. In addition, since multilateral institutions can take many forms namely international order, international regimes and international organisation (Ruggie, 1992:564), this study considers in its entirety the international organizations as multilateral focus of this study. Sub-regional, regional, and global multilateral institutions are thus taken into consideration to establish element of hegemony in Nigeria's multilateralism.

Essentially, the study considered Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS), Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger Development Authority, Gulf of Guinea Cooperation (GGC), OAU (now African Union (AU)), UN, Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Com-

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monwealth of Nations. Considering these multilateral institutions are based on the principle of concentric circle of Nigeria's foreign policy, each multilateral institution represents a clear circle in the formulation and implementation of Nigerian foreign policy. Other researchers can extend the knowledge by studying unilateral and bilateral dimension in the hegemonic posture of Nigeria in Africa.

1.7 **LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The process of research is challenging most especially when researcher has to cope with unanticipated problems. In the course of conducting this research many stumbling blocks were encountered which might have truncated or impeded the process of the research if not handled carefully. One of the limitations of this study is time. Most interviewees were not ready to spare enough time for the conduct of the interviews. Where informants were ready to be interviewed, it was always based on certain time limitation. The is mostly encountered in Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), being the foremost think tank in the Nigerian foreign policy making. In fact, some personal interviews conducted with members of NIIA were based on timing from interviewees. This type of scenario limited the extent to which discussions could be arranged with most of my interviewees in the institutes and it reduced the chance of reaching saturation with information gathered from each interviewee. Only a few of them granted enough time for the interview. Where informants were ready to grant interview with unlimited time, some expected immediate gratification in form of financial advantage. In other words, a situation was encountered where an informant asked what he stood to benefit if he granted the interview.

Some interviewees also begged for anonymity; they do not want any information attributed to them, most especially, regarding how the country handles its

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multilateral peacekeeping operations' finances. The interviews were conducted successfully by employing other sources such as the newspapers to validate many claims made in the research. Some even refused to have them recorded on tape and in this scenario, they only permitted hand written form of recording. In addition, some interviewees responded emotionally and aggressively to the questions and this made it difficult to ask further questions.

Furthermore, the policymakers were not easily and freely accessible; most of the appointments booked with some of those who are directly involved in the foreign policy making, were not honoured. Nevertheless, the researcher was able to surmount all the setbacks with patience and the need to source for additional informants and documents to enrich the data. Where informants refused recording and attribution on tape the researcher resulted to looking for evidence elsewhere in order to utilize the interviews.

1.8 **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This section considers some important literature of relevance to the subject matter. Literature review is *sine qua non* to the conduct of academic research and it helps to direct researchers on which area has been intellectually abandoned or under-researched; which needs further clarification and attention from interested researcher. In view of this, an attempt has been made to divide the literature review into sections for convenience and simplicity. This literature review is, therefore, thematically arranged to: (a) identify the gap in the literature, (b) provide a basis for the conduct of this research, and (c) guide against meddlesomeness in the arrangement of ideas. These themes are: (1) general overview of Nigeria's foreign policy and multilateralism, (2) security and Nigeria's multilateral policy, and(3) economy and Nigeria's

multilateral policy. The gap in the literature is identified at the end of each section to avoid any form of ambiguity. The rationale behind choosing all these literature is based on their relevance to the subject matter. Hence, few journal articles and text-books' chapters that cogently relate to this work are given consideration and most are sourced through internet and library.

1.8.1 **Overview of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Multilateralism**

This section discusses Nigerian foreign policy and its engagement with multilateral institutions after independence. It seeks to highlight some salient issues relating to Nigeria's multilateral policy. The British government under the Office of the Commonwealth and Colonial Office in London for most part of the colonial era conducted Nigeria's foreign relation. By the time the British was preparing to grant independence to Nigeria the country's foreign relations was automatically aligned towards the West, most especially the US, Britain and other Western European countries.

Thom-Otuya (2013:65-66) in his scholarly exposition of federalism in Nigeria asserts that the first Nigerian Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa did not hesitate to court the friendship of the British. This resulted in the foreign policy orientation thatwas pro-West. To corroborate the above view, Ogunbadejo (1976:14) states that Nigerian foreign policy under Balewa was completely aligned to the West contrary to his policy declaration of nonalignment during independence. Ogunbadejo further stresses that Balewa government even went to the extent of seeking policy advice from Britain whenever there was domestic turmoil. However, Thom-Otuya and Ogunbadejo's thesis on Nigeria's alignment with Britain does not consider the political climate, both domestic and international, under which such policy was exe-

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cuted. At domestic front, there was no unanimous agreement under which the foreign policy of the country should be based among the three federated regions. By 1957, each region, West, East, and North decided to conduct independent foreign policy. This culminated in a scenario of policy discrepancy. The northern region, predominantly inhabited by Muslims, had close relationship with Islamic World especially the Sudan and Saudi Arabia while the Western and Eastern regions engaged London and New York with direct diplomatic relations.

Thus, the complicated domestic terrain in which Nigerians found themselves at the time of independence made it difficult to forge a government of national unity that will be acceptable to all. This domestic circumstance necessitated the first Prime Minister to align the country's foreign policy with Britain. In addition, the international political climate signified by ideological tension between the West and the East impelled Nigeria to see UN and Commonwealth as safe haven for global relations.

According to Ambassador Jibrin Chinade (undated), Nigeria since independence has been playing decisive roles in some multilateral organisations particularly in the Commonwealth of Nations, the UN, OPEC, OAU/AU and ECOWAS. This is premised on the conviction that Nigeria by virtue of its position in Africa is naturally placed to represent the black race in any global forum. This is exactly why multilateral institutions have been employed to achieve such a mission. But it needs to be stated here that the domestic circumstance both in Nigeria and Africa generally could be seen as a moderating factor of Nigeria's multilateral policy for Nigerian government cannot act alone to solve the continental problems.

Another important work on Nigeria and multilateralism is that of Akinterinwa (2004) where he asserts that the UN has for most of the post-independent years

served as a forum for the pursuit of the foreign policy interest of Nigeria. Being a developing middle power country, Nigeria repose its confidence in multilateral organizations to promote its national objectives and interests in international politics. To support the above claim, Chibundi (2003:4) stresses that the admission of Nigeria to UN shortly after independence heralded the importance of Nigeria and Africa in the global diplomacy. The Nigerian government under the first Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, contended that Nigeria could not perform any important role in world affairs without participating actively in the activities of the UN. While Gambari (1980) on its own part laments that Nigeria did not have option at the time of independence than to join UN for multilateral policy formed an important foreign policy instrument on the part of all newly independent states. It was thus naturally expected that Nigeria would join the global institution to advance its foreign policy interests.

Adeniji (2005:1) observes that the anarchical international environment within which new states found themselves at the point of independence was one of the most important factors for joining the multilateral organization like the UN; and Nigeria in this case could not be an exception. This position lends credence to the conviction that for newly independent African countries to safeguard and protect their newly defined territory there was a need to seek protection under the global body. It is however noted by Aluko (1976:139-140) that the existence of Afro-Asian group in the UN before Nigerian independence in 1960 was already a consolation for the newly independent states to participate actively in the unknown global political terrain. It must be said that at the point of independence of Nigeria in 1960 only Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, and South Africa under apartheid regime were the independent African nations that participated actively in the activities of the UN. In this way, these four countries were not powerful enough to guarantee the corporate existence

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of newly independent African states in the international system. These countries were in themselves had their problems and could not defend the interests of Africa effectively. In contrast to the above claim, Frhd & Iwuoha (2012:76-78) stress that the need to defend the African and other developing countries' interests became the priority of Nigerian leaders in the UN. One of such case was the issue of apartheid regime in southern part of Africa where Nigeria committed so much material and financial resources to liberate the region from the racist regimes. Gambari (2011: 134, 1975:92-96) also supports the view that the defence of African independence and decolonization became an important step on the part of Nigerian government to ensure that all African territories are liberated from the shackles of external powers. Asisi-Asobe (1995) also agrees that Nigeria's demand in the UN to exclude South Africa from the Olympic Games in 1972 was to isolate the racist government in the global politics. It needs to be stated here that since most Nigerian leaders see African as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy it then follows that African interests are defended in the UN. The Nigerian activity in the UN in defence of African states should thus be seen as an extension of its responsibility to Africans not just another policy entirely.

In a related development, Adeniji (2005:3) asserts that the protection of African interests in the UN received a boost when Nigeria was elected as the Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid despite the fact that Nigeria was not part of frontline states of Southern Africa. He claims that Nigeria acquired the status through its efforts and energy against the evil of the racist policy. UN thus became an important forum through which Nigeria campaign for dissolution and dismantling of apartheid regime in some southern African states. As a result Angola, South Africa,

Mozambique, and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) became a diplomatic target of Nigeria in the UN.

However, Nigerian stance in the UN against the apartheid regimes in southern part of Africa should not be magnified for OAU members agreed unanimously to oppose any move in the UN that stood in the way of perpetuating apartheid regimes in the southern part of Africa. In this way, the cooperation of the members of OAU in the UN complemented and boosted Nigeria's diplomatic effort in its war against apartheid. Apart from using multilateral organizations to liberate the African countries from colonialism, Nigeria also employs it for peaceful purposes. According to Etekpe (2013:287-294) Nigeria has always been a prominent and law-abiding member of the UN. For most of the cases that may cause diplomatic tension, Nigeria has always been resorted to UN as an important mediator to solve diplomatic and political problems in the continent. This is exemplified by the acceptance of International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction on the Bakassi Peninsular (border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon) border case. The outcome of the case was ruled in favour of Cameroon and Nigeria peacefully accepted it without any appeal. Burgess (1998:37-61) also contends that Nigeria accepted the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL) operation and accepted to work together with the UN military contingent in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Although both Etekpe and Burgess give credit to Nigeria for its harmonious relationship towards UN in settling African political problems but the agreement of Nigerian government on the Bakassi judgment and working together with UNAMIL should not be amplified for most of these policies are intended to ensure that policy of good neighbourliness in Nigerian foreign policy is upheld. This view is supported by Dokubo & Joseph (2012:562) whose work elabo-

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rate on how the West African insecurity informs the policy of good neighbourliness and maintenance of Nigeria's territorial integrity.

Furthermore, Pham (2007:2) and Meireding (2010:4-5) posit that Nigerian government since independent regarded the country as the natural leader of Africa because of its population and relative economic advancement. Both scholars thus contended that it is this leadership posture that engineered Nigerian government to singlehandedly sponsor the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975. I concur with this argument with some reservation. Although, West Africa is the natural home in which Nigeria can easily exercise its leadership ambition but it does not suggest that Nigeria is not prominent in continental and global multilateral institutions. Herskovits (2001:315) concurs that Nigeria's "enduring influence" in the continent and global affairs is premised on its economic base. In this way, buoyant economy serves as leeway for Nigeria's role in AU and the UN.

Adeyemi-Suenu & Inokoba (2010:182) also discuss the military and economic capability on the part of Nigeria to exercise its leadership role in Africa, particularly in the Liberian and Sierra Leone conflict. Nevertheless, they criticize the domestic circumstance upon which this role was played. They argue that if Nigerians at home could be wallowing in the abject poverty and leadership tussle such leadership role is unfounded. This is supported by Omoiya (2012:11-12) who highlights the volatility of Nigeria polity since independence which needs a serious overhauling before projecting international influence. However, it needs to be stressed that the internal political climate, at times, does not constitute a constraint to ambitious foreign mission if such mission is part of the foreign policy interest of the state. This argument is supported by Obi (2008:187) who argues that Nigeria's sufferings at home should not affect its responsibility in Africa and the global political scene. He is of the view

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that Nigeria's responsibility towards Africa, especially to its West African neigh-

bours is in continuation of Nigeria's national interest. This view is in line with the

conviction that if Nigeria's West African neighbours are not politically stable then it

portends a serious security threat to Nigeria. Therefore, the internal condition of Ni-

geria should not be an excuse to abandon its role in the global politics.

In contrast to the above discussions, Etekpe (2011:181-190) contributes to the

theoretical underpinning of Nigerian foreign policy where he employs the role model

theory in discussing the leadership role of Nelson Mandela of South Africa, General

Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gamel Abdul Nasser of Egypt in maintaining peace

and stability in Africa. He maintains that the peace building effort in Africa especial-

ly in ECOWAS and OAU rest on the impacts of role models. It is based on this that

he proposes that for any meaningful peace and security to be maintained in Africa,

the role of leadership should be taken seriously. Sekhri (2009:431) also employs the

role theory in explaining the foreign policy of the third world. In his explanation, he

posits that the theory can be expended to explain the behaviours of Nigeria in Africa

since independence. In this way, he concludes that the role theory is behind the prin-

ciple of Africa as the centrepiece of Nigerian policy. These two important theories-

role models and role theory- are useful in discussing Nigeria's foreign policy towards

multilateral organizations but it would be more beneficial to incorporate some other

theoretical underpinnings for such discussion.

Closely related to the above theoretical lens is Alo's (2013:295-303) who af-

firms that the validity and workability of multilateral institutions is a function of

leadership commitment. This is particularly notable in the formation and workability

of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), one of the arms of AU,

which was established in 2001. The main reason behind the establishment of NEPAD

is to provide sustainable solution to Africa's teething problems such as poverty, political instability, health issues and insurgencies. Alo, in his work, employs the theoretical model of Michael Schechter-a model that stresses the importance of systemic, organizational and personality factors on the functionality and effectiveness of international organization. In this case, the model was applied to study President Olusegun Obasanjo's impacts and activities in the creation and functioning of NEPAD. The conviction that the international organization can be understood through the lens of an individual actor is the focus of the work, which lends credence to the idiosyncratic factor in analyzing events in African international relations. The impact of President Olusegun Obasanjo during his chair of NEPAD's Head of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) between 2001 and 2003 is the hallmark of the analysis, which testifies to the efficacy of the Michael Schechter's model.

However, it should be stressed that attributing the proper performance of an international organization to individual effort should not be exaggerated. This may otherwise amount to mono-causality. At least, other factors must be advanced to explain the smooth running of any international organization. One of such factors is the need of the time. By the time NEPAD was proposed, to champion the course of Africa's development, it was already too late. This is because the OAU, the main continental organization, had been redundant for decades and incapable of providing necessary apparatuses for ever-growing African malaise. It is therefore not surprising to see the like of Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wayde of Senegal and Bouteflika of Algeria who championed the establishment of NEPAD to wake African countries from the sleep of ages of underdevelopment.

Arising from the above therefore, the personality factor only cannot be attributed to the formation and functionality of NEPAD. It is a necessary ingredient of making Africa relevant in the contemporary global political and economic sphere. In respect to the purpose of this work, the article employs personality factor in the effective functionality of international organization, which is quite incongruent to the work. Nevertheless, the work may serve to provide information on the impact of Nigeria in the AU since it is assumed that President Obasanjo's activities in the AU is an extension and function of Nigeria.

Furthermore, Meierding (2010:1-14) contributes immensely to the foreign policy theoretical framework of middle powers and emerging power especially in relations to Nigeria. He criticizes the mainstream international relations theorists for discriminating against developing countries. The notion that IR theories cannot be applied to the developing nations because of their internal political configuration is refuted. Meierding therefore challenges that some conditions prevalent in some developing countries are also present in some developed nations and concludes that IR theories can be applied to developing countries particularly concerning Nigeria in Africa. Choosing Nigeria as a case study is premised on the assumption that countries like China, Brazil, India, and South Africa have received global attention in recent times and that Nigeria is under researched in term of application of IR theory. It is based on this conviction that Nigeria is chosen as the unit of analysis.

From the above discussions, it is discovered that none of the work sufficiently delve into Nigeria's multilateral policy in its entirety. In addition, from the theoretical point of view there is no specific focus on the application of Nigeria's hegemonic posture to the study of multilateral policy. The works of Etekpe, Alo, Sekhri and Meireding contribute to the theoretical understanding of Nigeria's foreign policy but

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none employs the hegemonic theories in explaining the multilateral policy of Nigeria. Notwithstanding the theoretical approach, at the end of data collection these theoretical underpinnings are useful in explaining the multilateral policy of Nigeria most especially the role theory. Despite this shortcoming, the research benefits from these contradictory views and tries to locate it within the purview of multilateral dimension in Nigeria's hegemonic posture.

1.8.2 **Nigeria's Multilateral Security Policy**

Security as one of the most important national interests of states has been a driving force in the foreign policy of Nigeria since independence. In order to guarantee the territorial integrity of the state, Nigeria government uses the mechanism of multilateral diplomacy. Therefore, some relevant literatures are reviewed to discuss the importance of security factor in Nigeria's multilateral diplomacy.

The Nigerian foreign policy, according to Obi (2008:98-112), has responded to transnational security. He links transnational security with a discussion on Nigerian foreign policy towards West Africa within which Nigeria plays a prominent role. As a regional hegemon in West African states, Nigeria has succeeded in putting in place a mechanism that controls incessant conflicts in the region and prevent as much as possible the external interference in the region which may pose a threat to Nigerian security. Alli (2012:11) also supports this line of reasoning where he considers Nigeria as the sole hegemon in the West African sub-region. Alli asserts that ECOWAS has become an instrument with which Nigeria discharge its responsibility towards its neighbours. Both authors are right in their arguments but one need to know that from the incipient ECOWAS was not meant to be an instrument of conflict resolution. It was established purely for the purpose of economic integration in the West

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African Sub-region. The incessant conflicts being experienced by the region after the Cold War hijacked the purpose for which it was created. It is now turned to a mechanism for conflict resolution rather than economic integration. This view is corroborated by Essuman-Johnson (2009:415) who analyses the role of ECOWAS in the maintenance of conflict resolution in West Africa. He laments that ECOWAS has done better in the area of conflict resolution than economic prosperity. It should be noted that this scenario is not peculiar to African case. The main purpose of the establishment of European Economic Community in 1957, for example, was for economic purpose but as time went by the security issue was included. Therefore, the functionality and purpose of any multilateral organization depends on the requirement of time, and in most cases it is very difficult to separate security issue from economic prosperity.

Aluko (1973:165-173) also supports security dimension of Nigerian multilateral policy by identifying the prime motive of Nigerian government behind the establishment of ECOWAS and other continental organisations. "The realization of regional insecurity experienced by Gowon during the civil war propelled the regime to carry along other West African countries in the region towards the establishment of ECOWAS", Aluko asserts. The Gowon administration was of the conviction that if West African economies are integrated there will be little time for conflict and no state will be ready to lose its economic benefit by fighting other state. However, unfortunately for Nigeria such insecurity persists until today in the region. This is a clear failure on the part of Nigerian government. This position is acceded to by Peter Pham (2007:1-18) who is of the view that Nigeria's foreign policy has been very lax to address the imperative of security, political stability and economic problems both within and outside the West African sub-region. The most cited case is the Nigeria's

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complacency in the Gulf of Guinea region where piracy and illegal fishing activities are widely taken place.

Bassey Eyo (1983:81-92) also stresses the fundamental security problems posed to Nigeria by the historical presence of France in West-Central Africa, particularly since 1960. In concrete terms, this problem assumes two main forms: the first is the effect of the French presence in the region threatening Nigeria's national security, and the second is its constraint on the natural growth of Nigeria's cultural and political interests in the region. It furthers that, in its conventional form, the French involvement in West-Central Africa impeded the natural emergence of Nigeria as a regional power. Thus, there is need for progressive development of a technological base of power by Nigeria in order to become a dominant force in the region. This is extremely important to a strong military force and a self-reliant economy, which will in reality confirm Nigeria's credentials as an alternative regional power to France. It must be stated here that the presence of France in Africa does not itself constitute a threat to Nigerian security but it is the activities of French government over years that makes Nigerian government perceives France as a threat. With this instance French poses direct threat to Nigerian security.

Nwokedi also agrees with Eyo's thesis (1985:195-209) on the sub-regional security threat faced by Nigeria from its neighbours. He confirms the existence of security challenges posed by the presence of France in the neighbouring francophone African countries where France has already established security agreement. It is thus argued that if the presence of France is just to ensure the stability of governments in the francophone African countries and to ensure friendly regimes are in power, then Nigeria may benefit from this arrangement in the end. According to the scholar, this will keep the region stable and in this instance, unstable governments in the neigh-

bouring countries will not threaten Nigeria. Nwokedi, therefore, concludes that Nigeria needs to put in place alternative security edifice that will stabilize the sub-region in term of security without which no meaningful economic progress will be achieved. It should be said that the article has failed to situate the argument within a broader concept of security and the concept of security has not been conceptualized which supposed to provide a background to the study. In this way, the author neither utilizes any theory nor concept to explain its work which is fundamental in providing a rationale for the study.

William & Haacke (2008:119-136) also note that it has been very difficult for Nigeria to carry along other West African members especially the Luzophone[3] and Francophone countries in the quest to maintain peace and stability in the sub-region. The overwhelming power of Nigeria in the region makes some of the countries uncomfortable and in this case, some are clearly under the security umbrella of France. It is this regional political condition that makes order and stability difficult to be maintained in the sub-region. Dokubo & Joseph (2011:562) therefore conclude that such region divided by colonial history, personal ambition and greed will be very difficult for a regional power to maintain peace and stability. Despite this regional complexity, Nigeria has been able to utilize the mechanism of multilateral policy, at least relatively, to maintain peace and order in the region.

Kwaghga & Robert (2011:1-9) digress a little bit from the above assertion by doubting the capability of Nigeria in utilizing multilateral institutions for maintenance of security. The scholars are of the opinion that if Nigeria could be derided at home with insecurity issue signifying by Boko Haram insurgency what hope for Nigeria in Africa. It seems the scholars are completely in love with the realist position,

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[3]The Luzophone countries are former Portuguese territories in West Africa and they are two in number. These are Equatorial Guinea and Cape Verde.

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which sees states as the only actors in the global politics. Otherwise, they would have recognized that terrorist group and insurgency constitute an actor in driving events at the global level. The mere fact that Nigeria experiences insurgency attack at home does not negate the capacity of Nigeria to maintain stability in West Africa. After all, Nigeria intervened in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts at the most trouble time in Nigerian political history.

In his work, Bach (2007:1-21) stresses that it was the hegemonic aspiration and power status of Nigeria that propelled the Nigerian government to sponsor the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975. It states that shortly after the successful conclusion of the civil war, premised on the supports Nigeria received from the members of OAU, the government decided to reciprocate the gesture to West African neighbours by the establishment of ECOWAS. According to Ogunbadejo (1977:37-49) the supports, both military and moral, enjoined from the overwhelming members of OAU made the winning of civil war possible. He further stresses that if OAU members have supported the Biafran course the result of the war would have been different. It was based on this support and the overt enmity displayed by certain African countries that propelled Nigerian government to strengthen relations with African countries.

In a related development, Jackson (2007:587-603) identifies territorial dispute, religious violence and corruption as the bane confronting Nigeria at home to perform its role effectively at regional level. He stresses that the leadership role of Nigeria in the continent is being affected and hampered by these scourges. For example, during the military regime of General Sani Abacha in the 1990s, Nigeria government promoted the democratic values abroad whereas at home Abacha could not hand over power to the democratically elected president. This is what most scholars

regard as paradox of foreign policy making on the part of Nigerian government at the time. Despite this lopsided situation, Nigeria played a leading role to keep peace and stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Oculi (2010) and Osuntokun (2005) also delve into the examination of Nigerian foreign policy from independence. In doing this they observe that the role of Nigeria in multilateral organisations started in the 1960s. In their articles, they assess how Nigeria dealt with Rhodesia's issue in 1965. Nigeria under the leadership of Balewa opposed to apartheid regime which resulted in the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961. According to Folarin (2010), such active participation in the Commonwealth of Nations resulted in the convening of Commonwealth Heads of government for the first time outside London, in Lagos in 1965. Such meeting was convened in order to discuss the Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia. Although the authors are right; but the active participation of Nigeria in the Commonwealth during the early years of independence signified the intention of Nigeria to ward off any form of colonialism, racism and domination over black race. Thus, such active participation is an extension of Nigeria's Africa centred policy.

In addition, Mohammed (2010) opines that with the joining of OPEC in 1971 Nigeria was able to increase its oil output in the global market which culminated in giving out aids to needy African states. One needs to recognise that the membership of Nigeria in the OPEC has again launched Nigeria into the politics of Middle East. Such claim came to the fore in 1973 when Nigeria voted in the UN for the withdrawal of Israel from Palestinian territory (Mohammed, 2010:147). It needs to be stated here that the membership of Nigeria in the OPEC goes beyond what this scholar describes. In OPEC, Nigeria has been an active partner and such resulted in Nigeria's

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economic boom of 1973. In 1973, the Arab oil embargoes enhanced the bargaining capacity of Nigeria in the global world politics and the oil power was used in punishing and rewarding foes and friends respectively. Nevertheless, the article can serve as secondary source in discerning the Nigerian multilateral diplomacy.

From the above, it is clear that multilateral organization is a mechanism Nigeria government employs to advance its national interest in Africa especially in the area of security. ECOWAS has been significant in this way. Thus, most of these works are relevant to the research. These literatures could be used in the course of conducting this research. This research will therefore serve as a compendium to the study of Nigeria's multilateral policy.

1.8.3 Nigeria's Multilateral Economic Policy

The relative dominant nature of Nigerian economy in Africa is one of the factors that dictate the dynamism of its foreign policy since independence. By the time of Nigerian independence in 1960, its economy, signified by large population, oil deposit, vast tropical agricultural produce, and significant commodity market, made it easier for Nigerian government to pursue an aggressive foreign policy adventure. It is therefore possible for Nigerian government since independence to contribute immensely to multilateral organizations while at the same time use such a medium to pursue certain goals and objectives in its foreign relations.

One of the earliest works written on Nigerian economic posture in relation to its external relation is by Angling (1964:137). He posits that the economic diversity and prosperity of Nigeria in the early days of independence was a factor reflected in its decision for joining the non-alignment forum. Nigerian in the early days of independence inherited vibrant economy from the colonial master and in this way; it was

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possible to pursue a policy of non-alignment. Although economy may constitute an important factor in the decision of Nigeria to pursue such a policy with certainty, however the political weight of Nigeria in Africa should better explain this more than the economy. Gambari (1975:95) contends that the wealth accrued from the oil enable Nigeria government to pursue foreign adventurism with certainty for Nigeria did not need any financial assistance from the developed countries. He therefore concludes that it was the oil wealth, which accrued to Nigeria in the 1970s during the Arab oil embargoes against the West that helped Nigerian government to initiate the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. This view is contrasted a little to Fajana's (1978:19) who asserts that the formation of ECOWAS was not only necessitated by economic prosperity in the country but also to ensure that Nigeria's neighbours are more aligned with Nigeria than with France-the erstwhile colonial master. Whatever the argument, what is certain is that the formation of ECOWAS has both political and economic undertones. It was a way of killing two birds with a stone.

In a related development, Gambari (2011:136) opines that the multilateral undertaking by Nigeria is borne out of its relative economic advancement in Africa. Otherwisw, how would one explain the activity of Nigeria in the UN, OAU/AU, ECOWAS, Commonwealth and OPEC since independence? Gambari therefore concludes that it is the economic viability especially the oil economy that enabled Nigeria to discharge its financial and moral obligation in all its multilateral undertakings most especially in OAU/AU and ECOWAS. This view is also supported by Alo (2013:296-303) where he narrates how Nigeria's economy dictate its position in the establishment of NEPAD and APRM. It is clearly stated that it was the economic buoyancy of both South Africa and Nigeria that made the establishment a reality for most African countries could not meet their financial obligations to the AU. This line

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of reasoning is in contrast with Jaye's (2008:159) who sees Nigeria as protecting its interests in its contribution to continental institutions. He highlights that the enormous security challenges being faced by the West African countries ordinarily demand the attention of Nigeria.

Moreover, Jaye may be right by this line of argument but he needs to realize that the ECOWAS itself where Nigeria contributes largest finance is made possible by Nigeria's economic prosperity. It is the Nigeria relative financial stability that has been sustaining the ECOWAS region since inception and no conflict has gone beyond the military and financial capacity of Nigeria. The argument can be complemented with what happened in the East African region in 1994 where close to a Million Rwandans and Burundians were violently massacred. This may be attributed to lack of a clear hegemon to instantaneously contain the situation before the intervention of the UN and other international organizations. Such a scenario might have repeated itself in West Africa but for Nigeria financial largess, it was contained. Ashaver (2014:6-11) also contributes immensely to the economy and Nigeria's multilateral policy. He states that it was the constant revenue, which Nigeria got from oil in the 1970s and 1980s, that allowed independent policy implementation towards the Southern African issue. He cited the Angola case as an example. In the Angolan debacle Nigeria stood firmly against the interest of the major powers and sponsored homegrown party that later defeated the western-sponsored one (Agwai, 2010). Financially, Nigeria contributed to the liberation of most Southern African countries and it is in this circumstance, Ashaver notes, that Nigeria achieved the status of frontline state.

Furthermore, Timothy Shaw (1978: 157-174) comes up with counter-idea where he identifies Nigeria's economic capability and its role in Africa and the glob-

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al politics. He laments that Nigeria should not be hoodwinked by its economic resources and population; its house needs to be put in order before projecting an aggressive foreign policy. Agbiboa (2011) also displays an opposing view in this case. He sees Nigeria as a toothless bulldog in Africa and global politics despite its economic prosperity. He contends that the relative economy prosperity enjoined by Nigeria has never been adequately and judiciously utilized to better the life of Nigerians and other Africans. He concludes that it was in the spirit of domestic corruption that impelled Nigerian government to intervene in the Liberian and Sierra Leone crisis. Although he acknowledges the economic factor in the establishment of ECOMOG but proposes that such billions of dollars expended in the crisis was unjustifiable in running a multilateral operations. Agbiboa's view is based on the fact that most of these countries where Nigeria has expended most of its oil wealth have not for one day appreciate the gesture instead serve as impediment to the ambition and aspiration of Nigeria in both continental and global multilateral diplomacy.

This argument is also supported by Adeniji (2005:5-6) where he stresses the competition being faced by Nigeria in its bid for the permanent membership of the UNSC if the restructuring is approved. In the West African sub-region where Nigeria is a clear hegemon, the aspiration of Nigeria in the UNSC may be truncated by the francophone countries while South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Egypt are also in a stiff competition with Nigeria despite its unparalleled commitment to the betterment of the African people since independence. One thing needs to be cleared at this juncture. Nigeria's bid in the UNSC may be seen by some African countries as a threat to their cooperate existence. This resistance should not be magnified for such issue also applies to Europe and Asia. In Europe, for example, German aspiration in the UNSC is being potentially blocked by Italy, Britain, and Spain while China would never al-

low Japan to ascend to the permanent position in UNSC. This therefore indicates that rivalry is normal between and among nations in any geopolitical calculation.

From the literatures discussed above, different approaches are employed in analysing Nigerian foreign policy. They are, therefore, very useful in discussing the foreign policy of Nigeria particularly in relation to economic and security factors of Nigeria's multilateral policy. However, the focus of this research is to examine, in its entirety, the foreign policy of Nigeria and multilateral policy with special focus on its hegemonic posture, which most works have not properly discussed. In addition, none has combined all multilateral bodies, consider in this thesis, in studying Nigeria external relations vis-à-vis its regional hegemonic posture. It also reveals that none of the work applies the concept of hegemony in studying the Nigeria's multilateralism. This work thus intends to fill the gap. The work will also extend the boundary of knowledge by looking at other factors alongside security and economy that influence Nigeria's multilateralism. Hence, this work will fill the vacuum by studying Nigerian foreign policy interests and factors under multilateral institutions, which is lacking in most of the works, and it is hoped that this research will in some way contribute in enriching the works that deal with multilateralism and foreign policy of regional hegemons in general. This research therefore examines Multilateralism as a strategy of Nigeria's regional hegemonic posture.

1.10 **DATA COLLECTION**

The purpose of this section is to set out the procedure and methodology of data collection. It is instructive to note that the research is based on case study to uncover the process of multilateral undertakings in Nigerian foreign policy since independence (Thies, 2002:1). This approach is thus premised on the qualitative method of data

collection, which is quite congruent with the in-depth analysis of Nigeria's behaviours in global politics vis-à-vis multilateralism. Thus, it rests on the principle and philosophical foundation of naturalism. Naturalism is a philosophical approach that emphasizes the study of particular phenomena in its natural setting as opposed to positivism (Pierce, 2008; 27). Naturalism gives priority to humanistic and hermeneutic approach, which is interpretative in nature. It is concerned with "social meanings, actor's beliefs, motives, purposes, and reasons which lead to social action rather than frequency" (Pierce, 2008:27-28). It is therefore based on this methodological procedure that population and sample, sources of data and data analysis techniques are discussed below.

1.10.1 Population and Sample

In a research that borders on using qualitative methodology, sampling is less reiterated and in this case purposive or theoretical sampling was employed. This, no doubt, allowed for flexibility in choosing informants and documents that are of relevant to the research (Silverman, 2000:104-105; Yin, 2011:87). Sampling is an act of selecting unit that is of direct relevance to one's research (Yin, 2011:88). It also allows access to those that can give correct information and opposing views on the subject matter. Selecting a unit that may have potential opposition to the established notion is also essential to arrive at objectivity and validity. In this study, relevant respondents were chosen for purpose of interview. As a result, the researcher relied on snowballing, which is premised on the conviction that information given by one respondent may lead to identify another potential and relevant informants. This non-probability sampling method is "where members of the population do not have an equal chance of being selected" (Pierce, 2008:91). Thus, non-probability samples

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include snowballs, nomination, volunteers, and theoretical samples. In my own case snowballs was employed and it dictated the number of respondents that were interviewed until saturation was attained. It also needs to be stated that the number of interviewees selected according to the non-probability sampling technique of snowballs was dictated by the principle of saturation.

Below is the summary distribution of interview respondents.

Table 1.1
Summary Distribution of Interview Respondents

Types of Interview	Elites	Academics & Researchers	Policymakers	Public Officials	Anonymous	Total
Personal Interview	2	8	3	2	4	19
Focused Group Interview		6	2		2	10

1.10.2 **Sources of Data**

In qualitative research, the main sources of data are primary and secondary sources of data (Davies, 2001:80-92). The primary source of data includes oral traditions, which can be garnered through semi-structured and unstructured interview and Focus Group Interview; observation and archival records. The secondary data includes unpublished works, journal articles, correspondences, textbooks, seminar papers, round table discussion papers, memoirs, almanac, conference papers, and other related sources. Explained below are the major sources of data that will be employed in this research. They are divided into two-broad group i.e. primary and secondary data sources.

1.10.2.1 **Primary Sources**

1.10.2.1.1 **Documentation**: One of the primary sources of data collection is primary document produced or generated by events. This particular source is very crucial to

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diplomatic historian who wishes to uncover the activities of government in policy making activity. This research will use government official documents that include policy ratifications, treaty signing, and agreements with multilateral organizations, foreign policy declaration notes, memoirs and gazette. All attendant shortcomings that may adversely affect the credibility of these sources will be taken into consideration. One of such is the authenticity of the document. This can be arrested through triangulation of sources.

1.10.2.1.2 **Archival Records**: Closely related to the above source is archival records and documents related to government policy. This source is useful in a situation where researcher needs old documentary evidence to understand the past events. In Nigeria, there are three principal national archival centres, which had been established since colonial days. One of the three National Archives will be visited to uncover the activities of Nigeria in the multilateral organizations since independence. The documents relating to hegemonic posture of Nigeria will also be given credence in the process of gathering archival records. Thus, the archival records can be a potential avenue to confirm the credibility and authenticity of various documentary evidences. This is because most of the archival records are contained in more than one source. An event, for example, may be covered by multi various sources like newspapers, government gazette, memo, interviews, and so on.

1.10.2.1.3 **Focus Group Interview (FGI):** The need for focus group interview may arise in order to examine various opinions concerning a topic under research. It is a credible source of gathering data from those people that deeply involved in the policy making process. In my own case, FGI was conducted with officials in the Nigeria

Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos. Between 10 participants were selected for this purpose, which I believe, generated necessary information for my research. In this process, contradictory views were taken seriously to provide alternative views on the research topic.

1.10.2.1.4 **Elite Interview**: In order to assess the view of the educated public most especially the expert in the field of international relations, diplomacy and foreign policy, personal or group interview was conducted with these set of informants. The idea behind this is that most of these experts can provide scholarly opinion, which may further shed light on the green areas of the research some of which may not be properly addressed by the think tank under FGI. In this case, the university lecturers, researchers and social critics will be interviewed for the purpose of strengthening the data sources.

1.10.2.1.5 **Individual Interviews**: Another source of data is interview, which can be conducted with a person that participated in the event or has direct knowledge about the issue under discussion. Interview is a way of sampling an expert opinion on a specific issue of a research. In conducting personal interview, it is invaluable to seek expert opinion rather than just ordinary passers-by or individuals. Nevertheless, it all depends on the issue under discussion. In this research, the expert opinion such as interviewing people in the ministry of foreign affairs, ECOWAS staffs, former hair committee on foreign affairs in the national assembly and members of academia. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews were conducted with these classes of people, which will be juxtaposed with documentary evidence to make a balance judgment.

1.10.2.2 **Secondary Sources**

1.10.2.2.1 **Media Outputs**: Sources related to mass media are also very relevant to political discourse. The opinions of think tanks in the printed and electronic media will be explored. Very notable in this area are newspapers, magazines, live programs, recorded interviews, press conference, and public opinion. All these sources can provide public reaction on Nigeria's multilateral policy.

1.10.2.2.2 **Research Works**: the published and unpublished research works will serve the backbone of the secondary data source for this research. All available materials that have been made for public consumption on Nigeria's multilateral policy will be consulted to supplement the primary documents and to confirm the veracity of primary sources. In this way, journal articles, textbooks, monographs, roundtable discussions, debates, conference papers, seminar papers and theses will be consulted. In this process, research institute like NIIA, libraries and internet sources will be explored in order to have access to the above mentioned secondary data sources.

1.10.3 **Data Analysis**

Data analysis depends on the methodological approach of a research. Since this research approach is qualitative method, it employs descriptive, historical and interpretative methods with critical analysis of available reading and research materials. Tape recorder and video recorder were be used as an instrument to collect information from primary sources. Moreover, to analyse the data from these instruments, discourse analysis and process tracing were employed based on the extracted information from the transcripts.

1.10.4 **Methods of Data Collection**

The most important data collection method used in this research was unstructured interview, which was supplemented by observation and discussion. Thus, respondents were chosen from Academia for personal interviews; Focus Group Interview (FGI) was also conducted with director, researchers, and secretary of NIIA. Also, the Director for Centre for Black Culture and International Understanding was also interviewed together with selected officials who have involved in Peacekeeping mission to Somalia and Sudan. Few members of academia, public officials, and elites were also interviewed. It is believed that all these respondents will provide data good enough to reach a saturation point as enunciated by Mason (2010). It needs to be stated here that there were people whom I have interviewed but whose names are not mentioned here. This group of people has been categorized as "non attributable respondents".

1.11 **CHAPTER OUTLINE**

This research is divided into Eight Chapters with each of the chapters focuses on issues that are linked together by research objectives. Thus, Chapter One, **Introduction**, presented an introduction to the entire thesis while Chapter Two, **Theoretical Framework**, discussed the theoretical framework that serves as the pillar for conducting the research. Chapter Three, **Historical Background of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Multilateralism**, delved into the history of Nigeria's foreign policy and multilateralism. It provides a background information on Nigeria's foreign policy starting from the formation of the geographical entity called Nigeria in 1914. This is necessary in order provide useful information on how multilateralism evolve as a strategy of foreign policy in Nigeria. Chapter Four, **Emergence of Nigeria as A Re-**

gional Hegemon in Africa, elaborated on the emergence of Nigeria as a regional hegemon in Africa. Since the thesis has two most important foci; Multilateralism and hegemony, it is imperative to provide background information on how Nigeria evolved as a regional hegemon in Africa and to what extend it can be considered one.

Furthermore, in order to establish the regional hegemonic posture of Nigeria in Africa in relations to some responsibilities it shouldered, Chapter Five, **Nigeria's Regional Hegemonic Posture and Multilateralism**, looked at how Nigeria has demonstrated its hegemonic posture through multilateralism since independence. This chapter examined several areas where Nigeria has played a leadership role in the issues pertaining to Africa. This role provided a convincing clue on why Nigeria embraces multilateralism in its leadership posture in Africa, Chapter Six, **Roles of External and Internal Factors in Nigeria's Multilateral Policy,** assessed those factors that rendered multilateralism expedient in Nigeria's leadership role in Africa since 1960. Chapter Seven, **The Success and Failure of Nigeria's Multilateral Policy**, evaluated and assessed Nigeria's strategy of multilateralism in relation to its hegemonic posture in Africa, while Chapter Eight summarized the whole work and presented the findings, observations and conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

HEGEMONY, ROLE, AND REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORIES

This chapter discusses the theoretical framework upon which the research depends. It identifies the basic elements of the theories and their application to Nigerian case. Theories of international relations abound. Thus, because of the detail theoretical and empirical approaches employs by Hegemony Stability Theory (HST) in its explanation of state and multilateralism, it seems appropriate as theoretical underpinning for this study. A theory with realist, constructivist and liberalist lens is therefore seems appropriate to provide deep insight into the multilateral dimension in the hegemonic posture of a regional power. The choice of this theory is based on the unavailability of theoretical understanding of regional hegemons at sub-structural level of analysis. In international relation research, most theoretical formulations are based on the structural foundation of the global system. And because of the intellectual origin of the discipline of international relations, which is rooted in western diplomatic culture, most of the theories have been formulated and applied to the Western powers in the global politics (Meierding, 2010:1). As such, most of the theories are not particularly developed to study the international relations of the Third World countries. In this case, most scholars (Prys, 2010; Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010; Nolte, 2007; Buzan & Weaver, 2003) have thus adopted the global structural theory of HST as applied to global hegemon to the study of regional hegemons in the global politics. According to Prys (2010),

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My observation in the theoretical literature is that in the absence of conceptual and/or theoretical frameworks that specifically deal with hierarchical power relations at the regional levels – authors fall back to furthest developed accounts of hierarchical relations in international politics in general, when looking at regional powers, and their strategies and effects within regional orders. More concretely, analysts apply, whether implicitly or not, theories or frameworks of thinking, such as the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, that originally have been intentionally articulated at the global level, which is where their assumptions are said to be valid….(p. 2).

This research, therefore, toes this line of reasoning.

2.1 HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY (HST)

The challenge of the international system is always the need to sustain the international peace and tranquillity by available means (Blanton & Kegley, 2012:378). The theories of international relations have been such that it is easy to correlate between the practice and the theory. For some of the theories have been circumscribed to accommodate the views of the few, the theoretical underpinnings have been suffering from inadequate empirical justification to support hypothetical claims (Mearsheimer, 2011). HST is all encompassing theory, which explains the role of hegemon in the global politics from realist, liberal and constructivist lens (Prys, 2010:9: Abbott & Snidal, 1998: 8). HST's focus is on regime, institution, order, norms, roles, and identity of hegemon. In this case, it has been regarded as the bridge-theory that links realism, constructivism and liberalism (Hansclever, Mayer & Rittberger, 1997:91). In addition, its emphasis on "power-based" and "interest-based" (Hansclever et al. 1997:90) analysis makes it a credible candidate for the purpose of understanding state's behaviour in championing the idea of multilateralism. It is in fact a hybridised theory of international relations that studies international institutions and powers from the tripod of realist, constructivist and liberalist point of views. The neo-liberal

acceptance of state as the major actor and unit of analysis in global politics links it with realist assumption (Hansclever et.al., 1997:83). Based on this, it is important to discuss the historical foundation of the theory and before I do this the HST needs definitional clarification.

HST is actor–centred theory of international relations that posits the regulation of international system or sub-system by a power or hegemon who guides and supervises the institutional arrangement that governs a system (Hansclever et al. 1997:84; Jackson & Sorensen, 2003:198). The basic assumption of the theory is that a state with preponderance power forms an institution-order, regime or organisation to maintain a status quo or to ensure the stability of the system from irregularities (Axelrod & Keohane, 1993:86). It is based on this perception that the hegemon would like to perpetuate its hegemonic dominance by establishing necessary mechanism that would govern the behaviour of states within the international system and this, in no doubt, requires policy adjustment from the supporting states (Baccini, Poast & Urpelainen, 2011:4). The hegemon uses the template and platform of international institutions to project its influence and power in the global politics. This is especially valid of regional and sub-regional hegemons who do not have material resources to project global power outreach. The multilateral institution is normally employed as a stage to influence and project its power via global politics (Yazid, 2007:56).

Hegemony is a word that represents domination of the whole by part (Moller, 2009:2). In the international political parlance, hegemony simply means the power preponderance of a single state to dominate the affairs of world or regional politics (Yazid, 2007:4). Hegemon in the international arena, in simple term, dominates the economic, social, political, and military spheres in which other entities, usually

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states, become subsidiary/subordinate powers. In the early years of twentieth century, the word hegemony was used to refer to the British naval and economic supremacy in the world. During the period, especially before the First World War, the British Navy was superior to any of its contemporaries in the world and this accelerated the pace at which Britain dominated the overseas trading for decades before the arrival of other economic challengers (Ravenhill, 2008:12). Therefore, the British naval supremacy acted as stimulant to world economic progress in the first decade of the twentieth century. Hegemony is defined in this research as the provision of leadership by the entity with the most superior resources - economy, military, politics, sociology and diplomacy to do so in the global or regional politics (Stein, 1993; Jackson & Sorenson, 2003: 196-198; Yazid, 2007:3).

What then is the origin of HST? HST is first employed by Charles Kindleberger to study the depression period in the global economy in the 1920s and 1930s[4]. For the first time in the analysis and provision of reasons for world economic disaster, it was suggested that the economic depression was as a result of absence of a hegemon to provide leadership in the economic sphere which would serve as global propeller for economic advancement (Yazid, 2007:2-4). During the period, the theory was basically economic in focus without any slight reference to political and security issues (Jackson and Sorenson, 2003). HST therefore is a theory that presupposes the need for a leadership in the global political and economic governance. It is a theory that hinges on global governance and diplomacy in the maintenance of world order. The basic tenet rests on the conviction that for economic progress to be attained a

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[4]The debates on the HST as a theory of international relation occupied the attentions of most students of international regimes, neorealism and neoliberalism in the 1990s. Most works produced during this period centred largely on the need to make clarification on the potency of the theory (HST) to provide useful and reliable explanation on the efficacy of cooperation in relation to preponderance power of a hegemon. The most important debates can be found in: Baldwin, D.A. (ed) (1993). ; HanscleverA. Mayer, P. & Rittberger, V. (1997); and Kratochwil, F. and Mansfield, E.D. (eds) (1994).

director/leader is needed to maintain such momentum (Lipson, 1993: 76-77). The HST wider application in the course of time to other spheres of international relations makes it a convenient theory that can explain the role of hegemon in the global politics. Notable in this is the linkage of the theory with the establishment of international institutions (Hansclever, et al., 1997:3).

Therefore, HST is predicated on the assumption that the strongest and the most powerful state in the global politics must provide an institution under which its needs and aspirations can be attained (Meierding, 2010:6). What such aspirations and needs supposed to mean remain to be questioned. Is it to the benefits of other members of the system or self-interested? The HST posits that the hegemon provides the mechanism and platform in the form of international institution to regulate the affairs of other actors in the international system to the benefit of all concerned parties (Lipson, 1993:77). And it is said that the performance and the durability of the institution depends on the continuous maintenance of the hegemonic position of the lone power. This means that as the hegemonic predominance of the sole power wanes so also the viability of the institution created.

The institutional prescription of HST therefore makes it relevance to both realist and liberalist tradition in international relations theory. The need for a hegemon to instigate the establishment of an institution for its own interest remains a crucial question. What about the benefit enjoyed by other members of the union? Can one see this as accident? However, it seems that most scholars of international organisation and regimes formation subscribe to the view that the public goods being instigated by the hegemon may be more beneficial to free riders, which could be amounted to cheating in the first place (Ruggie, 1992: 568; Keohane, 1998: 85). It is thus concluded that the preponderant economic and political power of hegemon may

serves as leeway and leverage to benefit more than other actors in the system or sub-system. The US can be cited as a case study in this regard. The provision of institutional mechanism to revive European economy by the US after the devastating Second World War became a useful mechanism for the hegemon to contain and counter the Soviet Union's political and military threat in Europe (Kegley & Blanton, 2012:431-432). As such, one may be tempted to concur that the provision of the institution by a hegemon may result in non-zero sum game otherwise termed as win-win game. This suggests that the instigation and establishment of institution for co-operative means is mutually beneficial to all parties concerned including the stabilizer called hegemon.

However, various scholars have discussed variants of hegemony theory namely hegemonic stability theory and hegemonic change theory. The most prominent of these scholars is Charles Kindleberger. Kindleberger's conception of hegemony is basically economic driven where the most powerful country in the global system provides and controls trade mechanism (Kindleberger, 1986, 1973). This is likened to what happened before the First World War when the British Pound Sterling (especially in gold form) was used as the medium of international exchange; which propelled it to become the single largest creditor to the world economy. The leadership role of Britain in maintaining global economy therefore enabled it to finance imbalance in the global payments. According to Kindleberger, this leadership role enhanced the stabilization of the international political economy until the British lost its hegemony after the First World War (Krasner, 1982:186). In this case, the US emerged the sole hegemon in the global economic system. But the US through its isolationist and protectionist policy was reluctant to play any significant role in global economy. As the British sterling gradually being replaced by US dollar, New York

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began to outpace London as the key international financial centre. As a result of internal political climate in the US between rival political actors about the global role of the US, there was leadership vacuum to be filled in the international economy (Kindleberger, 1973). That is, a leader in the form of hegemon was needed to rescue the global economy from being collapsed.

Thus, the economic collapse of inter-war period, according to Kindleberger was a result of the leadership vacuum created by the reluctance of the US. Immanuel Wallerstein (1983) seems to take the mercantilist approach, which also toes economic line in defining hegemony. In his view, hegemony refers to overwhelming power preponderance of a state. By this overwhelming power the hegemon controls economic, political, military, diplomatic and cultural affairs of the international system. His approach takes mercantilist turn when he opines that hegemony dominates and exploits the semi-periphery and peripheral countries. In this way, Wallerstein's conception of hegemony is tailored towards exploitation and domination, which is a negative aspect of hegemony that stands to threaten the global peace and security. This is in opposition to Kindleberger's (1973) who sees hegemony as a stabilizing force based on the preponderance material capability that will in turn propel the hegemon to provide public goods like economic stability and free trade within the global system. Despite Wallerstein's reification of military power the orientation of both scholars is tailored toward liberal view of hegemony with realist instinct. Mearsheimer (2013) in contrast displays realist version of hegemony which primarily rests on the conviction that for peace and stability to be maintained in the global political space there was need for the two existing world hegemons, the US and the USSR, to continue to dominate without any form of plurality. The view is based on the conviction that bipolar hegemonic system was more peaceful than any global sys-

tem ever existed. Mearsheimer is probably one of the most vociferous advocates of power politics among the contemporary international relations scholars. This is because he is always obsessed with power politics and does not believe in cooperation among states. In lending credence to his "bipolar peace theory", he cited the case of European system in the 19th and 20th centuries in which the multilpolar system dominated by Russia, Germany, France, Britain, and Italy caused confusion, chaos, and war. Mearsheimer, therefore, maintains that the bipolar system was easy to govern and calculate because of the limited numbers of poles of powers. Mearsheimer may be right on this thesis because there was not any major war in the global system between 1945 and 1991.

However, to single-handedly attribute peaceful Europe and by extension the world to bipolar system might amount to monocausality. There were other factors, which can better explain the global peace and harmony during the Cold War period. Factors like growing economic interdependence, the spread of liberal ideology, and the emergence of East Asia in the global political and economic system can be explored. In contrast to stability theory, hegemony also experiences change over time. This is most apparent in power transition theory that views hegemony as a form of cycle riddles with challenge, global war, and rebirth. This idea originated from Kenneth Organski (1964) and further given scholarly attention by Organski & Kugler (1980). In this work, state is perceived an entity that pursues security as its primary concern. The duo further stressed that states do not only pursue security but also designs international order based on its own interest. The core assumption of the change theory of hegemony rest on the fact that national growth rate, most especially in economic terms, may force an emerging powerful state to challenge the hegemonic position of the existing one. In this case, the challenger may wish to redesign in-

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ternational order along its own interests, which may in turn trigger hegemonic war. In this war a, hegemon would emerge as indicator of the global political economic and military direction. The most often-cited case was the inability of the former USSR to challenge the hegemonic position of the US between 1945 and 1991. In the present global system, China is expected to usurp power from the US in another hegemonic war, which Kegley & Blanton (2013:67) predicted it would happen in 2025.

While George Modelski's also agrees on hegemony as the capacity of a state to dictate the tune of events within the global system, he explains hegemony theory in terms of transitional form. In other words, Modelski's version of hegemony theory is tailored along chronological line where he specifically stated certain duration for the existence of a hegemon within the global system. It is based on this that Modelski divided the long cycle into four phases where a cycle lasts between 87-122 years. In this calculation Portugal dominated 16th century; Netherlands dominated 17th century; Britain dominated 18th and 19th centuries while the US dominate 20th century and beyond. His theory is primarily based on the previous historical existence of hegemonies most especially within the European international system. Gilpin (1981) looked at domestic structure to explain his version of hegemony theory. He opines that a state whose domestic system is based on liberal ideology stands a chance of emerging hegemon. Gilpin is of the conviction that the state with liberal domestic structure will invariably have superior domestic institutions, which may impel it to promote the same at international system. In this scenario, it is assumed that the creation of liberal international order would favour the domestic societies of liberal states. This may be likened to the US's institutionalization of Marshall Plan after the Second World War to restore the battered economy of Europe. Although it needs to be stressed that Gilpin(1981) also agrees with the conception of domination through po-

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litical and military control but this seems to be guided by the notion of anarchical international system. The point of convergence of most scholars of hegemony therefore rests on power and ability to dominate and control the international order.

In contrast, Keohane (1984) is of the view that hegemony does not necessarily have to maintain international order. Keohane takes neoliberal approach to hegemony where he defines hegemony as the ability of the preponderant powerful state to induce other smaller states to join an institution for purpose of cooperation that will in turn provide public goods. In this way hegemony in Keohane's definition means that such state must be in possession of critical raw materials, superior financial institutions and large market for import. He stressed further that international arrangement through institutions could be devised to maintain international order instead of resulting to hegemonic order. This view is in line with liberal institutionalist view, which advertises the possibility of cooperation among states as the viable mechanism to maintain order. In sum, the point of divergence of most of these scholars seems to be power, domination, and provision of public goods. What is certain is that most of the states that have aspired to hegemony throughout history seemed to have done so based on material capability but they have performed different responsibilities towards global community.

2.1.1 **Historical Foundation of Hegemony**

Hegemony has been part of the global social-political terrain from the earliest period. The exposition and writings of Herodotus - the father of history - is replete with the history of hegemonic influence of Greeks in the Mediterranean region (Seton-Watson, 1977:15-16). The Greek city-state reached its zenith of power during the time of Herodotus and was no doubt the hegemon in the period within the European

entity (Jackson and Sorenson, 2003:10-11). One can still talk about the Persian hegemony in the Near East and Central Asia. The greatest of all hegemon ever existed in the classical time was Roman Empire. It cut across three continents-Africa, Asia and Europe. The Roman dominated these parts of the world for centuries and any vassals that proved to be intransigent were inflicted with military defeat (Seton-Watson, 1977:15). This is exactly what happened in the Third Punic War (149-146 BC) when Carthage was trying to secede and assert its own authority (Baylis & Smith, 2005:47-51). Heavy battle ensued between the Carthaginians and the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean Sea, which resulted in the defeat of the Carthage (now Tunisia). Such was the hegemonic reach of Rome in the classical time. Ottoman Empire was also for some time a hegemon in the Mediterranean and the Middle East area for decades under the leadership of Ottoman Turks (Baylis & Smith, 2005: 51).

Furthermore, in the medieval period arose the emergence of the Iberian powers. Iberian powers dominated the entire European nations in overseas trading and colonisation for centuries (Seton-Watson, 1977:53-56). The wealth accrued from the overseas adventurism turned to military and naval supremacy of the Iberian powers for centuries in Europe. In the quest for global hegemon, the Portuguese took the lead by venturing into unknown seas. They mastered the navigation techniques and became the best maritime sea-faring trading nation by the 15th and 16th centuries (Holbraad, 1984: 8). Portugal and Spain led other European powers in the quest for overseas colonisation especially in the eventual discovery of America. Both Iberian powers dominated global political and economic terrain until the industrial revolution of 19th century that brought Britain to the limelight of global hegemon (Kegley & Blanton, 2012:92). At a point in European history in the early twentieth century, France, Germany, and Britain competed for both European and global hegemony. By

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the end of the First World War, the US rose to the position of global hegemon and overtook the European nations in the global economic and military domination (Holbraad, 1984: 36-41; Kegley & Blanton, 2012:461).

The Second World War was the last straw that broke the domination of the European nation's hegemonic dominance. The US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) reached the zenith of their powers and sustained the bipolar hegemonic system until 1991. The dissolution of the USSR left a vacuum for the US to become the sole hegemon since 1991. The historical narration of global hegemonic ascendancy consistently point to one important factor: the fall and rise of powers in the global system. The question now is: For how long the present global order will persist? This question is a herculean task to resolve given the present nature of global structure. The internal polity of the US and China coupled with alliances and balance of powers in the international arena will eventually dictate the direction of global order (Mearsheimer, 2013).

2.1.2 Indicators of Hegemony

The international politics of powers is a product of history. And the basic characteristics of hegemon are fussy. It is fussy because of non-definitive and diverse views on what constitute the basic features of hegemon (Holbraad, 1984:56; Handel, 1990: 12-15). That is, what a state can achieve or possess before it reaches hegemonic status is not universally defined. The interpretative repercussion of hegemon is therefore power-centred. And if this argument holds then power is abstract and difficult to measure and perceive. The accompanying questions now are: Does hegemon need global projection of power? Does hegemon restrict its activity to its region? What type of economic, political, and social systems a state should practise before claim-

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ing hegemonic status? Can a state acquire hegemonic status for itself? Who accord states hegemonic status? These questions need proper treatment and justification in order to identify the basic indicators of a hegemon. The most important attribute of a hegemon is *viable and large economy* (Moller, 2009:2). For example, presently the GDP of the US as the lone global hegemon is $16, 799,700 trillion and it is the largest of its kind in the world (IMF, 2013). The global reach of economic activity of a state and its ability to command greater share of it may accord a state a hegemonic status and position. This is in line with the conviction that state with predominant status in global economy would have healthy domestic population which invariably translates to military and political status in the global arena. A state with overwhelming global economic dominance can as well dominate the political and military terrain.

Another indicator of a hegemon is *large population* (Holbraad, 1984:78; Handel, 1990:48-50). The China's population of 1.347 billion makes it a great power not only in the Asia-pacific region but also in the world. Also, the population of the US which is at present 317 million, the third largest in the world, sustains its economic preponderance against the demographical preponderance of both India and China. In Africa, Nigeria's population is by far the largest and it stands at 176 million (official projection) compare to Ethiopian and Egyptian population of 88 million and 83 million respectively. (World Bank, 2015). Despite the economic viability of South Africa, Nigeria's demographical preponderance has turned it to become the largest economy in Africa in terms of GDP. It should be stressed that large population can be a blessing and a curse for a state depending on the level of state's mobilisation and integration of its population into economic productivity. The crux of the matter is that state with large population can as well turns the population to both economic and

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military benefit. Most European countries, for example, are economically productive but because of the intentional population regulation, it is impossible to compete with country like China in the global hegemonic aspiration. In fact, the population of China couples with its fast-growing economy has become a potential threat to Japan and the US. Therefore, population of a country is a necessary precondition to hegemonic status in the global politics. Because of its demographic preponderance, China is projected to be the next superpower in the next two-decade (Mearsheimer, 2013).

Moreover, *military capability* is also an indicator of hegemon (Holbraad, 1984: 56; Kegley & Blanton, 2012:276-281). At present, only China and Russia militaries occupy second and third positions respectively in the globe. In terms of air power and sea power, which have been gradually rendering land power useless, the US dominates. For example, total aircraft strengths of the US and China is 13, 683 and 2, 788 respectively while destroyer strength also stands at 62 and 24 in favour of the US (Global Firepower, 2014). Thus, a hegemon should be able to maintain a very large army to project its global reach. The most powerful states today are nuclear powers and they have the military potential of launching attacks to far distance places beyond their territory. The US, China, Britain, Russia, France, India etc. have the nuclear capabilities of launching attacks to distance places which makes them to be feared and respected in the global politics. It is unlikely in the contemporary global military calculation for a non-nuclear state to become a global hegemon. The last but the most enduring of all these indicators is *sociology* (Mearsheimer, 2013; Buzan, 2011). A hegemonic state should be able to control states beyond its border in term of social activities. Its culture must be either regional or global and must wield a global influence in term of social status (Buzan, 2011). Other countries must be ready to accept its leadership position not by coercion but by virtue of its global or

regional normative responsibility. In this aspect, the US, Britain and France score high. Their languages, modes of dressing, film industries dominate the global thinking.

2.1.3 **Types and Forms of Hegemony**

Hegemony in the international system manifests itself in many forms. Since 1900 the global politics has seen many types and forms of hegemony and this may be attributed to the structural foundation of global system at any given period of time. The global system itself has experienced epoch of hegemonic domination from one power or another. The most important form of hegemony is "*ordinary hegemony*" (Moller, 2009:4). This is a situation in which only one state dominates the system - whether global, regional or sub-regional system. In this case, the ordinary hegemon dictates the tune of event in such system because of its monopolistic power parity. Such power may include economy, politics and military. In such a system, the burden of leadership will be on the sole hegemon in the system.

Another form of hegemony is "*proxy hegemony*" (Moller, 2009:4). This is a condition under which a hegemon is exercised based on the delegation of duty by the global hegemon. This is most apparent in a situation in which a global hegemon, the US, delegates some of its responsibilities and powers to the local or regional hegemons. The proxy hegemon reaches its global hegemonic status through regional institutions. It becomes regional police that stabilizes sub-system and performs the role of a hegemon through exercising some power given to it by either global multi-lateral institutions or the lone hegemon (Moller, 2009:3). The prime examples was the role accorded to Egypt by the US as stabilizer in the Middle East and the US-UN's recognition of the role of Nigeria in leading ECOMOG mission in Liberia and

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Sierra Leone. The US is a prime example in this regard and the global multilateral organisation like the UN has been instrumental to this cause. For example, the regional and sub-regional international institutions are empowered to engage in multilateral peacekeeping in their different regions based on the assumption that the regional institution is most suitable to the conflict terrain and therefore better equipped than the UN.

Thus, most of these regional multilateral institutions are championed by the regional hegemons. In Africa, for example, Nigeria and South Africa are the most important hegemons in the AU while Nigeria is the most powerful actor and hegemon in the ECOWAS (Geldenhuys, 2008:2-4). In the ASEAN, Indonesia is a regional hegemon while Egypt dominates the Arab League. There is also "*bigemony*". This is a situation in which two most powerful actors joined together to form a union. The recent cooperation between Germany and the US has been alluded to in this case. The last form of hegemony is "*group hegemony*" (Moller, 2009:4). This occurs when three ("*trigemony*") or more states or power centres form alliance based on common interests which at times known as multilateral hegemony. The most-often-cited reference in this case is the US-EU-Japan alliance.

2.1.5 **International Institutions and Hegemon**

The focus of HST on multilateral institutions has made it a relevant theoretical underpinning in the liberal school of thought (Hansclever et. al. 1997:87). Closely related to this is the assumption of neo-liberal institutionalism that state is not bothered about relative gain but about absolute gains. The liberal approach does not see anything wrong in cooperation as long as gain is not elusive but realist cautioned that cooperation is not synonymous to harmony (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985:89:107-111).

In a related development, a hegemon is believed to provide public goods for international consumption through initiating the establishment of international organisation or institution. It is the assumption of HST that a hegemon is capable of single-handedly establishing institutions for maintaining global order in economic and security sphere (Lipson, 1984:61). Thus, Institution can be defined as a set of conspicuous "rules" which are mutually and consensually agreed upon by the actors (mostly states) on a specific issue area of international concern (Keohane, 1989). Krasner (1983) regards regimes (institution) as "implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectation converge in a given area of international relations." The two definitions appear to be contradictory in scope. This work is interested in ensuring that the definitions are in accordance with the focus of the research. Looking at the definitions above, one may be obliged to ask a question: Is regime the same thing as institution? Since multilateral institutions can take many forms, i.e. international order, international regimes, and international organisation (Ruggie, 1993:35), this study considers in its entirety the international organisation.

While some scholars (Hansclever et al. 1997; Snidal, 1985) observe that the creation and initiation of international institutions by a hegemon in the international system is purposive based on the interest of the hegemon, others (Baldwin, 1993; Carlsneas, 2008; Hass, 1980; Nye, 1980) agree that institution is mutually beneficial to both the hegemon and the international system at large. For example, the creation of General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) (now World Trade Organisation (WTO)) by the hegemon shortly after the Second World War enabled the Third World countries to access the international market for their agricultural produce which would have been otherwise difficult.

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Initially, the intention behind the initiation of the establishment of international institutions might not be to exploit the weak states by the hegemon, but the global reach of the resources of the hegemon is enough advantage to benefit more from any institutional arrangement (Hansclever, et. al. 1997:97). Moreover, under normal circumstance, if multilateral global institutions are not formed by a hegemon it may be difficult for small states to thread the competitive terrain of global political and economic sphere. Before 1945, for example, the number of countries that participated in the global political and economic fora was limited to Europe, America, Japan and China. Most countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were integrated to the world political and economic system through colonial domination. If global multilateral institutions like GATT, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN were not championed by the powers after the Second World War, would it have been possible for the Third World to have any say in the global system? What will be their condition in the global system? The fact is that the global multilateral institutions may be exploitative in nature, but it has done more good than harm to world politics and economy. At least for the time being, there have been no major wars in the global system since 1945 and this is enough an achievement for the UNO.

2.1.6 **Regional Hegemon and Institutions**

Regional hegemons nowadays are very common in the global politics. The demise of Cold War which results in unipolar system helps the promotion of regional hegemons. Regional hegemon by definition is that state which dominates a subsystem within the global politics because of its overwhelming influence, resources, population, economy and military capability (Geldenhuys, 2008:3). A regional hegemon may be a middle power, great power, or dominant state in the subsystem (Gelenhuys, 2008: 3; Holbraad, 1984: 67; Handel, 1990:23).

A regional hegemon, in most cases, act as proxy to global hegemon in a particular region and uses regional and global multilateral institutions as a forum to exercise its global role (Gelenhuys, 2008:3).In the Latin America is Brazil; Indonesia in South East Asia; South Africa in Southern Africa and Africa; Kenya and Ethiopia in the East Africa; Egypt in the Middle East and North Africa; Nigeria in Africa and West Africa and; India in South Asia (Gelenhuys, 2008: 3; Moller, 2009:4). That of Europe is more complex in nature. But one can point to Germany, France, Russia, Italy and Britain as hegemons in Europe while Japan and China could be regarded as the hegemons in the East Asia. It must be said that the arrangement of being a regional hegemon do not have any constitutional backing under the UN but it may be assumed to be tacit most especially in the troubled spot of the world where the leadership is needed to quell the tide of war (Moller, 2009:5). For example, during the intense rivalry between the Arab nations and the Israel in the Middle East, the US pinpointed Egypt as the regional stabilizer which culminated in the Camp David Accord (Stansfield, 2008:287). According to Barry Buzan (2003) there are presently eleven major power poles in the global politics. Some are multipolar and bipolar while only few are unipolar. **Table 2.1** below depicts this better.

Table 2.1
Poles of Power and Regional Structure

REGIONS	POLARITY	REGIONAL POWERS
North America	Unipolar	USA
South America	Unipolar	Brazil
Europe	Multipolar	UK, France, Germany Italy
Western Africa	Unipolar	Nigeria
Central Africa	No regional power	NA
Horn of Africa	No regional power	NA
Southern Africa	Unipolar	South Africa
Middle east	Multipolar	Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel
Post-soviet union	Unipolar	Russia
South Asia	Unipolar	India
East Asia	Bipolar	Japan, China

(Source: Frazier, D. & Stewart-Ingersoll, R. (2010))

At times, a regional hegemon initiate the establishment of international institutions that will cater for the interest of such subsystem (Gelenhhuys, 2008:4; Nwokedi, 1985:4). This happens especially if a hegemon in a region feels that the subsystem is marginalised or does not have the political and economic wherewithal to survive in the global system. This may also happen if the regional hegemon feels that the great powers and global hegemonic presence in the region is negligible in the face of threat and insecurity. A case in point is the establishment and sponsorship of ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) by Nigeria in 1990 (Alli, 2010:8). Also, a regional hegemon may deem it necessary to champion the cause of institutional establishment that will serve as mechanism to contain any emergency situation within the region or sub region. This is contingent on the cooperation of other states within the regional system especially if the state in question does not have the preponderance power in terms of economy, influence, diplomacy, military and demography to command other states to do its wish.

It should be noted that most regional and sub-regional multilateral institutions in the contemporary global system are created to serve some purposes within the regional system and mostly initiated either by the regional hegemon or in cooperation with other member states. However, it needs to be stated that a region or sub-region without a functional and viable hegemon will find it difficult to form and maintain multilateral institution. This is because the absence of an economic and military powerful state in a region may make it difficult to maintain regional institution in a functional way. For instance, in East Africa, when the Hutu/Tutsi conflict broke out in Rwanda and Burundi, there was no country powerful enough in the region to contain the genocidal war (Barnet, 2008:196-197). Although there was in place East Africa Community (EAC), but it lacks a viable hegemon to lubricate it with necessary

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resources to undertake the peacekeeping and peace-making mission in the Hutu/Tutsi war.

2.1.7 Realist and Neo-liberalist Views and HST

Both realist (neo-realist) and liberalist (neo-liberal) concurred about the complex nature of cooperation in the anarchic international environment (Hansclever et. al. 1997:24; Axelrod & Keohane, 1993:86). Only constructivist subscribes otherwise with its insistence on communication and sociology (Wendt, 1992:78-79). Still both pretend to have unanimously seeing international cooperation as the fact of modern contemporary international system presumably under different lens of actualising cooperation. In this case, the EU's success or failure has become an important testing case for both schools of thoughts. Neo-liberal and neo-realist also agreed that both economic welfare and national security are very important but with different interpretation (Schmdt, 2008:156).

Thus, the emphasis on cooperation and conflict are the basic important point of argument between neorealist and neo-liberalist. It should be said that there is tendency on the part of neorealist to discuss more on conflict while neoliberal discusses more on cooperation (Hansclever et al. 1997:91). Both also discuss the concept of power and anarchy, though from divergent points. The convergence point of both schools of thought seems to be apparent in the HST. It overshadows the rivalry between both theories by its emphasis on institution and power. The HST's advocacy of institutional framework tends to toe the neo-liberal intuitionalist line while its advertisement of power invites the realist focus (Carlsneas, 2008:91-93). At the centre-stage of this argument is a clear dichotomy of cooperation and conflict which the realist and liberalist circumscribed as the only lens through which international rela-

tions can be observed. Realist's emphasis on conflict in the international system is premised solely on the vague assumption of anarchy as the bedrock of analysis (Axelrod & Keohane, 1993:85-110). However, it subscribes to the notion that for cooperation to be established there must be a powerful state - a hegemon - that will initiate the cooperation and the other agencies (states) will later become a free-rider in the association (Hanscelver et. al. 1997:102). The argument can be sustained in many ways both from realist and liberalist point of focus. The provision and sponsorship of international institutions by a powerful state in a region or in the globe is two-way dimensional. It benefits both the sponsor and the subsidiary states both in the short and the long run. Although argument can be put up on the issue of cheating that may be arisen as a result of asymmetric power position in the system (Powell, 1993:209-220).

Moreover, evidence from the past has indicated that both sponsor and adjoining states benefit from the multilateral institutions. The most important historical precedence was the establishment of NATO and European Economic Community (EEC) under Marshal Plan and Truman Doctrine (Jackson & Sorenson, 2003:198; Kegley & Blanton, 2012:431-432). The US initiation of both schemes was primarily to restore the Europe back to its formal position after the Second World War. These two organisations (EEC and NATO) were also provided to ensure the safety of the Western Europe from the political clamp of the former Soviet Union. Although it may be agreed that the provision and initiation of these two important international organisations by the US was to serve its national interest, clearly Europe in general benefitted from the schemes that serve as a medium for the re-construction and re-building of Europe's battered economy. In sum, the provision of the organisation is of benefit to both the hegemon and the cooperating states. Anarchy, power, interest

and relative gain focus are the most important variables realist employ to show that cooperation among the nation is difficult at institutional level (Milner, 1993:143-147; Wohlforth, 2008:31-36).

Furthermore, at this stage, it is important to digress a little to one of the most important debates between the realist and the liberalist position on the provision of institution for cooperative purpose. These issues are relative gain and absolute gain conceptions (Grieco, 1993:116-120). It may be asserted that it is the appreciation and emphasis of international anarchy by the realist that propels the idealist to offer alternative solution to the dilemma of anarchy. In this way, it may be argued that the institutional liberalist has gone a step ahead to proffer solution to the theoretical standstill of the realist. Similarly, since realist assumes the impracticability of cooperation in the global system due to anarchy then the liberal has proved that there is always a solution to every problem (Abbott and Snidal, 1998:8)

The liberal position on the issue of gain is premised on the assumption that states are only interested in the absolute gain in their participation in the multilateral institution and are less bugged by what other state's gain would be (Hansclever et. al. 1997: 127; Doyle, 2008:50-68). This position contravenes realist position of relative gain. The relative gain conception of realist precludes and downplays any form of meaningful cooperation among states. This is because of the conception of power in the analysis of realist assumption. The realist is of the view that the states in the international system are most concerned with relative gains in order to avoid pitfall of converting such gain to military or economic power by the enemy (Kegley & Blanton, 2012:459). It is the conviction of the realist that relative gain should be a matter of concern because of its transitive nature. If both realist and liberalist are disconnected by the gain assumption, it is very clear that both agree that cooperation among

states is feasible but more difficult from realist view. The HST therefore takes mid-way position to provide useful delineation on the liberal-realist position in the international relations. By this, one is therefore right to apply such theoretical underpinning to the study of regional hegemon in the multilateral institutions.

2.1.8 Constructivism and HST

Constructivism as a theory is not a new template of political discussion in scholarly writings. Although its prominence came to the fore after the Cold War international system, it has been claimed in some quarters that constructivism has its root dated back to the writings of Italian philosopher Giambattisa Vico (Jackson & Sorenson, 2003: 254-258). The philosopher is said to have applied constructivist philosophy in its writing when he lamented that "the natural world is made by God, but the historical world is made by man" (Jackson & Sorenson, 2003). The claim is that historical event is not independent of human making and where they inhabit become their construct. In short, man is both an agent of civilization and change.

Thus constructivism is based on the human awareness and its environment and its place in it. What matters in this line of reasoning is the historical and socio-logical foundation of man. Both factors influence the orientations, beliefs, ideas that people hold about the world they live in. It may be assumed therefore that the social and political world is not based on objective reality; it is clearly inter-subjective. Thus, it can be summarized that the social and political world is not a concrete entity; it cannot be seen and touched. It is also not a material object that is devoid of human reasoning or interpretation. The basic ideas of constructivism are thus based on the following assumptions: (1) that human relations especially international relations depends essentially on the thoughts and ideas as opposed to material conditions or forc-

es; (2) its ideational foundation is inter-subjective which consists of ideas, concep-

tions, and assumptions which is shared among the people and; (4) arising from the

above, the beliefs they hold dictate the interests and identities of people or state

(Jackson and Sorenson, 2003; Baylis & Smith, 2005).

The major milestone in the constructivism is the view that international rela-

tion is what people make out of it (Wendt, 1992:391-425). The concept of anarchy

for example is a human construct. The fact that the international arena is devoid of

international police does not suggest a situation of anarchy. States only assume there

is a state of anarchy without any concrete evidence to substantiate it. For example,

the US conception that Iraq had Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) during the re-

gime of Saddam Hussein later proved to be untrue. In this case, there is a need to ask

some pertinent questions: What was the foundation of the accusation? Who formed

it? And who instigated the attack and occupation of Iraq? These are questions that

need correct answers and the international community especially the US Intelligence

and White House should be ready to answer these questions. The foundation of hu-

man being itself has been said to be based on falsehood. The deed has been done and

the Iraq is no more what it was used to be. Who will pay for this irrational policy on

the part of the US and its allies? The situation is set to confirm that international rela-

tions constructivists are correct to assert that the behaviours of states is premised on

conception, perception, beliefs, attitudes and assumptions. In Africa, for example, it

has been confirmed that South Africa used to possess nuclear weapon that stood to

threaten many countries in the region as far as Nigerian shore in the West Africa dur-

ing the apartheid regime (Oyebade, 1998:91). No loud voice was heard concerning

the threat this might pose to unharmed countries in the continent. The US and its al-

lies closed their eyes as if nothing was going on in that part of the world.

One, therefore, wonders why events in the international political arena receive different reaction from state actors. Definitely, the constructivists are right to rise to the occasion; to liberate the world from the bi-polar nature of global ideology in international relations which has been dominated by the realist and liberalist thinkers (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, & Zartman, 2008: 172-179). The coming to prominence of constructivism was after the demise of bi-polar world with the dissolution of USSR. The realist and liberalist thinker were reduced to state of disrepute after the collapse of USSR (Bercovitch et. al., 2008). None of the two schools of thought was strong enough to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union and in this case scholars began to think of alternative paradigm that will capable of explaining the global politics. It was in this circumstance constructivism came on board to rescue the thinkers from the cage of realist and liberalist orientation. Constructivists are of the view that it was the ideas and orientation of the Mikhail Gorbachev of the then Soviet Union that altered the international political landscape. Its idea of perestroika and glasnost which tended to dictate the foundation upon which the reform of Russian society will be based eventually spelt doom for the Soviet Union. The idea of the dissolution of USSR has never occurred to Gorbachev, but in the course of structural amendment of political and economic landscape, the Soviet Union met its waterloo and it eventually dissolved.

Idea has become the hallmark of constructivist reasoning. Ideas shape the world and the foundation of geographical location of people and its inhabitants dictates their views about the world and international relations. The today's sole superpower, the US was once in isolation from the global happenings. The US President James Monroe declared the isolation of the country in 1823 in order to allow for competitiveness of the US in global politics. It is in the conviction of constructivist

that idea and thoughts are different from material condition and forces. The constructivist is of the conviction that it is the idea and thought that shapes and determine the international actors' behaviours as opposed to materialist conception of Marxist theory. In this case some have opined that constructivist paradigm is idealist in approach and nature (Michael, 2008: 50-67).

The core ideational element upon which constructivists focus is intersubjective beliefs, ideas, conceptions, and assumptions that are generally shared and conceived among a community of people or a leader. In international relations, such beliefs manifested in the notion of sovereignty of a state; on the notion of nation or nationality; their notion of differences in culture in relation to other people; their notion of religion and historical foundation of their country and; traditions, political convictions and so on (Jackson & Sorenson, 2003:256). All these dictate the behaviours of states in the international system and the behaviour of states can only be predicted based on all aforementioned factors. For example, the historical foundation of Iraq and Iran has made both countries engaged in series of conflicts and Saudi Arabia has always seeing the Shiites in other parts of the Middle East as threat. Despite the perceived religion and language commonness among the Middle Eastern countries, the individual historical foundations, ideas, culture and orientation have been the major factor of conflict among them.

According to constructivists, ideas shape the world. Those with dangerous ideas and missions tend to propagate and proselytize it. The inventor of the atomic bombs for example, may not foresee that it will be used to kill millions of Japanese in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Also the invention of chemical weapons was based on certain assumption, ideas and orientation. When group of scientists came up with this, it might not occurred to them that Saddam Hussein and Basher Asad will one

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day put use these weapons for dangerous purpose. The geo-political thinker Karl Haushofer endangered the world by selling the geopolitics idea to Adolf Hitler of Germany (Ba & Hoffmann, 2003: 15-33). Since the end of Second World War, it has never occurred to some people to blame Haushofer for the war. Also, of recent, Angela Merkel declared to the world that Germany had sold chemicals to Syria in the past until 2011 (Al Jazeera News website, 2013). The question now is: Why did policy makers in Germany at the point of selling the chemicals to Syria did not had second thought that the chemicals might not be used for civil purpose only? But for what they wanted to benefit either financially or politically, they closed their eyes for any meaningful interpretation of the purchase. It is therefore useful to situate the HST within the constructivist lens.

Moreover, the connection between constructivism and HST is the identity and recognition of hegemon in a specific region. The source of constructivist idea in HST is that the domination of a regional power is based on "identity and recognition" (Frazier & Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010:6). A regional power, based on self-perception, identity, roles and recognition sees itself as hegemon and in some cases acceptable to the secondary states in the region. The self-actualisation based on material preponderant of regional power may propel it to arrogate special functions and roles to itself in the region. The maintenance of peace, security and order within a certain region may be perceived as the function of regional hegemon and in some cases global hegemon and institutions recognise the potential of such regional power to act as stabilizer. As such the material preponderance of a state over its neighbours may define its role within regional and global structure. This may well define the foreign policy of a state as certain roles are thought to be natural to its position within the global structure. The excellent example is the provision of public goods by hegemon either

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in its respective region or in the global arena. This is what is termed as "national role conception" as espoused by K.J Holsti (1970). Therefore, the self-perception of a regional power may propel it to perform special functions in its region and global politics; and this may well explain the constructivist aspect of the HST theory.

2.1.9 **Nigeria and HST**

The HST as a mid-way theory among the three most important theoretical perspectives in the international relations-realism, liberalism and constructivism- is concerned with gains and role. Each looks at the cooperation among states from different angles. The theory is found to be suitable in studying Nigeria's place in multilateral institutions and how it behaves towards multilateral institutions in its foreign policy formulation. In this case, Nigeria is placed within the context of *"benevolent"*[5] and *"proxy hegemon"* (see Chapter Four). For purpose of clarification, benevolent hegemon is a type of hegemon that initiates institutional establishment to cater for the benefit of all actors concerned and this happens especially when public goods are at stake (Nolte, 2009). Benevolent hegemon does not employ force in coercing states to support its cause but attracts other states by providing incentives and motivation. In Nigerian case, the public goods at stake are decolonisation, dismantling of apartheid, security, political stability and development. The figure below delineates this better.

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[5]This is a type of hegemon that initiates institutional establishment to cater for the benefit of all actors concerned. This happens especially when public goods are at stake. Benevolent hegemon does not employ force in coercing states to support its cause but attracts other states by providing incentives and motivation. In Nigerian case, the public goods at stake are security, political stability and development. For more information on benevolent hegemon, see Hansclever et al (1997). *Theories of International Regimes*.

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HST

Figure 2.1: Types of Hegemon

The political and social terrain of Africa is completely fluid. Thus, a continent with 54 countries may prove difficult to any hegemonic control and this has resulted in informal sub-regional arrangement, which may be minimal for a hegemon to proof its mettle. In this case, there is Central Africa, Southern Africa, Northern Africa, Eastern Africa, and Western Africa. South Africa and Nigeria are two continental hegemons that have been involving in the stability of the continent for a long period (Geldenhuys, 2008:6). Nigeria before 1994 was the only hegemon in the whole sub-Saharan Africa[6] and with the demise of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, the continental burden began to be shared by both hegemons. However, in the West Africa region where 16 (plus Mauritania who withdrew its membership from ECOWAS in 1999) countries domicile, Nigeria is no doubt a sole hegemon.

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[6]Sub-Saharan Africa is usually employed to refer to all African states south of Sahara desert. This definition is given based on the geographical separation of the North Africa from the rest part of the continent. It can also be defined in terms of culture and race. Most countries in the northern tier of Africa are mostly preoccupied (throughout history) with the happenings in the Middle East. This is especially true of Egyptian case.

Moreover, the population of Nigeria at present is about 176 million constituting 60% of West African population (World Bank, 2015). In terms of economic capability, Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa with GDP of 522 billion dollar (IMF, 2013). Its military capability is also the most powerful in West Africa and has the second largest armed forces in Africa after Egypt. In terms of capability, Nigeria occupies 4th position in Africa(Global Firepower, 2014). Also in Central Africa and some part of North Africa (especially in the Sahara Desert) Nigeria still exercise a measure of stabilizing force. The concept of hegemon in the Nigeria parlance and its utility and application is different from what obtains in the study of the US, for example. Thus, the notion of hegemonic behaviour on the part of Nigeria in West Africa and other parts of the continent has been benevolent in nature. This could be seen in the manner Nigeria assisted and responded to Namibian and South African cases. Since independence, Nigeria has been living peacefully with its neighbours and other parts of Africa. The nature of hegemonic position of Nigeria in Africa is a unique example of benevolent (not coercive) hegemon.

Despite the potency of HST in dissecting the multilateral policy of Nigeria, the data collected suggests there are other related theories that can provide better insight into Nigeria's multilateralism and its hegemonic posture in Africa. It needs to be stressed here that these theories are offshoot of HST. These theories are discussed below.

2.2 REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY (RSCT)

The RSCT is a form of subaltern security discussion in the global security architecture. During the Cold War global system, the global structure was the predominant approach adopted in security studies (Ayoob, 1991:259). As a sub-system, region has

become a useful mechanism in defining the contemporary international security which is seen as a step towards achieving global peace and security. The importance of regions as the basic unit of security analysis appeared in the 1970s when some states were coerced into the Cold War rivalries between the two superpowers. The only unified mechanism adopted then was non-aligned movement, which most developing countries adopted in resisting the Cold War influence (Ayoob, 1995).

Thus, some regional organizations were formed in the heydays of Cold War, which tried to curb the incidence of local rivalries within a certain region. ASEAN, OAU, ECOWAS and Organization of American States (OAS) were formed during this period. The focus of RSCT is that states who share the same borders are normally locked in a security dilemma. In terms of definition, RSCT is regarded as a situation whereby "local sets of states exist whose major security perceptions and concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security perceptions cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan,1986: 8). The theory posits that the security of states within a region or sub-region is defined by the geographical contiguity. It maintains that the security and safety of each state within a region cannot be isolated from the happenings in the neighbouring states. The focus of the theory therefore rests on the basic assumption of the need to ensure that the regional security is collectively pursued by states that make a regional security complex. There are basic features defining the RSCT. These are anarchy, geographical proximity, interdependence and rivalry, and independence (Lake and Morgan, 1997:11). These are elaborated more below.

The RSCT is defined in terms of anarchy, which pervades the sub-regional political structure of the region (Adler & Barnnet, 1996:65). The states that make up the regional system are locked up into regional security, which they cannot extricate

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from. In this process of anarchy, it may be possible to contrive a regional mechanism to address such security complex, which may be "standard or centred" (Buzan, 1986). Regional security complex is standard when the region is bipolar or multipolar in nature while the centred regional security is a unipolar system. The conception of RSCT is that regions are anarchical in nature, characterized by rivalries among contiguous states. RSCT also relies on the geographical proximity of states within a certain region (Buzan, 1986). It posits that states within a certain geographical setting with shared boundaries are inextricably locked together in terms of security. The position is that for the theory to hold, two or more states must share geographical proximity which may makes it difficult for each other to escape from the security threat of the adjacent states (Nwokedi, 1985:198). RSCT is also characterized by interdependence and rivalry among the constituted states. The regional arrangement render the need for interdependence in some areas inevitable while in some cases states may engage in rivalries in terms of dominating the regional complex. According to Buzan (2003) "the nature of security interdependence, national threat perceptions, and quest for autonomy are some of the crucial factors affecting the prospect for collaboration within regional security complexes".

The last characteristic of RSCT is the perceived independence from global structure (Lake & Morgan, 1997). RSCT evolves as a durable approach in achieving global security. This is because region perceives itself as capable of maintaining its security and it is regarded as such. According to the theory, region tries to maintain its independence by evolving a regional mechanism to prevent external penetration into the region (Ayoob, 1991:267). This is particularly so during the heyday of colonialism where region evolve mechanism to promote decolonization. The formation of pan-Africanism and subsequently OAU can be regarded as a prime example of this

scenario. At present, eleven regional security complexes are identified as constituting the basic security approach in the international system (Frazier & Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010:10). It needs to be stressed here that regional security complex has three principal sources of threat. They are intra-regional rivalry, intra-state threat, and extra-territorial threat.

Intra-regional rivalry is one of the major sources of threat to regional security complex. This rivalry normally brews among the competing states within a region (Ayoob, 1999:249). Such rivalries can constitute a threat to the regional stability and peace. The rivalry may occur between two most important actors in a region as obtains in the East Asia between Japan and China. In the South Asian sub-continent, Pakistan and India also define the regional security complex. The second source of threat, intra-state threat, occurs where there is a threat within the state itself which constitute an important element in the regional security complex (Adler & Patricia, 2009:63). The internal political imbroglio in a state may have a spillover effect, which may threaten the security of a region. This is especially true if the ethnic group in a state has language and cultural affiliations with another in contiguous border. In this way, the existence of problem in a state may warrant the group in another state to lend support or rise against their own state. Such is the case in the Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The last source of the threat is the extra-territorial threat (Ojo, 1980; Obadare, 1996). This is one of the most visible threats to regional security complex in the developing world and this may be a result of colonialism. The former colonial masters and the global powers do have influence and greater structural advantage over the regional security complex, which give them the opportunity to infiltrate the regions in the developing world. This source was very potent during the Cold War era where

the two superpowers courted for allies in the developing world. The US's influence in Angola, Liberia, and South Africa in Africa is a case in point. Such extra-territorial threat also defines the West African sub-region where France presence has been noted since the colonial times. It needs to be said that threats to the regional security complex are contained in many ways and one of this is the formation of regional organization to avert or curb incessant security issues (Zartman, 1967:551). The establishment and formation of such regional organization is tailored towards regime maintenance, intra-regional conflict control, collective defence and extra-regional intervention and self-reliance. It needs to be stressed here that where region security complex is unipolar the overbearing state may promote, sponsor, and establish a regional organizations that will cater for the threats enumerated above (Prys, 2010:12). In certain case, therefore, "Regional autonomy could reflect the geo-political design of the regional hegemonic leader seeking to reduce outside influences in order to enhance its own" (Lynn, 1973:58).

2.2.1 RSCT and Nigeria

The data collected showed that the RSCT could aptly provide explanation for multi-lateral dimension in the hegemonic posture of Nigeria. In addition, the collective security is not unconnected to Nigeria's multilateral policy as most of Nigeria's behaviours in the global politics tend towards the concept of collectivism to address security threats to West African security complex. This is achieved by evolving regional security architecture (Ali, 2012:13). Osaghae (2010:43) posits that,

> In an increasingly relegated Africa whose conflicts the international community failed to respond promptly to, it was clear that, benign colonialism or not, African regional powers were going to play more active roles in the affairs of their sub-regions in the post-cold war period. They have indeed done so mostly in the name of defending democracy and constitutional rule or preventing escalation of conflicts, which

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seems to be the most politically correct and acceptable justification to the global superpowers and international community at large for intervening in the internal affairs of other countries.

The country does seldom project unilateralism because of the fragility of continental politics. The nature of the regional security complex in the West Africa sub-region has occupied attention of policy makers in Nigeria since independence. While collective security might have been natural to Nigeria ever since independence, its membership in the ECOWAS as a regional forum was considered as window of opportunity to exert considerable influence outside the sub-regional security complex (Ali, 2012:13).

By Nigerian definitions, security is holistic in its multilateral undertakings. It is in such circumstance that Nigeria sponsored some sub-regional multilateral organizations in 1964 and 1975 (Ojo, 1980: 572). Because of the peculiar nature of African states at the time of independence, the burden of providing collective security instrument rest solely on Nigeria. Although countries like Ethiopia, Liberia and Egypt had been championing the course of collective security before Nigeria got independence, the political and social foundation of their intervention was very weak (Chibundi, 2003:5). Nigeria by its preponderance power in Africa was in the best position at the time of independence to defend the African interests through multilateral institutions and to seek independence for Africa as a region. Thus, Nigerian military Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, stated in 1971 that,

> Is fortunate in having the resources potential in men, material and money to lay a solid foundation for a socio-economic revolution in black Africa. The uncompromising objective of a rising economic prosperity in Nigeria is the economic independence of the nation and the defeat of neocolonialist forces in Africa.

The idea of collective security was later given another dimension when Nigeria unilaterally sponsored the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975. In addition, a Ni-

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gerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, with the idea of collective security to African problems, sponsored the idea of African Standby Force alongside South Africa (Alo, 2013:296). The formation of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), AU, and ECOMOG are all byproduct of Nigeria's philosophical underpinning emanating from the nature of regional security complex in Africa. Thus, the foregoing analysis of RSCT indicates that the theory is suitable in studying the Nigeria's multilateral policy in relation to its regional hegemonic posture.

2.3 **ROLE THEORY**

Role theory has been variously applied by sociologist and psychologist in the study of society from the early 1960s. The application of the theory to the field of international relations was a brainchild of K.J Holsti (1970). The theory developed narratives concerning the position of each state in the global political space. Holsti stressed that each state defines roles for itself in the international politics which to some extent provides clue in determining the foreign policy direction of states. In this way the theory developed two major concepts: role perception and conception in understanding the foreign policy of regional hegemons (Prys, 2010:12-14). Role perception refers to the roles expected a state to play in the global political arena while role conception is the role state defines for itself in the globe (Harnisch, 2011:8).

Role conception is a systematic appreciation of roles, as designed and formulated by policymakers in a state, state defines for itself in the global arena. It needs to be stated that to understand the foreign policy of a state, one can engage in discourse analysis of speeches of leaders, diplomats, military, and policymakers of a certain state to appropriately establish the role conception of such state. States conceived a role for itself based on the identity and norms, which define the existence of states

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within the international system (Prys, 2010:13). The role definition and conception of a state is a product of internal variables of the state, as state cannot devise a role beyond its internal capability (Harnisch, 2011:10). Such internal capabilities are economy, military, demography and geography (Holsti, 1970:235). There are some futures that are discerned from role theory which define the role regional hegemony can play in the global politics. Some of these features are discussed below

2.3.1 **Self-perception**

Concept of self-perception in role theory underscores the hegemonic role of a certain state in the global politics. It emphasizes the role a state perceived for itself within a regional subsystem or at structural level (Prys, 2010:9). The role perception establishes the fact that state may be pushed or willingly decides to perform certain role in the global politics and this arises from the material capability of the state. State cannot assume any role that is beyond its own means and capability and this tends to support the notion that role theory is a family member of hegemonic theories. In this manner, state look inward before projecting role for itself at either regional level or global arena.

2.3.2 **Role conception**

Role conception stipulates that some states conceive certain roles and responsibilities for themselves in the global politics. This approach posits that preponderant state in a region or globe naturally assumes leadership position for itself to perform certain responsibilities, which some small states may, not capable of doing (Wish, 1980:539). Again, this approach is a reminiscence of hegemonic theory, which relies predominantly on the material capacity of state. Some states willingly perform some

roles by regional recognition accorded to it by regional member states (Prys, 2010:12). In this case, a preponderant state may be invited by other state to assume a position of leadership in conflict situation. This, thus, pushes the boundary of role theory to include regional acceptance of hegemony. This element does not easy to track as most regional members occasionally resist the overwhelming power of a regional hegemony and this is natural as power breeds envy. In this way, role perception is a result of identity formation of a state in relation to the role of others (Wish, 1980:536). State in a regional subsystem may deem it necessary to perceive certain role for itself because of its material position within the system or subsystem. Some of these roles are liberator, regional protector, regional leader, anti-imperialist agent, mediator, regional protector, and bridge building (Holsti, 1970). The roles listed here are normally believed to be performed by hegemon in a regional subsystem or at global level. For state, therefore, to perform some of these roles and responsibilities, its material capabilities must dictate as such.

2.3.3 Role Theory and Nigeria

Role theory is one of the best-suited approaches in the study of Nigeria's multilateral policy. Prior to the date of independence in 1960, many Nigerian leaders began to perceive the country as the automatic leader of Africa. In order to perform the role conceived for the newly created state, the multilateral policy became an important instrument to perform such role (Adeniji, 2005:1). Through the content analysis of speeches, parliamentary debates, official documents and press conferences, it showed that Nigerian policy makers, leaders, public and military are aware of the certain roles perceived for the country. The data collected confirmed the suitability of the theory in studying Nigeria's regional hegemonic status and multilateral policy.

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Through triangulation of data sources, the research has identified some of the roles performed by Nigeria through multilateral organisations. These roles are regional protector, liberator, bridge builder, developer, regional sub-system collaborator, mediator, regional leader, and integrator. All these roles have been extensively discussed in Chapter Four. Thus, the framework below explains this better.

Figure 2.2: Theoretical Framework

2.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Conceptual framework provides a lens through which a particular research can be conducted (Leshmem & Trafford, 2007:1). This arises where concepts need further clarification based on one's study. In such instance, it is necessary to fashion out a framework that can vividly explain one's research direction. The foreign policy of

any country is guided by both internal and external factors. These factors dictate to a large extent type of policy that a state would pursue in the international system. At times, states are constrained by range of factors, which may ultimately priortise one policy over another. In order to do this, state needs to engage in rational policy making that will lead to achieving desired goals and objectives. In this case, conceptual frameworks that will guide the conduct of this research are primarily based on combination of concepts like **foreign policy**, **domestic factors, external factors, regional power/hegemon** and **multilateralism.**

2.4.1 **Foreign Policy**

Foreign policy is an appendage of international relations. It has been an important component of international relations since 1960s (Ra'ees, 2010:4). The emergence of international relations as a separate discipline after the First World War clearly demonstrated the need to study the relation between and among states in the global politics (Jackson & Sorenson, 2003:2-4). To do this, foreign policy as a subfield in the international relations occupies a crucial position in analysing the relationship between and among states. It is assumed that the foreign policy of a state is normally dictated by both external and internal conditionality and if this is true, it suggests that to precisely understand the foreign policy of a state its internal-external dynamics must play a part (Couloumbus & Wolfe, 1978:90-98; Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2008:1-8; Kegley & Blanton, 2012:188-223). The alliance of the US with NATO members in Europe was basically an imperative to contain the threat of Soviet advance in the Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. Also, the institutionalization of Marshall Plan by the US shortly after the Second World War was to restore the destructive economy of Europe to normal position. In doing this, it was assumed,

will boost the European economy to counter the economic and military weight of the Soviet.

Foreign policy as an academic field of study is as old as the emergence of state in the European state system (Henderson, 1998:33-37). Form the earliest period, communities, villages, districts, towns, and cities related with each other in form of external relations and whatever policy or message might have passed represented the foreign policy of the time. In the African society, the kingdoms and empires were the predominant pre-modern-state feature. Kingdoms and empires related with each at official level by sending symbolic messages, which may be either a signal for peace or war (Anene & Brown, 1966:255). In this symbiotic or parasitic relations grew the need to form alliances against the powerful kingdom or empire which is today tanta-mount to the realist assumption of balance of threat and balance of power (Jackson & Sorenson, 2003:3). In effect, the dominant characteristic of this time was for the powerful states to dominate the weaker ones and in this case reduced it to tributary or vassal dominion.

In the modern vernacular of international relations, some scholars are of the view that foreign policy as an academic field of study is a child of the 1960s (Ra'ees, 2010:3). It is not part of this work to trace the genesis and development of foreign policy as an academic discipline; the academic effort is just to provide a nonprofes-sional's information about its appearance and eminence in the study of international relations. One of the most important figures in the foreign policy field is James Rosenau whose work has become an important reference point to the later scholars in the field. He can therefore safely be regarded as the pioneer in the field. Rosenau (1971) defines foreign policy as an "adaptive behavior" which is interpreted to in-volve ultimate goals or what is better known as national interest (Starr, 1988:5). For-

eign policy as an "adaptive behavior" suggests that the formulation and implementation of foreign policy should be in response to the internal and external realities of a state. In other words, it should be a way to achieve the policy goals and objectives of a particular state. Going by Holsti's definition, foreign policy is a form of guide and measurement embarked upon by a state in response to external environment in order to effect changes in the behaviors of a particular group or actors usually states (Holsti, 1995:20).

Variously, definitions have been proposed and advanced by scholars in the field and it is not possible to exploit all of them. In sum, foreign policy is a form of action and response which is basically official in nature coming from the governmental circle and objectively carried out for a purpose toward a foreign country which is normally carried out by government officials residing either in the home country or in a foreign land which is an authentic representative of the government (Carlsneas & Guizzini, 2008:86-87).From the above, it can be inferred that foreign policy is a country's reaction to the external world, which is usually states in the international system. Formulation of foreign policy is not everybody's business; it is a policy make from government quarter, which is at best, represent the national objectives of the national government involved. In addition, foreign policy making is an abode of experts who are specialist in the field of policymaking. This is so because the mishap in policy formulation and implementation may land a state into unwarranted conflict or war. The excellent example of this scenario was the Vietnam War prosecuted by the US. Between 1965 and 1973, the US army intervened in to project its ideological standing in Vietnam. Incidentally, the guerrilla warfare tactic employed by the Vietnamese rendered the US military supremacy useless.

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2.4.2 **Factors of Foreign Policy**

In order to provide theoretical background in the formulation of foreign policy making and implementation in the world politics, it is useful to situate it within the context of internal and external dynamics that dictate the outcome of foreign policy state makes (Ra'ees, 2010:4). In this case, many factors or determinants could be highlighted to explain the theoretical underpinnings of foreign policy. Many factors can be accounted for in explaining the outcome of state's foreign policy. These factors are broadly grouped under external and internal factors. It is based on these two broad categorizations of foreign policy factors that the subsequent discussion is based.

2.4.2.1 **Domestic Factors**

Although the external environment is invaluable in analyzing the foreign policy of a state, it will be wrong to assume it alone can provide sufficient information on foreign policy of an actor-usually a state. In discussing domestic variable of foreign policy it is important to highlight some domestic factors which can go a long way to determine the foreign policy of a state. Such domestic factors could dictate the response of an actor towards other states in the global arena. Some of these domestic factors are: (1) geopolitics; (2) national interest; (3) economy; (4) leadership style; (5) political system; and (6) military capability (Duncan, Jancar-Webster & Switky, 2003:168-170). The effects of all these domestic factors vary from one state to another. For example, the effect of economy on foreign policy outcome of the US is different from that of Nigeria. The US economy is a developed and diversified one while that of Nigeria is both underdeveloped and agrarian in nature with the excep-

tion of oil economy. Thus, all these national attributes and variables have important bearings on the foreign policy of a state. All these factors therefore will receive proper attention in the subsequent discussion.

2.4.2.1.1 **National Interest**

In the global environment all states' action are judged in terms of national interest; it is one of the most controversial and debated concepts in international relation (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2008:3). To define action of a state in terms of national interest, at times, is difficult. This is because an action or policy deemed to be of national interest may not necessarily true. This is the dilemma most faced by both policy makers and foreign policy analysts. In most cases, the information available to analysts may not be readily available to the policy maker at the time of formulating policy. This in most cases poses lot of challenges to the analysis of foreign policy. Most international relations scholars, especially from developing world interpreted the invasion of Iraq by the US in term of the US's national interests whereas the US sees it from different angle. To settle the case, in the present global arena it is difficult to define a borderline between what is national and international. The border in essence is increasingly becoming blurred. Practically all events in the international politics are normally justified in term of national interests. During the Cold War, it was very difficult for both the Soviet Union and the US to define each other's foreign policies. Whatever action was taken during the heydays of Cold War was interpreted in terms of national interest (Duncan et al., 2003:174).

Thus, the most important element that dictates the interactions and policies of any state in the global politics is national interests. National interests of a state are multi-dimensional depending on the nature and status in the global politics. It needs

to be cleared that the most of important element of national interest of a state is security and territorial integrity of the state (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2008:2-3). This is not at all an uncompromising aspect of national interests. Virtually all states will go to any length (possibly war) to defend this aspect of national interest. National interests therefore can be defined as those important features that determine the external behaviours of a state towards external actors (Duncan et al, 2003:174). Usually, national interest is a by-product of the national attributes of a state. These national interests are graded according to the necessity of the time and space and this is discussed below.

Core Interests: Core interests dictate the primary objectives of foreign policy of state. This core interest is the basic requirement for the pursuit of other forms of interest by a state. Such core interests are the necessities for the continual corporate existence of a state (Kegley & Blanton, 2012:32). Some of these core interests dictate immediate policy action on the part of a state to safeguard state peril. For example, the US will go to any length in defending its borders against any form of encroachment from either Mexicans or Canadians whom it shares both territorial and maritime borders with. Some of these core interests normally warrant immediate action in the event of being undermined by another actor. Cores interests are: (1) the protection of territorial integrity of the state; (2) the protection of lives and property of the citizens; (3) the welfare of the state; and economic prosperity. These core interests dictate the pursuance of other interests.

Middle-Range Objectives: In foreign parlance, the pursuit of middle-range goals is not seen as fundamental to the existence of a state. These types of objectives are an appendage to the core interests and do not necessarily important to the existence of a state. Even if left unattended the citizens will not care to question govern-

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ment on it because it does not affect them directly. Middle-range objectives are normally pursued by the advanced states in the international system because of the need to project their value system beyond their border (Hinnebusch, 2002:1-22). Most small states do not have the political and economic wherewithal to pursue this type of interest; and major concern of small states is how to exist within the realist-driven international political arena. It should also be noted that some middle power countries also pursue these objectives with the intention to exert influence on the global politics (Hook, 2002:1-10). The pursuit of this type of objectives tends to suggest that a state is already at peace and tranquillity at home-front issues. This type of objective includes exerting influence in international institutions, regional domination, supporting allies and ideological marketing abroad.

Long-Range Goals: This is the type of goals and objectives that has to do with the aspiration of a state in the global politics. This aspiration can be manifested in any form and does not have to be pursued at all cost. In other words it is an optional objective which tends to project the image of the country in a good light in the global politics. It is a goal normally pursued by rich countries in the state system. For example, unipolar is an objective of the US while multi-polar system represents the long-range goal of the Chinese diplomacy. In essence, long-range objectives are those objectives that seek to direct and dictate the affairs of other states in the global politics and usually optional in nature.

2.4.2.1.2 **Geopolitics**

One of the most important aspects of foreign policy making is the spatial dimension of a state. This domestic factor is as old as the existence of human community and most ancient communities (i.e. Athens, Sparta, Rome, and Carthage) were very con-

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versant with this important feature of their communities (Henderson, 1998:34). The spatial dimension to foreign policy takes cognizance of the features inherent in the geographical location of a state. The landlocked countries, for example, must ensure friendly relations with the coastal neighbours, otherwise it will be difficult to conduct any overseas trade and transaction through sea. This may go a long way to affect the economy of such a state. This is exactly what Paul Haushofer considered in its geo-politics theory before the Second World War in Germany (Seton-Watson, 1977:95-99).

Further, Paul Haushofer's spatial dimension to politics has been described as the most important theory that influenced the decision of Adolf Hitler in the Second World War (Couloumbus & Wolfe, 1978:181). In addition, the factor of geography also influenced the decision of the US under President James Monroe in 1823 to embark on the isolationist policy. The geographical propinquity is also very germane in dictating the foreign security of a state. Israel is a case in point. It domiciles in a very hostile environment of Muslim and Islamic civilization and has developed enough art of weaponry to contain such volatile environment in which it resides. State that shares boundaries with many neighbours need to embark on foreign policy that may be termed policy of good neighbourliness to safeguard its own territorial integrity and security. This is what Buzan (1991) termed as "Security Complex" and it can be situated well to Nigerian case.

2.4.2.1.3 Economy

One unavoidable fact of foreign policy making is the strength of the state's economy. A State with buoyant and healthy economy can project its foreign policy with utmost certainty. Most countries in the developing world are very weak to formulate policies

that can go against the powers most especially towards the US. Country with weak and fragile economy cannot formulate independent and active foreign policy because it is assumed that the globalised world is being controlled by the giant economies. This means that the giant economies dictate the global political and economic terrain and the weak countries must adhere strictly to the rule of the game if they do not want to suffer economic sanction (Fajana, 1978:62). The agrarian economy cannot come up with policy that will be detrimental to the importing country otherwise its economy will be compromised by the importing country. Most countries in Africa and Asia belong to this category of state. In fact, the economically powerful countries dictate the tune of events in World Trade Organisation (WTO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) offered by the IMF to the developing countries is a case in point. The policy was dictated by the IMF and it worsened the economies of most developing countries especially Africa.

2.4.2.1.4 Leadership style

Foreign policy and leadership quality are two side of the same coin. The leadership orientation can effectively dictate the foreign policy orientation of a state (Osuntokun, 2005:38). The analysis of foreign policy at time may take idiosyncratic or biographical approach to determine the level of involvement and impact of a leader in a state's foreign policy. If a leader is agile it may affect the foreign policy of a state. Also, if a leader is paranoia there is tendency to formulate aggressive policy that may be detrimental to the peaceful existence of the international system. The analysis of the fall of the USSR normally takes biographical approach by looking into policies of perestroika and glasnost formulated by President Mikhail Gorbachev.

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2.4.2.1.5 **Political system**

This is closely related and familiar to the above factor. Political system of a particular state is sine qua non in determining the foreign policy of a state. The authoritarian or totalitarian regime for example is prone to formulating aggressive foreign policy because of the secrecy under which the policy is usually conducted. Authoritarian regime is not usually an open system that allow for public participation and criticism of government policy and in this case the foreign policy environment is normally shrouded in mystery (Duncan et al., 2003:189). On the other hand, democratic governments are likely to formulate policy that is peaceful in nature especially towards its fellow democratic governments. It is based on this conviction that democratic peace theory is developed; meaning that the democracies do not fight one another because of the process of decision-making (Mello, 2014:1). In the democracy, the process of reaching foreign policy decision is usually complex especially when considering the legislative input in countries like the US, Germany, UK, and Japan.

2.4.2.1.6 **Military capability**

The realist assumption posits that a state should be capable to defend itself in what is perceived as the anarchic international environment. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau were classical proponents of the realist idea and considered the state as the sole actor that needed military capability to defend itself in the anarchical global system (Couloumbus and Wolfe, 1978:65). It must be stated clearly that military capability of a state determines the type of policy a state would formulate towards its external environment. It is unrealistic of a militarily weak state to formulate an aggressive foreign policy towards a powerful state.

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2.4.2.2 **External Factors**

Foreign policy of a state cannot be made in isolation of the happenings in the external environment. Since the policy is meant to be formulated in reaction to the external milieu, it is therefore natural that the goings on within the international system is an important variable in foreign policy making. Such external variables or factors will be the focus of the next discussion. Some of those factors considered here are: (1) international system; (2) international organizations; (3) international law; and (4) activities of other states.

2.4.2.2.1 **International system**

The history of the state system beginning with the Westpahalian Treaty of 1648 is replete with history of domination of one power over the other. What obtains within the global political system in most cases dictates the foreign policy of states within the global system. Since 1648 group of states or a single state have been an important source of event driving the global political system. For example, the concert of Europe system was basically multipolar in nature while the cold war system was bipolar. The present international political configuration is no doubt unipolar and it goes a long way in dictating the foreign policy of states. Unipolar systems have one dominant power centre, bipolar systems contain two centres of power, and multipolar systems possess more than two such centres. The cold war system, for example, forced some states in Africa and Asia to come up with policy known as nonalignment and they formed an association of "Third State"-another centre of power- known as Non-Align Movement[7] (NAM).This fact can be best illustrated by Egyptian foreign policy

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[7]This is an association of Third World states formed during the Cold War struggle between the US and the Soviet Axis. The association was formed to create another centre of power in the global politics and the members are predominantly from the developing countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and some countries in Eastern Europe. Tito of Former Yugoslavia, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana,

in 1956. The international pressure during the Cold War era made Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt to nationalize Suez Canal. He did this in order to wrest control of the canal from Anglo-French domination and was assured of USSR support. This international atmosphere provided Egypt with opportunity to nationalize the canal. This situation also applied to Nigeria between 1967 and 1970 when the civil war broke out in Nigeria. France's support to Biafra during the civil war changed Nigerian foreign policy towards international system. Un this way, Nigeria sponsored the formation of ECOWAS in 1975.

2.4.2.2.2 **International law**

Law is an important constraint in the foreign policy of states in global politics. Closely related to the above is the impact of international law on the foreign policy making of states. It is an important judicial arm of UNO but with separate existence to adjudicate on important international issues. Conventions, treaties, agreements and covenants are important elements of international law, which must be abided by all member nations. The International Criminal Court (ICC) for example is an organ that tries individual who have committed criminal and grave offences like war crimes and genocide. While ICJ adjudicates cases between and among states and the judgment given by the ICJ must be adhered to by parties to the dispute. One prime example of this is the ICJ judgment on the Bakassi border issue between Nigeria and Cameroon. The judgment was in favour of Cameroon and Nigeria was promptly complied with immediate effect. The international law is thus an important source that conditions the foreign policy of states.

Gamel Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Surkano of Indonesia, Fidel Castro of Cuba and Haile Selasie of Ethiopia were prominent figures during the heydays of NAM. The first meeting was said to be held in Bandung in 1956 in Indonesia. The meeting is known as Bandung Conference.

2.4.2.2.3 **Neighbouring states**

The activities of other states in the global politics go a long way to dictate the foreign policy of state. This is most obvious if a state shares boundaries with many neighbouring countries. In this way, it may be possible that the foreign policy be affected and constrained by the activities of the neighbouring countries. In terms of security, the policies of contiguous must be harmonized to ensure the insecurity incidence is reduced to the bearable level. This is what Barry Buzan termed as "Security Complex". For example, most states in the West African sub-region, lack financial capacity to meet their dues in ECOWAS. This makes Nigeria to shoulder the financial responsibility and commitment of the organization since inception in 1975. This has been consistent over years in the formulation of Nigerian foreign policy.

2.4.3 **Multilateralism**

Multilateralism embodies all interactions that involve three or more transnational actors within the international system. Concepts like institution, order, regime and organization have been frequently employed to explain multilateralism. It needs to be stated here that not all of these concepts are necessarily multilateral in nature unless they incorporate elements that are inherent in the multilateral arrangement (Hasenclever et al., 1997:6). Multilateralism is therefore an act of coordinating policies collectively among three or more states with a view to achieving specific aims and objectives based on certain values, norms and principles (Ruggie, 1993:34). Multilateralism according to Ruggie (1993:33) is based on three principal principles. These principles are reciprocity, indivisibility, and non-discrimination. The following diagram better illustrates it.

Figure 2.3: Principles of Multilateralism

The above principles guide the conduct and existence of multilateralism and the lack of one of these tend to suggests that the regime, order or organization is not multilateral in focus and operation (Ruggie, 1993:34). Multilateralism in international relations is an old concept but the usage in the foreign policy parlance in Africa is very limited. Multilateral and bilateral agreements among states are designed to achieve some specific goals and objectives that a state could not unilaterally achieve within the international system. Some transnational border issues like environment, trade and investments, and migration need to be handled by multilateral cooperation as these are beyond the capacity of a state. Even, the most powerful state like the U.S. cannot solve these issues alone. Multilateral institutions like UN and EU have been performing wonderfully well since the end of the Second World War to proffer solutions to some of the teething problems in the global affairs. Multilateralism is a concept in international relations, which defines the activities of states in terms of coop-

eration and alliances. It is defined as a means by which states cooperate in order to achieve specific goals and objectives, which they cannot ordinarily achieve alone.

Multilateral diplomacy has a very long history dated back to the time of Westphalia Treaty of 1648. States align to achieve those goals, which are always beyond their means. The end of the First World War in 1918 saw the emergence of world multilateral institution that can cater for peaceful and just world. The idealists were soon proved wrong with the outbreak of Second World War in 1939. On this note, the more powerful UN replaced the League of Nations in 1945, shortly after the end of the destructive war. It was an attempt at creating peaceful and just world that propelled Washington, Moscow, London, Rome, Tokyo, and Paris to fashion out a global institution that would manage world peace and stability. By 1970s, multilateral institutions proliferated and this is exemplified by the rise of regional multilateral institutions in both Asia and Africa.

However, in the contemporary international system, the challenges facing the states are enormous and therefore need cooperative effort to solve (Wilson & Torjesen, 2009:6).The reaction of each state to multilateral body depends on the potential benefits or harms it brings. Therefore, to structure theoretical thinking about multilateralism, it needs to be cleared that state goes for multilateral cooperation when it is beneficial to do so. Theoretical perspectives about multilateralism abound. They are neorealist, liberal institutionalist, constructivism, neo-functionalism, and radical approach (Bouchard & Peterson, 2009:11). All these theoretical foundations look at multilateralism from different lens, which of course based on the tradition and practice of states in the international system. Each global multilateral institution defines its mode of operation based on the reason for establishment.

The development of diplomatic issues like poverty, underdevelopment, refugee, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental problem and debt crisis have been handling with care by the UN through its various agencies. By 1980s, regional organizations have proliferated and designed to emulate the success achieved by the EEC (now EU). Regional organizations like OAU, ASEAN, ECOWAS, NAFTA, APEC, OAS, Arab League have become important players in their respective continent and region. In the recent years, it is increasingly becoming fashionable on the part of the UN to employ these regional bodies in the settlement of disputes and while at the same time channelling developmental funds through them.

Furthermore, multilateralism is a key instrument of foreign policy that seems to contradict the basic principles of sovereign equality of states within the international system (Hurrel, 2005). This contradiction is reinforced with the allocation of positions based on material capability of states in the international institution. These two contradictory principles are reinforced with the inclusion of some leading states from developing countries in the international hierarchy of leading states (Martin, 1992:779). Looking at the way some regional powers like south Africa, Brazil and China trying to assert their pre-eminence in the UN through plurilateral mechanism, it can be inferred that Multilateralism serves as a strategy of power consolidation (Alden & Vieira, 2005).The emergence of regional integration has provided ample chance for regional hegemon to dominate their near abroad through the pursuit of regional economic arrangement as it applies to ECOWAS in West Africa, SADC in Southern Africa and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This enhances the bargaining capacity of a hegemon (be it regional or global) to come up with rules and regulations in political and economic terms according to their wishes (Martin, 1992:780).

Although HST establishes that the availability of an overwhelming dominant state in particular region is an important factor for states to co-operate but it does not clearly address the regional context. This lapse has been covered by subsequent scholars like Lake (2006); Nolte (2007); Martin, 1992; Buzan & Weaver (2003) who identify the existence of hegemony at regional level. Thus, hegemony theorist like Robert Cox have reiterated the economic and military pre-eminence of a given state within a region as insufficient source of coercive power to ensure localised acceptance of hegemony. For power to be effective and functional hegemony requires consent and willingness among the weaker states. This is usually attained through universalizing ideology of international institution. Talentino (2004) stressed that,

> The importance of multilateralism lies not in its ability to prevent states from pursuing selfish interests, but its ability to temper power with legitimacy, thereby introducing constraints on what states can do on their own. Might may prevail, but it is no longer considered to make right, a fact which forces states to work within the rules more than they might like.

At the same time one has to take into account that, from the perspective of regional powers, global and regional institutions comply with different functions. They may be used, in the first case, as an instrument to balance other great powers, regional counterparts or the US, and in the second case, they may be an instrument of domination and a mechanism to keep other powers out of the region (Nolte, 2009:891). This is noticeable in Nigerian case most especially in the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 with the cooperation of some selected West African states. The use of multilateralism remains the same for both regional and global hegemon with different means and method to achieve their aims and objectives. It needs to be stressed that Multilateralism, predominantly represented by international institutions, is used by "dominant power as instrument of power aggregation; access to strategic resources in the region; and also facilitates the diffusion of political ideas which serves the inter-

est of the regional power" (Hurrel, 2005; Nolte, 2009:894). In this way, multilateral-ism is may not necessarily represents an antithesis of power but a means to exercise power in a legitimate and "principled" way (Talentino, 2004).

2.3.4 **Regional Hegemon/Power**

Regional power in the international relations parlance is that type of states that have influence in the issue pertaining to their region (Nolte, 2010; Lemke, 2002). The def-inition of regional power becomes difficult because of the problem of identifying what constitute power in the global politics. There is also no consensus on how to measure the power capability of a state. What becomes unanimous agreement among scholars is the power preponderant of a state over others states (Bach, 2007: Adeba-jo, 2002). This power preponderance is based on the material capability that can be measured in terms of relative strength. Some of the materials capabilities identified by scholars are economy, population, military strength, landmass, geographical loca-tion, and natural endowment. In the actual operationalisation of what constitute the power projection of a regional power, some scholars also identify technological ad-vancement and popular culture as important elements of power projection (Prys, 2010; Frazier &Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). It should be said here that these two ele-ments of power projection do not apply to majority of regional powers, as they do not possess such intangible power. Most great powers and global hegemons possess these indispensable element of power most especially the US and Britain. It is there-fore not necessarily a prerequisite for measuring regional powerhood (Nolte, 2010).

Thus, the most common element scholars employ to measure the regional power status of a state is basically material in nature. In this case, some countries have been identified by scholars as belonging to this group of state (see Table 2.1).

While some of these are regional powers, others are noted to perform hegemonic role in their respective regions (Prys, 2010; Schirm, 2012. To label regional power as a hegemon such regional power should have capacity to transform its power potential to active policy formulation in its region (Prys, 2010). Such active formulation of policy must reflect in four ways. First, a regional power can be described as a hegemon in terms of its self-perception in the region, which will ultimately impel it to perform certain exceptional roles within the region. Second, a regional power must be recognized, at least by few, within the regional space as the leader to call upon when the need arises. Three, the regional powers should be able to provide public goods within the region for other regional members. Lastly, a regional power should project a value and preference within its own region. Thus, if all these are found to be present in the behavior of a regional power such can be categorized as performing hegemonic role and therefore can be termed "regional hegemon" (Lemke, 2002; Prys, 2010). The role of regional hegemon should not be confused with that of global hegemon namely the US but one thing that is common to all hegemon is leadership aspiration, power preponderance and provision of public goods (Lemke, 2002). Talentino (2004) stresses further that,

> Nigeria may not exercise the same degree of hegemony as the US, but it is the dominant state of West Africa and other states fear its preponderance. Its relationship with his neighbours has been competitive since the 1960s, when France sought to limit Nigeria dominance over the region by creating an organization of francophone states to balance against it. But Nigeria used its strong economic position in the first decades after independence to spearhead the creation of ECOWAS, in which it is by far the preponderant military and economic power.

It is based on this understanding of regional hegemon and power that this research is conducted in relation to Nigeria.

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2.4 **CONCLUSION**

Theory and concepts are very crucial in explaining phenomenon in international relations. The above analysis shows that the three theories, together with the concepts, are capable of explaining the phenomena under research. It needs to be stated here that HST is employed in this research as the underpinning theory while other two, role and RSCT are supporting theories. Moreover, by virtue of their operationalisation, both theories are treated as extension of HST. This is because of their explanation of role a regional power can play in the regional governance. Thus, role theory and RSCT are both extension of HST and the analysis above reveals that all the theories seem appropriate in revealing the roles of regional powers in the international politics. It also needs to be stressed that hegemony has it is employed here means benign leadership and should not be confused with hegemonic role of the US, Britain (in the 18th and 19th centuries) and USSR (in the Cold War period). It is purely used here as benevolent leadership as Nigeria does not wish to coerce any African state into collaborative action.

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND MUL-TILATERALISM

This chapter discusses the background to the policy of multilateralism in Nigerian foreign policy as well as focusing on the response of each regime and administration on the formulation and implementation. Before doing this, it is necessary to discuss the background to Nigerian foreign policy, most especially during the colonial rule. This is imperative because, it is very difficult to divorce the Anglo-Nigerian foreign policy from what happened afterwards. As would be expected the basic components of Nigeria's multilateral policy would also form an important part of this chapter.

3.1 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER BRITISH RULE

Analysing the history of Nigeria's foreign policy under British domination, how it has shaped events in Nigeria's external relation and how this history is manifested in the country's foreign relations afterwards, is an essential dimension of this study. This is in view of the fact that the post-colonial foreign policy orientation of Nigeria was not so much in distance with what happened during the colonial period. The scramble for and partition of Africa that began in 1885 by the European powers namely Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Germany and Italy resulted in the total occupation of Nigeria by the British in the 1890s (Flint,1965:147). Before the amalgamation of different regions in 1914, each region separately maintained link with the outside world. For example, the Northern region which was predominantly Islamic society had external relations with the Muslim world while Southern

and Western regions maintained external relations with Dahomey (now Benin Republic) and other ethnic groups in the western coast of Africa (Falola & Heaton, 2008:16). With the amalgamation of Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914 by Sir Fredrick Lord Lugard, the Governor-General of Niger area at the time, Nigeria as a country appeared on the world map and foreign relations started apace.

It is thus natural that the British government dominated all aspects of Nigerian society for most parts of colonial time, most importantly between 1914 and 1960. Throughout the period of British colonial rule, Nigerian foreign policy was dominated by the British government and this situation applied to many colonized territories in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Therefore, it seems appropriate to assert that Nigerian foreign policy from 1914 to 1960 was a product of colonialism (Chibundu, 2003:5). In other words, Nigeria did not possess foreign policy that served its independent interest before 1960 since it was the British that formulated and directed Nigerian foreign policy through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in London (Falola & Heaton, 2008:259). Foreign policies that affected the lives of Nigerians were claimed to have been formulated in London and those policies reflected the needs of the Metropole in the global politics of the time. Also, the formulation was affected by the political climate of the metropolitan Britain and international events of the day than events taking place in Nigeria (Folarin, 2010:45).

It should not be an over-statement to argue here that Nigeria was regarded as an extension of British territories because it was administered by a cadre of a few European colonial officers whose loyalty was to the Metropole not to Nigeria (Folarin, 2010:46). At this juncture it is pertinent to ask a question: What were the major goals and objectives of the Nigerian foreign policy under British administra-

tion? This and other issues will be the focus of the next section which discusses Nigerian foreign policy under British rule.

3.1.1 **Geopolitical and Strategic Issues**

The British domination of Nigerian foreign policy started in 1914 and it coincided with the beginning of the First World War (1914-1918) (Flint, 1965: 147). It was in the interest of the colonial masters to use the territorial base of their various colonies to support the efforts in the war. Therefore, it was in the foreign policy interest of British to use Nigeria as a military base and for generating raw materials for sustaining the war (Oliver & Atmore, 1976:207-208). Some energetic Nigerian adults were conscripted into British Navy and Army and engaged in fierce battles in Vietnam and North African countries (Morgan, 1999:238). Some were even served as administrators in their various capacities during the war. It should also be pointed out that the presence of France and Germany in the adjacent lands, such as Togo, Benin Republic and Cameroon was a threat to the British interests in Nigeria.

Therefore, the Nigerian territorial base had tobe protected at all cost from these two powers. In doing so, agreements were sealed with Germany which culminated in ceding Togoland (present day Republic of Togo) to her in order to checkmate the excesses of France (Morgan, 1999:238).The ceding of the territory may be regarded as part of appeasement policy of Britain to placate Germany before the outbreak of the Second World War. However, on the part of Africans, it was the strategy of colonial power in the employment of divide and rule principle which ensured and maintained the balance of power in both African and European political terrain. On the part of France, agreement was reached to create a definite border between Cameroon and Nigeria which both acceded to (Oliver & Atmore, 1976:227). Britain thus

shielded Nigeria from any external interference not only because of the territorial safety of Nigeria but also for the fact that Nigeria was the only British possession among its immediate neighbour which bordered the Gulf of Guinea, an important strategic location for both military and economic purpose. It was also close to the Southern African region where the British had the greatest possessions. Britain would not like to lose those areas to the advantage of other powers (Gardner, CO 554/2554, August 4, 1960; Aluko, 1976:137).

It is worth noting that the British government, in its effort at achieving geo-political dominance in Africa, did not allow any close rapport between Nigeria and Southern African countries of Republic of South Africa (RSA), Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) (Gardner, CO 554/2554, August4, 1960). All these countries were ruled under the white minority from Europe (Oliver & Atmore, 1976: 187). As a result of this approach, resentment grew among the black populace who regarded the action of the British and Dutch governments as an attempt to subject them to the rule of white minority group in the Southern part of Africa. Elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the presence of Europeans was brief and casual. As the spirit of nationalism and injustice grew among the Africans in Southern part of Africa, perhaps there was a need on the part of the people to carry along or to seek help from other parts of Africa of which Nigeria was prominent. After the end of the Second World War in 1945, most issues that were discussed in the Pan-African Conferences did reiterate on the issue of Apartheid Policy in the Southern part of Africa (Fasanmi, 2006:7). This meeting apparently threatened the British administration in Southern Africa.

As a result, the British tailored the foreign policy of Nigeria towards other issues. For example, when Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, and Sierra Leone sent a delegation

to London in order to demand for greater participation in the governance of their own countries, the Secretary of the State, Lord Milner, reacted violently that people of the British West Africa should not regard themselves as one entity and that the time had not ripped enough for Africans to involve in both legislative and executive arms of governance (Eluwa, 1971:214).The reason behind this lamentation on the part of the British was to ensure that there existed no unity between African countries, perhaps to perpetuate the white hegemonic rule in the RSA and other parts of Southern Africa. This issue was later resurfaced when the British officer named S.J. Fingland drafted the foreign policy direction of Nigeria in 1959 (Snelling, CO 554/2059, January 19, 1959).

Since Nigeria had limited autonomy to control its destiny, it became an opportunity for Britain to design the foreign policy in such a way that there would not be any room for cooperation or alliance between Nigerian and Southern Africa countries. Even at home, there was a need also to ensure that Nigerians of various ethnic groups were not united as the regions were ruled separately under different governance (Falola & Heaton, 2008:112). There was also a deliberate attempt on the part of the British to make sure Nigerians were not glued together so that there would not be a room for nationalistic feeling which might engender Nigerians to call for British withdrawal in the affairs of Nigeria. As there was a gradual movement towards independence in 1956, which meant a serious blow to British global political dominance, there was a ploy to ensure the loyalty of all its former colonial territories even after independence (Cabinet Meeting, CO 554/1548, September 11, 1958). As part of this ploy, the institutionalization of Commonwealth of Nations became a useful instrument to ensure continuous loyalty of Nigeria after independence (Ashton, 2007:75).

3.1.2 **Containing the Machinations of the Soviet Union**

It should be remembered that after the end of the Second World War the Cold War came to the fore between the Western World, primarily dominated by the US and Eastern World, dominated by the USSR. Because of the difference in ideological worldview of both camps, it was fashionable that each was vying for control in various parts of the world mainly in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, India was granted independence and this signified a loss in one of the most important parts of British colonies. In this respect, the British did not want the incursion of Soviet influence in Nigeria because its ideology may inspire the minds of the nationalists to demand for immediate self-governance, which Britain was not prepared to do at the time (Allen, TNA, DO 177/12, August 5, 1959).

It should be noted that the British had already noticed the handwriting of Soviet Union on the wall in Ghana. The communist ideology had been well entrenched in Ghana; and Kwame Nkrumah had been demanding independence from the British government after the Second World War (Morgan, 1999:239). In addition, the British opined that if independence was eventually secured by Nigeria, she wanted to ensure the continuity in Nigeria's loyalty to the British government and not to the Soviet Union (Head, DO177/12, January 17, 1961). In doing so, no Nigerian nationalist was allowed to attend any Non-Aligned Movement meeting which had strong supporters in Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Ghana, Malaysia, India, Egypt, Cuba and Senegal (Aluko, 1976:139). There was no formal relationship between Nigeria and Soviet Union under the British rule and most Nigerian educated elites were advised strongly not to accept or take any scholarship given by the Soviet Government (Delancey, 1983:167).

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It was in this circumstance that British government deliberately allowed the predominantly Muslim Northerners to dominate the political landscape of Nigeria after independence. This is based on the British government assumption that the established rules in Nigeria will be dogmatically followed by the North (Gardner, CO 554/2554, August 4, 1960). In fact the post-independent Nigerian foreign policy was later drafted by the British official named S.J Fingland on the invitation by Balewa (Snelling, CO 554/2059, January 19, 1959). Clandestine agreement had been reached between the Northern Nigerian leaders and the British government that there should be no relations between Soviet Union and Nigeria if eventually the independence was secured (Falola & Heaton, 2008: 154). It was when the British discovered that this stance can be maintained by the Northern elements that independence was proposed in 1957. The British did not trust the Southerners despite the fact that most of them received education in the British universities. The British government discovered that it was possible for the Southerners, if they were allowed to dominate the political landscape of Nigeria after independence, to defect to the Communist Camp after independence because of the high standard of education compared to that of Northerners (Oliver & Atmore, 1976: 225-226).The above reason only may not adequately explain the reason why the North was allowed to dominate the political terrain of Nigeria. There was a disagreement in 1953 between the south and the north on the date of independence because the north argued that the standard of education in the south was too high compared to what obtained in the north (Omoiya, 2012:11). Therefore, the handover of power to the north may as well be a tactic to allay their fears of well-educated south in the corporate existence of Nigeria.

Thus, because of high level of education among the Southerners, the Northerners rejected the motion for independence in 1957 and claimed that they were not

ready for such act. The Northerners, in order to prepare very well for independent, agreed that 1960 should be considered as the year of independence. Thus, the British agreed to grant independence to Nigeria as agreed by the North. All these actions on the part of the British were exhibited to ensure that a trusted government came to power to continue the British foreign policy agenda against the Soviet (Eastwood, CO554/1596, July 7, 1960). It was also part of divide and rule policy.

3.1.3 **The Need to Dominate Global Commerce**

One of the most important objectives of Nigeria's British foreign policy was to ensure the domination of global commerce. By 1920, the Nigerian market was already dominated by the British trading companies like the United African Company (UAC), the United Trading Company (UTC), Peterson Zachonis (PZ) and John Holt (Yearwood, 1998:53). The formation of these foreign firms ensured the domination of import-export market and virtually eliminated the indigenous and other foreign traders except British Conglomerates. The country was reduced to a cash crop-producing estate in which the British colonial office determined what should be produced, their prices and their export. Foreign economic policy was designed in such a way that no external European or American firms were allowed to exist or conduct business activities unless those companies that wanted to form partnership with British companies (Tyoden, 1983:148). The prominent example in this regard was the Shell-BP, jointly owned and operated in Nigeria by Britain and Netherlands since the beginning of prospecting for oil in 1903 (Steyn, 2009: 254).

The British foreign policy approach to economic development had three main objectives. The first goal was the expansion of Nigerian commerce through the exportation of raw materials-cash crops and minerals and the importation of European

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finished goods. To facilitate this increased commerce, the British made large-scale improvements to the transportation and communication infrastructure of Nigeria, building roads, railways, telegraph, and ports, and expanding the navigable water-ways (Yearwood, 1998:63). The second goal was to bring Nigeria into a cash economy based on the UK currency. The third goal was to force Nigerians to work for that currency.

Overtime, foreign economic policy resulted in the growing dependence of Nigerians on an export economy dominated by the British and Dutch firms in which indigenous Nigerian enterprises could not compete. The foreign firms conducted business primarily with a view towards European profitability to the detriment of local producers (Aiyede, 2009:254). The exploitative nature of the colonial economic policy ensured that very little sustainable development occurred during the colonial period. Neither the profit–mongering European firms nor the stingy colonial government was willing to invest in the long-term development of Nigeria in the period before the Second World War. The British firms took their profits back to Europe, enriching shareholders at the expense of the exploited Nigerian labourers (Falola & Heaton, 2008:121). Thus, Nigerian economy was planned and opened to the outside world according to the British economic interest. By 1939 seven British firms controlled two-third of Nigerian commercial activities and the most prominent among them was the United African Company (UAC), a branch of the larger Anglo-Dutch Consortium Unilever (Tyoden, 1983:149). Mines were developed and resources were exploited and exported to Europe according to the dictate of British economic policy.

The pattern of foreign policy in terms of colonial economic policy opened Nigerian economy to the outside world as a primary producer of agricultural and mineral products and this made the economy vulnerable to the intricacies of the global

economy at the time. By 1956, the Shell-BP discovered oil in large quantity in the Niger-delta in the Eastern part of Nigeria. This discovery, therefore, made the British to intensify policies that will perpetuate their hegemony in the economy of the territory. This is because, in the early 1950s, the nationalist leaders had been demanding for the total emancipation of Nigeria and the British government could not hold the territory again (Osuntokun, 2012). Thus, by the time the British colonial government proposed the date of Nigerian independence in 1957, with the official declaration in October 1960, the British economic foreign policy formed the integral part of Nigerian foreign policy formulation and implementation (Grey, CO 554/1958, June 24, 1958). The next question now is: What were the policies executed to achieve the above mentioned goals and objectives of Nigeria's British foreign policy?

The British government in Nigeria carried out policies through the Department of Commonwealth and Foreign Office (CFO) which was based in London through the native authority in Nigeria (Williamson, CO 554/1583, April 9, 1957). The Governor-General received instruction from the CFO in London on what policies to be formulated and executed (Falola, 1999:132). One of the most important policies executed is protectionist policy. This policy was to ensure the protection of Britain's Nigerian national interest against competition from other capitalists. To maximize the economic potential of Nigeria and to ensure the monopolistic tendency, the British government ensured that no other capitalist powers were allowed entrance into Nigerian market (Ebohon, 2012:204). Thus, all agricultural and mineral products were all exported to Britain and other parts of the world where British had commercial interests. The British government dictated the prices of the commodities like rubber, cocoa, coffee, and groundnut. No other power was allowed to export

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product into Nigerian market and the behaviour of British economic diplomacy at the time resembled the activities of today's multinational companies.

Another policy worthy of discussion is the policy of arbitration. The British ensured that there should be no conflicts between its own investors that operated in and outside Nigeria. This was done to ensure that no room was created for other competitors to take the conflict situation to their advantage. Arbitration was employed as a viable mechanism to ensure harmony among the British capitalists in Nigeria. This policy was also used to guarantee the survival of British political and economic interests in Nigeria. Nigeria was used as a meeting place for all other British colonies in West Africa (Mathew & Fasheun, 1980:556).The policy of divide and rule was also employed by the British in Nigerian foreign policy. This was to ensure the continuous dominance of British government in different territories in Africa. British government did not give room for any rapport to emerge among Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. This was primarily done to ensure that no conspiracy was planned against British authority in Nigeria. It is on record that Nigeria Ghana, Gambia, and Sierra Leone formed an association called National Congress of British West African (NCBWA) in 1919 under the leadership of a Gold Coast (now Ghana) lawyer, Casely Hayford (Falola & Heaton, 2008:137). It was under this association that a delegation was sent to London to press home their demands. The British government reacted violently and rejected their demands. This illustration is to buttress the earlier-mentioned point that British did not want any unity among its colonies in West Africa. All these policies worked fine for Britain to ensure that its national interest prevailed in the formulation of Nigerian foreign policy.

3.2 NIGERIA AS A STATE AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

The colonial domination of the geographical entity later named Nigeria was for centuries under the domination of different empires, kingdoms, serfdoms, and city-states. In a more term, there was no country like Nigeria before 20th century. It was purely of British coinage. In Africa, countries like Ghana, Egypt, Benin Republic, Morocco, Algeria and many more had been existed by name before the arrival of colonial masters from Europe. With minor exception of Egypt, all existed only in names without any clear geographical demarcation. After the surface departure of the colonial masters, most of the countries therefore decided to adopt the erstwhile kingdoms and empire names under which they were governed before the arrival of colonialism. The name "Nigeria" is therefore an adaptation from a series of suggestions available to the Governor-General of Nigeria, Lord Lugard, in 1914 (Azikiwe, 1929:330). In fact, the territories of Nigeria comprised many kingdoms before the annexation of Lagos, a western-coastal part of the country, in 1860. Most prominent of these kingdoms under which Nigeria had been existed before are Benin, Old Oyo Empire, Kanem-Borno Empire, Kano city-state and Songhai Empire. Each kingdom and Empire existed as separate entity and relationship between them was perceived as International Relations. The annexation of Lagos by the British in 1860 began the gradual process of total colonization of what eventually became Nigeria in 1914. The territory that was later captured was geographically divided into two i.e northern and southern protectorates (Elaigwu, 1988:174-175). Each of this geographical entity was administered separately and there was no attempt on the part of the colonial government to adopt unified system of administration.

By 1914, with effort from Lord Lugard, both territories were merged to form a single administrative entity and in this case, the name Nigeria was adopted without

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any proper consultation with the natives (Diamond, 1982:630). It needs to be stressed that despite merging both territories together, they were in practice being governed under separate administrative system. This explained why it was so difficult to reach consensus on the actual date of independence with the British government. The southern part had been agitating for independence since 1920 while the north did not make any move in this direction (Omoiya, 2012:9). It was this obvious difference that caused the self-rule to be delayed until 1957, when the country elected its first Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. But the country was still headed by the Queen of England until 1960 when full independent was granted.

Thus, for most part of the colonial years, the foreign policy of the country had been dominated by the British Commonwealth Office in London; while Nigerian did not have any input in the process of foreign policies that affects their lives (Ojo, 1983:57). It was in this process of foreign policy formulation by the colonial master that Nigerian soldiers were sent to the Eastern Europe, Far East and Middle East to fight on behalf of the Britain, a powerful member of allied powers, in the Second World War.[8]The return of these ex-servicemen from the war front confirmed that the white people were not invincible as hitherto perceived; they saw them fallen easily in the battlefront in the Middle East (Oliver & Atmore, 1976: 208). Once they arrived home, they related their experience to the nationalist leaders about the erroneous invincibility of the white people. This culminated in the pressure from the nationalists to demand for independence from the British. The independent was officially granted in October 1, 1960 and Balewa became the first Prime Minister under the Westmin-

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[8]The British established Royal West Africa Frontier Force under which Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Gambia fought gallantly in the Second World War. The total of 243,500 soldiers from all these four countries were conscripted and sent to war front in the Far East, Middle East and Europe. For detail on this see, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News Website November 9, 2009.

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ster system. In this way, the foreign policy formulation became a matter of urgency in order to make Nigeria relevant in the community of nations.

3.2.1 Development of Nigerian foreign policy in the post-colonial years

The granting of full autonomy to Nigeria as a geographical entity in 1960 necessitated the need to formulate independent foreign policy. The position of Nigeria in Africa became obvious to the nationalists and they responded as such. In Africa, Nigeria's independence signified a partial solace to many African countries, which were still under the colonial yoke. Although some countries like Egypt (1922), Liberia (1847) Ethiopia (never colonized), Ghana (1957) had gained their independence earlier, Nigeria's independence restored hope to some Africans and Nigerians alike because of its potential in term of natural endowments (Bach, 1983:35). In 1960, Nigeria became the largest African nation in term of population and its natural resource endowments rivaled any other countries at that time (Bach, 2007:301). The Nigerian nationalist leaders were well aware of Nigeria's potential in Africa and the global politics; and therefore decided to liberate all African countries from the yoke of imperialism and colonialism. In this way, Nigeria arrogated to itself the spokesperson of black race in the world (Falola & Heaton, 2008:258).

Moreover, Balewa, the first Prime Minister of the country, was of northern extraction with full western and Arabic education and he was a teacher until appointed as the country's Prime Minister. In his inaugural address in 1960, he clearly laid emphasis on the need for Nigeria to look into the problems of Africans rather than the outside world (Balewa, TNA, DO 177/12, 1960). The following are objectives of Nigerian foreign policy as declared by the first Prime Minister:

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- The termination or eradication of all forms of colonialism or colonial rule in Africa;

- Eradication of racial/apartheid policy in Southern Africa, most especially Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa;

- Commitment to functional cooperation with a view to promoting African unity;

- Promotion of peace in Africa and the world;

- Promotion of human dignity, especially the dignity of the black man; and

- Promotion of economic development and redressing the existing disequilibrium in the international political and economic system (Ojo, 1983:58).

As could be clearly gleaned from the objectives, the African issues are well ingrained in the foreign policy objectives after independence. This was clearly the beginning of Afro-centric focus in Nigeria's foreign policy. It will not be amiss to assert that at the point of independence in 1960, the British official had cleverly laid down the direction of Nigerian foreign policy with which the Balewa government would follow (Macleod, CO 554/1610, March 3, 1960). Balewa himself did not have any clue on how to govern the multi-ethnic society replete with all sorts of mutual suspicion and hatred. He therefore employed the external service in the drafting of Nigeria's foreign policy in 1959 under the headships of Peter Stallard & S.J. Fingland (Snelling, CO 554/2059, 19 January, 1959). While he was the Prime Minister he also held the position of Foreign Affairs Minister until 1961 (Ojo, 1983:57). In other words, Balewa performed the dual roles of a Foreign Affairs Minister and Prime Minister for certain period of time in Nigerian history. The corollary of this lopsided arrangement was that Balewa did not listen to homegrown nationalist leaders' ideas, instead leaned towards the directives laid down by the British authority

(Tijani, 2009:63). However, this political position on the part of Balewa can also be attributed to the international political climate of the time and the fragile domestic polity. This, therefore, tends to suggest that Balewa in collaboration with Britain singlehandedly created a path for the future direction of Nigerian foreign policy.

Thus, the path that such foreign policy formulation took cannot be fully explained without delving into the ministry that shoulders the responsibility of foreign policy in Nigeria. After the independence in 1960, Nigeria inherited the Ministry of Foreign affairs and Commonwealth Relations, the responsibility of which to manage the external relations of Nigeria (Ojo, 1983:57). In the colonial period, this ministry was controlled and managed by the British colonial government in London and consulates were established in Washington, London, Fernando Po, Khartoum and Mecca. In order to ensure the personnel in the Ministry of Foreign affairs were up to the task ahead of them, the British government sent forty Nigerians to Washington for diplomatic training while also assisted them to attend various UN Sessions in order to understand the workings of the organization (Mckay, 1964:154).

The establishment and management of scattered consulates were premised on the importance of those locations to the socio-political needs of Nigerians during the colonial period. For instance, the Mecca consulate was charged with the responsibility of taking care of Nigerian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia while the Washington's was to take responsibility of the welfare of Nigerian students in the US (Ojo, 1983). These centres were managed and funded by the colonial administration which tended to dictate the Nigeria's foreign policy at the time. This foreign office was inherited by the nationalist leaders with a little modification after independence in 1960.

3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA'S MULTILATERALISM

Taking a cursory look at objectives underlining Nigerian foreign policy (see page 112) it is conspicuous that most of these can be attained through multilateral means. This is what Nigeria government has been doing since independence. The idea of multilateral diplomacy in advancing Nigeria's hegemonic posture in Africa and global politics can be traced to pre-colonial period. It was the realization of the pivotal role of Nigeria in Africa that motivated Nigerian government to act through multilateral institutions (Adeniji, 2005:1). By 1919, some prominent Nigerians had been advocating for the need to secure independence from the British through Pan-African Movement, which had its root outside Africa, specifically form Central America.

The idea of emancipation of all black territories from the shackle of imperialism propelled some distinguished Nigerians who lived and educated in England and the US to join their counterparts from other parts of the globe. Nigerians like Herbert Macauley and Nnamdi Azikiwe (known globally as Zik of Africa) joined the Pan-African Conference that was held in Manchester in 1945, shortly after the Second World War (Adoghame, 2008:8). The essence of holding the meeting was to make sure that the African issues were tabled and considered at the time the UN was to be created. Also, to make sure that the normative principles inherent in the Atlantic Charters were applied to the African race. The pivotal role of Nigeria in the global politics through multilateral institutions was ingrained in 1919 when Nigeria and other British West African countries such as Gambia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone formed NCBWA with the sole objective of liberating the continent from the colonial yoke (Eluwa, 1971:205). In fact, a delegation was set up in 1920 among these countries and headed to London to meet colonial leaders on the need to demand for greater participation in their own domestic affairs. Lord Milner, the colonial secretary at

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the time rejected their demands (Eluwa, 1971:207). The rejection of the demands perhaps was one of the reasons that fuelled the need to strengthen the unity of Africans towards emancipation and decolonization of the continent.

Therefore, the establishment of NCBWA laid a solid foundation for the future multilateral undertakings in Nigeria. The idea behind the multilateral organization was that it is far better to act in unison than individual action. In the years preceding the Second World War, the Pan-African Congress in the US, Jamaica, Haiti, Grenada, Cuba, London, and France had been well established and known. The simple demand of the pan-African congress was the racial equality and independence of all African territories (Legum, 1966:528). It was in the midst of this global event that Nigeria under the umbrella of NCBWA represented the African nations in Manchester Conference of Pan-Africanism in 1945. Notable among African dignitaries were Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, William Tolbert from Liberia, Herbert Macauley and Nnamdi Azikiwe from Nigeria (Legum, 1966:533). There were also many delegates from the Caribbean and North America. All these events resulted in agitating for the establishment of indigenous African international organizations.

By 1950s, some African countries already became an independent entity and in this case Ghana, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria started to champion the course of establishing OAU (Omach, 2000:77). It did not come to fruition until Nigeria gained independence in 1960. The independence of Nigeria in 1960 further enriched the progress that led to the formation of the continental organization. The independence established Nigeria as the 99th member of UN and became the largest African member in both the UN and Commonwealth of Nations. The establishment of the OAU in 1963 signified the triumph of African leaders to take their destiny into

their hands (Touray, 2005:637). With the formation of OAU, many issues remained lingering in the minds of Nigerian leaders seeing the country as the automatic leader of African destiny.

One of such issue was the continuous domination of some African territories by the Europeans. Second, the political fragility of the African states rooted in the artificial boundary creation by the colonial powers. The third major issue for Nigerian leaders was how to pursue regional integration cum economic development in the midst of global political climate of the time. All these issues left many questions unanswered and the Nigeria's leaders after independence decided to redress the global imbalance through multilateral institutions (Adeniji, 2005:2). The creation of continental organization did not satisfy the appetite of Nigerian leaders for multilateral policy. In 1964, Nigeria proposed the need for the creation of West Africa Economic Council (WAEC). In addition, Niger Basin Commission and Lake Chad Basin Authority were formed at the instigation of Nigerian government to manage the water basin among the neighbouring countries (Frhd & Iwuhoa, 2012:77). West African Examination Council (WAEC), which was formed in 1952, was agitated for to take care of the educational standard of Anglophone West African countries. Although it was established while Nigeria was still under colonial rule, it gained strength with the departure of colonial governments from the region. However, the sub-regional economic organization was obviously impeded by the political climate of the time and most African countries were still trying to recover from the centuries-old domination from the colonial masters.

So, forming any sub-regional organization became a non-issue to most of them as they would not like ceding their hard-won independence to any higher authority less they regret it (Kacowicz, 1997:371). In other words, at the point Nigeria

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was advocating for sub-regional multilateral institution, most countries could not really understand the need for such a move. Most West African countries, in fact, were suspicious of Nigeria's domination because of its sheer size and population. This was how Nigeria failed in its bid to establish multilateral economic organization in West Africa in 1964. It was not until 1975, that other West African states agreed, through Nigeria diplomatic manoeuvre, to work together for ECOWAS establishment.

Furthermore, oil was struck in Nigeria in 1956 and commercial production started almost immediately for foreign exchange earnings. By 1970s, Nigeria had become one of the largest oil-exporting countries in the world and this position propelled it to join the OPEC in 1971. In order to bolster its global political and economic leverage, Nigeria used the opportunity to demonstrate its leadership willingness in the global politics through the cartel (Genova, 2010:118). By joining the organization in 1971, it became the most populous country in this multilateral organization.

3.3.1 Nigeria's Multilateralism and Legitimacy

The concept of legitimacy has rarely been assessed vis-à-vis Nigeria's multilateral policy. What the concept really portends in relation to Nigeria's foreign intervention is shrouded in confusion. Some scholars of internationalist orientations assert that the intervention of Nigeria abroad is legitimate if the UN or other regional bodies (Okeke, 2007:5) sanction it. Others are of the view that the Nigeria's foreign adventure needs to be legitimated from domestic political machinery. In terms of domestic legitimacy, Adeniji states,

> As far as Nigeria is concerned, the relevance of the UN has never been in doubt. The seemingly high profile of the global body in the conduct of the country's diplomacy is premised on the principle of multilateralism to which the Nigerian state has historically attached great importance (Adeniji, 2005:1)

This wake-up call on Nigeria's legitimacy in continental multilateral organization was evoked to argue against Nigeria's apathy to the US's bombing of Libya in 1986. It was argued that Nigeria should have condemned the US's bombing of Libya insofar it contravened one of the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy: Promotion of African unity. Although, Nigeria did not have the political and economic ability to threaten the US but its condemnation of the bombing would have sent a signal to the US when considering the political weight of Nigeria in the OAU. Also, in terms of external legitimacy of Nigeria's multilateral intervention, Article 42 of the UN Charter provides for the intervention of state in the internal affairs of other state for the sole purpose of restoring peace and security (Omach, 2000:76). In essence, UN Charter is readily available to provide legitimacy for Nigeria's multilateral intervention in such instance.

However, the argument is that foreign intervention is burdensome and as such should receive the blessing of domestic forces before it is taken. Both endogenous and exogenous approbation of intervention may be seen as complementing each other, not conflicting. Thus, the legitimization of intervention abroad needs to consider some important variables which are peculiar to Nigerian position in the global system. Before delving into this, there is a need to explore briefly what the concept of legitimacy means in the practice of international relations. Legitimacy is an act of being lawful. It is a process by which an action is deemed right or legal. According to Inis Claude, legitimacy is a critical aspect of politics together with power; and that power which is central to politics needs legitimacy to proof its legality (Claude, 1966:368; 1994:193). Thus, the concept of legitimacy is so widespread that most states called upon it may justify their actions. In fact, within the domestic political milieu, legitimacy dichotomizes the military rule from civilian administration and the

electorates in most cases provide the basis for democratic governance in a state. The concept of legitimacy is even sought after by the dictatorial regimes in order to provide legal basis for their action.

The above discussion therefore seems to equate legitimacy with rule of law and no wonder some states in the global politics try as much as possible to invoke the concept to justify their intervention. Claude asserts that "rulers seek legitimacy not only to satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their position" (cited in Luck, 2002: 48). National leaders, regional hegemons, global hegemons, judiciary and international institutions are the entities that do regularly employ the concept of legitimacy to justify their action, Nigeria is not an exception.

Legitimizing of Nigerian actions in the international organizations and global politics is provided for in the Nigerian Federal Constitution which stipulates multilateralism as one of the basic principles of Nigeria's foreign policy as quoted earlier. Since independence, various Nigerian governments seek legitimacy for their foreign intervention through constitution and National Assembly approval. But one thing that is missing here is the role of other domestic actors in legitimating Nigerian foreign adventurism. Since foreign intervention is financed by people's tax, other domestic actors like press, public opinion, pressure group and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) need to give their input in the process. In this case, legitimacy is sought through domestic consensus. In addition, the international organization through which Nigeria acts must also has the legitimacy to intervene in the domestic affairs of a certain state. Such legitimacy need to be provided by all parties making up such international organization. In this way, it is assumed that mutual consensus among the parties concerned can provide legitimacy for the action of the international organization and the corollary of this is that any state that wishes to act through such or-

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ganization is automatically considered having legitimacy. The prominent illustration in this scenario was the intervention of Nigeria in Mali in 2013. The legitimacy to intervene was provided by both Nigerian National Assembly and members of ECOWAS (Nwankwo, 2013:217).The Nigerian National Assembly and ECOWAS were of the view that the Tuareq strike in the northern Mali, if not immediately attended to, portends a significant threat to the security of the entire West African region.

However, it needs to be stated here that most times, the interest of a particular actor in certain issue may dictate the nature of legitimacy that will be sought. Legitimacy may be tacit in some cases especially if the actor concerned feel threatened by the event taken place in another state. In such a case, the concerned state may consider acting through multilateral organizations, a delay tactics and acting unilaterally in concert of friendly states may be a viable option. In such a circumstance, legitimacy is implied through the intervention of friendly countries. A prime example of such a case was the intervention of the US in the Gulf War in 1991 (Luck, 2002:59). Thus, the issue of legitimacy has to do with accountability and democratization of state action in the global politics, which in turn provide the basis for intervention. This view may appear moralistic as it guides against unwarranted intervention of the powerful against the weak. In Nigerian case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs examines the basis for intervention internally, think tanks like Nigeria Institute of International Affairs and National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, National Assembly, National Assembly Committee on Foreign Affairs and the President and his Cabinet (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015; Ojo, 1983:65).

Externally, depending on the issue at hand, Nigeria legitimatize its foreign intervention mainly through UN, OAU/AU, ECOWAS and other multilateral institutions of which Nigeria is a member. Besides all these internal and external source of

legitimacy, national and international expediency may force a state like Nigeria to intervene in a foreign country. Sao Tome and Principe intervention by Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo is a prime example. Military junta who was at ECOWAS meeting in Abuja, Nigeria overthrew the elected government of Sao Tome and Principe (Durotoye, 2014:27). Nigeria unilaterally issued a warning to the military regime to leave within 24 hours. It was such ultimatum that forced the military regime to flee and the civilian government reinstated.

Although, Nigeria acted unilaterally in such a case and did not need any legitimacy to interfere on the issue but one needs to recognize the fact that it may appear that Nigeria acted unilaterally; it did not. It was part and parcel of ECOWAS Declaration that no government ever seize power by force will be recognized by the member states and such declaration in itself can be invoked to provide a legitimacy for Nigeria's action in Sao Tome (Omach, 2000:79). Thus, the ECOWAS Declaration has provided the basis for Nigeria's intervention which was tantamount to multilateral diplomacy in disguise.

3.3.2 Essence of Multilateralism in Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Whether the Nigerian multilateral policy receives its legitimacy from external or internal sources remains an intellectual debate. What is clear is that its multilateral policy has important role to play in foreign policy making. Globally, states have resulted to multilateral policy for one reason or another. Nigeria at the point of independence realized the danger of acting alone in the anarchical global environment without the support of friendly states. Given the state of Nigerian politics at the point of independent, it was natural that the state adopted multilateralism as one of the cardinal

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principles of its foreign policy (Chibundi, 2003:2). The question that one should ask at this point is: What is the essence of multilateralism in Nigerian foreign policy?

The essence of multilateralism in Nigerian foreign policy could be grouped into the following: First, multilateral policy construed by various Nigerian leaders, has been regarded as window of opportunity for economic development (Pogoson, 2011:47; Ojo, 1980:573). In the early years of Nigerian independent, the federal government could see the sign that a state cannot be island onto itself if economic advancement is to be accomplished within the spate of time. It was the pressure of raising the standard of living at home and to make sure that Nigerian economy are well integrated into world economy that spurred the urge for multilateral undertakings. In other words, the need to align with financial and economic powerhouse like the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, and other developed countries in the IMF, GATT, and World Bank that necessitated the multilateral policy at the time of independent. Second, Nigeria also sees cooperating with other states in the multilateral organizations as a strategy to contain the threat of great powers, especially France, in the global politics (Ojo, 1980:580). This prophetic assumption came to the fore during the Nigerian civil war. Again, multilateralism is seen as means to boost image of Nigeria in the global society (Shaw, 1984:395). The consideration of Nigeria as the most important single element in African politics endeared the leaders to pursue multilateral policy in order to safeguard the interest of Africans anywhere in the globe.

Thus, the first attempt on the part of Nigerian leader to achieve this noble objective was to join the UN in its effort at curbing the state collapse in the Congo in the early days of independence in 1960. Nigeria was so embroiled in the Congolese debacle that the then Prime Minister of Nigeria questioned the degree at which the

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colonial master consulted the Congolese people before the declaration of independence. Balewa asserted that,

> The recent tragic events in the Congo must be uppermost in all our minds…I frankly admit that there are many features of this seemingly intractable problem which remain obscure to me. I am in some doubt as to the exact manner in which the constitution granting independence to that country was drawn up by the colonial power…and as to the degree of consultation there was with the Congolese peoples themselves, and at what level that consultation was carried out (Balewa, 1960; see Appendix III).

This is one of the instances of Nigerian leader's carefully worded message that exemplifies their concern to African problems. Because of the need to ensure safety and security of Congolese people were guaranteed, the Nigeria government was compelled to act through the UN. In sum, the factors of security and economy as enumerated above are regarded as the essence of Nigeria's multilateral policy and all these factors have been given detail attention in Chapter Five.

3.3.3 Features of Nigeria's Multilateralism

The practice of any policy by a state normally follows certain pattern which may distinguishes it from the practice of other state. This may be attributed to the peculiar characteristic of a state. The adoption and practice of Nigerian foreign policy has been consistent since independence and the pattern seems to remain the same over decades. As such, some features are identified which are peculiar to Nigeria's multilateral policy.

One of such features is leadership focus. Since independence, various leaders of Nigeria have been exhibiting consistency in the policy of multilateralism, a consistency that is very rare in the domestic realm (Barika, 2014:54). What is remarkable about Nigeria is its consistent multilateral policy since independence. No Nigerian leader has abandoned multilateral policy since independence and the zeal is

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shown in global, regional and sub-regional multilateral institutions. Another feature is the recognition of institutional power by Nigerian government. The Nigeria's 'manifest destiny' in African places it at the centre-stage of African and global politics (Adebajo, 2003:66). In order to discharge its responsibility as a regional hegemon in Africa, Nigerian leaders recognize the role multilateral institutions can play to legitimate its position in Africa. In this quest the advocacy for regional and sub-regional organizations has been central to Nigerian foreign policy since independence (Adebajo, 2003: 65). The mere recognition of the danger of acting alone in the continent might be responsible for Nigeria's multilateral zeal in global political atmosphere.

Norms is also central to the Nigeria's multilateral policy. The norms of international politics endeared Nigeria to multilateral policy and since independent deviation has not been recorded. The most important feature of multilateral institutions is its normative principles which tend to control the behaviour of states in the international system. This approach seems to toe the liberal view in international politics. Nigeria by independence realized the danger inherent in colonialism, which Balewa was not prepared to champion. The idea of hasty decolonization of Africa did not occur to Nigeria under the Balewa government because he did not want the case of Congolese to repeat itself in Africa (Saliu, 2007:1). Rather, Nigeria opted for gradual decolonization of African territories based on the internal integration of the state. It thus may be wrong to assert that the first Nigerian Premier did not promote decolonization of Africa; it advocated systematic and functional decolonization.

One of the cardinal normative principles of international organization, which Nigerian found attractive during the heyday of independence, is the equality of all member states of the UN. This golden theoretical principle did not only affect Nige-

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ria's membership in the UN, it also dictated the direction of Nigeria's behaviours to-

wards its neighbours (Adeniji, 2005:2). It was based on this principle that Nigeria

severed Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact in 1962, as Nigeria did not want to set a bad

precedence in Africa (Nwokedi, 1985:198). Such Defence Pact might propelled some

other countries, especially the Francophone, to enter into defence alliance with their

erstwhile colonial master, a step which Nigerian leader regarded as a threat to the

African territorial integrity. It was also based on the principle of equality of member

states that Nigeria denounced the testing of Atomic Bomb by France in the Sahara

Desert in 1962 (Chibundi, 2003:3). The conviction of such a reaction was the idea

that no state should be subservient to another as long as they are all member of the

same international organizations, the UN, which preaches the normative principle of

equality.

Another normative principle is that of Atlantic Charter jointly declared by the

US President, Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill

which is incorporated into the UN Charter in 1945. The Charter, which was drafted

by the duo in 1941, declared that all colonial territories should be independent and no

territories should be forcibly occupied outside the intent of the colonized people.

Such a declaration was capitalized on by Nigeria through its decolonization cam-

paign in Africa and other colonized territories in the world (Fafowora, 1997:52). Alt-

hough it took decades before such agitation could be materialized but such normative

principle provided a basis upon which Nigerian leaders reacted to colonization in Af-

rica after independence.

Another component of Nigeria's multilateral policy is soft and high politics.

The conduct of Nigerian multilateral policy is rest on the assumption of cooperation

at both high and soft political level. Such high politics like war, peace, foreign af-

fairs, defence, domestic security, and regional security have occupied the minds of policy formulators in Nigeria since independence (Barika, 2014:53). The idea is that for such sensitive issues to be resolved the multilateral institutions could be a reliable mechanism that could be employed to suppress the incidence both in Africa and the globe.

Furthermore, concentrism is another major feature of Nigeria's multilateralism. This feature was originally a theory designed for urban structural formation. It was first employed by sociologist Ernest Burgess in 1923 to understand the growth and development in the urban agglomeration. It stresses that the development and arrangement in the urban social setting arise naturally without any formal planning and prior knowledge of topographical harmony. The theory also states that patterns of actions revolve round a circle, which defines the whole (Omotere, 2011). In foreign policy analysis, it simply means that policy of a state revolves around a circle that shares the same centre or source. Many scholars, most especially from developing countries have been using the theory in explaining the foreign policy of states. Dawi (2003) employed the concept in studying the foreign policy of Indonesia where he identified four circles. President Abdel Nasser of Egypt in 1970s also located the foreign policy of Egypt within the three concentric circles i.e. Arab, Africa and Muslim and it defined the role Egypt plays in the global politics in the 1970s (Zartman, 1967: 549). The concept has thus being employed to define the boundary of states' foreign policy towards external environment. It is an avenue for ordering the state role in the international system in the order of priority. Ibrahim Gamabari (1989) also coined the theory in designing the foreign policy of Nigeria when he was the Foreign Affairs Minister of Nigeria. In applying this concept to foreign policy of states, it relies on the state's geography, internal capabilities, and external threat perception. All

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these variables make states prioritize their foreign policy agenda by applying the concept.

Moreover, con-centrist circle is based on the idea that the Nigerian foreign policy in its strictest form will follow specific pattern in its formulation and implementation. It is premised on the arranging of wants and needs in the order of importance. Simply put, it is hierarchical ordering of Nigeria's foreign policy priority in the global politics. In this way the innermost circle is Nigeria and its neighbours; the second circle explains the role of Nigeria in West African region; the third circle borders on the Nigeria's role towards Africa and last circle, the outside world (Ali, 2012:13; Akinterinwa, 2004; Benjamin-Teryima, 2014:1). In this ordering, the multilateral policy becomes a necessity to achieve such aims. Although, the concentric circle gained currency during the time of Ibrahim Gambari, a former Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister, it has been implicit in the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence (Benjamin-Teryima, 2014:2)

Thus, it is implicitly inferred that there is a connection between the concentric circle and Nigerian foreign policy. According to Omotere (2011),

> Analysis of Nigeria's foreign policy shows that her leaders operate within four "concentric circles" of national interest. The innermost circle represents Nigeria's own security, independence and prosperity and is centred on its immediate neighbours- Benin, Cameroun, Chad and Niger; the second circle revolves around Nigeria's relations with its West African neighbours; the third circle focuses on continental African issues of peace, development and democratization; and the fourth circle involves Nigeria's relations with organizations, institutions and states outside Africa.

Nigeria's foreign policy is tailored towards the four continuums which are interlinked in formulating and implementing Nigeria's foreign policy. In its first circle, Nigeria uses Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger Development Authority and Gulf of Guinea Community. The second circle uses ECOWAS while the third uses

OAU/AU. The last circle employs UN, OPEC, and Commonwealth of Nations. It needs to be stressed here that the employment of each multilateral organization at each circle does not really constitute a separation; they are clearly intertwined. Nigeria, for example, uses ECOWAS as launching pad to assert its role in global politics not necessarily limited to West African sub-region. This is because ECOWAS naturally serves as a mechanism to balance, on the part of regional partners, the hegemonic position of Nigeria in West Africa but Nigeria uses the regional forum to cater both for its backyard and for global influence particularly the UN. Therefore, the CCT can be used in explaining and analyzing the multilateral policy of Nigeria since independence. All the above features are important to give a preliminary guide to the direction of Nigeria's multilateral policy.

3.4 **CONCLUSION**

The response of Nigeria towards external environment is reminiscent of its colonial experience. Shortly after Nigeria got its political independence, Nigeria aggressively launched itself into continental politics to arrest the socio-political malaise plaguing Africa. The historical narratives therefore show that the colonial master of which Balewa decided to employ subsequently designed Nigeria's foreign policy direction. Nevertheless, the employment did not suggest that Nigeria's foreign policy shortly after independence was completely dictated by the British. Nigeria exhibited proactive foreign policy implementation despite the virtual presence of the British after independence. This could be seen in the way Nigeria responded to all the West's activities in Africa. One of the first steps Nigeria took was to abrogate the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact in 1962, which culminated in campaign against the racist regime in Southern Africa countries. Thus, in order to perform the leadership function

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in Africa in 1960s Nigeria resulted to the employment of multilateralism, most importantly the UNO and the Commonwealth, to challenge the West and its cohorts on the issue pertaining to racism, decolonization and development in Africa. Therefore, all Nigeria leaders since 1960 have been employing multilateralism to play leadership role in Africa. This leadership response has been discussed in Chapter Four.

CHAPTER FOUR

EMERGENCE OF NIGERIA AS A REGIONAL HEGEMON IN AFRICA

Most scholars of international relations accept the denominator of relative material preponderance of state as one of the reliable indicators of regional powerhood. Schirm, (2006:2); Nolte (2010:889); Bach (2007:303); Frazier & Stewart Ingersoll (2010) agree that high Gross Domestic Product (GDP), population, military capability and relative economic prosperity are the indicators of regional power status of a state within a delineated geographical setting. This does not only apply to regional hegemon but also great power and global hegemon (Prys, 2010:8). It is on this basis that power of a state is measured in relation to another. In differentiating between regional power and hegemon, Prys (2010:10) established that the ability of a regional power to convert such relative material preponderance to perform certain task and carry the regional burden is an important indicator of regional hegemonic position. One of such tasks is the provision of public goods i.e. maintenance of peace and order. Prys, therefore, identifies four main factors that may transform a regional power to regional hegemon. These factors are self-perception, regional perception, provision of public goods and projection of power to secondary states within a region (Prys, 2010:21).

It is thus based on the delineation that Nigeria as a regional hegemon will be examined. To provide further empirical evidence for these hegemonic indicators, Chapter Five has been devoted for such. The aim of this chapter therefore is to consider the extent to which Nigeria can be considered a regional hegemon in African

continent since 1960. The discussion is primarily based on material capabilities and to what extent such capabilities allow for a strong and influential foreign policy decisioning in Africa. Of course, it must be remembered that there has to be willingness and ability to maximise the resources potential of a state in the implementation of active policies. This discussion, then hinges upon resources and power projection that establish the hegemonic position of Nigeria in Africa which inform the employment of multilateralism as an important option to actualise and maintain the regional hegemonic status. The chapter also briefly highlights the response of each Nigeria's administration to its regional hegemonic posture vis-à-vis multilateralism. In this way the chapter serves as a prelude to Nigeria's hegemonic role in international institutions. To examine the hegemonic posture of Nigeria in Africa, and most importantly in West Africa, the typology of Prys (2010); Buzan & Weaver (2003); Nolte (2010); Lemke (2002); Patrick & Stewart-Ingersoll (2010) in defining regional hegemony is adopted in providing the basis for Nigeria's regional hegemonic presence in Africa.

4.1 NIGERIA AND SELF PERCEPTION IMAGE IN AFRICA

The process of leadership assumption by Nigeria in 1960 can be linked to Nigeria's material capability and colonial experience (Bach, 2007:303). Such material capabilities are embedded in demographic preponderance, geographical location, huge natural resources and military. Colonial experience can be found in the way African was partitioned by the Europeans; the experience of slavery; economic marginalisation and neo-colonial temptation (Osuntokun, 2005:38). All these factors summed together have endeared Nigeria to claim leadership position in Africa and place the continental burden on its shoulders (Ajayi, 2006: 114; Akinyemi, 2005; Shaw, 1987: 42).

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The Nigerian nationalist leaders who were instrumental to the eventual attainment of Nigerian independence also played greater role in defining the course of leadership role being played by Nigeria subsequently after independence. The leadership perception of Nigerian role in Africa can be likened to role theory which defined the role a country will play within the international system based on the perception of leaders (Holsti, 1970:235). Shortly after Nigeria attained its independence, the first Prime Minister of Nigeria on August 20, 1960 at the Federal House of Assembly, declared that Nigeria was, "adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa; it would be our aim to assist any country to find solution to its problem" (Al-Hassan, 2009: 2). The declaration was based on the role Nigeria was expected to play in Africa.

In this way, what could be regarded as "founding fathers" were those actively involved in the process that led to the attainment of Nigeria's independence in 1960. Most of these elites occupied positions in the civil service, parliament, press, and educational sector. To some of the so called founding fathers the colonial experience served as a school of sort that later dictated their response to the outside world in the course of formulation of country's foreign policy (Folarin, 2010:217). The founding fathers, reminiscent of their colonial experience, were of the views that the Nigeria's independence was not complete until the whole continent gain freedom for self-government. Despite some of these nationalist leaders were product of colonial education, they have learnt basic rudiment concerning freedom, equality, justice, and democracy (Folarin, 2010:218). This experience enabled them to envisage the need to tailor Nigeria's foreign policy towards the dismantling of colonial rule from the continent. It should be stressed here that the Second World War made the Nigerian nationalist leaders realised that the Europeans lacked moral right and obligation to

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perpetuate their lordship over their territories (Osuntokun, 2005:30). Some of Nigerian soldiers who were actively engaged in battle front in Europe, East Asia, and North Africa narrated their ordeal to nationalist leaders at home. The myth of European invincibility and superiority were discarded and the nationalist leaders were convinced that the so-called white people were not immortal as earlier presumed (Olusanya, 1968:227). Some of these founding fathers are Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Anthony Enahoro, Pa Imoudu, Obafemi Awolowo, Aminu Kano, Ladipo Solanke, Samuel Ladoke Akintola, and Ahmadu Bello. They employed and use the available channels to fight colonialism in Nigeria (Ubaku, Emeh & Anyikwa, 2014:60). Some of their actions were Afro-centric in nature which later set a tone for the role perception of Nigeria in the continent. The relative large number of educated elites in Nigeria which dictated the manner with which their ideas of freedom and equality were communicated to the African continent served as policy precedence which Nigeria later assumed in the continent.

Thus, it was coincidental at the time Nigeria got its independence to discover that most of these vocal elements later occupied some political positions in the administration of the country. As such, it created window of opportunity to set the tone of foreign policy towards leadership aspirations in Africa. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first Nigerian President stressed thus:

> Britain (and the West) cannot be fighting a war of liberation and yet keep (us) in political bondage… (African) soldiers are now shedding their blood. In the deserts of the Middle East, in the jungles of Burma, in the wilds of North Africa, in the mountains of East Africa, they are sacrificing in order to make the world safe for democracy. They fight and die so that…the rest of the world may have life and enjoy political freedom…Will their sacrifice be in vain? (Azikiwe, 1943: 60).

In addition, Obafemi Awolowo, the Premier (Governor) of the Western Region disclosed in 1966 that,

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> It is not infrequently the case that Africans demand that something
> should be done for them simply because it is being done for the Euro-
> peans…There is a burning desire to demonstrate that the Africans too
> can do what Europeans can do. This is natural and legitimate
> (Awolowo, 1966: 112).

The nature of roles Nigeria conceived for itself immediately after independence were primarily Africa-centred. In this way, it may be safe to conclude that Nigeria's Africa-centred policy orientation is as old as the state itself. It needs to be stated here that the continental leadership notion being held by Nigerian leaders gained currency during the colonial period and this has remained the same for most part of post-independent years (Folarin, 2010:219). This leadership aspiration has persisted for decades and nothing has made Nigerian leaders to jettison the African leadership conception. It is even more ironical to note that the policy articulation has remained the same despite some periodical social, economic, and political upheavals being experienced by Nigeria (Nwoke, 2005:115). Perhaps, the persistence may be explained by the roles Nigeria conceived for itself in Africa of which no leader has deviated from. According to Obadare (2001), the best suitable explanation for such persistence in Nigeria's role conceptions in Africa is a function of demography, economy and natural endowments. The same factors might have propelled the first Nigeria president, Nnamidi Azikiwe, to lament during his address at a public gathering in London on July 31, 1959 that, "It should be the manifest destiny of Nigeria to join hands with other progressive forces in the world in order to emancipate not only the people of Africa but also other peoples of African descent from the scourge of colonialism" (Azikiwe, 1961: 64).

It needs to be stressed here that the Nigeria's perception of its natural leadership position in Africa might have played a role when the first Prime Minister, Balewa, reacted to Kwame Nkrumah's proposal for United States of Africa in 1960.

Nkrumah, the President of Ghana at the time, proposed that African countries were artificial creation of the colonial masters and that all African countries should unite to become one country (Oliver & Atmore, 1971:285). In reaction to the proposal, Balewa insisted that, "Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others… if others wish to join Nigeria, their position would be made clear to them in such a union" (cited in Phillips, 1964: 90). Eventually in 1963, when OAU was about to be inaugurated it was Nigeria's position that later prevailed and adopted by the collectivity of African countries. According to Oliver & Atmore (1971:285), "in the eventual formation of the OAU in 1963 …it was the view of Nigeria's Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and not that of Ghana's Nkrumah, that was adopted by OAU". Thus, this position contradicts earlier assumption by some scholars who are of the view that Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah was more assertive than Nigeria in the leadership of Africa. Nigeria in the 1960s can be better described as being cautious in its foreign policy assertiveness. Nigeria's role conception has been well pronounced and established by the nationalist leaders and was free of any ambiguity since attaining political independence in 1960. Through the content analysis of speeches, parliamentary debates, official documents and press conferences, it showed that Nigerian policy makers, elites, public and military are aware of the certain roles perceived for the country. Thus, the self-perception of Nigeria's leadership role in Africa is all-encompassing; ranging from collective security to economic integration (see Chapter Five).

4.2 REGIONAL PERCEPTION IN AFRICA

From Nigeria's independence in 1960, most African countries have realized the potential of Nigeria as the leading country on the continent most especially within the

West African Sub-region. The regional perception towards Nigeria has made it to function actively as the main regional leader to be called upon in the wake of any problem. Nelson Mandela, the late former President of South Africa once affirmed that "the world will not respect Africa until Nigeria earns that respect. The black people of the world need Nigeria to be great as a source of pride and confidence" (Quoted in Maja-Pearce, 2013). As established by some scholars, one of the most important ingredients of regional hegemonic status is the recognition given by the secondary state or regional partners (Prys, 2010). In this case, Nigeria has been duly recognized, although with some element of resentment, as one of the most foremost regional hegemons in Africa. This regional leadership has been displayed in various countries through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral means. In 1960, Nigeria responded to the Congo civil war by sending troops under UN peacekeeping mission (Chibundi, 2003:5). 1n 1961, Nigeria also unilaterally condemned the testing of Atomic Bomb in the Algerian Sahara by France which ultimately led to the breaking of diplomatic ties between the two countries (Bolarinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). The question that may arise here is: What was Nigeria intended to achieve by breaking diplomatic ties with France because of Algeria? One possible explanation for this might be an attempt to warn France that Nigeria would not accept a situation whereby Africa, especially the francophone West African countries, would become a launch pad where its security could be compromised. Another possible explanation would be an attempt to deter further aggression form France given Nigeria's market potential to France's finished goods.

In 1975, Nigeria's regional leadership acceptance manifested in the manner with which African countries tacitly allowed Nigeria to lead African Caribbean and the Pacifics (ACP) negotiation with the European Economic Community (EEC)

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(Aluko, 1983:84). Despite the incompatibility of the negotiation with Nigerian national economic interest, as critically evaluated by Nigeria at the time, Nigeria led all African countries to the negotiation in 1975 (Aluko, 1983:85). In the post-Cold War international system, most African countries, especially within the West African subregion have on many occasions invited Nigeria to intervene in their internal affairs for purpose of installing political and social decorum. In 1990, in the early days of post-Cold War, Nigeria was invited by Samuel Doe of Liberia to rescue the country from imminent collapse (Salami, 2013:15). Also, in 1998, Sierra Leone under President Ahmad Tejah Kabah invited Nigerian government to restore order and rule of law in the country (Bach, 2007:309). In 2003, President Frederique de Menezes was deposed by military coup while attending the 6th Leon Sullivan Summit in Nigeria. President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria reacted by given 24-hour ultimatum for the restoration of the deposed president, which was quickly honoured by the military junta (Odigbo, Udaw & Igwe, 2014:99). There are many cases of Nigeria's regional acceptance as regional hegemon and some of these are discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

In terms of public goods provision, Nigeria has restored order, rule of law, and promoting good governance in Africa. The successful formation of AU in 2002 in Durban, South Africa was the brainchild of Nigeria's President Obasanjo and South Africa's Mbeki. It needs to be stressed here that "the Nigerian democratic consolidation coupled with President Obasanjo's international influence helped sustain the eventual formation of the AU together with NEPAD which has received recognition by the EU, UN and the Group of Eight countries (G-8) as the only reliable mechanism through which African malaise can be ameliorated" (Bolarinwa, Pers. Comm. January 28, 2015). Before the transformation of OAU to AU Obasanjo,

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Mbeki and Abdulaye Wade of Senegal had earlier proposed the formation of African home grown mechanism that will guarantee the promotion of rule of law, human rights, good governance, democracy and eradication of corruption in Africa (Folarin, 2010:395). The document establishing NEPAD was finally ratified in 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria and it was acceptable to African countries, the UN and donor countries (Pers. Comm., Bolarinwa, January 28, 2015). It needs to be stated here that the provision of public goods as espoused by most scholars as a credible indicator of hegemony is not only peculiar to Nigeria alone. The promotion of African Union has been part of Muammar Gadaffi's campaign, but most African countries, especially the two fore-most continental hegemons, South Africa and Nigeria did not trust Libya's proposal as its African Union definition tended to override the principle of sovereign equality of member states (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 29, 2015). Earlier in the 1980s, Gadaffi intended to occupy part of Chad and also meddled in the internal affairs of Liberia in the 1990s. These two cases of West African encroachment made Nigeria to prevent the Gadaffi's proposal from being champion the transformation of OAU to AU.. Gaddaffi proposed African unity under the umbrella of a President who will manage the affairs of the whole continent (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 29, 2015). This proposal made Nigeria to be wary of Libya in the proposed continental organization. Given the antecedents of Libyan overzealous leadership aspiration in the continent, Nigeria alongside South Africa designed the outcome of the continental organization in 2002 (Akinterinwa, 2015).

Thus, AU and NEPAD function together as the continental organization to alleviate the sufferings of Africans. In this manner, Nigeria has been influencing preferences and values within Africa political space. At sub-regional level, Nigeria displayed its hegemonic position by single-handedly sponsored the establishment of

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ECOWAS in 1975 which continues to provide platform for Nigeria's regional hege-

monic position (Nwoke, 2005:120). In 1999, in recognition of its role in Africa, Ni-

geria under President Obasanjo proposed the integration of the ECOWAS and South-

ern African Development Community (SADC) to hasten the proposal of African

Economic Community (The Washington Post, 1999). Obasanjo made the proposal

during the 19th anniversary of SADC, the organization that clearly establishes the

hegemonic position of South Africa in Southern African region. Both Nigeria and

South Africa are the two regional hegemons in Africa with each providing public

goods to their respective region. Both also direct the affairs of their sub-regional or-

ganization. In 1975, for example, Nigeria created a Trust Fund of $80 million under

African Development Bank to assist African countries in their developmental process

(Mailafia, 2010:179). In this manner, some African countries willingly accept the

leadership of Nigeria in Africa while other tactically resent it. Thus, having played

these roles, it was clear that Nigeria has been presenting itself as both proxy and be-

nevolent hegemon in Africa since 1960.

4.3 **NIGERIA AS A PROXY HEGEMON**

Nigeria as a proxy hegemon in Africa acts in two ways. First, it acts as the pro-

gramme coordinator and part of implementation committee for the G-8[9] and other

western countries. Second, it acts as the promoter of global values in terms of securi-

ty, peacekeeping, peacemaking and mediation (see Chapter Five). Nigeria, one of the

most influential countries in Africa, is being regarded by world powers as the major

Africa country to befriend. It needs to be noted that Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah

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[9]The Group of Eight (G8) refers to the group of eight highly industrialized nations—France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, theUnited States, Canada, and Russia—that hold an annual meeting to foster consensus on global issues like economic growth and crisis management, global security, energy, and terrorism

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championed African cause before Nigeria got its independence in 1960. Although Nigeria assumed leadership of Africa immediately after independence, one needs to recognise that Ghana had been performing such role before the assumption of Nigeria. Even when Nigeria did so, Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah was still very powerful in the continent. This was reflected in the way Ghana doled out $10 million to Guinea during the campaign for independence in 1958 (New Magazine, May 3, 2013). In fact, Nkrumah was part of delegate that represented African interest in Pan African conference in Manchester in 1945 (George, 2013). Ghana under Nkrumah continued to champion African cause until his death in 1972.

Moreover, such activities dwindled immediately Nigeria attained its independence. Therefore, most countries, especially the great powers and international institutions always put Nigeria in mind anytime the issue pertaining to Africa crops up (Akniterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). In this way, most of the continent responsibilities have always been placed on Nigeria's shoulders. Whenever there is any problem anywhere in Africa the first country of reference is Nigeria. This is the reason why Nigeria has been seeing intervening in all corners of Africa since independence. This role started from 1960, when the Acting Secretary-General of the UN, Mr. U. Than appointed Nigerian Commissioner of Police as administrative officer in Congo (Chibundi, 2003:4). The same Secretary-General also appointed a Nigerian, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, as the first African Commander of the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo. Nigeria performed creditably "on the political and diplomatic front and also served on the UN Advisory Committee on Congo, the Secretary-General's Congo Club and later chaired the Congo Conciliation Commission (CCC), barely a month after joining the UN" (Sanda, 2010:63). The major rationale behind the selection was based on the perceived role Nigeria was expected to play in

bringing peace and order to African countries. It was also aim to create a sense of belonging for Nigerian government in the issue pertaining to Africa. In fact, Nigeria was accorded proper recognition on issue pertaining to Africa in 1960 by removing the Rajeshwal Dayal, head of the UN mission in Congo, on Nigeria's complaint and replaced him with a Nigerian named Francis Nwokedi and a Ghanaian (Sanda, 2010:63).

Since 1960, Nigeria has been acting as proxy hegemon in Africa through peacekeeping and mediating roles in the UN. According to General Agwai (2010), the head of the UN/AU joint force in Darfur,

> The commitment to global peace in the UN has continued to define Nigeria's foreign policy since her independence in 1960. And nowhere is it more evident than in Africa which has remained the cornerstone of her foreign policy. Today, Nigeria is the leading peace-keeping nation in Africa and has shown tremendous leadership in all regional and continental efforts in conflict management.

In most of the trouble spots, where Nigeria intervened in Africa, it has always been acting on behalf of global hegemon and powers. This is mostly true of Sierra Leone and Liberia civil wars where the US and Britain, under the UN, allowed Nigeria to exploit all mechanisms to front the battle of reconciliation and peace building (Salami, 2013:141). Although, both the US and Britain later intervened, especially in Sierra Leone but the contributions of Nigeria to the eventual restoration of order in both countries was recognized and appraised by the UN (UNSC, 2003). The intervention of the major powers was needed in order to provide legitimacy for the intervention of the regional power. In terms of peacekeeping and peacemaking, Nigeria's Military Command in Kaduna has been approved as the UN training centre for would-be troops from West Africa (Alli, 2010). Inevitably, Nigeria has been per-

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forming the role of proxy hegemon in African politics. Nigeria, as noted earlier, alongside South Africa played prominent role in the formation of NEPAD in 2001.

Beginning from the formation, the G-8, EU and UN have accepted it as the forum to channel the developmental goals, including assistance to African countries. This legitimization and global acceptance by global powers can be regarded as a signpost to the acceptance of Nigeria as a proxy hegemon in Africa. This recognition was brought to the fore in 2003 during the presidential election in Zimbabwe. Nigeria under President Obasanjo supported Zimbabwe's emergence, which the West later denounced as an attempt on the part of Nigeria to compromise democratic standard (Folarin, 2010:401). The support given by Nigeria alongside South African were seen by the West as an attempt to rally support for their African brother in the face of western position (Folarin, 2010: 400). In 2003, Nigeria finally supported the withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in 2003 together with John Howard of Australia. The voting was held in Abuja, Nigeria in which Australia and Nigeria voted for the suspension of Zimbabwe against South African vote (Nyoni, 2007). The West claimed that Mugabe's attempt to hang on to power at all cost impelled him to commit gross human right abuse, amendment of constitution and land reform against the white (Folarin, 2010:395). The reaction of the West to Nigeria and South Africa's stance was the reduction in the annual aid given to NEPAD. The G-8 had earlier promised to assist NEPAD programmes with $64 billion and based on the Nigerian and South African sympathy to Mugabe's cause, only $6 billion was allocated (Folarin, 2010:401). With this financial disappointment, Nigeria remained committed to NEPAD cause has ever and Obasanjo as the Steering Committee advised the AU member the need to forge ahead (Fawole, 2004: 47).

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The step taken by the G-8 reveals that both Nigeria and South Africa are important strategic partners to the cause of major powers in Africa. Had Nigeria and South Africa went against the Zimbabwe cause, the response of the G-8 might be different to NEPAD. Thus, Nigeria has been a key player in African in relation to the interest of global powers. Some of the roles being played by Nigeria in the continent as a regional hegemon have been given extensive attention in Chapter Five.

4.4 NIGERIA AS A BENEVOLENT HEGEMON

Nigeria plays an important role in Africa in the area of assistance to needy countries. This assistance is most channelled through OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth (Mailafia, 2010:161). There are also some unilateral and bilateral channels through which Nigeria display its benevolence to African countries. For example, Nigeria under president Babangida established Technical Aids Corps Scheme (TACS) to assist needy African countries in the area of human capital and technical development. Nigeria is the sub-Saharan Africa country that offers this kind of programme to assist needy countries in all areas of development (Mailafia, 2010:177). The scheme was established in 1986 by a decree to promote Nigeria's regional hegemonic posture in Africa and Africa Diaspora. It needs to be stressed here that the scheme is being operated under the flagship of ACP countries. This suggests that the assistance is not limited to African countries; it included all countries in the Caribbean and the Pacifics. This scheme has achieved greater success in serving as important tool of foreign policy to assist the needy countries. According to Mailafia (2010:178),

> In the East African country of Uganda, TACs volunteers were responsible for the design and implementation of the IT network of the Kampala Institute of Teacher Education. In the Caribbean nation of Dominica, Nigerian TAC volunteers successfully designed and launched a new healthcare delivery system while one of the volunteers was retained as pioneer director of the Primary Healthcare System. In Zam-

bia, a volunteer was said to have designed and launched the first programme in Dentistry at the Medical School of the University of Zambia. In the Gambia, one of the Nigerian volunteers became the first Vice-Chancellor of the country's pioneer university. In Jamaica, another volunteer drew up the first of the country's national land survey. Several other success stories have been registered in countries as diverse as Fiji, Seychelles and Sierra Leone.

In 2014, Brazil, Venezuela, and Vietnam have also signified their willingness to benefit from the scheme and have made their position known to Nigerian government (This Day, September 10, 2014). According to the Director-General of the Directorate, TACs, Dr. Pius Osiyekanmi, "the scheme serves as enduring technical assistance scheme which identified the use of the large pool of trained man power available in Nigeria to enhance the social-economic development of benefitting countries" (ThisDay, September 10, 2014). The scheme was designed in 1986 as a tool of foreign policy to garner goodwill for Nigeria in the comity of nations. Under this scheme, over 38 countries have benefitted since 1986 in terms of provision of essential technical services and in its 30 years of cooperate existence the scheme has contributed over 4,000 volunteers to the ACP countries (Mailafia, 2010:177). In Fiji Island, for example, Nigerian corps has helped in drafting the constitution of the country and technocrats like medical doctors, teachers, lecturers, engineers, nurses and technicians have participated in the schemes since establishment in 1986 (This Day, September 10, 2014).

It is of interest to state that the scheme is purely bilateral in nature to assist needy countries with no string attaches to the assistance. "So it is mutually owned and there is no conditional ties attached to it, rather than just one Southern country assisting another Southern country" (Quoted in Babalola, 2011). The bilateral scheme is a signpost to Nigeria's hegemonic posture in Africa. Apart from the TACs, Nigeria also assists most African countries in financial terms by contributing immensely to

the formation of African development bank (ADB) in 1964 (Mailafia, 2010:178). Nigeria was the third largest contributor to ADB in 1964 after Egypt and Algeria. Egypt has 10.1 % voting capacity, amounted to $30 million, Algeria possesses 8.6% voting capacity, amounted to $24.50 million while Nigeria's contribution stands at 8.4% with subscription capacity of $24.10 million. By 2005 Nigeria's subscription floated at $197.86 represented 8.974% of the voting strength (Mailafia, 2010:179). Thus, some of the fund contributed to the bank is used in assisting poorer African countries. The former Secretary-General of OAU, Salim Ahmad Salim (2009) stated that "without Nigeria's help at crucial turning points, the Secretariat in Addis Ababa would have grounded to a halt". The financial contribution of Nigeria since independence to key multilateral institutions has been immense. The contribution is based on the issues at hand and official demands from various institutions. Nigeria has been enduring to perform its financial obligations in this regards (Alli, 2012:51). Mailafia, (2010: 178) opines that,

> For much of its independent existence, Nigeria has been a major contributor to multilateral institutions. Within the African context, the country has been a major contributor and/or dominant shareholder of such institutions as the African Development Bank Group, Shelter Afrique, Afrexim Bank, and the ECOWAS Fund for Compensation and Development, which was recently transformed into the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). In most African regional institutions in which Nigeria has been involved, she has contributed as much as 40 percent to the operational costs of those institutions. There was a time when Nigeria virtually underwrote the entire operational budget of the OAU/AU, at a time of fiscal difficulties when most member countries were not forthcoming.

In connection with the two regional organisations, OAU/AU and ECOWAS, Nigeria out-performed all other countries on the continent in honouring its official and unofficial dues. According to Madu Onuorah, the Abuja Bureau Chief, "Nigeria has participated in 25 out of the 51 established UN missions….the country has led

regional peace-keeping operations under the auspices of the OAU, as well as the ECOWAS…Nigeria spent an estimated \$10 billion to fund this Effort" (Onuorah, 2013). In fact, Nigeria further engaged in unilateral aids agreement with some members of OAU and ECOWAS if it is discovered that the multilateral financial capacity cannot be sufficient. In an interview with Professor Akinterinwa, the Director-General of NIIA, despite the fact that most Africa countries do not always reciprocate our father Christmas gesture, Nigeria has never stopped dolling out financial assistance to them (Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). Nigeria's financial contribution in the West Africa on multilateral institution is immense as the 75% of the official budget is contributed by Nigeria (Osuntokun, 2010).

It needs to be said that the overwhelming hegemonic power of Nigeria in West Africa has placed on it the responsibility to lead in some occasion with attendant huge financial commitment. Nigerian government spent on the ECOMOG operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone one million US dollars daily (Alli, 2012: 52). The huge financial contribution is not limited to the sub-region but also throughout Africa. According to Polish Ambassador to Nigeria, Grezgorz Walinski, "Nigeria has spent about \$13 billion on peacekeeping operation in Africa since 1960 and also sent over 250,000 members of the Nigerian armed forces to the UN's sponsored missions worldwide" (Agbakwuru, 2013). Also in the AU, the burden of running the institution is usually borne by the "big five". In other words, the financial burden of the AU rests on Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa (Adetula, 2005:179). It is noted that the 75% of the annual budget of the Union is contributed by the five countries and the rest 25% percent are shared by the rest 49 countries (Okereke, 2012:9). This shows that the financial contribution of country like Nigeria to the running of AU is quite alarming. One estimates concluded that as at 2008 Ni-

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geria contributed $14.4 million annually to the budget of the AU (Okereke, 2012:8). In fact, it was both Nigeria under President Obasanjo and South Africa under President Mbeki that sponsored the Millennium Partnership for the Recovery Programme (MAP) in the AU (Adetula, 2005:179). From 2014, the Nigerian financial contribution has risen to $16.7 million annually representing 18% of the entire AU annual budget and this contribution does not include ad hoc financial largesse being dole out by Nigeria on regular basis (Business Day, April 1, 2014).

The maintenance and upkeep of ECOWAS soldiers have always been the responsibility of Nigerian government as the headquarters of the force is located in Calabar, Nigeria with subsequent endorsement by the UN of National Defence College, Nigeria, as the Peacekeeping training centre for Africa (The Guardian, September 21, 2010). It is of interest to note that the 130th Battalion of Nigerian soldiers has been converted to the standby force of ECOWAS with Nigeria shouldered the financial burden of maintaining the force in line with African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Alli, 2012:31). All these financial contributions by Nigerian government have not resulted in any complacency and there are more areas, especially in ECOWAS operations in Mali and Niger, where there are ongoing financial contributions to multilateral operations (Obayuwana, 2014). All these roles are both functions of material capabilities and Nigeria's Afro-centric orientation since 1960.

4.5 NIGERIA'SREGIONAL HEGEMONY AS A FUNCTION OF MATERIAL CAPABILITY

In 1960 when Nigeria got its independence, its demography represented 25% of African population (Bach, 2007:302). This demographic preponderance suggests that at independence in 1960 one out of every four Africans was a Nigerian. This demo-

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graphical preponderance and ethnic diversity dictated the position Nigeria would occupy in Africa. Its diverse population with close language and racial affinity in neignbouring countries like Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Republic of Benin, Togo and Equatorial Guinea endeared the Nigeria leaders at independence to conceive a special role for Nigeria in Africa (Folarin, 2010:218). Seeing Nigeria as the most populous Black Country in the world, Nigerian leaders started to assume leadership role in Africa. Thus, the enormous population which dictates the internal dynamism of Nigerian society as the potential force in the African politics made Nigeria to develop the largest military arsenal in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1960 (Bach, 2007:300). With its huge population Nigeria had thousands of able-bodied youth population to mobilise into its armed forces.

The population also enables some countries to befriend Nigeria because of market potential as the sub-regional heavy weight in West Africa. This demographic factor might well explain the reason for French apprehension towards Nigeria's dominant force in West Africa (Bobboyi, 2010:102). The same demographic factor might also provide explanation for French relentless effort to court the friendship of Nigeria despite the seeming strain and stresses in the relationship since 1960 (Akinterinwa, 2005:88). Since 2004, Nigeria has become the largest trading partner of France in the whole of West Africa. Nigeria's demographic preponderance in Africa has enabled it to be the epicenter of African political economy since 1960. ECOWAS Report (2008) affirms thus,

> A careful examination of the economies and population of the ECOWAS Member States shows that ECOWAS is a good model of regional economic integration in which the strong and weak co-exist to foster socio-economic development on a large scale. Nigeria is the dominant economy in the region accounting for 62% of the regional GDP in 2007. Given the size of the Nigerian economy in relation to its neighbours, it is expected that Nigeria will continue to play its leadership

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role, within the framework of solidarity, in fostering sustainable regional economic development

Most international organizations know the importance of Nigeria as the demographic focus of Africa when it comes to policy implementation and execution. For example, the IMF, WHO, the United Nations' Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) recognize Nigeria as the vocal point of all its policies in Africa (Osuntokun, 2013).

Although high population may be a hindrance to the domestic political stability which may inform the country to perform lesser role in regional politics but if the population is properly mobilized in productively, demography can be a blessing to a country. Thus, the demography dictates the level of GDP, Military, market potentials, productivity, diversity, and talents. In Africa generally, Nigeria's GDP is second to none and has the largest stream of talents in the whole of Africa. Therefore, population has placed Nigeria in a comfortable position of being the epicenter of all activities in Africa. In September 2015, Nigeria's population is estimated around 176 million constituting 60% of West African population (World Bank, 2015). In terms of economic capability, Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa with GDP of 568.5 billion dollar (World Bank, 2015). Its military capability is also the most powerful in West Africa and has the second largest armed forces in Africa after Egypt. In terms of capability, Nigeria occupies 4th position in Africa (Global Firepower, 2014). Also in Central Africa and some part of North Africa (especially in the Sahara Desert) Nigeria still exercise a measure of stabilizing force. The concept of hegemon in the Nigeria parlance and its utility and application is different from what obtains in the study of the US, for example. Thus, the notion of hegemonic behaviour on the part of Nigeria in West Africa and other parts of the continent has been benevolent in nature.

Since independence, Nigeria has been living peacefully with its neighbours and other parts of Africa. The nature of hegemonic position of Nigeria in Africa is a unique example of benevolent (not coercive) hegemon.

4.6 NIGERIA'S AFRO-CENTRIC DISPOSITION

The articulation of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigerian foreign policy began at the point of gaining political independence. The realization of Nigeria's place in Africa renders multilateral policy an invaluable mechanism in order to ensure that the African interest is pursued in the global politics. Given the fact that Nigeria cannot act alone, multilateralism became an important instrument through which the African-Centred policy could be attained (Miereding, 2010:11). In his words, Olubejide Sunday, a research fellow at Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), surmised that "African-centred policy has been an important factor in the foreign policy of Nigeria since independence…. No Nigerian leader has deviated from this path since independence" (FGI, January 28, 2015). In this case pan Africanism or better still, African unity became a mechanism through which the declaration can be achieved. In his foreign policy statement submitted to the House of Representative in August 1960, the Nigerian first Prime Minister, Balewa, stressed that,

> Very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practicable policies as regards Africa. It will be our aim to assist any African country to find solution to its problem and to foster the growth of a common understanding among the new nations of the continent. We are determined to encourage the development of common ties between all states. The difficulties which will confront us in promoting the friendly association of independent countries in Africa are fully appreciated, but we believe that they can be overcome if a start is made by emphasizing and building upon …links which already exist (Balewa, 1960).

Nigerian political elite realized the enormous task ahead of African countries ever before attaining independence and as soon as the date of independence is

fixed, the foreign policy orientation of the nationalists in Nigeria was to define appropriate mechanism of defending African interest (Osuntokun, 2005:39). Joining the UN and Commonwealth of Nations in 1960 was not enough credential to pursue African interest and unity. It was when OAU was finally formed in 1963 that Nigeria was assured of its Afro-centric policy and the need to showcase its hegemonic ambition (Chibundi, 2003:8).

For purpose of definition and clarification, pan Africanism is an overzealous and emotional ideological leanings on the part of African countries and Africans in diaspora to unite together, and to fight a common course bedeviling the African people anywhere in the globe (Otunla, 2005:314). This idea emanated from the Africans in the US, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil and Britain. Because of the racial discrimination against the blacks in Europe and Americas, some of them developed the idea of promoting the unity of black race. It was this idea that radiated to the home base of the black people, Africa. Nigeria therefore adopted the idea from the diaspora African and employed it to wage war against the maltreatment of the black race in Africa by the Europeans (Alao, 1998:121). It is not in the interest of this research to provide detail information on the intellectual origin of this ideology; the view here is to provide background information on the term. In the 1950s and 1960s, the spirit of nationalism and nationhood radiated to Africa from other parts of the world. In showcasing their grievances to the colonial masters, the Nigerian and other African leaders promoted pan Africanism as important tool to forge the unity of Africans against all externalities (Otunla, 2005:319). It was in this process that Nigeria got its independence in 1960. When Nigeria attained independence, it became the single largest country by far on the continent. Realizing this position, Nigeria took the mantle of leadership of Africa upon itself and tried to rally round to unify African

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countries for a common cause. In an interview, Professor Bola Akinterinwa, the Director-General of NIIA, highlights that,

> The leadership of Africa was taken over by Nigeria at the point of independence. Nobody appointed Nigeria as the leader of Africa; the leadership was self-imposed. After we imposed the leadership on ourselves most countries recognized us as we represent Africa in the global arena and our foreign policy is tailored towards African interest (Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015).

At the point of gaining independence, the address given by the Nigerian Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister was that Africa is the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy. The Prime minister stressed that his country would "work with other African states for the progress of Africa and to assist in bringing all African countries to a state of responsible independence" (Balewa, 1960). The question this may pose is: Why Nigeria took up Africa as the centre-piece of its foreign policy and what did it want to achieve with it after independence? A statement by the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Jaja Wachukwu, perhaps provides some clues. He said:

> Our foreign policy is based on the following pillars; the concept that Nigeria is an African nation; it is part and parcel of the continent of Africa, and therefore is so completely involved in anything that pertains to the continent, that it cannot be neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country. We want to make this absolutely clear: we are independent in everything but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa-all questions pertaining to Africa must be considered as pertaining to Nigeria. The moment Africa is affected, we are involved. We want to make this absolutely clear, Nigeria finds itself involved in anything affecting the African continent anywhere, in any square inch of African territory, we are involved… (Wachukwu, 1961).

From the foregoing statements, it seems implicit that the problems of Africa countries have always been seen by Nigerian leaders as theirs. Also in1961, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first President of Nigeria, in his Address at Friend's Hall, London registered his belief in the establishment of OAU that,

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It is my firm believe that an African organization must emerge ultimately: it may be in the form of an association of African states or in the form of a concert of African states; but my main point is that so long as the form of government is clearly understood and an efficient machinery for organization and administration is devised, backed by multilateral conventions which would enhance the standard of living of Africans, safeguard their existence by collective security and guarantee to them freedom under the law in addition to the fundamental human rights, the dream of Pan-Africanism is destined to come true (Azikiwe, 1961).

Thus, the only way to alleviate some of the African problems is through African unity which later metamorphosed to the formation of OAU in 1963 by 30 African states. When the organization was formed Nigeria took the mantle of leadership and faced the continental malaise with pan African faith (Osuntokun, 2005:38). Some of the continental problems at the point of independence were colonialism, racism, apartheid, economic underdevelopment, civil strife, and disunity. Most of these problems were addressed at multilateral level in OAU and the UN (Ogwu, 2005:10).

The attainment of independence of Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and dismantling of racist regime in South Africa were all addressed through the UN and OAU. The Namibia and Congo issues are cases in point, which have been extensively discussed in Chapter Five. Added to this is the sponsoring of Pan-African zeal that incorporates about sixty countries from Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific. Nigeria led the union in order to protect the black race against the "divisive tactics employed by the colonial powers" (Otunla, 2005:326). The Afro-centrism continues to dictate Nigeria's multilateral policy even after the eventual demise of colonialism and apartheid policy. Nigeria under the leadership of President Obasanjo was instrumental in all stages that resulted in the transformation of the OAU to AU in 2002. With Nigeria's material capability alongside South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya, AU established many sub-divisions that can alleviate the sufferings of African countries. It

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can therefore be rightly asserted that the African centrepiece policy is one of the most important factors that account for Nigeria's multilateral policy.

4.7 MULTILATERALISM AND NIGERIA GOVERNMENT SINCE 1960

The greatest predicament of all former colonial countries at the point of independence in Africa was how to democratize the domestic polity. Ironically, this did not occur to Nigeria as Nigerian first Prime Minister was democratically elected based on Westminster system. The civilian government governed Nigeria for the first six years of independence (1960-1966). However, because of fragile political climate, the military forcefully took over power through coup d'état in 1966. The coup d'état resulted in killing some prominent Nigerian nationalists and political leaders. By the time military leader took over in 1966, Nigeria was already a member of some few multilateral organizations. Most of these multilateral organizations were primarily Afro-centric in nature. In this way, the following sections will discuss in brief the role of each administration, in chronological order, on Nigeria's multilateral foreign policy.

4.7.1 Nigeria's Multilateralism and Balewa Administration (1960-1966)

The post-colonial history of Nigeria's multilateral foreign policy began during the Balewa period. Balewa was a new leader of a new state and as such his experience during colonial rule and personal background were the only reliable assets that can be exploited to perform well in the Nigeria's external milieu (Shaw, 1983:2). Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was a northern Muslim who did strongly believe in the unity of the newly independent Nigerian state. Because of the domestic and international political atmosphere of the time, the foreign policy was more cautionary in focus. In

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terms of multilateral policy, the Balewa government registered the presence of Nigeria in the UN and participated in the activities that led to the creation of OAU (Okolo, 2001:70). In this way Balewa employed OAU and its principles in Nigerian foreign policy.

One of the principles of OAU is that of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The Balewa government believed strongly in this in order to ensure that peace and tranquillity was maintained in the continent. His UN Maiden Address in New York in 1960 is obviously full of multilateralism statements especially regarding the need for leadership position in Africa. Balewa stated,

> …We have absolutely no aggressive intentions. We shall never impose ourselves on any other country and shall treat every African territory, big, small, as our equal because we honestly feel that it is only on that basis of equality (through OAU) that peace can be maintained in our continent (Balewa, 1960).

The above statement reveals that at the point of independence the Nigerian leaders recognized the need to allay the fears by the African states of Nigeria's overwhelming power. The first Nigerian Prime Minister used the opportunity of his address at the UN in 1960 to table Nigerian position on the civil war of Congo and he further extended African position on the issue (Adeniji, 2005:4). He suggested many ways by which the problems in the Congo can be resolved and did not hesitate to promise the UN members of Nigeria's role in this respect. In his statement, the Prime Minister declared: "Nigeria is prepared to make its experience available and send technical experts to assist in planning and development for the future" (Balewa, 1960).

The immediate multilateral response of Nigeria to the Congo civil war was premised on the idea that the great powers should not be allowed to intervene in African affairs on Africa soil as such interference may possibly aggravate the already

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tense political situation in the Congo. The Minister's address at the UN was 90 percent coverage on the issue pertaining to the African problems most especially on the Congolese political turmoil (Delancey, 1983:167). Balewa realized the need for economic and peaceful development of the African countries in the post-independent years. Thus, his regime was preoccupied with the need to consolidate national integration at home and continental unity at African level. It was in this process that his government was overthrown by the military force in 1966. The administration thus laid foundation for subsequent Nigeria's foreign policy towards African countries.

4.7. 2 Nigeria's Multilateralism during Ironsi Regime (1966-1967)

The Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi regime represented an important watershed in the history of Nigeria's foreign policy. He is the first Military-General Head of State in the history of the country after the overthrow of the civilian government of Balewa in 1966. The political turmoil began with the ascension of Ironsi as the head of the state upon taking over, his policy clearly tailored on tribal line as opposed to the national interests (Elaigwu, 1988:174). It was in this mess that he abrogated the federal constitution and replaced it with the infamous Decree No. 34 of 1966 which established Nigeria as a unitary state (Omoiya, 2012:14). As one would be expected, the mindset of the General was being interpreted by many as an attempt at dominating Nigeria through the ethnic line (Igbo group) but the closer look at the renunciation of the federal constitution might be to forge the unity of the entire country under one administration. The government of Ironsi was short-lived, and only lasted for 6 months (January 15 to July29, 1966), therefore he could not make any significant, most importantly on the foreign policy.

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Notwithstanding his brief term in office, Aguiyi Ironsi's pre-coup experience needs to be taken into consideration in evaluating his role at multilateral level. He was the first Nigerian Commander of Force at the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo (Oguibe, 1998:94). By the time the Congo crisis erupted, at the insistence of Dag Hammarskjold, UN Secretary General at the time, Ironsi was sent to quell the tide of war in Congo (Oguibe, 1998)). By the time he became Nigerian head of the state he already had the knowledge of international political terrain which may explain the reason for his action against the Portuguese in Africa. Under the banner of Pan-Afrcanism, he resisted the Portuguese government in the southern part of Africa and did not allow Portuguese ships and aircraft into Nigerian soil (Folarin, 2010:247). His hard-line as anti-imperialist stance was based on the conviction that allowing colonial powers in Africa, it might further compound the African malaise caused by centuries of colonial domination. It was based on this that he closed Portuguese embassy in Nigeria with subsequent severance of diplomatic engagement between the two countries. The Ironsi pan-African zeal was truncated by the Counter Coup of July, 1966 by Major-General Yakubu Gowon.

4.7.3 **Nigeria's Multilateralism during Gowon Regime (1967-1975)**

In discussing the Nigeria's multilateral policy under Major-General Yakubu Gowon regime, it is appropriate to start by asking one fundamental question: Why did the regime choose to toe the multilateral line in the 1970s? In providing credible answer to the questions, it is augur well to probe into basic features of Nigeria's multilateral policy under Gowon regime. The Gowon regime inherited rudderless government and the apparatus of government was not consistent with good governance (Perham, 1970:232). Although it may be ironical here to discuss the issue of good governance

in relation to military regime, the good governance as it is being used here is relative. It also needs to be emphasized here that not all military governments are bad; in other words, the system of government does not decide good governance. Thus, both military and civilian government can be either good or bad in nature and practice. One of the most important reasons for Gowon's focus on multilateral policy was his realization of the need for economic development during the age of globalization. By the 1970s majority of the former colonial countries had already gained independence and were introduced to the world economy basically as consumer and producer of agricultural produce and raw materials (Biersteker, 1983:127). In this way, as soon as Gowon came to power he became an advocate of new global economic order based on the need for the developed nations to give privilege position to the developing countries, especially Africa, in order to compete favourably with the developed economies in the global arena. In doing so, he employed the multilateral organization called African Caribbean and the Pacific's (ACP), a multilateral institution that comprised countries of Africa, Central America and Pacific Countries (Aluko, 1983:84). Gowon led the African countries into the dialogue. The conference established a framework for addressing the economic underdevelopment of the African countries.

In addition, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), an integral part of the UN, was also employed by the Gowon to campaign for the imbalance in the global economy (Onwuka 1989:88). UNCTAD was forced to be created by the UN because of the pressure of the G-77, an alliance of third world countries in the UN. Gowon's regime was an important landmark in the history of Nigeria's foreign policy, he had enough time to pursue and continue the Pan-African approach to Nigerian foreign policy (Aluko, 1983:85). This was centred on the need to locate the African continent as the primary focus of Nigerian foreign

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policy. Nigeria's spatial location, its large economy, population, and enormous natural resources have bestowed on her, the need to play pivotal role in Africa from independence. This role has been a cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy. Gowon's government was also preoccupied with sole aim of quelling the tide of tribal conflict and polity in the first three years of his regime.

In effect, Nigeria's principles of multilateralism received a boost during Gowon regime given the domestic and external milieu of the time. Gowon was severely constrained by the need to ensure that Nigeria did not become 'Second Congo' in the continent. This he did by ensuring that OAU occupied a centre-stage in the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy (Aluko, 1983: 86). His first assignment was to ensure that African needs were properly attended to. In this way, by 1975, ECOWAS was formed despite sub-regional suspicion of Nigeria's unrivalled strength (Ojo, 1980:575). ECOWAS as an institution later became an important mechanism through which Nigeria showcase its hegemonic bid. Gowon was also instrumental in the signing of agreement that eventually led to the admittance of Nigerian into OPEC, the global oil cartel, in 1971. It may thus be fair to regard the time of Gowon as 'the golden age' for Nigeria's multilateral foreign policy. His long time in office may well explain this achievement.

4.7.4 **Nigeria's Multilateralism under Muritala-Obasanjo Regime (1975-1979)**

Because of the perceived discontent among Nigerian populace about the Gowon government, Mohammad Muritala overthrew his regime in 1975. This culminated in another episode to Nigerian foreign policy journey. The manner with which Gowon handled African issues was not satisfactory enough to Muritala-Obasanjo regime. Muritala's foreign policy focus was basically Afro centric in all dimensions for he

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did not hesitate to incur the wrath of the would-be powers in its stance against the domination of Africa and other developing world by the West (Meierding, 2010:7). After the assassination of General Muhammad Muritala in 1976, Olusegun Obasanjo assumed the position of Nigeria's Head of State, which lasted until 1979, the year the power was returned to the civilian rule.

The Obasanjo regime witnessed a dramatic multilateral policy essentially dictated by the happenings in the continental politics. Obasanjo in his foreign policy vigorously employed the Commonwealth of Nations, OAU, ECOWAS, NAM, and G77 forum in order to pursue Nigeria's interests through multilateral policy (Durotoye, 2014:26). Obasanjo was so powerful in the Commonwealth of Nations that he was appointed to the position of Eminent Person Group (EPG). The political climate of the post-war Nigeria favoured the administration of Muritala/Obasanjo regime. For one thing, the regime enjoined complete internal tranquility and this dictated largely the manner by which external relations would be handled. Such a tranquil atmosphere and lesson of civil war might provide a viable atmosphere to pursue adventurous multilateral foreign policy. The recognition of the regime of the role perception of Nigeria in the continental Africa and hence in the globe accelerated the pace at which multilateral organizations was employed as a tool of diplomacy (Barika, 2014:57). The policy was also employed to promote the international image and national interests of Nigeria. The regime's boycott of Summer Olympic Game in Canada in 1976 in protest of the West's support for Apartheid regimes in southern part of Africa is a case in point (Delancey, 1983:174). The regime resulted to what can be termed as "incitement diplomatic tactics" of independent African states against the West. In this campaign, some OAU, ECOWAS, and Commonwealth members went along with Nigeria to boycott the attendance.

The successful utilization of multilateral organizations by the regime was borne out of the fact that most African members of the Commonwealth were already express their dissatisfaction with the nature and manner by which Apartheid regimes were promoted and supported in the southern part of the continent by the Western powers (Aluko, 1983:196). It was therefore natural that most African countries and some other members of Non-Aligned Movement protested against the domination of southern African countries in the UN. In fact, the greatest success in utilizing multilateral diplomacy for the purpose of continental interest was achieved during this regime which lasted for just three years, and the transition to civil rule by the regime was followed

4.7.5 Nigeria's Multilateralism under Shagari Administration (1979-1983)

After years of military rule, the Obasanjo military regime handed over power to democratically elected president in 1979. The new democratic government continued the policy already well established by the military government. The idea of Afro-centricism, predicated on the need to liberate the continent from colonialism and dangerous racial ideology, occupied the attention of the government. The 1979 Nigerian Constitution devoted a section for multilateral policy as follows:

> The state (i.e Nigeria) shall promote African unity, as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international cooperation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestation (Nigerian constitution, 1979)

It needs to be elaborated here that since it is assumed that the inherent policy statement above cannot be actualized unilaterally, it is a policy statement that promote multilateralism in Nigerian foreign policy. The Sheu Shagari government obviously pursued its Afro-centric policy through OAU, ECOWAS and the UN. African

situation reports were periodically presented at the UN while peace and stability are maintained at home by proposing ECOWAS Common Defence in 1981 (Wright, 1983: 107). Also in 1980, the Nigerian government promptly acted through OAU by signing the 'Lagos Plan of Action' to redress and protest the imbalance in the global economy (Wright, 1983:95). In this quest, all OAU Heads of State were present and signed the treaty. The treaty later served as the blueprint for the Economic Community of Africa (AEC). This singular achievement was recorded during the period of Shagari administration, which tended to suggest the seriousness of the government on the need to promote continental economic interest at the global level.

However, in the area of maintaining peace and stability in Africa the government of Shagari employed economic power, both in ECOWAS and OAU, to exclude Samuel Doe, the President of Liberia from the meetings in 1980 (Okolo, 2001:73). The need to restore order to the domestic political terrain in Liberia was the most important factor for Shagari's action against Doe (Okolo, 2001:75). Despite the Afrocentric nature of Nigeria's foreign policy under Shagari, he cannot be compared to his predecessors because of the gross corrupt practices levied against his administration. Nevertheless, he utilized the multilateral institutions to display the leadership position of Nigeria in Africa.

4.7.6 **Nigeria's Multilateralism under Buhari Regime (1983-1985)**

This regime came on board after the successful coup d'état of 1983 that ousted the civilian government of Sheu Shagari. The accusation made by the leader of the coup was that the country has been reduced to haven of gross corruption and public violation of human rights (Omoiya, 2012:13). Hence, the coup was primarily based on allegation of corruption which garnered support from the public. Such government,

as would be expected, may not have enough time for foreign adventurism than to concentrate on how to restore the country back to normal position among the community of nations. In fact, to achieve this lofty goal also required that the government maintained cooperation with outside world. In order to achieve this, multilateral policy became a necessity rather that option. The regime, which lasted for less than 2 years, was adjudged the cleanest government in terms of discipline and accountability in the history of Nigerian government (Olukoshi & Abdulraheem, 1985:97). The first issue concerning multilateral diplomacy, which confronted the regime, was the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) issue. Nigeria under Major-General Muhammad Buhari and supported by his second in command, General Tunde Idiagbon was confronted with the need to appraise whether to register Nigeria as a member of OIC or not which the regime ultimately declined to do (Salami, 2014:82). This was in order to defend the secular character of Nigeria in the global politics.

Although both leaders were Muslims but they acted in the interest of the state which constitutionally regarded Nigeria as a secular state. In this way, OIC as a multilateral organization was rejected by the regime. The need to promote multilateral policy during this regime was basically at continental level and this was only limited by Nigeria's employment of ECOWAS and OAU as the only mechanism for multilateral diplomacy with occasional debate at UN of African issues (Othman, 1984:445).

Most prominent in this regard was the continental agricultural policy initiated under the banner of continental organization to promote African sufficiency in staple food commodities. Like most Nigerian leaders, his policy has been described as basically Afro-centric in application and theory and in this case most of the policy declaration of this period stemmed from the internal political climate in Nigeria (Orogun,

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1990:2). The declaration of the policy of "War Against Indiscipline" (popularly known as WAI) at home reflected the Afro-centric idea of the regime for the period of two years. Despite its Afro-centric policy, the regime has been criticized for its high-handedness towards the West African people. Possibly, because of the inherited economic problem from the civilian government, the regime decided to promulgate a decree that made deportation of all foreigners a policy (Aluko, 1985:540). This greatly affected the reputation of Nigeria in the West African region most especially as the policy affected its immediate neighbours such as Ghanaians and the Chadians, the largest West African foreign workers in Nigeria at the time.

4.7.7 Nigeria's Multilateralism under Babangida Regime (1985-1993)

Ibrahim Babangida regime staged a coup d'état in 1985 which ousted the Muhammad Buhari regime from power. This new regime lasted for 8 years. In other words, internal political climate forced him to relinquish power to another military regime. Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, the Foreign Affairs Minister during the Babangida era, was the brain behind all foreign policy landmarks achieved by the regime (Salami, 2014:83). The era of General Ibrahim Babangida witnessed an important development in the formulation of Nigeria's multilateral policy as Nigeria devised various mechanisms to achieve its national objectives in the global politics. The inherited economic malaise coupled with the oil glut of 1980s in the global market tended to have enduring impact in the formulation of multilateral policy under the regime (Salami, 2013:148).

The Babangida administration largely tended to be reactive rather than proactive. The need to contain domestic economic problem dictated to certain extent policy orientation and direction. Economic diplomacy rooted in multilateral policy be-

came the harbinger of the regime. The much-touted policy of IMF, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was the bedrock of its multilateral economic diplomacy (Anwu, 1992:2). Notwithstanding the economic problem and other domestic issue, Nigerian foreign policy received a boost under Babangida regime. The institutionalization of mechanism to render assistance to needy African and Caribbean states was devised in the name of Technical Aids Corps Scheme (TACS) (Aborisade, 2013). The regime ensured the strengthening of multilateral organizations called African Caribbean and the Pacific countries (ACP) whose intended aim was to enter into collective agreement with European Community (EC) (Salami, 2013:140). Also, the regime was also clearly the brain child of ECOMOG who intervened in the Liberia and Sierra Leone for the purpose of peacekeeping. All these will be given greater treatment in the following chapters. In short, Babangida regime could be described as the most influential in term of its application of multilateral policy in its relations with African countries and the outside world, notwithstanding his adverse effect on the domestic economy.

4.7.8 **Nigeria's Multilateralism under Abacha Regime (1993-1998)**

Abacha regime did not achieve much in term of foreign policy. This was because of the manner he dealt with the domestic civil society. His ruthlessness and unwarranted killings of Ogoni people of Niger Delta region, where oil is being produced, made the regime unpopular in both Africa and the outside world. As such, Abacha's regime was sanctioned by some countries for the atrocities he perpetrated against Ogoni people. The Commonwealth of Nations also suspended the membership of Nigeria for gross violation of human rights (Kolawole, 2005:875). General Abacha perpetrat-

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ed many atrocities and he was named one of the most corrupt leaders in Africa (Kraxberger, 2004:415).

Despite all these, similar to previous regimes, the government of General Abacha also employed the use of multilateral policy in quelling the tides of conflicts in Africa. It is of interest to note that the pariah status of General Abacha regime within the global system did not affect its utilisation of multilateral organisations. This is particularly true of the deployment of troops to neighbouring West African countries under ECOWAS. Abacha reinstated President Tejan Kabbah after the coup of May 25, 1997 by Major Johnny Paul Koroma (Oche, 2006). The ECOWAS Abuja Summit of August 28-29, 1997 was decisive in placing a total embargo on the new military junta. General Abacha was made chairman of ECOWAS on August 6, 1994 and subsequently redrafted to serve ECOWAS from 1996 to 1998, apparently to deal with the persistent sub-regional crises. On the whole, it could be said that Nigeria, despite the encumbrances of its military dictatorships or perhaps because of them, was able to contribute significantly to the consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region. As Okwuosa pointed out, "the peace and security portfolio of ECOWAS has given that organization a pride of place on the continent," to the extent that it is regarded as a model in sub-regional peace-keeping (2009, pp.4-5). He died while in power in 1998 and General Abubakar Abdusalam was made the president. As soon as the Abubakar resumed office, he was preoccupied with the need to organize election in order to hand over power to a democratically elected president. In the process of doing this the sanction by Commonwealth of Nations was lifted and the Nigerian glory, lost during Abcaha regime, was regained (Kolawole, 2005: 874). Because of the domestic situation, Abaubakar did not have enough time to achieve any foreign

policy landmarks. Abubakar eventually organized and supervised the election and handed over power to elected President, Olusegun Obasanjo, in 1999.

4.7. 9 **Nigeria's Multilateralism under Obasanjo Administration (1999-2007)**

Obasanjo has a unique history in the political affairs of Nigeria. He is the first President that governed the country under military regime and civilian administration. The winning of the just-concluded general election by General Muhammad Buhari in May 2015, makes him the second leader to have done so in Nigerian history. Obasanjo's first administration, as it has been explained above under military regime, was eventful as he devoted much to the multilateral diplomacy. When he eventually elected as the civilian president it seemed that he continued to toe the same policy line. Nigeria's multilateral policy has suffered under the decades of military administration most especially under Sanni Abacha regime. The civilian administration of Obasanjo was preoccupied with the need to register Nigeria back to the community of nations and to ensure the acceptance of the country back to the international forum (Dauda & Bako, 2012:1). When he came on board he engaged in shuttle diplomacy in which he travelled to many countries most especially the US and Western Europe.

One of the purposes of his visitation was to ensure that most of the Nigerian money siphoned abroad is recovered back (Dauda & Bako, 2012: 3). Also, he was of the belief that the Nigerian debt that stood at over $32billion undermined the economic development. Obasanjo, therefore, he approached the IMF for debt relief as opposed to debt rescheduling which has ruined Nigerian economy for decades (Durotoye, 2014:28). In approaching the IMF with other African countries with similar problem and he negotiated collectively on behalf of the continent (Obasanjo, 2005). He employed the position of Nigeria in the global politics in this way and launched

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debt relief campaign with all success. This is one of its first multilateral diplomatic efforts at ensuring that Africa states are debt free. At its best, Nigeria multilateral diplomacy repeated another landmark history under Obasanjo by championing the establishment of NEPAD, GGC, APRM, PSC and ASF (Oviasogie & Shodipo, 2013:200).

4.7.10 Nigeria's Multilateralism under Jonathan Administration (2010 -2015)

Another milestone in the Nigerian multilateral diplomacy started when Umar Yaradua and Goodluck Jonathan assumed presidency of Nigeria. The Yaradua administration succeeded that of Obasanjo in 2007 but the Yaradua ailment could not survive him in power until he finally surrendered to death in 2010. His demise led to the emergence of Jonathan, the Vice President, as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria since 2010. However, for luck and providence, he became the President of the largest black nation in the world in 2010. Since then he has been working assiduously to contain one form of insurgency or the other. The employment of multilateral diplomacy is given paramount in his foreign policy agenda but with different policy orientation (Dickson, 2010:6). Although he has been employing multilateral institutions like AU, ECOWAS and UN in its multilateral policy, he promises to implement this alongside the citizen's diplomacy (Alao & Oladimeji, 2013:59). In his own definition of multilateral policy, most especially issues relating to Africa, it must be consistent with the needs and aspirations of Nigerians. Any policy that stands to threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria will not be allowed to see the light of the day.

In essence, his own multilateral diplomacy is tied to the citizen's diplomacy which is absent in the previous administrations of Nigerian foreign policy. During his tenure as Nigerian president, he had already spent two years as the Chairman of

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ECOWAS with meritorious award and also presently co-chaired the UN Commission on Life Saving Commodities with Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg (The Guardian, January 22, 2013). He sponsored the ECOWAS intervention in Guinea Bissau and Burkina Faso by restoring order through democracy and capacity building in the country. President Jonathan recorded many successes in its multilateral diplomacy despite its failure at domestic front. According to ECOWAS Commission President, Kadre Ouedraogo in the recent 47th Ordinary Session of the organization in Accra, Ghana,

> ….In speaking particularly to President Jonathan, I wish to assure him that the commission will never forget his crucial contribution in the management and resolution of the crises in Guinea Bissau, Mali and Burkina Faso. As well as in the fight against the Ebola Virus disease, among other challenging matters. I am confident that nothing will come to make us forget the great pride Nigeria has brought to us…(Premium Times, May 19, 2015).

As noted above, in the international front, most especially in the multilateral sphere, President Jonathan recorded tremendous achievement, which ultimately enhances the Nigeria's posture in the African politics.

4.8 CONCLUSION

Hegemony in Nigerian foreign policy vocabulary denotes benign leadership and shouldering of continental responsibilities. This chapter shows the meaning of Nigeria's hegemonic posture in Africa and how such hegemonic role has been established since 1960. It also established Nigeria's hegemonic position in Africa based on the typology of international relations scholars. Thus, the above historical milestone in Nigeria's regional hegemonic posture revealed the consistency in the employment of Multilateralism as a foreign policy strategy. All Nigerian governments both civilian and military alike make multilateralism a cardinal policy in Nigeria's foreign policy.

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This may be premised on some factors peculiar to Nigeria as a state. The geographical contiguity of Nigerian state within the francophone African countries is one of the most important factors for Nigeria's multilateral policy. Another factor closely related to the above is the spatial location of Nigeria in the hearth of the continent. It is both located at the crossroad of the West and Central parts of the continent. And this makes the leaders of the country to assess the need for international collaboration in stemming the dangers of insecurity. All these factors are given priority in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER FIVE

NIGERIA'S HEGEMONIC POSTURE AND MULTILATERAL-ISM

This chapter examines Nigeria's role in international organisations in relation to its hegemonic posture in Africa. It seeks to assess how Nigeria pursues its regional hegemonic posture through the strategy of multilateralism in West Africa and among the entire international organisation. To establish this, attempt has been made to explore all issue areas where Nigeria has exhibited its hegemonic influence in Africa, most importantly through international institutions. Besides, its global presence will also be analysed in order to present a holistic picture of its multilateral strategy. It is the hegemonic position of Nigeria in the African continent that provides such a ground to perform certain roles in the multilateral organisations, which are very distinct from all other state actors from Africa, most importantly before the end of apartheid regime in South Africa.

5.1 MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION

Mediation and arbitration are probably the oldest means by which Nigeria showcases its hegemonic position in Africa. In order to accomplish this, Nigerian governments have been using multilateral medium of Commonwealth of Nations, OAU/AU, UN, ECOWAS and OPEC. In the early years of independent, Nigeria used the platform of the UN to mediate in the Congo crisis that erupted shortly after independence (Chibundi, 2003:3). The Congo crisis represented one of the earliest political problems ever encountered by the African continent. The political problem

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was all due to the impatience with which the Belgian left the country without adequate arrangement for legitimate leadership succession (Balewa, 1960). It was the leadership vacuum left by the Belgian that later spelt doom for the Congo who failed to reach unanimous agreement among various faction for eligibility to lead the newly independent country (Delancey, 1983:167). It was in the midst of this crisis that Nigeria under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa addressed the UN in 1960. In order to clear the air on the Congo controversy, Balewa stated,

> ....Congolese were right to appeal to the United Nations organisations for help and advice in rebuilding their country, rather than to turn to any individual power. Until achieving our independence, we have hesitated to add our views to the general discussion about the Congo lest we should merely add to the confusion. But now I feel that it is my duty to put before you, and to ask for your sympathetic consideration, the possible solutions which are presented before us (Balewa, 1960).

Thus, the Congo issue was extensively discussed in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) by Nigerian government in 1960 where Nigeria subsequently assumed the position of leadership in proffering solution to the political debacle. Balewa in his quest to quell the tides of conflict in the Congo therefore suggested three areas which needed proper attention by the UN. First, Balewa confirmed that there was no proper consultation among the constituting ethnic groups in the Congo before Belgian drafted the national constitution. Two, if there was a proper consultation then there was flaw in the making of the constitution, which possibly might not appropriately address the plight of all ethnic nationalities. Lastly, there was the need to find out the acceptance level of the constitution to the general populace by the Belgian before the handover of power to the indigenous people (Balewa, 1960). It was based on these identified approaches that Nigeria took the mantle of leadership in serving as a go-between UN and the Congolese people.

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In addition, Nigeria efforts at ensuring peace and tranquility in the southern part of Africa was the most challenging aspect of Nigeria's mediating role in the multilateral organisations. The mediating role played in the southern Africa countries spanned over three decades, starting from Sharpville Massacre in 1960 in the Republic of South Africa (Adebo, 1966). In the end, Nigeria's mediating role in the southern part of Africa ended with the dismantling of apartheid regime in the early 1990s, signifying with the ascension of Nelson Mandela as the first black president in South Africa. Dr. Joshua Bolarinwa, a research fellow in the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), asserts that,

> the significance and impact of Nigeria in dismantling racist regimes in southern part of Africa is invaluable. Nigeria became grossly involved in the event that the World could not take any step without consulting Nigeria. In the present political calculation, one may discover that South Africa is a force to be reckoned with but that does not mean (in decades to come) it has rendered the regional power status of Nigeria meaningless (Bolarinwa, Focus Group Interview (FGI), January 28, 2015).

Nigeria also assumed the frontline states status in the UN and OAU despite its geographical distant from the conflict in relation to Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Uganda (Akinboye, 2005:215). Nigeria chaired the UN Liberation Committee that demanded the withdrawal of South Africa from South West Africa (now Namibia) which resulted in the final conduct of election for home-Gowon government in Namibia in 1989 (Adeniji, 2005:4). The mediating role played by Nigeria by leading in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against the western-backed National Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Union for the total independence of Angola (UNITA) for the independent movement in Angola that led to the triumph of the generally-acceptable government in Angola (Wright, 1983:109).

The supports of the FNLA and UNITA by the South African government and the US in Angola was opposed to Nigerian government stand as it represented an attempt to perpetuate western presence in the country (Wright, 1983:107). In recognition of this, Nigeria sponsored the MPLA and persuaded other OAU members to support MPLA for the emergence of the unity government in Angola (Bach, 1983:40). In response to this, Nigeria gave $100 million aid to MPLA to commence state building in 1975 (Soremekun, 1983:9). Nigeria served as an important channel through which OAU, Commonwealth and some members of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) supported MPLA against the Portuguese in the process of independence (Bach, 1983:40). In 1966, the leader of Nigerian delegation to the UN, Simeon Adebo, addressed the UNGA on its inability to suppress the racial domination of black people in southern part of Africa. In his speech, Adebo stresses that,

> ....But we are as conscious as anybody else of its (UN) failures and weaknesses in every of these fields…; its failure to remove the last stronghold of colonialism and racial domination from our own continent of Africa and elsewhere in the world...(Adebo, 1966).

Furthermore, another significant period in Nigeria's mediating role was under the leadership of President Ibrahim Babangida whose regime witnessed the most turbulent era in the political history of West Africa. In this case, Babangida played a mediating role under ECOWAS and the UN from 1990 until 1993 (Salami, 2013). It tried to settle the rift that ensued between the rebel leaders, Charles Taylor and Samuel Doe (Salami, 2014:84). Babangida regime tried to proffer solution to this until he handed over power to Interim President, Chief Ernest Shonekan, in 1993 amidst protest of broken promise to hand over power to the civilian. The government that took over also continued the mediating role in Liberia until final settlement was agreed upon in 2003 under the civilian President of Olusegun Obasanjo (Salihu,

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2007:114). Nigeria granted asylum to Charles Taylor and the civilian government was restored under the Nigeria-led ECOMOG forces.

In 2004, Nigerian President Obasanjo, as the Chairman of OAU, also ensured that the Ivory Coast crisis received adequate attention from ECOWAS member states and this resulted in AU Ad-Hoc Summit in November, 2004 (Ebohon & Isike, 2004:5). The AU Emergency Summit was also convened on Ivorian issue in Abuja, Nigeria, which resulted in preventing the warring factions to continue the fierce battle and came to the round table on agreed terms (Bolarinwa, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015). In 2012, Nigeria was involved in a mediating the Malian crisis under the umbrella of ECOWAS and the UN to settle the secessionist question in the Sahel between the Tuareg and the Federal Government in power (Oyedele, 2012). At present, there is ongoing Nigerian mediating personnel under UN and AU in Somalia and South Sudan (UN Website, 2015). The records of Nigeria in the area of mediation cannot be fully discussed without mentioning its role in peacekeeping missions abroad.

5.2 PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING ROLE

These two concepts are normally used interchangeably in the political parlance, which seems to suggest that they represent the same meaning. Notwithstanding, both concepts are applied to denote different strategies adopted in the conflict areas of the world and the employment of each depends on the situation at hand.

In terms of definition, therefore, peacekeeping is a third party mechanism by which the peace process is attained in a certain area of the globe (Eugene, 2014:3). Peacekeeping mission does not allow for military intervention and it requires the invitation and acceptance of the warring factions (Ojekwe, 2010: 98). The main phi-

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losophy behind the concept is the need to supervise peace so that the fragile political atmosphere does not escalate into open conflict (Abdulwaheed, 2012:4). In this case the peacekeeping mission stay aloof and watch the situation with keen interest in which case the limited military combat would only be considered for self-defence (Sewall, 2002:192).

It needs to be noted that the contemporary peacekeeping operations under multilateral organisations is not limited only to combatants but also includes personnel from all walks of life like diplomats, lawyers, civil society, police, doctors etc. (Sewall, 2002:193). While it may be possible to assert that there is a difference between peacekeeping and peace-making, both are inextricably interwoven in all practicality. For purpose of differentiation, peace-making is a process by which the third party is forced into action in the face of total breakdown of law and order in a certain state (Kratochwil, 1994: 234). This type of mechanism is employed in a situation where there is a full escalation of war. In such situation, it is the responsibility of the peace-making mission to quell the tides of war and to ensure that the appropriate mechanism is employed to broker the ceasefire. It is after this partial peace-making effort that the peacekeeping mission would take over. Peacekeeping mission can come in either before the escalation of the conflict or after the ceasefire agreement between the warring factions in order to avert another looming danger of conflict escalation (Sule, 2013:2).

Thus, the concept of peacekeeping and peace-making have been important mechanisms, employed by the UN, ECOWAS and the OAU/AU, to settle inter and intra-state conflicts in the global political stage. It needs to be stated here that the multilateral peacekeeping operation by Nigeria is a way of displaying its hegemonic presence in the African regional affairs and in this circumstance; it may not be possi-

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ble to delve into all regions of the world where Nigeria engaged in such act. Nevertheless, a table is provided which summarily explains all Nigeria's multilateral undertakings (see Table 5.3). The history of multilateral peacekeeping in Nigeria's foreign policy started all away from the time of independence in Congo (Akinterinwa, FGI, January 28, 2015). The need to ensure that peace and stability reigned in the continent of Africa and the entire globe has been an important propeller for Nigeria's engagement in the multilateral peace operations. According to Sarah Sewall (2002), with the exception of India, no other country in Africa or in the global south surpassed the records of Nigeria in the area of global peace operations (Sewall, 2002:203). The tables **5.1** and **5.2** below confirm this.

Table 5.1
Top Ten UN Troop Contributors, 2000

Country	Troops Provided for UN-led Operations	Percentage of UN Troops Deployed
India	3, 957	14%
Nigeria	3, 231	12%
Jordan	2, 217	8%
Australia	1, 842	7%
Bangladesh	1, 509	6%
Ghana	1, 438	5%
Kenya	1, 124	4%
Poland	992	4%
Thailand	908	3%
Philippines	825	3%

(Source:http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtm)

Table 5.2
Top Ten UN Troop Contributors, 2014

Country	Troops Provided for UN-led Operations	Percentage of UN Troops Deployed
Bangladesh	9,400	9%
India	8,139	7.8%
Pakistan	7,936	7.6%
Ethiopia	7,807	7.5%
Rwanda	5,698	5.4%
Nepal	5,089	4.9%
Ghana	2,987	2.8%
Nigeria	2,930	2.8%
Senegal	2,835	2.7%
Egypt	2,613	2.5%

The two tables above narrates different story about Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping in the UN. The loss of Nigeria's top position to some African and Asian countries in Table 5.2 can be attributed to the growing domestic and regional demands for Nigerian troops. In addition, the rise of other states like Rwanda, Nepal, and Senegal in troops contribution may explain the loss of high percentage attained in 2000 as compared to 2014. This applies to all major troops contributing nations.

Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping are roughly grouped into three categories i.e global operations, continental operations and sub-regional operations. At all levels of peacekeeping operations, Nigeria performs creditably and its consistency and commitments have been globally recognized (see table 5.1 and 5.2). In order to simplify the Nigerian multilateral peacekeeping, each mission will be discussed under the following section.

5.2.1 Nigeria in the Congo (1960)

The first attempt to engage in multilateral peacekeeping operation was in Congo in 1960 when General Aguiryi Ironsi of Nigeria commandeered the UN peacekeeping forces in Congo (Fafowora, 1997:52). The Nigerian Prime Minister, Balewa, in order to make sure the conflict eased, was elected by the UN as the Chairman of the Congo Advisory Committee. This was the first time an African would be selected for an exalted position in the UN reconciliation committee. Dr. Josuha Bolarinwa, a research fellow in NIIA, confirmed this,

> The defence of black-African interests in the global political space gained attention of Nigerian leaders at independence in 1960. Nigeria did not hesitate at the point of independence to realise that African destiny was in its hand. In realisation of this golden fact, all issues related to Africa have been occupying Nigeria's attention in the global politics. It was observed by Nigeria government at the point of independence that if Nigeria did not rise to the occasion of defending Africans

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anywhere in the globe, no other country would be capable of doing so (Bolarinwa, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015).

It is thus in realization of the above that Nigeria responded to the Congo political debacle. Many high-rank officers like Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, who later became Nigerian Head of state, Lt. Colonel S.A Ademulegun, Major F.A Fajuyi, Brigadier Ogundipe and Major Hilary Njoku from Nigerian army were sent to the Congo to perform administrative role under the auspices of the UN (The Union, September 29, 2014). This was the first time Nigerian forces experience the international peacekeeping operation, and it also marked the first ever African involvement in peacekeeping (Agbakwuru, 2013). Nigeria performed creditably under the UN but because of the influence of external forces, the war raged on intractably for decades. In fact, the UN Secretary-General at the time, Mr. U Than, was highly disappointed to assert that: "Efforts to prevent the civil war and achieve reconciliation in the Congo were persistently obstructed and thwarted by professional adventurers who fought and killed for money" (Quoted in Chibundi, 2003:6). Such was the revelation of the high-level officer in the UN who was convinced that there were invisible hands in the Congo political situation which made it difficult for Nigeria and other states to achieve the intended aims of the UN in the intervention. This is because the colonial powers were not neutral in the crisis, most especially the British and the Belgian. Their roles were partial and it made it difficult for country like Nigeria to perform its mandate comfortably as assigned by the UN.

5.2.2 **Chadian Crisis (1979)**

Chadian political problems represented an important watershed in the history of peacekeeping in Africa. It is the first peacekeeping experience by the OAU since its inception in 1963 (Sesay, 1991:6). The peacekeeping in Chad was instigated by Ni-

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gerian government in 1979 in accordance to Kano Accord (Mays, 2002: 48). Under

the commandership of Colonel Magoro, a Nigerian, Nigeria dispatched 800 men to

the disputed Chad region in 1979 (Mays, 2002:40). Under the aegis of transformed

OAU, Nigerian participated well in the peacekeeping operation in Chad and contrib-

uted greatly to the cessation of hostilities in Chad in 1982. The problem in Chad

erupted as a result of the political rivalry between the two main factions. In 1979 a

National Reconciliation Committee on Chad was hosted in Lagos and Nigeria had to

find a lasting solution to the complicated political situation (Akinterinwa, FGI, Janu-

ary 28, 2015).

In addition to Nigerian peacekeeping force, some African countries such as

Senegal, Ghana and Mali also contributed large force for Chad crisis (Delancey,

1983:181). It was a Nigerian, Peter Onu, the Deputy OAU Secretary-General that

suggested the conversion of the formed OAU Defence Force to peacekeeping in

1979 (Mays, 2002: 41). According to Sam Amoo, a former Ghanaian army and dip-

lomat,

> Nigeria's leadership role continued (in Chad) with the convening of a
> conference on national reconciliation in Kano, Nigeria, on March 11,
> 1979. The conference was attended by representatives of four Chadian
> factions: President Malloum; Hissene Habre, leader of the Forces
> Armees du Nord (FAN); Goukouni Weddeye representing the FRO-
> LINAT; and Aboubakar Mahamat Abderaman, leader of the Mouve-
> ment Populaire pour la Liberation de Tchad (MPLT, supported by Ni-
> geria). Delegates from Nigeria, the Sudan, Libya, Cameroon, Niger,
> and a representative of the OAU participated in the conference. This
> conference (Kano I) was the first attempt to bring together all im-
> portant factions and interested parties, within and without Chad, for the
> purpose of seeking a negotiated settlement of the conflict (Amoo,
> Carter Center)

The above testimony further confirmed the leadership role of Nigeria in the

Chadian conflict. However, Muamar Gadaffi, the Libyan President at the time, acted

in violation of Lagos Accord and decided to interrupt the fragile situation in Chad

(Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). The National Front for the Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) received the backing of Nigeria and eventually appointed Muhammed Shawa as the President (Delancey, 1983:173). The Libyan presence in the conflict compounded the already-tense political climate and made it difficult for Nigeria under the OAU to control the situation (Akinterinwa, 1987).

The ceasefire thus broke down in 1982 under the umbrella of OAU Nigeria sent another set of soldiers to the conflict zone in Chad. Some African countries like Ghana, Mali and Niger also followed to send troops to Chad. Under the OAU agreement, each of the force-contributing states would be responsible for the financial responsibility of their forces (Sesay, 1991:15). Because some of the countries could not provide enough facilities to their troops and in this case, Nigeria assumed the responsibility (Sesay, 1991). Nigeria provided much of the finance and agreement was also reached among contributing countries which included the need for the external parties to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of Chad (OAU, 1982).

Thus, it was the financial arrangement that first challenged the ability of the OAU most as the organisation suffered from financial woe. Nigerian in this case sponsored the OAU intervention to the tune of $80 million (Adebajo, 2002:53). In a personal discussion with Professor Kunle Lawal, a former Commissioner for Education in Lagos state, Nigeria and a Professor of Diplomatic History at University of Ibadan, he opined that "at the height of the Chadian crisis OAU could not maintain the upkeep and supervision of the troops and most troops-contributing nations were forced to withdraw from Chad" (Lawal, Pers. Comm., April 24, 2012). Those countries that maintained their stance suffered the worst of their lives as most could not meet the requirement of intervention (Shaw, 1983:27). Nigeria insisted to stay longer and was in charge of maintaining those forces from Ghana and Senegal because their

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countries could not provide for them (Richard, 2013:14). Nigeria provided this assistance under the OAU agreement that it would repay Nigeria back. However, Nigeria did not receive any financial reimbursement from OAU (Shaw, 1983). The amount of the debt owed by the OAU to Nigeria was $80 million and was finally written off in 1989 under President Ibrahim Banangida (Adebajo, 2002:53). Despite growing domestic criticism on the debt forgiveness, the president did not yield and this scenario explains the burden a hegemon has to bear in its external relations.

5.2.3 **Nigeria in the East Africa and Western Sahara**

The Nigerian peacekeeping efforts also extended to the East African countries. Immediately after Somalia got its independence, there emerged border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia as it virtually occurred in most parts of the continent. The US agreed with the Nigerian-backed OAU resolution between Ethiopia and Somalia which stipulated that both countries should abide by the existing colonial boundary (Bolarinwa, FGI, January 28, 2015). In this case, Nigeria under OAU agreed that Somalia should rescind its irredentist ambition to occupy Ogaden and some parts of Ethiopia because of the presence of Somali ethnic minority (Bach, 1983:42). The resolution received a boost from the US and other partners to the conflict. Professor Bola Akinterinwa, the Director-General of Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) confirms,

> The leadership of Nigeria in Africa may be regarded as self-imposed in nature as no higher authority has ever made us to do so. This self-imposed leadership was showcased in the Horn of Africa when Nigeria quelled the border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. Thus, the acceptance of the US and the warring factions of the solution provided by Nigeria through OAU could be regarded as the sign of recognising Nigeria's regional hegemonic posture in Africa (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015).

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Thus, the agreement by the US with the OAU Ad-hoc Commission, chaired by Nigeria, could be regarded as the singular motivation for the success which Nigeria achieved in the area of peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa.

After the settlement of Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute, Nigeria under President Sheu Shagari settled the seeming division among the OAU members in 1980. In July, 1980 a meeting was held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, which was scheduled to settle some African teething problems (Adetula, 2005:167). The mere mentioning of Sharawai Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) issue resulted in an intense animosity among African countries because they could not agree on the resolution to be adopted (Bach, 1983:42). The Moroccan government regarded that part of Africa as its own while some African countries refused to abide by it. Consequently, Senegal and Morocco were threatening to leave the meeting. However, Nigerian president came on board to settle the matter among the OAU members amicably (Bach, 1983:42). This case has also been regarded as the diplomatic success of Nigeria in keeping Africa's unity. Thus, from 1960 until the late 1980s Nigeria has been particularly showcasing its hegemonic ambition through OAU, UN and Commonwealth and it was the outbreak of conflicts in Liberia, Ivory Coast , Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Mali that forced Nigeria to respond immediately to the crack in the wall in all the neighbouring West African countries. Nigeria responded towards all West African problems through the sub-regional multilateral organization, ECOWAS (The Guardian, April, 2012).

5.2.4 **Peacekeeping in the Mano River Region**

Mano River region comprises four countries namely Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. Virtually all of them have suffered from political turmoil of which

Nigeria has grossly involved in terms of peacekeeping operations. The first of this intervention occurred in Liberia in 1990. The civil war erupted in Liberia in December 1989 before the final fate of Cold War struggle. The Cold War might well explain the outbreak of the conflict in Liberia because of the assistance provided to Samuel Doe government by the US-backed military regime (Olonisakin, 1998:101). As the intensity of the Cold War eased, the National Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Liberia (NPFL) under the command and leadership of Charles Taylor overran the Samuel Doe government and the conflict erupted in a large scale not ever witnessed in African history. The lawlessness in the region thus made Nigeria intervention inevitable. Professor Ogaba Uche, the Director of Research and Studies, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs stresses that,

> the problems in Mano River Basin countries have received attention of various Nigerian governments, the problems of which Nigeria did not know anything about. Most of us are convinced that the problems were partly emanated from Cold War rivalries between powers most especially that of Liberia. Nigeria responded quickly in order that the conflict is arrested before assuming regional dimension (Ogaba, FGI, January 28, 2015).

The concern of Nigeria about human disaster this may produce, if left unattended to, forced Nigerian government to sponsor the Banjul Conference in the early 1990 to intervene in Liberia (Ero, 1995). The problem lies in the fact that ECOWAS was not designed, from the incipient, to respond to such large-scale crisis. Although Mutual Assistance Defence (MAD) was signed among the ECOWAS members in 1981, it has never been put to use (ECOWAS, 1981). Because of its overwhelming power in West Africa, which gives rooms for mutual suspicion among the smaller countries in the region, Nigeria exercised restrain to sponsor any sub-regional military initiative that might reduce the incidence of conflict in West Africa. This was intentional in order to allay the fears of ECOWAS members about the hegemonic

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aspiration of Nigeria within the West African sub region (Osuntokun, 2010). Since MAD could not be invoked to respond to Liberian crisis, the Banjul Conference produced mechanisms under which the members had to respond to the crisis in Liberia (Salami, 2013:780). In this case, ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) was formed to respond to Liberian crisis and Article 52 of the UN Charter supported this stance. The article is a UN initiative, which stipulated that in the event of any outbreak of conflict, it might be beneficial for the regional initiatives or organisation to take over the responsibility of maintaining peace and order (Abas, 2004:27). And because of the familiar terrain of the regional organisation, it is assumed such may be in the best form to put the conflict to rest. It was under this liberty that ESMC was empowered to take over the responsibility of quelling the tide of conflict in Liberia (Daily Champion, October 15, 2010).

Thus, the ESMC provided such regional initiatives for the military intervention in Liberia and with the subsequent creation of ECOMOG as the military arms of ECOWAS. It was after the adoption of the resolution in 1990 that the ECOMOG force went to Liberia for peacekeeping purpose (Hamman & Omojuwa, 2013:28). Between 1990 and 1997, about 16,000 troops were stationed in Liberia with attendant financial cost (Agbakwuru, 2013). Out of the 16,000 troops produced by the ECOWAS members, Nigeria contributed 12,000 troops, which amounted to 80% of all troops contributed (Hamman & Omojuwa, 2013:31). The president of Nigeria at the time, Ibrahim Babangida, suggested that,

> Nigeria has no territorial ambition in Liberia or anywhere else. We are in Liberia because events in the country have led to the massive destruction of property, the massacre by all the warring parties of thousands of innocent civilians including those of foreign nations, women and children some of whom had sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under Red Cross protection contrary to all recognized standard of civilized behaviour and international ethics and decorum. To those involved in false historical

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comparisons, intellectual intoxication and phantom analysis, I ask, should Nigeria and all responsible countries in the sub-region stand and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass grave yard? (Babangida, 1990).

Nigeria, therefore, could not wait for the lives of millions of Liberian people who were in danger while the international response seemed not forthcoming. In another speech delivered at Press briefing in Lagos on the Liberian crisis, the president reiterated,

> ….Many people still holds parochial view about our military intervention in Liberia. We are in Africa and we have the responsibility to act….ECOMOG does not force its way into Liberia likewise Nigeria (Babangida, 1990).

It was the Commission, the Responsibility to Protect, which signaled the potential of the conflict degenerating into massive humanitarian disaster in West Africa. Based on this report, Nigerian president shoulder most of the responsibility to establish political decorum in Liberia (Bolarinwa, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015). Between January 1990 and 1996, UN adopted 15 Resolutions that commended the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. AUNSC report states "its appreciation to the Chairman of ECOWAS for his initiative in organizing a regional summit on Liberia and to the Government of Nigeria…, and urges all parties to participate in the operation" (UNSC Report, 1995). Thus, the Liberian crisis with attendant intervention of Nigeria represented an important watershed in the humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War global politics.

Because of the huge financial and material loss suffered by Nigeria, the public tended to criticise the regime for such a flamboyant foreign military mission. In response, the Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, asserts,

> Perhaps many do not yet know, nor appreciate either the danger of international embarrassment the Liberian crisis portends for all of us in this sub-region in particular, and to Africa and the black race in general …Our critics tend to ignore the appalling human catastrophe which the

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Liberian crisis has created for us in this sub-region…for the avoidance of doubt, neither Nigeria nor the members of the ECOMOG forced their way into the Liberian conflict in a manner …. Resembling military adventurism. Nigeria is a member of the sub-regional group that took a solemn decision to restore peace by separating the warring factions in Liberia,…(Babangida, 1990).

The declaration quoted above was in response to the domestic and international fear that Nigeria was on a subterranean mission to occupy a neighbouring country. To allay such a fear, Nigeria intervened according to the UN and ECOWAS mandate and in a certain case Nigerian commander in the Liberia, Joshua Dogonnyaro, was replaced with Ghanaians just to make sure that its mission was not tarnished with propaganda from foes in the neighbouring countries (Adebajo, 2008:70). The replacement of Nigerian force commander with that of Ghanaian was also in response to the accusation of Nigeria's domination in the intervention. Overall, Nigeria made peace with the rebel leader, Charles Taylor and included him in the interim national government.

It is of interest to note that the pattern of governance in Africa remained the same all over. The Liberian political turmoil by 1997 replicated itself with the ousting of elected president from office by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone which was believed to have the backing from Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor (Fawole, 2004:298). The RUF had been receiving training under Taylors' leadership of NPFL in Liberia, and the crisis of 1990 provided incentive for the RUF to dethrone the duly-elected president, Tejan Kabah of Sierra Leone (Sesay, 1998:64). Since ECOWAS members had already agreed on a resolution for not recognizing undemocratic regimes in Africa, ECOWAS under Nigeria's leadership went ahead to reinstate President Tejah Kabah in 1998 (Osuntokun, 2010). The military junta promised it would return power to democratically elected president but refused to fulfill its promise, a step that forced the ECOMOG to forcefully launch an attack

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on the RUF (Osuntokun, 2010). The war in Sierra Leone continued unabated under the ECOWAS. The continuation of the conflict meant there was need for ECOWAS member, most especially Nigeria, to accommodate other multilateral organisation to stamp out the incessant war. It was based on this that OAU and the UN peacekeeping forces intervened (UNSC Reports, 1998). However, the killings and the kidnappings of the UN peacekeepers by the RUF rebels worsened the case. With the persistence of Nigeria-led ECOMOG who continuously sustained causalities without relenting effort, forced the rebel to surrender and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was able to capture the rebels and supervised election in Sierra Leone (Saliu, 2007:105). The president was finally reinstated in 1998 by Nigerian-led forces controlled the capital, Freetown, and also assisted in peace building and personnel training in the aftermath of the war.

Also, in Ivory Coast, the similar fate befell the democratically-elected President Laurent Gbagbo in 2002. Nigeria, together with South Africa, Ghana and Senegal held a meeting for diplomatic solution to the crisis in Dakar (Ebohon & Isike, 2004:5). The Dakar meeting resulted in constituting a force that will quell the conflict in Ivory Coast. ECOWAS peacekeeping force for Ivory Coast together with United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOMIC) was inaugurated under the leadership of a Nigerian Ambassador, Ralph Uwechue, as the Special Representative of the sub-regions peacekeeping operation (Omojuwa, 2013:28). Finally, in 2004, the rebels were forced to surrender and the peaceful atmosphere prevailed once again in Abidjan and other parts of the country.

5.2.5 **Multilateral Peacekeeping in Mali**

In 2012, the Nigerian multilateral peacekeeping efforts continued in Mali. The case of Mali is a complex one because it involved terrorist groups known as Al-Qaeda. The roles of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabab, Tuareg Rebels Force and Ansar al-Din cannot be underestimated in the Malian case (This Day, November 23, 2012). The Mali case became an issue in 2012 with the fall of Libya's leader, Colonel Gadaffi (Ireogbu, 2012). Most of Tuareg rebel groups were part of forces that fought under Gadaffi in Libya. They fought to rescue Gadaffi from the opposition groups emerged during Arab Spring that radiated nearly all the political landscape of the Arab World (Obayuwana, 2012). With the fall of Gadaffi, the weapons that were used in the revolution in Libya by the Tuareg were not surrendered. This gave them ample chance to use the weapons to launch attacks on Mali government. They declared separate region in the northern part of Mali, which was imminent for the entire region. Because of the reluctance of the UN to intervene, Nigeria led ECOWAS forces into Mali to nip the war in the bud before it went out of hand (This Day, November 21, 2012).

With the intensity of AQIM onslaught in the northern Mali in 2012, it became increasingly clear to the Mali government in Bamako that they needed foreign assistance (This Day, November 23, 2012). It was based on this realistic assessment that the Bamako government requested Nigeria to lead ECOWAS troop into Mali in November, 2012 (Oyedele, 2012). Nigeria needed to debate this in the National Assembly before any response was made. Senator David Mark, the Senate President, discussed the issue in the House of Senate, after which there was unanimous agreement that Nigeria should intervene in Mali (Senate Report, November, 2012). Thus, $34 million was approved in January 2013 for such operation and Nigeria led ECOWAS

into Mali. Apart from regional approval, the UNSC Resolution 2071 of 2012 also authorised Nigeria to lead ECOWAS intervention in Mali (Adigbuo, 2013:17-18). During the intervention, the Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonatahan, addressed the Donors' Conference organised at the end of the 20th Ordinary Session of the AU Summit in Ethiopia (Adigbuo, 2013:17)). The session identified raping, plundering, and assaults on the civilian as the most heinous crimes committed by AQIM all of which could not be controlled by Mali government. Thus, Nigeria led ECOWAS into Mali with the approval of the UNSC and the AU in 2012 and subsequently brought the conflict to condition of relative peace (UNSC, 2012).

5.2.6 Sudan Crisis and Nigeria's Multilateral Intervention

The Nigerian multilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking mission do not limit its presence to Sub-Saharan African alone; it is extended to all parts of Africa. Abidoye Morufu, a Diplomatic Historian at Centre for Black Culture and International Understanding confirms,

> the Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping operation is not… limited to Black Africa alone. It is a global mission and the presence of Nigerian soldiers has been felt in almost all corners of the globe. It is not surprising therefore to see Nigerian soldiers and police in peacekeeping operations in Sudan (Abidoye, Pers. Comm., January 29, 2015).

The Sudan crisis, which dated back to 1930s, also received the attention of Nigerian government. According to International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the Sudanese government in Khartoum has been using various methods to suppress the rights of Darfurians in the south for decades (ICG, 2005). The peak of the tension resurfaced in 2003 when the National Islamic Front (NIF) under the auspices of Khartoum government allegedly used force and military means to suppress the people of Darfur. The Khartoum government under Omar al-Basher accused the Suda-

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nese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) as constitut-

ing a potent threat to the government of Sudan (Ngwube, 2013:85). In this way the

two liberation organisations was labelled as terrorist groups by the Khartoum gov-

ernment and the government proceeded to use Janjweed to suppress them militarily

(Ngwube, 2013:86). The Janjaweed under the Popular Defence Force (PDF) perpe-

trated all sorts of atrocities that the UN categorised as ethnic cleansing and genocide

(UNSC Report, 2003).

Thus, Janjaweed carried sporadic attack on the civilians and the children

without any concrete and substantial justification to do so. The International Crisis

Group (ICG) reported that many women were raped and men massacred unjustifiably

while over 200,000 people were forced out of their location to seek refuge elsewhere

(Ngwube, 2013:84). The atrocities being perpetrated by the Janjweed, forces fully

backed by the Khartoum government, led some people to believe that the Khartoum

government intentionally engaged in a systematic way of exterminating the blacks

and non-Muslims from Darfur region (Saka, 2008). According to Integrated Regional

Information Network (IRIN), Nigeria was initially astonished and could not really

understand the plight of Khartoum government (IRIN, 2004). But because of the ef-

fect of the refugees being produced by the military onslaught on the neighbouring

countries, most especially the Chad, the government of Chad was forced to intervene.

The Chadian President, Derby, presented the case to the OAU because its initial in-

tervention did not achieve anything (Ngwube, 2013: 85).

With the agreement in May 2004 among the Assembly of Heads of States and

Governments of the AU, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed to

quell the seemingly degenerating situation in Darfur, most especially the humanitari-

an crisis (Ogaba, FGI, January 28, 2015). The result of the agreement led to the de-

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ployment of 300 forces from Nigeria and Rwanda to the Darfur region and the peace talks continued in Abuja, Nigeria (IRIN, 2004). The presence of Nigeria in Darfur was immense in 2004. The Chairperson of the AU at the time President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in agreement with the AU members suggested that there was a need to neutralise Janjaweed force in Darfur and to intensify effort at arresting the influx of refugees to the neighbouring countries most especially in the Chad (Ngwube, 2013:87). It was based on this situation appraisal that the AU Chairperson appointed another Nigerian, a former military president, Abdusalam Abubakar, as the special envoy to Chad and Sudan to mediate in the conflict in Darfur (The Guardian, September 21, 2010). The special envoy report on the situation in Darfur was not satisfactory to the AU members. This also led the organisation to intensify efforts at bringing the rebels and the central government together in Abuja, Nigeria in August, 2004 for the purpose of settling the conflict situation (Ebegbulem, 2012:5). In this case, Abuja Peace Agreement was signed and it led to Darfur Peace Accord.

Therefore, the failure of the Chadian President to intervene meaningfully forced Nigerian government to assume the mantle of peace broker, eventually in 2004, a ceasefire agreement was signed. The AMIS and UNAMID Mission were both under the command of former Nigerian Defence Staff, General Martin Luther Agwai (Pham, 2007:112). The current UNAMID Deputy Joint Special Representative is also a Nigerian, Abiodun Bashua. He was appointed 2014 by the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon (Sudan Tribune, September 18, 2014). Such is the role played by Nigeria in Sudan crisis. Below is the summary of Nigeria's multilateral operations since independence.

Table 5.3

List of Multilateral Operations by Nigeria since Independence

NAME	COUNTRY	ORGANISATION	YEAR	ROLE
ONUC	CONGO	UNO	1960-1964	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND FORCE COMMANDER
UNSF	NEW GUINEA	UNSF	1962-1963	MILITARY OBSERVERS
OAUTM	TANZANIA	OAU	1964	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND TRAINING
UNIPOM	INDIA/PAKISTAN	UNO	1965-1966	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNFIL	LEBANON	UNO	1978	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
OAUPMC 1	CHAD	OAU	1981-1982	BATALLION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
OAUPMC 2	CHAD	OAU	1982-83	BRIGADE OPERATIONS
UNIMOG	IRAN/IRAQ	UNO	1988-1991	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNAVEM	ANGOLA	UNO	1989	MILLITARY OPERATIONS AND DETACHMENT
UNTAG	NAMIBIA	UNO	1989-1990	MILITARY OBSERVERS
NATAG	SIERRA LEONE	UNO-OAU	1991	TRAINING TEAM
ONUMOZ	MOZAMBIQUE	UNO	1992-1994	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNTAC	CAMBODIA	UNO	1992-1993	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNOSOM	SOMALIA	UNO	1992-1995	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
UNIPROFOR	YUGOSLAVIA	UNO	1992-1994	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
MINORSO	SOMALIA	OAU	1995	BATTALLION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
NATAG	GAMBIA	UNO	1993	TRAINING TEAM
UNASOG	AOUZOU STRIP, CHAD/LIBYA	UNO	1994	MILITARY OBSERVER
UNTSO	ISRAEL	UNO	1995	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNCRO	CROATIA	UNO	1995-1996	RESTORATION OPERATIONS
UNIKOM	IRAQ/IRAN	UNO	1991-2002	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNAMIR	RWANDA	UNO	1993-1996	BATTALION OPERATIONS
UNOMIL	LIBERIA	UNO	1993-1997	OPERATIONS
ECOMOG	LIBERIA	ECOWAS	1990-1997	OPERATIONS
ECOMOG	SIERRA LEONE	ECOWAS	1998	MILITARY OPERATIONS AND STAFF OF-

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				FICERS
ECOMOCI	COTE D' IVOIRE	ECOWAS	2002	BATTALION OPERA-TIONS
UNAMID	SUDAN	UNO	2003	MILITARY OPERA-TIONS, TRAINING AND DEPUTY JOINT SPE-CIAL REPRESENTA-TIVE

(Source: Author's compilation)

Thus, Nigerian multilateral peacekeeping role since independence has been to maintain peace and stability in the globe (see table 5.3). Nigerian government has embarked on various missions under multilateral organisations to ensure there is political stability in the global environment and for this to be achieved there is a need for stable polity throughout the world.

One would wonder why Nigeria takes responsibility for maintenance of peace and order in Africa and elsewhere in the globe. Nigerian government is of the conviction that any problem or instability in any corner of the globe affects its own peaceful existence either directly or indirectly. In order to make sure that its own security is guaranteed, West African region becomes Nigeria's priority (see Chapter Six for details). This assertion is true as the world is now more connected than before. The shooting down of MH17, a Malaysian flight, over the airspace of Ukraine by rebels clearly lends credence to this. In its attempt at stemming the tide of political instability, therefore, Nigeria has engaged in virtually all UN peacekeeping and observer mission (see table 5.3). According to Polish Ambassador to Nigeria, Grezgorz Walinski,

> having been involved in 40 out of the 55 peacekeeping mission of the UN, Nigeria has now participated in 73% of all peacekeeping operations. Four of these missions have been commandeered by Nigeria senior military officers. Currently, Nigeria has about 6,000 peacekeepers in various flashpoints, 4,000 of which are in Darfur, Sudan (The Vanguard, October 31, 2013).

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In OAU/AU and ECOWAS, Nigeria has been involving itself in stabilizing political terrain of Africa immediately after independence. The African problem is always at the centre of Nigerian foreign policy and this has been the case since 1960. This is confirmed by the views of Adeyemi Linda, a fellow in the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs,

> African problems have always been occupied the attention of Nigerian government since independence. No African country has been doing the way Nigeria does. We are the most ubiquitous of all countries in Africa especially where conflict and dispute occur. I have been to Somalia and Sudan under peacekeeping operations of Nigerian police force. I do not see any African country that march the standard and the way Nigeria operates (Adeyemi, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015).

Although, Nigeria at some points of its political history also suffered political instability, its capabilities to constantly deal with its internal problems serve as strength to replicates such experience at international level. The successful end of Nigerian civil war in 1970 attests to this position. Starting from the Congo crisis in 1960, Nigeria assumed the position of leadership to settle the political, ethnic and border problems between nations involved.

5.2.7 Global Peacekeeping Operations

At global level, Nigerian government also maintains its peacekeeping role. Abidoye Morufu, stresses, "in 1962, Nigerian humanitarian mission was sent to the Papua New Guinea in the Asia Pacific to ensure stability in that part of the globe and few army and police were sent as observers" (Abidoye, Pers. Comm., January 29, 2015). In relation to the Pakistan-Indian dispute, Nigerian soldiers were part of observer mission in 1965 under the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) with a Nigerian battalion as observers (see Table 5.3). In its peacekeeping effort, Nigeria sent its soldiers to Lebanon in 1978 under the United Nations In-

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terim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL). In Lebanon, 673 Nigerian soldiers were sent of which 43 died and 120 wounded (The Union, September 29, 2014).Under the commandership of Lt. Colonel Taye Olubokun, 900 Nigerian soldiers was deployed to Slovenia on June 1992 under United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to keep peace in Yugoslavia (Eugene,2014:5).

Furthermore, in 1992, Nigeria police force was deployed to Cambodia under United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as observers to maintain tranquility in that part of the globe. During the First Gulf War (1980-1988), Nigerian army was on supervision and observation mission under United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG). In the Gulf War, between Iraq and Kuwait, Nigeria was part of the mission that supervised peace between the two countries in 1992. The most important aspect of Nigeria's global multilateral operation takes place in Haiti where 121 Nigerian police officers serve under United Nations Formed Police Unit since 2004 (Ezigbo, 2010). The massive earthquake that devastated the country in January 2010 killed a Nigerian whose name has been identified by the UN as Ms. Dede Yebovi Fadairo (UN, 2010). She was an Associate Report Writing Officer in Haiti under the UN. Hence, Nigeria's record in the multilateral peacekeeping operations under the UN, OAU, and ECOWAS is notable.

5.3 NIGERIA'S POLICY OF DECOLONISATION

The African continent began to be a subject of colonial domination in the early 19th century. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 culminated in partitioning the African continent among the global powers of the time without giving preference to socio-cultural diversity. The colonial domination of Africa lasted for most part of 19th and 20th centuries and by the middle of the 20thcentury, most African colonies began to

gain political independence. In this case, Morocco, Ghana, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia became prominent (Oliver & Atmore, 1977:85). By the beginning of the 1960s, Nigeria and some other African countries got their independent. With the independence of Nigeria in 1960, it became a matter of urgency on the part of the Nigerian government to ensure that the continent got liberated completely from colonial powers. Professor Bola Akinterinwa, the Director-General of the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs highlighted this further,

> In recognition of our place in Africa, Nigeria took the leadership of the African continent upon itself. This is in realisation of the fact that Nigeria is an independent nation, a sovereign, that do not need to consult any other country before doing what it thinks is right. It is thus our own right to do what is right in Africa (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015).

Nigeria has always seen Africa continent as the centre of its diplomacy, a conviction that help shaped the decolonisation of the continent by successive Nigerian governments (Fafowora, 1997:52). When Nigeria got its independence in 1960 it joined the UN as the 99th member of the global multilateral institution with the hope that the interests and rights of Africa will be safeguarded and defended with all available diplomatic mechanisms (Otunla, 2005:315). Nigeria government at the point of independent had the presumption that the Nigerian independence was incomplete without the total emancipation of the continent from the colonial yoke, as stated in the Nigerian Constitution (Nigerian Constitution, 1979). It was in the moral conviction of Nigeria that the declaration of Atlantic Charter should be applied to all regardless of race, religion, sex and affinity (Jinadu, 2005:24). In this case, the policy of decolonization was implicitly declared by Nigerian government at independence. In fact, two out of the ten objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy are pointed towards the actualization of this policy. These are:

Support for the rights of peoples for self-determination and freedom from colonial and foreign subjugation, and for all liberation movements, in their legitimate struggle for national independence; an unwavering support for all efforts to destroy the obnoxious system of apartheid in southern Africa, and all forms of racial bigotry and prejudice anywhere in the World (Chibundi, 2003:10).

The wave of Nigeria's decolonization policy was felt throughout the continent and this could be attributed to the experience of Nigeria under colonialism and slavery. The psychological demoralization and dehumanization caused by the centuries of slavery and colonialism made Nigerian government developed a strong aversion to colonialism and racism in Africa (Folarin, 2010). Decolonisation wave of 1960s in Africa did not resonate throughout the continent as some countries were yet to gain independence. Not only this, some countries got their independence but were still ruled under the white minority supremacy. This was the case in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Republic of South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, and Swaziland. The most complex of this case was the Republic of South Africa. The republic was declared independent in 1910 under the white minority rule, which later established the racial policy known as apartheid policy, the policy that discriminated between white and black which gave ample superiority to white race over the black.

It was, therefore, in this enigmatic socio-political situation that Nigeria found itself after independence. The task before Nigeria was colossal, as Nigeria needed to face some external and unanticipated forces in its bid to arrest the situation in all these countries. Dr Joshua Bolarinwa, a research fellow at Nigeria Institute of International Affairs stresses this further,

 In realizing the need to dismantle the evil of apartheid in the southern part of Africa, a vigorous step was taken by Nigerian government. Nigeria was of the conviction that the existence of white supremacist government in the southern part of the continent represented an affront to the black race. In this effort, Nigeria government unilaterally established National action committee on apartheid, which hoped to monitor

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closely the progress of apartheid policy in the continent in collaboration with OAU members (Bolarinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015).

The British, Dutch and Portuguese were unwilling to yield to any pressure and it was all these countries that Nigeria was prepared to face in its decolonization campaign. Also, Nigeria had to challenge the USSR and Cuba in Angola. The involvement of the USSR and Cuba against the US was an extension of Cold War struggle in the global politics of the time. The situation became so complex that Nigeria at a point resulted in using economic sanction as weapon most especially against Britain and the US (Bach, 1983:38). Nigeria, therefore, employed multilateral mechanism to lobby for the support of all other countries in the campaign against the twin problems of colonialism and racism in Africa.

5.3.1 Nigeria, OAU and Algerian Struggle

The first attempt on the part of Nigeria in this process was towards the French in Algeria through the nascent OAU in 1961 (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015). Although OAU has not been formally formed before the liberation guerrilla warfare began in Algeria but the two groups who later formed the nucleus of the organization had been created (Adetula, 2005). The Monrovia bloc and Casablanca bloc were the two most important groups that later united to form OAU with its first meeting in Ghana under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah in 1958 (Bolarinwa, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015).

There seemed to be a point of divergence between the two groups that made it difficult for African countries to evolve a common front at forming the continental organisation. The Casablanca bloc seemed to be radical in their approach and was advocating for the political federation of the continent under the banner of United States of Africa (Aluko, 1983:192; Otunla, 2005:319). Nigeria, who happened to be

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the leader of the Monrovia group, did not agree with the Casablanca bloc under the direction of Ghanaian leader, Nkrumah. The Monrovia bloc contended that the regional economic grouping should be advocated instead of political federation as no country would like to forfeit its hard-won independence to any supranational state (Otunla. 2005:325).

Eventually in 1963, both groups unanimously, through shifting of grounds, agreed to form OAU, which was based on the twin principles of equality of all states and non-interference (Otunla, 2005:319). In the process of forming this organisation, Nigeria under the Monrovia group had been criticizing the domination of the Algerian people by the minority French settlers who declared Algeria as part of France. The testing of Atomic Bomb in the Sahara between Algerian and Chadian border in 1961 worsened the case and Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with France in the same year (Aluko, 1983:81). Chibundi (2003)stresses that "Algeria suffered under French military occupation from 1956 until 1962 that recorded the bloodiest independent movement in the history of Africa" (p. 3).

5.3.2 Decolonization in Southern Africa

After the formation of OAU in 1963, Nigerian government began the intensification of its decolonization struggle in Mozambique, Rhodesia, Angola, and South Africa. Nigeria thus concluded that without the total independence of all African countries from colonial bondage, its independence was not complete (Jinadu, 2005:25). At the United Nations General Assembly meeting in 1961, Portuguese government insisted Angola was an extension of Portugal (Chibundi, 2003:3). In support to this claim, Dr. Jaja Wachukwu, the Nigeria Minister of Foreign Affairs retorted,

> Nigeria could never accept the fiction that any square, inch of an African territory could be considered as an integral part of a metropolitan

European country; indeed that Nigeria could never accept the twist, considering that Angola was part of Africa, whilst Portugal was part of Europe, and that was all there was to it (Wachukwu, 1961).

It should be remembered that the Balewa government played an important role in the events that led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961 as a protest against the apartheid policy (Falola & Heaton, 2008:384; Chibundi, 2003:4). However, since the end of Nigerian civil war in 1970, the government has brought greater vigour and commitment to the campaign against colonialism.

In the immediate period after Nigerian civil war (see Chapter Five) it was far from clear how these two elements, the African support and the hostility towards the white-ruled Southern part of Africa would be reflected (Berger, 2003:175). One of the most important steps taken by Nigerian government was on Portugal. Portugal was the first to receive the federal Government's uncompromising message in the southern part of Africa. In 1971, at the OAU Summit Conference, General Gowon, the Nigerian military president at the time, urged the organization to co-ordinate its efforts and liberate at least one African territory within three years (Ogunbadejo, 1976: 38).On the request of Gowon, Major-General Olutoye who was the Chairman of the OAU Defence Commission at that time also favoured the setting up of an African Military Force (AMF) to implement Gowon's idea (Ogunbadejo, 1976:40). Gowon, therefore, urged sub-Saharan Africa to take immediate positive action to free the continent from racism and imperialism. It should be noted that Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau had taken serious steps at weakening Portugal's hold which coincided with Gowon's decolonization declaration in the continent. To buttress this point, Ogunbadejo laments,

one of the first to see the writing on the wall was General Spinola, the president of Portugal, who from his experience in Guinea-Bissau,

where he commanded the fight against the nationalists, came to the conclusion that Portugal's colonial wars could never end in victory against Nigeria (Ogunbadejo. 1976:40).

The above claim testified to the effectiveness and seriousness of Nigeria's de-colonization policy in Africa. In the end, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola were granted full independence by Portugal in 1974, 1975 and 1975 respectively. All these countries received financial assistance from Nigeria on achieving their independence. Sum of $500,000 and $675, 890 were given to Guinea Bissau and Mozambique respectively after gaining independence while Mozambique was further assisted with $1.8 million in aid (Adebayo, 1983:27).

The employment of multilateral campaign against the racist regimes in the southern part of Africa became a dominant instrument of Nigerian government. Nigeria took a strong stance against white minority regimes that governed most part of southern African countries. A central tenet of Nigeria's multilateral policy became the strangulation of these regimes by boycotting them and threatening to impose harsh sanctions on countries that did business with them (Adebo, 1966). In 1979, Nigeria rejected the application of British government for port development project in Nigeria, which British government had earlier promised to assist with 31 million pounds (Wright, 1983:113). Such rejection sent a warning signal to Britain on the seriousness of Nigeria on racial policy in South Africa. Also, the two oil tankers transporting oil to British Petroleum in South Africa were also arrested in Nigerian water and confiscated the cargoes (Wright, 1983:113). Nigeria frequently addressed the UN on the apartheid issue, and took the championship of the UN's anti-Apartheid Committee from 1966 until South Africa's liberation in 1994 (Akinboye, 2005: 214). In 1979, a New Nigerian Newspaper stressed that "the state (Nigeria) shall promote African unity…and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations" (New

Nigeria, June 15, 1979). Nigeria lobbied for the exclusion of South Africa from international bodies such as the Commonwealth and the OAU, and organized boycott of international sporting, including the 1972 Olympic Games (Akinboye, 2005:214). The Nigerian campaign against racial discrimination, apartheid policy and colonialism continued unabated in the Southern part of Africa in 1976 during the period of Olusegun Obasanjo. He also continued the policy and his own stance on the decolonisation policy seemed to be more aggressive than predecessors. Obasanjo declared that "it is ... in Namibia that the external enemies of Africa's interest are joining hands with the racists in South Africa to make a last ditch stand to frustrate Africa's will to freedom" (Obasanjo, 1976).

The most challenging aspect of Nigeria's decolonisation process in Africa occurred in Angola and Namibia. The decolonisation of Angola pitted Nigeria against the General Ford government in 1975 (Aluko. 1976:24). In fact, Nigeria launched another offensive towards the US by refusing to receive the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, on the issue of Rhodesia of which Nigeria had already discussed in OAU meeting in Ethiopia (Bach, 1983:38). The case of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was not so different from Angola case. In Zimbabwe, where the majority of the populations were black Africans, The white minority became the dominant force and Nigerian government could not fold arms and watch this ugly development. President Sheu Shagari stated,

> Sanction alone will not destroy…racism in southern Africa. They can, however, be used to support the armed struggle…we shall continue to assist, encourage and support that struggle with all our might and resources (Shagari, 1980).

Thus, the Nigerian government was committed to the principle of Black majority rule in Zimbabwe and because of what happened in the Portuguese territories, the white settlers in Zimbabwe was also reluctantly expecting that the fate of Portu-

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guese might also befall their government in Zimbabwe. Vorster, the minority white government regime leader, therefore, intensified effort to ensure that Nigeria's campaign did not materialize in his own domain (Shaw, 1983:5). Finally, in 1980, Robert Mugabe was voted in as the first black Prime Minister in Zimbabwe while Canaan Banana was the President (Bach, 1983:38). The Namibian struggle for majority rule is the longest of all in terms of Nigeria's involvement. It therefore requires separate treatment from other southern African struggles.

5.3.3.1 **Namibia Liberation Struggle and Nigeria**

The Nigerian effort in support of Namibia liberation struggle began shortly after independence. It was the third of its kind that Nigeria got involved in its early day of its independence. The first one was the Algerian war of independence against France, followed by the Congo debacle after the exit of Belgian. The Namibia crisis was the longest of all the cases ever involved by Nigerian government. It is important to discuss the background information that led to the protracted civil strife in Namibia. Namibia was formerly called South West Africa (SWA) during the League of Nations in 1919 (Aluko, 1983:197). It was an area that was formerly occupied by the German in 1884. After the defeat of German in the First World War, the area was placed under the Trusteeship Council of the League of Nations in 1919 (Oliver& Atmore, 1976:262). Based on the proximity of South Africa to the SWA, the responsibility of administering the territory was awarded to South Africa.

According to Olajide Aluko (1983), the award of the power to administer the territory to South Africa was followed by the responsibility to give regular reports on the situation of the occupied territory to the League of Nations on a periodical basis. By 1945, when the UN was formed, the South Africa was obligated to continue with

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the administration of the country based on the fragility of the socio-political atmosphere of the territory. Suddenly in 1946, South Africa declared the territory as part of the Union of South Africa (Daily Times, November 12, 1975). At this point, the inhabitants of the territory began to demand for self-government because of the dwindling in the quality of life they lived (Aluko, 1971:179). By 1966, the UN renamed the territory to be known as Namibia. Under the auspices of OAU in 1966, Liberia and Ethiopia dragged South Africa to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for its insistence on the occupation of the territory illegally (Oliver & Atmore, 1971: 263). The ICJ, therefore, declared that it does not have the jurisdiction over the case. The lamentation on the part of the ICJ may be interpreted as a way to frustrate the OAU members to surrender to the wishes and aspirations of South Africa on the matter.

Similarly, Nigeria was compelled to act through the UN and OAU in 1970. By 1971, UNGA unanimously took the decision that pronounced the occupation of Namibia by South Africa as unconstitutional and illegal (Arikpo, 1971). The UN further advised all the members of OAU and the UN to distant themselves from South African government if the latter did not relinquish its claim over the territory (Arikpo, 1971). It was the insistence of South Africa that led to the Nigerian government taken over the case. This is because of Nigeria's perception of its liberator role in Africa. Adebajo (2002:44) observes, "the big brother syndrome has afflicted Nigerian leaders since independence. It implies a sense of responsibility and a feeling of protectiveness toward weaker inexperienced siblings". The sole independent movement in the Namibia, South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), began to receive the attention of Nigerian government in the late 1960s. The Nigerian inspiration to interfere in the Namibian case was received by the OAU, such acceptance might base on the fact that Nigeria contributed 90% in its drafted charter (Gowon,

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1971). This milestone achievement is credited to Dr. Teslim Elias, a Nigerian Attorney General at the time. It should be stated here that the OAU Charter condemned all acts relating to racism and colonialism in the continent. The charter states clearly that "eradicating all forms of colonial vestiges and racial discrimination from the continent of Africa should be pursued by all" (OAU, 1963). It was based on this that Nigeria took a strict stance with OAU in liberating Namibia from South African apartheid regime.

The first step taken by the UN was the revocation of South West Africa as the original name of the territory in 1966 and replaced it with Namibia as an independent territory from South Africa (Akinyemi, 1978:156). Under the OAU, all members severed relations with South African regime based on the UN resolution (Daily Times, January 23, 1973). In the process of liberating Namibia, Nigerian government went through some processes, which did not bear any result. At a point, Nigeria was forced to employ economic tools to deal with the US and the rest of the West to renounce their support for South African regime (Shaw, 1983:39). In 1981, President Shagari, for example, threatened the US with oil embargo as thus,

> I want to make it abundantly clear: We are committed to armed struggle to liberate Namibia and end racism in South Africa. We are supporting and will continue to support the liberation fighters. We will not sacrifice this commitment for any other cause (Shagari, 1981).

In the Harare conference of 1986, which housed the Heads of African states of Non-aligned, Nigeria proposed the formation of African fund to assist and liberate southern African countries (Folarin, 2010:282). By this proposal, Nigeria donated $50 million to African Fund (Folarin, 2010). At last in 1989, UN established United Nations Transition Assistant Group (UNTAG) to supervise the total withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia with preparation for the conduct of election (UN, 1989). Many Nigerians served under both OAU and the UN to supervise the final handover

to the civilian government in Namibia. Peter Onu, Jolaoso Olajimi and Ambassador Lawrence were all members of UN Council on Namibia while Nigeria's policy Commissioner, Ezedima Ifejika, was appointed the Deputy Adviser of UNTAG (Adigbuo, 2005). In all, 183 Nigerian police officers and 40 election observers worked under UN and OAU to supervise the successful transition to civil rule in Namibia in 1990 (Adigbuo, 2005).

5.4 **FIGHT AGAINST CROSS BORDER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES**

In Africa, there was a move by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2001 to ensure that Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) that proliferates in Africa are brought under control (Anikulapo, 2012). It has been well established by the UNDP that most of the weapons that found its way to Africa have been used in robbery, insurgency, drug trafficking, rebellions, organised crimes and terrorism (UNDP, 2007). The UNDP was well aware of the danger these crimes pose to the lives of the West African people. It is recognised that the presence of these threats will constitute potent blockade to the thriving of good governance, democracy, security, and stable polity in Africa and West African in particular. It is, therefore, based on this assessment by the UNDP that ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) was established in 2000 and reviewed in 2007 with the report submitted to the Summit of Heads of States and Government (UNDP, 2007).

This became a necessity because of the incessant wars and some other crimes that pervade the socio-political terrain of member states of ECOWAS. The Programme is set in accordance with the Code of Conduct governing the moratorium and the plan of action adopted by the Council of Ministers at OAU Bamako Declara-

tion of 2000 and 2001 UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNDP, 2007).

The main target of ECOSAP (in collaboration with UNDP) is to lessen the burden of trans-border crimes in West Africa, to reduce the incidence of weapons circulation in the region and to promote security within the entire region. In doing this, Nigeria shoulder the responsibility of establishing the ECOWAS Small Arms Units (SAU) in Abuja with additional responsibility of training the police and other military personnel to combat the flow of small arms within the west African sub-region, most especially in the Sahel region (Alli, 2012: 112). According to reports, the absence of governmental structure with attendant anarchical atmosphere in the Sahel makes the expanse area a safe haven to all sorts of criminal activities (The Guardian, September 11, 2012). The situation has been appraised by the UNDP and ECOWAS where Nigeria has been playing a pivotal role (The Guardian, 2012).In combating this security threat, Nigeria has engaged all concern agencies and institutions within the ECOWAS member states (Anikulapo, 2012). Regular meetings are conducted at various official levels, which include all Chiefs of Defence Staff, Chiefs of Police, Chiefs of Customs, and Immigration Chiefs throughout the West African sub-region (Anikulapo, 2012). The reason for Nigeria's involvement in this is to ensure that at various stages of the programme proper implementation mechanism and strategy are put in place to achieve the mandate set out by the UNDP. The fact that the issue is security-based programme has been linked up with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) philosophy in the continent (Ajetunmbi&Omotere, 2011:311). The major rationale behind the establishment of NEPAD is to ensure good governance, human rights and democracy in Africa. There is therefore a concrete nexus between eradication of weapon proliferation in the West Afri-

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can sub region and NEPAD programmes. It is assumed that the philosophy of NEPAD can only be achieved in environment devoid of security threat, a threat that emanates as a result of proliferation of weapons in the wrong hands (Akande, 2012). Professsor Joy Ogwu of Nigeria was the Chairman of Conference on SALW in 2012 which was held in New York (Anikulapo, 2012).

5.5 DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN AFRICA

Nigeria was a democracy in 1960 until 1966 when the military took over the government. Throughout the post-colonial Africa, it was so difficult to establish democratic government by the African states and where it was established it became increasingly difficult to maintain (Akinrinade, 1998:74). The way and manner with which the colonial government ruled Africa did not provide a fertile atmosphere for democracy to thrive for most African countries were governed on the basis of colonial interests in the metropole (Akinrinade, 1998:74). Thus, when the colonial rulers were about to leave Africa, the seed of discord had been sown among various ethnic and religious groups. This greatly affected the natural growth of democratic governance in the continent. It has been accounted that the earliest attempt of Nigeria to promote democracy in Africa was in 1960s in Congo, Algeria and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) but after the coup of 1966, the coup that overthrew a democratically elected administration by the military junta, Nigeria lost its grip of the campaign for democratic governance in Africa. The zeal in the promotion of democracy revived when Nigeria supported and supervised election of MPLA in Angola in 1976. It has to be noted that at the time even though Nigeria remained under a military government but there was adequate promise and clear agenda to return to the civilian government (Wright, 1983:109).

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The existence of apartheid government in Namibia, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa forced Nigeria to lead democratic campaign in OAU and UN (Olukoshi & Abduraheem, 1985). However, as one would expect that it is very difficult to promote what one does not have, the military government ruled Nigeria for most part of the Cold War period but this did not stop Nigeria from promoting democracy and supervise election under OAU and ECOWAS in Africa. In fact, Nigeria was under military rule when it supervised democratic consolidation in Namibia in 1990. Oyelami Babatunde, a Local Government Head at Nigerian Ministry of Development says,

> It is ironical to discover that Nigeria sold out to the world what it did not have in Namibia. Such trick may be difficult to explain in the game of international politics but we were clearly well aware that Nigeria's hegemonic position in Africa at the time may provide an explanation for this (Oyelami, Pers. Comm., January 29, 2015).

The Liberian and Sierra Leone crises are the most disturbing of all. The two countries were plunged into crisis due to military coup and Nigeria at home was at this same time suffering from the same political cankerworm. Under the military presidents of Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha Nigeria intervened under ECOWAS and UN to restore order in Liberia and Sierra Leone. To prove its mettle, Nigeria supervised election under military leader in Liberia and civilian President Olusegun Obasanjo achieved the completion stage(Salami, 2013:149). In 2006, Nigeria restored order in Liberia with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Nigeria subsequently granted asylum to the former warlord, Charles Taylor (Adeniji, 2005:4). Some scholars (i.e.Saliu, 2007; Adebajo, 2008; Salami, 2013; Ebohon & Isike, 2004) have described this situation as embarrassing to ECOWAS and OAU as Nigeria promote what it did not have at home.

Thus, Nigeria, through ECOWAS Protocol on Unconstitutional Change of Government, has restored and consolidated democratic governance in Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, and Mali in 2006, 2012, 2013 and 2012 respectively (Salami, 2014). The implementation of this protocol rests too much on the oars of Nigeria, as most countries in the sub-region do not have military and material capacity to enforce such Protocol in the member countries (Abubakar, 2014). As such, it has been customary on the part of Nigeria to restore any government, depose by military coup in Africa under both AU and ECOWAS Charter. Nigeria under President Obasanjo restored democratically elected leaders in Ivory Coast, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo (Fawole, 2012). This to certain extent has maintained peace and order in Africa.

5.6 COUNTER-TERRORISM

The issue of terrorism is a new phenomenon in the multilateral undertaking of Nigerian government. Since 1960 until early 2000, Nigeria did not really understand what it entails to suffer from terrorist attack as most of Nigerian political issue has been settled internally. The idea of Nigeria to battle terrorist attack has never been part of policy agenda since independent (Onuoha, 2012:4). Although, there were few domestic issues that resembled an act of terrorism but the fact that Nigeria could suppress them easily had hoodwinked the successive Nigerian governments to underrate terrorism as a threat to national and sub-regional security (Adesoji, 2010: 97). Since 2003, Nigeria has involved itself in combating terrorist attack under the aegis of ECOWAS (Abubakar, 2014). Meetings and round table discussion have been convened by Nigeria with ECOWAS member states to suppress the question of terrorism in Africa since 2003. But the effort being expended was miniature in early parts of

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2003 until Boko Haram intensified their campaign through bombing and kidnapping. Boko Haram insurgency is very difficult to define, as it does not have any concrete agenda it pursues. It can only be defined by its name, which means western education is forbidden.

Nigeria under ECOWAS and AU has intensified efforts at cooperating with all other multilateral organisation as West Africa has become a focus of Global War on Terror (GWOT) (Mohammed, 2014). The presence of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabab in the northern part of Nigeria has made the Nigerian government to be more serious on the need to collaborate with AU under Peace and Security Council (PSC), ECOWAS Counter-Insurgency group and GWOT to wipe out the imminent impact of terrorism from the face of African continent (Obayuwana, 2012). The presence of Nigeria in the PSC of AU has given Nigeria an ample chance of displaying the credentials of AQIM as potent terrorist group in the whole of Saharan enclave (Okwe &Anuforo, 2014:2). Thus, with the experience of Nigeria on Boko Haram terrorist group, Nigerian government has intensified efforts at multilateral level, most especially within the ECOWAS to fashion out the best strategy to eliminate or at least reduce the threat of terrorism and insurgency in Africa. The Boko Haram issue presently is no more the issue of Nigeria only it has become African issue in nature due to the fact that terrorist operations is continuously assuming continental-wide dimension. Various meetings in Abuja, Bamako, Ndjamena, and Yaoundé have been sponsored by Nigeria, AU and ECOWAS to confront the menace of terrorism in Africa (Fawole, 2012; Guardian, January 31, 2015). The recent approval by the AU member to assist Nigeria with 7,500 troops could be seen as crucial step in stemming the scourge of terrorism and insurgency in Africa (The Guardian, January 31, 2015). Nigeria government was part of the mission that defeated AQIM

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in Mali in 2012 and it also stationed its troops in Darfur to curb influx of insurgent groups into Chad, its closest neighbouring country. Therefore, it needs to be stressed that without the cooperation of Nigeria in West Africa, it may be difficult to stamp out terrorism and all forms of insurgencies in Africa. Similarly, Nigeria needs the cooperation of AU and ECOWAS member states to deal with Boko Haram issue.

5.7 NIGERIA'S POLICY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS

Nigeria's policy of good neighbourliness is a reminiscent of its regional power position in Africa. The policy was introduced in the early 1970s to make sure that Nigeria's close and distant neighbours do not pose a threat to its territorial integrity (Ogunbadejo, 1976). Nigerian nationalists were well aware of the fact in the early 1960s which later made Nigeria to intensify the creation of OAU in collaboration with other independent African states. (Folarin, 2010:222). The first Prime Minister of Nigeria had earlier sponsored the establishment of Lake Chad Basin Commission and Niger River Development Authority with aims to forestall any rancour that might emanate from the joint ownership and uses of the resources (Abegunrin, 2003). Also, in 1964, after the successful launching of OAU, Nigeria went ahead to sponsor African Development Bank (ADB) where it holds major share amounted to 13% (Sesay, 1998: 61). The neighbour centric in Nigerian multilateral policy manifest itself in the way Nigeria poised for the creation of multilateral organisation for regional political and economic integration. The aim was that if Nigerian neighbours are relatively secured in terms of economic and political issues, it is possible for Nigeria to utilise such opportunity to present itself as the economic powerhouse in Africa (Nwoke, 2005:139).

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Furthermore, Nigeria's multilateral policy also extends to the policy of moral obligation to its neighbours and other African countries (Okolo, 1988). In its quest to make sure that the African countries live in harmony and peace, Nigeria abhors flexing its political muscle towards its neighbours. In order to assure African countries of its peaceful co-existence, Nigeria signed the OAU Declaration on Border Disputes among African states in Cairo, 1964 (Balewa, 1964). This was the first time Nigeria would sign such a declaration to allay the fears of African countries base on its preponderant power in Africa. The major fallout of this declaration was to make sure that the African countries do not degenerate into ethnic and national fragmentation, which may in turn cause confusion in the continent (Nwoke, 2005:137).Despite the peaceful co-existence of Nigeria with its neighbours, Cameroun dragged Nigeria to ICJ in 1994 to protest the need for border adjustment in the Bakassi Peninsular (Guardian, May 12, 2011). In fact, the Constitutive Act of the AU that was signed in 2002 abhors the use of force and it is based on these aforementioned principles that Nigeria accepted the jurisdiction of ICJ on the Bakassi Peninsular border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon (Eno-Abasi, 2011). Initially, the Bakassi was not an issue as Nigeria did not have any problem dealing with the situation. Most of the people in the Bakassi Peninsular belong in its totality to Nigerian ethnic group from Cross River state (Guardian, June 24, 2011). Despite this glaring historical antecedent, the judgment was passed by the ICJ in 2002 in favour of Cameroon which Nigeria did not denounce (Meierding, 2010). Nigeria having presented its own side of the story to the ICJ accepted the verdict in Cameroon's favour despite allegation that there was conspiracy in the judgment especially in relation to France support (BBC News, August 14, 2006). According to IRIN (2007) the acceptance of the ICJ jurisdiction and subsequent withdrawal of Nigeria from the territory shows the weight

Nigerian government gives to multilateral organisation and hence the Constitutive Acts of AU and the UN's principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes (IRIN, November 14, 2007).

Another area in which Nigeria has showcased its good neighbour policy in relation to multilateral organisations is the construction of trans-Saharan African highway from Lagos/Kano to Algiers (EENI, 2015). There have been plans among various Nigeria's neighbour for the construction of highways that will link all Nigeria's northern neighbours in order to promote African integration (Lawal, Pers. Comm., April 24, 2012). The project was started by the OAU members in 1971 which projected to have completed before now. But the slow progress from Chad, Mali and Niger affected the programme (EENI, 2015). With cooperation among OAU members, the Lagos-Algiers highway is expected to reduce long distance of sea route between West African countries and the Mediterranean world. Besides this development, there is also ongoing effort between Nigeria and Algeria to build a pipeline and optic fibre link between Algiers and Johannesburg via Lagos, Nigeria (Adeyemi, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). In addition, among ECOWAS member countries, Nigeria has constructed thousands of kilometer roads within the ECOWAS region sometimes without refunding from the members (Nwoke, 2005:140). In fact the road linking Nigeria to Togo via Republic of Benin was unilaterally constructed by Nigerian government to promote the movement of goods and people within ECOWAS member state (Nwoke, 2005:141). Presently, effort is ongoing at constructing the ECOWAS oil and gas pipeline. All these projects are partly financed by Nigerian government to ensure that ECOWAS countries enjoy free movement enshrined in the ECOWAS Protocol. To achieve this lofty plan, Nigeria has established the ministry of cooperation and integration to deal with any issue involving sub-regional infra-

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structural development. According to Nwoke (2005:140), "Nigeria has resolved, alongside Ghana, to take urgent steps towards establishment of a free Trade Zone".

5.8 NIGERIA'S CAPACITY BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The need to promote human rights is borne out of the conviction that such continuation in human deprivation of essential rights might jeopardise the chance for stable political and social atmosphere. If this happens, it may in turn affect the economic productivity of the entire continent. There is thus a connection between development and human rights promotion in Africa. It can be stated here that the responsibility to monitor human rights abuse by states within the global system has been an important aspect of the UN where committees and sub-committees are selected to monitor the progress of human rights promotion in the international system (Olonisakin, 1998:97). Such monitoring and assessment was hampered by the Cold War international system. During the Cold War, nations were pre-occupied with ideological war between the two polars and no enough space for human rights monitoring. In other words, global superpowers were vying for allies in developing countries where gross abuse of human rights was recorded (Sesay, 1998:149). Either of the superpowers would be ready to sponsor proxy war in order to protect friendly regimes, while weapons were also sold out to allies without properly appreciating the prevailing situation in the affected state (Olonisakin, 1998: 97). Such weapon procurements were normally used for human rights abuses.

Thus, the Cold War political atmosphere made it difficult for the UN to really perform the function of monitoring and progress reporting in countries where human rights abuses were noted. By 1986, the OAU adopted a Charter on human rights, culminated in the establishment of African Commission on Human and People's

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Rights (OAU, 1987). The responsibility of the commission was adopted in the OAU Charter, charged with the responsibility of monitoring and reporting human rights progress in all African states. Incidentally, no appropriate mechanism was put in place to actualise the stated goals and objectives. The commission has also been criticised for having no institutional capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of other states as stipulated by OAU Charter (Olonisakin, 1998). These two shortcomings made it difficult for the commission to sanction and punish any regime that involve in human rights abuse in Africa. Based on this fact, country like Nigeria assumes the responsibility to promote human rights and capacity building in Africa under the UN and OAU/AU Charters.

The first test for Nigeria's promotion of human rights and capacity building was in southern part of Africa. When many countries like Namibia and South Africa suffered under white racist regimes, Nigeria took the responsibility under OAU to train many South Africans and Namibians in Nigerian schools and colleges (Akinboye, 2005: 214). Under the UNGA, Nigeria promised further to admit the Congolese, who were ravaged by war, to Nigerian schools. Tafawa Balewa, the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, stated,

> I propose that those African states which hold the same views as Nigeria combine with us to find places in secondary schools and technical schools for some hundreds of Congolese boys...Nigeria is prepared to make its experience available and to send technical experts to assist in planning and development for the future. We can also lend professors and teaching staff from the time to give short courses and lectures, and assure you that many qualified Nigerians are eager to take part in such work during their school and college vacations (Balewa, 1960).

In 1964, there were 1,703 Nigerian professionals in Congo, involved in peacekeeping, peace building, capacity building, and project supervision (The Union, September 29, 2014). Such was the commitment of Nigeria in the UN to ensure that adequate training was provided for Africans to assume the leadership positions in

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African countries. Also, to safeguard the rights of Namibia to attain independence,

Nigeria, under the auspices OAU, financed to refer the Namibian case to the ICJ in

collaboration with Liberia and Ethiopia, the earliest African members of the UN

(Chibundi, 2003:4). Under the auspices of AU, Nigerian soldiers, police and admin-

istrators have participated in capacity building in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Li-

beria and Sierra Leone. Adeyemi Adesola, a Nigerian police officer and a trainer un-

der UN Police in Somalia confirmed that,

> I was a part of the team that was sent to Somalia and I must confess to
> you that no other African country has matched the level with which
> Nigeria performed. Most of the materials used were provided by Nige-
> ria government. The government and people of Somalia were trained
> by us in the administration of security policy. In fact, we are the cham-
> pion in promoting peace in Africa (Adeyemi, Pers. Comm., January
> 28, 2015).

Under ECOWAS, Nigeria has trained many military and civilian personnel

from ECOWAS member states in the Nigeria Defence College (NDC), Abuja (Alli,

2010). Below is the list of countries that have benefitted from the scheme within the

ECOWAS member state.

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Table 5.4
ECOWAS Member States Soldiers in Nigerian Defence College

Course No	Countries	Total
3	Sierra Leone	1
4	Ghana, Sierra Leone	2
5	Ghana, Senegal Sierra Leone	4
6	Benin Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo	3
7	Benin, Cote D' Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Senegal	7
8	Benin, Cote D' Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Senegal	5
9	Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo	6
10	Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal Sierra Leone	5
11	Benin, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Senegal Sierra Leone	5
12	Benin, Ghana(2), Senegal, Sierra Leon, Togo	6
13	Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Sierra Leone	5
14	Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone	5
15	Benin(2), Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo	7
16	Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo	7
17	Benin, Cote D' Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone	6
18	Ghana, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo	4
19	Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone	6
20	Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone	6

(Sources: Alli, A. (2012)).

The table above is only limited to military and personnel training given to ECOWAS member states which does not include other African countries of AU that have participated in the programme. It is assumed by Nigerian governments that giving such training will boost the human capacity building of the national military forces of the participating countries to face any internal threat that may confront the would-be government. This is because most of these countries are not financially capable and lack personnel wherewithal to offer such a training within their borders (Alli, 2010). In addition, given Nigeria's international recognition in peacekeeping operations, most African countries would like to expose to one of the best military training available in the continent than to solicit outside for military assistance. Such a gesture to ECOWAS members by Nigeria rests on the conviction that such training would boost the military response of ECOWAS if such service is requested in any part of Africa.

5.9 **REPRESENTATION IN THE MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS**

The exhibition and recognition of hegemonic presence of Nigeria in Africa is reflected in the way Nigeria has been representing Africa in various multilateral institutions. In African context, Nigeria has supplied the leadership and administration of both OAU and ECOWAS more than any other countries in Africa and it has suffered most casualties in the peacekeeping operations (Akande, 2013). According to the latest estimates by the UN, of all the countries that suffered most casualties, Nigeria is ranked second as of January 3, 2015. Below is the figure according to the UN latest estimate.

Table 5.5

Casualties of the Top Five Countries in the UN Peacekeeping Mission, 1948-2015

COUNTRY	CASUALTIES	NO OF MISSION
INDIA	158	24
NIGERIA	144	14
PAKISTAN	137	16
GHANA	133	18
BANGLADESH	123	21

Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf

In recognition of its pivotal role and losses in UN missions in Africa and elsewhere in the globe, UN honoured 11 Nigerian soldiers posthumously in 2010 (The Punch, June 1, 2010). In fact, the Nigerian politicians and technocrats are well known in organisations like Commonwealth, UN, OAU, ECOWAS and OPEC. According to the UN, over 60 countries have never participated in the UNSC non-permanent member since 1954 out of 128 registered members (UN Website, January, 2015). The earliest attempt on the part of Nigeria to assume any position in multilateral organisation was in 1960s in Congo when a Nigerian, General Aguiyi Ironsi was appointed as the Force Commander of UN Operation in Congo (Chibundi, 2003:6). In 1964, a Nigerian, Chief G.K Amachree was appointed as Under-Secretary in the

Office of Secretary-General of the UN (Chibundi, 2003: 5) (see Table, 5.6 for details). Below is the table depicting Nigerians who have held one position or the others in multilateral organisations.

Table 5.6
Few of the Positions Held by Nigerians in Multilateral Organisations since Independence

S/No	Name	Position	Date
1	Major-General Agui-yi Ironsi	Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Congo	1960-64
2	Major-General Olusegun Obasanjo	ECOWAS Chairman	1978-1979
3	Major-General Yaku-bu Gowon	OAU Chairperson	1973-1974
4	Peter Onu	OAU Secretary-General	1983-1985
4	Major-General Mu-hammadu Buhari	ECOWAS Chairman	1985
5	Major-General Ibra-him Babangida	ECOWAS Chairman	1985-1989
6	Major-General Ibra-him Babangida	OAU Chairperson	1991-1992
7	Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari	(1) Chairman of The United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations	1990-1999
		(2) President of The Executive Board Of UNICEF	1999
		(3) Under-Secretary-General of The United Nations Special Adviser on Africa	2000-2005
		(4) Under-Secretary-General of The United Nations for Department of Political Affairs	2005-2007
8	Major-Genral Sani Abacha	ECOWAS Chariperson	1996-1998
9	Major-General Ab-dusalam Abubakar	ECOWAS Chairperson	1998-1999
10	Umar Musa Yar'adua	ECOWAS Chairperson	2008-2010
11	Goodluck Jonathan	ECOWAS Chairperson	2010-2012
12	Riliwan Lukman	(1)OPEC President	1986-1989
		(2)OPEC Secretary-General	1995-2000
13	Emeka Anyaoku	Commonwealth Secretary-General	1990-1999
14	Major-General Jo-seph Garba	President Of The United Nations General Assembly	1989-1990
15	Professor Joy Ogwu	(1)Member Of The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Advisory Board On Disarmament Matter	2006-2007
		(2) First President, United Nations Women, United Nations Entity For Gender Equality And Empowerment Of Women	Present
		(3) Member Of The Board Of Trustees Of The United Nations Institute For Training And Research (UNITAR)	Present
		(4) First African President Of United Nations Programme Of Action On Small Arms And Light Weapons	2011
		(5) President Of The United Nations Security Council	2010,2011,

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		(6)Chair Of The Special Committee On Peacekeeping Operations	2014
			2008-Present
16	Professor Adebayo Adedeji	(1)Executive Secretary to United Nations Economic Commission for Africa	1975-1978
		(2) United Nations Under-Secretary-General	1978-1991
17	Dr. Teslim Olawale Elias	Judge, International Court of Justice	1976-1979
		Vice President, International Court of Justice	1979-1982
		President, International Court of Justice	1982-1985
18	Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu	President, International Civil Aviation Authority, One of the UN agencies	Present
19	Akinwumi Adesina	President, Africa Development Bank	Present
20	Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala	World Bank Managing Director	2007-2011

(Source: Compiled by the author)

The representations of Nigeria in various multilateral institutions is un-matched by any other African countries and this may explain the reason why Nigeri-an military has better international exposure and experience than some other African countries (Ojeme, 2013). Such representations and training have provided Nigeria with much-needed global policy orientation, which in turn serves as guidance to for-eign policy making towards external environment. Those Nigerians who have served and trained at various capacities in the global multilateral institutions in turn become the favourites of Nigerian government in formulating political, economic and social policy (Oseghale, 2013). For example, Teslim Elias, who served as the president of the ICJ, was for some time an adviser to Nigerian Supreme Court. It is also right to assert that Nigeria's service in multilateral organisations has helped to strengthen its domestic structure and its hegemonic aspiration in Africa in one way or the other.

5.10 **CONCLUSION**

The global political system is an abode of powerful and the weak. States that are powerful tend to display the elements of their powerfulness through many means and methods. In this case, the weak states accept what they could. Why some powerful states used such to advance the interests of humanity in the global politics, a few

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have used theirs to suppress and intimidate the weaker countries. The position of Nigeria in Africa and the global South has been acknowledged by some scholars who consistently tried to assert that Nigeria has important role to play in the global political atmosphere. This revelation also goes for countries like Brazil, South Africa, India, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, and Indonesia. The position of each of these regional powers in their respective regions is nevertheless varied. This depends largely on the geopolitics of each region where the regional power resides. For Nigeria, its influence reminiscent of its overwhelming position in Africa has since been noted in some areas which is basically moralistic in nature. Such areas include good neighbourliness policy, decolonization, peacekeeping and peacemaking, capacity building, financial assistance, and frontal role in the global affairs.

This, therefore, shows the hegemonic presence of Nigeria in the global south, most especially in Africa. The multitude of responsibilities being shouldered by various Nigerian governments in multilateral institutions since independence is in realisation of Nigeria's regional power status in Africa. Such regional power status emanates from internal power matrix as defined by the realist proponents. Such internal matrixes are geographical position, economy, population, military might, natural resources and relative technological advancement. All these domestic variables will be discussed in Chapter Six. The chapter will ultimately shed light on the material position of regional hegemonic position of Nigeria in Africa. It also needs to be stressed here that there are external determinants, which are very significant in the formulation of Nigeria's multilateral policy. Such externalities are regional security, cold war, French factor and global power calculations. Therefore, this material preponderance and other external factors that will be the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

FACTORS OF NIGERIA'S MULTILATERAL POLICY

The policy of multilateralism is a global phenomenon, which cannot be ignored by any viable state. The potency of multilateral institutions in managing international affairs in a very diverse and matured way boosts the confidence of developing states in them. It has to be noted that the approach adopted by each state is quite varied and this depends largely on the composition of state. The influence of each state in the international system is not the same so also in the multilateral institutions. Although, it is clearly stated in the Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter that all states are bounded by the principle of equality and the right to a vote. This declaration is only stated to alleviate the fears of the small and weak states in the international system.

It is in this context; this chapter examines the impacts of external and internal factors of Nigeria's multilateral policy. It is assumed that there is variability in the factors that dictate the multilateral policy of each state in the global system, states respond differently based on their capabilities and push factors. The latter refers to factors that render multilateral policy inexpedient in Nigerian foreign policy. Such push factors are security, territorial integrity, extra-African affairs, and border issue. In this way, the factors that direct and dictate Nigeria's multilateral policy are endogenous and exogenous in nature. It needs to be stated that the internal factors act in two ways: first, they serve as material capabilities for Nigeria to pursue aggressive and active role in multilateral organisations. Second, they serve as push factors in terms of national interests to be achieved in multilateral institutions. Discussing these is the focus of this chapter.

6.1 INTERNAL FACTORS

6.1.1 Security

One of the crucial factors that dictate Nigerian multilateral policy is the issue of Nigeria's territorial integrity. The maintenance of domestic security and the reassurance that the territory of Nigeria is free of any external aggression is one of the cruxes of her multilateral diplomacy. This could be adjudged as the primary aim of Nigeria's multilateral policy since independence (Okerafor, 2010). According to Aborisade (2013), Nigeria places an important premium on security in the formulation of its foreign policy and this may explain why Nigeria chooses multilateral policy to solve the insecurity problems at both external and internal milieu. To address this, the African continent becomes the primary focus of Nigeria's multilateralism where its security can be guaranteed. According to Yorom (2010),

> Nigerian leaders believe that the country's security is tied to that of other African states because of cultural and historical experiences, and because of transnational security issues which are defined by the way in which the security of a state is affected by what happens in contiguous countries around its neighbourhood (p. 277).

The above revelation reflects in the pre-occupation of various Nigerian governments in the affairs of the continent for most part of post-independent period.

By definition, security can be defined as absence of insecurity from internal and external sources. In other words, the absence of "substantive or existential threat" to the national survival of a state is deemed as security (Rothschild, 1995:54). The anarchical global environment as defined by the realist makes states to devise means of survival by itself otherwise state's security may be compromised by other states (Wendt, 1994:385). There is ongoing argument by some scholars (Weaver et. al., 1993; Suhrke, 1999; Klare & Thomas, 1994) who are of the views that the state security should not constitute only lens through which security can be defined. They

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thus mentioned human security, international security and societal security as the alternatives paradigm to security. The view here suggests that the security should be all-encompassing. But the state-centric approach to security can be sustained insofar it is seen as the only viable entity that can provide security in the international system.

So, as long as states are still viable enough to provide for the security of its own people, invariably all other aspect of security will be guaranteed. To buttress this point, the sociologists for example believe that the best way to maintain societal peace and stability is through family unit (Checkel, 1998:333). This is based on the idea that if each family, which is seen as the basic unit of any society, could take good care of their children then society can be relatively free of all sorts of crimes which might undermine societal security (Fox & Murry, 2000). This line of thinking can be sustained insofar the family is the basic unit of any society and this assertion can be true if government of a state discharges its responsibilities to the citizenry accordingly. This may in turn help in achieving political and social decorum at family and national levels. The same applies to states in the international system. If each state can take appropriate step in ensuring peace and stability within their geographical confine, that in turn may guarantee international security.

Another aspect of security that worth mentioning is the approach adopts by some scholars. Various scholars (Sen, 1990: 203-218; Kapstein, 1992; Keohane & Nye, 1998:81-94; levy, 1995:35-62) have defined security in its holistic form covering all aspects of society namely environment security, economic security, social security and information security. In the midst of this convoluted ideas, the focus of this research is on conventional understanding of security between states and other actors within the international system. The maintenance of national security by vari-

ous state actors in the global system may not be as easy as one would be expected, there are various forces in the contemporary international and national system that may pose a potent threat to the security of states. Such is complicated by the globalization process that emerged in the1960s.

Globalization is an important force in the contemporary global system which renders the territorial integrity and sovereignty of state porous. One of the forces of globalization that threatens the security of state is the emergence of new actors in the global socio-political system (Hughes, 2000:5). New actors like terrorist groups, multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental international organisations (NGOs) and religious groups have become dominant actors in the global system and some of their activities, especially the terrorist group and MNCs, pose serious challenge to the security and sovereignty of states. In addition, the emergence of new powerful states is another aspect of globalization that poses risk to global security (Muller, 2013:607). The rise of states like Brazil, China, India and many other middle power states poses a risk of power transition in the global politics, which might endanger the security of states in the course of possible reaction from the existing powers or hegemons (Zehufuss, 2013:157). The existence of some failing states in the international system is also seen as a security threat to states in the global system (Schultz, 2013:240). The failing state (because of the forces of globalization) may extend its cankerworm to other parts of the world. This happens especially if the failing state is in possession of some strategic natural resources which may prompt the needy states to act. The unavailability of such resources can pose security threat to the international community. In certain case, failing state may occupy a strategic position in the global spatial space which might compel the powers to act. Such is the case of Djibouti and Somalia in the Horn of Africa, Libya in North Africa and Equa-

torial Guinea in West Africa. In effect, the issue of national security is a complex one that state needs to deal with through alliance, cooperation and integration. This is the case of Nigeria.

From the early days of independence, various Nigerian leaders have recognized the need to make Nigerian security a priority of which they discovered the need for collaboration with other countries of the world (Meierding, 2010:11). It is assumed that the security of Nigeria is clearly intertwined with international security or simply put, with security of other states in the international system. The issue of security is also an important fillip in Nigeria's multilateral policy especially in its membership of the UN (Iyalla, 1966). Like all other newly-independent countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Nigeria's joining of the UN after independence was meant to benefit from the collective security under the umbrella of the global organization most especially in the volatile Cold War political atmosphere where the survival of weak countries were not guaranteed (Gambari, 2005:188). So, relied on the UN security mechanism became an important factor in becoming a member. After joining in 1960, Nigeria discovered, going by its experience in Congo, Algeria and Tanganyika that it seemed the UN alone cannot be relied upon (Adetula, 2005:157). Based on this assessment, Nigerian government started devising a mechanism where it could have greater political leverage to control the affairs of the continent. And if possible to use such continental organization as step to launch and project its national interest in the UN (Ate, 2011:90). OAU was sponsored by Nigeria in this regard and the multilateral appetite of Nigerian government continued to demand for sub-regional organization subsequently. The failure of the UN, most especially in the area of peace maintenance in the global system accelerated the urge for Nigeria's quest for multilateral organization where its national interest can be best safeguarded (Dai-

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ly Times, October 27, 1969). The failure of the UN was highlighted in the UNGA in 1966 by the head of Nigerian delegation, Simeon Adebo, where he remarked that,

> … its (UN) degeneration from an organization for the maintenance of peace and security into an organization for the maintenance of cease-fire; its incapacity to deal with glaring cases of international misbehaviour by countries, great or small; its failure to solve the problem of increasing poverty … are lesions for responsible states (Adebo, 1966).

The first attempt for security at multilateral level started all in 1961 when France tested Atomic Bomb in Algeria (Chibundi, 2003:3). On the need to guarantee its own security by way of international security, Nigeria acknowledged the threat the nuclear bomb posed to international security (Bach, 2007). With the testing of Atomic Bomb by France, it became increasingly obvious to Nigerian government that such matter needed to be discussed in the UN, given the fact that OAU and other continental organisations were still at embryonic stage (New Nigeria, October 8, 1968). Even if they were fully operational, they would not be in any capacity to discuss or curb arms race and nuclear proliferation. Nigeria, therefore, recognized that there was nothing it could do to put an end to technical knowledge already acquired to produce nuclear weapons and in this instance Nigeria joined other developing countries in the UN to sponsor and condemned in its totality the proliferation of nuclear weapon in the global system (Abacha, 1996). The Sahara Atomic Bomb test experience has taught Nigeria a lesson that its security is not at all guaranteed given the proximity of Sahara to northern border of Nigeria.

Sharkdam Wapmuk, a research fellow at NIIA, lamented that "despite Nigeria's protest under the nascent OAU alongside other African states, France did not show any sense of remorse" (Pers. Comm., Januray 27, 2015). In the midst of this diplomatic row, Nigeria unilaterally reacted to the situation by closing French embassy in Nigeria and stopped all form of commercial activities with France (Shark-

dam, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015). Thus, by 1968 when UNGA opened discussion on the issue of nuclear proliferation, Nigeria was the first among all countries that supported the move. The term of the agreement was that the transfer and acquisition of nuclear technology is allowed only for peaceful purposes (UN, 1968). The agreement was subsequently opened for signature and Nigeria was among the first sixty-three countries that deposited their ratification of the treaty of nuclear non- proliferation in September 1968 (Bach, 2007). In African context, Nigeria sponsored a continental nuclear-free zone before the UN in 1974.

The sponsoring of this at African level can be linked to press report that the South African government possessed the nuclear capability for the production of nuclear weapon (Wright, 1983:105). Given the Nigerian stance on the issue of racism and apartheid in southern part of Africa, it was not safe for Nigeria to remain silent as the strategic nuclear production was aiming at curbing the interference of Nigeria in dismantling apartheid regime in African continent (Wright, 1983). Therefore, Nigeria appraised the situation and discovered that one of the factors for South Africa's nuclear power development was to threaten Nigeria in order to back down of its campaign against the apartheid regime.

In the OAU, the security has been an important driving force in Nigeria's participation since 1963. Nigeria has sponsored various missions and mechanisms to curb those activities that may undermine its security and that of the continent (Shaw, 1983:4). In order to prevent regional insecurity which might naturally undermine Nigeria's security, OAU members were advised and motivated to back MPLA in Angola in 1975 (Alimi, 2005:337). The OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad in 1981 was also sponsored by Nigerian government to make sure the sub-regional West African security was not undermined (Obadare, 1996:147). The recent Nigerian-sponsored

ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Ivory Coast are further indicated readiness of Nigeria to guarantee the security of the entire West African region. To solidify African security, Olusegun Obasanjo proposed the creation of Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa in 1990 (Adetula, 2005:176). The proposal did not come to fruition until Obasanjo assumed leadership position in Nigeria in 1999 (Touray, 2005:639). Such was the respect accorded to Nigeria in the maintenance of continental security. In the present AU, Nigeria is a permanent member of Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the organization and has sponsored many security initiatives in the AU including the NEPAD and APRM (Adetula, 2005:174).

Another move towards the realization of security through multilateralism is the sponsoring of Mutual Defence Pact in the ECOWAS in 1981 (Ebo, 1996:155). This move serves as an approach towards achieving national and sub-regional security in West Africa. It is based on the idea of collective defence, which stipulates that any external aggression against any West African states be considere as attacking the collective members of ECOWAS in which case the response shall be made collectively (Bolarinwa, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015). The Nigeria's promotion of this idea is in realization of the need to provide domestic security architecture to insecurity issues bedeviling the sub-region and to ward off any external interference in the internal affairs of all countries in the West African sub-region (Ebo, 1996:155). Thus, the security issue provides a background for Nigeria's multilateral policy and this dictates to certain extent the degree of its commitment to African problems especially before 1994, the year of apartheid demise.

6.1.2 **Military Capability**

The state's reaction to external environment is reminiscent of its domestic capability and its relative military preponderance. Nigerian armed forces are divided into three divisions which comprises Nigerian Army (NA), Nigerian Navy (NN), and Nigerian Air Force (NAF). All the three branches constitute the composition of Nigerian armed forces and NA is the largest of all. In terms of national security, therefore, Nigeria possesses enough military power to protect itself and to project external influence (see table 5.1). Although the question of the quality of the forces may arise, but relatively in Africa Nigerian armed forces is well advanced (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015). Nigeria's quest at sponsoring multilateral organisations most especially ECOWAS is derived from its relative military strength in the sub-region. Professor Bola Akinterinwa, the Director-General of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, asserts that,

> If Nigeria did not have enough military capability, how was it possible for it to unilaterally sponsor the establishment of ECOMOG and its operation in all trouble spots in West Africa? Categorically speaking, Nigeria's military preponderance in Africa has not been challenged and cannot be challenged by any African states. In fact the UN relies heavily on the capacity of Nigeria's military to maintain peace and order in Africa…the question of whether Nigeria is a hegemon or not does not arise in military sphere. We are completely in control (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 27, 2015).

In terms of military expenditure, training, projection, mobilization, and strength, Nigeria is by far the greatest military power in the West African sub-region. Its military preponderance thus helps in shaping how it responds to multilateral organization and this may well explain why Nigeria dominates the activities of ECOWAS in the sub-region (see table 5.1 below).

The launching of ECOMOG in 1990 to respond to regional insecurity arising from Liberian civil war was made possible by the strength of Nigerian military force

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(Akinterinwa, 2015). In fact, the bulk of ECOMOG force is dominated by Nigerian military as most countries did not want to lose the few human resources they have. But Nigeria with huge army can afford to mobilise enough force to respond to multilateral peacekeeping. It will be difficult if not impossible for a country with small army to respond to all multilateral peacekeeping requests at the sub-regional, regional and global level (Okerafor, 2010). The size of Nigerian army dictates to some extent the manner with which it mobilizes troops for various international missions. Not only the size of army but also other paramilitary forces account for Nigeria's military might in Africa (This Day, July 5, 2003). The Nigeria Police, for example, has peacekeeping division, which has been in operation in various parts of the globe including Haiti (The Punch, January 19, 2010)).

In the West African sub-region, the Nigerian military dominates all peacekeeping activities and its tentacles also spread to other parts of Africa. By 1993, 75% of ECOMOG forces of about 11,000 were provided by Nigeria in Liberia (Bach, 2007:307). According to Dr. Nurudeen Mohammad, the Nigerian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the ECOWAS troops in Guinea Bissau comprised 50% of Nigeria's in 2014 (Vanguard, February 1, 2014). In comparative analysis, Nigeria ranked fourth in Africa in terms of military strength. Below is the military strength of the top 10 countries in Africa.

Table 6.1
Military Capabilities of Top Ten Countries in Africa

No	Country	Annual Military Budget	Active Personnel
1.	Egypt	$4, 400,000,000	468, 5000
2.	Algeria	$10, 570,000,000	512,000
3.	South Africa	$4, 610,000,000	88,000
4.	Nigeria	$2, 330,000,000	130,000
5.	Ethiopia	$340, 000,000	182,000
6.	Niger	85,000,000	5,300
7.	Chad	$120,000,000	30,000
8.	Ivory Coast	$440,000,000	9,500
9.	Ghana	$120,000,000	13,500
10.	Cameroon	$370,000,000	14,000

Source: Global Fire Power (GFP), February 17, 2015

The military strength of the top 10 countries in Africa above yields important message. Each of the African military power mentioned above are hegemon in their respective sub-regions which clearly shows that all of them, except Algeria, could be classified as regional power in Africa but they do necessarily perform hegemonic role. In the whole of Africa, only South Africa and Nigeria perform hegemonic role in their respective regions and Africa as a whole (Akinboye, 2005:223: Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010:8). In the western part of Africa where Nigeria belongs, no other country can favourably compete with Nigeria in terms of military strength and is by far the military powerhouse of the sub-region (see Table 5.1). In fact, the population of Nigeria, according to UNDP, constitutes 60% and 18% of West Africa and Africa respectively (UNDP, 2014). In Africa generally, Nigeria needs to collaborate with South Africa for continental military operation. It should be noted here that before the dismantling of apartheid regime in southern part of Africa, Nigeria was the sole military power in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (Akinboye, 2005:223).

Given Nigeria's preponderance power in West Africa, various Nigerian leaders have been cautious about the strength of Nigerian military so as to avoid unnecessary arms race among the West African countries (Wright, 1983:105). The conviction is that if Nigeria begins to procure arms and ammunition beyond reasonable

doubt, the small countries in the West African sub-region may suspect that Nigeria want to pursue aggressive policy in the region.

Therefore, the relative military weakness of Nigeria compared to Egypt's and Algeria's may not be appropriately explain the strength of each country as each of them belong to different geographical location. And of all the continental powers mentioned above, the Nigerian military is much felt in the continent than any others (Akinboye, 2005). The Nigerian military has been instrumental to the political decorum in the continent since independence while the Egyptian military is preoccupied with Middle Eastern cause (Adeniji, 2005:3). The military capability therefore is an important factor in the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's multilateral policy.

6.1.3 Nigerian Civil war and Multilateral Policy

Another domestic variable that determines the multilateral policy of Nigeria was the civil war that erupted in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. The civil war was an important landmark in the formulation of Nigerian foreign policy for it made the Nigerian government re-assessed its position in the global political arena. For the purpose of this research, it may not be possible to delve into detail discussion of the civil war as it may cause distraction, therefore, it will only be dealt with briefly here. Nigeria is an ethnically diverse country with over 250 distinct groups and of all these, three major groups become predominant because of their relative population (Abacha, 1996:2). These are Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba and each of them dominates North, East and West respectively. The Nigerian civil war also known as "Biafran war" occurred principally between the federal government and the Igbo. As it has been always conceived by outsiders, Nigeria as a country is not roughly divided between northern

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Muslim and southern Christians. The north is not the only Muslim region in Nigeria and the south is not the only Christian region. Nigeria by natural geographical definition is clearly divided into three parts and each is dominated by the three principal ethnic groups mentioned earlier.

Sociologically, the northern part is dominated by the Hausas-Fulani, the west by the Yorubas; and east by the Igbos. It was this arrangement that existed in 1967 when civil war broke out. In terms of religion, the eastern region is dominated by the Christians, the north by Muslims while the West is predominantly populated by Christians and Muslims equally. By this analysis, therefore, there is no question of certain religion dominating the socio-political terrain of Nigeria. In fact, it may be difficult to conclude that either of the two religions has the largest adherents as there is no reliable census to buttress the claim. It was in this socio-political condition that civil war broke out in 1967. The main reasons behind the civil war could be attributed to the internal struggle for power between the east and the north (New Nigeria, October 8, 1968). When Nigeria got its independence in 1960, the north produced the first Prime Minister, in person of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa., based on the parliamentary system of government and the east produced the president named Nnamidi Azikiwe (Falola & Heaton, 2008). It was this arrangement that was unfolding when military took over in 1966 headed by Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo military officer from the east. In the coup, many northern leaders were killed which made the north assumed that the coup was staged in order to install the Igbo leadership (Diamond, 1982:638). It was in this situation that another counter coup was staged in 1967 by Major-General Yakubu Gowon of northern extraction. As soon as Gowon assumed the leadership, with the killings of Aguiyi Ironsi, the first coup leader, the eastern region decided to secede by declaring the independent state of Biafra in 1967

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(Oliver and Atmore, 1972:291). Before the declaration, the oil revenue and other revenues that supposed to be deposited to federal account was withheld by the leader of the cession group, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu (James, 2011:1).

The OAU under the headship of Ghanaian President, General Ankrah invited Ojukwu and Gown to Accra, Ghana in order to settle the problem amicably (Oliver and Atmore, 1972:291). On getting back to Nigeria, Ojukwu, the leader of the secessionist part declared the eastern region as the state of Biafra. This prompted the federal government to act immediately. The war lasted for 30 months until the forces of Biafra surrendered in January 1970 and the war ended in favour of federal government of Nigeria. Thus, the question now is: How did the war affect or promote multilateralism in Nigerian foreign policy? The civil war as it lasted for 30 months assumed global dimension. Expectedly, the Cold War international political climate repeated itself in Nigeria as the Soviet camp and the Western camp jostled for their interests (Aluko, 1983: 194). Under the UN, the Nigerian government did not trust the mechanism proposed by the OAU to resolve the Nigerian issue as there may be competing interests (Daily Times, July 10, 1969). At the OAU meeting on Nigerian civil war, Adebo, the Nigerian representative to the UN, clearly warned OAU members not to refer the Nigerian case to the UN. Adebo thus lamented that "to intervene was "incompatible" with respect for the territorial integrity of Nigeria and is not a step calculated to promote African unity" (Daily Times, September 27, 1967). As a result of intense campaign by European Community, especially France and Portugal, and Biafran propaganda about the pogrom, all permanent member of the Security Council except USSR refused to sell arms to Nigerian government to prosecute the war (Ojo, 1976: 55; Aluko, 1976:129). As Nigeria was in the forefront of campaign against apartheid and the French atomic test in the Sahara, some of the western coun-

tries saw the civil war as the golden opportunity to dismember Nigeria (Akinterinwa, 2005:82).

As one would be expected, the French government under Georges Pompidou was very anxious to lend helping hand to Biafra as arms and ammunitions were supplied through Benin Republic, Angola and Equatorial Guinea (Obadare, 1996:142). As most western countries refused to support Nigeria, Nigeria was forced to bank on OAU member support (Daily Times, September 27, 1967). The UN and OAU became an important mechanism for winning the war for Nigerian government, the OAU made it clear that they did not want any member to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria as it is entrenched in the OAU Charter of 1963 (Daily Times, May 1, 1969). In the words of Arikpo, Nigerian representative to the UN during the civil war, "the UN members are advised by my government to stay away from the internal affairs of Nigeria as the government would not hesitate to dislodge any external interference" (Morning Post, October 19, 1967). It was the UN's neutrality and most especially the steadfastness of the OAU members in committing to the unity of Nigeria that ensured victory to the federal government side (Ogunbadejo. 1976:36).

After the successful defeat of Biafra and end of the civil war, some important lessons about global politics were learnt. One of such lessons is the need to strengthen integration in Africa through multilateral organization. Two, the need to diversify Nigeria's global relation as most of the western friends refused to lend helping hand in the course of the war. Three, Nigerian government recognized the need to have friendly neighbours and sub-regional organization that will serve Nigerian purpose (Ebo, 1996:154). The Biafran side resulted to extensive propaganda and this made the West denying the selling of weapons to the federal government (Daily Sketch, October 20, 1967). In fact, Nigeria was about to lose the war to Biafra when the So-

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viet and later Britain responded by providing all necessary arms and ammunition to Nigerian government.

Therefore, after the successful completion of the war, Gowon recognized the impact of OAU on the outcome of the conflict. He visited nearly all African countries to show sign of appreciation for their support of one Nigeria. According to Oye Ogunbadejo (1977) "…the war was seen by many non-African states as an African problem, and so long as the OAU was assuming responsibility not even the United Nations felt that it could properly make a formal entry into the dispute" (p. 36). Although, it needs to be stated here that alongside France and Portugal, there were some African countries that supported Biafran secession in the open. Nigeria's closest neighbours, Benin Republic, Tanzania, Gabon, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Sao Tome and Principe were OAU member that supported Biafra and most of the weapons supplied to Biafra by France passed through Benin Republic (Obadare, 1996:142). As soon as the war ended, President Gowon intensified effort to make sure a sub-regional organization is established to counter French weight in Africa and to promote its national interest as the single largest black country in the world (Sesay, 1998:55; Aluko, 1983:196-197). It is in recognition of this fact which led to campaign for the formation of ECOWAS by Gowon after the successful terminal end of the war.

6.1.3.1 The Formation of ECOWAS

The intensification of effort to establish sub-regional multilateral institution which will serve the interest of Nigeria as the sole hegemon in the sub-region began in earnest after the civil war. Gowon travelled to various West African countries to campaign for the need to establish a sub-regional organization (Nwoke, 2005:122). The task before Gowon was complicated, as it needed to persuade the three zones within

the region. The West African region is a complex political climate, which comprises 16 countries divided between three zones namely Francophone, Luzophone and Anglophone. It was so easy for Gowon to convince the Anglophone of the intention to establish sub-regional organization but it needed diplomatic menouvering to campaign the need to other two zones. It needs to be said that since independence most African countries, especially in the West African sub-region, have been suspecting the hegemonic ambition of Nigeria in Africa mainly because of the size and natural endowments (Bach, 2007).

Hence, coming up with the need for sub-regional organization seemed to them as an attempt on the part of Nigeria to dominate all other 15 countries in the West African sub-region. Their membership of OAU was understandable primarily because they felt Nigeria could not be so irredentist to occupy the whole continent. It is in this dilemma that President Gowon found itself after the civil war. The first progressive move towards the creation was the alliance with President Gnasingbe Eyadema of Togo, one of the francophone countries' leaders (Nwoke, 2005:120). Gowon was of the view that if one of the francophone countries could be convinced then the idea might be tenable to other francophone members. Gowon entered into bilateral projects with francophone countries so as to convince them of Nigeria's readiness to shoulder the sub-regional organization's responsibility. As pointed out by Nwoke (2005), the…strategy which Nigeria adopted in an effort to overcome the resistance of foot-daggers in the ECOWAS project was benevolent, big brother, Father Christmas, Spraying diplomacy. Spraying diplomacy was exhibited in Benin and Guinea in the mid-1970s" (p. 121). Earlier in 1972, Nigeria had formerly resented the joining of EU-ACP Lome Convention, an association that gave concession to African countries in the European market. Nigeria recognized that since France was an

important state-actor in the EC, agreeing to join it might serve as leeway to convince the francophone West African countries of Nigeria's ambition. Nigeria thus joined and led the EC-ACP negotiation in 1973 (Bach, 2007:304).

The establishment of Communaute Economique de l' Afrique de l' Oust (CEAO), an economic community for francophone west African countries in 1973, prompted Nigeria to intensify its effort at having a unified economic community in West Africa (Ojo, 1980:596). With the agreement by Togolese president, Gnasingbe Eyadema, Nigeria also forged ahead to mount pressure on other neighbouring francophone African states. In this manner, Nigeria threatened Benin, Niger and Chad to agree to its cause knowing full well that their consonance may serve as leeway for other francophone countries to surrender (Nwoke, 2005:122). Niger and Chad, being landlocked countries, began to re-assess their position. This is based on the conviction that if Nigeria should close its border, with the resultant effect of not having access to the sea, it might be disastrous to their economy (Ojo, 1980:604). As a result, both countries agreed to join Nigeria in 1974 to form the union. The Benin government, the closest of all Nigeria's neighbours, prompted by economic inducement also agreed to join the union. The cooperation of all these francophone countries motivated all other francophone countries to sign ECOWAS treaty in May 1975 with the headquarters in Accra, Ghana and later moved to Abuja, Nigeria (Brown, 1989:259). The 16 West African countries under the leadership of Nigeria finally formed ECOWAS in 1975 and the withdrawal of Mauritania in 2000 reduced the membership to fifteen. Therefore, the Nigerian civil war opened to Gowon the danger of isolation by francophone countries as few of them supported the disintegration of Nigeria. The establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 was seen by Nigeria as a way to integrate the region and to have common policy regarding economy and security.

The initial years of ECOWAS operation was difficult as Nigeria shouldered over 33% of institutional budget (Sharkdam, FGI, January 28, 2015). This is not surprising as most countries were not economically buoyant to honour their dues. Only Ghana and Ivory Coast contributed meaningfully at 13% each to ECOWAS (Sharkdam, 2015). It needs to be stressed here that the ECOWAS problems from the incipient has been financial in nature as the sub-region is home to some poor countries. The average per capital income of the region in 1974 was $270 and only Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast were economically viable in the whole region as independent nations (Adebajo, 2002:34). By 1980, Ivory Coast had the highest per capital income (of $1,150) in the whole sub-region and is the leading nation among francophone West Africa. As a result, this economic viability enabled Ivory Coast to contest West African leadership with Nigeria. In 1970s Ivory Coast assisted Nigeria in bailing out ECOWAS from financial woes. It needs to be stressed here that Accra was chosen as the ECOWAS headquartered in 1975 but under President Babangida of Nigeria, the headquartered was relocated to Nigeria in 1987 and out of $15 million budgeted for the construction of the building Nigeria contributed $5 million (Adebajo, 2002:34). Thus, since 1975 ECOWAS has been a multilateral institution through which Nigeria exhibit its hegemonic position in Africa with attendant financial and material implications.

6.1.4 **Economy**

The government of each state in the global economy devises means and strategy by which its economic interest will be protected and strengthened against other state actors. The economic capacity of a state is one of the important instruments of foreign policy and it has greater influence in determining such policy (Adeyemi-Suenu and

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Inokoba, 2010:1). Some countries especially the developed nations, promoted multilateral institutions to ensure stable political and economic climate in the global space. This in return will ensure the smooth running and flow of goods and services across borders (Gill and Law, 1989:478). The promotion and stability of global economic system has and still is the responsibility of hegemon in the international system. In the 18th century, Britain dominated the global economy and maintained the system until it became weak, and the US took over after the First World War. The US also came up with its own hegemonic device, which dominates the global economic terrain until now. In the contemporary global system, such hegemonic role is being displayed and sponsored at regional and sub-regional level of multilateralism.

The Nigerian economy at the point of independence gave Nigerian leaders hope and assurance that the country would rise to become an industrial heart of the continent (Herskovits, 2001:314). Economy affects Nigerian multilateral policy by three important ways: First, the large and robust economy, at least by African standard, gives Nigerian leaders the idea of promoting integration in Africa. Second, the relative advanced economy, in addition to oil, gives Nigeria the opportunity to finance some of its ambitious plans, most especially in the OAU and ECOWAS (Herskovits, 1975:316; Shaw & Fasehun, 1980:554). Third, the need to solve some problems posed by commodity trade, debt burden, poverty, underdevelopment and African marginalization is also an important area by which economy impacts on Nigerian multilateral policy (Alli, 2012:68). Professor Joy Ogwu, the permanent representative of Nigeria to the UN, stressed that,

> Economic concerns underpin Nigeria's role in the ECOWAS….Effective regional cooperation and integration in Africa is critical to the solution of the country's numerous problems….It is impossible to solve the problems posed by poverty and debt burden on an individual country basis… and for this to be effective…Nigeria is expected to play this role in view of her status as the largest market in the

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sub-region with vast natural and human resources….The role of hegemon is also expected of Nigeria at the continental level…where the country was a protagonist for the recently established AU (Ogwu, 2005:10).

Since independence in 1960, many countries and leaders have seen Nigeria as being in the best position to protect the economic interest of Africa. Some inherent problems after the demise of colonialism from the continent also required the need for multilateral diplomacy and in this case Nigeria assumed the responsibility in 1960 (Ebo, 1996:159). Thus, many countries and individuals were of the belief that from the economic point of view, Nigeria would compete favorably with countries like Brazil, Mexico and Argentina at the time of gaining independence (Shaw, 1983:6-7). The economic prosperity was promising and the Nigerian leaders were convinced of the need to dominate African market. With the largest market in Africa signified by overwhelming population and resources, Nigeria started proposing African integration as a platform to launch itself as Africa's economic powerhouse (Brown, 1989:258). At independence, the Nigeria's future economy was promising given the leaders the idea that Nigeria needed to promote "Pax Nigeriana" and to be a leader in Africa as its "manifest destiny" (Adebajo, 2003:64).

The huge population coupled with oil and other agricultural resources like cocoa, groundnut, palm oil, rubber and cotton, gave an impressive outlook on the economy. In 1970 alone, Nigeria supplied 3.5% (2,376,000 tons) of the crude oil export to the US, placing it at the comfortable position to dominate African political terrain (Bach, 1983:43). In 1979, Nigeria rose to the seventh position in the world in the production of crude oil and occupied the first position in Africa (Wright, 1983:98). In 1963, Nigeria's population represented 25% of African's which made it attractive to the investors coming to Africa (Wright, 1983:100). The agricultural produce was amounted to $6.3 billion in 1970 and was ranked 9th in the world alongside Turkey

(Kushnir, 2013). Also in 1970, the Nigerian agricultural production represented 27.1% and 65% of Africa and West Africa respectively (Kushnir, 2013). This huge economy thus prompted Nigerian leaders to promote multilateralism under which the Nigerian economy can be galvanized into developed ones. In this sense, the need to dominate African economy and market was behind the Prime Minister's sponsoring of West Africa Economic Community in 1964 (Shaw, 1983:1).

It should be noted that by the time Nigeria gained its independence, it saw the International monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), and the World Bank (WB) as colonial economic instrument to further perpetuate their hegemonic role in the global economy (Wright, 1998:136). This idea radiated from the situation Nigeria found itself and some African countries at independence. Most African countries were all enmeshed in economic underdevelopment and abject poverty and Nigerian leaders, especially those with communist orientation, accused the West of conspiracy to put Africa at the bottom of ladder in the global economy (Rodney, 1973). It was based on this that Nigerian joined other developing countries from Asia and Latin America to form Group of 77 member of the UN which advocated for New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1964 in response to G7 (Akinrinade, 1998:173). In the process of this, Nigeria was trying to devise a continental economic multilateral institution that will cater for its interest and that of Africans. Between 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria's economy had already been growing steadily and by 1970, the Nigeria's annual growth rate was 44.8% which amounted to $11.4 billion (Kushnir, 2013). In the same year, Nigeria's GDP was $25.4 billion representing 23.1% and 72.1% of Africa and West Africa respectively and was ranked 20th globally (Kushnir, 2013). By 1970s it was in the economic caucus of Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) contesting economic buoyancy and

competition with countries like Brazil, Singapore, South Korea and Mexico which were then located in the semi-periphery in the global economy (Shaw, 1983:7). It needs to be stressed that oil had become an important aspect of Nigerian economy in 1970s after successful prospecting and exploration in the 1960s.

The history of oil exploration in colonial Nigeria started between 1903 and 1958 when the first shipment of Nigerian crude oil arrived in Rotterdam (Mayall, 1976:289). The oil economy was not as significant as commodity economy after independence and most of the government revenue came from the exportation of cocoa, palm oil, rubber, cotton, groundnut and coffee. Oil export began to be significant in Nigerian economy shortly after the civil war (Herskovits, 1975:313). The radicalization of foreign policy in the 1970s coincided with the height of Nigerian influence in foreign affairs, This was as a result of the oil boom and the subsequent rise of oil price that occurred in the years after the conclusion of the civil war (see table 5.2). The wealth that generated from oil enabled the country to become an important source of aid throughout Africa (Shaw, 1984:394). At the same time, Nigeria was able to use its oil as a bargaining chip with the western powers that purchased it, and also used it to meet their energy needs.

In 1960, Nigeria produced 6,367 barrel of crude oil per day while it astronomically rose to 395,905 barrel in 1970 (see Table 5.2). Angola, a rival oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, produced 1,100 and 83,900 barrel of crude oil in 1960 and 1970 respectively (OPEC, 2014). The enormous resources that Nigerian leaders inherited after independence created suspicion in the global political economy that Nigeria would soon become the an important player in the continent (Shaw, 1983). London Financial Times buttressed this claim further,

> In a world economy that is basically reliant on oil, Nigeria's economic
> and strategic importance is enormous….Increasingly, Nigeria's wealth

and position has immensely enhanced her political and strategic importance in Africa and world politics. A strong member of OPEC, a pioneer and stabilizing force in the OAU, a member of the non-aligned nations, a founder of ECOWAS, Nigeria is slowly but assuredly emerging as major factor in the global power calculus (Financial Times, March 17, 1981).

Such is the lens through which the world described Nigerian economy and the result of this economic enormity is its employment in the global politics most especially on issue relating to Africa. As a member of OPEC and OAU, Nigeria has used its economic resources to pursue its strategic interest. According to Andrew Young, a leading activist in improving US-Nigerian relations under President Jimmy Carter of the US and General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria,

> Nigeria will endeavor to foster its interest in economic development and stable trade relationship with the west while simultaneously continuing to use its leverage with western nations and corporations in the interest of its political goals on the African continent especially with regard to South Africa (cited in Shaw, 1983:5).

This reveals the extent of Nigeria's employment of economy as an instrument of diplomacy in dealing with the outside world. The most important of Nigeria economy is oil, which has created enormous wealth and influence for Nigeria in the international system. It is this oil economy that provides Nigeria with much-needed revenue to pursue ambitious regional integration in Africa.In 1966, for example, oil production contributed 5.8% to Nigeria's GDP but rose to 14% in 1973 (Tyoden, 1983:153).

By 1974, Nigeria had become the sixth largest oil producer in the world and was the second largest supplier to the US after Saudi Arabia (Akinterinwa, 2005:88). As long as oil prices remained high, as it did for most part of President Gowon period (1970-1975) (see Table 5.2 below), Nigeria was a force to be reckoned with in international affairs. The oil weapon, therefore, became an important instrument in Nigerian foreign policy strategy; it was used both to reward allies and to punish op-

ponents by the Gowon government (Bach, 1983:44). The statistics below is a testimony to the astronomical increase in Nigerian export revenue from oil during Gowon administration. During this period of oil boom, it is on record that Gowon lamented that "the problem of Nigeria is not money but how to spend it" (Morning Post, October 23, 1968).

Table 6.2
Petroleum of Production and Export

Year	Crude oil production per thousand barrels	Crude oil production per thousand tones	Crude oil exports per thousand barrels	Crude oil exports per thousand tones	Natural gas production million cubic feet
1958	1,876	257	1,695	230	1,609
1959	4,096	561	4,065	552	4,939
1960	6,367	872	6,244	849	5,095
1961	16,802	2,283	16,506	2,243	10,943
1962	24,624	3,346	24,680	3,421	17,179
1963	27,913	3,793	27,701	3,754	22,106
1964	43,997	5,978	43,432	5,878	36,333
1965	99,853	13,567	96,985	13,234	79,438
1966	152,428	20,710	140,118	19,333	103,820
1967	116,525	15,832	109,057	15,011	93,950
1968	51,907	7,053	52,847	7,180	51,628
1969	197,204	26,794	197,246	26,984	145,714
1970	395,905	53,791	383,455	52,100	285,512
1971	558,828	75,928	542,545	73,984	458,973
1972	665,286	90,392	650,980	88,431	604,642
1973	750,609	101,985	723,314	99,688	772,777
1974	823,349	112,788	795,710	109,662	959,524

(Source: Ministry of Mines and Power, Petroleum Division. Accessed at National Archive Ibadan, Nigeria)

With such huge amount of revenue derived from oil economy, Nigerian government started to pursue regional integration ambition in Africa. The astronomical increase in the production of oil in the 1970s could be attributed to the energy crisis of the 1970s, which was as a result of Arab oil embargoes on the US. This led to the renewed interest in the Nigerian oil by the US who perceived the Middle East source of energy as unstable and unreliable. This spurred increased in the volume of production and price as opposed to pre-1970s. The ECOWAS campaign had started since

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1964 but with heavy financial clout in the 1970s Nigeria was able to sponsor some projects in West Africa to motivate West African countries to cooperate with the formation of regional organisation. One of the projects was the supply of electricity to Niger Republic from Nigeria's Kanji dam which amounted to 9.6 million naira ($6.32 million) in 1972 and this convince some of the west African countries of the readiness of Nigeria to shoulder in its totality the responsibility of the regional organization (Nwoke, 2005:121).

With the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, Nigeria broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and participated in the OPEC oil embargo against the US, illustrating its solidarity with its oil producing Arab allies while simultaneously using the oil weapon against a formidable western foe (Wright, 1983:108). In addition to this, OPEC as a multilateral cartel served Nigeria multilateral policy well in dealing with the West on the issue of Palestine and Southern African issue (Herskovits, 2001:315-317). Nigerian government gave substantial amount in aid and loan to some poor OAU member countries who could not cope with the high price of oil in the global market. For example, in 1972 the Gowon government donated $158,000 to Kenya, $75,000 to Guinea and $150,000 to the Sudan (Nwoke, 2005:121). Such generosity was paid for with oil revenues. By 1974, the oil revenue accounted for 90% of Nigeria's export earnings and over 80% of its total revenue (Herskovits, 1975:315). In 1975 Nigeria started to use its oil as economic and political tools and began selling petroleum directly to African countries at concessionary rates. African countries were allowed to purchase Nigerian crude oil at three-quarters of the market price (Guardian, October 30, 1990). This was premised on conditions that the purchasing country had its own refineries and that the country agreed not to resell the oil to third parties. By this, Nigeria hoped to stimulate relations with African countries

and help struggling African economies get on their feet. With the oil revenue and attendant assistance to OAU members, the West African countries agreed with Nigeria in 1975 and ECOWAS was formed with Nigerian oil revenue (Nwoke, 2005:124).

Such oil revenue also provided Nigeria with much enough financial resources to meet its obligations in UN, OPEC and OAU. According to the latest estimate, Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and occupies 13th position in the global production. Nigeria's oil production constitutes 2.62% of global oil production and export in 2013 (OPEC, 2014). In addition to this, Nigeria is also the third largest producer of palm oil in the world after Indonesia and Malaysia (United States Department of Agriculture, 2014). Its cocoa production also constitutes 7.7% of global production in 2012 making Nigeria the 4th largest producer in the world (World Cocoa Foundation, 2014). Nigeria's record in strategic resources is notable and it is by far the richest country in Africa in all essential products (Bach, 2007). In 2014, Nigeria surpassed South Africa as the largest African economy.

In fact, the ECOWAS and its military offspring, ECOMOG, rest solely on Nigerian financial capability as most ECOWAS members are very poor to meet their dues (Daily Champion, July 8, 2003). In 2002 only, Nigeria paid $60 million which represented 60% of the whole amount for ECOWAS currency stabilization while Ghana, Guinea and Gambia paid 17%, 5% and 0.07% respectively of the $100 million allotted. (Comet, May 21, 2002). In short, without the huge financial contribution of Nigeria, ECOWAS cannot survive the ravages of time. In sponsoring ECOWAS and AU, Nigeria is of the view that the free movement of people and common currency could open the African market to Nigerian exports as it competes with France, the US, Britain and recently Japan and China (Nigerian Tribune, October 17, 2013). To achieve this laudable goal, Nigeria sponsored the construction of West Af-

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rican Gas Pipeline (WAGP) covering 997km miles long off-shore which is intended to supply some ECOWAS member countries with Nigerian gas (Nwoke, 2005:127). Monetary union had also been sponsored, although it was formerly scheduled to materialize in 2005 but due to some political and economic circumstances in the region, the target is yet to be realized. The formulation and implementation on the monetary union is still in progress. The buoyant economy therefore could be adjudged as an important factor in Nigeria's multilateral policy.

6.2 EXTERNAL FACTORS

6.2.1 Geographical Contiguity

Geography is an important determinant of foreign policy for countries in the global strategic policy. This has been the pre-occupation of military, economic and diplomatic strategist for centuries. Professor Alfred Thayan Mahan, an American Naval Historian in 1905 coined the word Middle East to show the strategic importance of such location to world powers (Couloumbus & Wolfe, 1978:66). Thus, the safety and importance of a country's territory depends on its geographical location and in this case, the US serves as a good example. Its relative geographical isolation from Europe gave ample chance to stay aloof of all conflict that engulfed the continent in 18th and 19th centuries (Kegley & Blanton, 2012:217). Its geographical location gave it an opportunity to go into isolation after the formation of League of Nations in 1919. Therefore, the US geographical location in the western hemisphere provides it with relative security when compared to countries like Germany, France, China, Canada, Brazil, Argentina and Switzerland (Kegley & Blanton, 2012:216). It needs to be stated that some of the US's neighbours do not possess tangible capability to threaten its territorial integrity. Such revelation cannot be said of Nigeria. Nigeria is located in a

region where it needs the cooperation of its neighbours to survive (see Map 5.1 be-

low).

Figure 5.1: Map of Nigeria and its Neighbours

The geographical location of Nigeria in the hearth of Africa has always been a source of worry and anxiety to Nigerian leaders since independence (Ogwu, 2005:6). Nigeria is bordered in the north by Niger and Chad; in the east by Cameroon and in the west by Benin republic. It is also bounded in Gulf of Guinea by Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea (see Figure 5.1). Incidentally, Nigeria shares different colonial experience with all these countries. Four of them are francophone while two of them belong to Luzophone.

It is therefore in this dilemma of geo-politics that Nigeria found itself in 1960. As policy was needed to court the friendship of all these neighbouring countries, multilateralism becomes expedient (Ogunbadejo, 1976:44). By 1964, Nigerian Prime Minister, Balewa had started advocating for sub-regional organization that will serve the west African sub-region of about 16 countries (Effiong, 2012:35). Thus in 1964, West African Economic Community was launched by Nigerian government and invitation was extended to other West African countries. The realization on the part of

Nigerian government of the existence of overwhelming number of francophone countries becomes an important security threat to the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Nigeria clearly identified the threat that all these small countries could pose to its territorial integrity and thus decided to curb this through multilateral organization given the fact that UN and OAU are not in the best position to perform such role (Okon, 1999:181-182). Although Nigeria commands greater influence in the OAU, Nigerian leaders were of the conviction that sub regional organization would better serve Nigerian interest than any other organization. According to Professor Kunle Lawal, the former Commissioner for Education in Lagos, Nigeria,

> The unilateral sponsoring of sub-regional organization was borne out of the notion that there was greater need to control the affairs of West Africa…the only mechanism was to integrate all the neighbours and other West African states (Pers. Comm., April 24, 2012)

It also needs to be reiterated here that the role some West African neighbours played during Nigerian civil war in which they served as a go-between France and the secessionist group, taught Nigeria an important lesson need to circumvent the role of France in the sub-region (Ogunbadejo, 1976:54). This has been discussed extensively under Nigerian civil war. The continuing reliance of francophone African countries is understandable given the fact that some of them feared the preponderance power position of Nigeria in Africa in which they hope that in the event of any act of irredentism on the part of Nigeria, France would be readily available to dislodge Nigerian military operation (Nwoke, 2005:118; Adebajo, 2003:67). Therefore, in order to allay the fears of all these francophone countries, including the Anglophone, Nigeria started sponsoring the sub regional organization that will serve as a medium to gather and discuss the sub-regional problems (Nwoke, 2005:117). As one would be expected, the idea did not materialize as early as Nigeria wanted it to be. It

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is based on this that a case of Equatorial Guinea will be enumerated in relation to Nigeria's geography.

6.2.1.1 **The Case of Equatorial Guinea**

The presence of potential and actual threat to Nigerian economy and territorial integrity through Equatorial Guinea has been a concern to Nigerian foreign policy makers since independence (Obadare, 2001:81; African Concord, February 3, 1987). The geographical location of Equatorial Guinea as the closest island to Nigeria has been identified as a threat to Nigeria since independence (see Figure 5.1). The Nigerian government recognizes the fact that the country is too small, considering its population of 500,000 and land size of 28,000 square kilometers. It was believed that the island might easily become a "launch pad" where Nigerian territory will be invaded by external forces (Obadare, 1996). Also, it is recognized by the government that most of the Nigerian offshore oil facilities are clearly located in the direction of the Equatorial Guinea in which case it may serve as threat to those offshore installations (Newswatch, May 23, 1988). From Nigeria's coastal region of Calabar to Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea is 96 kilometers, which Nigeria regards as serious economic threat of which strategies have been devised to reduce the security and economic threat this contiguous state poses to Nigeria (Obadare, 1996:145: Aworawo, 2010:100).

One of the most important strategies is the need to integrate the country into multilateral organization in order to bridge the communication gap. The role the island state played to French incursion during Nigerian civil war was quite immense as the weapons and artilleries supplied to the Biafra secessionist passed through the island (Sunday Times, January 11, 1976). The appraisal of the role the island country

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may play in the future security and economy of Nigeria made some eminent Nigerians to call for the annexation of the country by Nigeria. As Ebenezer Obadare of the Department of International Relations, Ife, Nigeria puts it,

> We believe it is now time for the Nigerian armed forces to become involved in foreign policy pursuit, lest we deny ourselves the clout that befits a giant, which indeed we are. We fought civil war and we lost over one million brethren to keep this country together. We must not hesitate to fight Equatorial Guinea now to do same (1996:146).

Such was the extent to which Nigeria went in solving Equatorial Guinea case. The limitation to such military venture lies in the fact that the external powers especially France, the US and China may intervene which some political analysts warned will cost Nigeria heavy military operations (Sunday Times, January 11, 1976: Aluko, 1983:195: Aworawo, 2010:101). It was this historical analogy that deterred Nigerian government from annexing Equatorial Guinea (Obadare, 1996:147).

In order to contain the threat posed by this island state, multilateral organization was sponsored by Nigeria, and it included all countries that bordered the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, Gulf of Guinea Commission was formed in 1999 and it contains the following countries namely Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea (Ogwu, 2005:355). It is interesting to note that most of these countries are geographically located in central part of Africa as defined by the UN. Hence, Nigeria's geographical location at the equidistant point in Africa makes it accessible to all parts of Africa with attendant security implication (Osuntokun, 2005:35). Nigeria's strategy of making the area free of economic and security threat bore fruit in 1999. Nigeria is the only Anglophone country among these countries; the rest are Luzophone and Francophone and this suggests that Nigeria has successfully devised another multi-

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lateral platform under which the threat of Francophone and Lusophone can be curtailed in the west and central parts of Africa.

6.2.2 **Apartheid Policy**

How Nigeria displayed its hegemonic presence in Africa through dismantling of apartheid and racism in the continent has been extensively discussed in Chapter Four. The main argument here is that the apartheid regime constituted an important factor in the formulation of Nigeria's multilateral policy, most importantly in the UN, Commonwealth, and OAU. Therefore, this section will briefly discuss the apartheid and racism as important factor in the formulation of Nigeria's multilateral policy. The presence of apartheid and racial discrimination in the southern part of Africa prompted Nigeria to result to multilateral policy in the early days of independence (Abacha, 1996).

The appreciation of the role the apartheid South Africa played in the Nigerian civil war and Portuguese support for Biafra made Nigerian government launch intense campaign against apartheid in South Africa (Morning Post, October 29, 1969). The racist regime in South Africa was of the view that if Nigeria could be disintegrated it would serve as evidence to the international community that African countries are not capable of governing themselves, such conviction will justify the apartheid policy in South Africa (Ogunbadejo, 1976:36). In addition, the apartheid regime was of the conviction that if Biafra could secede, it might serve as ally of South Africa in the black Africa (Akinboye: 2005:213). The frontal-attack role played by Nigeria in relation to racist policy thus forced South Africa to avenge the pressure of isolation caused by Nigeria in all multilateral organisations, most especially in the Commonwealth, the UN, and OAU (Gambari, 2005:189). After the civil war, Nigeri-

an government under Obasanjo intensified efforts and pressurized both OAU and the UN to sanction the apartheid regime. It should be stressed here that,

> Nigeria and South Africa had pursued philosophically irreconcilable interests. While the protection of the apartheid policy was central to the survival of racist South Africa in a hostile political environment, the destruction of same was central to Nigeria's African policy in the OAU and even derived its legitimacy from the country's constitution (Obadare, 1996: 144).

Therefore, Nigeria acted through multilateral institutions to contain campaign against South Africa. In order to unify fully domestic mechanism against Apartheid, Nigerian government under Major-General Olusegun Obasanjo sponsored the establishment of National Committee against the Apartheid (NACAP) and Southern Africa Relief Fund (SARF) to work with OAU and the Commonwealth on the issue of apartheid (Akinboye, 2005:214). In the UN, the Chairmanship of Committee against Apartheid was reserved for Nigeria for most part of the period, from 1966 to 1990 (Gambari, 2005:189). The role played by Portugal and South Africa during Nigerian civil war thus made government aware of the looming danger to its territorial integrity in Africa as South Africa developed nuclear weapon capable of launching attack as far as Nigeria (Okolo, 1988:72). Post-civil war Nigerian government therefore mounted pressure on the UN and OAU for the need to wipe off apartheid policy from the continent.

6.2.3 Colonial Heritage

Closely related to the above is the factor of colonial legacy and heritage. The demise of colonialism in Africa led to many unsettled issues that have plunged the continent into unending crisis (Wright, 1998). From the 18th centuries, when colonial incursion into Africa began, there had been gradual replacement of African culture with Europeans' (Chibundi, 2003:61). In this case, African kingdoms lost most of their herit-

age to the European powers. The African pre-colonial administrative system, kingdom affiliations, traditional social and justice system, and educational system were all replaced with the European's. This is most apparent in the French colonies where "Frenchification" and policy of assimilation were vigorously pursued to make Africans behaved like Frenchmen the corollary of which was the presentation of anything African as barbaric and antediluvian (Oliver & Atmore, 2005: 256).

The implication of this cultural and social wipe off was the lost in the social mechanism that was used in governing African society in the pre-colonial times (Chibundi, 2003:59). After the departure of the colonial masters, the African traditional social system was virtually displaced with the modern European's which was basically elitist in nature. Thus, the application of European social system to African society became increasingly unbearable to Africans most especially those who lived in the remote part of the continent, who had barely experienced the presence of Europeans. Chibundi (2003) noted that "the close affinity between the language groups of the continent, the prevalence of similar basic ideas of like and living and the amount of cross-border ethnic links coupled with the high degree of active communication network that existed in pre-colonial Africa" lend credence to the existence of harmonious relations among Africans (p. 62). Such was one of the reactions of Nigerians to the colonial heritage in Africa. It was part of this problem that resulted in Congo crisis after the demise of Belgian in the late 1950s. The society could not be governed by the central government as some regional leaders decided to govern their separate domain as it were before colonialism (Balewa, 1960). Nearly all parts of Africa were affected by the social revolution brought about by colonial masters.

The common problem that resulted from this is the boundary issues that later resurfaced among African countries (Etekpe, 2013:286). In fact within intra-state re-

lations, there were also boundary and land problems. It was in realization of all these attendant issues that prompted Nigeria to make sure that the continental organizations were formed to artificially wield the unity of Africans (Otunla, 2005:314-316). In this case, Nigeria alongside its neighbours formed Lake Chad Basin Commission and River Niger Commission in 1964. It was formed to allay the fear of other small African countries in using the common resources which hitherto belong to all of them in the pre-colonial times (Nwoke, 2005:116). The rivers and the lakes had been in use among various communities before the coming of Europeans and this has denied some ethnic nationalities from using it anymore since it does not fall within the confine of their newly created country. It was to forestall the social problems which might emanate from the artificial division that propelled Nigeria to create the two institutions that will govern the usage and distribution of the common heritage immediately after independence. Those at the Berlin Conference of 1884/85 where African countries were partitioned on papers did not recognize the problems that the partition would later cause to Africans. In fact, it may be difficult to know and assess the reason why the Europeans partitioned African countries without proper consultation about the ethnic and tribal boundaries, which would have served as the basis for boundary delineation.

By 1960s, most of the problems that occupied the attention of Africans emanated from boundary issue. It was in recognition of this that the OAU was formed and a Nigerian lawyer, Dr. Teslim Elias, drafted the complete charter (Elias, 1965:245). The subsequent meeting that was held in Cairo in 1964 was primarily devoted to the need for all African countries to abide by the existing boundaries among them and which was subsequently entrenched in the OAU principles in 1964 (OAU, 1964). By 1964 there were boundary disputes in almost all parts of Africa and most

resulted in armed conflicts that claimed hundreds of lives (Etekpe, 2013:286-287). One of such disputes was between Algeria and Morocco in the Sahara desert. The boundary dispute resulted in 100 deaths (Meyers, 1974:354). The earliest attempt on the part of Nigeria to respond to such dispute was in Tanganyika in 1964. In order to safeguard the territorial integrity of Tanganyika under Julius Nyerere, Nigeria supplied the country with troops that later trained the Tanganyika soldiers before doing away with British's (Meyers, 1974: 363). Such recognition of impending continental-wide social problems caused by boundary led Nigeria to the acceptance of the ICJ judgment on the boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon in 2002 (Etekpe, 2013:294). Until now, the continental multilateral organizations have been employing in settling all problems that may emanate from colonialism. However, recent experience has shown that the UN is increasingly invited by Nigeria to mediate in some of these issues based on the neutrality of the organization. One of such case is the Nigeria-Cameroon border dispute (Akinterinwa, 2005:103). There are many other social problems created by colonialism, which Nigerian government has been trying to resolve through multilateral institutions.

Language and communication problem between and among African countries is also part of colonial heritage. The African languages have been the medium through which people communicated their ideas in the pre-colonial times and there was no question of "elite languages" as it exists today in almost all part of Africa (Abacha, 1996). The existence and subsequent imposition of colonial master languages further created another cleavage within African people (Phillipson, 1996:163). Those who live in the urban settings could understand the European languages while those who live in the remote parts of Africa stick to their communal languages and this continues to exist because of the limited capacity on the part of

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governments to provide stable and sound educational system that will arrest the situation (Danladi, 2013:14). The attendant problem therefore is the existence of many European languages on the continent. Portuguese, French, English, Dutch, and Belgian are all European languages that are widely spoken at official level in several African states. As such, it is difficult to form a common language in the continental organizations. In the OAU and ECOWAS, where Nigeria belongs, it has been increasingly difficult to settle the language barrier but Nigeria government has started the campaign to make sure that the indigenous African languages are developed and spoken so as to ensure that the programmes of the institutions are communicated to the grass root (Danladi, 2013:11). General Sanni Abacha, a former military head of state observed that,

> We do recognize that our region [Africa] consists of peoples divided not only by artificial colonial boundaries but also by linguistic differences. The lack of easy communication posed by this linguistic barrier has serious implications for the realization of our goal of total integration in Africa within our sub-regional organization. Nigeria will embark on a vigorous language programme that should ensure that our people, within the shortest possible time, become bilingual and multilingual (Abacha, 1996).

In 2011, for example, a research was sponsored by Nigerian government to identify how to unify the Yoruba dialects in Nigeria, Togo and Benin Republic among the ethnic speakers in the three countries (Kluge, 2011). African languages like Swahili, Hausa, Mandingo, Zulu, Yoruba, and many more are being promoted by Nigeria in both ECOWAS and OAU/AU in order to arrest the problems of communication for development purpose most especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Abacha, 1996:12).

6.2.4 **Cold War**

This was a decisive landmark in the history of Nigeria's multilateral policy. One of the most important factors that determined the foreign policy of African countries in the 60s and 70s was the Cold War (Akinrinade & Sesay, 1998). The tension that arose between the USSR and its allies on the one hand, and the US and its Western allies on the other. It was during this tense political climate that Nigeria gained its independence. Formally, the Balewa government did not give any recognition to this important global issue in formulating Nigeria's external relations at independence. Balewa government gave significant weight to western nations in the formulation of Nigerian foreign policy but refused to allow any Eastern bloc country to open embassy in Nigeria (Aluko, 1976:142). He went to the extent of rejecting Soviet scholarships and did not allow any Nigerian students to travel to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and its satellites for educational purpose (Aluko, 1976:144).

The close rapport between the West and Nigeria during the Balewa administration could be as a result of the internal political climate of the time. Balewa did not want Nigerians to be exposed to the communist ideology of the eastern bloc which he thought can disrupt the nascent democracy in Nigeria (Osuntokun, 2005:34). The Balewa government, in contrast to the close rapport it maintained with the West, clearly declared in its inaugural presidential speech that "the country shall pursue Non-Aligned policy which would give the country a diversified opportunity to interact with any powers in the global politics and also to seek for assistance anywhere in the world" (Balewa, 1960). It was in this political stalemate that Gowon came to power in 1966. As soon as Gowon took over the power, he declared that the Nigerian foreign policy as Non-Aligned with radical tone (New Nigeria, October 8, 1968). Before Gowon, most of the Nigerian external trade was with the West and this

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might explain the reason most of the oil conglomerates in Nigeria were all from the Western states (Mayall, 1976:324).

Because of the nature of internal political environment at the beginning of Gowon administration he could not give much attention to this policy. The civil war and its successful end, therefore, gave much impetus to the policy of Non-Alignment. The lesson of the civil war opened some facts of international politics to Gowon as he perceived danger in the over-reliance on the West. By 1968, Gowon had embraced the USSR and its satellites and they were allowed to open embassies in Lagos (Aluko, 1976:148). Based on the attitude of Britain and the US during the Nigerian civil war, Gowon could not wait to allow his government to crumble and he turned to the Soviet Union for help. The Cold War that stood to threaten the global peace and security at the time played itself out in Nigerian civil war. Most of the western countries refused to render any meaningful assistance to the Gowon government and some even went to the extent of providing military and moral support for the secessionists which help prolonged the war (Ogunbadejo, 1976:38). It was this attitude of the West that propelled the Gowon government to embrace the East for help, and it was in this circumstance that the policy of Non-Alignment was vigorously pursued by the Gowon government (Chibundi, 2003:15). As a consequence, Gowon realized the danger of relying on a power bloc, by the end of his administration in 1975, he had maintained a balance in Nigerian foreign policy during political climate of the Cold War. It is therefore based on this that Non-Aligned Movement will be discussed.

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6.2.4.1 **Non-Alignment Movement (NAM)**

Non-Aligned Movement is unlike other multilateral organisations like OAU, ECO-WAS and the UN. It is a loose association of many countries in the global politics who intended to maintain their neutrality in the East-West ideological confrontation. It drew its membership from virtually all continents especially among developing nations. The main idea behind the formation of the grouping was to form a "third voice" in the global political arena and to ensure the maintenance of international security and order (Sesay, 1998:147-148). It should be noted that most developing countries, especially in Africa, got their independence during the intense Cold War era and most wanted to benefit from both camps so as to maximize their economic gain (Ebo, 1996:152). In most parts of the developing countries, the economy under-development, poverty, unemployment among others were the order of the day, and to arrest these issues, there emerged the need to form a formidable ally among the developing countries.

The NAM was championed by various third world leaders of the time namely Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Jovanka Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria and Ratna Dewi Surkano of Indonesia. All these leaders had one thing in common: Their economies were less competitive in relation to the developed ones and they all suffered from structural weakness in the global economy. Thus, the idea of maintaining neutrality in the global political space became expedient, as they did not want to be embroiled in the struggle. Some Nigerian leaders joined the forces before independence in 1960. Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamidi Azikiwe joined the NAM but not in the name of Nigeria but in the name of the region they represented in Nigeria (Aboluwodi, 2012:59). Although Nigeria declared the policy of non-alignment at independence,

the true non-aligned policy became expedient during and after the Nigerian civil war. Shaw & Fasheun (1981) noted that "the economic supremacy occasioned by revenue from oil gave Nigerian government the confidence to pursue nonaligned policy with all objectivity" (p, 558). After the civil war, Nigerian government used the opportunity of overwhelming membership of NAM in the UN to mount pressure on the West on the racist policy in South Africa and Namibia (Delancey, 1983:171-172). Nigeria thus used NAM forum as an opportunity to defend the interest of black race in the international politics. The perceived marginalization of Nigeria and African countries served as an important impetus to join other developing nations in forming the NAM. In order to further its interest in the global politics and enlist the support of other developing countries, NAM became a useful mechanism to promote African interest in the global political space (Otunla, 2005:326). After the demise of Cold War, NAM lost its vitality despite Jakarta Declaration of 1992 which tended to revitalise the relevance of NAM in the presence global political economy (Sesay, 1998:157). It was indeed an important mechanism of the Cold War political order.

6.2.5 **French Factor**

France's political and economic influence is also important in Nigeria's multilateral policy. Since independence in 1960, France has always perceived Nigeria as potent threat to its hegemonic ambition in Africa (Obadare, 1996:142; Akinterinwa, 2005:83). Most of the French erstwhile colonial territories are located in close proximity of Nigeria in West Africa (see Map 5.1). The recognition by the French leader, George Pompidou, of the threat Nigeria posed to French ambition in Africa made it opposed the establishment of ECOWAS right from 1964 (Ogunbadejo, 1976:23). In fact, as it was noted earlier, the delay in the formation of ECOWAS until 1975 was

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primarily the handwork of French government for most francophone African countries economy and politics have been tied to France. It was based on this assessment that France opts to engage in diplomatic battle with Nigeria all the time. Since the severance of diplomatic relation in 1961, because of France's test of atomic bomb in the Algerian territory, France has been closely monitoring and challenging Nigeria's leadership role and ambition in Africa (Iheduru, 2003:55).

The height of France challenge came up during Nigerian civil war. According to many scholars, France was the principal sponsor of Biafran secession with the hope of disintegrating Nigeria (Ogunbadejo, 1976; Aluko: 1976: Nigerian Observer, September 18, 1969). Because of the presence of oil in the Biafran territory, France was convinced that if the war ended in favour of Biafra, it would dominate the exploration, extraction, and commercialization of Biafran oil industries (Stremlau, 1981:49). Thus, France ambition in Nigeria disintegration is two-fold. First, France is of the conviction that by dismembering Nigeria it will remain the sole actor in the regional order of West Africa (Adebajo, 2000:190-192). Second, the importance of oil in the Nigerian hegemonic behaviours has been noted by France and it was of the view that once Biafra secede the federal government revenue capability will dwindle and France will be in the best position to source from Biafran oil for its industry (Nwokedi, 1985:201). Nigeria realized all these threats coupled with the fact that all Nigerian neighbours are francophone.

In order to drastically contain the role of France in Africa, Nigeria thus see hope in the establishment of sub-regional multilateral institutions (Nwokedi, 1985:198). Although OAU was in existence during the Nigerian civil war, but the francophone members of the organization made it difficult for Nigeria to employ the organization to reduce France's influence in Africa (Ogunbadejo, 1976:46). Because

of the complex nature of OAU, Nigeria decided to unilaterally sponsor a sub-regional organization, which will unite all three principal zones in West Africa. Luzophone, Anglophone, and Francophone are all present in West Africa. The Portuguese zone also supported the Biafran cause in 1967 through Portuguese military aid to Biafra (Obadare, 1996:147). Therefore, to curb the excesses of French role and influence, Nigeria vigorously under General Gowon pursued regional integration. Before the proposal, Nigerian government has been rendering financial assistance to some of these West African countries and by 1975 through some stresses and strains Nigerian finally succeeded in establishing the ECOWAS as the way to circumvent France influence and also to promote regional economic integration in the West African sub-region (Iheduru, 2003:55; Nwoke, 2005:123-125).

6.3 CONCLUSION

Some of the factors enumerated above occasion the defining and implementation of Nigeria's multilateral policy since independence. These external and internal factors are very crucial in the formulation of Nigeria's multilateral policy and they dictate to certain extent the degree at which Nigeria's multilateral policy will take in the future. Although some of these factors namely Cold War, racism, colonialism, apartheid are no more but their replicas are still to be found in the conduct of global politics. For example, global economy still looks favourable to the West and the seeming global competition among the US and China, Russia and the US, Japan and China among others represents another dimension of Cold War political climate. The diversification of relationship that had been established among the NAM members still relevant and sustainable in the present global political system. Some factors like economy,

security, French factor and African policy will continue to shape the multilateral policy of Nigeria in the foreseeable future as most of them are recurrent national issues.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE OUTCOME OF NIGERIA'S MULTILATERAL POLICY

It is crucial to assess the benefits accrued to Nigeria in its initiatives and engagements with multilateral institutions. This chapter examines in its entirety what the country has gained in its policy of multilateralism while at the same time evaluate areas where failures seem to have been recorded. The fundamental adoption of a policy by certain government is based on rationality, which in turn employs to achieve some national goals and objectives. Therefore, if adoption of certain policy cannot guarantee the achievement of intended objectives there is need to re-assess and re-orientate the policy formulation and implementation procedure. Multilateral policy as a foreign policy direction is an integral part of Nigeria's foreign relations, which is geared towards achieving specific national interests. The achievement of the set goals and objectives can be a platform upon which the policy can be assessed. Having said that, the focus of this chapter is to evaluate and assess the Nigeria's multilateral policy in relation to stated goals and objectives.

7.1 SUCCESS OF NIGERIA'S MULTILATERAL POLICY

7.1.1 Debt Forgiveness

In participating in multilateral organisations since independence, the greatest success of Nigerian government is the financial contribution of multilateral organisations to the economic and social development of Nigeria. The multilateral institutions, most especially the UN agencies, have been a source of financing national economy since independence. The earliest attempt on the part of Nigeria to utilize multilateral insti-

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tution in financing domestic economic development predates independence (Obasanjo, 1992). In 1958, Nigeria approached the IMF, one of the agencies of the UN, for developmental loan to construct railway line from central Nigeria to the north in Borno state, the present area where Nigeria suffers the Boko Haram insurgency (Wapmuk & Agbalajobi, 2012:32). In this quest, the IMF granted $28 million and this accelerated the pace at which Nigeria industries were catching up with other states in the early parts of independence (Wapmuk and Agbalajobi, 2012:31). The emergence of external borrowing from the multilateral institutions, most especially from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African Development Bank (AfDB), represent an important landmark in the process of debt accumulation in Nigeria.

Although it can be asserted that borrowing from external sources, especially from international institutions, is not that bad if the capital is judiciously harnessed for developmental purpose. Thus, with the initial capital borrowed from the IMF in 1958, Nigerian government was able to construct 1,780 kilometers of railway lines which served as initial boost to the transportation of people and goods from the southern part of Nigeria to the north and vice versa (Obasanjo, 1992). Also in the early 1960s, Nigeria borrowed from the IMF in order to finance the construction of hydropower station in Northern part of the country. From this fund, Kanji Dam was finally constructed to supply electricity to the entire country (Obasanjo, 1992). In other words, the multilateral institution served as the medium to access fund for national development in the early days of independence. Nigerian former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, establishes that,

> …countries like Nigeria depended on the external environment for the implementation of our first and second development plans after independence. Thus, our own borrowing in Nigeria did not start in 1977 as some people have suggested. To cite two instances, we borrowed for the Kanji Dam, we borrowed for Nigerian Railway extension to men-

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tion a few, all in early sixties but under more favourable terms than in later years (Obasanjo, 1992).

The government subsequently resulted to borrowing even when Nigerian economy was in good shape in the early part of 1970s (Nwoke, 1996:124). In order to avoid abusive use of multilateral creditor institutions the military government came up with promulgation of a decree which allowed Nigeria to limit its external borrowing to $1billion in 1970 (Wapmuk & Agbalajobi, 2012:32). In 1977 this amount skyrocketed when another decree was promulgated to allow Nigerian government to source for external borrowing up to $3billion (Daily Independent, April 23, 2012). By 1980, Nigeria's debt amounted to $13 billion and it coincided with the Mexico open declaration of 1982, which declared that it could not repay her debt to the IMF (Adofu & Abula, 2010:24). It was during this Latin American economic crisis that Nigeria submitted a proposal to borrow from IMF. Given the fact that the IMF was financially stressed up on the failure of debtors to repay their debts, Nigeria's request was turn down (Nwoke, 1996:124-125). The accumulation of Nigerian debts climaxed in 1985 when Nigerian government under Ibrahim Babangida government applied for another loan from the IMF to finance the plummeting domestic economy (Anwu, 1992:3).

It should be stressed that various Nigerian governments for decades renege on their promise to repay back the loan while the debt servicing was ongoing. By the time Obasanjo administration assumed position in 1999, Nigeria's external debt has risen to $18 billion and by 2004, it has reached $32 billion (Obasanjo, 2005). In this debt quagmire, Nigerian government under President Obasanjo decided to launch a national and multilateral campaign for debt cancellation in the IMF. In doing this, Nigeria carried along all members of ECOWAS and AU who were also affected by the debt burden (AFRODAD, 2007). President Obasanjo in 2004 therefore estab-

lished national working committee that will work with him on the need for cancellation of the Nigerian debt. Earlier in 1990s Obasanjo has decried the manner with which the international community handled sub-Saharan African debt issues.

> ….There was occasions when creditors offered forgiveness to a debtor just because the sovereign debtor was finding it difficult to meet her obligations. In these instances, debt cancellation came as a result of political expediency rather than commercial necessity. In this category will be the debts of Germany in the 1930s, those of Great Britain immediately after the World War II, as well as the most recent examples of Poland and Egypt… (Obasanjo, 1992).

It should be noted that the Obasanjo government had earlier suggested to the World Bank in 1999 on the need to cancel Nigerian debt so as to pave way for domestic economic and social reengineering (Akinterinwa, 2005:102). Obasanjo stated that, "the amount devoted since 1980s in servicing the debt was more than double the debt itself" (Obasanjo, 2005). In this way the Obasanjo government established Debt Management Office (DMO) and other relevant agencies to ensure the campaign was successful (Alli, 2006). With the intensification in the campaign using Commonwealth and UN forums, Nigerian succeeded in 2005 in which 60% of its debt was written off by World Bank and other creditors like Paris Club and London Club (Adofu & Abula, 2010).

This is an important landmark in the history of Nigeria's multilateral engagements as the cancellation of the debt enables Nigerian government to divert its attention and resources to domestic issues. Wapmuk & Agbalajobi (2012) observe that, "the reduction in Nigeria's debt stock, and the corresponding reduction in foreign debt servicing, freed up critical resources needed for sustainable development" (p.37). It is also need to be stressed that,

> Government was able to save US$1 billion a year- with US$750 million in savings for the Federal Government, and a sum total of US$250 million to the state governments. The savings, which was referred to as 'debt relief funds', was channeled into critical sectors and projects

such as provision of 4000km of rural roads, 166 new primary health centres across the country, 400,000 insecticide-treated bed nets, a million doses of anti-malarial medicines, and training of 145,000 teachers amongst others (Wapmuk & Agbalajobi 2012:37)

It is thus right to assert that this milestone achievement is made possible because of Nigeria's close rapport and influence in the UN to court the friendship of some powerful countries in the organisation. Before the debt cancellation, some Nigerians were skeptical about the position of France on this and Nigeria was surprised to discover that the Chirac Administration was helpful to Nigerian in the UN (Gambari, 2005: 201-202). Thus, nearly all members of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the UN contributed in no small measure in the partial cancellation of Nigerian debt by the World Bank.

7.1.2 Loan and Financial Assistance

Nigeria benefited from participation in the multilateral organizations by attracting loans and financial assistance to finance strategic national projects. Much assistance has been rendered to Nigeria through multilateral project funding of which the rural populace benefits. One of such assistance came from AfDB in 2009 when a total of 562 motorcycles and 248 bicycles were distributed to farmers in five states in Nigeria (Daily Trust, August 31, 2009). Those states that benefitted from this assistance are located in northern part of the country where agriculture is the dominant occupation. The programme was sponsored in order to boost the security and standard of living of the rural dwellers in these states (Nigerian Bulletin, 2009). In its quest to boost Nigerian financial sector, AfDB also went ahead to support the Nigeria's public and private enterprises. One of such attempts was the granting of the United Bank for Africa (UBA) in Nigeria the sum of $150 million loans as one of the initiatives to promote regional development in Africa (Daily Trust, July 16, 2009). Such loan was the

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largest of its kind in the history of AfDB. Other Nigerian banks also received loans from AfDB (see Table 7.1 below).

Table 7.1
Nigeria's Loan from AfDB

S/N	Bank	Amount(million dollar)
1	Access bank plc	35
2	Zenith bank plc	170
3	Intercontinental bank plc	100
4	Guaranty trust bank plc	40
5	Fidelity bank plc	18

(**Source:**Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Policy, 2009).

Apart from this, a total amount of $185 million was also approved for the toll road project in Lagos and Nigerian liquefied natural gas project (Daily Trust, July 26, 2009). The loan was made possible mainly because of Nigeria's active role in the AU and the UN in order to ensure that public and private sector economies are properly financed to boost Nigerian economy. Nigeria also attracted loans and assistance from the UN agencies. In 2009, through UNDP for community development, a total of $24 million was spent in Ondo State, Nigeria to assist in developing the state (Nigerian Bulletin, September 2009). Furthermore, a total amount of $250,000 was awarded to Nigerian Federal polytechnic, Kwara state, in order to upgrade the facilities in the campus environment (Nigerian Tribune, August 28, 2008).

In the area of health, World Health Organisation (WHO) and United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) approved $119million to curb child-maternal mortality rate in Kwara State, Nigeria (The Nation, July 22, 2009). According to the UN, the state was affected in 2008 with high mortality rate and this propelled the WHO and UNICEF to present the case to the UN and it was based on the situation report that the fund was raised to alleviate the incidence of child mortality rate in the state (UNDP, 2008). Furthermore, in order to control the high incidence of influenza in Nigeria, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) also approved $4.5 million

for the procurement of equipment to control Avian Influenza in Nigeria (The Guardian, September 17, 2009). Some of the equipment procured was motorcycles, sampling materials, disinfectant, and other related materials. According to Dr. Tesfai Tseggai, the Chief Technical Adviser and Team Leader of the FAO's Emergency Centre for Trans Boundary Animal Diseases, "the items were to support the state in sustaining surveillance, facilitating fast delivery of samples and promoting biosecurity" (The Guardian, September 17, 2009).

WHO also collaborated with Nigerian government in the fight against Ebola Virus, a disease that pervades the West African sub-region. In containing the deadly disease in West Africa, Nigeria, UNICEF and WHO collaborated and the disease were eventually eliminated in Nigeria in matter of few months, while the fight continues to make the same success in other parts of west African countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea (WHO, 2014). This is in fact a success story for WHO in West Africa because it is assumed that if Nigeria could not get rid of Ebola quickly, it may become a disaster because of Nigeria's population and city of Lagos which is an overcrowded urban area. Thus, Nigerian government has benefitted immensely in terms of financial assistance in its engagement with multilateral institutions.

7.1.3 Peacekeeping Remittance

Nigeria also benefit financially through multilateral peacekeeping in the UN. The multilateral peacekeeping operation in Nigeria's foreign policy started in the Congo shortly after independence and it has been a source of foreign exchange earnings to Nigerian government since (Sule, 2013:16). It should be noted that the multilateral peacekeeping operation in the ECOWAS and OAU/AU is attributable to the hegemonic aspiration of Nigeria in the global politics where the finance is usually borne

by Nigerian government. That of the UN is two-fold: Serving as source of income and also a means to promote its leadership aspiration in the global politics (Adeniji, 2005:2). Nigeria's participation in the UN Peace and Security Operations (PSO) serves as source of revenue to the government in many ways. First, the reimbursement collected from the military hardware and equipment used in the various mission areas are utilized to procure new military equipment for Nigerian military (Onuorah, 2013). Therefore, the obsolete equipment is expected to be replaced by the new ones, and reimbursement is also received from the UN on food items, clothing, medicine, and logistics.

Troops are also paid monthly allowances and this depends on the number of troops a country supply to a mission (Sule, 2013:35). In the UN, Nigeria is one of the largest troops-contributing nations in the world and this suggests that the amount the Nigerian government will be getting from rendering this service is significant to the national revenue generation. For example, the amount Nigerian government received on equipment within 1999 and 2000 for its operation in UNAMSIL amounted to $798,063 which is a substantial amount by African standard (Inemenen, 2008:7). According to the UN (1996), each personnel is paid $1,349 by the UN and the money is always paid directly to the Nigerian government. In this case, Nigeria government pays each troop $600 which suggests that on each troop contributed to the UN mission, Nigerian government gains $734 (Reuben, 2008:6). It needs to be stated here that there is no fixed amount being paid by the UN to peacekeeping nations, it varies from one country and operation to another. For example, in Liberian mission, each troop was paid $1000 per month, this means that the Nigerian government will decide what to be its revenue through the well standard procedure laid down (Onuorah, 2013).

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The above analysis thus nullifies popular belief that the participation of Nigeria in the PSO in the UN is a waste of the country's finance. Many Nigerians are not aware that government benefits from mobilizing Nigerian troops to the UN and it is the responsibility of the government and the media to sensitize people on this in order to reduce the intensity with which the public criticize the Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping in the UN. It is only when it comes to the continental peacekeeping under the AU and the ECOWAS that Nigeria normally choose to shoulder responsibility of peacekeeping (see Chapter Four). Thus, contrary to popular opinion, the Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping operation is a source of revenue for Nigerian government.

7.1.4 **Multilateral Peacekeeping as Proxy for Capacity Building**

The regular mobilization of Nigerian soldiers to the war and conflict zones has become a mechanism for federal government to expose its military and police officers to the international standard operation (Olofinmuagun, 1995). It is assumed that the domestic training may not be adequate for the combatants and exposing them to military operation within the international system may equip Nigerian forces with better skills. Also, meeting with their peers from other parts of the globe expose them to the best practices required of military operation (Sule, 2013:28). According to Akande (2013), the constant international exposure of Nigerian military men is seen as a way to acquire more operational skill and technique, which the home government may be unaware of. The Nigerian government is well aware of the fact that the military technology is constantly changing and exposing Nigeria to global multilateral peacekeeping operation may allow them to learn the up-to-date handling of the new military technology available in contemporary global system. Since 1960, Nigeria has been

gained this high-level skill by making the best use of UN training in the field of peace and security (Ogaba, 2000). According to PSO, Abuja (2001), in the whole of Africa, Nigeria's military ranks best in ground operation (Adebajo, 2002:46).

This however can be explained in terms of years of experience and exposure in the international system and such experience has been displayed in the continental and domestic arena. In the Liberian civil war, for example, the unilateral sponsoring of ECOWAS operations became successful not only because of financial clout but also because of experience in the international peacekeeping (Onuorah, 2013). The way Nigeria handles regional security operations is reminiscent of its multilateral peacekeeping experience for decades in the UN and various Nigerian leaders are quite aware of this advantage over other African countries. As a result, apart from financial benefits, multilateral peacekeeping operation also serves as field training for Nigerian military and police personnel.

Nigeria also recorded another success in the area of getting free training for some officials in the fight against drugs in Nigeria. The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) recognised the strategic importance of Nigeria in its campaign against drug trafficking and crime in Africa. The UNODC representative to Nigeria Mrs. Mariam Sissoko stated that five clandestine laboratories where drugs are produced from methamphetamine have been revealed to them (Oshegale, 2013). She thus warned that the countries who serve as transiting point for drug also stand the risk of getting their population caught in drug usage locally. In assessing the situation in Nigeria, the UN volunteered to train 200 Nigerian Drug and Law Enforcement Agencies (NDLEA) staff to monitor the progress of drug trafficking and abuse in Nigeria (Oshegale, 2013). In effect, the Nigeria government appreciated this gesture and those 200 officials have undergone training under the UNODC to boost the

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capacity of the NDLEA to fight drug abuse not only in Nigeria but also across West Africa (Olajuwon, 2013). This has been a success for Nigerian government to expose its NDLEA staff to the best training available on dealing with drug abuse in Nigeria. Those officers trained by the UN have become the backbone of NDLEA to arrest the menace of drug in Nigeria (Oseghale 2013)**.**

7.1.5 **Maintenance of Peace and Security in Africa**

One of the greatest breakthroughs of Nigeria in its multilateral policy is the ability to maintain peace and stability in Africa since independence. Although the overall results may not be that favourable but in terms of its input in the area of peace in Africa, Nigeria has made tremendous progress. The first attempt was in Congo and subsequently the continent has become a platform for Nigeria to display its norm and morality in the area of maintaining peace and order (Okolo, 1988:71). Dr. Bolarinwa, a research fellow at NIIA stressed "this is the area where Nigeria has scored high in its multilateral policy. If one considers the financial and material commitments to peacemaking both in Africa and the entire globe, Nigeria is second to none in Africa" (Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). Since Africa has been declared as the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy, it is customary and natural that the greatest achievement is recorded in Africa, most especially in the area of peace and order. As enumerated in Chapter Five, one of the main factors of Nigeria's multilateral policy is security and this has been relatively achieved in the continent since independence.

The records of Nigeria in the area of peace and security in Africa is recognized globally most especially by the US, Britain, France and Japan (Akande, 2013). Some of these countries have collaborated at one time or the other to assist Nigeria in maintaining peace and order in Africa. One of such is the role played by France in

Mali to complement the effort of ECOWAS in maintaining order in Mali (Oyedele, 2012). Also, in Liberia, the maintenance of peace and security propelled Nigerian government to sponsor the establishment of ECOMOG which later assisted by Britain and the US. The same ECOMOG was instrumental in keeping peace and order in Sierra Leone together with Britain and the US. The success of Nigerian in the area of maintaining peace and order through multilateral organisations have been given priority in Chapter Four and Five and there is no need of going into detail here. In short, in ECOWAS and OAU/AU, Nigeria is a principal actor in the making of peace and order in countries like South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Somalia, Chad, Mali, and Niger (Salami, 2014:28). Nigeria's presence is felt in almost all corners of Africa in the area of maintaining peace and order through international organisations and in this way Nigerian territorial integrity has been relatively saved for decades until the issue of Boko Haram emerged. The idea is that if all African countries could live in harmony and peace then Nigerian security will also be guaranteed (Gambari, 2005:189).

In a related development, when Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars were ongoing Nigeria was compelled to establish a refugee camp in Oru, Ogun State, Nigeria to accommodate the refugees so that they will not complicate the already worsen situation in those countries (This Day, June 28, 2007). The refugee camp became necessary in order to ensure that these refugees did not pose security threat to other parts of Africa (Ugwuegbu, 2001). Thus, most of these refugees have been integrated into Nigerian system and some of them do not even intend to go back to Liberia and Sierra Leone after 17 years (This Day, June 28, 2007). Nigerian government enrolled some of them in local schools while some of them enrolled in some technical schools to become artisan (Adebayo, 2014:30).

While country like the US withdrew from Somalia debacle when some of its citizens were violently murdered, Nigeria in contrast suffered the worst casualties in Liberia and Sierra Leone lost about 700 soldiers in Sierra Leone alone but remained determined until peace and stability were maintained in both countries (the Guardian, June 20, 2011). This has also become an issue-area where Nigeria recorded diplomatic success incomparable to most regional powers within the global arena. Therefore, the records of Nigerian in the area of maintaining peace, stability, and security in Africa are unmatched by any other African countries since 1960. In other words, Nigeria has recorded tremendous success and it has boosted the image of Nigeria among the international community and virtually all the issues which relate to Africa receive Nigeria's blessing in any multilateral organisation.

7.1.6 **International Image Boosting**

Another success recorded by Nigeria in its multilateral undertaking is the promotion of its credentials in the global politics. Ever since independence, Nigeria by virtue of its position in Africa signifies by population, big economy and resource endowment has been trying to promote its image within the global politics. Hence, its participation in most of the multilateral organisations has enhanced its image and helped it to promote its interests on the global stage (Osuntokun, 2005:46). In the OAU/AU and ECOWAS, Nigeria's active participation has promoted Nigeria's credentials in the UN. As Africa is seeking for UNSC permanent seat of at least two, it is highly expected that Nigeria will occupy one of the two seats if the request is approved. Nigeria has just served another tenure on UNSC, ended on December 31st, 2015. This marked 5th time Nigeria has occupied the UNSC non-permanent seat. All these

achievement is further supported by ECOWAS and AU members (The Guardian, October 18, 2013).As Professor Bola Akinterinwa succinctly puts it,

> The multilateral policy has boosted the image of Nigeria in the global politics to the extent that there are some positions in the UN that we do not need to contest before we are considered. Now we are the de facto leader of Africa alongside South Africa in the global politics. We are invited anytime anything goes wrong anywhere in Africa. The Libyan case best describes my point…(Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015).

Thus, the clamour for the restructuring of the UNSC has been ongoing for some years now primarily because of the interest of some actors who constantly advertise the need for the enlargement of UNSC (Ojeme, 2013). India first raised the issue of UNSC reform in 1979 at the General Assembly in which Nigeria co-sponsored at the 34th Session of the General Assembly; the question of the reform did not gather momentum until the 48th Session of the General Assembly (Gambari, 2005:195).Thus, Nigeria has employed the AU and ECOWAS forum to secure non-permanent membership of UNSC five times (1966–1967, 1978– 1979, 1994–1995, 2010–2011, 2014 – 2015). This makes it the most frequent and experienced of all African countries in the UN (Adedoja, 2011).Nigeria in this case has been using its membership of UNSC to promote its own national interest agenda. Ibrahim Gambari, the former representative of Nigeria to the UN surmises that,

> …during Nigeria's tenure in the UNSC, she had the privilege of presiding over the adoption of the historic Resolution 242 on the Middle East problem….Nigeria also participated in the adoption of Resolution 435 on Namibia which underpinned the terms for the attainment of Namibia's independence (Gambari, 2005:190).

It should be noted that successive Nigerian administrations have been trying to promote some of these credentials in the regional and global multilateral organisations in order to cling to the UNSC permanent position if eventually restructured.

One of the credentials advertised by Nigeria is population (Adedoja, 2013). Successive Nigerian governments have asserted that if truly the UN promotes equality then it is significant that they consider the application of Nigeria because it is the largest black nation in the world and has connection with black race in the Americas, Europe and Africa (Adeniji, 2005:2). Dr. Bamanga Tukur, the former National Chairman of the then Nigeria's ruling party, People's Democratic Party, asserts that "Nigeria ranked high among the countries jostling for membership of the UNSC being a regional power and largest black country in the world", he adds, "our rating is very high as a regional leader" (Quoted in Fabiyi, 2013). The Nigerian government asserts that all the permanent representatives of UNSC are "white" which indicates that the society is a "white club" without any black representation (Adeniji, 2005:3). In this case, Nigeria will be in a better position to represent Africa if the UNSC needs black representation.

There is intense competition at present from the continent most especially from Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, and Ethiopia. Only Egypt can compete with Nigeria in this case but this has been well argued by Nigerian government and officials that Egypt does not culturally and racially represent African continent (Ojeme, 2013). Ambassador Suleiman Dhairu stresses, "after democratization and change of membership of the UNSC…Nigeria…should represent Africa and Egypt representing the Middle East and Arab World" (Quoted in Ojeme, 2013). Many Nigerian scholars are of the view that Egypt is Afro-Asiatic country and should go and compete with Arab slot if there is any. It is assumed that if Egypt is considered instead of Nigeria, then, it will represent Arabs rather than black Africans. The same argument goes for South Africa. In terms of international exposure, South Africa is very new mainly because of the apartheid for which Nigeria has helped in liberating

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(Akinboye, 2005:213). It needs to be stressed here that South Africa does not repre-sent only African indigenous population but also the white race of European ances-try. Therefore, it may not represent the black sub-Saharan African people. In addi-tion, it is argued that despite recent performance of South Africa in the international politics, Nigeria is still in the better position for the African slot (Gambari, 2011). In this way, the Nigerian government has increasingly using multilateral organizations to promote its image in this direction.

7.1.7 **Economic Advancement**

One of the most important factors that dictate Nigeria's multilateral policy is econo-my, which has been dealt with in Chapter Five. Application of multilateral policy as a mechanism of promoting its economic interest in the global stage, Nigeria has rec-orded some achievements especially in connection with ECOWAS. Before the for-mation of ECOWAS in 1975, Nigeria has engaged itself in some steps that would advance its domestic economic interest in the global arena. In the first instance, Ni-geria's economy was basically backward by modern global standard and therefore could not compete favorably with industrialized countries. Therefore, Nigeria opted for regional economic integration in Africa. The first step taken in this direction was the need to advance the collective interest of African economy, which began, with the leading of African negotiation with EEC in 1973 (Aluko, 1983:84). Osuntokun (2005:41) states, "whenever Nigeria found a forum, whether in the non-aligned con-ferences, the OAU, ECOWAS, the Commonwealth and the UN, economic concern and pre-occupation dominated our declarations and speeches".

It is of interest to elaborate more on the issue of Nigeria and the EEC because it defined the final faith of ECOWAS formation in 1975. Earlier in 1971, the EEC

countries were trying to reduce tariff for goods and services that came from Africa as most of their exports were primary products (Ogunsawo, 2005:202). The EEC thus wanted to enter into negotiation with African countries of which Nigeria was an important actor. The then Nigerian Commissioner for Trade, Wenike Briggs, was of the view that joining of the negotiation with other African countries would be of benefit to Nigeria in order to motivate the west African countries in the formation of ECO-WAS (Aluko, 1983:85). Some Nigerians who worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Economic Development were of the conviction that the economic negotiation with the EEC was not beneficial to Nigerian economy in any way. One of the arguments against the negotiation was that Nigeria did not rely on agricultural product as 80% of its export came from oil and its agricultural export to European market was less than 10% of which Nigeria could not benefit from Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d' Exportation (STABEX) arrangement (Wright, 1998:139). The STABEX arrangement was based on the idea that those African countries whose export to European market constitute over 10% of agricultural products will benefit from tariff reduction. According to Ogunsawo (2005:203) "as long as Nigeria did not fall under this categorization it made no sense to join the economic negotiation with EEC". At last in 1975, through appraisal and assessment of the regional economic cooperation, Nigeria decided to lead the OAU members to negotiate with the EEC. Olajide Aluko argues further,

> in terms of direct monetary benefits, Nigeria did not expect much. On the contrary Nigeria government saw its decision to participate in the negotiation as a way to promote African unity and reduce economic… balkanization (Aluko, 1983).

Another senior official in the negotiations, Dr. Olu Sanu, observed that "history might also record that Nigeria's act of solidarity with African states was a major contribution towards the goal of African unity and inter-African economic coopera-

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tion" (Sanu, 1980). It needs to be stated here that the negotiation was led by Nigeria purely to secure favourable trade relation between Africa and Europe which has gone down in the history as one of the earliest successes in Nigeria's multilateral policy. The negotiation has proved to be useful in Nigeria's economy as Nigeria has grown to be the largest EU trading partner in the West African sub-region (Akinterinwa, 2005:94). For details, see Table 7.2 and 7.3 which highlights the recent trading relation between the EU and ECOWAS member states.

Table 7.2
ECOWAS-EU Trade Investment Statistics

	2000	2005	2009	2010	Growth rate 2009/2010	Annual average growth rate 2009/2010	Shares in total Extra EU-27 imports (2010)	Shares in Eu-27 imports from Africa (2010)	Shares in Eu-27 Import From ECO-WAS (2010)
ECOWAS	11561	13738	16496	21169	26.3%	6.2%	1.41%	15.83%	100.00%
Benin	81	33	31	31	0.5%	-9.1%	0.00%	0.02%	0.15%
Burkina Faso	70	30	82	99	20.5%	3.6%	0.01%	0.07%	0.47%
Cape Verde	13	19	27	36	35.0%	11.0%	0.0%	0.03%	0.17%
Gambia	32	6	11	18	61.4%	-5.6%	0.0%	0.01%	0.09%
Ghana	1 173	978	1097	1 458	32.9%	2.2%	0.10%	1.09%	6.89%
Guinea	523	445	384	472	22.9%:	-1.0%	0.03%	0.35%:	2.23%
GuineaBissau	5	3	2	6	143.5%	1.2%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%
Ivory Coast	2 059	1 978	3 054	3 215	5.3%	4.6%	0.21%	2.41%	15.19%
Liberia	435	926	533	341	-35.9%	-2.4%	0.02%	0.26%	1.61%
Mali	76	42	20	27	34.5%	-9.8%	0.00%	0.02%	0.13%
Niger	95	130	219	196	-10.6%	7.5%	0.01%	0.15%	0.93%
Nigeria	6491	8 389	1041	14 592	40.1%	8.6%	0.97%	10.91%	68.93%
Senegal	410	521	261	297	13.5%	-3.2%	0.02%	0.22%	1.40%
Sierra Leone	105	121	100	159	59.5%	4.3%	0.01%	0.12%	0.75%
Togo	65	116	258	221	-14.4%	12.9%	0.01 %	0.17%	1.04%

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The table above reveals that the bulk of EU imports from ECOWAS member states are from Nigeria, which would have otherwise difficult if Nigeria did not sponsor the negotiation of ACP-EU in 1973. Although it may be right to assert that since oil forms 80% of merchandise export to EU from Nigeria, it is expected that Nigeria forms the single largest trading partner of EU in West Africa.

It is of interest to note that Nigeria as economic powerhouse of Africa promote regional economic integration in order to enhance its economic productivity in Africa and most especially within the West African sub region (The Guardian, October 30, 2010). After successful formation of ECOWAS in 1975, the trade relationship between Nigerian and its West African counterparts have been on the upsurge. Nigerian successfully launched Free Trade Agreement, ECOWAS Common Currency, Custom Union, and promotion of the free movement of the people across West African countries (The Nation, December 30, 2010).In addition, the successful adoption of Lagos Plan of Action after the economic summit, which propagated and promoted common market among African countries in 1980 led to the adoption of collective self-reliance and regional integration. This in turn boosted Nigeria's confidence in West Africans markets (Nwoke, 2005:123). Thus, because of nature of Nigerian economy, which is based on the oil export, Nigeria records trade surplus with ECOWAS, EU, and AU member states. Below is the recent summary of Nigeria's trade relations with the aforementioned blocs.

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Table 7.3

Selected Trade Partners for Nigeria (2009-2012) (Data Given in Thousands of USD)

	2009	2010	2011	2012
Import from AU	2416245	2911749	2920450	1566375
Export to AU	8510888	10494748	13092447	21022001
Trade Balance	1017028	5327757	10215305	14164371
Import from EU	7799669	9658924	15642145	8356760
Export to EU	11203780	19406833	35759834	50998444
Trade balance	3404111	9747909	20117689	42641684
Import from ECOWAS	71631	182836	753499	151833
Export to ECOWAS	2151288	2044825	3579659	5545051
Trade balance	2079657	1861989	2826160	5393218

(Source: International Trade Centre (2014))

It needs to be reiterated that the favorable balance of trade surplus between Nigeria, ECOWAS and AU members signifies the success Nigeria has attained in its multilateral policy in economic sphere. Although one may wonder why ECOWAS members' export to Nigeria is comatose in relation to imports, it should be stressed that majority of ECOWAS member states are mono-product economy and the political economy of the region is not complementary but competitive in nature (Nwoke, 2005:124). Apart from surplus trade relation with AU and ECOWAS members, Nigeria also enjoins the investment climate of ECOWAS and AU members based on the signing of Protocol relating to trade relation among the ECOWAS and AU members (The Nation, June 19, 2013). Such protocol enhances Nigeria to boost its investment in other parts of Africa. In fact, Nigerian Ambassador to Ghana, Ademola Oluseyi, affirms that any trade dispute that may arise between Nigerians in Ghana can be settled by ECOWAS Protocol amicably (Business News, September 23, 2014). By ECOWAS and AU protocols, Nigerian investment in African countries has grown steadily over years. In his word, Mr. George Aboagye, Chief Executive Officer of Ghana Investment Promotion lamented that there were 17 Nigerian firms operating in Ghana at present and their total capital amounted to $1.5 billion between

1994 and 2011 (The Nation, August 14, 2014). In a similar reaction, the Chief Executive Officer also stresses that,

> the regional integration of which Nigeria is a prime factor has yielded considerably for Nigerians in some African countries as most Nigerian banks and other private investors are eyeing countries like Ghana, Togo, Zambia and Rwanda.

Nigeria is among the five top investors in Rwanda and investment in cement, building materials, concrete products, insurance, banking, petroleum and real estate are the areas where Nigeria dominate market in other parts of Africa (Tetenyi, 2014). Ademola Oluseyi, the Nigerian ambassador to Ghana, also stated that seven Nigerian banks are now in operation in Ghana. They are United Bank for Africa, First Atlantic Bank, Zenith Bank, Access Bank, Equity Assurance, Regency Alliance, and NEM Insurance. He also stressed that the Nigerian investment totaled $2 billion in Ghana alone in 2014 (Sun News, September 16, 2014). Other Nigerian companies operating in African countries are Dangote Groups, African Petroleum, Oando and SO Energy (Business News, September 23, 2014). Unipetrol also operates in Sierra Leone, Togo and Ghana where it dominates the 70% of Sierra Leonean terminal tankage and also secured five retails outlets in Togo (The Guardian, September 18, 2002). In essence, Nigeria's multilateral policy has paved the way for reliable investment climate in some African countries.

7.1.8 Nigeria's Democratic Consolidation as a Commonwealth Member

One of the enduring objectives of the Commonwealth Secretariat has been to support the promotion of human rights in Commonwealth member states. Nigeria as a democratic nation is identified itself with the Commonwealth. This is in view of the organization's role towards restoring Nigeria to democracy in 1999, which led to the

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emergence of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as democratic President. This development would be impossible without the contribution of the Commonwealth. This no doubt increased Commonwealth's dignity and its competence in the eyes of the international community (Ojo, 2013:17). Thus, human rights issue has not only become a global concern but there are also urgent steps aimed at protecting and promoting human rights globally. As such, it is an international issue of concern. In Nigeria, little attention is given to human rights issues. The impact of the Commonwealth in the process of human rights promotion among its members and Nigeria in particular, cannot be over-emphasized. The beginning of the Commonwealth could be traced back to the early 19th Century, with credit to Roseberry who was is said to be the first person who used the term in 1884 in Australia of which she described 'British Empire as a Commonwealth of Nations (Adebanwi, 2004:768).

There are two important documents relating to human rights promotion by Commonwealth. This includes Singapore Declaration of 1971 and the Harare Declaration of 1991. Singapore Declaration was signed on 22nd January, 1971 which was issued at Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Singapore Declaration contained 14 Declarations of which all the member countries in the Commonwealth were committed to comply to the principles as stipulated in the organizational charter. Six principles are clearly stated in the charter namely Protection of human rights of the Commonwealth citizens in member states, respect of race, languages, tribes, religion, sectionalism and artificial hatred. It could also be noted that Singapore Declaration has re-structured and make Commonwealth exceptional in its great contribution and impact on the human rights protection (Anyaoku, 2011:502). Similarly, Harare Declaration of 1991 is also another important document of the or-

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ganization, which was issued on 20th October, 1991 in Harare, Zimbabwe by the CHOGM. The Harare Declaration contained 13 declarations.

The importance of Nigerian membership in the Commonwealth from independence to date could be seen as one of the great development in the historical development of Nigeria, with regard to the role played by the Commonwealth in maintaining the territorial integrity of Nigeria as a nation. This is because, the organization had significantly prevented Nigeria from disintegration particularly during the so-called Biafra crisis under the leadership of Major General Yakubu Gowon (Odomovo, 2014: 48). Nigerian crises of the 1960s resulted in the loss of lives and property. The Commonwealth was the first international organization that attempted to provide a platform for peaceful resolution before the outbreak of Nigerian civil war. Moreover, Arnold Smith, Secretary-General of the organization, organized first peace meeting between Government of Nigeria and the leaders of the movement for the emancipation of Biafra which was held in 1966 in Kampala, Uganda (Ofoegbu, 2013:68). In the same vein, the role played by Commonwealth in the prevention of Nigerian crisis could be seen as one of the great achievements of the organization in human rights protection and in member states. It needs to be stated here that Smith strived to prevent the outbreak of Biafra crisis at three stages namely early 1967, mid 1967 and early 1968. Some Commonwealth staff were sent to Nigeria to mediate between the warring factions. These included Emeka Anyaoku, Yaw Addua and Hugh Springer all in an effort to prevent Nigeria from disintegration (Akhaine, 2013:209.). Thus, despite effort made by the Commonwealth for the prevention of Biafra war, Biafra as a state was eventually declared in 1967 and led to 30 months war.

7.1.9 **Diplomatic Achievements**

Nigeria has recorded much success in the area of diplomatic negotiations in the multilateral institutions. For a country that believes in employing multilateralism in promoting its credentials in the global politics, it is expected that such country might have accumulated enough experience that will serve as leverage in its negotiation bid in multilateral organisations. In the UN, because of its years of experience in the peacekeeping and peacemaking in the international engagement, Nigeria has secured accreditation of its Peacekeeping Training Centre as one of the UN centres for training would-be peacekeeping forces from any part of the globe, most especially African countries (This Day, February 16, 2004). In 2010, the final accreditation letter was issued in recognition of the quality of training Nigeria provided for its soldiers that participate in the peacekeeping operations since independence (The Guardian, September 21, 2010). The centre is located on Nigerian soil in Jaji, Kaduna. Since its establishment in 2010, many African countries have been sending their military officers for training in the centre and such group training, has strengthened cordial relationship between Nigeria and some African countries.

Furthermore, since 2009, terrorist attack has been rampant within Nigeria and its neighbours. Consequent upon the removal of Gaddafi of Libya in 2011, there had been intense upsurge in the proliferation of small and light weapons in the West Africa of which Nigeria does not have control. In this case, the UN becomes an important avenue for Nigeria to clamour for the need to block arms leakage to Nigeria and its neighbouring countries (The Guardian, May 8, 2014). Thus, Nigeria scored diplomatic goal when the UN eventually blocked all sources of terrorist funding in Nigeria. It is believed that the blocking of funding may well starve the terrorist organization of fund to procure necessary weapon to propagate their dreadful campaign

(Nigerian Tribune, March 31, 2014). In ECOWAS and AU, Nigeria has successfully employed the forum to declare war on terror in Nigeria and other parts of Africa where terrorist organization operates. In 2014, at Extra Ordinary Meeting in Accra, Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, utilised the opportunity of the meeting to campaign for the need to declare war on terror in Nigeria, Mali, and Guinea Bissau (The Guardian, June 1, 2014). It was in fact a diplomatic breakthrough for Jonathan to act in coalition with other members of ECOWAS in its fight against terrorist groups. The AU and ECOWAS members together have contributed 7,500 troops to declare war on Boko Haram terror group (Vanguard, February 2, 2015). Therefore, it is the diplomatic maneuvering of Nigeria in the ECOWAS and AU that endeared the members to cooperate with Nigeria as it was becoming difficult for Nigeria to face the terror group unilaterally. This is because, the terror group has assumed regional dimension, which may be difficult for a state to tackle effectively (Premium Times, January 17, 2015).

It was in this respect that Nigeria led over 193 members in the UN towards the adoption of UN Programme of Action (POA) on eradication of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Subsequent upon Nigerian Permanent Representative to the UN, Professor Joy Ogwu, was nominated as the President of the conference that debated the need for the eradication of illicit arms trade (The Guardian, January 22, 2013). The adoption of the programme has been majorly described as the diplomatic triumph for Nigeria in the UN (The Guardian, September 9, 2012). The German Delegation to the Conference, Deltev Wolter, writes,

> Nigeria had arrived at the Zenith of its diplomatic glory with the successful handling of the conference. Nigeria has now become the golden child of the UN Disarmament programme, and all eyes will now be on it….Most European and Western countries who have developed support system for eradication of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, would now be eager to see purposeful programme from Afri-

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ca where these weapons are mostly proliferated that can be supported (Anikulapo, 2012).

Most African and indeed developed countries appraised the diplomatic acumen of Professor Ogwu, a Nigerian, for making the conference a reality for adoption. It is stated that the adoption and campaign against small arms has continuously been blocked by the Latin American and Middle East countries from the onset. Chika Ejinaka, the Director of First United Nations Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, is of the view that "It is now amazing to see that nearly all countries now concur to the adoption of eradication of SALW which is an important landmark in the history of the UN to reduce the incidence of insecurity in the global arena" (the Guardian, September 11, 2012).

Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in the area of free movement of people across ECOWAS countries with the adopting of harmonized international passport in the region. The national passport Nigeria has been using since independence was abandoned for ECOWAS unified one in order to lay a solid foundation for regional integration in Africa. Dr. Abimbola Ogunkelu, the Minister of Cooperation and Integration in Africa surmises that,

> with the introduction of the ECOWAS passports Nigerians could travel to any part of the world with the document which consist of green (ordinary) blue (official) and red (diplomatic) passports….The passport would identify the country of the holder and that the three colours will be used by all ECOWAS members in West Africa….the introduction of ECOWAS passport would further help to minimize the difficulties encountered by ECOWAS citizen in travelling to any part of the sub-region (This day, February 18, 2002).

In 2007, the issuance of the passport began in Nigeria to showcase its readiness to champion the cause of integration in Africa and other African countries has followed suit (The Guardian, July 6, 2007). This is achieved through the diplomatic

ingenuity of Nigeria in ECOWAS. The Director General of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Professor Bola Akinterinwa stated that,

> One of the singular diplomatic triumphs of Nigeria in its multilateral policy is the recent adoption of harmonized international passport across West Africa which is instigated and sponsored by Nigeria without any resistance from all the West African countries. It is in fact one of the several ways to show Nigeria's seriousness in championing the cause of Africa and to show its hegemonic aspiration in the continent (Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015).

All these diplomatic breakthroughs are possible in the light of Nigeria's keen interest in multilateralism.

7.2 FAILURE OF NIGERIA'S MULTILATERAL POLICY

Nigerian government prior to and after gaining independence is a force to be reckoned with in all multilateral institutions in which it involves. Adoption of consistent policy in foreign policy making requires constant evaluation and assessment which may in turn gives room to locating policy discrepancies. Nigeria's activism in various multilateral organisations for over six decades allows scholar to locate policy failure and adjustment area. Despite monumental achievements being recorded by Nigeria in its multilateral undertaking, as discussed in previous sections, its multilateral policy needs adjustment and repositioning in various aspects. These policy failures are discussed in the following sections.

7.2.1 Hostility of the UN and OAU members during Nigerian Civil War

Nigeria's multilateral policy from the earliest period has been geared towards the promotion of African interests in the global politics and also uses such continental arena as a stepping stone for its global diplomatic influence. Despite decades of benevolent gesture to African cause, some countries still do not acknowledge the lead-

ership position of Nigeria in Africa. At times when there is need for Africa to provide leadership in global multilateral institutions like the UN, most do not agree with Nigerian leadership (Alli, 2012:76). Although it may be said that all counties have equal right in the workings of multilateral institutions but it should be reiterated that the commitments and capabilities are not the same. Thus, those states that are advantageously placed in terms of capability perform both financial and moral responsibilities in the multilateral organization and the common sense dictates they are reciprocated and respected as such (Obayuwana, 2013).

It should be stressed at this juncture that the selection of five permanent members of the Security Council after the Second World War was as a result of their efforts of the winning the war. Otherwise, why countries like Italy, Spain, Brazil, Portugal, India, and Turkey were not included in the permanent membership of the UNSC after the Second World War? The exclusion of Japan, Germany, and possibly Italy may be more understandable from the fact that they were humiliated and defeated by allied powers for being an aggressor. The efforts of Britain, the US, USSR and France in the maintenance of global peace and security during and after the Second World War might well explain why they were qualified for such exalted global position. If such matrix still works then Nigeria deserves African cooperation on any global issue.

The first failure of Nigeria's multilateral policy occurred during Nigerian civil war when some OAU members supported the secession of "Biafra" from Nigeria. Despite Nigeria's campaign in the OAU and the UN for indivisibility of Nigeria, countries like Ivory Coast, Benin Republic, Gabon, Tanzania, Zambia, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Equatorial Guinea did not support the cause of one Nigeria in the OAU and their support made it difficult for Nigerian

federal government to easily defeat the secessionist (Daily Times, October 27, 1969). Also, in the UN, some members supported the Biafran cause of which Nigeria had already warned UN members not to interfere (Daily Times, May 1, 1969). The warning turn on deaf ear of some countries including those African countries mentioned and non-African countries like Israel, Haiti, France, Portugal China, Spain, and Vatican city (Delancey, 1983:170). This is a clear failure of Nigeria's multilateral policy despite initial warning and address in the UN by Simeon Adebo, the permanent representative of Nigeria to the UN at the time. The diplomat appealed to the UN members that the issue was basically internal and Nigeria needed the cooperation of the UN member states (Daily Sketch, August 20, 1968).

Eventually in 1969, the UN agreed that the Nigerian civil war was basically an African issue and it would be left to be handled as such (UN, 1969). Despite the UN acceptance of Nigeria's position some countries still went ahead to recognize the state of Biafra. Countries like Portugal, France and Israeli provided technical and military assistance to Biafra in the cause of the crisis (Perham, 1970:241). This was a clear failure on the part of Nigeria to prevent the UN and OAU members from interfering in the internal affairs of the country. After the war, Nigeria was expected to either break diplomatic relations with those countries or severe economic ties with them. Some were even of the conviction that the issue needed to have been debated at the UN and OAU after the successful completion of the war to serve as deterrence to other would-be states in adhering to the strict rules and regulations of non-interference (Ogunbadejo, 1976). It should be stressed here that the war did not affect the relationship Nigeria had with some of the countries that supported Biafran cause. Each country in the international system tries to formulate rational policy that suit its own national interest and this may well explain why state should strive to come up

with best policy. Those countries that supported Biafran cause may have their reason for doing so and in this case it is the country at the receiving end of such policy that needs to re-assess its standing in the global politics.

7.2.2 **Bakassi Border Issues**

It needs to be pointed out that most African countries especially the West African states have been perceived Nigeria's overwhelming power in Africa negativelysince independence. From the diplomatic and political history of Nigeria's relations with its African counterparts, Nigeria has despised using military force against any African countries despite continuous hostility towards Nigeria. The case in point was the Bakassi issue which was largely ceded to Cameroon by the ICJ based on available evidence. Despite Cameroon's provocation and unwarranted killings of Nigerian soldiers and civilians in the border skirmishes, Nigeria did not retaliate and kindly accepted the jurisdiction of the UN on the issue (Akinterinwa, 2005:93). Many scholars and policy commentators have decried the manner by which Nigeria accepted the ICJ ruling without proper assessment of the situation on ground (Etekpe, 2013; Akinterinwa, 2005). It is assumed that Nigeria should consult the inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsular before accepting the decision to cede the territory to Cameroon. Akinterinwa stresses that,

> …taking the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication is a non-solution and therefore a waste of time…For as long as the residents of the disputed peninsular are emphasizing non-preparedness to be part of Cameroon, the ruling of the ICJ cannot be of little or no effect. The principle of self-determination has to prevail. This means that the only feasible and lasting option is to seek political solution to the problem (Akinterinwa, 2005:103).

In 2002, consequent upon the acceptance of the judgement, there had never been any attempt by Cameroonian government to integrate the area and most of the

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people still owe their allegiance to Nigerian government. It may be wrong to shift the whole blame on the Cameroonian government, as the pattern of governance in Africa generally does not give necessary attention to the survival of the citizenry. The problems encounter by the people living in the Bakassi border can be an extension of state failure in Africa and may not adequately explain the failure of Bakassi government. The area is in desperate need of infrastructural facilities that will make life meaningful to the people. This has been described as the gross failure in the way Nigeria handles its multilateral policy. How would one explain such a scenario where Nigeria displayed a lackadaisical attitude towards an issue that is of paramount to its security? The ceding of the territory by Nigeria under Olusegun Obasanjo has been adjudged a failure in the sense that Nigeria did not optimally exploit diplomatic channel in the UN to ensure it did not loss the territorial battle (Akinterinwa, 2005:103). The Chairman of Bakassi Council of Cross River State, Dr. Ekpo Bassey, opines that,

> Incessant attacks by the Cameroonian gendarmes is absolutely not satisfactory….I do not at all satisfied with the way the international community has handled the problem of resettlement. The ceding of Bakassi in the first instance was an unfortunate development, if a territory is ceded, the people were not ceded. They had the option of relocating to this part of Nigeria and we expect that since they have lost their economic base, traditional homes, and certain identities, we thought a lot of things could have done to cushion this effect. So far, the way it is done is actually unsatisfactory. That is why we are afraid the people may themselves become a security threat (Quoted in Eno-Abasi, 2011).

Some scholars are of the view that the peaceful acceptance of the judgement represents a mark of Nigerian leadership position in Africa to ensure the peaceful co-existence among African states (Meierding, 2010). Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that such acceptance must be in consonance with national interest. Dr. Walter Ofonagoro, the former Nigerian Minister of Information, stresses that the territo-

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rial battle was long lost to Cameroon in 1970 when Nigerian Head of State, General Gowon, voluntarily ceded the Bakassi to Cameroon because of the support of the latter in the Nigerian civil war (Vanguard, November 28, 2012). At the time of Gowon's action, the step was applauded by international community and Nigerians alike for Nigeria's concern for peace and harmony among OAU and the UN member states. It needs to be said that Nigerian government should have pre-empted the consequence of Gowon's action in this respect as the subsequent administrations refused to honour the agreement and decided to refer the case to the ICJ (Etekpe, 2013).

However, it should be noted that Nigeria relied too much on the efficacy and perceived neutrality of the international court on the Bakassi border dispute. Akinterinwa bluntly surmises that "…rather than giving military support [to Cameroon] within the framework of the Franco-Cameroonian defence pact, France opted to provide legal assistance to Cameroon at the ICJ" (Akinterinwa, 2005:93). The support received by Cameroon from France and other countries could be responsible for the result of the ICJ Judgement. Therefore, the manner with which Nigeria handled the case resulted in its failure to effectively utilize its position in the OAU and the UN to promote its interest in the Bakassi Peninsular. The ICJ's ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon without proper appreciation of the situation might have resulted in the sufferings of masses in the border. The submission does not suggest that the situation of the people in the border area would be better if Nigeria had been awarded the territory given the manner of governance in the country. All these issues should have been pre-empted and prevented by the UN, Nigeria and Cameroon before the judgement was passed. The Cross River state government, the state administration where Bakassi is located in Nigeria, has been crying for assistance from the UN because of the

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deplorable condition of people living in the area (The Guardian, June 24, 2011). The

Secretary to the State Government, Fidelis Ugbo, lamented that,

> The Bakassi situation is a kind of tsunami ….So far we have done our
> bit. The federal government has also done its best under the circum-
> stance. But what we are driving further is to see how we can assist the
> people to get the UN that was arbiter in this matter to do something
> because if we had tsunami and the whole people stood up to help, the
> Bakassi situation is likened to a kind of tsunami. We expect the inter-
> national community to also help in ensuring that the people are given
> assistance and proper settlement (Guardian, June 24, 2011).

In addition, a former Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of Nigeria, Bo-

la Ajibola, laments that,

> …the ministry of justice, in those years in early 60s, sought for legal
> opinion on this matter and because of what happened in 1913 in An-
> glo-German Agreement, it was since then that we have this uphill task.
> Because it was Britain that ceded the whole of that Bakassi area, well
> entrenched in article 21 and 22 of that agreement, specifically to Ger-
> many. Germany, when it suffered defeat during the Second World
> War, was deprived of that area and Bakassi went to France and it was
> France that gave independence to Cameroon and that was how Came-
> roon got into it (Adefaka, 2012).

Thus, the case presented above is not intended to provide holistic picture of

what transpired between Nigeria and Cameroon on the border dispute. It is presented

briefly here as a case of Nigeria's multilateral policy failure. What is important here

is that the UN is expected to have pre-empted the situation based on the lack of ca-

pacity on the part of Cameroon to integrate the people. Whatever may be the situa-

tion of the Bakassi today can be aptly described in terms of failure of Nigeria's mul-

tilateral policy to assess the situation before it accepted the ICJ jurisdiction over it.

Nigeria should have thought twice before allowing the case being refereed to ICJ in

the first place. Hence, according to the rule, both disputed countries have to agree

and consented before the case can be taken on by the ICJ.

7.2.3 **Reaction of ECOWAS Members**

Despite Nigeria's contributions in the ECOWAS and OAU/AU many scholars and well-meaning Nigerians have been clamouring for the need to re-assess Nigeria's multilateral policy in order to make sure that Nigeria is getting proper recognition and positions. As it has been noted in Chapter Four and Five, Nigeria single-handedly sponsored the establishment of this regional organization and the largest financial burden rests on it. At present, about 65% of the ECOWAS budget and all ad-hoc intervention in all trouble spots in the region are normally financed by Nigeria (BBC News, November 21, 2012). Despite the enormous contributions, Nigeria's leadership in the sub-region is threatened. Ambassador Dhairu Suleman notes that,

> …we are not liked in Africa, we are only tolerated. All these African countries, they tell you something when you are around, but behind you, they say a different thing. Nigeria has never had territorial ambition but despite the fact that we have never had territorial ambition and we have been Father Christmas to everybody, they still resent her and that is nothing but envy. They envy Nigeria because of what God has blessed Nigeria with. So, we have not received commensurate appreciation for what we did (Vanguard, September 1, 2013).

One of such occasion was the rejection of harmonized monetary policy being sponsored by Nigeria in the ECOWAS. Most countries in the sub-region, especially the francophone part, do not succumb to the plight of Nigeria on the need to have a common currency for speedy transaction and regional economic integration within the sub-region despite initial agreement (The Nation, June 19, 2013). The result of this attempt is the constant delay and suspension of issues relating to common currency despite the earlier agreement the scheme would commence by 2005. Nigerian government in 2002 had promised to contribute $60 million to ECOWAS currency stability and the idea was that by 2004 ECO Currency and CFA Franc would merge together to form a single currency in the region (Comet, May 21, 2002).

The failure of Nigeria in this regard could be attributed to many economic and financial issues within the sub-region. According to Funsho Abiri, an investment consultant with the ECOWAS, the lingering crisis in the Euro-Zone, trade barriers, conflict of interests, and pursuit of economic and monetary sovereignty among West African countries were the problems hindering the implementation of a common currency policy by Nigeria (The Nation, June 19, 2013). Thus, lack of economic capability on the part of Nigeria to resolve some peculiar issue like common tax and mode of transaction within West African countries and the presence of France economic interest in the region are cited as bane confronting Nigeria in this regard (Nwoke, 2005:135). Despite decades attempt on the part of Nigeria to stem the tide of France's influence in the region, the francophone countries still align themselves economically to the metropolitan France, which thus makes it difficult for Nigeria to evolve multilateral currency operation within the region. It needs to be stressed here that some countries like Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso whose economies are relatively advanced compared to other francophone West African countries may see Nigeria as less capable to drive the economy of the entire region. And this might well explained the reason for their continuous economic and political alliance with France.

In the OAU, ECOWAS, and the UN, most African countries do not often agree with Nigeria to assume and attain important positions in the multilateral organisations. If one considers the contributions of Nigeria to the continental unity and peace since 1960, it is unthinkable to assume that most African countries do not give Nigeria its proper place in multilateral organization. In 2013, Gambia contested the non-permanent membership position of UNSC, although Nigeria won the seat with reasonable vote over Gambia, it seems unthinkable that a country that has benefitted

immensely from Nigeria's multilateral and unilateral gestures could oppose Nigerian stance in global politics (This Day, October 6, 2013). Under Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps Scheme, the country has requested for Nigerian experts in the field of education, law, and engineering and presently, a Nigerian is the Chief Judge of the country appointed by the President of the country, Yahaya Jameh (The Gambian Point, April 3, 2012). In 1990, the head of Gambian army was a Nigerian named, Colonel Abubakar Dada (Adebajo, 2002:53). Such act of contestation shows that Nigeria's extension of gestures to most of these countries do not guarantee their support to Nigerian cause as they also have their own national goals and objectives to attain in their foreign relations. So, seeing them as competing Nigeria may not necessarily denote hatred or enmity towards Nigerian cause.

Furthermore, in 2011 Nigeria also faced multilateral diplomatic tussle with some African states when contesting for the president of UNSC. Out of the total 190 votes that Nigeria supposed to garner four countries voted against Nigeria; they are all from Africa (Obayuwana, 2013). The four countries that voted against Nigeria are the greatest beneficiaries from generous multilateral financial and military contributions of Nigeria in the UN and ECOWAS. Professor Ogwu, Nigeria's Permanent Representative to the UN reiterated during an interview with the Guardian newspaper that,

> overall, I must tell you, we have to review, and I don't want to speak lightly now. We have to review our multilateral diplomacy. We must make it a priority. Decisions are taken there….Beginning with elections, some states, which have aspirations for the Security Council for the year 2026 are already campaigning. That is strategic planning…So when I said reviewing our multilateral diplomacy, it is all encompassing (Obayuwana, 2011).

Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Guinea voted against Nigeria in the UNSC which the Federal Government of Nigeria regarded as potent threat to the hegemonic

aspiration of the country. If Liberia and Sierra Leone could oppose to Nigeria's interest in the multilateral organisations then there is urgent need to redirect the multilateral undertakings of Nigeria. Again, Professor Ogwu, stresses further that "Nigeria seriously needs to appraise its multilateral policy in order to deal with seeming embarrassment. The time of such action is now not tomorrow" (Obayuwana, 2013). Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan also noted in 2013 during his tenure as ECOWAS Chairman that the entire members had agreed with Nigeria on the candidate to vote for as the AU Chairman Commission and later discovered that most of them supported different cause which diametrically opposed to Nigerian stance (The Guardian, January 22, 2013). It is based on this that a Nigerian Diplomat, Professor Nwangu Okeimiri lamented that, "new tough stance on reciprocity is needed now by countries such as Nigeria before ECOWAS turns 50…" (Obayuwana, 2013).The African disregard to Nigeria's effort at multilateral level could be interpreted as a sign of resentment as power usually breeds envy. In all these cases, the Liberia and Sierra Leone positions is the most appalling considering the financial and material contributions of Nigeria to both countries' survival. In another declaration, Professor Ogwu observes that,

> considering that Nigeria spent over $10 billion during the period of a very bloody conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and even the mere fact that by the close of 2012 Nigeria regularly sent presidential jets to pick the presidents of countries like Liberia to Heads of States Summit in Abuja while such countries cannot be counted upon for reciprocities … it surely calls for action on the trajectory of the country's foreign policy (Obayuwana, 2013).

It should be said that such appraisal by high profile Nigerian could lead government into adopting hostile measure in his multilateral undertaking and this may explain the way Nigeria handled the Malian case by contributing just 1,200 troops while other smaller countries like Chad contributed 2,000 troops (Adebajo, 2013).

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The election of Akinwumi Adesina as the president of African Development Bank clearly illustrates the hostile nature of African countries, most especially West African's, to the hegemonic aspiration of Nigeria in May 2015 (Guardian news, June 8, 2015). It needs to be stressed that Nigerian president under Jonathan administration had reached agreement with all the West African countries to present unanimous candidature of Nigerian for the position (The Guardian (UK), June 8, 2015). As a show of opposition to Nigeria's regional power status, Cape Verde, Chad, Mali, and Sierra Leone forged ahead to present their own candidates. Out of eight contestants for the position, five of them were from West Africa (Business Day, May 29, 2015). In the most desperate bid to thwart the emergence of a Nigerian, most of the non-African shareholders supported Ms. Cristina Duarte, a candidate from Cape Verde. Despite the initial resentment, most African countries outside West Africa voted for Nigerian candidature against Chad and Cape Verde. In the midst of this stiff resistance from the West African countries, other regions voted en masse for Nigeria's candidature by winning with 60% vote over other contestants (The Guardian (UK), May 29, 2015). All these oppositions and resentments can be seen from the point of view of statehood. Each country has its set goals and objectives clearly entrenched in the constitution and one may not expect their national interest pursuits to be in agreement with Nigeria's all the time.

7.2.4 Failure of Domestic Mechanisms

In formulating and implementing its multilateral policy Nigeria has also recorded failure in mobilizing its domestic apparatus in implementing some of the policies agreed upon at multilateral level. One of such is the SALW, which was headed by the diplomatic prowess of Professor Joy Ogwu, the Permanent Representative of Ni-

geria to the UN. The United Nations programme of action on the eradication of illicit arms trade in the global arena expects that Nigeria should have established an agency charged with the responsibility of achieving the UN mandate on SALW in Nigeria (Anikulapo, 2012). The threat of illicit arms to Nigeria and the rest of Africa is immense as it promotes the abuse of human rights, kidnapping, insurgency, rebellions, and child trafficking. These issues have been generally known as capable of destabilizing existing peace within the global arena. The most astonishing aspect of the SALW is that it was Nigeria that headed and sponsored the move in the UN for adoption in 2012 (Guardian, September 16, 2012). The question now is: Why is it so difficult for Nigeria to come up with agency to achieve the mandate? The International Transparency Report reveals that,

> of the 10 million of such weapons said to be in Africa, Nigeria alone has about seven million…Nigeria is not providing good leadership in this all-important agenda….we cannot understand why it does not have one agency, even when other countries in Africa with less resources and influence have done same (Anikulapo, 2012).

If the above quote is right, then it suggests that 70% of the illicit arms trade in Africa ended up in Nigeria and this indicates that Nigeria presents a potent threat both to itself and to the region as a whole. The UN and some members of AU have accused Nigeria of nonchalant attitudes towards addressing important security issue on the continent. ECOWAS Forum also states,

> we would expect that a country that has such huge security challenges, including cases of terrorism....Militancy would be very active in this process. And you see the respect that your country has earned with its leadership of this conference. So we are not sure why your government is not doing anything about this important agenda (Anikulapo, 2012)

It is ironical on the part of Nigeria to see that it cannot utilize the mechanism it sponsored at multilateral level to achieve security measure within its borders when many countries have done so. Some of the countries who were signatories to the Pro-

gramme of action since 2001 have been submitting reports to the UN and Transparency International except Nigeria, which most people assumed, supposed to be in the forefront (Nte, 2011:7). The Transparency International, has acknowledged countries like Benin Republic and Niger, small as they are, for submitting their reports regularly. This is a clear indecision on the part of leadership posture of Nigeria in Africa. The Nigerian government recently, after much pressure from the UN and other international community, assured the committee of ongoing plan to establish an agency to that effect (Osimen & Akintunde, 2015:16).

The Director of First United Nations Division (FUND), Chika Ejinaka, confirms, "moves had already begun to ensure that the national commission on SALW and disarmament issues is set up. We are already at an appreciative stage in setting it up" (Anikulapo, 2012). The questions that also arise are: Why does it take too long to implement such programme at national level in Nigeria? Does Nigeria need to be pressurised before taking important national security issue? At least the country is blessed enough with adequate means to constitute an urgent agency that will implement such UN policy. This should not astonish anyone giving the fact that most national issues also receive the same response from government. The issue is that the programme is likely to have been handled the same way all national issues have been treated, which show the insensitivity of Nigerian government to the plight of insecurity within its border. It is thus a clear manifestation of poverty of national policy if such multilateral arrangement could be handled with levity.

Furthermore, in the domestic terrain, Nigeria also suffers the national depletion and degradation of its multilateral peacekeeping equipment despite the financial benefit accrued to the nation through its engagement in the multilateral peacekeeping (Sule, 2013). Nigeria's financial gain from the multilateral peacekeeping operations

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should have served as an avenue to update and acquire up-to-date equipment for the national army, which will put Nigeria at advantage to protect the country. As one of the largest troop-contributing countries, the modernization of the military equipment and the upgrading of Contingency Owned Equipment (COE) can serve as a means of projection Nigeria's military image in the international system which will in turn advertise the credentials of Nigeria in the UN. The state of Nigeria's military equipment in certain case has rendered Nigeria rudderless in the comity of nations. Madu Onuorah, an Abuja Bureau Chief elaborates that,

> ….Over the years, Nigeria has been unable to purchase and deploy significant quantities of equipment in order to attract sufficient benefit from the reimbursement for equipment. Smaller countries like Ghana and Bangladesh have benefitted immensely from the UN reimbursement for equipment and personnel. Due to the benefits, they upgraded COE and acquired other equipment more appropriate for peacekeeping (Guardian, June 7, 2013).

Professor Ibrahim Gambari, the Representative of the Joint AU/UN Head of Mission in Darfur, also buttress that the lackadaisical attitude on the part of government to update and upgrade the peacekeeping equipment led to the sending back home of a Nigerian battalion in 2012 who was deemed to have performed below expectation in the operation in Sudan (Guardian, June 7, 2013).

It needs to be stressed here that the UN gives credence to proper equipment maintenance of troops-contributing countries before deployment (Onuorah, 2013). Nigeria is lacking in this respect despite its overwhelming material capability compared to other African states. The expectation is that the money being paid by the UN to Nigeria supposed to have been utilized to upgrade the national military equipment. This attitude should be seen from the perspective of corruption that has bedeviled and crippled the institutional capacity of the country to respond to internal and external problems. Despite that Nigeria played important role among the UN troop con-

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tributing countries, which is expected to perform its duty duly as mandated by the organisation. In this respect, the country has been failing despite the employment of multilateral institutions as the hallmark of its regional hegemonic posture (Adeniji, 2005; Meierding, 2010). Apart from this, the salary of the troops are also normally delayed which encourages criminal activities on the part of the Nigerian troops. It is on record that Nigerian troops in Liberia fathered over 250,000 children through rape and assault on women while some of them alleged of looted shops and houses (Adebajo, 2003:73). The latter has made some international observers to question the intervention of Nigerian in Liberia. Although such issue represents a dent on the image of Nigeria's leadership posture, which should have been pre-empted by Nigerian government. It needs to be stressed that such atrocity during intervention may not be limited to Nigeria alone but such act of immorality should be campaigned against by all countries regardless of their place of operation. In a similar vein, some troops who lost their lives are also not giving proper attention by Nigerian government and their families and relatives are not properly taken care of. Adebajo (2003) stated that over 400 Nigerian soldiers lost their lives in Liberian civil war. In certain case where money is released to the deceased family, it normally takes time. Some of these national issues have reflected in the manner in which Nigerian troops perform in the multilateral operations (Sule, 2013).

Related to the above is the failure of Nigerian government to pay its dues in the UN (Guardian, January 1, 2013). The delay in the payment of Nigerian dues can be seen as a mark of irresponsibility and dent on the image of the country that has seen multilateralism as the hallmark of its global diplomacy. Unlike some developing countries, Nigeria is blessed enough to carry out its multilateral responsibility at the UN without any further ado. But the manner with which such issue is treated might

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be the result of red tape in the Nigerian bureaucracy (The Nation, May 16, 2012). If Nigeria could not fulfill its institutional dues at the UN, how can it be accorded respect in the comity of nations? Adebajo Adekeye, an Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, affirms that,

> ….Delays in Nigeria's payment of its UN dues weakens its political credibility, even as it seeks to return to the UN Security Council….Any serious country would surely observe the simple rule of no representation without taxation" (Adebajo, 2013).

If Nigeria continues at this pace, its clamouring and campaign for a permanent seat in the reformed Security Council may be jeopardized. This is because the UN needs state commitment in terms of finance in the running and management of its affairs. If Nigeria at the lobbying stage could be seen as debtor state in the UN, then, its quest for a seat in the UNSC may not materialise. It is thus unbefitting of a rich country like Nigeria to be accused of delaying its dues in the global multilateral organization like the UN. Such attitude may put Nigeria at disadvantage position in its quest for sensitive position in the global institution. Not only this, its image at international politics will be reduced to unimaginable proportion despite its overall multilateral financial contributions to ECOWAS and AU. The Nigerian total debt by January 2013 in the UN stood at $3, 847,773 million, equivalent to 600 billion Nigerian Naira (Obayuwana, 2013). This is obviously a mark of dwindling international image in Nigeria's foreign policy.

7.2.5 **Nigeria's Strategic failures**

In formulating and implementation its multilateral policy in Africa, Nigeria does not have a precise strategy on the mode of operation, exit strategy and its definite interest. At least what is expected of a country is that a concrete national goals and objectives are outlined in execution of a policy. Nigeria's multilateral policy is not well

charted on a course and this explains why Nigeria has not been maximally benefitting from its multilateral engagement at continental level. Nigeria, as discussed in Chapter Four, has been a frontal force in Africa since 1960s and it has assisted the liberation of many countries from the colonial yoke. Surprisingly, Nigeria does not have anything to show for all these gestures. Ambassador Dhairu observes,

> …We did a lot for Angola, but Nigeria never benefited anything from Angola; even when Nigeria wanted to sign a fishing right with Angola, they didn't agree, but they signed a fishing right agreement with Ibru organization. When I was in Angola, Ibru fishing trolleys were fishing in Angolan territorial water, but for the Nigerian government to sign an agreement with them, they didn't (Vanguard, September 1, 2013).

In effect, Nigeria designs no appropriate mechanism to benefit from its multilateral intervention in some African countries, an intervention that Nigeria in most cases financially sponsored. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, where Nigeria was the frontal actor that prevented the imminent collapse of the countries, it has never been accorded recognition in the area of investment (Afriquejet, October 2, 2012). Josuha Bolarinwa, a Research Fellow at NIIA, stresses this further,

> I am of the view that Nigerian foreign policy supposed to be reviewed as there is need to uphold the principle of reciprocity. How would you explain a situation of outright neglect of national interest for multilateral undertakings that stands to threaten our very existence? I need to tell you that Nigeria applied to invest in countries like Angola and Liberia but these countries were reluctant to grant the license. How would you explain this scenario? This is unacceptable in the game of politics (Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015).

Some countries who did not at all contribute to the survival of these two states begin to enjoy the fruits of peace Nigeria had sown, which make some scholars to question the huge financial and material resources expended in the multilateral peacekeeping in these two countries (Adebajo, 2002 & Salami, 2014).

The Failure to prevent South Africa from assuming the position of AU Commission Chairman in 2012 can also be attributed to the strategic failure of Nigeria in

Africa. Nigeria and South Africa had earlier agreed that no continental powers should occupy the position of AU Chairman as there should be a room for smaller countries to engage actively in the smooth running of AU and to feel a sense of belonging (The Punch, August 7, 2012). The former Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olugbenga Ashiru opines that,

> The necessity to promote inclusion, sense of belonging and accommodation irrespective of size and endowment would impel the encouragement of medium and small African countries to occupy that position to ensure greater unity and solidarity. Now that South Africa has broken the age-long tradition, she must bear the burden of acting urgently to heal the wounds that its action has brought, and in the same vein, take positive steps to consolidate unity on the continent (Ashiru, 2012).

Nigeria believed South Africa would agree with the proposition, which made Nigeria to shun contesting for the position in 2012 having agreed with South Africa on the issue. In 2012, it is surprising to discover that South Africa contested the position of AU Chairman with other smaller countries and eventually won (Aremu, 2012). This position astonished Nigeria as the issue has been discussed at ECOWAS and AU level. What surprised Nigerian Government most was that majority of the ECOWAS countries voted Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the wife of South African President to assume the Chairmanship position. Adekeye Adebajo, an Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa notes that,

> …Nigeria's international voice has been muted. The fact that Abuja failed to rally support to prevent South Africa's Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from assuming the Chair of the AU Commission…despite its principled and, in my view, correct position that no representative of a large African power should occupy the post (Adebajo, 2013).

It needs to be stressed here that some scholars have described this scenario as *return match diplomacy* (Daka, 2012). The decision of South Africa to breach agreement can be traced to 2011 when one of the wives of South Africa's President, Gloria Bongekile Ngema, contested for a position in AU and lost because of Nige-

ria's diplomatic weight (Adibe, 2012). In addition, in 2011, in an obvious opposition to South African stance in the AU, Nigeria supported the Transitional National Committee in Libya and presented its position to the UN (Kalu, 2011). South African President was a close ally of Muammar Gaddafi and as such objected to the AU position which Nigeria sponsored with approval from the UN. As a result, Dr. Zuma probably has counted on two losses to beat Nigeria at its own game (Nasarawa, 2012). He contested with Dr. Jean Ping of Gabon, the incumbent.

However, it should be stressed that the political situation in the continent provided opportunity for the emergence of South African president as the AU Commission Chairman as North African countries, Nigeria, and others grappled with political turmoil within their borders. It is also noted that there was no strong leaders like Nigerian Olusegun Obasanjo and Libyan Gadaffi to contest the position with Zuma. But this argument can be nullified as Nigeria has always been reacting to international issues even at the most critical point of its political history. Nigeria, for example, responded to Liberian issue when it was even declared a pariah state by many major global powers. So, attributing the emergence of President Zuma to leadership vacuum and political turmoil in Africa is not enough as Nigeria was trying to keep the unwritten agreement that no continental powers should hold the position anymore. In 2012 AU Assembly where Zuma emerged a Chairman, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan was absence while Ethiopian president was also not in attendance (Adibe, 2012). So, the assembly was comfortable for Zuma to manipulate as some noted that South African campaigned to other African countries of Nigeria's support to its bid against the Gabonese candidature (Abidoye Morufu, Pers. Comm., September 23, 2013). Nigerian government has been strongly criticized in this respect. Nigeria's News Diary reiterates further,

The decision of President Jonathan not to attend the Summit or ask Vice-President Namadi Sambo to represent him has really caused incalculable damage to the reputation of Nigeria. There was no reason for Nigeria to stake her credibility over this election, if the country knew that it would not be fully committed, at the highest level of government to the contest (Nasarawa, 2012).

Thus, the absence of Nigeria in the AU Assembly was a catastrophe for some African countries as there was no formidable force to prevent South Africa from emerging the AU Commission Chairman. In this case, becoming AU Commission Chairman by South Africa is attributed to Nigeria's diplomatic failure on the continent. But scholar like Adibe (2013) has argued that the absence of Nigeria from the AU Assembly may be intentional to allow for the emergence of Zuma. This is based on the conception that South Africa supported the candidature of Okonjo Iweala, a Nigerian as the President of the World Bank in 2012 (Vanguard, March 28, 2012). Therefore, if this is right, then, Nigeria could be said to have reciprocated by its tacit support for South Africa; while at the same time Nigeria campaigned openly for Gabonese President, Dr. Jean Ping, born of Chinese father and Gabonese mother (Ogaba Uche, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). The abstinence of Nigeria in the assembly voting may be interpreted as a mark of support for South Africa as international politics is unpredictable. In international politics, all things are possible. Moreover, because of the unavailability of document to back any claim, Nigeria's decision in AU can be a matter of speculation. Nevertheless, the emergence of South Africa as the AU Chairman Commission can be described as the failure of Nigeria's multilateralism.

7.2.6 Failure of Structural Adjustment Programme

Nigeria has always been a responsible member of the UN for decades and actively participates in some of its agencies' activities to bolster and promote its interest in

the global political space. Nigeria economy was in good shape in the 1970s, especial-ly during the energy crisis in which Nigeria leverage as oil producing country (Nwagbara, 2011:34). The economic momentum was sustained until early 1980s when Nigeria recorded sharp decline in domestic economic development because of corruption and policy misplacement and priority (Adekoya, 2012). According to Adegbayi Akinbade, a Historian and National Examination Officer in Nigeria, "the prosperity of the 1970s soon resulted into oil glut in the 1980s and Nigeria resulted to borrowing from the IMF" (Pers. Comm, January 30, 2015). The borrowing from the IMF did not receive any approval under Ibrahim Babangida regime. This, however, resulted in the adoption of SAP as dictated by the IMF and other multilateral credi-tors (Ukah, 2014:176).

The economic hardship suffered by Nigerian in the 80s and the subsequent IMF's rejection of Nigeria's application for loan worsened the situation. By the time Babangida became the president of Nigeria in 1985, the economy was already in bad shape and this resulted in institutionalization of SAP as instructed by the IMF. The rationale behind the SAP according to Olusegun Obasanjo (2005) was to enliven Ni-gerian economy from its primitive stage most especially as concerned agriculture. The programme also intended to promote prudent fiscal policy and reduce govern-ment expenditure and public ownership. As such, the World Bank assumed this would promote external debt management and export promotion. Without any initial public debate and engagement, Nigerian government proceeded to institutionalise SAP by reducing government expenditure, retrenchment of workers, devaluation of currency, and adjustment in the interest rate (Adofu & Abula, 2010:23). The failure of government to take into cognizance the plight of Nigeria led to public outcry by Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and Academic Staff Union of Universities

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(ASUU) in 1990 (Adegbayi Akinbade, Pers. Comm., January 30, 2015). The programme resulted in public resentment as people were subjected to unnecessary hardship. It needs to be stressed here that the aim of the IMF for such programme was to reduce the wasteful expenditure incurred by governments in the developing countries without appreciating the level of corruption in place in many countries.

IMF was thus of the conviction that good governance can have a positive impact in the management of countries but most of the countries where the policy was adopted were ruled under military government (Nwoke, 1990). This was the case in Nigeria. The IMF should have considered that in terms of fiscal prudence, developing countries' military governments could not be trusted. With the institutionalisation of SAP, the inflationary condition in Nigeria worsened. For example, in 1986 the inflation rate was 5.4% and by 1989 it had skyrocketed to 40.9%, a situation that resulted in unemployment, poverty and strike (Ukah, 2014:176). The response of the military government was repression, which ultimately led to industrial face-off between government and the workers (Nwagbara, 2011:36). In this scenario, government was in a great mess as there was no solution in sight. It needs to be pointed out here that IMF was sincere to have suggested the policy to Nigeria; it was Nigerian government that failed to appreciate the domestic social terrain before executing the policy. Of what importance is the policy that brought hardship to citizen when the intent of the policy was to alleviate the sufferings of the people? The policy was a clear failure of Nigerian government for accepting multilateral conditionality to the detriment of its citizens.

While some countries like Malaysia and Singapore also formed part of the countries where the policy was also presented and suggested by the IMF, they did not adopt the multilateral policy in its wholesale form and instead they adapted it to their

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domestic circumstance and the policy recorded a measure of success in these countries (World Bank, 2002). In Nigeria, the government embarked on the policy implementation without a proper examination and evaluation to suit domestic social and political terrain. The government cut public expenditure as suggested by the IMF and resulted to public resistance, as most Nigerians could not afford three-square meals. Life became more difficult and the economic terrain looked bleak and hopeless. Had Nigeria review the multilateral policy before implementation the result might be different. Thus, the SAP failure represents a negative historical relevance in Nigeria's multilateral policy, as it was a fiasco.

7.2.7 Extra-African Affairs in the West African Region

One of the hallmarks of Nigeria's multilateral policy is to reduce the presence of external influence in the West African sub-region as elaborated in Chapter Five. Although one may give credit to Nigerian government on this front but there are still much to be achieved in this regards. Since independence in 1960 the overbearing presence of external powers in affairs of Africa has been a concern for Nigeria. Adeyemi Linda, a Research Fellow at NIIA, notes that,

> As long as African economy and political spheres are continuously piloted by exogenous forces then it portends security threat to Nigerian interest in the continent….It will also affect the aspiration of Nigeria as major power in Africa. In this case, Nigeria sponsored sub-regional and regional organisations which in its view will drastically reduce the external influence (FGI, January 29, 2015).

Sadly enough, this has not been so. The OAU was the first multilateral instrument Nigeria relied upon in the 1960s and 1970s. But despite vigorously pursuing decolonisation and anti-apartheid policy in the OAU, the external influence neither reduces nor varnishes. The US, British, France, Portugal the USSR and Cuba were especially prominent during the Cold War. The formation of ECOWAS and

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subsequent overwhelming financial contribution did not stop the external interference, which continues to threaten Nigeria's interests and aspiration in the continent. The current events in the continent most especially in the West African sub-region suggests that Nigeria as a regional power has failed woefully in its bid to ward off external influence in its sphere of influence (This Day, November 23, 2012). Some factors may seem responsible for this lacklustre. The Nigerian industrial establishment and market do not provide ready-made market for the West African countries and in this way they need to seek alternative markets for their raw materials and agricultural produce (Nwoke, 2005:147). It should be stressed here that it may prove difficult for Nigeria to ward off external influence from Africa because of the pace of globalization and interdependence. This can be reduced but Nigeria is not viable enough in terms of economy, technological advancement, and industrialisation to achieve such objectives. This has led to growing external influence in the West African sub-region.

Within Africa, Nigeria has also witnessed a situation whereby another African country became a threat to its security. This was especially true of activities of Libyan leader, Gadhafi in Chad, Niger, and Mali (Nigerian Tribune, November 20, 2012). From the earliest period, the interference of Libya in the internal affairs of some West African countries has been a potent security issue for Nigeria. Amodu (2013) stresses that "it is sad to note that the same rebels equipped by external partners in Libya to oust Muammar Gaddafi out of power are the same rebel in the Malian debacle. Both extra-African power and Libya have really made the security situation in West Africa a sorry case" The recent debacle in Mali is attributable to this lamentation. If Nigeria could not prevent Libya, a fellow African state, from interfering in West Africa how can it do so against countries like France and the US? Nigerian

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government has been inattentive to allow its neighbours posing security threat to it despite many years of multilateral arrangements to subdue the menace. Jide Osuntokun (2015) observes that,

> Tchad [Chad] itself had never from colonial times till now been stable and had never been under civil administration under French colonial rule. It was simply referred to as *Territoire militaire du Tchad*. It has continued to be governed by soldiers with consequent instability necessitating Nigeria's military intervention in the country in the 1980s. In the absence of jobs, Chadians have always been ready to offer their services legally or illegally as fighters rather than starve at home in their inhospitable environment.

> This is the situation of one of the Nigerian neighbours in the northern border.

The complicated security lapse in the whole of Sahel region may be attributed this. Most of the countries located in the Sahel are not properly functioning and capable of controlling marauding elements in the area. Osuntokun (2015) stresses further,

> …in other words, what is happening now is history repeating itself. The joint military operation has now become necessary because Nigeria has failed to protect its own territory through lack of military preparedness and diplomatic manoeuvering that should have anticipated events if we had secured our borders.

Not only that, a former Nigerian Ambassador to Sudan, Bola Dada, gives his first-hand experience in an interview with Punch correspondent on the role played by neighbouring countries in the emergence of Terrorism in West Africa including Nigeria.

> When Sudan came under pressure during the US Bill Clinton era, they sent Bin Laden away. Osama Bin Laden had established himself there. In fact, one of his wives was the daughter of the Speaker. So when Sudan was under pressure to send Osama Bin Laden away, he decided to divide his Al-Qaeda army into three; he took the first team to Afghanistan and kept the second team in Sudan; the third group he sent out to be disturbing the whole world, including Maghreb which is close to Mali, Chad and Niger. I raised an alarm in 2001 that Al-Qaeda was in Nigeria – that Al-Qaeda had penetrated Nigeria through Chad. You know Chad has a border with Borno State...

He stresses further,

….We have about eight million Nigerians in Sudan: people who settled there after pilgrimage. Many who couldn't reach Saudi Arabia just settled there. And Al-Bashir (Sudanese president) was a descendant of Borno State. I reported all these, including the fact that Yerima (one of Nigerian governors) was there at that time but I was ignored. Yerima got back to Nigeria and the following day, he declared Sharia. And from then, they were sending students for Jihadist training. Then when I got wind of the distribution of Osama Bin Laden Al-Qaeda groups, I reported. I told them to check our borders between Mali, Niger, and Chad – that Al-Qaeda was on the move (Dada, 2012).

The above revelation confirms that Nigeria cannot subdue the incidence of insecurity in its borders without stemming it from its root in Sudan, Libya and Chad. According to the Ambassador, the way the northern Nigerians perceive their relations with Arab/Muslim countries is a factor for the failure of Nigeria's multilateralism. A prominent Nigerian scholar, Professor Jide Osuntokun, corroborates this line of reasoning,

> We must learn a bitter lesson from this Boko Haram insurgency which started from local grievances but has now snowballed into an international crisis drawing in Cameroun, Niger and principally Chad and Libya as a distant source of weapons since the collapse of the Col. Gaddafi's regime in which we foolishly supported the invasion of an African country by NATO. Perhaps I need to say that Libya is not strange to Borno because there is a large section of Maiduguri called FEZZARI originally settled by people from The Fezzan in southern Libya. The lesson in all this is the appreciation of the nexus between foreign and domestic politics (Osuntokun, 2015).

From the above, it was cleared that whatever Nigerian government agrees to achieve in collaboration with AU/OAU and ECOWAS, the northern Nigeria may serve as obstacle because of the way they hide security information and intelligence reports from countries like Libya and Sudan. The Ambassador also retorted that,

> There was a kind of covenant between Sudan and Libya to destabilise Nigeria to promote Islamisation. So, what is happening to President Goodluck Jonathan now may have something to do with that pact. They call it Afikaya, a doctrine that all African states must be governed by Muslims only. Gaddafi fought for it rigorously before he died – that all African presidents must be Muslims and in any African country where by error a Christian is there, they should make life difficult for that person until he is deposed. I got wind of it in one document. I

read it with my eyes that all African countries must be governed by Muslims and any country that is mistakenly being ruled by a Christian, they should make life difficult for him. They said it's the injunction of the Quran (Dada, 2012).

Thus, the lack of full utilization of Nigeria's potential capacity could be attributed to all these security mess. This scenario shows that there is a domestic and regional obstacle to Nigeria's security interest in AU and ECOWAS. In this case, Nigeria's financial commitment in the AU and ECOWAS has never done justice to its aims and objectives in the region. It may be argued that Nigeria may not be powerful enough to prevent great powers and non-state terror groups from interfering in the sub-region but it must be able to do so against fellow African states like Sudan, Somalia, Morocco, and Libya through its multilateral engagement in the AU, UN and ECOWAS.

7.3 CONSEQUENCE OF NIGERIA'S REGIONAL HEGEMONIC POSTURE

Assumption of Nigeria's regional leadership since independence has its enduring effects on Nigerian domestic structure. The various roles and responsibilities performed at continental level with attendant financial and material implications is an anomaly in Nigeria's external relations. How would one explain impoverish condition of 74% of Nigerians in the midst of affluence? The problem with Nigeria began at early days of independence when there was self-perceptive notion on the part of Nigerian leaders as the giant of Africa. Professor Bola Akinterinwa stressed that "Nigeria assumed the leadership position in Africa in 1960 although on a cautions note when compared to Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah. We see ourselves as the automatic regional leader and promoter of African interests in global affairs"(Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). What was expected of Nigeria at independence was to focus on how to manage the domestic economy in a form that would enable it to

compete with other industrialized nations. In 1960, Nigeria inherited brilliant economy with relatively advanced infrastructures to pursue Nigeria's path to economically prosperous nation (Falola & Heaton, 2008:385). Instead, the country was preoccupied with nearly all problems that bedeviled Africa, which underlined its hegemonic conception in Africa. Some of the financial resources that supposed to mobilize for economic advancement at home were squandered in the course of external military adventures in places like Chad, Congo, Southern African countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mali. In 1960, when Nigeria got its independence, over one million dollar was contributed to the UN purse on Congolese civil war (Adigbuo, 2013:13). In addition, between 1979 and 1982, the OAU borrowed $80 millionfrom-Nigeria for Chadian peacekeeping operations, which Nigerian government later wrote off (Adebajo, 2002:53). For newly independent and developing economy like Nigeria, the money expended was unwarranted and should have been invested locally for the development of the country. The same financial recklessness repeated itself in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2004 where the country is said to have expended over $10 billion (Onuorah, 2013).

It needs to be stressed here that Nigeria was at par, in terms of economic viability, with countries like Turkey, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hungary, Poland and Egypt between 1960s and 1970s and instead of consolidating on that gains the country reveled in continental adventure (Kushnir, 2013). This does not at all suggest Nigeria should abandon its leadership role in Africa but it supposed to be in tandem with its domestic structure. After all, the essence of foreign policy is to promote the national interests of a state, but Nigeria chooses to divert her resources and given priority to international commitment regardless of national interest. Although some of the policies, most especially the policy of good neighbourli-

ness was to secure the border of Nigeria but Nigeria has also failed in this respect. The formation of Niger Development Authority, Lake Chad Basin Commission, and ECOWAS is to guarantee and secure the territorial integrity of the country (Nwoke, 2005:116). Today, where is that security and territorial integrity? I think the problem has to do with the way Nigeria handles its regional leadership. If a hegemon for that matter cannot secure its border, which is one of the reasons for the adoption of multi-lateralism, then how could such country claim leadership in the larger continental politics? What Nigeria should have done since independence is to concentrate its energy on the neighbours. It is amazing to discover that Nigeria saw apartheid South Africa as a threat to its security, which premeditated its action in southern part of Africa (Chibundi, 2003:4). The material and financial contributions of Nigeria towards decolonisation and dismantling of apartheid Nigeria was extreme form the point of view of the Nigerian economic reality.

Thus, Nigeria's hegemonic posture in Africa has affected the domestic structure economically, politically and socially. Nigeria sponsored the creation of ECOWAS with attendant financial implications. The question now is: What has such organisation contributed to the national economy of Nigeria since 1975? Also, in terms of security, the organisation has not been used in any form to safeguard the Nigerian security. The rampaging impact of Boko Haram today is reminiscent of Nigeria's misplaced priority. Although, it is a good thing to belong to regional and sub-regional multilateral organisations but it should not hoodwink Nigeria from the reality of its social standing. The decades of negligence in the northeastern part of the country bordering Chad, Cameroon and Niger is the result of present security debacle being experience by Nigeria. Since this part of Nigeria is a tri-junction of four countries, securing it should have been Nigeria's priority to avoid unforeseen circum-

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stances in the future. The three countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon should have been locked up in a security and economic union, which might have guaranteed the territorial integrity of the country from the northeast. This is because nobody today has proper glimpse of where the Boko Haram originates. Any underpinning theories employ now to explain the Boko Haram scourge is only a matter of speculation and conjecture given the plural nature of the northeastern part of Nigeria. Most scholars linked the emergence of the terrorist group to Libya and Sudan, which explains the role Chad, Niger, Mali, and Cameroon might have played as a transiting point (The Punch, February 12, 2015). Nigeria though established two multilateral organisations, Lake Chad Basin commission and Niger Development Authority, in 1964 to have all these transiting countries locked up in a social arrangement but the successive Nigerian leaders have never utilized the bodies for security purpose. In fact, the two bodies were redundant for most part of 1960s and 1970s (Nwoke, 2005:117).

It must be noted here that ECOWAS and OAU are distant multilateral bodies to solve Nigeria's security problems because of divergent issues among member countries. Nigeria's inordinate continental ambition has veiled its judgment to remember that it is very difficult for country like Nigeria to project into continental leadership. In fact, West Africa is also a very big place for Nigeria's leadership ambition given its technological and economic advancement. How a country like Nigeria will think of dominating 16 countries? This is a clear case of over-zealousness and over-ambition. It would have been better if Nigeria had restricted its leadership ambition to its neighbouring countries, which would have given it much-needed political and military muscles to prevent the contemporary security debacle in the northeast. Instead, Nigeria's buoyant economy, military capacity, population and huge natural resources has made it to believe in a continental leadership aspirations

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that does not do any good to Nigeria's national interests. In this case, Nigeria's hegemonic ambition in Africa has affected Nigeria economically, socially and politically.

7.4 CONCLUSION

In a country of over 176 million populations like Nigeria, multilateralism is unavoidable, as the country needs to relate with various organisations to promote its national interests. In Nigeria's foreign policy, multilateralism occupies an important place in the formulation of its foreign policy and this may explain why Nigeria has been very active in the global politics for decades. To achieve maximally the desired aims and objectives in the multilateral institutions, Nigeria needs to re-orientate and redefine its approach at domestic level in order to reap the full benefits of its multilateral undertakings. Although the results of Nigeria's engagement in multilateral institutions have been mixed over decades but with closer observation it looks as if Nigeria is losing out in its global and continental multilateral participation. It needs to be recognized that some of the failures recorded can be attributed to Nigeria's internal and regional circumstances, which to some extent were preventable. Thus, Nigeria's achievements have been subsumed by apparent failures in every sector within the West African sub-region and Nigerian society.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.1 FINDINGS

The purpose of this research has been to assess and explore Nigeria's strategy of multilateralism in relation to its hegemonic posture in Africa in general and West African in particular. Chapter One discussed the objectives, justifications and scope of the study of this research. In Chapter Two, theoretical debate on the thesis is discussed, while theories of hegemonic stability, role and RSCT are elaborated in detail. Chapter Three is devoted to historical phases of Nigeria foreign policy and multilateralism. Furthermore, Nigeria's foreign policy history was discussed from the earliest period to the contemporary time and major principles and features of Nigeria's multilateralism are enumerated. Chapter Four delved into emergence of Nigeria as a regional hegemon in Africa, while Chapter Five extended the discussion on Nigeria's hegemonic posture in relation to Multilateralism.

Here emphasis is laid on the area where Nigeria exhibited its hegemonic posture in multilateral institutions especially in the OAU/AU/ ECOWAS, and the UN. In this chapter, it is found that Nigeria exhibited its hegemonic presence in multilateral organisations through decolonization, dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, peacekeeping, democratic promotion and capacity building in African countries. What is observed from this is that a state with meagre resources cannot embark on all these foreign missions. This is because of the cost implication on the domestic finan-

cial capability. Chapter Six elaborated those external and internal factors that conditioned Nigeria's multilateral policy. This chapter elucidated those factors that necessitated the activism of Nigeria in multilateral institutions. It is thus found that security, economy, pan-Africanism, French factor, and Cold War are major factors that informed the activism of Nigeria in multilateral institutions. In Chapter Seven, the results of Nigeria's multilateral policy are analysed. The research also found that while Nigeria recorded success in economy and diplomatic spheres it also recorded failure in warding off external actors from its region. Nigeria also recorded failure in some domestic issues like structural adjustment programme, internal security, and lack of maintenance in the equipment used in multilateral operations. In achieving the above result, the research has adapted the structural theory of HST, role theory and RSCT to explore Nigeria's multilateral policy and it has revealed some facts through in-depth analysis of available documents and personal communications with various scholars and researchers in Nigeria. This concluding chapter will be dedicated to presenting and discussing the findings of the research and highlighting its arguments.

The historical phases of Nigeria's foreign policy and multilateralism revealed that Nigeria's Multilateralism is used to promote and pan-Africanism in the early days of independence. The unity of Africa has been an important aspect of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence and it has been promoted through multilateral institutions ever before the formation of OAU in 1963. The African issue was the first to be engaged with in the UN as soon as Nigeria got its independence in 1960. Congo was boiling in 1960 and Nigeria could not react unilaterally and this made Nigerian government under Tafawa Balewa to react to the issue through the UN (see Appendix Three). From independence until 2015, most of the chronic issues suffering by African states have been occupying the attention of Nigeria through multilateral in-

stitutions. Nigeria's financial contribution of $80 million to OAU during Chadian crisis between 1979 and 1983 reinforces the connection between its multilateral policy and pan-Africanism. In Liberia, Nigeria supplied over 12,000 ECOMOG forces, which represented 80% of ECOWAS contribution (Adebajo, 2003:69). Also in Guinea Bissau in 2014, Nigeria contributed 50% of ECOWAS forces to restore peace and order in the country. In 2014, 18% of AU yearly budget was contributed by Nigeria, which amounted to $16.7million (Obayuwana, 2014). It has been estimated that Nigeria has spent over $13 billion on peacekeeping only since 1960 and contributed 250,000 members of Nigerian armed forces to peacekeeping operations globally. Nigeria suffered over 300 casualties in its multilateral engagement in ECOWAS-ECOMOG operations and recorded the second highest casualties in the UN peacekeeping operations with 144 soldiers lost to various battles (see Table 5.4, page 221).

In addition, Cold War has been found to be one of the factors that determined multilateralism in Nigerian foreign policy. It is discovered that during the Cold War global political system, Nigeria's continental performance most especially in the OAU and the UNO were more pronounced than in the post-Cold War period. Nigeria was able to manipulate members of OAU, Commonwealth, and the UN in its decolonization and antiapartheid campaign within the continent and this resulted to the dismantling of apartheid and racist regimes in Southern Africa with eventual liquidation of colonialism from the continent. What is observable from this trend in Nigeria's behavior is that its influence was felt in almost all corners of the continent in the Cold War period as opposed to post-Cold War global system. This does not means that Nigeria's hegemonic posture has come under threat, not at all. What it indicates is the possibility of the ascension of South Africa and other minor powers in the continental politics in the contemporary global system. Another observed pattern of Ni-

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geria's hegemonic behaviour is that its influence is most felt in the west African sub-region in the post-Cold War international system. During the Cold War Nigeria performed few roles as a regional hegemon within West Africa but with the demise of Cold War its sub-regional pre-eminence become more pronounced starting from Liberian civil war in 1990. In this way, what is observable is that the demise of the Cold War and subsequent civil strife in most states in West African sub region may be a better explanation for Nigeria's growing influence in the West African regional order.

Furthermore, the historical background of Nigeria's foreign policy showed there is complicity between Nigeria's foreign policy objectives and multilateral institutions. At global level, Nigeria employed Nonaligned Movement, Commonwealth, OPEC, and the UN in achieving its goals and objectives. In OPEC, for example, Nigeria participated in oil embargoes of 1973 that sanctioned supporters of Israel such as the US and other Western allies. Because of OPEC sanction, the price of oil was raised which made Nigeria to sell oil at concessionary price to some OAU and ECOWAS members. Such high price of oil enhanced the diplomatic bargaining of Nigeria in the global politics. In addition, in the UN, Nigeria's membership has enabled it to promote its own national interest. For example, Nigeria is the most frequent non-permanent member of Security Council in Africa. Nigeria has represented Africa five times (1966 – 1967, 1978 – 1979, 1994 – 1995, 2010 – 2011, 2014 – 2015). As such, Nigeria has been using such experience to campaign for its permanent membership for future enlargement of UNSC.

Moreover, the exploration of how Nigeria has been displayed its hegemonic posture through multilateralism can be traced to apartheid and decolonization issues in Africa. Thus, the research has found that Nigerian multilateralism is closely linked

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to the policies of apartheid practiced by South Africa and the decolonization process on the African continent. The study found that Nigeria's multilateral policy was mainly directed towards liberating southern parts of Africa during the heydays of Cold War. In the multilateral organisations, Nigeria's preoccupation during the Cold War was to ensure that southern African issues were debated and in some cases sponsored resolutions and committees to address the issue most especially in Angola and Namibia. Nigeria for example, gave $100 million in aid to Angola to run its nascent administration. Nigeria also donated $1.8 million to Mozambique for its support for liberation struggle in Southern Africa. After attainment of independence in Mozambique, Nigeria assisted the country with amount of $675, 890 to augment its administrative cost. Zambia, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde also received $506,000, $500,000 and 60,000 respectively upon attaining independence. So, in the Cold War period, the greatest percentage of Nigeria's multilateral energy was devoted to African issues.

Besides, economic integration is also one of the areas where Nigeria has showcased its leadership position in Africa. Nigeria's sponsor of ECOWAS in West Africa is closely linked to promoting economic integrating in Africa according to documents and interviews conducted on the research. Although, the regional economic multilateral institutions has been used as a platform in promoting Nigeria's economic interests in Africa, the bulk of Nigeria's participation in ECOWAS has always been in security and political matters. The regional organization was formerly conceived as economic in nature but some of the areas where successes have been recorded are the maintenance of security and order in Africa. The Sierra Leonean, Liberian, Malian and Ivorian cases are prime examples in this case. Thus, in the area

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of economic integration, the regional multilateral organization has achieved little when compared to political issue.

Another issue-area where Nigeria's leadership has been displayed through multilateralism is the maintenance of regional order. The research shows that regional powers are very effective in settling and maintaining peace and order. Going by Nigeria's records, the research found that regional hegemon is better equipped in settling regional conflicts than non-regional powers. This is best illustrated by Liberian civil war where Nigeria army suffered over 300 casualties whereas the US was forced to withdraw its troops after recorded 18 casualties in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. Nigeria in contrast stood firm in the face of rebel assault led by Charles Taylor in Liberia. There were also domestic opposition to Nigeria's campaign in Liberia but Nigerian government insisted peace must be restored at all cost to Liberia. It needs to be stressed that while the US intervention in Somalia was not to achieve any immediate goals and objectives Nigeria's intervention may be said to be intertwined with the West African regional security as a whole. In this case, Liberia's direct security threat to Nigeria may well explain Nigeria's insistence to quell the conflict in Liberia. Such immediate threat was nonexistent in the US case in Somalia. The Mano River crisis which comprised Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Gambia are all put to rest by Nigeria-led ECOMOG forces. The ongoing rebellion and terrorist onslaught in Mali also receives Nigeria's response. Thus, where global hegemon fails regional hegemon may triumph.

In examining factors that dictate multilateralism in Nigeria's hegemonic posture, the research found that security is very crucial. This research found that there is a nexus between Nigeria's multilateral policy and the protection of its territory from external threats. Such external threats are extra-West African affairs, terrorism, racist

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regime, terrorism and France. The engagement with multilateral institutions since independence by Nigeria has been to achieve a measure of security within and outside Nigerian borders. As discussed earlier in Chapter Five, Nigeria from the time of independence discovers that most countries in Africa are not viable enough to be called state in the proper sense of it. Some like Sao Tome and Principe, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, and Togo are very small in terms of population and landmass and they could be used by any external powers to launch attack on Nigeria which will invariably undermine the security of Nigeria. This hypothesis came to pass during Nigerian civil war where France and other countries used these neigbours to supply arms to Biafran secessionist. Also, Nigeria is of the view that foreign countries may engage in subversion in neigbouring countries which may have a reverberating effect on Nigeria security. All these sums together are the factors that propel Nigeria from employing multilateral institutions in solving the seeming security problems in Africa. This fact is consistent with the documents collected from press library in Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and interviews conducted with International relations experts from Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and Olabisi Onabanjo University Nigeria.

Apart from security, systemic pressure is also found to be one of the factors that dictate Nigeria's multilateralism. Because of the way external powers pursue their economic and political interest in various regions of the globe, it is possible for regional hegemon to face pressure and threat to its hegemonic ambition from external or global powers. This is greatly noticeable in the manner France and other powers poke nose in the affairs of West Africa where Nigeria establishes its hegemonic influence. Some scholars (i.e. Prys, 2010; Nwoke, 2005; Mulugeta, 2014) are of the view that the fact that regional hegemon is being threatened by external powers and

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regional member does not nullify the hegemonic position of a regional power. There is always resentment both at regional level and at global level to the role of hegemon in the regional politics. From Nigeria's point of view it is discovered that the members of regional security complex in West Africa do intentionally collaborate with non-regional powers to undermine Nigeria' hegemonic influence and this clearly defines the role some francophone countries play with France in the region.

Besides systemic pressure and security, national interest is also found to dictate Nigeria's multilateral policy. The efficacy of multilateralism in promoting national interest by regional power is well established by the study. The study found that Nigeria, throughout its independence years, is an active member of various multilateral organisations most especially the UN, OAU/AU, and ECOWAS. Through the critical appraisal and analysis of interviews and available documentary evidence, the research found the nexus between Nigeria's continental aspirations and its multilateral policy. The activities of regional power like Nigeria in all its multilateral undertakings are geared towards achieving some of goals and objectives set out in its foreign policy most especially in relations to security and economic objectives. It is discovered that despite achieving high profile in its multilateral engagement its economy and security are not getting better than previously set out in its foreign policy.

Another factor that dictated the use of multilateralism in Nigeria's hegemonic posture is material capabilities. The research found that Nigeria plays more active role in peace and stability than economic aspect. Its hegemonic influence in other words is felt more in peacekeeping, stability, and conflict resolution than economic sphere. The researcher observes that to be recognized at global level as a regional hegemon, such a state must possess enough material capabilities to project its influence and perform exceptional responsibilities within its own sphere of influence. Ni-

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geria since 1960 has been carried out its regional hegemonic responsibilities and its presence is felt in all corners of Africa and even beyond.

Therefore, in evaluating Nigeria's employment of multilateralism in its hegemonic posture, the research found that there is Regional Power Variability. The research confirms there is variability in the influence of regional powers. The active participation of Nigeria in African politics confirms the fact that there is variability in the influence of regional powers in the global politics. The impact of Nigeria in African politics since independence is noticeable and acknowledged by great and global powers. The research discovered that the most influential country in African politics is Nigeria and this was most apparent during the Cold War. In terms of continental effect, Nigeria has been an influential regional actor in Africa and the emergence of South Africa since 1994 as post-apartheid state can be a factor in the competitiveness for continental power. Although, South Africa is a power to be reckoned with in Africa but Nigeria's continental records surpassed that of any African countries in all areas. Thus, the way and manner Nigeria influences the continental politics is different from its contemporaries in the global politics. Some regional powers like Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran are less active in their respective regions in relation to Nigeria in Africa. It is discovered that despite the fact that other regional powers are richer and powerful than Nigeria, they perform lesser role in their respective regions (see Table 5.1). This may be explained by the regional complexity in which each regional power found itself. In West Africa where Nigeria is a regional hegemon, all other countries are by far small in comparison with Nigeria and Nigeria is presently represents Africa as the largest economy with its GDP of $522 billion compared to South Africa with GDP of $350.6 billion. So, in terms of resources and capability, only South Africa could compete with Nigeria in the whole of Africa. In

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relations to other regional powers, it may be very difficult for them to perform hege-

monic role because of the complexity of their respective regional politics. In Latin

America, for example, The US, Argentina and Mexico serve as challenger to hege-

monic status of Brazil in South America while Egypt, Turkey and Iran are all facing

challenges from various countries in the Middle East. The regional security complex

in the Middle East is not clear and it is multi-polar in nature. Nigeria is a clear re-

gional hegemon in West Africa where the regional security complex is uni-polar.

The examination of Nigeria's multilateralism in relation to its leadership pos-

ture in Africa also revealed that global powers and hegemon cooperate with Nigeria

as a regional hegemon. Global hegemon cooperate with Regional hegemon by ac-

knowledging its role in making peace and stability within its region. In this way, re-

gional hegemon is given special position in the global multilateral organization to

exercise such role. The research found that regional hegemon is normally recognised

by either global power or global multilateral institutions to perform a mediating role

in a regional conflict. This is the case with Nigeria in Africa where Nigeria is

acknowledged by the US in Liberian civil war. Libyan case also shows that the world

recognizes the hegemonic influence of Nigeria in Africa. When the Libyan case was

raised in the UN the world could not reach final decision until Nigeria presented Af-

rican position by recognizing the Transitional National Council in Libya in 2011.

This became imperative because of the way Libyan leader was supported by other

regional power, South Africa. At AU, level there was no unanimous agreement as the

two regional powers took different positions. Some African lesser powers were even

not ready to support TNC as they regarded it as western trick to occupy Libya. In this

elusive political situation, the UN was concerned about Nigeria and South African

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positions on the issue in order to legitimate NATO intervention in Libya against Gadhafi. Nigeria supported TNC and South Africa later.

Evaluating Nigeria's multilateralism and hegemony also pointed out that Nigeria's regional hegemonic status is well acknowledged but threatened. Nigeria is acknowledged globally as a regional power and hegemon in African politics but it is being threatened by both African states and external powers. The research found that Nigeria's hegemonic position in Africa is threatened by some countries most especially France and other francophone countries in West Africa, such as Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Senegal. The way and manner some francophone countries react to issue in multilateral organisations shows that they do not really like the way Nigeria dominates continental politics and this is most noticeable from South African and France actions in Africa. Both powers are not really comfortable with Nigeria's hegemonic influence in Africa and they represent important challengers to Nigeria's hegemonic bid. In their quest to challenge Nigeria, the research has shown that they act through third parties like Ivory Coast, Togo, Senegal and Cameroon. The prime example in this case was the French influence in the Bakassi peninsular border issue between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Besides, the research also discovered that Nigeria is over ambitious in its leadership aspiration in Africa. The study found that regional hegemon may be carried away by its excessive hegemonic ambition which may ultimately result in devoting its attention and resources to global issues to the detriment of its regional responsibilities. Nigeria assumes a continental role for itself whereas it needs to limit its hegemonic ambition to West African sub-region where over 16 countries reside. In the global political terrain, it is very rare if not almost impossible to see a regional hegemon like Nigeria trying to assert its hegemonic responsibilities on over 54 coun-

tries. Africa is very large for Nigeria to assert its hegemonic role and this has affected the way Nigeria responds to its immediate responsibilities in West Africa. Mali case is a prime example. Nigeria maintained troops in various part of Africa most especially in Sudan and Somalia whereas it needs to react first to its immediate neighbours because of the potential threat Mali possess to Nigeria's territorial integrity. It needs to be stressed here that both Sudan and Somalia also portend significant threat to Nigeria's security given the fact that terrorism thrive in those two countries, but contemporary geopolitical reality demands that Nigeria should react more to political stalemate in Mali than the two countries mentioned above.

8.2 OBSERVATIONS

In conducting research, most especially foreign policy research, behavioural pattern is normally the product which by implication may yield reliable policy recommendation and reorientation. In this research, three important observations are discerned. They are theoretical, policy and application observations. These three observations are further highlighted as follow.

Theoretical observation: Several scholars (Prys, 2010; Nolte, 2010; Meierding, 2010; Frazier & Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010; Moller, 2009, Bach, 2007 and Vayrynen, 1979) have consistently established the regional power status of Nigeria alongside South Africa, Brazil, China, and India. In terms of theoretical orientation, Prys (2010) has advocated for the need to apply structural theory of hegemony to assess the role of regional hegemon in the absence of power theory that can explain the behavior of regional power in global politics. This is exactly what this research has achieved by using Nigeria's multilateralism to analyse its hegemonic behavior in Africa. It needs to be stated here that Nigeria is not the only regional hegemon in Africa

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and according to Frazier & Stewart-Ingersoll (2010) there are only two major hegemons in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa. This research observes that Nigeria's continental hegemonic role has dwindled since the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 while its hegemonic role in the West Africa sub-region has been consistent since independence.

As it has been discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, there are three theories which can adequately explain the Nigeria's multilateral diplomacy. In relations to hegemonic stability theory, which is the grand theory that uphold the pillar of the research, it can be observed that Nigeria serves as a stabilizing force in the sub-regional and regional polities of Africa since independence. This is most noticeable in the way Nigeria collaborated with some OAU members in liberating Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa. In 1986, Nigeria donated $50 million to African fund being suggested at Harare conference. Apart from southern parts of Africa, Nigeria also collaborated under AMIS-UNAMIS hybrid to restore normalcy to Darfur crisis in Sudan, which some Nigerian leaders have seen as one of the sources of Nigerian insecurity. It also needs to be stated here that the contribution of Nigeria to peace and security in its natural abode, West Africa, surpassed that of any state actor. The financial and material contributions cannot be repeated here as it has been consistently highlighted in Chapter Seven and Finding sections of the thesis. Apart from HST, Role Theory can also adequately explain the multilateral diplomacy of Nigeria. Considering the African-centred policy of Nigeria, it can be immediately discerned that Nigeria conceived for itself the role of liberator, developer, anti-imperialist agent, and regional protector in Africa. All these responsibilities have been elaborated in Chapter Five of the thesis.

Moreover, the Regional Security Complex theory, which has been extensively discussed in Chapter Two, is also a useful theory in explaining the multilateral policy of Nigeria. In relation to West African sub-region, the pattern of security complex is a "centred" one. It is a centred security complex because it is unipolar region headed and controlled by Nigeria. This is clearly different from "standard" regional security complex, which may be bipolar or multipolar in nature. Thus, the West African centred regional security complex has given Nigeria opportunity to perform hegemonic role in West Africa since 1960. According to this theoretical speculation, in a centred regional security complex, the overall regional leader provides mechanism under which regional security can be attained. This can be likened to the formation and sponsor of ECOWAS in 1975 by Nigeria. The centred regional security complex theory assumption is clearly upheld here. Nigeria sponsored the sub-regional mechanism under which the social and economic integration could be achieved. But later in the 1980s, the ECOWAS increasingly played security role in the sub-region. In this case, Nigeria has contributed both financially and materially to ensure that ECOWAS survives. From the formation in 1975, Nigeria contributed 33% of the ECOWAS budget and contributed $5million of $15 million budgeted for the institution structure in 1986. One is therefore safe to assert that regional security complex theory is one of those theories that can explain multilateral policy of Nigeria.

Policy Observation: Foreign policy is a response of state towards external environment which of necessity needs to take into cognizance the domestic and external imperatives. The Nigeria's multilateral policy has failed to give proper attention to neighbouring countries, as they are very crucial in the maintenance of Nigeria's territorial integrity. Current events have shown the need to evolve a strategy that

will involve all Nigeria's neighbours in the same socio-economic union. In this way multilateral policy should be reengineered to accommodate the need of the neighbours and if this is satisfied then the West African interest as a whole can be promoted. The idea of leaving one's backyard dirty and sweep the distant yard needs to be avoided. The current Boko Haram situation is a living testimony that reinforces this proposal. It should be noted that the scourge of terrorism is a potent threat to the Nigeria's security and the failure to instantaneously put an end to it may further worsen the case.

Nigeria also lacks in the area of citizen diplomacy that is expected to provide policy compass to Nigeria's foreign relations. A country's foreign policy is expected to be in agreement with the welfare and security of the citizen. Nigeria as a nation does give financial assistance to countries, which in turn may not yield any benefit to the country as a whole. For example, Nigeria wrote off the OAU debt of $80 million when it was indebted to the multilateral financial institutions to the tune of $33 billion in 1986. In this way, Nigeria's domestic realities do not really reflect the way it responds to financial issue at multilateral level. Although this does not suggest that Nigeria should abandon its responsibilities in multilateral institution but moderation is what is being advocated here. Foreign policy is not all about financial assistance alone. The country is expected to devise other means of assisting the needy countries in Africa, which will be in consonance with the goals and objectives of its national interest. Nigeria as a country also does not consider reciprocity before giving any form of assistance to states in the international system. Most of the assistance rendered through multilateral organisations to most African countries is untied. Most Western nations render assistance to other countries based on national interests. It is strange that most African countries assisted by Nigerian government do not show

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any sign of appreciation. They become the staunch opposition of Nigerian government in global and regional politics. This is particularly true of the Franco-phone West African countries. It is needs to be stressed here also that these countries may have their reason for doing so giving the fact that they are independent entities with national goals and objectives. Thus, whatever may be their reason for such response, there is need to contrive alternative methods to dole out cash to the needy African countries.

In addition, Nigeria's domestic economy is also very weak in relation to other regional powers in the global economic relations. Viable domestic economy is a panacea for progressive and independent foreign policy. The period of General Gowon, most especially, is regarded in Nigerian history as the most wasteful of all governments (see Table 6.2). Most of the wealth amassed as a result of the oil boom was squandered instead of laying a good foundation for national economy. Agriculture was neglected and oil became the principal source of government revenue. Thus, from the time of Gowon Nigerian economy was susceptible to the intricacies of international oil prices which dictate, to a greater extent, fiscal policy. Government abandoned many projects which could not be executed because of the oil glut that occasionally arose. It is conventional in international relations that a state needs to build a strong economy before projecting a viable and independent foreign policy and to do otherwise is to subject the foreign policy to the dictate of the major powers. It is assumed that an economically strong nation can pursue externally oriented goals and objectives with utmost certainty. This condition still prevails in Nigeria till today where government cannot pursue foreign policy goal with utmost certainty because of the fragile domestic economy and politics.

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It is, therefore, imperative at this point that the Nigerian government should strive to build its economy and make its political environment viable before launching aggressive foreign policy to the detriment of its citizens. After all, countries like the U.S., Western Europe, Canada, Japan and some other Eastern Asian countries yielded to domestic pressure before projecting meaningful foreign policy. This is particularly true of the U.S. in the 19th century, during the period of President James Monroe. The government of Monroe went into isolation in order to compete favourably in the international environment. Japan also did the same thing from the times of Tokugawa Leyasu, Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyosi until the time of the Meiji restoration. It is, therefore, true to assert that before a nation can project itself externally, it needs a virile economy and a stable internal political climate to do so. Nigerian government should borrow a leaf from this universal political ethos.

Application Observation: In terms of application and transferability of the research outcome, it is observed that regional hegemons' behaviour may be very hard to generalise. As it has been observed in this research, not all regional powers or hegemons can exert the same influence in the regional subsystem. As it has been also noted in the finding section of this chapter, there is variability in regional powers and this may dictate to certain extent how a hegemon will influence regional decision. Nigeria's case in West Africa and Africa is an exception to regional power status. It must be stressed here that Africa's backward place in global economy, politics and security in the post-independent periods compared to other continents like Asia and Latin America render Nigeria's role indispensable in the continent. In other words, Africa as a continent is unique and nobody expects China, India or Japan to exercise hegemonic role over Asia. This is not possible as Asia unlike Africa is a very large

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continent with many sub-continents and races. Although in terms of number of states, Africa retains the largest number with 54 states. However, in terms of social cohesion and commonality, Asia is the most diverse. In essence, it may be possible to apply this research in a region where there is overwhelming power disparity among the actors. Also, a regional power may expect to perform hegemonic role in its own region but not the way Nigeria has done in West Africa. There are 16 countries in West Africa where Nigeria overwhelmingly dominates but such number of countries may be impossible to dominate by regional hegemon in other regions of the world. It should be expressed here that the theories applied here can be extended to study the role of regional hegemon in international organisations.

8.3 CONCLUSION

Despite all shortcomings, Nigeria's multilateral policy has recorded tremendous success in enhancing its hegemonic position in Africa. The same multilateral mechanism has been used to attain some domestic goals and objectives. In Nigerian civil war, the multilateral avenue was employed to uphold the territorial integrity of the country and in the contemporary time the same mechanism has helped Nigeria government in launching military campaigning against the terror group in northern Nigeria. Despite some fundamental flaws in Nigeria's multilateral policy, it has been able to employ it to navigate the dangerous terrain of international and domestic politics to its own advantage. The multilateral policy in Nigeria's foreign policy cannot be treated in isolation of its activities in Africa and global politics since independence. Nigeria reacts to international issues through multilateral organizations by promoting its own interests and that of other African countries. As a result, various Nigerian leaders since independence have been utilizing the mechanism of multilateralism to promote Nige-

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ria and African interest in global politics. Not only this, Nigeria also participates in global multilateral organization like the UN to engage in peacekeeping and peace-making outside the shore of African continent and this should be seen as another dimension of Nigeria's hegemonic role. Although Nigeria does not claim to be a global power or hegemon, its impact in global multilateral organization tends to serve as leverage to achieve some diplomatic success in global politics. The recent clamouring for the restructuring of the UNSC is a case in point. One of the credentials being advertised by Nigeria is its role in the global peacekeeping since independence.

In a country of over 170 million populations like Nigeria, multilateralism is unavoidable as the country needs to relate with various organisations to promote its national interests. In Nigeria's foreign policy, multilateralism occupies an important place in the formulation of its foreign policy and this may explain why Nigeria has been very active in the global politics for decades. The historical background of Nigeria's multilateral policy thus confirms that all Nigerian government since post-independent years has laid much emphasis on the need to collaborate at global level to solve some of its internal problems and that of Africans'. This is needed based on some factors which rendered multilateralism indispensable in the foreign policy of Nigeria. Factors like geographical contiguity, neighboring country's weakness, territorial integrity, prevention of transnational security challenges like arms trafficking, drug trafficking and terrorism. Not much has been achieved in all these issues and it remain to be seen how such issues can be tackled at multilateral level. It also needs to be stressed here that the international political system is replete of powerful countries and the weaker ones. In this way, it is an unwritten law in the game of international politics that the giants will always lead the way in defining the regional or international order. Because of the material capabilities available to the superpower, great

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powers and regional powers compare to small powers, some states have chosen to champion certain cause that may improve the security and peace at global level. Nigeria as a regional power has been doing this since independence and its leadership is acknowledged at both regional and global level.

At regional level, Nigeria's role is acknowledged in Africa and has been placed one of the major regional protectors, liberators, financiers, mediators and anti-imperialist agents. Also, Nigeria has performed in the area of good neighbourliness policy, decolonization, peacekeeping and peacemaking and capacity building in the global affairs. Nigeria, as it has been stressed earlier, is not the only regional power in Africa but its power is much felt in Africa than any other continental power, most importantly South Africa. This is especially true of Nigeria's role in Africa before the demise of apartheid regimes in southern part of Africa.

Furthermore, it also needs to be stressed that Nigeria's regional hegemonic role in Africa is exceptional compare to other regional powers in the international system. Of all regional powers identified by scholars, Nigeria is the weakest in terms of military and economic capacity. For example, Nigeria cannot be compared to regional powers like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa and yet it surpassed them in taking up responsibilities in its own region. This can be explained primarily in terms of roles Nigeria conceived for itself in Africa. Thus, Nigeria may have been performing beyond its means. This is most particularly noticeable in ECOWAS where it shoulders most of the institutional responsibility. The variability in the region may also explain Nigeria's overwhelming role in Africa. In the West Africa sub-region where Nigeria originally resides, most countries are very small to exist as state and in this way, the regional responsibility rests solely on Nigeria's shoulder. Throughout Africa in the 60s, 70s and 80s, the greater part of African responsibilities fell on Nigeria

and this explain why some Nigerians protested the OAU debt being cancelled by President Ibrahim Babangida in 1986. The president cancelled the debt of $80 million owed by OAU during the Chadian crisis between 1979 and 1982. Since it is not a written law that regional power should do everything at regional level, it would have been wise for Nigeria to exercise a measure of restriction on the manner with which financial and material commitments are channeled. Although Nigeria recorded some success in its multilateral policy but it does so at the expense of its citizens. It is also strange to note that despite all financial and material commitments to regional issues, the most potent threat to Nigerian security emanates from the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. It needs to be recognized that some of the failures recorded can also be attributed to Nigeria's internal circumstances which to some extent are preventable.

The case of Boko Haram, for example, is a failure of domestic apparatus to respond to the callings of Nigerians on the imminent threat in the northeastern part of the country (see Chapter Seven). The emergence of terrorist group in the Borno state of Nigeria cannot be treated in isolation of the geographical location of the area which should have of necessity been treated as such. Nigerian scholars and diplomats have established the links between the emergence of Boko Haram, Sudan and Libya. They are of the conviction that most of the people that live in Borno today were descendants of Libya from Fezzan and they have always exhibits extremist aspect of Islam. It has also been noted that there are millions of Borno people in Sudan who have permanently chosen to live there on their way to Mecca. In this way, there has been connection between Borno and Sudan in terms of sending youths to Islamic schools, euphemism for terrorist training, in Sudan. Nigerian government refused to yield to some of the comments from various quarters. This may be premised on the

fact that Nigeria has always been ruled by northerners who might have provided shield, albeit unknowingly, for the proliferation of extremist schools in the north. It also needs to be stressed that there are millions of Muslims in the Western part of Nigeria who are very peaceful in their conduct and practice but as I stressed earlier, the insecurity in the north today can be interpreted from internal and external events. Thus, Nigeria's achievements have been subsumed by apparent failures in every sector both within the West African sub-region and Nigerian society.

In view of the overall analysis, the thesis has two separate foci: documenting and analyzing Nigerian foreign policy through the multilateral institutions with particular reference to how this is achieved through Nigeria's regional hegemonic status. The second focus is the one where it shows clearly the dynamics, objectives, and process of Nigeria's multilateral diplomacy. What this thesis shows, in this respect, is that the Nigerian government and its institutions have pursued a very well orchestrated and highly effective strategy. They have been pursuing policies, which are clearly conceived and coherent. This is a point of some significance in the international relations sphere. Much of the literature in international relations is based on the assumption that it is the leading western powers who are most effective in using multilateral mechanism, and that the rest of the world is simply the recipient of the outcome of the policies emanate from multilateral institutions. Nigeria seems to be an example of non-western regional power, which has seen the importance of multilateral institution and has devised a coherent policy to accrue and use it. The thesis also used structural theory of hegemonic stability to explain the behavior of non-western regional power in the global politics. In this way, the thesis might break ground in opening up this sphere. In terms of international relations theory, it is worth asking question as to whether this substantially changes thinking about what hegemonic stability theory is.

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At the very least, it broadens the conception of the theory. As the policy is directed towards other countries, most especially African countries, it would definitely have some impacts on their domestic policy.

It is premature to suggest clearly what such impacts look like without the proper evaluation of the effect Nigeria's multilateral policy would have on other African states. In doing so, it is hoped can further strengthen the theoretical framework which is based on the conception of hegemony. In order to properly assess the Nigeria's multilateral policy impact on other African countries, further research in this area is recommended to examine in details the impact of Nigeria's multilateral policy and regional hegemonic posture and its effects on the African states since independence. This will open up new idea on the regional hegemonic status of Nigeria in Africa. It also needs to be stressed that Nigeria's hegemonic role in Africa cannot only be pursued through multilateral policy alone and it is not clear whether other forms of Nigeria's diplomatic channel can confirm the theories used here. That is why it is necessary for this research to be extended to other forms of Nigeria's diplomatic relation in order to establish whether other forms of relation can conform to the theoretical orientations of this research. Therefore, I suggest other researches be conducted in the area of unilateralism, bilateralism and plurilateralism to see whether they can also establish Nigeria's hegemonic posture in Africa.

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
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APPENDIX I

NAMES OF THE INTERVIEWEES (Personal)

1. **Professor Bola Akinterinwa:** Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos. January 27-29, 2015, 10 am -12pm.

2. **Professor Ogaba Uche:** Director of research and studies department, the Nigerian Institute of InternationalAffairs, Lagos. January 28-29, 2015, 1pm-2pm

3. **Professor Olakunle Lawal:** Former Commissioner for Education in Lagos, Nigeria and Professor of Diplomatic History, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. April 24, 2012, 12pm-3pm

4. **Adegbayi Akinbade**: Political Historian and Deputy Director, National Examination Council, Abuja, Nigeria. January 30, 2015, 8am-10am.

5. **Dr. Josuha Bolarinwa**: Research Fellow at NIIA, Lagos. January 28, 2015, 3pm-4pm.

6. **Dr. Sharkdam Wapmuk**: Research Fellow at NIIA, Lagos, January 29, 2015, 8am-9am.

7. **Dr. Kolawole Alo**: University Lecturer, Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Ogun State University, Ago-Iwoye, Nigeria, February 4, 2015, 7pm-9pm.

8. **Babatunde Oyelami**: Local Government Coordinator, Ministry of Youth and Development, Akure, Ondo State, Nigeria, January 26, 2015, 6pm-8pm

9. **Abidoye Morufu:** Diplomatic Historian, Centre for Black Culture and International Understanding, Osogbo, Nigeria, January 29, 2015, 6pm-8pm

10. **Adeyemi Kazeem Adesola:** UN Police Trainer, Mogadishu, Somalia. Divisional Police Officer, Muritala International Airport Ikeja, Lagos, Nigeria, February 22, 2015, 1pm-3pm.

11. **Dr. Paul Osifodunrin:**Senior lecturer, Department of Hstory and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos, Nigeria, February 2, 2015, 12 pm-3pm.

12. **Dr. Olawale Salami:** Senior lecturer, Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Ogun State University, Nigeria, January 30, 2015, 5pm -7pm

13. **Mr. Lukman Oyelami:**Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Lagos, Nigeria. February 3, 2015, 3pm-6pm

14. **Mr. Adegoke Surajudeen:** Policy Analyist and Social Critics, Benin, Nigeria. February 3, 2015, 12pm-2pm

15. **Dr. Isiaka Adams**: Senior Political Correspondent, Punch Newspaper, Lagos, Nigeria. March 20, 2013 and January 26, 2015, 9am-10am

NAME OF THE INTERVIEWEES   (Focused Group)

Dr. Kristen Chineke: Research Fellow, NIIA, Lagos.
Dr. Joshua Bolarinwa: Senior Research Fellow, NIIA, Lagos
Professor Fred Agwu: Research Coordinator, NIIA, Lagos
Olubejide Sunday: Research Fellow, NIIA, Lagos
Ramatu Raji: Research Fellow, NIIA, Lagos
Akinkugbe Busola: Research Fellow, NIIA, Lagos
Adeyemi Linda: Research Fellow, NIIA, Lagos
Ogundeji Olusegun: Research Fellow, NIIA, Lagos

Table 2.3
Summary Distribution of Interview Respondents:

Types of Interview	Elites	Academics & Researchers	Policymakers	Public Officials	Anonymous	Total
Personal Interview	2	8	3	2	4	19
Focused Group Interview		6	2		2	10

LEAD PERSONAL QUESTIONS

How would you describe Nigeria's multilateral policy since independence?
Why multilateral policy in Nigeria's foreign policy?
How would you describe Nigeria in the world?
How would you describe Nigeria in Africa?
How would you describe Nigeria in West Africa?
In what way (s) has Nigeria demonstrated its hegemony?
Is there any connection between Nigeria's regional hegemonic status and multilateral policy?
What are determinants that direct Nigeria's multilateral policy?
What are the impacts of domestic factors on Nigeria's multilateral policy?
What are the impacts of external factors in formulation of Nigeria's multilateral policy?

FOLLOW UP PERSONAL QUESTIONS
Can you give a case where Nigeria is consulted on African issue?
Can you mention those issue-areas where Nigeria cannot employ unilateralism?
Are you saying Nigeria's influence in Africa surpasses that of any other African countries?
What do you mean by Nigeria being in control?
Can you give examples of when states or multilateral body contacted Nigeria for intervention?
How does Nigeria achieve relative peace in Africa?
How then would you describe Nigeria's intervention in west African countries?
Who are the kitchen cabinets in Nigeria's foreign policy?

FOCUSED GROUP QUESTIONS
In what way (s) has Nigeria demonstrated its hegemony?

Is there any connection between Nigeria's regional hegemonic status and multilateral policy?

What are determinants that direct Nigeria's multilateral policy?

What are the impacts of domestic factors on Nigeria's multilateral policy?

What are the impacts of external factors in formulation of Nigeria's multilateral policy?

What are the success and failure of Nigeria's multilateral policy in ECOWAS?

In implementing and executing multilateral policy, what are the challenges facing Nigeria?

What is the prospect of Nigeria's multilateral undertakings in the future?

The candidate at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria.
**(from January 27 – February 2)**

The candidate conducting Focused Group Interview with researchers and policy makers at Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos,

The candidate conducting Focused Group Interview with researchers and policy makers at Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria

Respondents at the Focus Group Interview session, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos.

The candidate at Press Library, NIIA, Lagos, Nigeria (February 4)

The candidate at personal interview session with Director-General of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Professor Bola Akinterinwa.

The candidate with the Director of Research, NIIA, Professor Ogaba Uche.

APPENDIX III

Address by His Excellency, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR, President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the Fifty-Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, Thursday, 23rd September, 1999.

Nigeria, Africa and the World in the Next Millennium.

Mr. President,

A little over two decades ago, I addressed this assembly as head of a military government in Nigeria. On that occasion, the focus of my statement was the urgent need to terminate colonial rule in Namibia and Rhodesia(now Zimbabwe), and dismantle the racist apartheid South Africa. Today, it is a great source of joy for me and my delegation that a distinguished son of Namibia is presiding over the affairs of the 54th session of the UN General Assembly. My delegation assures you of its full cooperation and unwavering support throughout your tenure.

May I also convey, through you, Mr. President, our deep appreciation to your distinguished predecessor, His Excellency, Mr. Didier Opertti of Uruguay, for the able and efficient manner with which he conducted the proceedings of the 53rdSession.

Our appreciation also goes to the secretary-general, His Excellency, Mr. Koffi Annan, for his visionary leadership and the invaluable work of the secretariat under his stewardship.

Permit me also to warmly welcome, on behalf of my country and delegation, the republic of Kribati, the Republic of Nauru and the Kingdom of Tonga, who have just joined this family of nations.

Mr. President, I stand before this assembly today very proud to be the leader of a Nigeria that has successfully managed the transition to democracy, after a decade and a half of military rule. I would like to seize this opportunity to express the profound appreciation of all Nigerians for the international support and encouragement, which combined so effectively with the relentless determination of Nigerians themselves to reconstruct their country into vibrant democracy.

Our administration has raised the hopes of Nigerians, and their expectations are correspondingly high. We are well aware of the enormity of the challenges that we face. But we are fully resolved to tackle our numerous social, economic, and political problems head on. And by the Grace of God, we will not fall.

Since assuming office some four months ago, our administration has put in place an institutional framework for the purpose of reconciling competing interests and groups in our society. Our democratic institutions are now operating effectively within the system of checks and balances enshrined in our constitution. Furthermore, we have opted for a policy of inclusiveness in all our political appointments, with a cabinet, for instance, in which all registered political parties are represented, thus moving away from the divisive practice of "winner-takes-all".

Our administration has initiated policies aimed at revitalizing the economy in order to create an enabling environment for investment and economic growth. We

have also put in place appropriate legal framework for the protection of foreign investments and repatriation of legitimate profits.

Other measures taken include:
(i)   A vigorous anti-corruption campaign;
(ii) The promotion of transparency and accountability in public life;
(iii) The abolition of decrees and regulations which hindered the inflow of foreign investments;
(iv) The generation of opportunities for employment and income savings for domestic investments;
(v)   The privatization of key-state enterprises such as electricity and telecommunications;
(vi) Legislation measures to redress obvious cases of neglect and injustices done to ethnic minorities, particularly in the oil-producing areas of the Niger-delta region, and to deal with the problems of the environment;
(vii)   Investigation of past human rights violations with a view to promoting and protecting fundamental freedoms;
(viii)   Strengthening the capacity of the law enforcement agencies to promote law and order as well as security, and to deal more effectively with the problem of drug trafficking.

Mr. President, Africa is indeed proud and glad to see the end of this century coincide with the total elimination of colonialism and the twin menace of Constitutionalised racism in the southern part of the continent. The United Nations deserves our warm commendation for the crucial role it has played in this process.

Let me also, Mr. President, pay tribute to the thousand who lost their lives in the struggle for freedom so that those of us alive today can proudly say we have the destiny of the continent in our hands.it is, however a destiny which poses monumental challenges in our effort to improve the quality of life on our continent. We must strive to alleviate the grinding poverty and material deprivation that has persistently remained a feature of our political freedom.

Africa and Globalisation
Mr. President, as we approach the dawn of the new millennium, the defining feature of our increasingly interdependence world is accelerated globalization and the liberalization of production, trade, investment and finance. But, for us in the developing world, the reality today is quite. Globalization, in its various manifestations, is already experiencing a troubled relationship with the imperatives of development.

Mr. President, it is rather tragic that Africa, the least developed of all regions and the least able to cope with external shocks, has borne the brunt of the adverse effects of globalization of the world economy. There are grim statistics, which indicate that the well-known marginalization of the continent has turned into de-linkage from the global scene.
(i)   Since 1992, Africa's exports and imports as a share of world trade have declined from four per cent to two per cent;
(ii) Africa's development is presently strait-jacketed by a debt burden of around 300 billion US dollars;
(iii) The continent is experiencing import compression, weak productivity, and low output. On the average, factories that are still operating, do so at less than 30 per cent of installed capacity;

(iv) Africa's share in total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to developing countries has dropped from eleven per cent in the late 1980s to less than five per cent in the second half of the 1990s and to a meager 1.2 per cent of world FDI flows in 1997.

And may I point out, Mr. President, that this trend has continued despite the efforts of African countries to implement far-reaching economic reforms and maintain macro-economic stability, particularly through the introduction of more open and business-friendly investment environment, and the provision of incentives to attract foreign investment.

In the quest for a better and fairer management of globalised world economy, it is incumbent on us to direct our searchlight on the unsatisfactory evolution of the multilateral trading system. In participating in the historic Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations that ushered in the new rules-based trading system, the developing world had hoped that the new trading regime would enhance their trading fortunes, facilitate their effective integration into the world economy, and arrest their marginalization from the global trading system.

Unfortunately, however, the vast majority of developing countries, particularly in Africa, have so far been unable to reap the benefits arising from their membership of the world trade organization. Africa's trade prospects continue to be hampered by the non-implementation of the special and differential provisions that favour developing countries, and the increasingly protectionist measures that are being imposed against their export products. Besides, the paucity of technical and financial assistance that would have enabled the developing countries to take advantage of the limited market access opportunities that exist continues to deepen Africa's marginalization in the globalised world economy.

Debt Overhang

Mr. President, without doubt, the biggest monetary and financial obstacle confronting developing countries is the chronic debt overhang. According to UN figures, the global debt of all developing countries stood at 567 billion US dollars in 1980, and 1.4 trillion US dollars in 1992. In that twelve years period, these countries made foreign debt payments totaling 1.6 trillion US dollars. Now, out of the forty-one countries which the World Bank describes as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), thirty-three are African countries, a group that, some believe, is richly deserving of their own special category, called Severely Indebted Low-Income Countries(SILICs).

Today, in sub-Saharan Africa, every man, woman and child owes 357 US dollars. This is a continent where millions live in abject poverty earning around 100 US dollars a year, or twenty-seven cents a day. Some African countries now spend as much as four times on servicing debts as they do on education and health care. Some countries now spend up to 40 per cent of their national budgets on debts servicing. Furthermore, it is reliably estimated that for every dollar given in official development aid, three US dollars go back to the rich countries in debt service payments.

Mr. President, I make bold to assert that debt relief for developing countries is not a plea for charity, but an urgent matter of social and economic justice.It has to be redressed if there is to be peace and stability in the 21st century. Therefore we propose the following:

(i) Definitive debt cancellation, not just reduction or rescheduling of the debt service regime;

(ii) Eligibility limited to unpayable debts which for Africa, means the bulk of the 300 billion US dollar current stock debt;

(iii) Debt remission that is not predicated on the institutionally harsh conditionalities of structural adjustment programmes;

(iv) Recognition on both sides of the bargaining table that lenders and borrowers share joint responsibilities for debts incurred in circumstances that are morally questionable in the first place;

(v) Debt cancellation that benefit ordinary people.

Mr. President, Nigerians rightly expect democracy to yield perceptibledividends in their lives. Our administration will, however, find tha task of meeting this expectation virtually impossible without substantial reduction of our debt burden, especially as we call on the same citizens to make sacrifice implicit in the recent measures aimed at prudent management of our national economy.

I wish to invite the attention of this assembly to the related issue of illegal capital flight from Africa. It is an open secret that much of Africa's wealth have been illegally siphoned out of the continent by corrupt regimes and unpatriotic individuals working in collaboration with foreign partners. Nigeria and many African countries would be able to pay off large portions of their debts if only they could recover some of the capital illegally stashed abroad. We thus believe that now is the time to collectively deal with this issue.

In this regard, Mr. President, Nigeria calls for a concerted effort of the international community through an international convention for the repatriation to Africa and developing world of all capital illegally transferred from these countries.

Such an international convention or agreement is legally feasible and morally sustainable. It will compel participating banks to disclose the source of the illegal accounts they hold, repatriate them to the countries of rightful ownership, and subject the guilty parties to the full weight of national and international law.

Mr. President, it is with a heavy heart that I raise the issue of the HIV/AIDS pandemic throughout Africa. Our continent is bearing the brunt of this terrible disease which now kills around two million Africans annually, thus officially overtaking malaria as Africa's number one primary health care problem. This situation is even more frightening in that it has now left six million children orphaned in eastern and southern part of Africa. in west Africa, the disease has been spreading just as rapidly. Unlike malaria which is location specific, HIV/AIDS knows neither climate nor regional boundaries. Global cooperation is an imperative if we are to succeed in dealing with this scourge.

Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping
Among the immediate challenges facing Nigeria and Africa today, is resolving the many conflicts raging on the continent. Today, as many as nineteen sub-Saharan countries are engaged in armed conflicts. The negative impact of these conflicts in human, social, economic and environmental destruction does not need to be described here.

Nigeria, and indeed the entire West Africa sub-region have devoted considerable human, material, political and diplomatic resources to the resolution of the crises in the sub-region, starting with Liberia and subsequently Sierra Leone and guinea Bissau.

Efforts are being made in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Angola for peaceful resolution of their conflicts.

Indeed, African leaders at the recent summit of the organization of African unity held at Algiers, and at the urging of the Nigerian delegation, agreed to declare next year as the year of peace, security and stability in Africa. By this declaration, we have dedicated ourselves to making the year 2000 the year when Africans direct all efforts into effectively eliminating armed conflicts on their continent. We hope to build on the fresh momentum for peace occasioned by the budding peace initiatives in Congo, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Angola.

We have also agreed on the overriding need to uphold codes of decency, ethics and minimum standards of decorum among African governments and their leadership. The days are gone when OAU turned a blind eye to the excesses and abuses of power by member-governments. Forceful and undemocratic changes in governments will no longer be overlooked or tolerated. We intend to condemn in absolute terms all violations of these codes, and ostracize their perpetrators. It is our duty and moral responsibility to treat our citizens decently and humanely.

Mr. President, my country has always believed that the threat to international peace and security from any corner of the globe should be considered a threat to the peace and security of the world as a whole. While the maintenance of international peace and security remains the primary responsibility of the Security Council, the Charter provision for the complementary role of regional and sub-regional groups has also proved to be critical to the maintenance of peace at the regional and global levels. The establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a clear testimony of our commitment to sub-regional peace. As the records show, ECOMOG succeeded in putting an end to the Liberian war in 1997, reinstating the democratically elected president of Sierra Leone in 1998, and also bringing about the current peace agreement for Sierra Leone signed in Lome, Togo in July 1999. The time has come however for the Security Council to assume its full responsibility, especially in Sierra Leone and other flash points of conflicts in Africa. for too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in west Africa has been left almost entirely to a few states in our sub-region. The non-implementation of the peace agreement and Nigeria's continual burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining Nigeria financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop. The United Nations needs to do more in providing logistics and financial support to assist regional peace-keeping and peace-building efforts as well as enhancing the welfare of refugees worldwide without discrimination.

Reform of the Security Council
Mr. President, my delegation believes that it has been the purpose of the United Nations organization to prescribe democracy and change for its members and yet make little or no progress in the democratization of its own organs such as Security Council. My delegation accordingly urges the general assembly, during this session, to include deliberations and reach agreement on the modalities for the reform and expansion of the Security Council so that the millennium assembly will adopt them next year and not later.

How can the United Nations continue to perpetuate and justify a situation whereby Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat in the Security Council? In order to promote reform and democratization of the security council, Africa, with fifty-three-member states, should be allocated at least two permanent seats, commensurate not only with the continent's size and population, but with its track record also of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr. President, I wish to re-affirm our belief that the United Nations is the most universal body ever designed for collectively resolving humanity's common problems. Our organization has come a long way since its establishment fifty-four years ago. Although, created in a different era and under different circumstances, and in spite of numerous constraints, the United Nations has continuously sought to adapt itself to the changes in it which remains an institution whose working methods, procedures and administrative structure have in many respects become outdated. Yet, the world as we know it today without the United Nations would be inconceivable. For it has come to symbolize hope for a better and more secure future for many, particularly in the developing areas of the world, indeed, though a majority of our countries could not be members when it was created, we are, today, its strongest defenders and advocates of the ideals for which it stands. We believe in the family of nations, and within that family the strong members have the responsibility to protect and strengthen the weaker members.

Mr. President. At the close of the twentieth century and the beginning of the third millennium, there is need for stocktaking and proper assessment of the implementation of previous resolution emanating especially from the major World Summits and the realization of the purposes and objectives of our organization. In this regard, I pledge Nigeria's continued contributions and positive commitments to the ideals of the charter of the United Nations.

APPENDIX IV

NIGERIA JOINS THE UNITED NATIONS (THE MAIDEN ADDRESS, October
7th, 1960)
By
Sir AbubakarTafawaBalewa, K.B.E., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
*Prime Minister Sir AbubakarTafawaBalewa led the Nigerian delegation to the
fifteenth Regular session of the United Nations General Assembly during which he
made this, the country's maiden speech to the World body on7 October 1960, the day
Nigeria was admitted as the 99thmember of the Organization*

Last Saturday the country which I have the honor to represent, the Federation of Nigeria, became independent and assumed the rights and responsibilities of a sovereign State. Today Nigeria has been admitted to the United Nations and assumes still more responsibilities.

On behalf of my countrymen in Nigeria I thank you all most sincerely for accepting us as a fellow Member of this organization. We are properly grateful for this recognition and for the generous friendly gesture made by so many Members who sent very distinguished delegations to join us in celebrating our accession to independence. I am particularly pleased that so many important representatives could come to Nigeria on that occasion, because they will be able to inform their Governments of the genuine desire of Nigeria to have friendly relations with you all.

Before proceeding to deal in detail with the many questions which are of interest to my country, it is better to state briefly the principles which we have accepted as the basis of our policies in international relations. First, it is the desire of Nigeria-as I have said already to remain on friendly terms with all nations and to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organizations. Secondly, Nigeria, a large and populous country of over 35 million, has absolutely no territorial or expansionist intentions. Thirdly, we shall not forget our old friends, and we are proud to have been accepted as a member of the British Commonwealth. But, nevertheless, we do intend to ally ourselves as a matter routine with any of the Power blocs. We are committed to uphold the principles upon which the United Nations is founded. Fourthly, Nigeria hopes to work with other African States for the progress of Africa and to assist in bringing all African Territories to a state of responsible independence.

It is perhaps natural that I should speak about Africa first. **We in Nigeria have been fortunate in achieving our independence without bloodshed or bitterness,** and I hope that this will lend weight to the proposals which I am about to set before you.

The recent tragic events in Republic of the Congo must be uppermost in all our minds, and it is about that country that I wish to speak to you first. I frankly admit that there are many features of this seemingly intractable problem which remain obscure to me. I am in some doubt as to the exact manner in which the Constitution granting independence to that country was drawn up by the colonial power which formerly administered the territory, and as to the degree of consultation there was with the Congolese peoples themselves, and at what level that consultation was carried out. I do not know how widely the provisions of the new Constitution were known in that country, or whether there is any pattern of administration going up from the village to the provincial and to the national level.

Many other questions present themselves which require answers if we are to find a solution to the present problems. For instance, what sort of government machinery is available to execute whatever policies may be decided upon the Congolese Government? Nevertheless, with the information which is available to us, we in Nigeria feel there are several important factors to be constantly borne in mind in dealing with the problem.

The first of these is that Africa must not be allowed to become a battleground in the ideology struggle. For this reason the Congo situation must be a matter to be dealt with primarily by African States at the political level. Secondly, we believe that in dealing with the problem of creating a real political life in the country itself, it will be necessary to start at the bottom, by seeing that local and provincial authorities are established, while maintaining the essential unity of the country.

We also believe that the Congolese people were right to appeal to the United Nations Organization for help and advice in rebuilding their country, rather than to turn to any individual power. Until achieving our own independence, we have hesitated to add our views to the general discussion about the Congo lest we should merely add to the confusion. But now I feel that it is my duty to put before you, and to ask for your sympathetic consideration, the possible solutions which are presented before us.

We warmly applauded the immediate response of the United Nations to the Congolese disaster. The speed with which troops were sent to maintain law and order was most commendable. But the mere sending of armed forces is not enough. I consider it essential that the United Nations should thoroughly investigate the root causes of the troubles which have arisen there, and I suggest the appointment of a fact-finding commission to look into the circumstances which caused the present crisis. Without a proper and thorough analysis it is idle to pretend that an effective remedy can be prescribed.

Here I would say that to my mind it is most important that none of the great powers should be represented on the fact-finding commission because, however honest their intentions, it would be inevitable that they should be regarded as having a particular interest in the problem.

The first essential is to find a Government capable of governing, and for this it will probably be necessary to hold new elections in the Republic of the Congo. When these have been held, there will be some properly authorized leaders with whom the United Nations Organization can cooperate. I think it is important that the United Nations should work only with those whom I have termed the authorized leaders. They may seem to some of us to be far from perfect, and to some even objectionable; but if they are duly chosen by a majority, then they must be supported. It would be the height of folly to attempt to impose a Government which was not founded on popular support, and the result would be even greater confusion. I have studied various suggestions which have been put forward, and I can tell you that some of those which appear at first sight attractive are really quite impossible.

For instance, there can be no question of the United Nations taking on the role of administering Power or of the Republic of the Congo being regarded as United Nations Trust Territory. That Republic has been declared independent, and if a practicable plan is to be worked out, we must accept the facts and arrange for assistance and advise, which the United Nations can give on an agency basis without infringing on the sovereignty of the Government.

It is true that elections cannot be held overnight. It is an arduous and lengthy task to arrange elections in such a large territory, and some immediate action is re-

quired in the meantime. So I think that the United Nations must take a much firmer line than hitherto and quite firmly support the Central Government in maintaining law and order and in keeping the machinery of day-to-day government moving. This will entail giving additional powers to the United Nations force and to its other agencies, but only for a limited period, until new elections have been held. Once the people have chosen their representatives, it will be possible to hold discussions to find out the form of government which will be generally acceptable.

Will the result be a confederacy or a federation? The root of the problem will lie in revenue allocation. And here the United Nations can be of the greatest assistance, by providing the necessary experts to inquire and advise. In all of its activities it is most essential that the United Nations make use of only the most able and experienced experts. I am not criticizing any of the United Nations Staff now serving in Congo, but I do want to emphasize that if this problem is to be solved, it is absolutely necessary to procure the services of men who are really knowledgeable and capable of working out practicable means of dealing with the various questions.

I have said already that much of the present situation in the Congo is obscure. But from what I have heard I believe that the situation is not so desperate as is sometimes thought. I am told that the lower branches of the civil service are efficient, that the public utilities continue to function and that there is a fair amount of executive capacity.

It seems to me important to ensure that the ordinary day-to-day government is kept working, because if that is allowed to collapse, the difficulties will be increased a thousand fold. In order to man the higher positions it will obviously be necessary to train the Congolese. To this end, **I propose that those African States which hold the same views as Nigeria combine with us to find places in secondary and technical schools for some hundred of Congolese boys.** I do not think the ignorance of the language of instruction would be much of a problem, and I am sure that the effect of a larger number of Congolese seeing how other African countries manage their own affairs would have a beneficial result and will help the Congolese to take a wider view and to realize fully the importance of not allowing a breakdown of the constitution to take place

Nigeria is prepared to make its experience available and to send technical experts to assist in planning and development for the future. We can also lend professors and teaching staff from the time to give short courses and lectures, and I assure you that many qualified Nigerians are eager to take part in such work during their school and college vacations. Those are but a few of the ways in which the Congo can be helped. I am sure that late though it already is, it is not too late. We African States should come together to assist the Congolese to solve their problems. I feel sure that we can do so, but it must be done collectively and not done merely as so many individual States. We must do it together and we must be entrusted with this responsibility by the United Nations and be given its full backing. Nor would I limit advice and assistance to African countries, but would welcome the participation of other States; though I repeat I think it would be advisable to exclude the greater powers.

Now to deal with the more general problems of Africa; problems which are bound to arise when the Powers which colonized Africa in the last century are now relinquishing their control and granting independence to their former colonies. The most serious problem in these cases seems to me to be that **political independence is totally inadequate itself if it is not accompanied by stability and economic secu-**

rity, and if there is not genuine personal liberty, with freedom to express one's views and to profess whatever faith one desires.

Economic weakness is evident in a new country open to every kind of pressure and results in other countries depriving its people of the freedom to choose a form of government which they feel suits them best. Spreading political propaganda or more insidious infiltration through technical assistance can virtually rob any under-developed country of its freedom. I, therefore feel that if the advanced nations of the other continents are really desirous of seeing the new African States stand on their own feet and make their own particular contribution to the peace of the world and to the happiness of mankind, they should make a real effort to desist from fomenting trouble in any of the African countries. The best way for them to assist us in reaching maturity is not by ideological propaganda, in whatever form it may be disguised, but by helping us genuinely, with really good will, to develop our resources and to educate our human material up to those standards which are necessary for proper development.

Many of the new African States are, indeed, potentially rich and should contribute to improving the world, but for the fact that they lack the technological knowledge and the financial capital necessary to develop their resources. It is especially in this field that I commend the many schemes which the United Nations has sponsored for assisting the underdeveloped countries. Indeed, I wish that there were many more of them. I would not necessarily limit technical assistance to the United Nations, but I do seriously suggest that it is in the best interests of world peace for assistance from elsewhere to be given only to those countries which, although still under-developed, are politically stable and have a properly constituted government which is capable of understanding the risks of accepting aid from another country. **I certainly deprecate direct assistance being given by individual power to countries which are not yet able to stand on their own feet and are potentially unstable, because such aid would only give rise to suspicion and, in the end, the receiving country may find itself involved in the ideological war, a thing which, as I have already said, we in Africa must do everything in our power to prevent.**

I wish to make our position plain beyond any measure of doubt with regard to the African Continent. We in Nigeria appreciate the advantages which the size of our country and its population give us, but **we have absolutely no aggressive intentions. We shall never impose ourselves on any other country and shall treat every African Territory, big or small, as our equal because we honestly feel that it is only on that basis of equality that peace can be maintained in our continent.**

The colonizing powers of the last century partitioned Africa in haphazard and artificial manner and drew boundaries which cut right across former groupings. Yet, however artificial those boundaries were at first the countries they have created have come to regard themselves as units independent of one another. We have seen them all seeking admission to this Organizations as separate states. It is, therefore, our policy to leave those boundaries as they are at present, and to discourage any adjustment whatsoever. I hope that this policy will bring about an atmosphere of trust, and that if each country is given proper recognition and respect as a sovereign State, it will be possible to have effective cooperation on all matters of common concern to us.

I hope that priority will be given in the various geographical groupings. I refer to the West and the North and to Central Africa and do recommend joint consultations about non political matters such as the coordination of the transport and communication systems, research in connection with natural resources, and above all, education. **I should like to see students being freely admitted into the universities**

of other neighboring territories, and I am sure that by such steps, we shall entirely eliminate any desire or need to station armed forces on our frontiers. However, I must say that I do not rule out the possibility of eventual union. But for the present, it is unrealistic to expect countries to give up their sovereignty which they have so recently acquired, and I am quite sure that **it is wrong to imagine that political union could of itself bring the countries together. On the contrary, it will follow as a natural consequence of cooperation in other fields.** So I wish to state that I think that it will be the greatest threat to peace in Africa if any country sets out to undermine the authority of the properly chosen leaders of other states with a view of imposing political union. That way can only bring trouble. In the fullness of time, as political relations develop and there is more and more consultation between the States of regional groupings, then political union may well be a natural result, but it would be wrong either to impose it or seek to hasten the process unduly.

So far, I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think that we are not interested in other regions, and we hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organization. But, being human, we are naturally concerned first with what effect our immediate neighborhood. We do indeed believe in the United Nations as providing perhaps the only machinery for inducing world peace. But while proudly and gratefully accepting membership in this supreme world body, may I frankly say that we who waited for admission have sometimes been concerned, lest our older and more powerful brethren are losing sight of the objective which, in founding this organization, they sought to serve. If I think correctly, the whole purpose of this organization is to enable the different countries to work together in a friendly atmosphere to procure the peace and progress of mankind, and this cooperation is meant to link all the member nations, no matter what sort of Government each individual country enjoys within its own boundaries. It was also, I believe, the intention of the original promoters to see that countries which are now backward should be assisted in every possible way to develop so that they become world assets and not liabilities. I do not think that it was ever the intention of any of those countries which were responsible for the creation of this Organization to turn it into an arena where party politics could be played on the highest level, and where ideological differences would obscure the main objective of securing peace among the nations and stability in the world at large.

Nigeria is a populous country. There are about 35 million of us and our territory is relatively large. We are willing to learn before we rush into the field of international politics, but we are totally unwilling to be diverted from the ideals which we think to be true. That is the reason we in Nigeria will not be found to align ourselves as a matter of routine, with any particular bloc. Indeed, I hate the very ideas of blocs existing at all in the United Nations.

The General Assembly is the supreme conference in the world, and if the ideas on which it is based are really accepted, then one would expect every representative, no matter from where he comes, to feel absolutely free to express the mind of the country he represents, to feel that he is in no way restricted either by the lobbying of other representatives, or in the case of under-developed countries, by being put under an obligation through technical and financial aid. Each representative should be strong enough to resist all efforts to deflect him from the path of truth as he sees it.

We in Nigeria honestly believe in the principle of the United Nations, and we believe that with a change of heart among the members and especially among the more powerful nations, there is no reason why there should not be peace and happi-

ness. **I think that all will agree that the present tension in the world is due to mutual suspicion and the efforts made by groups of countries to impose ideological notions of one kind or another on their neighbors.** I am speaking frankly to you, Mr. President, because this is the first occasion on which my country has been able to speak out in the councils of the world. One great advantage which we new nations have is that the accession to independent makes a clear break with our past and presents us with the opportunity to enter into the field of international relations untrammeled by prior commitments. It is probably the one occasion in the life of a nation when it is possible to choose the policies with the inherent qualities of goodness. And so, as we gratefully take the place to which you have invited us, we feel an immense responsibility to the world which you represent. We see nation wrangling with nation, and we wonder how we can help.

Just one week ago the clocks were midnight and Nigeria was on the threshold of independence. There was a brief ceremony at which the leaders of three different faiths,each said a brief prayer. We then realized, all of us, that however much we might imagine ourselves to be responsible for the happy accession to independence, we realize that, above all, there is a divine providence, and I do honestly believe that this is the one primary essential for international friendship.

Cooperation is for each man to be true to his religious belief and to reaffirm the basic principles of his particular creed. It may be that, when we hear the world crying out for peace, we may receive the inspiration to deal with these intractable problems and be able to really devote all our resources to the advancement of mankind by applying those eternal truths which will inevitably persist long after we ourselves are utterly forgotten.

Sir AbubakarTafawaBalewa

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