Universiti Utara Malaysia

ASYMMETRY OF POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN THAI GOVERNMENT AND MALAY MUSLIMS AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN THAILAND, 2004 – 2013

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A Thesis submitted to the Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government in fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy Universiti Utara Malaysia

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
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i

ABSTRAK

Konflik yang berlaku sejak tahun 2004 di Selatan Thailand telah menimbulkan perdebatan hangat, bukan sahaja dalam kalangan ahli akademik dan ahli politik, tetapi lebih memeranjatkan berlaku dalam kalangan pihak berkepentingan dengan konflik tersebut. Pelbagai hujah yang dilemparkan berkaitan tercetusnya konflik di selatan Thailand, termasuklah petunjuk yang salah daripada pemimpin agama yang radikal dan kerajaan Thailand yang terus membuat penafian ke atas identiti orang Melayu yang beragama Islam. Tiada penjelasan yang jelas berkaitan hal asimetri (ketidakseimbangan) dalam hubungan kuasa antara kerajaan Thailand dan orang Melayu yang beragama Islam serta bagaimana dimensi ini menambah dan terus menyumbang kepada hubungan yang sedia ada, iaitu ketegangan dan konflik antara kedua-dua pihak yang bertelagah. Oleh itu, objektif kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji dan menganalisis kedinamikan ke atas ketidakseimbangan hubungan kuasa antara kerajaan Thailand dan orang Melayu Islam dengan menfokuskan implikasi terhadap konflik di selatan Thailand berdasarkan gabungan teori-teori asimetri. Kerangka teoritikal ini menekankan interaksi strategik semua pihak yang terlibat dalam konflik dan cuba untuk menyediakan satu kerangka analitikal bagi menganalisis hubungan ketidakseimbangan kuasa antara semua yang terlibat dalam konflik. Kajian ini dibahagikan kepada tiga bahagian. Bahagian pertama mengkaji hubungan kuasa politik antara kerajaan Thailand dan orang Melayu Islam yang merangkumi dasar perdamaian pentadbiran selatan dan pergerakan politik orang Melayu Islam. Bahagian kedua tertumpu kepada hubungan antara kuasa ketenteraan kerajaan Thailand dan keupayaan pergerakan militan Islam. Bahagian terakhir membincangkan hubungan kuasa sosioekonomi antara kerajaan Bangkok dan orang Melayu Islam serta bagaimana ia menyumbang kepada konflik yang berlarutan di selatan Thailand. Hal ini termasuk juga kuasa kerajaan pusat dan keupayaan orang Melayu daripada segi sosioekonomi. Data untuk kajian ini diperolehi daripada data primer dan sekunder. Sumber data primer diperolehi daripada dokumen, laporan, ucapan, warta kerajaan diraja, siaran akhbar dan dasar keselamatan. Temu bual dengan tokoh-tokoh ilmuwan dan terkenal serta pihak-pihak yang terlibat dengan konflik juga telah dijalankan. Data sekunder termasuklah daripada buku, artikel jurnal, surat khabar dan majalah. Hasil kajian ini mendapati bahawa hubungan kuasa simetri antara kerajaan Thailand yang berkuasa dan kuat serta orang Melayu Islam yang lemah dan ditindas telah menyemarakkan lagi api konflik di wilayah ini. Malah pemberontakan yang berlaku adalah reaksi daripada militan Melayu Islam untuk menentang tindakan yang mereka anggap sebagai keganasan kerajaan Thailand terhadap cara hidup masyarakat Melayu Islam di sana. Perdebatan ini akhirnya menunjukkan bahawa tindakan kerajaan Bangkok dalam menanggani konflik ini jelas tidak berkesan.

Kata kunci: Perhubungan kuasa asimetri, Teori Asimetri, Orang Melayu Islam, Selatan Thailand, Kerajaan Thailand

ABSTRACT

The conflict outbreak in Southern Thailand since 2004 has provoked a hot debate, not only among the academicians and political practitioners, but surprisingly it also involved a broad range of stakeholders in the conflict. Commentators provided a range of explanations for the resurgence of the conflict in southern Thailand. These include: misguidance from the radical religious leaders and Thai's government continuous denial of Malay Muslims' ethno-religious identity. Missing from these suite explanations is the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai's government and the Malay Muslims and how this dimension added or contributed further to the already tensed relations between the two warring groups. Thus, the objective of this study is to examine and analyze the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai's government and the Malay Muslims, with a particular focus on its implications on the conflict in southern Thailand, using combined theories of asymmetry. The theoretical frame work highlights strategic interactions of those involved and attempts to provide an analytical framework in analyzing the imbalance of power relations among those involved in the conflict. This study is divided into three parts. The first part examines the political power relation between the Thai's government and the Malay Muslims which includes peace-building policy of southern administration and the Malay Muslims' political movements. The second part explains the relation between the Thai government's military power and the capability of the Malay Muslims militant movements. The last part discusses the socio-economic power relation between the Bangkok government and the Malay Muslims and how it contributes to the raging protracted conflict in the southern Thailand. These include the central government power and the Malay Muslims' socio-economic capabilities. Data for this study were collected from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include documents, reports, speeches, royal government gazette, press releases and security policies. Interviews with knowledgeable and prominent figures and those involved in the conflict were also conducted. Secondary data include books, articles, journals, newspaper and magazines. The study reveals the extreme asymmetry of power relations between the Thai's strong government, and the weak and deprived Malay Muslims, has contributed further to the intensity of the conflict in the region. It is discovered that the insurgency is a result of the Malay Muslim militants' reaction to resist what they considered as the state of violence against their very existence as people. Finally, it is argued that Bangkok government's effort to manage the conflict was ineffective.

Keywords: Asymmetry of Power Relations, Asymmetry Theories, Malay Muslims, Southern Thailand, Thai Government

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF APPENDICES

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Bersatu The United Front for the Independence of Patani
BIPP The Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (Islamic Liberation Front of Patani)
BNPP The Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (National Liberation Front of Patani)
BRN The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolution Front)
CDR The Council for Democratic Reform under a Constitutional Monarchy
CPM 43 The Civilian-Police-Military Task force 43
CPM The Communist Party of Malaya
CPT The Communist Party of Thailand
DP The Democrat Party
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
GAMPAR The Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (Greater Patani Malayu Association)
GMIP The Garakan Mujahidin Islam Patani
GMP The Garakan Mujahidin Patani
IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices
IO Information Operation
ISA The Internal Security Act
ISOC The Internal Security Operations Command
NCPO TheNational Council for Peace and Order
NESDB The National Economic and Social Development Board
NRC The National Reconciliation Commission
NSC The National Security Council
NSO The National Statistics Office
OIC The Organization of the Islamic Conference
PAD The People's Alliance for Democracy
PAO The Provincial Administrative Organization
PPP The People's Power Party
PT The Pheu Thai party
PULO The Patani United Liberation Organization
RKK (Runda Kumpulan Kecil) The small militant unit
SAO The Sub-district Administrative Organization
SBPs The Southern Border Provinces
SBPAC The Southern Border Provincial Administrative Centre
SBPDSC The Southern Border Provinces Development Strategy Committee
SBPPBC The Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command
SWCOM The Special Warfare Command
TF The Task Force
TRT The Thai Rak Thai Party
VDC/ Or Sor The Volunteer Defence Corps
VDV/ Chor Ror Bor The Village Defence Volunteers
VPV/ Or Ror Bor The Village Protection Volunteers

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

This study focuses on the conflict in southern Thailand as an internal armed conflict, which has been occurring in the territory of Thailand. It is clear that the Thai government and the Malay Muslims are the parties to this conflict. The recent outbreak of conflict since 2004 has provoked the most nuanced debate among scholars. With respect to earlier studies, the conflict has risen in the context of the War on Terror, as well as the role of international Islamic terrorism behind the global and local Muslims' activities are widely discussed issues. But many scholars clearly state that the Malay Muslims' insurgencies have not related to global issues or Islamic militant groups in other regions. They are only local conditions being the internal armed conflict between the government and the minority Malay Muslims (International Crisis Group, 2005; Sidel, 2007; Liew, 2007).

This study uses the term "southern Thailand" to represent the conflict area in Malay Muslim dominant provinces. Academic studies, reports of international organizations, the international media, and Thai media tend to use this term to signify the area of conflict in southern Thailand. However, in term of geopolitics, the southern region is on the Malay Peninsula, connected with the Central region of Thailand, and it may be classified into the south west coast and the south east coast. In term of administration, it may be roughly separated into sub-regions, for example; the upper southern represents to provinces above Songkla province and the lower southern, as well as the far south and deep south or southernmost are represented to

be the Southern Border Provinces (SBPs). Normally, the SBPs is officially called by the government. In fact, the SBPs comprise of five provinces along the border of Thai and Malaysian, which are Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkla, and Satul provinces. Likewise, the area of Southern Thailand can be defined as a territory of the former sultanese state of Patani. Therefore, historians, the Malay nationalist and separatist groups often feel satisfied to name this area as Patani. On the other hand, local ordinary people usually simply called "Sam Chang Wat" (three provinces) or specify a province of provinces dominated by Malay Muslims, which are Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat provinces, including four districts of Songkla province, which are Chana, Thepa, Sabayoi, and Nathawi.

About 1.6 million Malay Muslims or about 80 percent of total 2 million populations have dominated southern Thailand. Malay Muslims who follow Islam and adhere Malay custom speak local Malay language that is not mutually understood by Thai speakers. Tension and armed conflict become regular situations in the relationship between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. Particularly, there are many separatist movements were found since 1960s for example, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the Patani United Liberated Organization (PULO). Previously debates over the causes of Malay Muslims insurgencies often focus on ethno-religious identities and historical trauma narratives. Especially, the conflict of cultures between Buddhist and Muslim cosmology has been considered as the root cause of conflict for a hundred years since the Thai government annexed the land of Malay Muslims to be the part of the establishment of nation-state and Malay

Muslims have become the minority of Thailand (Pitsuwan, 1985; Che Man, 1990; Aphornsuvan, 2008).

Although armed struggle of the Malay Muslim separatists had occurred in southern Thailand for decades, the violent escalated reemerge in 2004. Due to the current conflict from January 2004 to 2013, there were 8,540 violent incidents took place, besides 5,352 fatalities and 9,965 were wounded (ISOC Region 4, 2014, January 3). While during the early 2000s are as violent as once in the late of 1990s. There were 83 incidents in 1997, 139 incidents in 1998, and 107 incidents in 1999. Similarly, violent incidents rose steadily: 32 incidents in 2000 and 114 incidents in 2001. Though after the government had abolished the SBPAC and CMP 43 on May 1, 2002, there were 82 incidents in this year, and 84 in 2003. The number of incidents jumped sharply in 2004, rising from 84 in 2003 to 1,843 incidents in 2004 (Jitpiromsri & Sobhonvasu, 2006, March).

For the re-emergence of the recent unrest should not conclude easily that identity issues have driven the conflict. Actually, the paradox will become more intense if we simply agree on the influences of ethnic or religious matters. For example, ethnic identity is multi-dimensional interaction. While ethnicity is understood in relations to others and in some unfortunate cases, such interactions are confrontational. This is one of the reasons that the term ethnic or ethnicity bears nature of being problems, which are ethnic conflicts, ethnic disputes, ethnic discriminations, ethnic cleansing, and ethnic wars and so on. This is to say, in many cases, ethnic and religious differences have been treated as if they are the cause of conflicts. Though the ethnic and religious differences themselves do not the root cause of conflicts, but they

3

become issues of confrontation when the differences are politicized (Sani, Nakamura, & Taya, 2010).

Furthermore, internal armed conflict dynamics of domestic and international situations influence very much on the change of goals, strategies, and tactics used by separatist movements. In recent times, for example, the BRN-Coordinate – the strongest separatist group in the area, emphasizes that it does not want to separate the southern region apart from Thailand (Peungnetr, 2013, September 17). Conversely, the highest objective of the Malay Muslim militants, in the past decades, was the establishing an independent state of Patani. In matters of strategies and tactics, the insurgency departs from the traditional script of resistance in the past. In particular, the Malay Muslim militants have used more terrorist-type tactics in insurgency such as ambushed attacks, car bombing, burning government buildings, attacks on civilians, destructions of civilians' property, including assaults on a wide range of persons like police, soldiers, teachers, and monks. Meanwhile, some scholars assert that the continuing violence has linked implicitly to the network of illegal activities such as drug trafficking, cross-border smuggling, organized crimes, and activities of influential groups (Bamrungsuk, 2008).

As a unitary state, Thailand is likely to assign the highest value to security. Thus, the Thai government seriously concentrates on the problem of Malay Muslim insurgencies that threaten the internal security (Samudavanija, 1996). In order to confront with the serious situation, the government exercises various measures based on political, military, and socio-economic power. According to political power, the government emphasized the investigation about the fact of violent incidents caused

from human rights violation by state officers. The NRC, an independent body also established to study the conflict and to make policy recommendations for the government to solve the conflict. For a decade, the southern administrative organization has been changed several times until the SBPAC was reestablished in 2006. At the present, the Thai government also tries to open opportunities for stakeholders, particularly the Malay Muslims, to participate in the southern administration more and more.

Moreover, the Thai government emphasizes using the military power, which is an imperative instrument to counterinsurgency. There are professional military and police forces were deployed to the area, including paramilitaries and local militias organized with well-armed maintained by the government agencies. Besides, the military operations to keep peace and order in southern Thailand were supported by security laws. At present, the martial law was declared to enforce suddenly when the insurgencies arisen in 2004. Next, the emergency decree, which gives wide powers to the army declared in 2005. Lastly, the ISA has imposed in some areas of southern Thailand since 2009. In addition, the socio-economic power is seriously exercised, especially operating the development programs to solve poverty and improve quality of life of Malay Muslims. A lot of budgets were spent for socio-economic development programs by various Bangkok's administrations. From 2004 to 2014, all budgets have reached 208 billion Baht or more than 6.5 billion dollars (Isara News Agency, 2014, January 3).

Although the Thai government with complete power occupies more resources than the Malay Muslims and put a lot of effort into resolving the conflict, these attempts

may be wasteful. The current conflict between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims has continued without interruption. The chronic situation of the violence has impacted on both sides. For the Thai government, the ongoing insurgency is the serious threat to internal security. On the other hand, it is too complicated and hard for the Malay Muslims live peacefully in the area of conflict.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The recent outbreak of conflict in southern Thailand since 2004 has provoked hotly contested debate, not only for the academicians and political practitioners, but also surprisingly an involvement of a broad range of stakeholders to the conflict. Commentators provided a range of explanations for the resurgence of the conflict in southern Thailand. These include: misguidance from radical religious leaders and Thai government denial of Malay Muslims' identity namely, ethnic, religion, language, and culture. Particularly, the government's integration policy to assimilate the Malay Muslims into Thai-ness has been the root cause of conflict. The concept of ethnic-religious conflict is widely held but misleading because it leads to an essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other, when in fact the conflicts between them are the result of political, military and socio-economic relations.

There are a number of political scientists who argue that self-identification and frustrations do not lead to insurgency in southern Thailand. As the recent studies view that the political process set by the Thai government has a problem of high centralization at Bangkok. The issue of the lack of decentralization reduces political

6

power of the Malay Muslims because they have limited the participation in the Thai government's administration. While there are reports investigate on results of use violence means against each other. Alongside, there are several studies point that the Malay Muslims have gotten little economic development, received very little public spending, and lacked of public services in many aspects. For many scholars, these serve as necessary conditions behind the insurgencies and also make the impacts on the ongoing violence in southern Thailand. From preceding studies, numerous studies have investigated the conflict in southern Thailand, but none of them has managed to provide a detailed picture of asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims from the perspective of the asymmetric conflict. Moreover, there are no concerning enough on political confrontation with military and socio-economic conditions that related together and established asymmetric conflict in the power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. Importantly, missing from these suite explanations is the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims and how this dimension added or contributed further to the already tensed relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims.

Therefore, this study uses the combined asymmetry theories to examine and analyze power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, with particular focus on its impact on the conflict in southern Thailand. The study argues that the Thai government is varying strong in the asymmetry power relations. On the other hand, the Malay Muslim minority dominating southern Thailand is the weak in the power relations. In matters of power relations, which can break down into the

elements of politics, military, and socio-economy power relations. In deploying the combined asymmetry theories, this study draws the asymmetry of power relations under sharper analytical focus by analyzing the form of asymmetric power relations between the asymmetric conflict parties linking to the ongoing violence in southern Thailand. Simultaneously, the extent of the study focused on the impacts of the power relations. With regard to the conflict resolution, the study critically examines the effectiveness of the Thai government's operations, as well as considering the best way of resolving the conflict in southern Thailand more generally.

1.3 Research Questions

This study has several fundamental questions. These include:

1. How the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims since 2004 aided insurgencies in southern Thailand?

2. What are the impacts of the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims on the conflict in southern Thailand since 2004?

3. Has the Thai government responded to the conflict in southern Thailand effectively?

4. How can the best approach and recommendations resolve the conflict in southern Thailand?

1.4 Objectives of the Research

The objectives of this study are as follows:

1. To analyze how the asymmetric power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims has aided insurgencies in the region.

2. To examine the impacts of asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims on the conflict in southern Thailand since 2004.

3. To examine the effectiveness of the Thai government's response to the conflict in southern Thailand.

4. To propose the best approach and recommendation in resolving the asymmetric conflict in southern Thailand.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study will be a significant endeavor in promoting peace and conflict resolution in the ongoing asymmetric conflict between the Thai government and Malay Muslims and its impacts on the conflict in southern Thailand that related to the theories of asymmetry power relations. By understanding of the asymmetry power relations, the effectiveness of the Thai government responded to the conflict must be assured of a competitive advantage. Moreover, this research will provide recommendations on how to resolve the ongoing conflict to sustainable peace in the conflicting parties. In addition, this study will be helpful to resolve theoretical questions and may develop better theoretical models for study the conflict between the Thai government and Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. It will also influence public policy on the conflict resolution. And importantly, this research will serve as a future reference for researchers on the subject of asymmetric power relations and the related conflict studies.

1.6 Operational Definitions

The following operational definitions are the main concerns of this study.

The Thai government is defined as term of administration and its agencies e.g. bureaucratic organizations. These also include groups of administrators, which make public policies and exercise executive, political and sovereign power through custom, institutions, and laws within Thai state.

Malay Muslims are defined as Muslim political leaders, religious leaders, political activists, and militants, who adhere to Malay customs, habitually speak the local Malay language, and settle down in southern Thailand.

Southern Thailand is defined as the area of conflict, which covers Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat provinces, including four districts of Songkla province, which are Chana, Thepa, Sabayoi, and Nathawi. It is known as the Malay Muslim dominated provinces that placed along the border of the Northern Malaysia and may be known as the historical state of Patani.

Power relations are defined as term of imbalance of power in a relationship between two parties that are Thai government as the stronger and Malay Muslims as the weaker. It could be said that the conflict in power relations comes from the asymmetry in three dimensions: politics, military, and socio-economy respectively.

Political power is defined in term of power relations based on the political sphere as an area for compromise, negotiation, and arbitration (Hoffman, 2007). This form of power adheres to positive value, such as understanding, and links to the balance of

power created to promote openness and to offset its negative possibility between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand.

Military power is defined in term of fatal violence exercised and has been acted by the organized physical force which is based on the fact that an individual's behavior is affected by punishers such as death, physical pain, confinement and removal of freedom, and so on (Whitmeyer, 1997, June). This form of power is operations of main power agencies of the Thai government, which are professional military and police forces, including paramilitaries and militias. In addition, it also refers to the insurgency of Malay Muslims with violent means to resist against the Thai government.

Socio-economic power is defined in term of power relations on socio-economic spheres. Typically, it focuses on the socio-economic power that may cause social and economic changes that affect patterns of the production, the distribution of incomes and wealth, exchange, and consumption of the objects of nature, including the way in which people behave, and the overall quality of life in the studying area.

The insurgency is defined as the operation with brutal methods, including terrorist tactics exercised by Malay Muslim militant aim of achieving political wills/objectives in order to change existing power relations, to be independent, and to be autonomous (Greene, 2004, September).

1.7 Literature Review

The literature review will take a close look at the studies published in the past years, exploring the causes and impact of the conflict between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. The researcher will focus on the recent studies, particularly doctoral theses, research reports, reports, and articles on the conflict. These can be grouped into three categories. This review will first examine the political power aspect. Then it will move on to the military power aspect. Finally, it will have a look at the socio-economic power aspect.

1.7.1 Literature on Political Power

There are some literatures on the political power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, which can be gathered into two groups: the difference of ethno-religious and the state-society relations. The first one views that difference of ethno-religious or religion identity is root causes of political conflicts in southern Thailand. Important study for consideration is by the political scientist best known for propounding that southern Thailand's conflict is religious is Surin Pitsuwan. His published doctoral dissertation "Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand" (1985) presents the root of problem that has come from the conflict of culture between the Buddhist and the Muslim cosmology. The Malay Muslims as ethnic religious minority have to face the problem of participation in politics within the state, which is manifestation of Buddhist cosmology in politics, administration, and ritual because this has brought about cultural disintegration. When the Thai government has continued its policy, it has to be confronted with resistance. Consequently, the Thai government has not any

12

support because of lacking legitimacy. The form of resistance of the Malay Muslims is similar to ones in other Muslims communities by holding to religious symbols and institutions for resisting to the state. In his opinion, the Malay Muslim insurgencies have not urged for purely religious reasons, but these are spurred for Malay language and race or Malay nationalism emphasized the sense of Malay Muslims' recognition of their distinct ethnic identity.

Many studies strongly believe that the conflict appears more evidently, when the Thai government has operated the integration policy and others to assimilate the Malay Muslims into Thai-ness, so it can be seen in Wan Kadir Che Man's published doctoral dissertation entitled "Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand" (1990). This study points to the relationship between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, which usually focuses on the conflict on identity problem. The researcher believes that violence in the area has been caused from exclusion and assimilated policies as the attempt by the central government to dominate or subjugate the Malay Muslims in the country. From the past, Thai government has succeeded in the assimilation of ethnics which are minority in Thailand such as Chinese, Lao, and Malay Muslims who live outside the present conflict areas, including Muslims are in other areas of the south and Bangkok and suburban (Skinner, 1957; Suhrke, 1970-1971, Winter).

Furthermore, Imron Maluleem's work on "Analyses the Conflict between the Thai government and Muslims in Thailand: Case Study of Muslims in the Southern Border Provinces" (1995). He explains that Muslims in the south have the different aspects from ones in other region of Thailand, namely, ethnic, language, culture,

13

tradition, and ideology. Generally, the facts are ignored because the Thai people are always united, so this leads to misapprehension and brings about obstacles to the relationships between the Malay Muslims and the local Thai Buddhist authorities. As a result, this makes the impact on the government of Thailand in the south.

Most of the arguments on the conflict between the Thai Buddhist and the Malay Muslims identity rely on a vague notion of static identities. Similarly, Imtiyaz Yusuf's work on "Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand" (2007) insists that the root of the crisis in southern Thailand has derived from the role of ethno-religious identity. He also concludes that the conflict in the south of Thailand has still been a local conflict between two ethno-religious identities of the Thai Buddhism and the Malay Muslims in a modern nation-state setting. The ethno-religious extent of Islam in southern Thailand makes it difficult to negotiate and stop the conflict if it is not accompanied by recognition of ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity of southern Muslim, including addressing their political complaints with a sense of justice. However, Yusuf argues that the local religious features have largely shaped the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. Currently, it is also subject to different Islamist trends from both the region and the Middle East.

It tends to be clear that recent studies on the conflict in southern Thailand present the complexity of identity problems more than once in the past. Particularly, two deep researches of anthropologists, a recent work by Anusorn Unno's doctoral dissertation on "We Love 'Mr. King': Exceptional Sovereignty, Submissive Subjectivity, and Mediated Agency in Islamic Southern Thailand" (2011). This research is based on Agamben and the anthropologist idea of the state of exception; the dissertation

14

demonstrates that Malay Muslims' cultural and political lives have related to different forms of sovereignty i.e. Islam, Malayness, the Thai state, and the monarch. Unno argues that Islam and Malayness identities are different from state ideology. Unsurprisingly, the Malay Muslims have known that it is difficult to be compatible with other forms of sovereignty, which has been associated with Buddhism and Thai ethnicity.

Likewise, a recent published Master thesis entitled "Panyah not jadi nayu (It's very difficult to be nayu): Ethnicity, Meaning, and Negotiation of Melayu in Everyday Life" (2008) was written by Sorayut Aim-Aur-Yut, providing a question on identity of the Malay Muslims in relationship with the Thai government and Islamization in recent years of violence. He suggests that the Malay Muslims' identity may have many meanings in different contexts. Under the Thai government's current intervention, the meaning of being Malay Muslims (Melayu) becomes an important strategy for negotiations.

The use of ethno-religious or identity for political purposes does not make it an identity conflict in the sense of a conflict as a matter of identity or informed by purely identity issue. The recent study conducted by Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan on "Confronting Ghosts: Thailand's Shapeless Southern Insurgency" (2010) argue that despite the discernible religious hues in insurgent discourse, the insurgency has remained fundamentally based on earlier local narratives, goals and motivations. They also find that the insurgent groups have involved in the insurgency; each may have different opinions. Further, the nature of the insurgency itself has changed from the hierarchical and structured struggles of the past that were

15

mostly led by a political and religious elite to the fluid and shapeless organizational structure.

Second group put emphasize on the root causes of political conflicts in the area of state-society relations. These studies reflected the problem of power relations; especially there were studies explained the current conflict more reasonably. With respect to the problems on political aspects, some scholars viewed that the Thai government had the legitimate problem to exercise its power over the Malay Muslim minority. With regard to reasons of lacking legitimacy of the Thai government, the present study by Duncan McCargo's "Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand" (2009). He mentioned that the conflict between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims had been a war over legitimacy.

McCargo identified two problems of lacking legitimacy of the Thai government. First, according to the representative bureaucracy, the Malay Muslims had less opportunity to work as government employees or there was very little proportion of them in the bureaucracy when comparing with Thai Buddhist employees. Second, with respect to representative politics, although the Malay Muslim politicians would be promoted through the general election in national politics, there was very little percentage of them so they could not push any important policy advocacy. Furthermore, at the level of local politics, though the Malay Muslims could occupy high proportion of administrative positions from the election, decision-making in some levels was still centralized at Thai bureaucratic system. The issue of the lack of decentralization as mentioned made the Malay Muslims couldn't participate in any activities of the government truly.

16

Furthermore, some scholars have focused on Thai government's policy. These works suggested that the policy of the Thai government, which focused only on political stability and national integration, failed to meet the Malay Muslims' aspirations. They usually reflect policies that affect the Malay Muslims' identity, including the examination about success and failure of these policies. For example, Ornanong Noiwong studies how the Thai government reacts to the problem of the Malay Muslim separatism in the region; her unpublished doctoral dissertation is "Political Integration Policies and Strategies of the Thai Government toward the Malay-Muslims of Southernmost Thailand (1973 – 2000)" (2001). The study presents that democratization has opened channels for the Malay Muslims to participate as equal citizens in Thai political life, and to access to political power to protect the ethnic interests both at the national and local levels. Moreover, the study has concluded that political integration can be attained in a culturally fragmented society because the leaders of the majority group have been willing to accept the principle of the rights for ethnic minorities, and the leaders of ethnic minorities have willing to engage in cooperative efforts to control ethnic competition.

While, Nipon Sohheng's doctoral dissertation entitled "Malay Muslim Elite Responses to Governments' Policies of Modernization in Southern Border Provinces of Thailand" (2008) show that assimilation policy has been blamed as the "structural violence" for the local people because it has limited the local participation. It is clear that Thai government's policies of modernization towards the Malay Muslims do not satisfy the Malay Muslim elites. As a result, their responses to the socio-political and socio-economic policies are quite negative, especially the policy of forced

17

assimilation, centralized political appointment, and conflict resolutions. While the Malay Muslim elites' responses to the Thai government's socio-political policies have been characterized by their deep concerns in clarifying the problems embodied in those policies such as unfairness, injustice, discrimination, misunderstanding, and law violation of various people.

1.7.2 Literature on Military Power

There are several literatures concerning the impacts of military power on the conflict in southern Thailand. The important work relevant the Thai government's military power to the security policy proposed by Mark Tamthai & Somkiat Boonchu "National Security of Southern Border Provinces: 30 Years" (2006). They found that there have been several security policies since 1978. These policies shared understanding of national security as territorial defense. They argue that there was a strong uniformity about the use of military power and priority of defending the state security.

Since 2004, in an effort to confront the Malay Muslim insurgencies that threaten the internal security in the southern Thailand, the Thai government declares some security laws that give the government more power to use military apparatus against the insurgencies. The report of The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) on "Thailand's Internal Security Act: Risking the rule of law?" (2010), presents a comprehensive assessment of the Internal Security Act of B.E. 2551 (2008) or ISA from the perspectives of international laws and international standards. The ICJ has reported that the exceptional powers provided by the ISA are more limited in scope

and less restrictive of rights than those under the emergency decree and the martial law. However, the nature of the ISA is a quasi-emergency law that is often used to empower the executive authority and security forces, to suppress political opposition, and to undermine the rights of citizens. Moreover, lack of a clear definition of "internal security" in the ISA gives discretion to the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) to determine the limits of its own jurisdictional competence, including the authority to decide which activities will be monitored or suppressed under the ISA. In addition, the ICJ suggests three primary concerns on the ISA: Firstly, ICJ worries that many definitions and provisions are vague and too broad. Next, the fundamental rights are at risk of being violated, especially the issues closely relate to liberty and security of persons, fair trials and processes, freedom of movements, expression and association. Thirdly, the extensive powers have been vested to security forces can cause the risk of undermining the principles of civilian authority which is the heart of democratic governance. In fact, the ISA is less impacts on people's rights, liberties, compare to the martial law and the emergency decree applied in 2004 and 2005, respectively.

The use of military power by the Thai government was mostly blamed by human rights reports as causing confusion in the region. Some reports are pointing that the human rights violation by the security forces is a key factor of the chronic violence. With particular focus on the military operations, most of the human rights reports concern on the impacts from the abuse of power by the government's security forces.

For example, the Human Rights Watch's report on "It Was like Suddenly My Son No Longer Existed: Enforced Disappearances in Thailand's Southern Border

Provinces" (2007, March) provides unresolved disappearances in associated with the current situations between February 2005 and November 2006. There were 22 cases of the Malay Muslims' disappearances, including a well-known lawyer: Somchai Neelapaijit's disappearance was on March 12, 2004. The Human Rights Watch informs that many disappearances have been suspected by armed security forces who involvement in or of having information about the insurgencies in the area. In some cases, witnesses finally saw the missing persons in the detention of militants who were identified as members of the security forces. Furthermore, witnesses saw victims who were forced into double cab pickups or trucks commonly used by police and the army. They have believed that missing persons were tortured and heightened by extrajudicial killings finally. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch has known that detainees have been held outside of conventional detention facilities.

Another important study for consideration is by Rungrawee Chaloemsripinyorat's research report "The Security Forces and Human Rights Violations in Thailand's Insurgency Wracked South" (2008). The report describes structure of military operation and recruitment of security forces in the South, and points out that a key factor of the violence is the abuse of power by authorities. She finds that the human rights violation has arisen from the military operations of security forces under the provision of the emergency decree because there are some significant causes. In fact, some authorities have not any knowledge about human rights and the emergency decree as "a license to kill" provides sweeping power to the security forces. They can call suspected persons to answer questions, censor news, and ban the press or

sale of media items; it also allows authorities to tap phones and to search documents of suspected persons.

Some of reports also reflect the impact on human rights violation caused by military operations from both sides, the security forces and the Malay Muslim militant. However, often lack of provide reason in decision-making to use military power against each other. A research report by Major General Samrej Srirai "BRN-Coordinate and Unrest in 3 Southern Border Provinces and 4 District of Songkla Province on Period of Years 2004 – 2007 and Conception of Situation Solving" (2007) provide a useful facts about the Malay Muslims insurgency with particular focus on the BRN-Coordinate. It conforms to Rungrawee Chaloemsripinyorat "Thodkwamkid Khabuankarn Ekkarach Patani" (2013). Both of studies present the structure of BRN-Coordinate, including the militant's ideology, goal, recruitment and military operations of BRN-Coordinate, which is the strongest separatist movement and play important role in the latest uprising flared since January 2004.

In recent time, it seems to be that both the Thai government and the Malay Muslims focus on use military tools for fight against each other. Despite there are many studies on impacts from military power of both sides. However, none of them draws the current situation as asymmetry of power relations. Moreover, there are no concerning enough on military confrontation with political and socio-economic conditions that related together and established asymmetric conflict in the power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims.

1.7.3 Literature on Socio-economic Power

With particular focus on socio-economic aspect as a dimension of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, there is few studies concern on this problem. Even though, some studies point that socio-economic problem may related to the Malay Muslims grievance. The most important study that focuses on this issue is Ake Tangsupvattana & Ora-orn Poocharoen on "Problems of the Three Southern Border Provinces: Policy Recommendation" (2009). They pointed that poverty and lacked rights to manage and access to natural resources of the Malay Muslims may serve as necessary conditions behind the insurgent operations.

While Srisompob Jitpiromsri & Panyasak Sobhonvasu's article on "Unpacking Thailand's Southern Conflict: The poverty of structural explanations" (2006, March). They discussed the socio-economic aspects of the secessionist insurgency in southern Thailand. Interestingly, they argue that the current violence's escalation has concerned the aggression of the Malay Muslims. They clearly demonstrate that poverty may not be the root cause of the crisis. Nevertheless, this study illustrates that social grievances may serve as necessary conditions behind the insurgent operations.

Likewise, a well-known report "The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC): Overcoming Violence through the Power of Reconciliation" (2006) suggests that the phenomenon of current violence in southern Thailand can be seen as results from three conditions: First, the agency conditions. These are the perpetrators of unrest situations and some state authorities and both use similar methods to respond to each other. Second are the structural conditions. These are several injustices arising from

various causes, which include the existing justice process and the administrative system, economic and natural resource problems faced by most people, and education system, which fails to empower people to overcome various social challenges, which are secular and religious aspects. In addition, the population and geopolitical factors make sharp contradictions of the quality of life among the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand and Malaysia. Third, the cultural conditions in the area are the ethno-religious identity and history narratives, and they are crucial in any attempt to persuade people to accept or agree with the perpetrators of violence. All allow insurgents in the region to use ethno-religious justifications to legitimize the operation of violence in the pursuit of their own objectives in the name of the Malay Muslims identity.

It is remarkable that an analysis of the asymmetry of power relations in the conflict between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims is missing; the literature in the field of conflict in southern Thailand has usually concerned with identity issues. As we've seen, very few studies have been focused on the power relations and most of the previous studies ignore the problem of asymmetric conflict between the conflict parties. The role that asymmetric power relations play in the deadly conflicts in southern Thailand has been greatly underestimated. More research is required to gain a better understanding that due the Thai government has any strong power, why it has been losing to solve the power asymmetric conflict as roots causes of the problem. Along with this, it is clear that the asymmetric on political, military, and socio-economic power relations reflects the conflict reasonable. This is significant to

conduct more studies on the asymmetric power relations and its impact on the conflict in southern Thailand comprehensively.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

This section has sought to contribute to the combined theories of asymmetry power relations. The goal in combining these varied concepts is to explore the power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. In the first part, a set of key concepts and types of asymmetric conflict is defined and described. One of the purposes of this study is to investigate the impact of the asymmetric power relations to the intensive conflict among parties. Therefore, a theory to investigate the decision-making processes of actors is discussed. Then it examines the explanation of strategic interaction theory and negotiation theory in the context of the asymmetric outcome.

1.8.1 Asymmetry Theory

The asymmetry theory is a theoretical concept introduced in the post-World War II period (Stepanova, 2008). This theory is used to explain power relations among asymmetry parties in context of international conflicts, for example the United States of America and Vietnam War and the former Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan (Arreguin-Toft, 2005); the politics of asymmetry between China and Vietnam (Womack, 2006). It is also charity to investigate an internal asymmetric conflict between a state and non-state actors, for example the dynamics of asymmetric conflicts between the Israeli and Palestinian (Gallo & Marzano, 2009); group identity and power asymmetry in reconciliation processes in the Israeli and

24

Palestinian case (Rouhana, 2004, March). Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, the concept of asymmetric conflict has come to the fore in conflict theory since there are growths of the emergence of intra-state and inter-ethnic wars (Gallo & Marzano, 2009).

Through the basic idea of the asymmetry theory is contrast with the symmetry theory that indicates a relation of commensurability of parts. The original of the term symmetry comes from the Greek word "summetria," derives from sun which means "with" or "together", and "metron" which means "measure." Therefore, symmetry theory is strongly related to harmony, beauty, and unity, including a connection that is stable among parties (Brading & Castellani, 2003; Smolin, 2006). In contrast of symmetry definition, a number of authors have explained the asymmetry theory in the context of the conflict in power relations among actors. According to Womack (2006), the asymmetry theory is the core component of interpretive conflict of imbalance of power relations that creates either subordination or competition for the domination. In addition, Stepanova (2008) points that asymmetric conflict prioritize power disparities based on quantifiable parameters, which are political superiority, military capabilities, and socio-economic performance. Some academicians may add other dimensions of power, mostly social and technological development, such as asymmetry of purpose or a sharp contrast between the two sides in their overall understanding and interpretation of the relationship.

The asymmetry theory focuses on two major points. The first one deal with the disparities of capacities create fundamental differences in interests and perceptions between a strong (party A) and a weak (party B) of the relationship. Second, the

25

tension of asymmetry of power relations is merely a consequence of the difference in interests and perceptions between two parties. As mentioned above, asymmetry theory views that the relationship between two parties is not stable, so it is usually dynamics. Therefore, a tension has been made easily from the conflict of interests. On the other hand, occasionally, it is occurred from negative perceptions towards others that have become increasingly. Generally, both sources happen simultaneously. Furthermore, a different situation of opportunity and vulnerability, which each side confronts, will fundamentally shape mutual perceptions and interactions in an asymmetric relationship of power (Womack, 2004, May; 2006).

The asymmetry theory actually views the world as dualism (the stronger and the weaker), it does not point that a difference will cause a conflict by itself like the dichotomous phenomenon about "us" versus "them" that is often implied in study on terrorism and terrorism-related issues. The learning process in an asymmetry of power relations expresses that both sides apparently accept the imbalance of power relations as normal. In the system of the asymmetric relationship, both parties have to carefully manage their affairs by themselves with the consideration about the interests and perceptions of the other. Thus, the superiority of the more powerful side will not be challenged, and the self-determination of the less powerful side will not get threatened (Womack, 2006).

Typically, the power relations between the strong and the weak that differ greatly in various dimensions, the opportunities and risks of the interests and perceptions of the relationship will be much greater. Certainly, it is imperative to the strong to have confidence about the deference of the weak in every asymmetric situation. With

26

respect to the word "deference", it does not mean that the weak obeys the strong, but the weak acts in accordance with the reality of the disparity between them. On the other hand, the weak needs to be confident that the strong respects its autonomy. Whether in a normal and peaceful relationship, autonomy and deference can normally exist together. If parties perceive each other incorrectly, this will make the relationship troublesome. It can be seen that the weak will believe that the requirements of the strong for deference are the threats to its self-determination. On the other hand, the strong will believe that the effort of the weak to guard itself is the threats to the distribution of power truly (Womack, 2004, May).

In addition, the asymmetry of power relations desperately consistent with empirical facts, it is constructed by systematically collecting data and analyzing the data for patterns. According to Stepanova (2008) and Gallo and Marzano (2009), there are three strands in the literature that formally explain the existence of asymmetric conflicts. The first strand focuses on a strong imbalance in power asymmetry provision of conflicts. The second strand emphasizes disparities based on quantifiable parameters in status between the adversaries setting up the conflict. The third strand highlights strategic and/or tactical interactions ability to transform the characteristics of conflict.

The first strand, power asymmetry occurs when an extreme imbalance in power exists, so this type of asymmetry quite common in conflicts. The conflicts that are characterized by power asymmetry is not just about the stronger side making use of its advantages, sometimes the weaker can take to initiate the conflict as well. They propose an example, the conflict between the United States led-coalition and Iraq in

27

the First Gulf War. Undoubtedly, both actors were states with recognized governments and a regular army capable of taking decisions and implementing their will to fight. As a result, the asymmetry was in the massive difference in military force, a matter of quantity rather than of quality (Gallo & Marzano, 2009).

In addition, Stepanova (2008) describes three main points related to power asymmetry, particularly in terms of militarized definitions of asymmetric conflict. First, the disparities of power are very significant. Although the explanation of the idea of power does not absolutely reach into all aspects of life, it can adequately extend to some main spheres, which are politics, military, and socio-economy. Second, when an asymmetric conflict occurs each party must always face the extreme imbalance in resources. Therefore, it is crucial for each side to take the advantage of the opponent's weaknesses in order to achieve its goals and objectives certainly. Lastly, in reality, when an armed conflict happens, damage and losses on both sides are estimated. In a power asymmetric conflict, a large number of victims (especially civilians) and a great deal of damage of the weak that have the extremely low power resources are immeasurably more than the stronger ones. The weaker usually think that the most effective method of all asymmetrical means to make a counterattack is terrorism. Since this way can balance this asymmetry by making civilian of the opponent, suffer as much as those in whose name the terrorist claim to act.

The second strand, the extreme imbalance in status between the parties provides the rational for the structural asymmetry. It is this that makes asymmetric conflicts quite peculiar and different from the others. In structural asymmetry, one of the parties is a

state or a governmental institution and the other a non-state actor, such as a political organization or liberation movement. Typical examples of structural asymmetric conflicts are what characterize most of the relationship between the colonizers and the colonized is at the center of the conflict (Gallo & Marzano, 2009).

Stepanova (2008) also points that the power plus status asymmetry or so-called double asymmetry has the further advantage of conflicts studied to those where terrorism can be employed as a tactic of non-state actor. In this type of conflict, a non-state actor may well be transnational non-state actors. Moreover, power plus status asymmetry remain the key asymmetrical assets of the state as well. In this study, an asymmetric conflict is treated as extreme imbalance of political, military, and socio-economic power is complemented and intensified by power and status asymmetry between a strong (a government in a state actor) and a weak (non-state actor).

The third strand, strategic asymmetry usually occurs in an extreme imbalance of power relations. Besides, strategic asymmetry it is a two-way power relation. As Womack pointed, the power relationship between asymmetric conflict parties is not one relationship, but rather two distinct sub-relations: that of A to B, and that of B to A. It tends to view power as the enacting in every interaction, and, it depends on resistance in each of those interactions. Therefore, the asymmetric conflict does not work in just one direction and the stronger could not easily use its superior power to decisively crush its weaker opponent (Womack, 2004, May). In addition, strategic asymmetry is an internal armed conflict within the context of state and an international armed conflict, so-called the irregular warfare. Typical examples of

29

tactic operations in strategic asymmetric conflicts are known as insurgency, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, counterinsurgency and/or counterterrorism (Gallo & Marzano, 2009).

According to Stepanova (2008), there are three main points that focuses on the strategic and/or tactical relations which are often overlooked. First, we must accept that the disparities of power are very significant. Although the explanation of the idea of power does not absolutely reach into all aspects of life, it can adequately extend to some main spheres, which are politics, military, and socio-economy. Second, when an asymmetric conflict occurs, each party must always face the extreme imbalance in resources. Therefore, it is crucial for each side to take the advantage of the opponent's weaknesses in order to achieve its objectives certainly. Finally, when an armed conflict happens, damage and losses on both sides are estimated. It can be explained that, in an asymmetric conflict, a large number of victims, especially civilians and a great deal of damage of the weak that have the extremely low power resources are immeasurably more than the stronger ones. The weaker usually think that the most effective method of all asymmetrical means to make a counterattack is terrorism. Since this way can balance this asymmetry by making civilian of the opponent, suffer as much as those in whose name the terrorist claim to act.

This section answers why the violence exists within the context of power relations between a strong actor and a weak actor. Using the asymmetry theory as a starting point upon which to build, this section focuses upon the disparities of capacities between a more powerful actor and a less powerful actor of the relationship. This

section then highlights the tension which have revolved around asymmetry of power issues. However, since wars are usually waged over multiple characteristics of conflict, the disparities of capacities should not be employed beyond initial asymmetric conflict in the power relations. This study then compiles a group of factors that influence actor strategies. These factors are also used to explain the existence of conflict and its outcomes.

1.8.2 Strategies and Outcomes of Asymmetric Conflict

The major shortcoming of asymmetry theorist, as well as the researchers that view asymmetric conflicts are caused by imbalance of power relations between conflicting parties, is they do not accurately explain decision-making process and strategic interaction among actors. This section then takes a closer look at these theoretical frameworks. The important theoretical frameworks for analyzing a decision-making process of actors is rational actor model (RAM). The rational actor model developed by Graham T. Allison's the "Essence of Decision" (1971). The rational actor model is an advanced of rational choice theory that emphasizing individuals and organizations that pursue goals and decide among competing alternatives while possessing extensive information, a coherent preference ordering, and a commitment to the principles of self-interest and utility maximization (Wandling, 2011).

At first, this model appeared to explain the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The traditional view of Allison's rational actor model has been used by foreign policy theorists to understand the underlying principle of decisions affecting the state and its status in

31

war conditions, for example the United States' decision-making to invade in Iraq (Saikaly, 2009); the normalized relations between the United States and Libya in 2003–2006 (Ahmeid, 2014). Despite this model direct use in foreign policy analysis but it assumes that a government is an assortment of disparate institutions, each with its own preoccupations and habits (Wandling, 2011).

The RAM suggests that the actors are really based on rational choice and able to make the best possible decisions in terms of benefits and costs in a certain situation. Principally, the actor performed a particular action constituted a value-maximizing means. The rational actor also selects the best strategic option among alternatives outcomes calculated to achieve its strategic goals and objectives. Besides, actor, problem, strategic selection, and action are considered to be associated with model tools to investigate the decision-making processes of actors. To illustrate the analytical advantages of this model to clarify the strategic asymmetry, it is important to understand the basic assumption of value-maximizing behavior among actors. The general principle of this approach can be formulated as follows: the probability of any particular action results from a combination of the nation's: there are relevant values and objectives, perceived alternative courses of action, probability estimates of various sets of consequences that will follow from each alternative, and valuation of each set of consequences (Allison, 1971).

As results, this yields two propositions – an increase or a decrease in the cost of an alternative. First, an increase in the cost of an alternative i.e. a reduction in the value of the set of consequences will follow from that action or a reduction in the probability of that alternative being chosen. Second, a decrease in the cost of an

alternative, i.e. an increase in the value of a set of consequences, which will follow from that alternative or an increase in the probability of attaining fixed consequences, increases the probability of that action being chosen (Allison, 1968).

Allison assumes that the nation or state is the rational actor. At this point, the government relevant to a strategic problem constitutes what the nation has chosen as its solution. Thus, the government's action is conceived as a steady-state choice among alternative outcomes. In addition, action results from national choice among alternatives of a means calculated to achieve strategic goals and objectives. This theory maintains that a government is an arena in which groups and individuals compete for power and influence. These characteristics of government are as important in shaping government behavior, as are rational calculation and purpose. Along this line of thought, the rational choice theory is usefulness as descriptive tools for understanding a non-state behavior. Apparently, the non-state actor that conceived as a unitary decision-maker of ethnic minority that pursue specified goals to struggle for liberation or self-determination its nation can be regarded as rational actors.

With respect to the actor strategies and outcomes, perhaps there are two actor strategies for clarifying the outcome of conflict between the warring groups. One is through strategic interaction between two or more warring groups in a situation containing set rules and outcomes. The strategic interaction has been developed by some important researches that focus on the conflict outcomes that depend on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Importantly, this theory tends to answer why strong actors employ strategies that are not optimized for

victory and how do the weak win the asymmetrical warfare. The first one, Andrew Mack's essay "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" (1975), the place to look was differentials in the political will to fight and prevail, which were rooted in different perceptions of the stakes at hand. While, the argument put forth by Arreguin-Toft's seminal assessment of "How the Weak Win Wars" (2005) investigates the chances of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts, which depend on the interaction of the strategies strong and weak actors use.

Arreguín-Toft provides a very useful approach for a framework of analyze actor's strategies. In order to adequately capture strategic interaction theory, it is important to look closely at Arreguín-Toft's theory of asymmetric conflict, which he terms strategic interaction. He proposes that asymmetry in strategies explains who wins the conflicts. This enhances our understanding of zero-sum outcomes in asymmetric conflicts, which depends on the strategic interaction of strong and weak actors. With statistical and in-depth historical analyses of asymmetric armed conflict between a state actor and a non-state actor across two hundred years, namely the case studies of Murid war (1830 – 1859), the Britain in the south African war or Boer War (1899 – 1902), the Italian conquest of Ethiopia (1935 – 1940), the United States war in Vietnam (1965 – 1974), and the former Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan (1979 - 1989).

Arreguin-Toft found that when the very strong meet the weak in asymmetric armed conflict, strategy matters more than power. He argues that theory of asymmetric conflict outcomes could help us understand how and why the weak respond to strong and strengthening actor in the interaction system. Arreguín-Toft points that the

34

strong failure to success in asymmetric armed conflict under a number of conditions. Particularly, strong actors can lose the war if they adopt the wrong strategy given their adversary's strategy. While fully aware of the spectrum of strategies, he proposed the forms of ideal-type strategies, which is the building block of the asymmetric conflict: offensive strategies for strong actor and defense strategies for weak actor. First, the offensive strategies for strong actors are conventional attack and barbarism strategy. The conventional attack emphasizes on the stronger military power to win the war in a decisive engagement by destroying the physical capacity to resist of the weak. Whereas the barbarism is a strategy adapted to cause deliberate or systematic harm to non-combatants or the civilian population, such as crop destruction, roundups into concentration camps, hostage taking, forced disappearance, rape, murder, and torture. The goal of barbarism is destroying the weak actor's political will and its capacity to fight. In addition, to pursuit a military or political objective, the strong actors may develop the Special Forces or paramilitaries to do the work (Arreguin-Toft, 2005).

Second, the defense strategies for weak actors are conventional defense and guerilla warfare strategy. The conventional defense is the use of armed forces to defense the territory, population, strategic resources, etc. of the weak. The conventional defense matches for conventional attack strategies. It aims to damage strong actors' capacity to attack by destroying its advancing or proximate armed forces. While the guerrilla warfare, and its related strategy of terrorism, is the organization of a portion of a society for imposing costs on an adversary using armed force trained to avoid direct confrontation. There are two essential elements of the strategy, which are sanctuary

35

(physical, e.g. swamplands, mountains – or political, e.g. poorly regulated borderland or borderland controlled by sympathetic states), and a mass support. The guerrilla warfare is match for barbarism strategy. It aimed to balance the power at destroying the strong actor's will to fight. Alongside, both sides have more strategic options on the contrasting side. For example, the strong actors might choose a hearts and minds or conciliation strategy over barbarism. In the same way, weak actors might choose non-violent resistance or terrorism instead of guerrilla warfare. Moreover, barbarism could be used defensively and guerrilla warfare offensively (Arreguin-Toft, 2005).

Interestingly, regime type is matters in the outcome of asymmetric conflict. It is a factor known to exert an important influence on the outcome of conflict. Arreguin-Toft shows that whether authoritarian or democratic regime can use barbarism to defeat weak actors, but since the end of World War II, strong actors can no longer win a subsequent peace against weak actors they have overcome by barbarous strategy. Furthermore, by means of barbarism, both regime types may face international sanction. But only democratic strong actors who pursue an indirect offensive against the civilian population possibly lead to risk of failure caused by the problem of domestic support, for example, the Britain in the south African war (1899 – 1902) and the United States in the Vietnam War (1965 – 1973) (Arreguín-Toft, 2005).

Then there is negotiation theory. This type of asymmetric conflict outcome is contrast to Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction that is narrowed in terms of zero-sum outcome, perhaps understandably but not always insightfully on strategy choice

among asymmetric conflict parties. On the other hand, negotiation theory has been well regarded in investigating outcome of asymmetric conflict in terms of win–win transactions. According to Zartman (2008), a leading scholar in the study of negotiation describes negotiation as a process of joint decision-making. His negotiation theory has been used to analyze many different cases of asymmetric conflict management and resolutions (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008, January), for example the Israeli and Palestinian Oslo process (Schif, 2012); symmetry and asymmetry in international negotiations (Pfetsch & Landau, 2000).

Typically, negotiation theory implies that negotiation may occur when the conflicting parties are facing no-win situation or they have neglected the confrontation against the other as the only way to resolve the conflict (Zartman & Faure, eds, 2005; Jeong, 2010). In asymmetric negotiations, analysts share an emphasis that perceptions of symmetric power relations among negotiators tend to result in negotiation that is more effective and more satisfactory outcomes than perceptions of asymmetric power relations. Asymmetric negotiation process often requires the support of an acceptable third party facilitating communication and structuring the process and this has become a popular tool for resolving the international crises in the post-Cold war era. One of the third party interventions is mediation. As Zartman (2008) suggests, there are several categories of mediation in the negotiation process. It relies on the status of the mediators and their interests i.e. mediation by states is motivated by self-interest, mediation by small and medium sized power, and mediation by international organizations and NGOs.

In summary, the theoretical framework describing the theories of asymmetry power relations. The theroretical underpinning in the section of asymmetry theory suggests how the asymmetric conflict between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims has arisen. Further, the relevant theories based on asymmetry theory are examined namely the rational actor model, and the outcome of asymmetric conflict theories. This study relies on the asymmetric conflict between disputants which have different objectives and strategies. Therefore, Allison's rational actor model is useful to approach the Thai government as a rational unitary decision maker respond to the conflict, as well as investigate the decision-making processes and actor behavior of the Malay Muslims.

Though, the asymmetry theory and the rational actor model are not highlights very much about the conflict outcome. Then the next theories are defining the outcome of asymmetric conflict. The interaction between the actors is frequently crucial in determining the asymmetric conflict outcome, Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction is one of the conceptual tools useful for approach the outcome of asymmetric conflict in terms of zero-sum outcome. Alongside, the negotiation theory is suitable for understanding the win–win outcome of asymmetric conflict. Hence, the theories of asymmetry power relation proposed in the theoretical framework section should contribute to a better comprehension and conception for examine the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims and its impacts on the conflict in southern Thailand.

1.9 The Components of Asymmetry of Power Relations

In deploying the literature review and theoretical framework this study is able to analyze the asymmetric conflict together with both objectives and strategies of the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. The brief explanation on the conceptual model could be observed through the figure 1.1

Figure 1.1: The Components of Asymmetric Power Relations

1.10 Research Methods

This study uses a qualitative method. It relies on analytical approach. This method allows the researcher to examine the historical development of the asymmetry of power relations with respect to its far-reaching implications to the conflict in the region.

1.10.1 Data Collection

The data for this study collected mainly from two sources that are primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include documents, reports, speeches, the royal government gazette (e.g. the general consensus on peace dialogue process signed on February 28, 2013; the speech on the violence in southern Thailand by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, May 8, 2004; October, 30, 2004; April, 2, 2005; July, 23, 2005; the apology to the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand by former Prime Minister Surayuth Chulanon, November, 2, 2006; statements of the BRN-Coordinate; report of the National Reconciliation Commission – NRC; reports of the Human Rights Watch; reports of the International Crisis Group; reports of the Deep South Watch), press releases (e.g. press release on the renewal of the emergency decree in southern Thailand by Amnesty International December 21 2012), and security policies (e.g. National Security Policy; the Executive Order or the Prime Minister's Office Order No. 206/2549; Administration and Development Policy for Southern Border Provinces, 2012-2014).

The secondary sources consist of some useful books (e.g. "History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani" by Ibrahim Syukri; "Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case

Study of the Malay Muslim of Southern Thailand" by Surin Pitsuwan; "Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand by Wan Kadir Che Man; "Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand" by Duncan McCargo), journals (e.g. Critical Asian Studies; Journal of Southeast Asian Studies; Contemporary Southeast Asia; Southeast Asian Affairs; Asian Survey; Pacific Affairs; SBPAC Journal; Songklanakarin Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities), electronic journals, magazines (e.g. Matichon Weekly; Nation Weekly), and newspapers (e.g. The Bangkok Post; The Nation; The Straits Times; Matichon; Thairath; Daily News; Khao Sod; Thai Post; Pim Thai). The national library of Thailand and libraries of various universities in Thailand and Malaysia are important for this research.

In addition, in-depth interviews with knowledgeable and prominent figures and other participants in the conflict are conducted. In order to get a good representation and a balanced background of interview respondents, various groups of key informants are interviewed, namely representing the government officers, academicians, Malay Muslim politicians, and religious leaders. The selected interviewees are considered good informants since they have a deep concern of the conflict in the region. The names of the key informants and their respective designations are listed in appendix B. There are some selected government officers, for example, senior security officers, including soldiers and police authorities. There are some of Malay Muslim leaders, for example, former members of parliament and executive of the private Islamic school. Some are young Malay Muslims. The rest are academicians who are Thai Buddhist, Thai Muslims and Malay Muslims from public universities in

Thailand. The data collected in in-depth interviews was non-formal and unstructured. Thought unstructured interviews are generally best to tape-record but it reflecting upon consent of interviewees. This allows the interviewees be uninhibited to interacting with the researcher and follow the discussion.

1.10.2 Data Analysis

The data analysis is carried out in accordance with the research questions. It relies on analytical approach. This method allows the researcher to examine the development of the asymmetry of power relations with respect to its far-reaching implications to the conflict in the region. There are a wide range of analytical approaches employed in qualitative research e.g. content analysis, narrative analysis, grounded theory. However, the content analysis is the most suitable instrument for this study.

According to Schreier (2014), the main analysis phase is where all material is coded. It is normally divided into coding units and assigning these units to the categories in the coding frame. Then, the results of coding should be prepared for answering the research question. Following these steps, three specific activities of analysis are proposed for this study. First, it entails categorizing the data for patterns of the asymmetry power relations, particularly in terms of political, military, and socio-economic aspects. Second, the data is coded by assigning these units to one subcategory (i.e. goals and objectives, strategies and tactics). Finally, the activity involves analyzing the data in the context that were collected and arranged for answering the research questions.

1.10.3 Limitations of Study

A possible limitation in this study is that it conducted at the same time of the conflict in southern Thailand together with the country's political crisis. It was not possible for this study to collect sufficient data for this research, particularly with materials that are related to security issues. It was difficult to access to some specific documents, for example, searching some historical documents on the conflict in southern Thailand was denied to access by the national library of Thailand. Importantly, due to secondary data constraints, it was difficult to obtain sufficient information. Moreover, interviews with some key informants are difficult to conduct and some informants did not allow for tape-recording, as interview respondents concerned about their standing in sensitive issues. However, more than half of the interview respondents consented for tape-recording and short-field note during personal interview session.

1.11 Chapterization

This study examines and analyzes the impact of the current power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand, including using the combined theories of the asymmetry. To achieve this, the study is organized as follows: Chapter one contains a brief introduction, problems under investigation, literature review, theoretical framework, and research methods. Chapter two provides a historical background of the conflicts between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. Chapter three examines the asymmetry of the current political power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in the region. Chapter four examines the asymmetry of the current military

power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in the region. Chapter five examines the asymmetry of the current socio-economic power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in the area. Chapter six provides the synthesizer of theories and practices of asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. Final chapter contains the concluding remarks and recommendations.

1.12 Chapter Summary

In conclusion, this chapter provided the introduction of the study. The chapter starts with the background, statement of the problem, research questions, objective of the research, significance of the research, and operational definitions. Then it provides the literature review and outlines a theoretical framework for this study. It is about how imbalance in power relations raises the conflict and types of the asymmetric conflict among conflicting parties. It also investigates the explanation of the decision-making processes of actors. Then it discusses the strategic interaction theory in the context of asymmetric outcome. In addition, the chapter goes further to the components of asymmetry of power relations. Following, the chapter provides the research method and goes further to the chapterization of the study. The next chapter will explore the historical background of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims.

CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Introduction

Although the historical background of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims has been proceeded for hundreds of years, it has happened between the stronger and weaker states relationship appearing in the traditional polity system in Southeast Asia traditional polity system that may be explained by such a framework of historical theory. The transformation from the traditional polity system to the asymmetry of power relations actually occurred in the early of the 20th century.

When the Western colonialism caused the change i.e. the Siamese state became a nation-state, the Bangkok administration established a unitary state that a central government has had complete authority over its certain territory and population. This leads to the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, or it can be seen as a government and a non-state actor until nowadays. Therefore, the historical background of their asymmetry of power relations can be divided into four periods i.e. the starting point of making of the power asymmetry (1900s – 1920s), the tension in the power relations (1930s – 1940s), the national security and insurgency (1950s – 1970s), and the democratization and politicization of conflict (1980s – 2003).

2.2 Making of the Power Asymmetry (1900s – 1920s)

The asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims started in the early of 20th century that was the period of transition from

traditional tributary system to a power relationship in the framework of Thai nation-state. The movements in this way were importantly caused by the Western colonialism. Especially, the role of the British in the Malay Peninsula that threatened more severely in Thailand since the mid of the 19th century. In theory, the Western colonialism was the model of the administrative reform in the early Thai nation-state, and then the colonial model became expanded through the Thai bureaucracy apparatuses (Vandergeest, 1993, January). In practice, however, the Thai internal colonialism had different aims from the ones of the Western colonialism because Thai modern state adapted the concept of colonialism for maintaining the highest political benefits of the ruler in Bangkok. While the Western colonialism, especially, the British has paid less attention to political power over her colony since the mid of the 19th century, but she has paid more attention to the exploitation of advantages of free trade in the framework of liberalism (Ryan, 1983).

In the past, the region of the Malay Muslims was namely the Patani. Before 1808, the Patani state was divided by the Thai government into the "Seven Malay Muslims Principalities" that were Pattani, Nongchik, Raman, Rangae, Saiburi, Yala, and Yaring (Satha-anand, 2008). This region had long traditional relationship with Thai government in the way of overlord – tributary (pratesaraj) which was similar to the northern Malay states, i.e. Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis that are parts of the Federation of Malaysia at the present. It is simplistic to suggest that this traditional polity relationship of states in the Southeast Asia demonstrated that the weaker states accepted the power of the stronger states as the protector. During wars, the weaker states reciprocated by sending a conscript army to fight with the strong

46

state's enemy. In normal situation, the weaker states expected to provision something as a tribute. For example, the Malay Sultanate states sent "bunga mas dan perak" (golden and silver flowers) to Ayutthaya every three years. In addition, other strong states such as Johor and Aceh were sometimes treated as such (Suwannathat-Pian, 1988; B. Andaya & L. Andaya, 2008; Virunha, 2002; Wolters, 1982 as cited in Winichakul, 1994).

2.2.1 The Bangkok's Administrative Reform

Unlike traditional states, Giddens describe the characteristic of the modern nation-state as a bordered power container that are "circumscribed arenas for the generation of administrative power" (Giddens, 1985, p. 13). The administrative structure of the modern state that Bangkok, which was planned from the late of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century in the era of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V, reign 1868 – 1910) was the unitary state building, which was centralized power and building efficient political, military, and socio-economic apparatuses to the Bangkok' ruler. With raison d'état, this was to react to pressure from the Western nations which influenced on the Bangkok's territory and benefits and to build the political unity to counter to the local governor's power (Samudavanija, 1998; Mead, 2004).

The age of administrative reform in southern Thailand occurred by the Thai government's concern on the expansion of the British power in the northern Malay states, which was increasing in the mid of the 19th century. This made the Thai government consider that inefficient administration over the Seven Malay Muslims

47

Principalities might lead to British intervention. In 1896, the Seven Malay Muslims Principalities were annexed to the monthon of Nakhon Si Thammarat which included Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phattalung, Songkla, and the Seven Malay Muslims Principalities. Within the so call "Monthon" in the "Thesaphiban" system, the Thai government appointed a Thai resident to give counsels to governors in the Seven Malay Muslims Principalities and to perform in foreign affairs. However, later the Thai government increased intervention to other affairs, i.e. politics, court, and finance through the mechanism of the bureaucractic system. This caused the conflict between the Thai government and each governor of the principalities. Especially, the conflict enlarged more violently after Tungku Abdulkadir Kamaralluddin (Praya Vichitpadi), the new governor (Raja) of Pattani, inherited from his father and took the role to be the resistance leader against the annexation power of the Thai government, but political and military power of the Malay Muslims governors was weakened by divide and rule policy during decades (Ongskul, 1978).

In the early part of 1902, the Thai authority arrested rebel Tungku Abdulkadir. He was sentenced to jail in the northern part of Thailand and was released after three years in jail. Behind this situation, not only did Tungku Abdulkadir try to bargain with the Thai government to cancel the policy of reduced autonomy of Pattani but also he tried to make contact with Frank Swettenham, the governor of the Straits Settlements, to persuade the British to interfere and protect Patani from Thai power. Unfortunately, this situation hid the ministerial envoy of Thailand's trick that deceived Tungku Abdulkadir in to signing the document to approve of the Thai administrative reform. However, Frank Swettenham refused to interfere in the Thai

administration because the British acknowledged the Thai government's sovereignty over this region (Ongskul, 1978; Satha-anand, 2008; Pitsuwan, 1998; Syukri, 2005).

On March 10, 1902 there was an important agreement between the Thai government and the British of Malaya, namely the "Treaty between the United Kingdom and Siam" signed at Bangkok. It was the agreement on the new frontier between their territories. This treaty was signed five years later after the "British and Siam Secret Convention" signed in 1897. The Thai government promised that it did not provide any territory or grant any concession in the Malay peninsula to other great power countries (e.g. France, Germany, and Russia) without allowance from the British. The important substance of the treaty 1902 was that the Thai government accepted that the government of British Malaya influence on the four northern Malay states, namely Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis, including some islands. In return, the Britain let the government of the federation of Malaya manage its debts with the Thai government neatly. Moreover, the British canceled both the British extraterritorial powers in the Siam and the British consulate. This made the Thai government have a disadvantage since the Bowring Treaty of 1855. In addition, the British allowed the British subjects to have title to land but had to pay taxes as same as natives, but the British subjects in the Siam should be exempt from all military services. Besides, the Thai government borrowed money from the British and gave interest rate as 4 percent per year for building railways connected between the Siam and the British Malaya (Bunnag, 2005; Satha-anand, 2008).

2.2.2 The Malay Muslim Rebellions

Certain territory is the basis of the modern state system that leads to the demarcation of borderlines and signing international treaties. Moreover, this becomes a ceremony of modern states to prevent states from problems and solve problems of international conflict (Aphonsuvan, 2012). Indeed, the effect of the treaty between Siam and British 1902 means that after losing the four northern Malay states to the British, the British acknowledged the Thai sovereignty over areas of Songkla and Satul and accepted the Thai governmental power over the Seven Malay Muslims Principalities. This area covered an area of 13,890 square kilometers (5,363 square mile) and was far away from Bangkok. It was about 1,030 kilometers. Moreover, this region was the farthest territory from the center of Thai administrative power in Bangkok. Alongside, the population census in 1906 found the total of population of the Seven Malay Muslims Principalities to be 242,052 people divided according to ethno-religious groups, i.e. 208,076 Malay Muslims, 30,597 Thai Buddhist, and 3,332 Chinese, or in percentage 85.96 percent, 12.64 percent, and 1.38 percent respectively (Ongskul, 1978).

To enhance more benefits, Thai government changed the tax system by abolishing the monopoly tax being collected by local governors. This new tax system increased a lot of revenue for Thai government. In 1900, the government could collect total revenue from Seven Malay Muslims Principalities, which surged to 327,782 Baht. After deducting all cost of bureaucratic affairs 144,026 Baht and the money sent to the Ministry of Finance was 141,857 Baht. So there was the total annual affair left to local governors 41,859 Baht. That was much less income compared with what they

used to receive in the past (Ongskul, 1978). Indeed, the annual budget 1903 – 04 of the Thai government got total receipts 45,540,000 baht and had total expenditures 45,499.365 baht (Carter, 1904). Main revenue of the Thai government in the early 20th century came from the collection of various taxes: gambling farm tax, spirit farm tax, opium farm tax and lottery farm tax. Also, some obtained from import duty, royalty and export duties on tin, the railway traffic receipts, octroi taxes, and the Chinese poll-tax, while about a half of expenses spent on affairs of the Mahatthai (the Ministry of Interior) 10,580,018 baht, the Kalahom (the Ministry of War) 6,532,140 baht, and His Majesty's Civil List 6,000,000 baht (Carter, 1904).

Tension between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims increased after July 27, 1906 when the Thai government proclaimed the "Monthon Pattani" for the southern administration. Indeed, the Thai government believes that this administrative reform could eliminate external influences of the British and aimed to develop southern Thailand to achieve equal growth or better than the British Malay states (Ongskul, 1978). However, the great rebel occurred in the monthon Pattani in 1909. It was namely the "holy man rebel" led by a religious leader named Haji Bulah, who had combined elements of Islamic and superstition ideologies that excited the Malay Muslims against the Thai government. Later, Haji Bulah was arrested and sentenced to jail for 13 years in Bangkok. Nevertheless, rebels like this still spread to other areas by many religious leaders until September 1911 (Ongskul, 1982).

Interestingly, since the administrative reform, minorities in the north, the northeast, and the South of the country, which had reduced autonomy, resisted continuously.

51

During 1901 – 1902, the Thai government was faced with peasant rebellions against the centralized administration that broke out in ethnic minority regions especially Laotians in the North and the Northeast of country. The strongest resistance occurred in the Northeast that was the so-called rebel of a "man of merit" (ผู้มีบุญ) (Nualpian, 2000). Facing the insurgencies was not easy for the Thai government. It was clear that the government began to set a regular army system in the beginning of the 20th century. However, the procedure in this system was operated slowly. There were only the monthons of Bangkok, Korat, and Rajburi, which established the military in full order. Another monthons had only the monthon police forces that were directly under resident-general (Carter, 1904). When the Thai government started to exercise the Mandatory Military Service Act of 1907, the men who were selected to be soldiers in most monthons, including Pattani were on active duty in the monthon police forces. However, the monthon police forces were not the military forces that had the important role in counterinsurgency.

Resistance to the administrative reform spread throughout the country and made King Chulalongkorn adopt the incremental policy by postponing the administrative reform programs (Gothamasan, 2008). At the same time, however, he influenced the education by changing the education reform in the modern education system that showed the centralized management by the government in Bangkok (Vandergeest, 1993, January). A few years later, after succeeding to the throne of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) who ruled Thailand from 1910 – 1925, the Thai government met an economic problem because of royal extravagant expenditure together with an economic depression after the World War I. During 1918 – 1922, the Thai

government announced using various tax measures that distressed the Malay
Muslims. Moreover, socio-economic disadvantage between southern Thailand and
Bangkok resulted from a variety of tax measures. In addition, the effect of national
education policy that destroyed the local education system related to original religion
and culture. Finally, excessive grievance led to insurgencies of Malay Muslims
against the Thai government vastly and more violently until the Pattani Crisis
happened in 1923 (B.E. 2466 as traditional Thai calendar). The conflict exploded
because of the effect of economic and educational policies of the government during
that time. Besides, there were peasant rebels in other regions, including in the
monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat. In this monthon, there was the Peasant Robber –
bandits who denied paying any taxes and they gather to attack several district offices
and police stations (Nualpian, 2003). Even in Songkla province, there were bandits
in many where beyond the control of the Thai authorities, included the armed gangs
that crossed the Siam border and committed a lot of crimes in Kedah and Perlis
(Cheah, 1988).

During January 21 – 30, 1923, the report of the Thai government stated that there
were 1,000 – 2,000 Malay Muslims gathered to bring about the insurgency. The Thai
government deployed hundreds of police to control the situation. Finally, 15 leaders
were arrested and each was sentenced to jail for 10 years (Gothamasan, 2008). A
well-known historiography of the Malay Muslims states that:

> In 1923 the Malays started a movement by refusing to pay tax because of
> their hatred of the Siam-Thai officials who received their money and also
> because their system of administration did nothing to improve the country.
> In this year the Malays launched a movement to demand freedom. This
> movement was suppressed by the Kingdom of Siam after fight occurred
> between members of the movement and a troop of Siamese police in of

53

Mayul (Rakak). Several Malay leaders accused of involvement in this movement were arrested and sent to Bangkok charged with treason. Some of them died and were buried there (Syukri, 2005, p. 84).

Though insurgencies in 1920s finished with the Malay Muslims' defeat, the Thai government had concerns of resistance and operated its political power by adapting law and order in the South related to the identity of Malay Muslims. Furthermore, in the mid-1923, the Thai government issued the "Bureaucrat Guide for Officers of Ministry of Interior in Muslims Dominance Monthon" which changed some aspects of administrative procedures that could reduce the Malay Muslims' dissatisfaction. Some important parts were as follows:

1. Whatever practices or regulations that appear to oppose Islam should be abolished immediately. Any new guideline must not be in violation of the Islamic religion. It is desirable that they should be supportive to Islam.
2. The level of taxation among the Malay Muslims of Patani should not be higher than that of the Malay states (under the British).
3. Public officials to be assigned to Patani should be honest, polite and firm. No official should be sent there as a part of punishment on account of their misbehavior in other areas (Pitsuwan, 1985, p. 68).

Nevertheless, the success of counterinsurgency programs resulted from the Thai government's operation of military power by emphasizing the increase in the monthon police force and the supporting the budget for keeping peace and order efficiently. In addition, with respect to the socio-economic power, the Thai government alleviated economic trouble and developed infrastructure such as road, railway, and post office over this region before 1928. It could be said that no resistance worried the Thai government. Until February 1932, King Prachadhipok (Rama VII, reign 1925 - 1935) abolished the monthon Pattani and returned it to the monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat. Later, in December 9, 1933, the Thai government after the Revolution of 1932 abolished the monthon system totally. It was replaced

with regional administration, following the Administration of the Kingdom of Siam Act, 1933 (Ongskul, 1978).

2.3 Tension in the Power Relations (1930s – 1940s)

In the 1930s, it was the significant time for the history of power relations because this time was the transitional period in the modern Thai politics that was the bloodless Revolution by the People Association in June 24, 1932, which transformed the government from an absolute monarchy into the constitutional democracy. A noteworthy fact is that the Malay Muslims were positively affected by political change of Thailand during this time. As a result, it was important transitional time of the Malay Muslims community caused from the Thai political change. Together with influence of the Islamic revivalism, the Malay nationalism, and other factors leading to tension in an asymmetric relationship of power.

After the Revolution of 1932, the Thai politics impacted positively on the power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. The People Association consisted of 102 military officers and ordinary civilians and Pridi Phanomyong was an important intellectual person with 4 Muslims in Bangkok Metropolitan Area and suburbs, namely, Banchong Sricharoon (Haji Abdulwahab), Prasert Sricharoon, Karim Sricharoon, and Cham Promyong (Haji Shamsuddin Mustafa) who was later appointed as the Chularajmontri (Shaikh al-Islam), the first Suni (Aphonsuvan, 2007).

The People Association set a resolution during the changing Thai system of governance from absolute monarchy to a democratic regime to achieve the goal

55

called the Six Principles of People Association, which consisted of the "independence, safety, economy, equality, liberty, and education." The first principle emphasized national independence, and the other five principles were the announcement to provide the protection of safety and economy for the people, granting rights, equality, and liberty to the people, including providing education to the people considerably (Pethlert-anan, 2000).

Remarkably, the education policy of the People Association's administration promoted the establishment of private schools in southern Thailand. Consequently, it could build good relations with Haji Sulong Abdulakadir Tohmeena (1895 – 1954) who was a Malay Muslims leader and was well educated from Mecca, Saudi Arabia. In 1933, Haji Sulong met Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena, the former Prime Minister in Bangkok in order to receive 3,200 Baht, which was financial support from the government for building his school. Later, the Prime Minister was aware of the importance of Haji Sulong. Therefore, he travelled to Pattani province to preside at the opening of Haji Sulong's school by himself (Ockey, 2004; Khunthongpet, 2004). However, relationship between the Thai government and Haji Sulong, including the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand gradually declined with the downturn of democratization in the late 1930s.

2.3.1 Nationalism and Militarism

In October 1933, the conflict between the People Association and the royalist led to the bloody situation, which was called, the Boworadet Rebellion. This incident caused the military faction in the People Association to have more important role as

56

the protector of the constitution (Pethlert-anan, 2000). However, the lack of unity within the People Association was the important impediment of democratization in Thailand. It was resulted from different political thoughts between the civilian group led by Pridi and the military faction led by Field Marshal Phibun. The first group favored liberal politics and socialist economics, but the latter favored nationalism:

> The 1932 revolution, however, failed to provide a strong foundation for democracy. The two factions within the People's Party that executed the revolution had their major political differences. The military faction, led by Phibun Songkhram, saw the institution of the armed forces, particularly the army, as the agent of modernization, and therefore playing a major role in nation-building. The civilian group led by Pridi Phanomyong favoured a mass party that derives its power from the people and viewed it as a prerequisite for promoting democratic environment. The civilians eventually conceded and helped lay the foundation for the military domination of Thai politics. Military coup d'état became a regular feature of Thai Politics (Che Man, 2003, p. 4).

Nationalism and militarism could be coactions with the centralized bureaucracy that had operated since the early days of the nation-state. Eventually, cooperation between military and bureaucracy occurred and continued to exert its power. Moreover, the military power was an important apparatus of the state to control over the regions throughout the country. This factor was an important reason to clarify why Thai politics during this time was usually explained by the well-known theory of so call the bureaucratic polity. It point to why policy operations of the Thai government in the approach of nationalism and militarism corresponded to benefits of the bureaucratic elites that could affect throughout the country very quickly (Aphonsuvan, 2007; Riggs, 1966).

When Field Marshal Phibun became the Prime Minister, during his first term as Prime Minister (1938 – 1944), the Thai nationalism and militarism ideologies were

influenced by the Fascism of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The Field Marshal Phibun's administration stressed the nation-building policy in order to counter the England and France influence and make Thailand into a civilized nation. Alongside, the government composed a series of laws and regulations known as the "rattaniyom" (State Decrees) to reconstruct the national identity. It changed from the traditional fetters of the monarchy into Thai-ness, which highlighted modernization in culture and thought such as hygiene, health, and clothing (Chaloemtirana 1983; Aphonsuvan, 2007). Moreover, the nation-building policy attempted to force minority groups, i.e. the Chinese and the Laotians, especially the Malay Muslims to be assimilated as "Thais":

> The perception of a civilized Thai nation-state devoid of remnants of Feudalism was actually very Eurocentric in its presumption and ideas. Various minority groups were affected by this cultural policy, but the Malay Muslims of the south were especially hit by these new cultural laws and regulations. The terms "Southern Thais" and "Islamic Thais" were to be referred to simply as "Thais." The term "Thai Islam" was an invention of the Thai government to indicate that, while it did tolerate religious differences at the time, it did not consider that there should be any other significant differences among citizens of Thailand (Aphonsuvan, 2007, p. 36).

According to widely known decrees, twelve the state-ism decrees or known as the "Rattaniyom" were issued. The first decree was to change the country's name from Siam into Thailand. Despite decrees that greatly affected everyday life of the Malay Muslims were the ninth decree, entitle the "Thai language and books and citizen duties" and the tenth decree on the "clothing of Thai people" that Thai men and women were forced to wear the Western style clothes. As a result, the wearing of the Malay Muslim clothes, like the sarong, robes, and turbans of men were forbidden. In the same way, Malaysian female head coverings were no longer permitted.

58

Moreover, the government officers whose names were Malay, Arab, Chinese, or Thai that was not the official Thai language were forced to change and correct their names (Khunthongpet, 2004; Syukri, 2005).

Tensions increased after the Thai government had announced it would use the Civil and Commercial Code section 5 and 6 on Family and Succession in 1943. This law was enforced instead of the Islamic law, which was applied in the province courts of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satul provinces. This law caused the revocation the position "Dato' Yuttitham" which performed as a judge in family and succession cases in accordance with Islamic law. This change made the Malay Muslims who had disputes in those cases avoid going to the Thai civil courts and appearing in Islamic courts in the northern states of Malaysia, namely, Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, and Kedah. While, some Malay Muslim communities selected "To' Kali" that was not related to the Thai civil court system. Evidently, during 1943 – 1947, there was not any family and succession case of the Malay Muslims appeared in the Thai civil courts at all (Khunthongpet, 2004).

However, the Malay Muslims' nationalist movements in southern Thailand were slowly formed. The main factor of this phenomenon, not only started from dissatisfaction with assimilation policy and reaction against the Thai authorities' abuse of power in the area. But also got influence from the Malay nationalism, which was widespread after the World War II. It became the ideology of resistance against Thai national discourse and its discursive practices upon the Malay Muslims in southern Thaialnd. Interestingly, Haji Sulong was a distinguished leader in the movements of Malay Muslims. His role as a leader had at least two important

conditions concerning with him. First, according to his personal character, Haji Sulong was born into a religious leader's family. He learnt Islamic knowledge and he was proficient in both Al-Quran and Al-Hadith. He knew Arabic very well because he studied in Mecca and he used to be a religious teacher there for many years. Later on, he returned to Pattani province and became a religious leader (To' Kuru) and opened a Malay traditional school in his hometown (Khunthongpet, 2004; Ockey, 2004).

Secondly, there was more opportunity for political participation due to democracy after the Revolution of 1932. There was the combination of the characteristic of traditional-charismatic leadership and modern leadership supported by legal-rational authority. Haji Sulong got more opportunity from the administration of the civilian regime started in 1944, which promulgated the Patronage of Islam Act of 1945. This law stipulated that the Provincial Islamic Commission had to be set in southern Thailand. Haji Sulong was selected by religious leaders in Pattani to be chairperson of the Islamic Commission of Pattani province (Khunthongpet, 2004). This law also sets an organization on behalf of the "Central Islamic Commission of Thailand" and assigned the commission to choose Chularajmontri (Shaikh al-Islam) to be the chairperson, which was the head of Muslims in Thailand. Cham Promyong or Haji Shamsuddin Mustafa, who was a Malay Muslims in Bangkok, was selected to be the first Chularajmontri in accordance with the law and this law stipulated that Chularajmontri and the commission had to perform Islamic affairs and give advice to the Thai government for the administration of Islamic affairs.

2.3.2 The Seven Point Demand of Haji Sulong

The Provincial Islamic Commission became the important channel for communication between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. In 1947, the administration of Rear Admiral Thawan Thamrongnawasawat, which was supported by Pridi Phanomyong set the Investigatory Commission to meet the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand, listen to their problems, and get their suggestions. The proposal being well known was the Seven Point Demand of Haji Sulong that was sent to the government in Bangkok. Indeed, the Islamic Commission of Pattani province created this proposal and Haji Sulong performed as the president. This proposal was taken in the meeting of Islamic Commission of Pattani province on April 1, 1947 with some people participated and then it was submitted to the "Investigatory Commission" on April 3, 1947.

The proposal composed of a political demand for self-determination of the Malay Muslims and other propositions that reflected socio-economic, cultural educational demands, including the Sharia court as follows:

1. The governing in the four provinces of Pattani, Satul, Yala, and Narathiwat was absolutely ruled by a chief executive with having authority in Islamic affairs and having full authority to appoint government servants in these provinces and to dismiss by means. A person who took this top position had to be a Muslim in these 4 provinces and was elected from all Muslims in this region. This position could be set for term of office.
2. 80 percent of government servants in each department in 4 provinces had to be the Malay Muslims.
3. Official documents such as forms and receipts had to be used in both Malay and Thai language.
4. The Malay language had to be taught in primary schools until graduating elementary schools before students learnt the Thai language.
5. Establishment the court that conducted a trial by using Islamic law, this separated from the government's judicial system having To' Kali

61

appropriately and having full power to judge without being under anybody's power, except for being illegal.

6. Revenues from taxes and other earnings that were collected from the four provinces had to be expended only in these four provinces without sharing out to other regions. And

7. The Provincial Islamic Commission had full power to legislate regulations about Islamic affairs approved by the supreme authority (in No. 1) (Mongkolworawan, 2009, pp. 25-26).

At the same time, the Provincial Islamic Commission in other provinces also submitted demands in the same way. For example, Friday as a holiday, radio broadcasting in local Malay language, and avoidance of calling the Malay Muslims as "Khaek" which means the other etc. (Khunthongpet, 2004; Siamese Demand for Use of Malay, 1947, May 13). Although some demands got a response from the Thai government most demands still were avoided; especially the Malay Muslims' demands for autonomous politics and economy, which were not acceptable. Because the Thai government assumed that, this would separate this region from Thailand (Whitinghame-Jones, 1947; Khunthongpet, 2004).

On November 10, 1947, a military coup d'état which was supported by Field Marshal Phibun happened. Mr. Khuang Aphaiwong was appointed for the puppet Prime Minister. Later, Field Marshal Phibun returned to be the Prime Minister again in April 1948. Field Marshal Phibun's administration was no longer patient with the southern problems. On January 16, 1948, Haji Sulong and his associates were arrested and convicted of the "rebellion in the kingdom" and he spent time in jail until June 15, 1952 (Khunthongpet, 2004). After his release, Haji Sulong still carried on political activities for the Malay Muslims' rights. Until August 13, 1954, Haji Sulong and his eldest son, Ahmad and his two associates were arrested over again. It was believed that all might be killed in that day without any acceptance by the Thai

authorities (Satha-anand 2008; We won't harm Sulong: Gen Phao, 1955, January 29).

Actually, Haji Sulong's movements were not more excessive than regulations affirmed in the constitution of Thailand. His demands were not too much, but he just wanted the Malay Muslims to be autonomous under the Thai state power. It could be said that the Thai government acted against Haji Sulong with negative perceptions because the government was concerned about his role in movements to get the rights of Malay Muslims (Khunthongpet, 2004).

When the Thai government ignored to using political power and decided to apply the military power it caused acts of violence. It was not only a case of extrajudicial killing of Haji Sulong but also included the so-called Dusun Nyor Rebellion happening in a small village named Dusun Nnyor in Narathiwat province. On April 28, 1948, there was a clash between one thousand of the Malay Muslims and the Thai police force (Revolt in South Siam – Police Attacked, 1948. April 29). This event was the great tragedy that occurred from negative perceptions towards the Malay Muslims. Some scholars believed that this incident occurred from the uprising of the Malay Muslims. Even the Thai police commander at that time also got the report from the area, which said that the Malay Muslim militants began to attack police in response the arrest of Haji Sulong (36 Killed in Siam 'Rebel' Clash, 1948, April 30).

There was the report of the Investigation Commission of Thai government after the Dusun Nyor incident had finished. It identified that this incident occurred from

misunderstanding and did not arise from political motivation. For the reason that, at that time, the Malay Muslims in Dusun Nyor gathered to ritualize the local superstition for fighting against the militant of Malayan Communist Party (MCP). While, the Thai police concerned that people gathered together to resist against the government so they tried to inspect them. In the same way, the Malay Muslims distrusted the police officers and did not allow the police officers to check them. Unfortunately, this caused a confrontation between the two parties. Then, finally, the violent clash which lasted for 36 hours. It could be proved that the real reason for this case happened from a misunderstanding, the fact about the death toll was not certain. There were different references, which stated that the Malay Muslims died between 30 – 400 people and between 5 – 30 the Thai police officers were killed (36 Killed In Siam 'Rebel' Clash, 1948, April 30; Khunthongpet, 2004; Satha-anand, 2008).

There was confusion about the effect of this event and the seizure of Haji Sulong. Some studies referred news of The Straits Times which stated that the Malay Muslims emigrated from southern Thailand to Kelantan, Malaysia because of the effect of the Dusun Nyor incident (Che Man, 1990; Phusawang, 1978). On the other hand, some news reported that the migration of Malay Muslims of about 3,000 people happened because of the arrest of Haji Sulong and the duration of informing this news had occurred about two months before the Dusong Nyor incident (Siam Fears Revolt by Malay?, 1948, February 16; 3,000 Quit South Siam, 1948, February 29).

Nevertheless, some refugees participated in the first Malays Muslim organization, namely the Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR). The GAMPAR was founded in February – March 1948 at Kota Bharu, Kelantan. At its founding, there were hundreds of people who joined this organization. Most of them were Malay Muslims, but some were the Malay in Kelantan, and so on. It is clearly that the GAMPAR had Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Nik as the president and it acknowledged that Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen was the supporter (Che Man, 1990; Che Man, 2004).

The declaration of the manifesto of GAMPAR announced the intention to struggle for liberation of the southern region from Thailand as follows:

1. Must combine 4 provinces, i.e. Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun to form Melayu Islamic state and liberate Malay Muslims in 4 provinces from contempt, insult, oppression, and taking advantage.
2. Must provide the administration, which is suitable for Malay Muslims' needs and stand point, including tradition and Islam.
3. Must exalt the status and quality of life of Malay Muslims as Bumiputera, which has high position in humanity, justice, freedom, and suitable education (Nik Mahmud, 2006, p. 81).

Although the objective of this movement was supported by some Malaysian groups that tried to push the British government to annex the southern Thailand to the Malay Federation. However, the British government did not agree with that offer because this was not more important than friendship with Thailand (Yegar, 2002). Though, the relationship between England and Thailand was not rather smooth after the Thai government had allied with Japan during the World War II. During 1943 – 1945, the Thai government had governed the four states of Malay Federation, i.e. Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Teranganu. Later, both governments restored their well relationship afterward and set the police cooperation in the Border Agreement in

December 1948, which contributed to other cooperating. In addition, there was an agreement on government cooperation to suppress and investigate information about the movements of the CMP and the Malay Muslim separatists in the nearby area and the frontier between their territories (Ratanachaya, 1995; Yegar, 2002).

2.4 The National Security and Insurgency (1950s – 1970s)

During the 1950s, this period was one of the most important transformations of Thai political by transforming from nationalism and militarism of the Field Marshal Phibun administration into the totalitarianism rule of Field Marshal Sarit. With reference to the Field Marshal Phibun's administration, constitution, parliament, and election had been supported continuously since the first general election in 1937, therefore, the Malay Muslim politicians could play a political role. In the general election in February 1957 and the general election in December of the same year, Haji Ameen Tohmeena, who was the second son of Haji Sulong, was elected to be a Member of the Parliament for Pattani province. However, he was arrested and accused of treason and he was imprisoned during 1961 – 1965. After the Thai authority had released him, Haji Ameen fled to Kelantan, Malaysia until he passed away in 2001. The Thai government always suspected haji Ameen Tohmeena that he was an important leader of the BRN (Khungthongpech, 2004; Yeema, 2006; McCargo, 2008).

2.4.1 Authoritarian Regime

After the 1958 coup d'état led by Field Marshal Sarit had overthrown the Field Marshal Phibun administration. On February 9, 1959, Field Marshal Sarit was

66

appointed Prime Minister after his second coup had overthrown the military junta that he backed up. It could be said that, the Field Marshal Sarit's coup in 1958 threw Thailand into the longest age of totalitarian military regime. This coup was different from the five coups during the 1932 – 1958 period, which the coup groups changed only the executive in power. Indeed, the Field Marshal Sarit's coup extended the military power into the civilian sphere by abolishment of political power and constitutions, abrogation of parliaments, and suspension of participant political activity including the election (Samudavanija, 2002). This situation causes the so call state of exception – the period of separation of power between the legislative, the executive, and the juridical branches (Agamben, 2005).

In order to introduce the state of exception, the executive also creates the situation like peace, order, or threat to national security. Accordingly, it leads to an abnormal time that claims to require extraordinary measures to confront a national crisis. By this means, "the government establishes the legalization of the situation or abnormal time, which always is exceptional because there is always a crisis prompted by enemies" (Streckfuss, 2011, p. 129). The Thai government also introduced the National Security Act of 1959 and in 1964, the Thai government announced to apply the first security policy on the SBPs proposed by the Office of the National Security Council (NSC) which was controlled by the army. In conjunction with the problem, this policy focused on southern Thailand as a specific area (abnormal area) in political, military, and socio-economic dimensions (Bunnag, 2004).

Previously, the Thai government set the Committee for Economic and Social Development in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satul provinces on behalf of the

Commission for Southern Development which was the first committee in March, 7, 1961 and changed several committees within two years. This committee planed five developmental approaches, i.e. governance, education, training, infrastructure, and welfare. Major projects followed the National Economic and Social Development Plans, which started since 1961. In parallel with economic and social development, the Thai government also established the Administrative Coordinating Center in Southern Border Provinces on January 11, 1965. It was placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. This had the objective of being the orientation center for the Thai government officers who were sent to work in southern Thailand. Moreover, for being a public relations center between the government agencies and the local people (Bunnag, 2004).

Thai government emphasized the development for the south in several levels as words of Field Marshal Sarit that spoke to the Malay Muslims in the ceremony of delivering the central mosque of Pattani province on May 25, 1963. Some parts of statement as follows:

> As the Prime Minister of the government of His Majesty the King, I always considered that making benefits for the Thai people occurred by creating both physical and mental happiness for all people. Religion led to mental happiness, so I supported all methods. Now you could see a wonderful central mosque built here. Also, with respect to my wishes, I tried to make people have well-being, be prosperous from commerce, agriculture, industry, and economic development in accordance with some projects. As a result, progress benefited for people (Field Marshal Sarit, 1963 as cited in Bunnak, 2004, p. 145).

In the same year, the government announced that Saturday and Sunday were official holidays through the country. It's replacing declaration Friday as the official holiday in the southern Thailand, which was the fourteenth consecutive years after the Thai

68

government had accepted the Malay Muslims' need proposed through the Investigation commission since 1947. In the early 1960s, there were the Thai Buddhists in the region of less than 10 percent. According to political perspective, which stressed on minority problems, such population proportion made the Thai government think that this could threaten security. Thus, the government implemented a policy to distribute land to the Thai Buddhists who were outsiders; especially the Thai Buddhists people from the Northeast who came to settle down in self-help settlements in southern Thailand (Bunnag, 2004). Several scholars often indicated that education policies in this period. Especially the education policy, which focused on controlling the "pondok" (the Malay Muslims' traditional school) made the Malay Muslims resist the integration into the Thai-ness (or it actually tried to make them become citizen) (Pitsuwan, 1985; Che Man, 1990).

Typically, the Thai government used the provincial police forces and the Border Patrol Police (BPP) to prevent and suppress insurgents and criminal in the region. Nevertheless, when the insurgency became more violent in 1966, the Thai government deployed soldiers in the region by setting the Battalion Combat Team of Pattani which was the first Thai Royal Army area office in southern Thailand. This was developed into the main security forces to counter insurgency of the Fourth Army Areas, which was established in 1975.

2.4.2 Separatism

During the 1960s, the insurgencies of Malay Muslims were not similar to the traditional model, which was called the peasant rebel against the Thai government.

Previously, the disordered revolt had proceeded for more than five decades. But, the Malay Muslim uprising during this time was the fighting for self-determination in the form of insurgency. The movement was a good political-military organized structure and used ideologies (i.e. Malay nationalism, Islamic ideology, and socialism ideology), which aimed to overthrow the administration of Thai government in the southern Thailand. Moreover, people in the region, including overseas organizations and foreign governments, supported the Malay Muslim insurgents. In this period, terrorism was amalgamated with the insurgency to resist against the Thai government. Consequently, the Thai government responded to the Malay Muslim insurgencies by using the stronger power for counterinsurgency as well.

Since the GAMPAR had ended its role, some members joined to set a new organization was founded in 1959, namely the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP). The BNPP had Tengku Abdul Jalan (Adul Na Saiburi), a former member of the parliament (MP) of Narathiwat province, as the leader. Similarly, the former movements, the GAMPAR and the BNPP, expressed intention to establish the greater Patani sultanate state. It also had the closest relationship with the Kelantan's leaders, particularly the Party Islam (PI), a Malaysian's conservative Islamic party that had strong influence in the Kelantan politics (Pitsuwan, 1985).

The objective of fighting of the BNPP was not irredentism anymore; the BNPP indeed fought to be independent. Furthermore, during the late 1960s, the BNPP was the first Malay Muslim separatist organization, which set up armed forces to make guerrilla warfare against the Thai government, namely the National Liberation Army

70

of Patani People (NLAPP). In addition, this group had an alias "Pak Yeh" (Idris bin Mat Diah) as the guerrilla leader and was surrounded by several hundreds of militants. Some of them were recruited from the Malay Muslim gangsters, including former bandits and outlaws (Che Man, 1990). Though, numerous of Malay Muslim students who studied abroad were the members of the organization. Not only Malay Muslims students in Malaysia but also Malay Muslim students in Pakistan, Mecca, and Cairo became the BNPP's oversea base (Che Man, 1990).

In March 1963, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) was formed. This group had Ustaz Abdul Karim Hassan (a former member of the BNPP) as the organization's leader. The BRN was different from the former movements and had the objective to establish a republic of Patani. In the beginning, it used socialist ideology instead of labeling themselves as Malay nationalist or concerned with Islamic ideology. Because of their ideology, this group was suspected of being an alliance with the Thai and Chinese – Malay communists (Pitsuwan, 1985; Che Man, 1990; Singh, 2005). Initially, the BRN stressed on establishing a political organization, which depended on the traditional Malay Islamic schools (pondok) for being an important base of mass movement. Within only five years, the BRN could spread its influence into many pondok of southern Thailand. Until 1968, the BRN began to set its armed force to fight in the model of guerrilla warfare (Che Man, 1990).

In the same year, the Patani Organization United Liberation (PULO) was formed by Tengku Bira Kotanila (known as Kabir Abdul Rahman) and a group of Malay Muslim students at the Aligarh Muslim University, India. The PULO used the Malay nationalism as main ideology to stimulate young Malay Muslims, which were the

main target to participate in the organization. Apparently, the PULO use Mecca, Saudi Arabia as the headquarters until 1984. Moreover, Kelantan, Malaysia was used as their operational base for various missions. Such expansive support made the PULO possesses the best-trained and best-equipped military force among the separatist groups in this period (Che Man, 1990; Pitsuwan, 1985).

During the 1970s, the Malay Muslim movements had labeled themselves as the Patani liberation, which operated the most strongly. They could build autonomous zones and the overlapping of state power against the Thai governmental power in the area of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat provinces, and some parts of Songkla province, except Satul province. Guerrilla operations typically included ambushes and attacks on police stations and government offices that happened intermittently, including kidnapping, extortion, and blackmail with the Thai and Chinese businesspersons who did business in the area (Che Man, 1990). Insurgencies of the Malay Muslims during this time made the Thai government conduct the special operational force that was the mixed force among army, police, and paramilitary to suppress the insurgencies in southern Thailand. The government presented statistics between 1968 and 1975 which were 385 clashes with the "Malay Muslim Terrorists"; 329 terrorists dead; 165 surrendered to the Thai authorities; 1,208 arrested; 1,451 weapons of various types, 27,538 rounds of ammunition, and 95 grenades captured by the authorities; and 250 terrorist camps destroyed (Megarat, 1977 as cited in Che Man, 1990).

From the 1970s to 1980s, the Thai government reacted to situations in the southern Thailand by using administrative power in three aspects, which were political, military, and socio-economic power. In the beginning, the Thai government stressed

72

on using military power against counterinsurgency of the Malay Muslim separatists. The national security policy of 1969 was named the "Security Policy in Southern Border Provinces" in which various government agencies were involved. For instance, Interior Ministry, Education Ministry, the Committee for Southern Development, the National Security Council, and some other agencies. The essential parts of this policy, which was implemented from 1969 to 1974, to increase the numbers of security forces (soldiers and police), including weapons and to develop the southern Thailand in both political and socio-economic aspects. Through using military power against counterinsurgency of the Malay Muslim separatist groups, which were very strong during this time (Chaiching, 2009; Soe-heng, 2008).

The democratization happened to the short period after the Thai student uprising had called for democracy of October 14, 1973. This made the Malay Muslim students who were studying in Bangkok form their group, namely the Slatan, which engaged in political activities in the southern Thailand and throughout the country. The Slatan collaborated with the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), which was the leftist Thai student organization (Uma, 2010).

The democratization in that period roused the movement for political and human rights of the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. For example, the greatest protest of the Malay Muslims called for the responsibility of the Thai government in the murder case of the five innocent Malay Muslim villagers by Thai Marines in district of Bacho, Narathiwat province, which occurred on November 29, 1975. One month later, several thousands of the Malay Muslims marched around the Pattani city and protest at the Pattani central mosque. It was supported by students' organizations in

Songkla and Yala provinces. The protest became spreading out at the end of January 1976. It caused the former Prime Minister Kurkrit Pramoj took a four-day tour to the region to consider the fact of this event and listened to the problem of unfairness, which happened to the Malay Muslims (Voice of Patani, 1976, February).

But the democratization would impact Malay Muslims' participation in Thai politics. Young Malay Muslim leaders and intellectuals who got well educated from Bangkok were candidates for the general election in 1975. The political role of the Malay Muslim politicians and students (the Slatan) had to end after the leftist students had been massacred on October 6, 1976 at the Thammasat University, Bangkok. This bloody event caused coup d'état and Thai politics turn back to the military junta regime. Disappointment in the Thai democratization caused the Malay Muslims to mistrust the Thai government more. As a result, when the general election was held in 1979, they participated in it with less enthusiasm (Che Man, 2003).

2.5 Democratization and Transition of Conflict (1980s – 2003)

In the 1980s, the Thai government considerably changed its approach in the internal security operation by switching from an emphasis on suppressing insurgencies of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) with military measures to political measures, which well known as the politics ahead of military policy (นโยบายการเมืองนำการทหาร). On April 23, 1980, General Prem Tinsulanonda, the unelected Prime Minister declared the Executive Order (of the Prime Minister Office) No. 66/2523 known as the Policy to Win Over the Communists issued to provide the policy guidelines is as follows:

1. Politics must lead the military in an effort to fight against the Communists and other armed insurgencies:

2. The policy of Politics ahead of Military must be employed indiscriminately to avoid the people's war: and
3. Armed counter-insurgencies must be changed to peaceful methods (Che Man, 2003, p. 16).

Such policy influenced a significant change in the administration in southern Thailand and led to the Executive Order No. 8/2524 on the improvement of administration in the SBPs, signed on January 24, 1981. This order restructured the responsibilities for the region by creating two new entities, the Southern Border Provincial Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Police-Military Task force 43 (CPM 43).

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Policy level                    ┌─────────────────┐
                                │  Prime Minister │
                                └─────────────────┘
                                         │
                                         ▼
                           ┌──────────────────────────┐
                           │ Office of the National   │
                           │ Security Council (NSC)   │
                           └──────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────────────────┐                ┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ Ministry of Interior     │                │ Office of the National       │
│ (MOI) and other          │                │ Economic and Social          │
│ Ministries               │                │ Development Board (NESDB)    │
└──────────────────────────┘                └──────────────────────────────┘
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Policy to Practice level   ┌──────────────────────────┐
                           │ Commander of the Fourth  │
                           │ Army Region              │
                           └──────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ Border Provincial        │        │ Civilian – Police – Military │
│ Administrative Centre    │        │ Task force 43 (CPM TASK      │
│ (SBPAC)                  │        │ FORCE 43)                    │
└──────────────────────────┘        └──────────────────────────────┘
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Implementation level

┌───────────┐ ┌───────────┐   ┌───────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌───────────┐
│ Provinces │ │Government │   │ Civilian  │ │  Police   │ │ Military  │
│           │ │ offices   │   │           │ │           │ │           │
└───────────┘ └───────────┘   └───────────┘ └───────────┘ └───────────┘
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Figure 2.1: The Structure of the Southern Border Provincial Administration in the Executive Order No. 8/2524, signed on January 24, 1981

Adapted from: Manakit, P. (2005, July). P*roblem Security Management the case of 3 Southern Provinces Incident*. Research report presented to The Secretariat of The Senate; Sonklin, J. (2000). *The Role of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center on Resolution the Security Problems in Southern Border Provinces* (Master's thesis). Ramkhamhaeng University.

Functionally, the SBPAC was put under the authority of the commander of the Fourth Army Region. The army Region, which established in 1976 in order to take the responsibility in maintaining internal security in the greater southern region that covered 14 provinces including Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkla provinces. The SBPAC's administrative structure was designed as an organization that brought the policy to practice level and it was placed above the level of provincial administration and government offices in the area. In addition, the SBPAC was open to the appeal of people about abuses of power by some officers. Importantly, the SBPAC gave a chance for the Malay Muslim elites who usually were national politicians, religious leaders, and scholars in universities who participated in the organization as consultants. This brought about the close relationship between the Malay Muslim elites and the chiefs of the army and the head of bureaucracy offices, including the party leaders in Bangkok and other areas.

> This change was the turning point. The majority of the Malay Muslims began to response positively to the government policies and programs. Many Muslim leaders agreed to work for change within the Thai system by participating in national and local elections. They were able to gain certain political and bargaining powers, which enabled them in different capacities, to help and develop their community (Che Man, 2003, pp. 22-23).

Together with using a policy of so called the "politics ahead of military" which was the policy of finding political rather than military operations. The Thai government was more focused on socio-economic power to solve the southern Thailand problems as well. The socio-economic development projects which were specified in the fourth National Economic and Social Development Plan, between 1977 and 1981. It was emphasized on the development of infrastructure such as transport routes and public health. Including economic development projects like the multi-purpose dam

77

in Yala province, provincial electricity authority's projects in 300 villages in the three southern provinces (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978, May).

Likewise, General Chavalit Yongchaiyut, Commander-in-Chief of the army during the period May 1986 to March 1990, also formulated a policy namely the Southern Development Project (โครงการทักษิณพัฒนา) or was known in the Malay name "Harapan Baru" (ความหวังใหม่), this policy attempted to implement the following objectives:

1. To develop quality of life of the people in the Muslim provinces and to raise their democratic consciousness and confidence to enable them to live in harmony locally and nationally;
2. To promote unity among the different ethnic groups and to reduce suspicions and distrust between government officers and the local people; and
3. To preserve local culture and to encourage the people to participate in resolving local problems (Che Man, 2003, p. 17).

At the same time, on March 1986, the meetings among the Malay Muslim politicians and religious leaders in southern Thailand decided to form a political affiliation known as the "Wahdah" (unity). The Wahdah had Den Tohmeena, the MP for Pattani province, as a chairperson and the Malay Muslim politicians as members (Yeema, 2006). Although the Wahdah was known as a group of Malay Muslim politicians, its organization was not limited only the Malay Muslim politicians because it also had non-Muslim politicians in southern Thailand who were founding members. Besides, the Wahdah had methods to operate political activities for making benefits of both Muslims in Thailand and non-Malay Muslims too. This can be seen from 6 objectives as follows (Che Man, 2003, pp. 19-20):

1. To forge unity among the Muslims in Thailand;

2. To preserve the rights and interests of the Muslims;

3. To develop the Muslim community in political, economic, educational, and social aspects;

4. To implant correct political consciousness among the Muslims;

5. To introduce Islamic system and to make the Muslims understand and practice it; and

6. To promote and develop a democratic system.

In 1990, General Chavalit established the New Aspiration Party. After the coup d'état had occurred in February 1991, the Wahdah group joined the party. Wan Mohammad Nor Matha, an important member of the Wahdah group, took a position of deputy party leader. The group was very successful in the 1992/1 general election; the Wahdah group's candidates were elected to occupy seven of the nine seats of members of parliament in three provinces in southern Thailand. In addition, the next general election after the event so called the blood May 1992, the Wahdah group could occupy almost MPs seats in the area. This event made some politicians of the Democrat Party, main competitors of the Wahdah group, set the group named the Jama'at Ulama Pattani Daruslam, which had Surin Pitsuwan as a leader. The Jama'at Ulama Pattani Daruslam group tended to use the pondok as main machinery for driving their political activities. That was different from the Wahdah group, which used the Province Islamic Commission as a base for movement (Yeema, 2006).

Up until 1997, the new constitution of Thailand as well known as the people's constitution was promulgated. This constitution was accepted as it was one of the most democratic constitutions of Thailand. It emphasized political rights and liberties, including giving more chance for people participation in political activities

and so on. The Constitution also influenced the regulating policies of the Thai government that affected several aspects of the Malay Muslims.

Fortunately, one good result from this constitution was the changing the national security policies for the southern Thailand (1999 – 2003) formulated by the National Security Council for using as the framework and guidance to solve the problem in the region during the years 1999 to 2003. The outstanding characteristics of the policy are as follows: First, this policy highlights the cultural differences and diversities and the way of life of the people within the area in order to make them be social capital and power for solving problems and sustainable development in southern Thailand. Second, this policy focuses on the participation by allowing the people to take part in the process of thinking, policy formulation, and the implementation of security policy, including having a sense of possessing the policy (The Office of the National Security Council, n.d.).

As mentioned above, the Thai government had responded to the problem by setting up the SBPAC based on the concept of single management. The army was the main responsible party from policy formulation level to policy implementation. The army also had the authority to control the operation of resolving insurgency problems in political and military aspects in southern Thailand. On April 23, 1996, Banhan Silapa-acha's administration which was the elected government promulgated the Executive Order No. 56/2539 in order to improve the chain of command of local agencies. Both political and military work was previously under the Fourth Army Commander, but, with respect to this order, the Forth Army Commander had the authority to control only the security units, while civilian and police units were under

the responsibility of the SPBAC director, which under the control of the Ministry of Interior (Sonklin, 2000).

Despite four decades of Thai government attempts to implement socio-economic development programs in southern Thailand the results during 1990 – 2003 was disappointing because the economies of three provinces of SBPs i.e. Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces had so much lower expansive rate than other areas and overall rate of Thailand. Moreover, this region had the poor whose total amount of 311,500 people was the highest proportion. That was almost 1 in 5 of the population, which were less than 2 million people (National Reconciliation Commission, 2006).

The socio-economic status quo of the Malay Muslims was in a depression that was the opposite direction from the prosperity of the Malay Muslim politicians in Thai politics. From 1990s to 2000s, the political situation gradually entered into democratization and the Malay Muslim politicians in the Wahdah group was appointed high political positions progressively. Especially, Den Tohmeena and Wan Mohamad Noor Matha leaders of the Wahdah group were appointed important positions in Thai politics. However, it might be too quick to summarize that the continuing insurgencies came from grievance that was the result of inequality in socio-economic status quo.

One report of the senate presents that ongoing violence has occurred from the problem of state apparatuses that are significant causes of existing separatist movements. At the same time, some government agencies lack of personnel who will be sent to work in southern Thailand such as doctors, nurses, and teachers. The

81

number in these careers is less than the people's needs. Ironically, it is a paradox that security forces can operate strongly, but they themselves are the condition of the Malay Muslims' insurgency. It is clear that although separatist movements precede current insurgencies, there are some questions about the connection between the Thai authorities and some insurgents in several events. This report shows the fact that not only do Thai authorities, especially police and soldiers who are corrupt and abuse their power. They are suspected of being troublemakers to get benefits from the government budget and promote their positions in the bureaucratic system and throw the blame on the Malay Muslim separatist. These problems are the important conditions that lead to a grievance of the Malay Muslims. Additionally, local and national politicians as well as national political parties are assumed of being troublemakers in some events to acquire political interest from discrediting political opponents as well (The Secretariat of the Senate, 1999).

According to the other side of southern Thailand problem, some Malay Muslims try to continue their armed fighting to liberate the region from Thailand. In 1980s, the separatist movements still fought against the Thai government. However, during this time, there were changes in some aspects that strengthened and weakened the Malay Muslim separatist movements. Positively, the Islamic ideology had more important roles in reinforcing separatist movements (3 Thai rebel groups have teamed up says paper, 1980, July 4).

The changing that caused weakness in the Malay Muslim separatist movements was disharmony. Initially, the BNPP changed its name to the Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP). Later, in the mid-1980s, some members of the BIPP separated to set a

82

new group that had named in Malay as the Garakan Mujahidin Patani (GMP).
Furthermore, in the late 1980s, members of the GMP split to found the Garakan
Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) which had the objective of establishing the Islamic
state in southern Thailand. Both groups got the influence of jihad, which was the
fight of the mujahedin movements in Afghanistan war. At the same time, the event
that extremely affected the PULO happened in 1984 as Saudi authorities searched
the PULO's headquarters in Mecca. Leaders and members of the PULO were more
than 700 people arrested and deported or sent them back to Thailand (Che Man,
1990).

During the late 1980s, the PULO divided into three factions. The first one was the
Old PULO the logo of the faction was an eagle, which named its armed unit as the
Caddan Army and had headquarters in Syria with Tengku Bira Kotanila as leader.
The second faction was the New PULO and the logo of this faction was crossed
"kris" (Malay dagger) with Haji Abdul Rahman Betong as leader. Moreover, in the
mid-1990s, some members separated from the New PULO and formed the third
faction so-call the "PULO-88" (Abu Jihad) with Dr. A-rong Muleng as leader.
Similarly, the BRN was also divided into 2 factions, which were the BRN-
Coordinate that had a sub-group, namely the BRN-Ulama and the other called the
BRN-Congress headed by Rosa Burako (Che Man, 2004; Gunaratna & Acharya
2013; Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, & Piggott, 2009).

Disunity within movements caused turbulence with many members of separatist
movements. Additionally, the Thai government promoted an amnesty program and
continuous military pressure to the insurgents. Interesting data showed that from

83

1980 to the early of 1988 there were 6,127 insurgents from the three main Malay Muslim separatist movements – PULO, BRN, and BNPP and their surrender to the Fourth Army region. These direful situations urge insurgents to try to adjust struggles against the Thai government again (641 Muslim rebels surrender to army, 1988, January 21).

On August 31, 1989, some separatist groups i.e. the BIPP, the BRN Congress, the BNP, and the new PULO formed the United Front for the Independence of Pattani or Bersatu (United) in order to set up an umbrella organization. They hope that it is the way to unity in the Malay Muslim movements for fighting against the Thai government and to attract international interference and financial donations for their cause. Such changing came from considering their weakness within separatist movements of the Malay Muslims, including evaluating the strengths of the Thai government that fought each other through many decades.

> The Malay Muslim resistance movement has not shown very impressive records. This is due to the fact that the strengths of fronts seem to depend more upon ethnicity and religious motivation than upon the principles of effective organization. Secondly, the fronts have been unable to develop their international contacts effectively. Thirdly, the resistance movement of the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand has carried out a struggle against all odds. Thailand has not only been a strong state, but also a state with lengthy experience in dealing with minority communities. Although the Malay Muslim movement in the Patani region has not been able to pose a serious threat to the Thai government, it continues to persist. This is because the movement is motivated by ethnicity, religion, and history, which cannot simply be removed by improving the socio-economic condition of the people (Che Man, 2003, p. 16).

Furthermore, the changes within separatist movements since 1990s have happened amid the political atmosphere and the Islamic revivalism after the end of the Cold War, while the Malay Muslim separatist movements use them as alternative political

84

ideology against the Thai government which is stronger (Jory, 2007, July). However, guerrilla warfare emphasized armed force and had an operational base in the forest. They usually claimed responsibilities for the military operations "by dropping leaflets at scenes so officials could use them as evidence for proceedings in Thailand and used them for asking cooperation from Malaysia to arrest leaders or members of movements who were in Malaysia" (Ratanachaya, 2005, p. 96).

It could be said that the insurgency in the area has decreased the violence level during the late 1990s. Even though the Malay Muslim separatist movements try to use various tactics in insurgency campaigns such as torching and bombs that have the targets, i.e. state schools, government offices, and public places, including attacking government officials and gun robber. The use of military power of the Malay Muslims for making guerrilla warfare with Thai government is very feeble, in particular after the New PULO's leaders who are Haji Abdul Rahman Betong, Haji Da-oh Thanam, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam were arrested in 1998. Later, some militants were forced to surrender to the Thai authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2007, August).

In the early 2001, the Thaksin administration came to power together with the Malay Muslims insurgents changed to use terrorist tactics and aimed to soft targets, especially the Thai Buddhist civilians. A case in point is, on the morning of April 7, 2001, there was a bomb blast at a railway station in Hat Yai, killing 1 person and injuring 38 people. In the evening on the same day, a bomb blast also occurred at a hotel in Betong district, Yala province. After these incidents there were attacks on police sub-stations and the blasts in southern Thailand of more than ten events.

Despite this, no one group claimed responsibilities for these insurgencies. The Thai government paid a lot of attention to them and began to have questions about the ways to solve the existing southern problems. The next year, on April 30, 2002, the former Prime Minister Thaksin enacted the Executive Order (of the Prime Minister Office) No. 123/2545 and abolished the SBPAC, which was an administrative organization emphasizing on political affairs and development, and CPM 43, which was a measure for using military power under the directive of the commander of the Fourth Army Region. As a result, the southern administration was placed under the central administration at Bangkok, same as the administrative system in the rest of country (Buruspat, 2005; Che Man, 2004; Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, and Piggott, 2009).

2.6 Chapter Summary

In conclusion, the historical background provides an understanding of the nature of the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. Historically, the Malay Muslims were weakened because of administrative reform in Thai nation-state building in the early 20th century, including policies of the Thai government that operated to centralize power, which once the Malay Muslims used to possess. It must be pointed out that after the 1932 revolution had changed the Thai political regime from absolute monarchy to democracy, this brought about increasing political power to the Malay Muslims through supporting political rights and so on. Besides, Malay nationalism spread more widely during that time, which encouraged the Malay Muslims to become more aware of the importance of rights in autonomy. These are not only causes that led to the Malay

86

Muslims separatism, but causes that include nationalism and militarism in Thai politics, the totalitarianism regime, and discontinuity of democratization which have diminished the opportunity for communicating the right way which led to misunderstanding, made tensions, and turned into the conflicts with each other. Although historical conditions have affected the asymmetric conflict very much, the asymmetry of power relations between the parties always has been dynamic. The following chapters are necessary to emphasize on contexts and various changes influenced the conflict.

CHAPTER THREE
THE POLITICAL POWER RELATIONS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the asymmetric of the current political power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. For the criteria of the asymmetric conflict in political power furnished here, the researcher draws upon the particular definition; political power is a peaceful method that provides the opportunities for both parties to participate in the conflict resolution. This chapter category the asymmetry of political power relations into three major parts, i.e. political tension and the Thai government responds, peace building policy for the southern administration, and the Malay Muslims' political movements.

3.2 Political Tension and the Thai Government Responds

To explain how violent situations increased so much during this period, it is vital to consider a few violent situations. The beginning of 2004 was the starting point of the renewal of the open violence when stealing guns from an army camp occurred and followed by a bloody confrontation at the Krue Se Mosque, including Human Rights violation, which was seen in the Takbai incident. The explanation discloses the problem of power relations that has changed from the past and helped to understand success and failure of Thai governments' response to insurgencies and the impact of the problem, including asymmetric conflicts on political power in southern Thailand.

On January 4, 2004, the situation called the guns robber incident occurred when several insurgents raided the Fourth Development Battalion of the Royal Thai Army

or local people called the Pileng camp in Jo Airong district, Narathiwat province. Four soldiers were murdered and 413 rifles were taken from the store. In the same night, nearly twenty schools were torched in 11 districts in Narathiwat province. Despite, the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra tried to reduce this insurgency with explanation that this was a normal criminal. In fact, the Commander of the Fourth Army area responded by suddenly declaring martial law in the southern Thailand in suddenly. According to this law, soldiers were authorized above civilian officers to search many places, including the Malay Muslim villages, private Islamic schools and pondoks. Furthermore, under martial law, soldiers and police were allowed to arrest without a judicial warrant and detained suspects for up to seven days without charge (Manakit, 2005, July; Nualpian, 2008).

The government's response to the insurgency was seriously challenged by the militants. The security forces had to face the more violent insurgency and extended it to the southern provinces. Obviously, insurgents used terrorist tactics by changing their targets from civil servants to the weak such as school teachers, the Buddhist villagers, Buddhist monks, and novices who were killed and injured by the insurgents. It appeared that the insurgency increased together with the abuse of power by security officers. Moreover, the human rights violation has not only happened in the area of conflict. On March 11, 2004, Somchai Neelapaijit, the chairperson of the Thai Muslim Lawyers Association, was disappeared in Bangkok by those who were likely to be police officers (Human Rights Watch, 2007, August).

At the same time, the Malay Muslims leaders were arrested and accused seriously of being wire-pullers of insurgency. Also, politicians belonged to the Wahdah group,

89

being a member with the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) at that time, were suspected. They were two members of parliament from Narathiwat province, Arrepen Uttarasint and Najmuddin Uma, including one senator from Pattani province, Den Tohmeena (a former Wahdah's leader). After that, in June 2004, Najmuddin Uma reported to police in Bangkok, and he was suspected of being a master mind of insurgents. He wanted on 10 charges, but the criminal court dismissed his charges at the end of next year (Interview with Najmuddin Uma, 2014, March 12).

Actually, tension between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims has far increased after the Krue Se mosque incident. It occurred in the early morning on April 28, 2004. More than 100 militants attacked ten police outposts across Pattani, Yala and Songkla provinces. The most violent event occurred at hundreds-year-old Krue Se Mosque in Pattani province. 32 people who took the mosque as the base to fight against Thai authorities were killed in the Krue Se Mosque massacre. With respect to violent events in the Krue Se and another 10 militant attacks that took place at the same day in Pattani, Yala, and Songkla provinces, there were 107 insurgents who died, 6 were injured, and 17 were arrested, while 5 soldiers and police died and 15 were injured. A high death toll of Malay Muslims insurgents in one day might be seen as a win for the Thai government. Yet, some journalists and human rights activists questioned about the necessity of using heavy weapons and opening fire on insurgents who had only short guns and knives. In addition, there was evidence that some arrested insurgents might be killed after surrendering to the authorities (Satha-Anand, 2004, July – September; The Independent Fact-Finding Commission on the Krue Se, 2004, July 26).

90

The former Prime Minister Thaksin's reaction was to praise the army for its swift response, but played down the political aspect: "There is nothing to be afraid of. These are drug addicts," he said (International Crisis Group, 2005, May 18, p. 26). Since this violence occurred on the same day as the Dusun Nyor incident happened on April 28, 1948. International NGOs commented on the motivation of Malay Muslim insurgents that it was driven by historical memories of ethnic Malay Muslim victimization (Human Rights Watch, 2007, August). Several analysts have doubted that whether jihad ideology is the motivation of insurgents or not. Considering forms of insurgencies from 2004 until now, the current situation has very remarkable characteristics. It is not only the biggest sacrifice of the Malay Muslims lives, but it is also the event that leaves traces showing the influence of local-Islamism in the operations related to jihad in the sense of Malay Muslims in southern Thailand clearly (Sugunnasil, 2006, March). Though, the emphasis on the religious issue makes some questions. It is not clear that the separatist movements, especially the BRN-Coordinate or the other separatist groups have operated this operation. Typically, they tend towards ethnics more than religion issues and take their operations with well planning than use the suicide attack.

More aggressive conflict created by abusive measures of the security forces continued to grow, especially after the Takbai incident. The incident happened in the holy month of Ramadan on October 25, 2004 at Takbai district in Narathiwat province. When more than 1,000 Malay Muslims protesters demanded the police release six persons of local militias (VDV/ Chor Ror Bor) who were arrested for having supplied weapons to insurgents. In the afternoon 1,000 soldiers and police

91

under the command of Forth Army Region Commander, Lieutenant General Pisarn Watanawongkiri used tear gas and water cannons on the protesters. Together, a shooting started in which seven men were killed. After that 1,370 protesters were arrested. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, these detainees were thrown into the backs of open-top army trucks, and made to lay, layer upon layer, on top of each other. The destination of the transportation of detainees was the Ingkayutthaborihan military camp in the nearby province of Pattani. The distance was only 150 kilometers, but it reached the military camp at night (so the total time was more than 3 hours). This caused a total of 78 detainees died of suffocation during transportation (The Independent Fact-Finding Commission on the Fatal Incident in Takbai, Narathiwat province, 2004, December 17).

Later, the Prime Minister Thaksin issued an Executive Order No. 335/2547 signed on November 2, 2004 to appoint "The Independent Fact-Finding Commission on the Fatal Incident in Takbai, Narathiwat province." However, the report of the commission that disclose in a month later did not point the actions of state officials' fault, but it provided the reasons for the violent operation of them (McCargo, 2006). Significantly, the report reveals a reason that there were not enough vehicles to transfer the detainees to the Ingkayutthaborihan military camp, and therefore they were loaded in this manner. Whereas Lieutenant General Pisarn Watanawongkiri explains to the commission that detainees were transported faultily because the authority was concerned on the safety of Her Majesty Queen Sirikit who was in residence at the Thaksin Ratchaniwet Palace that is located in Narathiwat province

(The Independent Fact-Finding Commission on the Fatal Incident in Takbai, Narathiwat province, 2004, December 17).

However, many questions arose regarding the human rights violations and impunity for security force abuse of power. One of the sharp critics came from the Asian Legal Resource Centre:

> In the case of the Narathiwat killings, the response of the government was to establish a fact-finding commission into the deaths answerable to the Prime Minister. This was despite the fact that the distinctive characteristic of these killings, compared to those in April, was that most had occurred in custody. Whereas the army officer responsible for the killings at Krue Se had public security as a pretext, those in Narathiwat could offer no such explanation for the large number of men who died packed like sardines in army trucks. Instead, bad planning was held as the cause of death, despite ample reports suggesting more to it than that. The outcome of the enquiry into the Narathiwat killings was virtually a facsimile of the Krue Se enquiry (Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2005 March, p. 39).

The failure to bring justice to the Malay Muslims who were victims of human rights violations raised similar concerns among the human rights community in Thailand and abroad. The Thai government also faced strong critics by its neighboring countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia and international organizations like Organization of Islamic Conference (now Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and United Nations Organization (McCargo, 2006).

To save its international credibility, the Thai government invited the OIC in June 2005. As a result, the Pan-Islamic organization delegates, led by Mr. Sayed Gasim Almasri, the former OIC Secretary-General visited southern Thailand. The tour brought the members of the delegation to the Krue Se Mosque in Pattani Province and the Takbai police station in Narathiwat Province, where tragic incidents took place in 2004. The OIC delegates also met the representatives of government

officials, the Malay Muslims local religious and community leaders, and members of non-governmental organizations. The Thai government told the visiting OIC delegation that the only way to control the situation in the region is through the imposition of martial law (Public Relations Center of Director of the Internal Security Division of the fourth section, 2013, July 19). Interestingly, the statement of the Thai government is offends the ideal of equality before the law. It also offends the fundamentals of the rule of law and human rights as established under the Constitution of the country and international Covenant. Thus, "When large-scale killings under the command of senior officers are treated as mere trifles, the security forces and society alike are sent a message that they live by different standards" (Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2005, March).

3.3 Peace Building Policy for the Southern Administration

Since the insurgencies erupted in the early of 2004, the Thai government has perceived as a serious threat to the national security and the legitimacy of southern administration. As the RAM suggests, goals and objectives of an actor derived from its understanding of its security and interests (Allison, 1971). In response to this problem, the Thai government intends to win the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims as the major political goal. It believes that the major political goal can be achieved through enhancing a genuine political participation of the Malay Muslims in Thailand's mainstream body politic, in general, and, in southern Thailand, in particular. Thus, Thai government used the peaceful political power by presenting peace building policies along with setting up the new model of southern administrative organizations.

94

3.3.1 Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPBC)

On March 24, 2004, the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra signed the Executive Order No. 68/2547 titled the Peace Building Policy in three Southern Border Provinces. It cited one reason, which was referred to His Majesty King Phumibon speech that delivered to the Prime Minister on February 23, 2004. Later, this is guidance for the southern solutions which well known as grand strategy following the King's idea "Understand, Reach out, and Develop" (เข้าใจเข้าถึงพัฒนา) (Poocharoen, 2010, August; Manakit, 2005, July).

The peace building policy also introduces the new agency of the southern administration namely the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPBC), which performs administrative duties, controls and commands, facilitates the coordination, and manages the integration between plans and agencies participating in tackling problems in the area. Interestingly, the peace building policy has assigned the responsibilities to various parties.

First, the Office of the National Security Council (NSC) is responsible for giving recommendations to the Council of Ministers of Thailand (the Cabinet of Thailand) about the relevant policy, and NSC is the center for the examination and evaluation of the operations of agencies in ministries, including local people's needs in order to propel national interest. In addition, NSC is responsible for integrating security plans in the south. Second, the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) is responsible for the integration of social and economic development plans in the south. Third, Internal Security Operations Command

95

(ISOC) is responsible for the establishment of the ISOC Region 4 Front to be the controlling center and the keystone for coordinating the operations of the SBPPBC. And; fourth, all government agencies, local administrative organizations, and state enterprise support and give the first priority to SBPPBC, direct the administrative system in the way of unity, and aim at achievement of operations in order to respond to peace building policy (Manakit, 2005, July).

Alongside, there was the Executive Order No. 69/2547 that was signed on the same day as the peace building policy that assigned SBPPBC to be the controlling center and the keystone for coordinating the operations of problem solutions in the southern region. It also was issued to adjust the role of the Ad Hoc Policy Committee for Solving Problems in the SBPs that was established since 2003, chaired by the Minister of Interior – Wan Mohamad Noor Matha a Malay Muslim politician, for coordinating with SBPPBC (Manakit, 2005, July).

Figure 3.1: The Structure of the Southern Thailand Administration, according to the Peace Building Policy

Adapted from: Executive Order No.68/2547 titled "Peace Building Policy in Three Southern Border Provinces" signed on 2004, March 24.

Remarkably, the SBPPBC was under the control of the ISOC, its administration had the character of a military organization, which was divided into general staff sub-division, and operation division that were appropriate functions for wartime activities. Domination from the military happened because the SBPPBC's office was located at Sirinthon military camp in Pattani province. Furthermore, personnel in important positions of the organization and most personnel more than 80 percent were soldiers, total personnel is 509 which consists of 416 soldiers, 82 civilians, and 11 policemen (Manakit, 2005, July).

The Thaksin administration adapted the administration of the SBPPBC several times. However, it still emphasized chiefs of the army who were responsible for the operation of the SBPPBC. In addition, after General Sonthi Boonyaratglina had been promoted by the Prime Minister to Commander-in-Chief of the army in October 2005, he was assigned suddenly to be responsible for the SBPPBC. The Prime Minister was strongly confident that General Sonthi Boonyaratglina, as a Muslim from Bangkok, could resolve the Malay Muslims Insurgency better than Thai Buddhist officers could. However, the effects from more severe insurgencies that happened later made the Prime Minister decide to abolish the SBPPBC on January 1, 2006. The ISOC Region 4 Front, which was a military agency, replaced the responsibility for the southern insurgencies (Poocharoen, 2010, August; Nualpian, 2008).

3.3.2 Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC)

The degree of the violence in 2004 and the early 2005 was high and the impact was widespread. Midst the turmoil the Thai government attempted to find conflict resolutions in southern Thailand actively. For impacts of this violence on internal side, although the TRT led by the former Prime Minister Thaksin won a sweeping victory throughout the country in the general election in February 2005 (the TRT party's candidates were elected to occupy 377 seats of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives). However, candidates of the TRT led by Wan Mohamad Noor Matha lost all its seats in the southern Thailand to the DP. Despite Thaksin returned as Prime Minister by forming a single party government for the first time in Thai political history. However, Thaksin and his followers have lost the trust among the Malay Muslims. Moreover, most voters of both the Malay Muslims and the Thai Buddhists in the area think that he failed to solve the insurgency problems and he should take responsibility for impunity for security force abuse of power (Jitpiromsri & McCargo, 2010, August).

After the general election, on March 28, 2005, the Prime Minister formed an independent body namely the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). The NRC established by the Executive Order No. 104/2548. The commission headed by former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun. Dr.Prawes Wasi, a well-known medical doctor became the deputy chair and Surichai Wungaeo as the secretary. Other 45 members comprised 17 representatives from the civic sector, both Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslims from the south, twelve representatives from the civic sector outside

99

the area, seven representatives from the political sector, and nine representatives from civil service and security forces (McCargo, 2010, February).

The NRC was assigned to function for one year between April 2005 and April 2006. The objectives were to search for the truth of ongoing violence which existed in the South by investigating into human rights violation such as the Krue Se and Takbai incidents. In addition, to study and research for the root causes of conflict and the current expansion of violence in southern Thailand, and to make policy recommendations for the government to build trust between Malay Muslims and state officials. Besides, the NRC made the public learn and realize the severe damage of violence and abhorrence. As well, it suggested that conflict management through the peaceful means with supporting justice and co-existence by respecting social and cultural diversities to build national reconciliation. Finally, it had to submit the report of the commission to the Prime Minister and the public as soon as possible (National Reconciliation Commission, 2006; McCargo, 2010, February).

The NRC began to start their hard work during a very critical situation. On April 3, 2005 bombs exploded many places i.e. a shopping center in Hat Yai and Songkla Municipalities, including the lobby of Hat Yai International Airport in which two people were killed and 66 wounded. On July 14, 2005, 23 attacks were carried out simultaneously in Yala municipality, targeting police officers, power pylons, and commercial areas that killed two people and wounded seventeen. In response, the cabinet approved an Emergency Decree on Public Administration under Emergency Conditions, 2005 (B.E. 2548) known as the emergency decree. The plenary powers by this decree had been given to the Prime Minister to issue orders that had a very

serious effect on the rights and freedoms of people who resided in the southern region (Emergency Decree on Public Administration under Emergency Conditions, 2005).

The decree stipulated that the Prime Minister had to ask consent from the cabinet in order to announce a state of emergency for some areas or throughout the country under emergency condition if necessary. Consequently, the Thai government has implemented the emergency decree as part of its efforts to douse the southern insurgency. On July 16, 2005, a state of emergency was declared to replace martial law in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces, with the exception of four districts in Songkla province where the situation was deemed less serious. The emergency decree has given power to political factions to command security forces in the South, which is different from the martial law that has allowed military to invoke and enforce the law, which has more serious violations of human rights. There is a question about imposing the emergency decree that is considered a draconian law and anti-democratic (South needs rule of law, January 3, 2011, Bangkok Post, p. 8). One of the criticisms came from Anand Panyarachun, chairman of the NRC, who pointed out that the emergency decree was compared to a "license to kill" which allows the security forces to ignore Malay Muslims' human rights (Human Rights Watch, March 2007).

Since early 2006, the Thaksin administration faced political pressure from ineffective solutions in the southern unrest which showed no signs of diminishing. Moreover, the Thaksin administration confronted a serious problem, which was the anti-Thaksin regime movement led by Sonthi Limthongkul, a media tycoon who now

set up the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) that presents itself as a defender of the King. It was well known that PAD has grown up from the secret support of businesspersons, scholars, government officials, NGOs, and groups close to the monarchy (McCargo, 2006). The Prime Minister responded to the opposition by calling a snap election and the opposition led by the DP, which had lost its administration to Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001, boycotted this election. Eventually, the Constitutional Court of Thailand found the general election on April 2, 2006 to be invalid in the month later (Pathmanand, 2006, March) The political unrest in Bangkok was one reason the public was very less interested in the NRC report. The Thaksin administration did not react enthusiastically to the "truth" of conflict that was revealed by the NRC report. Followed a medical model, the NRC presents a diagnosis for understanding violence in southern Thailand, and prognosis of violence phenomenon in the area, and proposes some therapeutic measures. The NRC emphasizes issues of justice in place of a central problem of the current conflict. Truth here reflects that the defect of law enforcement is the most important condition that cannot provide justice to the Malay Muslims, including the unequal structure of local economy, education, population and border area geography. These are the structural conditions, which cause violence in the south. Whereas the cultural conditions e.g. language, religion, and history are not the root cause of the current violence, rather it is one justification invoked to legitimize violence that makes the situation worse (National Reconciliation Commission, 2006; Jitpiromsri & McCargo, 2010, August).

The NRC also discloses the insufficient of the government to restore peace and order in the southern region. It seems that the NRC believes that abolished the former SBPAC and CMP 43 in 2002 was one cause of the current unrest problem. Besides, this abolishment has made the government not able to reduce the conditions of this problem since the Thai government lacked an effective channel for cooperation and communication with the Malay Muslims (International Crisis Group, 2005, May 18; McCargo, 2006).

On September 19, 2006, the Thai army staged a coup that overthrows the Thaksin Shinnawatra administration. This is the 12nd military coup in Thai political history organized by the Council for Democratic Reform under a Constitutional Monarchy (CDR). It was led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the Commander-in-Chief of the army. One of the reasons stated by the CDR for taking power was the failure of the Thaksin administration in solving unrest problems in southern Thailand (Moosa, 2009). In addition, other reasons concerned keeping the power of Royal institution, rift in Thai society, and corruption were always the justification of the preceding military coups (Petchlert-anan. 2007). On the other hand, a real reason of the coup is tensions between bipolarity in Thai politics. The first one is pro-Thaksin faction and the other is anti-Thaksin faction, which is known as the royalist or network monarchy forces (McCargo, 2005, December; Charoensin-o-larn, 2007; Yoshifumi, 2008).

During the period of administration by the military junta, there was a deeper military engagement in the resolution to the southern insurgency. This not only used military forces for counterinsurgency, but it also interfered in civilian administration both at

the national and local levels (Poocharoen, 2010, August). After General Surayud Chulanont had become Prime Minister in October 1, 2006, he proclaimed that the major missions would be to build national reconciliation and solve the insurgency. On November 2, 2006, General Surayud Chulanont gave a public apology during his visit to Pattani province. He stated, "I have come here to apologize to you on behalf of the previous government and on behalf of this government. What happened in the past was mostly the fault of the state" (Human Rights Watch, 2007, August).

On October 30, 2006, the Prime Minister signed the Executive Order No. 207/2549 to reestablish SBPAC and CPM Task Force, which were responsible for solving the insurgency problems in the SBPs. Interesting, the area of SBPs is expanded to cover the vulnerable area of five provinces are Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat provinces and all parts of Songkhla and Satul provinces, same as the area that the old SBPAC used to take responsibility in the period of 1980s to 1990s. Although Pranai Suwannarat, former governor of Nonthaburi – a province close to Bangkok, was the first director of the new SBPAC, the power of administration in the region was assigned to the army. Obviously, SBPAC was confined to the direction of ISOC. The Executive Order also established the ISOC Region 4 Front to be an agency, which was responsible for missions of ISOC in the region under the command and control of the Fourth Army Region commander (Dubus & Polkla, 2011, June).

The role of the army still influences the administration in southern Thailand very much. In the aftermath of the general election in December 2007, the People's Power Party or PPP that was supported by the former Prime Minister Thaksin won again. The PPP candidates were elected to 233 seats out of 480 seats in the House of

Representatives. Accordingly, Samak Sundaravej becomes the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in February 2008. The ongoing political conflict between pro-Thaksin and anti-Thaksin made the PPP-led coalition focus strongly on maintaining their administrative power in Bangkok. The former Prime Minister Samak was willing to assign the army to take the main role in responsibilities for the southern crisis. He appointed General Anupong Paochinda, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, to have the full power in solving the southern problems so that he would not interfere in the Samak administration in Bangkok (Chalermsripinyorat, 2008, November 28-29).

A favorable opportunity for using the political power to solve unrest in the south happened in the period of the DP-led coalition cabinet. In December 2008, the Constitutional Court banned the PPP as a result the DP leader Abhisit Vejjajiva became the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister declared that politics should take the lead over the military for solving insurgency. Additionally, the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act, 2010 (B.E. 2553) took effect on December 30, 2010. This bill stipulates that the present-day model of SBPAC is the specific bureaucratic form that is under the Prime Minister who commands both ISOC and SBPAC.

The existing SBPAC set for being accountable for Thailand's border provinces with Malaysia, so-call the Five Southern Border Provinces (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Sonkla, and Satul provinces) as same as the previous SBPAC. The operational framework of the existing SBPAC will be in line with the southern development strategy that is created by the Southern Border Provinces Development Strategy Committee (SBPDSC) known as the Southern Cabinet. There are 36 members,

which composed of ministers and senior officials being responsible for the south. The SBPDSC headed by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister who are accountable for internal security and the secretary-general of SBPAC is a secretary-general of SBPDSC. Remarkably, there is an important change at implementation level because the new SBPAC supports the participation of people with establishing the Advisory Council for Administration and Development of the Southern Border Provinces. The advisory council is comprised of 49 members that give functional representation based on the economic and social groups of community. These members' comments on making the policy of development in accordance with the identity of people in the area, give advice, suggest, and oversee the operation of SBPAC (The Southern Border Provinces Administration Act B.E. 2553, 2010).

Under the present-day model of SBPAC, the Thai government believes that this provides more chance for all parties to participate in the resolution and the administrative processes and that people can participate increasingly, especially, the change from semi-military organizational structure under ISOC to civilian officers' administration under the Prime Minister.

Policy level

Figure 3.2: The Structure of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) since 2010

Adapted from: The Southern Border Provinces Administration Act B.E. 2553. (2010, December 29). *The Royal Government Gazette*, p. 127 (80 ก); Declaration of the Southern Border Provinces Administration, the Title Organizational structure of the Southern Border Provinces Administration, BE 2554 (2011, August 24). *The Royal Government Gazette*, p. 128 (95 ง).

As the RAM memtioned, the national governments are really based on rational choice. The governments are able to correctly identify policy challenges and to make the best possible decisions in terms of benefits and costs, taking into account the goals and values of them (Allison, 1971). The SBPAC is an important agency for supporting a peace dialogue process with insurgent groups in the aftermath of the next round of elections. In the 2011 General Election, although the Phue Thai party lost all seats in the southern region, the pro-Thaksin Shinawatra won the election landslides throughout the country. Accordingly, Thaksin's younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra became the first woman Prime Minister of Thailand.

In October 2012, the Prime Minister appointed Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong as a new secretary-general of SBPAC. A few months later, on February 28, 2013, the Thai government through Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, Secretary-General of the NSC, and Hasan Taib, chief of the BRN signed in the first agreement to initiate a peace dialogue process at Kuala Lumpur which was facilitated by the Malaysian government. The peace dialogue process was successfully satisfied when the agreement between two conflicting parties was established. They announced the Common Understanding on Peace Initiative in Ramadan 2013 in order to have a break in the fighting during a 40-day period covering the holy month from July 10, 2013 to August 18, 2013. Though this agreement was violated, it built hope and led to the belief that the peace dialogue process would be developed for earnest negotiation in the future (Jitpiromsri & Panjor, 2013, August).

3.4 The Malay Muslims' Political Movements

This section will present the political opportunities of Malay Muslims for participation in the political process and their political will to achieve some degree of autonomy as its common goal of all of the sectors of the Malay Muslim community. They presenting a proposal for a new local government model and giving the rights to self-determination of the local population that is the means to solve the conflict accepted among parties. However, political participation is necessary to trust other existing political institutions as well (Segall, 2005, March). Therefore, it must focus on the effect of democratization's problem in Thailand that causes the Malay Muslims to mistrust the Thai government. The lack of trust is a very important factor that makes the Thai government fails to solve the current conflict.

3.4.1 Political Participation

The problem of representative politics of the Malay Muslims is an interesting issue. Throughout a decade of deadly asymmetric conflicts, most of the Malay Muslims do not refuse the political process at the level of national politics. On the other hand, they express their strong political will to participate in general elections by going to the polls in order to show their acceptance or rejection of the policies of political parties and the Malay Muslim politicians in various terms. According to the number of eligible voters in general elections since 2001, the average of percentage of voter turnout in general elections in the southern provinces is higher than the overall average of the country in each election, e.g. 69.94 percent on January 6, 2001, 72.56 percent on February 6, 2005, 74.52 percent on December 23, 2007, and 75.03 percent on July 3, 2011 (see table 3.1).

109

Table 3.1:

Percentage of Voter Turnout in General Elections (2001 – 2011)

Provinces	Percentage of Voters			
	2001	2005	2007	2011
1. Yala	76.38	75.93	78.09	77.53
2. Pattani	74.41	72.95	76.64	76.84
3. Narathiwat	72.78	73.59	77.69	78.02
4. Songkla	76.93	78.30	78.67	77.34

From: Office of the Election Commission. (n.d.). *Statistic of General Election.* Retrieved from http://www.ect.go.th/th/?page_id=494

With respect to the rate of voters as mentioned above, the very high levels of political participation of the Malay Muslims in general elections have not decreased since 2001. This reflects their confidence towards the way of democratic political process, more or less. This issue is very interesting because there are wide discussions about democratic values and election in Muslim communities. Some think that Muslims usually reject the concepts of democratic development and election in case of being beyond their religious principles. The recent studies show that democracy can be established in Muslim societies (Hashemi, 2009; Kanra, 2009; Bayat, 2007).

Moreover, enthusiasm that shows the aforementioned political attitude that causes whatever effects is a very interesting issue to study with serious attention. First of all, the results of several elections have made the Wadah group lose credibility in the area. Apparently, reading the results of general elections since 2005, most participants have rejected to vote for the Malay Muslim politicians who are members

of the Wadah group that belongs to the TRT. This includes other parties like the People Power's party (PPP) and the Pheu Thai party (PT) established by Thaksin Shinawatra, who is thought to take responsibilities in violent situations in the area. The vote results make the Malay Muslim politicians in the Wadah group who are members of the pro-Thaksin party lose credibility in the area. More interestingly, the Malay Muslim voters strongly tend to vote for less well-known politicians. For example, in the 2007 general election some of the Malay Muslims voted for a small political group under the Phue Phandin party led by a medical doctor Waemahadi Wae-dao (Yeema, 2006; Sugunnasil, 2006).

Inappropriately, the new faces of the Malay Muslim politicians under the DP during the Wadah group's deterioration still have a role in politics not much. Since the DP has spent long-term as the opposition of the parliament and could be the short-term of the DP-led coalition from December 2008 to August 2011. Besides, the Malay Muslim politicians under the DP are dominated by party's leaders who are Thai Buddhist politicians in Songkla province. Thus, they do not have as much of a political role, as they should. According to one analyst:

> Although the Democrats have been the largest single party in the southern border provinces since the 2005 general election, they are not fully trusted by Malay Muslim voters. None of the Democrat members of parliament from the far south enjoys high standing within the party; and none has ever been selected by the Democrats for ministerial office. In many respects, the marginalization of Malay Muslims within the Democrat Party parallels their second-class status within Thai society as a whole. While the Democrat Party claims to speak for the lower south, Malay Muslims from the region are distinctly uneasy about this claim (Jitpiromsri & McCargo, 2010, August, p. 171).

In the meantime, Thailand has faced the problem of political conflict that lead to discontinuation of the democratization process. Particularly, cessation of electoral

111

democracy occurred after the military coup in 2006. There was the application of the so-called "judicial activism" (the growing involvement of the courts and judicial power in the political sphere). In May 2007, the Constitutional Court became a measure to get rid of the Thaksin's network by ordering the dissolution of the TRT.

As a result, Wan Mohamad Noor Matha, a key leader of the Wadah group was banned from participating in politics for a five-year period. It is the hardest time for the Wadah group. Lots of members of the Wadah group moved to be under new established small size parties such as the Royal People's party, including the Matubhum party formed by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, a Thai Muslim and the 2006-coup leader. Nonetheless, each person could not win in general elections (Utarasint, 2005, February 4).

Additionally, the Malay Muslims' rejection of political elites with charisma in the area and in major political party opens the chance for new political groups to be alternatives. The new Malay Muslim politician groups, including major parties try to gain the support from the Malay Muslims by presenting some policies to solve the southern insurgency, including, a proposal for adapting the structure of southern administrative organizations. Most interestingly, several political parties' proposals require decentralization of the Bangkok's central administration. They call for the government to establish a specific local administrative organization that is suitable for the local people to participate in self-governing and have more autonomy.

3.4.2 Movements for Self-determination

The conflict in southern Thailand is the very structure of the relationship between the conflict parties. According to the asymmetry theory, the matters of the confrontation in a conflict characterized by structural asymmetry (power plus status asymmetry) is to change the structure of relations between them, that "Usually one of the parties seeks to alter it, while the other struggles to avoid any change" (Gallo & Marzano, 2009, p. 35). Consideration of the Malay Muslims' lack of opportunity to participate in the government administration can focus on what is typical of the Thai bureaucratic system. While the Thai government has adapted the southern administration by the reestablishment the SBPAC, this procedure does not change the bureaucratic structure within the provincial administrative system. It is still strongly centralized to Bangkok.

Figure 3.3: The Structure of Provincial Administration and Local Administration in Southern Thailand

Adapted from: Yeema, B. (2008). *Thai Local Government.* Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press.

As showed above, the structure of provincial administration reveals several problems of the Thai bureaucratic system. At the level of local politics, there are more of Malay Muslims working in local government organizations than the Thai Buddhists. The problem comes from the model of local government organization and show that it is not suitable for local areas truly. The local administration in Thailand is usually criticized that it is the "one-size-fits-all" mentality of bureaucratic design. It does not emphasize any special type and consider the difference and diversity among the regions. Furthermore, it cannot respond to the demand for participatory governance at the local level (Chardchawarn, 2012; Yeema, 2008; Chareonmueng, 1997; Poocharoen, 2010, August).

The results of prolonged insurgency have led to the discussion of the problems of strong centralization of the Thai government. It brings about the model of decentralization in order to build a special type of local administration. Interestingly, proposals to change the type of local administration in southern Thailand initiated by several political parties which want support from Malay Muslims during the general elections. In the 2005 election campaign, the DP presented the "Pattani Declaration" which had as its main point to establish the southern administration agency the same as SBPAC that was created in 2010. At the same time, the Mahachon party also introduced the "Yala Declaration" which aimed to set up a special local administration corresponding with the identity of Malay Muslim in the region. However, at that time, a proposal to decentralize was not accepted as expected from local people (Sugunnasil, 2006, March).

During the 2011 general election, the PT used the proposal of General Chavalit Yongchaiyut that wanted to establish a special local administrative namely the Nakorn Pattani (Pattani city). It substituted for the existing government administration in the southern Thailand as an election campaign. Nevertheless, the proposal of the PT was rejected by most of the voters. The result of the 2011 election showed that though the PT party won the election and got absolute majority to be one-dominant party government, but it lost all seats in southern Thailand again. This caused the PT to lack legitimacy to produce a decentralization policy as it proposed (International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11; Panjor, 2013, January – March).

Until now, there are two main alternatives of decentralization proposed by scholars and civil society in the region. The first alternative is the "three Nakorn" (three cities) which composes of two models. The first model is the "three Nakorn, two levels" which suggests elected provincial governors for each province, but keep the existing type of local administrative organizations. The second model is the "three Nakorn, one level" which proposes to elect provincial governors for each province the same as the first one and abolishes all existing local administrative organizations (Jitpiromsri, 2012, July 4; Panjor, 2013, October).

The second alternative is the "Pattani Mahanakorn" (Pattani metropolitan administration) adjusted from the "Nakorn Pattani" which the PT used to present. This alternative is improved for being two models. The first model is the idea of "Mahanakorn – two levels." It is an election of a governor for southern Thailand and maintains the provincial administration by having provincial governors by election, including election for members of the municipality and SAO at the same time. The

116

next model is the idea of "Mahanakorn – one level." It is an election of a governor of southern Thailand and revokes provincial administration and all existing local administrative organizations (Panjor, 2013, October; Sripunsuk, 2009, December).

Each alternative has its own reasons that are not much different. Therefore, it is difficult to indicate which model is the best for southern Thailand's autonomy. Generally, scholars and civil society in the area emphasize the election for local administrators. They believe that local people who are accepted can solve people's problems and this will get rid of a political condition that is one cause of the conflict. However, it cannot be concluded that whether it should gather all provinces into one territory or not. Because as to may affect the efficient administration and anxiety about much change from the existing administrative system (Panjor, 2013, October).

Though, each model aims to reduce power of the Thai government so it must have a strong will to decentralize the governmental power. Some analysts believe that the proposal of decentralization is not getting a response from the Thai government because it worries that this will be the first step towards a separate Malay Muslim state (Chalermsripinyorat, 2008, November 28-29). In the view of some security officers, they still believe strongly that some of the Malay Muslim politicians had a connection with separatist groups. Even family members of former the Wadah's politicians were identified as leaders of separatist groups and some of the local politicians were suspected of supporting the separatist movements (Interview with a national intelligence officer, 2014, July 5).

An interview with members of the Wadah group, Najmuddin Uma, a former member of parliament from Narathiwat province stated that the Malay Muslim leaders often made them be the victims because of being suspected by the government authorities (Interview with Najmuddin Uma, 2014, March 12). Besides, Burahanuddin Useng, a former member of parliament from Yala province, accepted that the Malay Muslim politicians were doubted and denied to join in activities of the Thai Buddhist community increasingly since they became the target of the militant's attacks (Interview with Burahanuddin Useng, 2014, March 12).

It could be noticed that at the end of 2010, the Asia Foundation surveyed opinions of people in the area of democracy and conflict in southern Thailand. The survey indicated that 37 percent of respondents felt that the Thai government officials failed to understand the Malay Muslims who were the local people. Remarkably, 67 percent of respondents required provincial governors and chiefs of police for a town or province in the area to be directly elected. They believed that decentralization processes were a more effective form of governance and the best answer for conflict management in the region (Klein, 2010, November).

Despite that most of the Malay Muslims may prefer decentralization. However, the Malay Muslim elites who have power in the existing local administrations are concerned about the effect from changing the local administrative model. Due to their power being decreased, they have not support the plan of decentralization. Then negative reaction from stakeholders in the existing administrations may worsen current conflicts. For this reason, people in these organizations refused to vote for candidates of the PT that provided a proposal on the special local administrative

models in the 2011 general election (Interview with Nipon Chaiyai, 2013, October 11; Interview with a senior Thai Officer, 2014, March 11).

3.5 Chapter Summary

In conclusion, the political power relation between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims reflects the structural asymmetry. It is clearly that a major goal of the government's political power is to win the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims by promote the participation of them in the southern administration. When considered on using the political power of the Malay Muslims, they need to achieve some degree of autonomy. Although several political parties, scholars, and civil society are confident that decentralization and giving some degree of autonomy to the Malay Muslims are able to lessen current conflict. However, the government does not decentralize power to the Malay Muslims. It has to accept that the exercise of political power to solve political problems of southern Thailand is not easy by several reasons. The most important obstacle of solving the southern problems is that the conflicting parties emphasize using military power to fight against each other. In the next chapter, the researcher turns to consider about the asymmetry in military power relationship of both sides and its impact on the ongoing conflict as show in more details.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE MILITARY POWER RELATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the impact of the current military power relations between the Thai government and Malay Muslims. Even though military power is the instrument to achieve political goals, it differs from political power. On the other hand, military power focuses on fatal violence, such as death, physical pain, confinement and removal of freedom, and so on. This chapter categorizes the asymmetry in military power relations into two major parts, i.e. the Thai government's military power and the military capability of the Malay Muslims.

4.2 The Thai Government's Military Power

Since 1990s, the Malay Muslim insurgencies have not made a lot of trouble for the internal security of Thailand. This tendency is the success of political controlled military program that has been operated continuously since 1980s. As mentioned earlier, from 1981 to 2002, the Civilian, Military, and Police Task Force 43 (CMP 43) is the agency being responsible for security mission under control of the Fourth Army area. After the SBPAC and CMP 43 were abolished on April 30, 2002, it made the security task and counterinsurgency under the responsibility of the Provincial Police Region 9 that has its headquarters in Yala province.

The new challenge of internal security happened after the insurgents attacked the Fourth Development Battalion of the Royal Thai Army known as known the guns robber incident on January 4, 2004. Then, the Thai government gave authority to the

army in order to direct the SBPPBC to solve the deadly conflict in southern Thailand. At the beginning, the SBPPBC was assigned to responsibility of the Commander of the Fourth Army area. Later, it was placed under control of the Commander-in-Chief of the army. Despite the after math of the military coup in 2006, the junta administration reestablished the SBPAC and the CPM 43. The former used political and socio-economic power to win the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims. Conversely, the latter used military power against the Malay Muslim militants within the region. However, both organizations (SBPAC and CPM 43) were under the direction of a semi-military organization, which was ISOC. They set up the ISOC Region 4 Front in order to be an agency in control once again. Yet again, this agency was placed in the direction of the Fourth Army Area Commander.

Typically, the internal security is under the ISOC's responsibility. Despite the Prime Minister heads the ISOC, but the army has always influenced decisions and has absolutely been authorized to maintain peace and order of the country (Chambers, 2010; Bunbongkan, 1987). Since 2004, the army has expansive power to use the military operations for counterinsurgency and deployed professional security forces to quell the insurgency in the south continuously. At the present, there are professional security forces in southern Thailand, including soldiers, police, paramilitary, and militias who were trained and armed supported by the government up to 150,350 personnel (Jitpiromsri, 2012, July; International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11; Puengnetr, 2009, December 28; Govt beefs up forces in South, 2009, March 13).

4.2.1 Security Forces

The offensive strategy uses by the Thai government is the conventional attack which emphasizes on the stronger military power to counter the Malay Muslim insurgency. The core of Thai government's security forces is the conventional soldier forces that have about 23,704 officers. According to the mission of the soldier forces, it will take a main role in responsibility for 1,900 villages or approximately 13 soldiers per 1 village. Moreover, soldiers' mission has about 2,600 per day such as protecting teachers and guarding some places i.e. road, train stations, government offices, and so on (Jitpiromsri, 2012, July).

Before October 2007, the army divided the soldiers' forces by setting up four forces and one task force. The first one is the Sri Sunthon Force was responsible for operations of the security forces from the army, navy, Border Patrol Police (BPP), and Ranger. Second, the Suntisuk Force was a special operation unit from the Special Warfare Command (SWCOM). Third, the Pecharawut Force was responsible for the Thai – Malaysian border. Last, the Anothai Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit or known as the Anothai Task Force was a function of a support unit. Additionally, there were the Information Operation Unit (IO) from the SWCOM and the Ranger Task Force which was a paramilitary force controlled by the army (Chalermsripinyorat, 2008, November 28-29).

In October 2007, General Anupong Paochinda, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, adjusted the structure of military forces deployed in southern Thailand. This structure of military units was a Task Force (TF) that was under the control of ISOC Region 4 Front. The army decided to alter the Suntisuk Force to be the Suntisuk

Task Force that had a duty on the public relations project (series of the southern relationships) and still kept the Anothai Task Force to be responsible for EOD. The Sri Sunthon Force was dissolved and the zone divided by provinces was directly in charge of each the First to Fourth Army Areas that came from all over the country.

The military deployments in the southern provinces were comprised of four of Task Forces (TF). There are, TF 1, TF 2, TF 3, and TF 4 that were responsible for Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Songkla provinces respectively. Later, their names were changed to Yala TF, Pattani TF, Narathiwat TF, and Songkla TF as follows: (Tang Dap Plueng, 2010, January; Amnesty International, 2009, January; Chalermsripinyorat, 2008, November 28-29).

1. Yala TF (TF 1) controlled by the Third Army Area takes responsibilities for Yala province. It is comprised of six battalions from the army and one sub-division of the BPP.

2. Pattani TF (TF 2) controlled by the Second Army Area takes responsibilities for Pattani province. It is comprised of five battalions from the army and one battalion marine of the navy.

3. Narathivat TF (TF 3) controlled the First Army Area takes responsibilities for Narathivat province. It is comprised of seven battalions from the army and two battalions of marines of the navy.

4. Songkla TF (TF 4) controlled by the Fourth Army Area takes responsibilities for four districts of Songkla province i.e. Chana, Thepa, Nathawi, and Sabayoi districts. It is comprised of one battalion of the army and one sub-division of the BPP.

123

The deployment of the army showing that each Army Area takes responsibilities for each zone is the form of the deployment that never happened in military operations to counterinsurgency in the past. Normally, the Fourth Army Area is responsible for the greater southern region, the First Army Area comes from the central region, including Bangkok, the Second Army Area comes from the north-eastern region, and the Third Army Area comes from the north and northwest region of the country. The army claims that such adjustment of structure will provide good effects for the coordination among the military commanders, the chief of provincial polices, and the provincial governors. It also helps to increase the achievement of military operations among the security forces since the commanders in each Army Area can closely takes responsibilities for their subordinates. Thus each TF competes with each other for reducing the insurgency so that the commander in chief in Bangkok can make decisions easily to reward (Tang Dap Plueng, 2010, January).

Other than amounts of current conventional soldier forces, the army also has about 18,000 rangers (Thahan Phran) which are volunteer paramilitary. The rangers getting military training between 45 days up to six months and equip with well arms from the army. Nowadays, the rangers become an important combat unit to fight against insurgence. It takes greater responsibilities operating in fighting against the Malay Muslim militants, including providing security within villages and urban areas. The rangers are directly under the Southern Border Provincial Ranger Force. Since April 2011, the Thai government has approved an increase of rangers up to 12 regiments and 5 female platoons. This raises the number of rangers raise. The army recruits rangers from local people and nearby provinces but some of them come from the

other regions. About 90 percent of the rangers are the Thai Buddhists and approximately 10 percent are the Malay Muslims (International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11).

Since the unrest happening in the early of 2004, the National Police Office (NPO) has sent armed police forces from Bangkok and other regions to operate in southern Thailand about 16,918 officers. These main armed police forces are the provincial police, the BPP, and the police EOD. Normally, the Thai police get military trained and well weapons support from the government. Before 2004, a main force in the area was the provincial police who worked at police stations in districts and some areas had police stations in sub-districts that were under the provincial police headquarters. All were directly under the Provincial Police Region 9 that had administrative center in Yala province. On September 10, 2004, the NPO adjusted the operation of police in the area to suit the situation by setting up the Operation Center of National Police Office Front (NPO Front) that worked as the command center controlling all the southern police's units. Then, in 2008, the command center was modified to be the Southern Border Provinces Police Operations Center (SBPPOC) (Jitpiromsri, 2012, July; Prawat Karnkotang Sor Cho Tor, n.d.).

The local militias were organized by agencies of the Thai government. There are 7,000 personnel of the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC/ Or Sor), which are paramilitary organized by the Ministry of Interior. Alongside, there are nearly 85,000 local militias include 60,000 Village Defense Volunteers (VDV/ Chor Ror Bor) and 24,768 Village Protection Volunteers (VPV/ Or Ror Bor). On occasion, they are mainly required to patrol the village. Nevertheless, they may also be required to

125

search for insurgent suspects in the surrounding area, including participation in military operations with the soldiers and police. The Ministry of Interior sets up the VDV by recruiting males, 18 years and over. There are 30 males in each village. They receive weapons training from the army and are armed with a mixture of shotguns and automatic weapons. Since the VDV is set up in both the Malay Muslims and the Thai Buddhists villages most militia members are almost 90 percent are the Malay Muslims. On the other hand, the VPV is militia force of the Thai Buddhists that have about 24,768 personnel set up by the King's Guard and abide by Her Majesty Queen Sirikit's suggestions (International Crisis Group, 2009, December 8; Klein, 2010, December; Stop Using Kids in Security Operations, Report Urges. 2011, March 4).

At present, there are security forces with armed weapons, including soldiers, police, paramilitary, and militias up to 150,350 personnel. It means that when considering from the southern population that has about 2 million, there is 7.5 percent of the region's population now under arms supported by the state as follows:

126

Table 4.1:

Number of Armed Security Forces in Southern Thailand

Types of Unit	Types of forces	Personal
1. Soldier	Professional Military	23,707
2. Police	Professional Military	16,918
3. Ranger (Thahan Phran)	Paramilitary	18,000
4. Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC/ Or Sor)	Paramilitary	7,000
5. Village Defence Volunteers (VDV/ Chor Ror Bor)	Local Militia	60,000
6. Village Protection Volunteers (VPV/ Or Ror Bor)	Local Militia	24,768
Total		**150,350**

Adapted from: Jitpiromsri, S. (2012). *The New Challenge of Thailand's Security Forces in Southern Frontiers*. International Conference on Political Science, Public Adimistration and Peace Studiesin ASEAN Countries. September 6-7. At International Convention Center, Prince of Sonkla University (PSU), Hat Yai, Thailand, 31 – 50; Jitpiromsri, S. (2012, July). *Muekaokam Neungroiduen Khongsatanakan Changwatpaktai: Raokamlangchapaitangnai (**เมื่อก้าวข้ามหนึ่งร้อยเดือนของสถานการณ์จังหวัดภาคใต้: เรากำลังจะไปทางไหน**)*. Retrieved from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/3354

Counting the number of security forces that are civilian intelligent agents being unarmed civilian, there are 8,238 personnel and the other military duties that are unarmed military has 4,794 personnel. As a result, there is a total security forces being the government officers and local militias organized by the Thai government up to 163,422 personnel (Jitpiromsri, 2012, July).

Though, the Thai government has a long plan to reduce soldier forces that come from outside area and assign soldier forces in the area to take military responsibility.

In 2005, the Thai government agreed to establish the 15th Infantry Division named the Phaya Tani military camp in Pattani province (in the area nearby the Ingkayutthaborihan military camp). Expenditure on camp's building cost of 16,770 million Baht and the building was completed in the beginning 2014. Besides, the 15th Infantry Division has some organic units, which are the 151st Infantry Regiment that is responsible for Narathiwat province, the 152nd Infantry Regiment that is responsible for Yala province, the 153rd Infantry Regiment that is responsible for Pattani province, and the Division Support Command that is responsible for four districts in Songkla province. There are also the 15th Engineer Battalion, the 31st Cavalry Squadron, the 15th Signal Battalion, and the Military Intelligence Unit (Interview with a colonel, 2014, June 28).

4.2.2 Law Enforcement

An important component of Thai military power would be the security laws. Thailand has a number of security laws that place as the most important legal measures for military operations. Until now, there are three security laws enforced in all parts of southern Thailand. Out of a total of 37 districts of the region, 33 districts were placed under a state of martial law and are the zone that must use military enforcement maximally. While the Thai government declared 32 districts under a state of emergency at the same time. Thus these had to be controlled by the emergency decree. Then, only five districts were declared to be placed under the Internal Security Act (ISA).

It can compare some characteristics and reasons of enforcement among these laws. First, the martial law was invoked in January 2004 by the Fourth Army Area Commander for all parts of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces and for four districts of Songkla province. At that time, the martial law is only one security law that is a measure for exercising military power when there is a security threat. This law gives total power to the military faction to announce and use laws broadly by allowing the military faction to interfere and control the civilian faction. The martial law allows soldiers have authorities to search houses and places without court warrant as well as may detain suspected persons without charge for up to seven days (Amnesty International, 2009, January; Declaration to abolish the Martial Law in some areas, 2007, January 26).

Second, in response to the increasing insurgency, the Thai government preferred an alternative security law for military operations in southern Thailand. On 19 July 2005, the Decree on Government Administration in a State of Emergency B.E. 2550 (the emergency decree) was issued. The emergency decree gives authority to the Prime Minister to declare the state of emergency in which responses to internal or external threats. The emergency decree also sets the time for enforcement at three months per time (Chambers, 2010). The emergency decree is different from the martial law as it is imposed by executive order. Then it is necessary the army can require renewal from the cabinet to enforce the law every three-month. The emergency decree authorizes security forces, soldiers, police, and civilian officers to arrest arbitrarily and detain persons without trial for an initial seven days. With warrants from the courts, the period of detention without charge can be up to 30

129

days. Thus, detainees can be detained for a maximum of 37 days. Whereas in the case of serious offenses, the period of detention can be extended for up to 48 days under the Criminal Procedure Code (Amnesty International, 2009, January; International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11; Wangni, 2009, May 29).

Latest, the third security laws is the Internal Security Act, B.E. 2551 (2008) or known as the ISA. The military-appointed National Legislative Assembly passed the bill before the 2007 general election, and it took effect on February 27, 2008. In essence, the ISA is usually set under the ISOC, which means that the army has a lot of authority to enforce this law because the law enforcement in regional level is under the control of the army Area (Chambers, 2010). In December 2009, the cabinet lifted the emergency decree and replaced it with the ISA in four districts of Songkla province. Later, in January 2010, the cabinet also replaced the emergency decree and the martial law in Mae Lan district of Pattani province (International Crisis Group, 2012. December 11; ISA in South: A Backward Step, 2011, January 11).

Though, the ISA is less strict than two previous security laws. The ISA does not authorize broad power to security officials. It allows people to prosecute the authorities and offers legal protection for suspects. Under the ISA, the authorities must have arrest warrants and they will issue a prosecution order within 48 hours, according to the Criminal Procedure Code. In addition, Section 21 of the ISA provides a form of amnesty, which grants an opportunity for detainees or suspects in the security cases to report themselves to authorities and attend a rehabilitation camp instead of been charged with criminal acts. The procedure under Section 21 of ISA must be considered by the commission and depends on the voluntariness of the

accused persons who have received the effects of violence (Dueramae & Samoh, 2012, March 10).

The Thai government's military campaign with the security laws enforcement has raises fears among the Malay Muslims; particularly the people in villages were most affected by enforcing the security laws and had the most violations of human rights (Interview with a senior officer of the NSC, 2014, July 11). It causes anxiety to know that the security forces are not educated about human rights. According to Amnesty International, it recognizes that there is no policy to torture or ill-treat detainees. Though "security forces have systematically relied on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in their efforts to obtain information, to extract confessions to compensate for poor intelligence and evidence-gathering" (Amnesty International, 2009, January, p. 4).

Although the Thai government emphasizes on conventional attack instead of barbarism strategy, there are often violations of human rights caused by the security forces. The reports of truth investigation (such as the NRC report) identified harm from abuses of human rights by the government authorities but it could not make a prosecution with any authorities who made a mistake. As the operation of security forces is under the security laws, especially the martial law and the emergency decree that codify to protect authorities not to take responsibility from their operations. The human rights abuses often occur while people are detained under the control of authorities. Evidently, the security forces set the "questioning center" and detaining under administration of soldiers and police such as the Reconciliation

Center (ศูนย์เสริมสร้างความสมานฉันท์หรือศสฉ) or ex-name was the Peace Evolution
Center (ศูนย์วิวัฒน์สันติ), which was the army's agency established on April 30, 2004
and located at Ingkayutthaborihan military camp in Pattani province and Pitak Sunti
Center which is the police's agency located at the Southern Border Provinces Police
Operation Center (SBPPOC) in Provincial Police Region 9 School, Yala province
(Bukpisut   Sunsermsrangkwamsamanachan   Kaikorkongjai   'Som-Toraman'
Phutukcherntua. 2009, December 28).

Meanwhile, during the exercise of the emergency decree; human rights abuses
occurred constantly; for example, on May 29, 2007, a Malay Muslim woman was
raped and murdered in Yala province, and this led to a demonstration to call for
soldiers and rangers' withdrawal from the area (Satha-anand, 2014, June 12). On
June 8, 2009, a group of gunmen fired into the prayer hall of the Al Furqan Mosque
at Ipayae village, in Narathiwat and twelve people died and eleven were seriously
injured (Twelve die in mosque shooting, 2009, June 9). A Buddhist man was
suspected to be one of the attackers and was arrested by police a few months later.
Furthermore, on January 29, 2012, four villagers who were the Malay Muslims in
Pattani province were killed by rangers; they were accused of being members of the
insurgent groups. Besides, several incidents of alleged torture occurred while in
detention including disappearances and extra-judicial killings. Local people believe
that the security forces operated and concealed these situations and the army avoided
taking responsibility as well (International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11).

132

Since the security laws allow the Thai government to use the military power excessively and this often causes the violations of human rights. In the opinion of the International Crisis Group, there are at least two further objections to the military operation under the special laws enforcement.

> First, that they are counterproductive: the extensive and unchecked powers they grant to authorities encourage abuses, while prolonged reliance on them weakens public confidence in the justice system… Secondly, that the laws have failed to bring insurgents to justice: courts routinely dismiss security-related cases involving confessions or evidence obtained under the special laws. Confessions are often obtained while suspects are in army custody, before they are handed over to police and an arrest warrant is issued (International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11, p. 11-12).

There are several cases of human rights abuses act by security forces. For example, on May 29, 2007, a Malay Muslim woman was raped and murdered in Yala province, and this led to a demonstration to call for soldiers and rangers' withdrawal from the area (Satha-anand, 2014, June 12). On June 8, 2009, a group of gunmen (believe that they are VPV) fired into the prayer hall of the Al Furqan Mosque at Ipayae village, in Narathiwat and twelve people died and eleven were seriously injured (Twelve die in mosque shooting, 2009, June 9). Later, on January 29, 2012, four villagers who were the Malay Muslims in Pattani province were killed by rangers; they were accused of being members of the insurgent groups. Besides, several incidents of alleged torture occurred while in detention including disappearances and extra-judicial killings. Local people believe that the security forces operated and concealed these situations and the army avoided taking responsibility as well (International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11).

Actually, the Thai government has felt aware that the strict exercise of military power builds discontentment among the local Malay Muslims and increases public

resentment against the authorities (Interview with a senior colonel, 2014, June 17). Evidently, in 2009, the former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva considered two alternatives. First, reduced number of security forces from other regions and increase security forces that were paramilitary from local people; for example, the enlarged number of the rangers and the VDC (Or Sor). Including, as mentioned above, the army set up the locally based the 15th Infantry Division and planned to use this division to assume responsibility for southern Thailand, replacing the remaining security forces from the other regions. Second, the former Prime Minister Abhisit also announced that he did not agree with the enforcement of the security laws in the area constantly, especially the emergency decree. However, his success was the promulgation of the ISA replaced the emergency decree in five districts of total 37 districts in the region (International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11).

However, the idea to abolish the emergency decree is opposed from the army that is in charge of solving the conflict. The army always claims that the security laws are necessary and help contain the violence in the region (International Crisis Group, 2012, December 11). In addition, the document of the Public Relations Center of ISOC Region 4 expresses that there is a necessary reason to enforce the security laws because insurgency in the South is not a normal crime that can use the criminal code. Though, such crime employs terrorist tactics used by insurgents so it is vital to exercise the emergency decree to strengthen security and gather the security forces from agencies of military, police, and civilian officers to be in charge of protecting safety, property and to build confidence for those people who are innocent.

> If the emergency decree was revoked and exercised only the criminal code… soldiers would not operate at all. Was only force of police

134

sufficient to take responsibility? There were not any governments would like to use the emergency decree… because nobody wanted the country or some parts of the country been under the state of emergency or insecurity situation (PRC ISOC Region 4, 2012, April 2).

We can consider the less efficiency of the enforcement of security laws to counter the insurgency in southern Thailand. Mass media reported that total arrest warrants were issued 9,961 and 6,944 were arrested since 2004 to 2013 (this number did not include 2,557 suspects who were detained and sent to the questioning center, 631 persons were prosecuted, and 1,906 were released. Nevertheless, 20 persons were detained during this time). The result of security case procedure that was prosecuted in court found that the court sentenced 685 cases that had 1,474 defendants. According to these cases, the court sentenced 264 cases or 38.54 percent, which had 444 defendants, and court dismissed 421 cases or 61.46 percent that had 1,030 defendants. Interestingly, in all cases that the court sentenced, there were death penalty 46 cases which had 57 defendants, life imprisonment 73 cases which had 111 defendants, and imprisonment not over 50 years 145 cases which had 276 defendants (Isara News Agency, 2014, January 3).

The proportion of dismissed cases was as high as 61.46 percent because the court found that there was not sufficient clear-cut evidence. In addition, the accusation of officers usually depended on the confession they got from an investigation under special laws (Muslim Attorney Center, 2011, December 21). In addition, in official inquiry process of court, detainees in security cases were usually not bailed out. This meant that a defendant would suffer as a prisoner for a long time. From studying some cases about litigation to the Supreme Court, it found that the shortest trial was 3 years 5 months 27 days and the longest trial was up to 8 years 1 month 8 days

(Deep South Journalism School, 2014, February 19). This evidenced that not only did the problem occur by process of the exercise of military power that was placed under opaque and faithless special laws. It was also caused by the delayed legal redress that did emphasize injustice of the government more and more.

4.3 The Military Capability of the Malay Muslims

The insurgencies in southern Thailand are the impact from the strategic asymmetry between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, which has caused from the extreme imbalance of power relations (Gallo & Marzano, 2009). The Malay Muslims have weaker power in all aspects, but they have enough capabilities to fight against the stronger power of the Thai government. At present the Malay Muslims have their military capability in two aspects. First, there is organized militancy operational level. Second, there are guerrilla warfare, and its related strategy of terrorism.

4.3.1 The BRN-Coordinate's Operational Level

Since the late 1960s, the Malay Muslim separatist movements namely the NPP, BRN, and PULO began to set up armed forces to make guerrilla warfare against the Thai government. Such movements used to have military capabilities to threaten the internal security of Thailand during 1970s to 1980s. Obviously, most organizations almost lost roles absolutely in the next decades, though some separatist groups, i.e. the BIPP, the BRN Congress, the BNP, and the new PULO tried to form an umbrella organization known as the "Bersatu" (Che Man, 2003).

136

Therefore, there were many questions during the beginning of the Malay Muslim insurgency that began in the early of 2004 about which organizations commanded militants to fight against the Thai government. In present day, most analysts are confident that militants under command and control by the BRN-Coordinate (or BRN-C) have turned particularly violent in recent years (Srirai, 2007; Chalermsripinyorat, 2013; Jitpiromsri, 2012).

As mentioned earlier, the BRN-Coordinate was formed in the mid-1990s after the BRN had been divided into two factions, the other being BRN-Congress. With respect to the BRN-Coordinate, Major General Samret Srirai (2007), who used to control security forces in southern Thailand mentioned that the organizational structure of the BRN-Coordinate had very little change from the structure led by the politburo led of the BRN established in 1960s i.e. the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP). It was the principal policy-making and executive committee and there were two operations composed of a political faction (MASA) and a militant faction (MAY).

Figure 4.1: The Structure of the BRN-Coordinate

Adapted from: Srirai, S. [Major General]. (2007). *BRN-Coordinate and Unrest in 3 Southern Border Provinces and 4 District of Songkla Province on Perioud of Years 2004 – 2007 and Conception of Situation Solving*. Bangkok: National Defence College; Chalermsripinyorat, R. (2013). *Thodkwamkid Khabuankarn Ekkarach Patani (ถอดความคิดขบวนการเอกราชปาตานี)*. (2nd Edition). Pattani: Deepbook Project, Deep South Watch.

Currently, the DPP is the principal policy-making and the executive committee of the BRN-Coordinate. The DPP has a chairperson and a deputy chairperson who are leaders and is divided into seven sections including the foreign, military, youth (Pemuda), psychological operations, religion (Ulama), economy, and homegrown (Bamrungsuk, 2011, April; Lue-pradit, 2013, March 26). The supreme leaders of BRN-Coordinate, who are disclosed now, are Sapae-ing Baso, Masae Useng (Ustaz Deng), and Ismael Yusof (Ustaz So). They have escaped from arrest to Malaysia since 2004. A senior security officer stated that these leaders still operated and commanded militants secretly in Malaysia, especially in the area of the northern states that closed to southern Thailand. For example, the Thai police announced a sizeable public reward of 10 million baht for Sapae-ing Baso, the former principal of Thamvitya Mulniti School in Yala province, and for Masae Useng (1959 –), the reward was 3 million baht (Interview with a senior security officer, August 12, 2013).

Evidently, on May 1, 2003, Thai authorities seized a document named the "seven-revolution plan" of BRN-Coordinate during searching a house of Masae Useng, a leader of BRN-Coordinate. The document presents the strategies of BRN-Coordinate divided in two parts. The first part is the plan that has been operated since 1992, it composed of five steps. The first step – the building mass consciousness is the agitation of mass to realize the Malay Muslims to struggle for independence and to

139

liberate southern Thailand from occupation of the Thai government. The second step is about the establishment mass and support through religious teaching. The third step is about the set of organizational structure. The fourth step is about the establishment of militants that aims to reach 3,000 militants. The fifth step is about the building nationalism in all Malay Muslims. The second part is composed of two steps, i.e. the sixth step and the seventh steps – preparation for revolution and declaration the revolution through opening full-armed struggle for liberating the Patani nation (Bamrungsuk, 2011, April).

In operational level, the information stated that the committees of the youth (pemuda), the psychological operations, the religion (ulama), the economy or financing affairs were in charge of the political faction (MASA) in several aspects. Such as mass mobilization and member searching which were taken responsibilities by religious leaders and religious teachers of the Islamic Private Schools. In addition, treasures were responsible for making money and many accounts of the BRN-Coordinate would focus on the voluntary donation of money by members and supporters. Including funding itself by setting up the occupational groups, cooperative, and financing funds (the BRN-Coordinate set the rule for members to donate monthly and yearly namely each person donated 1 baht per a day and 360 baht one time per year). In addition, there would be a secretary who did the general affairs and coordinated experts or senior consultants that most of them were influential persons and local leaders (Bamrungsuk, 2011, April).

Some studies presented the structure of the MASA as organized by imitating the administrative area of the Thai government. It is divided into five levels, namely

province level called the "Kas" which was divided into three areas i.e. the Kas Yala, the Kas Narathiwat, and the Kas Pattani (that included four districts of Songkla province). The next level was sub-province, which covered 2-3 districts called the "Sakom", in order that the Kas Yala had three sakom, the Kas Narathiwat had six sakom, and the Kas Pattani had 5 sakom. Then, the establishment in district level was called the "Komisari" (or the "Daerah"). Next, the establishment in sub-district level was called the "Lekaran", and the establishment in village level was called the "AJAK" which was the abbreviated form of the "Ahli Jawatan Kampung" (village committee) that had at least twelve people (Srirai, 2007, p. 180; Chalermsripinyorat, 2013, pp. 53-55).

While the structure of the militant faction (MAY) was similar to the MASA i.e. starting from the least level being militant cells in the village level called the RKK (Runda Kumpulan Kecil) that was platoon-sized units of six men for operations. Generally, the RKK is recruited from the "Pemuda" (youth wing) in the area. Most of the youth are persuaded to join a group of students in traditional Islamic schools that are registered by the Thai government to be Islamic private schools (some are pondok). Both types are the secondary schools that teach both Islamic and general sciences. At the present, there are more than 100,000 students. This youth is the target that will be recruited by religious teachers (called the ustaz) who are members of the separatist movements. Particularly, the BRN-Coordinate has used community Islamic schools as a base for mass movement since the establishment of the BRN originated in the 1960s (International Crisis Group, 2009, June 22, pp. 6-8; Che Man, 1990, p. 99).

141

The pemuda gets basic military training that takes time from a few months to 2 years. Recruited persons are also trained in guerrilla warfare tactics for two levels under codes called "Tadika" and "Pondok" that take about two years (Chalermsripinyorat, 2013). While some information about the period of time for training of permuda and RKK is very confusing. The security officers believe that each training program does not take long time. For instance, the document named Set of Knowledge for Performance of Officials in SBPs is made by an agency in the area of ISOC and point that before entering RKK, selected persons have to take a mental training around two weeks. Later, trainers provide them with a military training program divided into two courses. The first course emphasizes practicing fighting skills, patrol, reconnaissance, and armed combat and so on. The second course highlights tactic practices and takes at least 1 month for training (now, it might take only 15 days). The style of training emphasizes guerrilla warfare tactics to provide armed and unarmed combat, including planning and testing in real operations (The Fifth Operational Cooperation Center – OCC 5, 2010).

Such a military training program is sufficient to make the RKK exercise military operations to attack soft targets, such as armed or unarmed villagers and civilian officers, that may depend on support from the permuda and the AJAK organized in their villages and nearby areas. The RKK is under the command and control of the "Harimau" (commando). This is a military cell in sub-district level (Lekaran) which is recruited from the RKK due to high capacities to attend added commando programs. Whereas some of the RKK are recruited to work in the "letupan" this is a unit taking responsibilities for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Both the

142

harimau and the letupan have higher military capabilities than the RKK's and usually attack the hard target of militant operation including the soldiers and police (Srirai, 2007; Chalermsripinyorat, 2013).

Interestingly, a document from an agency of ISOC presented that number of total militant as 3,240 personnel. With respect to the "1st battalion" (in Kas Yala), there were 648 personnel 6 kompi, while, according to the "2nd battalion" (in Kas Narathiwat), there were 1,728 personnel from 16 kompi, and in the "3rd battalion" (in Kas Pattani), there were 864 personnel from eight kompi (The Fifth Operational Cooperation Center – OCC 5, 2010, pp. 19-20). This showed that BRN-Coordinate's militants were very small in proportion to armed security forces. Weakness of the militants was also seen from very limited quantity and quality of weapons and not all militants were well armed. Most of the militants' firearms were obtained by armed robbery from Thai authority several times. In addition, they attacked and stole revolvers, semi-automatic, and automatic firearm of security forces as well as civilians. Between 2004 and 2013, total numbers of firearms stolen by militants were 1,965, but Thai officers could retrieve 700 firearms, which showed that militants still had 1,265 firearms in their hands. Besides, proof of firearms that terrorists used to make violence totaled 5,829 found that they used a same gun totaled 812 (or 14 per cent) (Isara News Agency, 2014, January 3).

The military power of Malay Muslims is much weaker than the Thai government's military power. The highest predicted number of the BRN-Coordinate can be calculated to be about 7.5 percent of armed security forces namely soldiers, police, paramilitaries, and militias, which are up to 150,350 personnel. Actually, the number

of militants has clearly decreased. According to the prediction of authorities in early 2014, it was reported that there were the RKK about 2,291 personnel – a decline of nearly one-third since 2010. However, when militants, mainstays, members, and alignments are combined, the Thai authorities believe that there will be networks of the BRN-Coordinate about 11,189 personnel that may be separated in various levels i.e. the ulama 314 personnel, mainstays 207 personnel, RKK 2,291 personnel, alignments 5,979 personnel, other leaders 1,118 personnel, and other people 1,280 personnel (Isara News Agency, 2014, January 3).

4.3.2 Terrorism as a Weapon

Though some studies have point that terrorist tactics have started to use in several groups of separatist since the early 2000s, the number of violent incidents have not increased dramatically. In fact, the Malay Muslim insurgencies in recent year have been very different from the ones which happened earlier. Since 2004, the use of terrorism which has aimed to attack unarmed civilian tends to occur increasingly. According to the upsurge of use of terrorist tactics in southern Thailand, there are some examples e.g. unarmed civilian attacks and the atrocious act of beheading that has happened several times. These make the approach more reliable (The terror of beheading, 2009, February 24; Andre, 2012).

There are several explanations for causes of unarmed civilian attacks. As Human Rights Watch observes, the militant's attacks on civilians can be divided into three categories. First, attacks on Thai Buddhist civilians who work for the government, attacks on Thai Buddhist villagers, including Buddhist monks. These civilians are

144

legitimate targets because they represent the invasion of the Patani Darulsalam (the Islamic state of Patani) by the Kafir (infidels) state. Second, attacks on Malay Muslims who allegedly collaborated with Thai authorities, this target is qualified as Munafig (hypocrites) or those who have sided with the occupying forces of Kafir. Third, attacks on Malay Muslims who disagree with or are perceived as undermining the operations of Malay Muslim militants, this target is qualified as traitors who have committed Haram (forbidden sins) by betraying the ideology of Malay nationalism and Islam (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

Likewise, a government's monograph entitled the "Set of Knowledge for Performance of Officials in SBPs" prepared by an agency of the ISOC has explained that the militant clarified the former Patani state that it had ever been an Islamic state. They also fatwa (religious edict or ruling) that the Patani state was the darul harbi (nation at war). Therefore, it was Fard (tasks) or Wajib (mandatory) for all Malay Muslims to declare the "Jihad" to fight against invasion of the Thai government. In this sense, someone who does a jihad by confronting the Thai authority will die in the form of Shahid – who have died fulfilling a religious commandment. According to the declaration, the Patani state is the Darul Harbi. Non-Muslim people are applied to Thai Buddhist people and have often been labeled as the kafir. While, the Malay Muslims who betray the separatist movements, or cooperate with government agencies, may have often been labeled as the Munafiq (The Fifth Operational Cooperation Center – OCC 5, 2010, pp. 19 – 20).

Some studies believe that the Thai government's harsh repression against Malay Muslims religion, language, and culture has made idea of the holy war have been

145

deeply understood among many Malay Muslims (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Helbardt, 2011). A case on February 13, 2013, about 50 militants of the BRN-Coordinate assaulted a marine base in the Bacho district of Narathiwat province. However, the Thai marine decimated the attackers and 16 militants were killed. One of them was Mahrosu Jantarawadee who was a 31 year old man. His family and neighbors believed that he did a jihad by confronting the Thai authority and he was buried as a shahid (Marshall, 2013, March 25). Both the bodies of warrior and some victims, for example fatalities of Krue Se Mosque incident and Takbai incidents were buried as the shahid (Liow & Pathan, 2010). With respect to the Krue Se Mosque incident, it was the uprising without well-armed in the morning of April 28, 2004 and it was a martyrdom operation (McCargo, 2006). Other military operations acted by militants later did not be self-sacrifice. Clearly, while the large number of suicide attacks occurring across the global, there was no reported incident of suicide attacks in southern Thailand.

Despite Islamic rhetoric has been more used as a label for supporting militant operations against the Thai government, it might be too quick to summarize that the terrorist attacks of the militants, particularly the BRN-Coordinate comes from the Islamic ideology. The BRN is the first Malay Muslim socialist group which formed with socialism ideology neither Islamic ideology nor Malay nationalism (Che Man, 1990). At present, the BRN-Coordinate still claims itself as a liberation organization, not a separatist group (see appendix D). As the International Crisis Group notes that "BRN has always been more of an ethno-nationalist movement, with Islam as an

146

important aspect, but cast in terms of reasserting ethnic identity rather than religion per se" (International Crisis Group, 2005, May 18).

In terms of asymmetry approach, insurgencies have three components tactics to pursue a military organizer's objective sush as political mobilization, guerrilla warfare, and the use of terrorism. Thus, terrorism is a form of insurgency that most integrates closely violence from one side against civilians with asymmetrical violent confrontation against a government. It is relevant in view of the terrorists' need for a form of violence that serves as a force multiplier in confrontation with an incomparably stronger opponent that they cannot effectively challenge by conventional means (Gompert & Gordon, 2008; Stepanova, 2008).

It can divide the objectives of BRN-Coordinate to use terrorist tactic into several objectives. The first objective is used to achieve the military objective of the BRN-Coordinate. The terrorism tactic is generally used as a weapon of the weak or there is a lower formal status in an asymmetrical confrontation. According to asymmetry theory, it is the most effective method of the weak to confront the strong with terrorism since it can balance the asymmetry by making suffer on civilian of the opponent (Stepanova, 2008). Therefore, the use more terrorist tactics by the BRN-Coordinate may reflect the need of a type of military tactic that help to increase its power in fighting against the Thai government as an outstanding stronger opponent (Byman, 2007).

The BRN-Coordinate's defense strategies are guerrilla warfare, and its related strategy of terrorism. Therefore, the militants have focused on hard targets (e.g.

soldier, police, and ranger) and soft targets (civilians and unarmed officers). But soft targets are easier to access than hard targets so young militants such as permuda have primary attacked soft targets. The terrorist attacks on the soft targets also are a part of military training and mind testing of recruited militants (Jitpiromsri, 2006, February 1). Using more aggressive tactics can make the BRN-Coordinate increase military capacity. Because terrorist attacks serve as a force multiplier in confrontation with the opponent that the BRN-Coordinate cannot effectively use only by a guerilla warfare tactic.

The second objective is used to achieve its political objective. Terrorism tactics of the BRN-Coordinate are usually used to achieve their political purposes. That is, in the short term, to compel the government to accept its demands. For example, the violent incidents increases slightly in 2013 because there is an important change of the situation – the 2013 open peace dialogue process between the agency of the Thai government and the BRN-Coordinate facilitated by the Malaysian government happened in Kuala Lumpur. The terrorist tactics caused the BRN-Coordinate to use more aggressive practices to give them increased bargaining power in the peace dialogue. Unfortunately, the peace initiative process was halted after the country's political conflict, which lead to the army's coup d'état on May 22, 2014.

Finally, the third objective of the BRN-Coordinate is an endeavor to gain mass support by terrorist attracts. Evidently, from 2004 to the end of 2013, there were a total of 2,889 bomb attacks. Mostly of the roadside bombings targeted soldiers and police officers, commanders, and chief executive officers. Several bombings targeted the headquarters of the government's administrative office and business centers of

148

the cities in the region. Furthermore, they occurred in nearly all areas of cities such as Hat Yai, Mueng Songkla, and Sadao district (Isara News Agency, 2014, January 3; International Crisis Group, 2009, December 8). Each bomb attack had done a lot of damage and there were casualties of security forces and innocent victims, both the Thai Buddhists and the Malay Muslims. Though, such bomb attacks hit a specific target, particularly a karaoke bar with an objective to get support from the Malay Muslims who have an aggressive approach to place of amusements in the region.

In addition, such terrorist attacks against civilians are in reprisal or payback for the human rights violations of the Thai authority. This made the BRN-Coordinate gets more support and had legitimate as the protector of the Malay Muslim community. A case in point was a clash between the security forces and the Malay Muslims, which occurred on September 21, 2005 after troublemakers had opened fire in a coffee shop at Tanjong Lima village, Ra-nge district of Narathiwat province and people were killed and injured. Later, angry villagers believed that this situation was done by Thai security force. They protersted against authority, but authority did not accept their demands. Consequently, villagers captured two suspected marines and killed them. On October 16, 2005, a Buddhist monk and two Thai Buddhists at Wat Promprasit, Panareh district of Pattani province were murdered (Nualpian, 2008).

Undoubtedly, the Thai government uses the direct strategy that mainly focuses on conventional attacks. While the BRN-Coordinate employs the guerrilla warfare tactic and the terrorist tactic as indirect strategies to confront with the strong military power of the Thai government. According to Arreguín-Toft (2005), the outcome of this type of strategic interaction (direct attack VS indirect defense) reflects that the

149

weak actors are much more likely to win. As a report presented that there were the totals of 495 casualties of the Malay Muslim militants. Whereas a total of 4,937 casualties of the security forces, namely soldiers, police, rangers, and VDV, exclude local militias (ISOC Region 4, 2014, January 3).

Figure 4.2: Number of Casualty in Southern Thailand (2004 – 2013)

From ISOC Region 4. (2014, January 3). *Kong-amnuaykarn Raksa Kwammankongpainai Paksi-suannar Chi-changkropropsippi Satanakarn Kwamrunrang Na Chaidaentai (กองอำนวยการรักษาความมั่นคงภายในภาค 4 ส่วนหน้า ชี้แจงครบรอบ 10 ปีสถานการณ์ความรุนแรง ณ ชายแดนใต้).* Retrieved from http://www.southpeace.go.th/th/News/explain/1196.html

As mentioned above, the statistics of casualties in security showed that 5,352 were killed and 9,965 were wounded. The majority of casualties are civilians, including religious leaders who are both the Thai Buddhists and the Malay Muslims that 3,574 were killed and 5,601 wounded. Classified by religion, the Buddhists received the

150

largest number of loss which had 8,585 people (2,259 died and 6,326 wounded) while the Muslims had 6,108 people (2,962 died and 3,146 wounded) and people who cannot be able to identify religion were 624 (131 died and 493 wounded) respectively. On the other side, fewer casualties i.e. security forces, namely soldiers, police, rangers, and VDV, excluding local militias, are that 992 were killed and 3,945 wounded. Next, fewer casualties are civilian officers, including teachers that 387 were killed and 323 wounded. Whereas the fewest casualties were the Malay Muslim militants that 399 were killed and 96 wounded (ISOC Region 4, 2014, January 3).

The number of security incidents that can be proved from 2004 to 2013 totaled 8,540. Between 2004 and 2007, incidence level is astoundingly high with occurrences of more than 1,000 per year. The statistics showed that there were 601 incidents in 2004, 1,006 incidents in 2005, 1,249 incidents in 2006, and 1,669 incidents in 2007. However, it could be seen that incidents gradually decreased from 2008 on. It was reported that there were 769 incidents in 2008, 757 incidents in 2009, 625 incidents in 2010, 680 incidents in 2011, 542 incidents in 2012, and 615 incidents in 2013 (ISOC Region 4, 2014, January 3).

Figure 4.3: Number of Violent Incidents in Southern Thailand (2004 – 2013)

From ISOC Region 4. (2014, January 3). *Kong-amnuaykarn Raksa Kwammankongpainai Paksi-suannar Chi-changkropropsippi Satanakarn Kwamrunrang Na Chaidaentai (กองอำนวยการรักษาความมั่นคงภายในภาค 4 ส่วนหน้า ชี้แจงครบรอบ 10 ปีสถานการณ์ความรุนแรง ณ ชายแดนใต้).* Retrieved from http://www.southpeace.go.th/th/News/explain/1196.html

The escalation of violent incidents in southern Thailand reflects that no any party wins, but the situation turns into a conflict perpetuation which causes serious damages for both parties. While the military operation of BRN-Coordinate becomes terrifying by using guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics which causes damage to Thai security forces and unarmed civilians. Such military operations can force the Thai government which is stronger to provide negotiation and listen to their problems and political demands. Though the BRN-Coordinate's fighting is still far from their goal that is separating the southern region apart from Thailand.

152

4.4 Chapter Summary

In conclusion, the military power relation between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims is a strategic asymmetry that occurs in an extreme imbalance of power relations. The offensive strategy of the Thai government is the conventional attack highlights the stronger military power to win the asymmetric warfare. The Thai government has applied armed security forces which are composed of professional military i.e. soldiers and police deployed from both internal and external offices to take a main role in responsibility for southern security. It also sets up paramilitary and local militias organized by the government. In addition, the security laws endorse military power of the government acted by security forces. However, the exercise of stronger military power causes violations of human rights of Malay Muslims, builds an obvious condition to stimulate Malay Muslims to resist the Thai government. The government authorities' abuse of power is a reason to justify the legitimacy of using violence of Malay Muslim militants. Moreover, the BRN-Coordinate's defense strategies are guerrilla warfare and its related strategy of terrorism aimed to seek more balance the power at destroying the Thai government's capacity to fight. In addition, the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims also comes from the disparity in socio-economic. Therefore, the problem of the power relations in socio-economy and its impact should be examined in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC POWER RELATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the impact of the current socio-economic power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims and it impacts on the conflict in the area. Typically, the socio-economic power may cause social and economic changes that affect patterns of production, the distribution of incomes and wealth, exchange, and consumption of the objects of nature, including the way in which people behave, and the quality of life in socio-economic spheres. In this sense, some analyses of the impacts from socio-economic power to the conflict in southern Thailand can be categorized into three major parts, i.e. the Thai government's socio-economic power; and the Malay Muslims' socio-economic capabilities.

5.2 The Thai Government Socio-economic Power

This part provides the strategies of the Thai government's socio-economic power to achieve the socio-economic goal that is to promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims. First, using socio-economic development is to improve quality of life of the Malay Muslims, to eradicate poverty, and to reduce socio-economic disparity serving to exacerbate the Malay Muslim insurgency. Second, the Thai government uses socio-economic power to decrease the grievances of Malay Muslims and to help people affected by the violence in southern Thailand. Finally, researchers have investigated the impacts of the exercise of socio-economic power on the Malay Muslims.

5.2.1 Socio-economic Development Policy

Since the early of current insurgency, the Thai government spends specific budget allocation in socio-economic development policy to diminish the problem exacerbating the Malay Muslim uprisings. On March 16, 2004, the Thaksin Shinawatra's cabinet approved the Development Strategy for Southern Border Provinces (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat), 2004 – 2005 provided by the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). This development strategy aims to improve the quality of life of the people. In addition, build an economy and society in southern Thailand to be equivalent to those in other regions of Thailand. The development strategy particular focuses on five aspects as follows (Manakit, 2005, July):

1. Accelerate the problem of basic needs and eradicate poverty.
2. Build up new economy and strengthen the existing economy.
3. Develop a telecommunications network.
4. Develop of human and society, and
5. Administrate natural resources and environment sustainably.

To achieve the objectives, the Thai government gave the 2004 – 2005 budgets more than 27,000 million Baht to government agencies in the area under a southern administrative organization that was the SBPPBC set at that time. Then, after the military coup d'etat on September 19, 2006, the junta administration assigned the ISOC led by the army to be responsible for the overall southern administration and to control the whole of problem solving. In socio-economic activities, however, the Thai government authorized the SBPAC to be in charge of the socio-economic

development sector. The government also empowered SBPAC to work under the policy and control of the Council for Development of Special Economic Development Zones in Southern Border Provinces which had the Prime Minister as being a chairperson (Dubus & Polkla, 2011, June).

In fact, the army controlling the ISOC still plays an important role in implementing the government's socio-economic development policy. At the local level, the ISOC empowered the ISOC Region 4 to be in charge of security issues and socio-economic development as a part of counterinsurgency program. The military leaders realize that implementing socio-economic development programs with lots of efforts in the area will have a positive affect for solutions on insurgency problems. Moreover, improving life conditions over this ungovernable territory during deadly conflict will reduce the grievance among Malay Muslims. Apparently, the ISOC publicized the speech of General Anupong Paochinda, Former Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army and Deputy ISOC Director, through mass media as follows:

> We have approached solving the problems in the south in the right way by using development projects to win the hearts of the people in the afflicted areas. In the past, we can achieve a meeting of minds built on a basis of effective development projects that really solve the people's problems. The make life good and when that happens, people's problems evaporate (Moving forward together, 2009, June 3).

To ensure they achieve their desired goal, the ISOC has tried to improve the quality of life in the area through various development projects. This strategy involves implementing development projects under various ministries aimed at resolving problems before they lead to join the insurgents. To date, the ISOC Region 4 claimed that this strategy has succeeded in spreading a better trust among the Malay Muslims (Moving forward together, 2009, June 3). Alongside, the government strongly

156

believes that "If the government could make the locals feel secure about their jobs, economic status and equal treatment, they would not be easily lured by insurgency groups to turn against the government" (Ruangdit & Laohong, 2009, December 29).

Despite the Thai government accelerates economic and social development seriously, the quantity of people living below the poverty line in southern Thailand has not decrease. With the focus on Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces, poor people increased steadily. There was an increase from 263,000 people in 2004 to 308,000 people in 2007 and to 364,000 people in 2009, equivalent to 14.8 percent, 16.9 percent, and 19.7 percent of nearly 2 million respectively. Especially, the scale of poverty has a very high percentage in the Malay Muslims' dominated areas, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces having proportion of the poor of more than 20 percent of the population (Administration and Development Policy in Southern Border Provinces, 2012 – 2014).

The Special Development Zones is one of the important programs of the Thai government to mobilize solutions to the Malay Muslim insurgencies. The program was started on November 28, 2006, and the cabinet approved Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkla, and Satul provinces to be the Special Development Zones in Southern Border Provinces. Later, on January 13, 2009, former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva appointed the Council of Ministers for Development of Special Zones in Southern Border Provinces (known as the Southern Cabinet). This council chaired by former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and NESDB worked as a secretary, and they had power to set policies and measures, consider and approve plans as well as projects, and form budgets for supporting the development in this

157

special zone. Then, on April 7, 2009, the cabinet approved the Plan for Development of Special Zones in Five Southern Border Provinces, 2009 – 2012 with important aims to upgrade the people's quality of life and increase annual household incomes two times from 64,000 Baht per year to 120,000 Baht per household.

This plan is operated under five strategies as follows (The Council of Ministers for Development of Special Zones in Southern Border Provinces, 2009, April, p. 7):

1. Protect the safety of living life, promote justice to build up trust in state power, and prevent some people, who are likely to be troublemakers, from resisting the government.

2. Enhance occupational stability and income for low income people for self-sufficiency.

3. Provide job opportunities and enhance the quality of life.

4. Enhance the strength of the economy in the area and develop cooperation with foreign countries, and

5. Manage a special development zone.

To achieve that socio-economic development plan, the Thai government sets the total fiscal year budget at 69,334.30 million Baht, which could be classified by the year. The fiscal year 2009 was 8,515.71 million Baht; the fiscal year 2010 was 21,196.63 million Baht, the fiscal 2011 was 22,174.40 million Baht, and the fiscal year 2012 was 17,447.58 million Baht. This total budget was allocated for 6 main development programs as below (The Council of Ministers for Development of Special Zones in Southern Border Provinces, 2009, April, pp. 9-13):

1. Elevation of income and quality of life of people in selected villages.

158

2. Promotion of justice, security, and safety.

3. Development of the quality of the people, multiple cultures, and standards in social services.

4. Stimulation of economy and investment.

5. Development of economic connectivity with neighboring countries, and

6. Improvement of laws and regulations and increasing the administration's efficiency.

Moreover, the Thai government also continues to stimulate the socio-economic development programs to enhance the life quality of Malay Muslims. On May 4, 2012, former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra signed the Executive Order No. 104/2555 to appoint the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces. This committee had an important principle, which was a high-level mechanism for the command, coordination, supervision, and promotion of the operation to be the unity and integration among all government agencies. Additionally, such a committee has to depend on ISOC for main agency in coordination with various levels of mechanisms in both Bangkok and southern Thailand (Administration and Development Policy for Southern Border Provinces, 2012 – 2014).

In the meantime, that committee also comes up with the new administration policy, namely the Administration and Development Policy for Southern Border Provinces, 2012 – 2014 proposed by the National Security Council (NSC). It is the first security policy formed by the participation of all stakeholders, including Malay Muslims. In addition, this policy emphasizes operations in accordance with human rights and rule

of law as well as socio-economic development to solve the unrest problems by considering the area capability and to allocate the benefits equally for every sector, and to suit the Malay Muslims' needs and not destroy identity and the way of life of them. This policy also called the "9529 Plan" since it is composed of 9 objectives, 5 execution approaches, and 29 joint targeted strategies (Development Integration Center in Southern Border Provinces Area, 2012).

To accomplish the 9529 Plan, the government sets a development's action plan that provided the 3-year budget for operations amounting to 68,274.5608 million Baht, included the 2012 budget was 24,243.0089 million Baht, the 2013 budget was 22,636.5907 million Baht, and the 2014 budget was 31,394.9576 million Baht. Alongside this, the ISOC also established a new agency under the ISOC Region 4 named the "Development Integration Center in Southern Border Provinces Area" in order to be a center for integrated administrative, monitoring, and evaluation on socio-economic development operation. Furthermore, the army has been a main agency to operate as the 9529 Plan, especially to make the south be safe and peaceful under His Majesty King Bhumibol's strategies, Understand, Reach out, and Develop together with to solve socio-economic problems through the King's economic philosophy named the Sufficiency Economic Philosophy. This economic philosophy has become elements of the nation's official development plans after the 1997 economic crisis. Interestingly, this economic philosophy is explained as a guideline that can be applied to all economic systems and is not an obstacle to development of industrial capitalist economy that is a model for national socio-economic

development since the late of 1950s (United Nations Development Programme. 2007; Wattachai, 2005 as cited in Phadungchevit, 2007).

Several projects under the label of sufficiency economy operated by the army usually focus on promoting the agricultural production process and farm production to promoting sustainable self-sufficiency by using modern technology as little as possible, such as making organic fertilizer and bio-fertilizer for farming, rehabilitation of rice planting, animal husbandry, fish culture and so on. The army claimed that training programs were given to more than 220,000 people, but villagers who attended the training programs said that they did not get enough certain income to fulfill their needs (Rossi, 2012; Beech, 2009, October 19; International Crisis Group, 2009, December 8).

The ongoing Malay Muslim insurgencies have made the Thai government allocate a lot of the budget for counterinsurgency and build socio-economic development programs to solve the problem of those insurgencies. From 2004 to 2014, the 11-year budget of the Thai government was about 208,323 million Baht. The subsequent budgets are displayed in Table 5.1

161

Table 5.1:

Thai Government's Budget for Solving the Insurgency (2004 – 2014)

Budget Year	Budget (Million Baht)
2004	13,450
2005	13,674
2006	14,207
2007	17,526
2008	22,988
2009	27,547
2010	16,507
2011	19,102
2012	16,277
2013	21,124
2014	25,921
Total	**208,323**

From: Isara News Agency. (2014, January 3). *Sibpi Faitai PuenTukplon 1,965 Krabok Yodtai Prubmai 3.7 Panrai Tegnop Talu 2 Saenlarn (10 ปีไฟใต้ปืนถูกปล้น 1,965 กระบอกยอดตายปรับใหม่ 3.7 พันรายเทงบทะลุ 2 แสนล้าน).* Retrieved from http://www.Isranews.org/south-news/scoop/item/26320-tenyears.html

Inappropriately, the government's efforts to promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims with various socio-economic development programs are useless. The Malay Muslims in this region express the view that the development programs cannot be successful while there is still unequal resource distribution. Only local elites get benefits, whereas general people gain nothing. The failure of spending a lot of the budget is questioned by a Malay Muslim politician, Jeh-aming Tohtayong, MP of Narathiwat province. As he states, "We have seen huge amount of the budget spent for the south during six years, but the development of the economy and quality

of life discontinues. All cabinets still provide a lot of the budget for securing safety only. Thus people doubt that there is a lot more money spent in the area every year. The development is not advanced and we do not trust in safety" (Teunsop Plarnngopkaetai Horkarnka Chi-maiprongsai, 2010, January 27).

A senior Thai officer pointes that the operation of development programs by the army may be successful in some the Thai Buddhist and the Malay Muslim communities. However, there is still the problem about the access to most the Malay Muslims' needs. Mainly, people in the Red Zone do not cooperate with officers, particularly security forces. Both sides mistrust each other (Interview with a senior Thai officer, 2014, March 11). While, some critics have said that the factors causing failure are an inefficient administration of government agencies and most people lack opportunity to participate in projects and planning (Jitpiromsri, Lomlim, & Laiphapon, 2012). Indeed, it creates an industry of insecurity which makes more reason to ask for more of budget and makes corruption expand. If it continues the legitimacy of the Thai government will be destroyed eventually (International Crisis Group, 2009, December 8; Chalermsripinyorat, 2009, December 9).

5.2.2 Compensation and Rehabilitation Measures

Besides socio-economic development programs, the Thai government has exerted socio-economic power to reduce the grievance of the Malay Muslims and help people affected by the southern unrest who have been impacted to liberty, life, and property. Compensation measure began on May 3, 2005; following, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra signed the Executive Order No. 160/2548 and

163

appointed the Compensation Committee (known as "Kor Yor Tor"). This committee is responsible for setting a policy for compensation, makes a database, and coordinates with government agencies to compensate and rehabilitate affected people fast.

The regulation of compensation for victims and families that can be classified into four groups as follows (Puengnetr, 2012, March 21);

1. All groups of people who are both Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims.

2. Public servants.

3. People who are violated by Thai officers or Malay Muslim insurgents.

4. People who are detained, arrested, and imprisoned by authorities, but get proof of innocence later.

The Thai government emphasizes compensation and rehabilitation for people affected with having the retroactive effect since January 2004. However, the government compensates some people who were affected by previous incidents too. According to the information of the Compensation Committee, it shows that the government paid compensation to the relatives of persons who had a forced disappearance by government authorities from the beginning of 2002 to mid-2006. There were a total 23 victims. Almost all of them are the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand, except Somchai Neelapaijit, a Thai Muslim-lawyer, who disappeared in Bangkok (10 Kamtam-Tob "Karnyiewya" Poodairabphonkratop Ruepoosoonsia Chakhetkarn Kwammaisangopnai Jor Cho Tor, 2012, August 1-15).

The regulation of compensation from 2004 to 2012 has both original and adjusted ones that give more financial compensation. The original regulation due to the cabinet resolution on May 31, 2005 provided a compensation package to people and public servants. For example, with respect to people, the compensation payments for death are 100,000 Baht per person and for disability is 80,000 Baht per person. With respect to a public servant, compensation is paid for death up to 500,000 Baht per person and for disability up to 500,000 Baht per person. The regulation of compensation was adjusted by the new regulation due to the cabinet resolution on August 14, 2012. For example, in the case of people, the compensation payments for death and disability is 500,000 Baht per person and covers people who died and were disable since January 1, 2004 (Puengnetr, 2014, April 11).

Additionally, the Thai government approved the new regulation for compensation by paying up to a maximum of 7,500,000 Baht to relatives of a hundred of victims killed by the army's armed forces and the suppression of the Red Shirt protest in Bangkok in 2010. This new regulation had a retroactive effect for persons affected by political turmoil during a few previous years too. Then, this causes adjustment to the regulation of compensation payments for persons affected by the unrest in southern Thailand in some cases that were happened by government authorities' abuse of power and these persons get the same level of compensation.

Since mid-2012, the Thai government has paid compensation to relatives of victims who were killed by government authorities up to a maximum of 7,500,000 Baht. This is especially true of dead people in four major incidents as follows: (Puengnetr, 2012, March 21; Sor Or Bor Tor Mobgnenchuayleuyiewya Pusoonsia Lae

165

Dairaubponkratop Suebnuengchak Hatkwammaisangop Nai Changwatchaidanpaktai, 2012, August 1-15).

1. The victims of the Krue Se Mosque incident and another incident in the same day, on April 28, 2004.

2. The victims of the Takbai incident, on October 25, 2004.

3. The victims of the Al Furqan Mosque in Ipayae village, on June 8, 2009.

4. The victims who were disappeared, and who had died/disabled from violations by the government authorities.

From 2004 to 2014, the Thai government has spent the total budget for compensation up to 2,380,573,052 Baht, especially between 2012 and 2013; the expenditure amounted to 722,029,448 Baht (30 percent of the budget of compensation spent in ten years). The budget figures for the period 2004 – 2014 are as follows:

Table 5.2:

Thai Government's Budget for Compensation and Rehabilitation (2004 – 2014)

Budget Year	Budget (Baht)
2004	151,711,758
2005	152,364,358
2006	204,399,101
2007	276,334,487
2008	273,175,253
2009	233,994,588
2010	155,230,990
2011	197,291,233
2012	388,102,568
2013	333,926,880
2014	14,041,834*
Total	**2,380,573,052**

From: *Saruppon Karnchuaylueyiewya Phudairap Phonkratop Chak Hetkarn Kwammaisangop Pingoppraman Por Sor 2547 – 2557 (สรุปผลการช่วยเหลือเยียวยาผู้ได้รับผลกระทบจากเหตุการณ์ความไม่สงบ ปีงบประมาณ พ.ศ. 2547 – 2557).* (2013, November 24).
Retrieved from
http://www.sbpac.go.th/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=file&id=40: 2547-2557&Itemid=564&lang=en

* The figure of the 2014 is the data during 2013, October 1 – November 18, 2013.

By this conciliation strategy, the Thai government spends a lot of the budget for the compensating and/or rehabilitating people affected by the violent incidents. This is especially true of the financial compensation for the Malay Muslims who were victims of human rights violation by the security forces in the Krue Se and the Takbai incidents as well as other incidents. The Thai government hopes that this measure will reduce the Malay Muslims' resistance against the administration.

167

Indeed, the financial compensation can build a better image for the Thai government and saying sorry from the head of government and the army commander. The first apology to the Malay Muslims was by General Surayut as the Prime Minister. This occurred in 2008, and on March 2011 General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the Commander-in-Chief of the army apologized for security forces' abuse of power in the Krue Se Mosque and the Takbai incidents (The Deep South, 2011, March 27).

Nonetheless, although there are compensation payments to relatives of victims in these incidents as well as apologizing from the army Commander, a criminal proceeding for government authorities in both massacres cannot be prosecuted. Besides emphasizing the financial compensation payments, the Thai government needs to make people trust in the government by creating justice for victims. In many cases, this will include eradicating inequality and injustice in the socio-economy in order to decrease the Malay Muslims' grievance.

5.3 The Malay Muslims' Socio-economic Capabilities

Though the Malay Muslims are the weaker in the structural asymmetry with the Thai government, they are not powerless at all. The specific political geography of southern Thailand as the borderland between Thailand and Malaysia strengthens socio-economic power of the Malay Muslims. This is to say, the Malay Muslims get benefits from two distinctive points. First, some of the Malay Muslims becomes cross-border workers and go to work in Malaysia and second, some of the Malay Muslims who continue living in the unrest situation can make a little bit of benefit

from trades and smuggling, including illegal oil that was smuggled from the neighbor countries.

5.3.1 Socio-economic Status Quo of the Malay Muslims

As mentioned above, Thai government spending for development programs do not succeed; they can support the whole economy in southern Thailand with average expansion of the economy of about 1 – 2 percent per year (Jitpiromsri, 2014, July 25). Besides, there have been insurgencies for several years and now there are negative economic factors as well. These include energy price increases for natural gas and petroleum gas, for a transportation sector increase. At the same time the cost of living increases, but agricultural prices decline (Jitpiromsri, Lomlim, & Laipapon, 2011).

The Thai economy has grown over the past few decades, so most scholars' view is that Thailand has experienced sustained economic growth, which has contributed to a reduction in poverty. However, the economic disparity in Thailand has increased very much. It is in inverse relation to the index of economic disparity of neighbor countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, where their economic disparity has tended to decrease (Khaosa-ad & Liamjaraskul, 2013).

When considering in the country level, the figure in 2009 showed that the population of Thailand was divided into five groups and the gap between the maximum earning 20 percent of household income and the minimum earning 20 percent of household income increased 12 – 15 times. The richest earned more than a half of total income (54.4 percent) while the poorest shared the income only 4.6 percent. At the same

time, the survey found that the maximum earning 20 percent of population had an average income roughly 11.9 times the income of the minimum earning 20 percent (Tangkitvanich, 2010; Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), 2006, November).

Moreover, the survey by the World Bank in 2012 showed that the growth rate of average annual real GDP over the past two decades had been 5.1 percent. During this period, the poverty rate fell from more than 40 percent in 1988 to approximately 10 percent in 2009. Nonetheless, over the same period, the inequality rate, which was measured by the GINI index, has remained static – 0.49 in 1988 and 0.48 by 2009. The poverty and inequality trends at the national level have remained constant and hardly changed during the last three decades. Although there are the significant declines in poverty at the national level, regional differences continue to exist. Total economic growth appears to be related to a relatively slow decrease in inequality at the national level and there are several increases of inequality in Bangkok and the other region (The World Bank, 2012).

In addition, there are noticeable regional disparities in human development and economic opportunities in Thailand. The four indices of the 2009 UNDP Human Achievement Index (HAI), which relate to public service delivery i.e. health, education, income, and transportation and communication reflect that each dimension of Bangkok performs much better than other regions. Certainly, Thailand established a highly centralized unitary state system where Bangkok is the administrative capital and centralized-unitary city government. Consequently, public spending has been concentrated on looking after population about 10 million in

170

Bangkok. On the other hand, most of populations in the other regions have been neglected and received very little public spending, including lack of public services in nearly all aspects (Khaosa-ad & Liamjaraskul, 2013; Jitpiromsri & Sobhonvasu, 2006, March).

In the case of southern Thailand, more than 2 million of the population in the region still faces substandard infrastructure and inadequate supplies of land and capital. There is poverty together with a low quality of living standards. Although some policies have affected socio-economic development in southern Thailand, these policies to solve poverty do not result in the changing the quality of life of the Malay Muslims at all. It can be seen that the number of people living below the poverty line in southern Thailand still increases continuously and there is a high proportion of about 20 percent of the population in some areas (Nayobai Karnboriharn Lae Karnpattana Changwatchaidan Paktai B. E. 2555 - 2557).

The overall production, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2012, which was surveyed by the NESDB found that while the GDP of the Thai population throughout the country was 183,804 Baht per capita per year, the GDP of the population in Bangkok was 436,479 Baht per capita per year. That was three times higher than the average in the country. Comparing the GDP of southern Thailand, it found that the GDP of the population in Bangkok was three times higher than the GDP of the population in Yala province and whole parts of Songkla province. These were 112,207 Baht and 134,843 Baht per capita per year, respectively. Additionally the GDP of the population in Bangkok was almost six times higher than the GDP of the population in Pattani and Narathiwat provinces that were 74,748 Baht and 75,422

171

Baht per capita per year, respectively (The Office of National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), 2014, April).

In principle, there are some negative views on socio-economic power that this form of power relations is very important to social class division, and dissatisfaction is the crucial factor that makes the class conflict expands to violence based on ethnic conflict (Mann, 2005). In the meantime, when considering the main structure of population in southern Thailand, it shows that there is still socio-economic disparity among three ethnic groups namely the Malay Muslims, Thai Buddhists, and Chinese. Comparing these groups, the Malay Muslims have less socio-economic opportunity, but have more poverty than the Thai Buddhists and the Chinese. As well, some of the Malay Muslims have expressed their dissatisfaction to the ethnic Chinese population in southern Thailand who control local business for a long time (Interview with Malay Muslims students, 2013, June 15).

According to the National Statistics Office (NSO) (2011), it would not focus on the ethnicity of the population, but it would identify each person's religion, and the population of southern Thailand in 2010 amounted to 2 million. Of the total population, 80 percent, or about 1.6 million people who were Thai and Malay who adhered to Islam. While almost 20 percent, or about 400,000 people were the Thai Buddhists, including the Chinese who adhered to Buddhism, and less than 0.5 percent were follow Catholic or Protestant. The percentage of the Malay Muslim population was the highest in Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala provinces, which were 87.25, 83.0, and 79.6, respectively. In addition, the four districts of Songkla province had a percentage of followers of Islam of about 60 percent and most of them were

the Malay Muslims. But some were Thai Muslims who have spoken Thai in everyday life. Even though most of the Malay Muslims can speak Thai and read Thai, almost all of them use local Malay language in everyday life. With respect to span of age, it found that 100 per cent of youth aged 18 – 19 and 98 percent among those in their 20s, including both Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhist, were able to read Thai, but the proportion gradually declined in the groups over this age. The survey provided that only 37 percent who were over 60 years, including both the Malay Muslims and the Thai Buddhist, can read Thai (Klein, 2010, November).

Table 5.3:

Population in Southern Thailand (2000 – 2010)

Provinces	Year	
	2000	**2010**
1. Pattani	595,985	605,208
2. Yala	415,537	432,245
3. Narathiwat	662,350	668,863
4. Songkla*	300,000**	304,404
Total	**1,973,872**	**2,010,720**

From National Statistical Office (NSO). (2011a). *The 2010 Population and Housing Census*. Retrieved from popcensus.nso.go.th/file/popcensus-08-08-55-T.pdf; (2011b); *Population and Housing Census Classifies into Districts and Sub-districts of Songkla Province in December 2010*. Retrieved from http://service.nso.go.th/nso/nsopublish/districtList/S010107/th/74.htm.

* Only Chana, Thepa, Na Thawi, and Saba Yoi districts.
**Estimated by the researcher.

Economic disparity is closely related to social disparity. A survey conducted by NSO in 2000 showed frightening data that Malay Muslims in southern Thailand had a much lower education level than of the Thai population in general. Interestingly,

69.8 percent of the Malay Muslims had only a primary education, only 9.2 percent of them had completed secondary education, and only 1.7 percent of the Malay Muslims had a bachelor's degree. Furthermore, the Malay Muslims had a lower education level than the average of the Thai Buddhists in the same area, 49.6 percent of the Thai Buddhists had a primary education, 13.2 percent had a secondary education, and 9.7 percent of the Thai Buddhists had a bachelor's degree (Tangkitvanich, 2010; Jitpiromsri & Sobhonvasu, 2006, March).

Different education level leads to different employment opportunities as well. This extremely expands socio-economic disparity between the Malay Muslims and the Thai Buddhists who live in the same region. Though jobs in Thai administrative organizations do not depend on quota by ethnicity or religion, there are initial regulations about the qualifications of education. Therefore, it is difficult for the Malay Muslims, who are less educated, to obtain jobs in government organizations. Only 2.4 percent of the Malay Muslims work in the public sector. While Thai Buddhists have a percentage in the public sector that is 19.2 percent (Jitpiromsri & Sobhonvasu, 2006, March).

Indeed, the Malay Muslims receive very few benefits from socio-economic development programs. The problem of the socio-economy of the Malay Muslims has still not been improved yet. Likewise, the prolonged southern unrest worsens the problems of poverty and the quality of life of local people. The central government sectors usually take personnel recruitment by competitive examinations that make the Thai Buddhists and the Thai Muslims who come from other areas work as government officials in southern Thailand. In the meantime, the Malay Muslims

often feel that Thai people, whether Buddhist or Muslim, in a bureaucratic system are representatives of Thai colonial style rule. This is significant because Malay Muslims think that Thai authorities usually treat them as the "Colonial subjects" (No Justice for Families of Victims in the Deep South, 2011, March 17).

This reason is one of the things that make most of the Malay Muslims feel isolated from government administration. The grievances of the minorities are the direct results from such socio-economic elements. The existing intergroup differentials in ethno-political relations, which settled on unequal economic growth expanding educational chances and high inflation rates, should make a relative sense of deprivation that leads to intensified collective grievances (Gurr, 1993 as cited in Saxton, 2005, January – March; Sen, 2006; Taya, 2007).

According to young Malay Muslims, they feel alienation from the Thai government administration, especially people who are non-members of Thai administrative organizations. Some youth usually have questions when they compare their socio-economic status quo and other opportunities with ones of the Thai Buddhists and the Thai Muslims. They have been ruled as the second-class citizen. Besides, some young people often refer to the Bhumiputra policy of the Malaysian government that provides socio-economic rights, including giving more opportunities on education and working in the government services for native Malay Muslims than other ethnics. By comparing the rights that they have been given by the Thai government it makes them feel grieving (Interview with Malay Muslims students, 2012, June 15; 2013, October 9; 2013, October 12).

As a result, the abandonment of the Malay Muslims to poverty and under intense of socio-economic inequality and discrimination can produce feelings of discontent and deep grievances and often causes them to mobilize people to fight against the Thai government with violent means. However, the socio-economic capacity of the Malay Muslims is also expressed in other ways that do not merely respond with violence directly.

5.3.2 Cross-border Workers

The ongoing unrest in southern Thailand and daily violence leading to death has affected socio-economic aspect seriously. This part focuses on survival alternatives for the Malay Muslims by working as migrant workers. The current wave of the insurgencies has created more migrant workers than ever before. The reality of the socio-economic status quo of the Malay Muslims means one has to survive by being a migrant worker in urban areas both within and outside to country. In addition, it should consider how this phenomenon could make a link between the rural and the urban economy.

Unemployment and increasing poverty have prompted many Malay Muslims to seek jobs in nearby provinces and Bangkok. Some of them made a decision to work in neighboring big cities of southern Thailand, which have a better economy and more well-being such as Hat Yai, other districts in Songkla province, and Satul province that are not far and have Thai Muslim communities. These migrant workers are young people who work to support themselves and send money back to their families. On the other hand, some of the Malay Muslims decided to emigrate with all

176

their members in families, especially families affected by unrest situations and they had lost head or members of the family.

Even though it is difficult to survey how many migrant workers move out to other provinces, there is clear information that reveals that a lot of unemployed Malay Muslims now choose to work in Malaysia. A report presented that a number of the Malay Muslims who emigrated to work in Malaysia were nearly 200,000 persons (Sommai & Pethrat, 2008, September 7). These migrant workers worked as daily workers, including working for short-term and long-term jobs in agriculture, industry, services sectors in Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah states and far areas namely Kuala Lumpur and other states of Malaysia and Singapore. In fact, most of the Malay Muslims who work in the services sector and in Thai restaurants are illegal workers for the reason that the Malaysian government does not give a work permit for this job. During each month, some Thai workers must leave the country to visit their relatives or to go over the border and then return so that their passports will stamp at immigration controls. On the other hand, the Malaysian government gives a visa and a work permit to a Tomyam restaurant entrepreneur for 3 – 6 months each time and some entrepreneurs are dual nationals i.e. of both Thai and Malaysian citizenship who can stay permanently in Malaysia (Sommai & Pethrat, 2008, September 7).

Most of the young Malay Muslims work in the Malay Muslim's restaurants, which well known as the Tomyam restaurant. Approximately, there are the Malay Muslims' restaurants and street food stalls in Malaysia of more than 20,000. The rent for big restaurants in Kuala Lumpur is 180,000 Baht per month, and it can make

about 200,000 to 300,000 Baht as income per month. Street food stalls can make money of at least 2,000 – 3,000 Baht per day. Therefore, money from this business is not less than 1,000 million Baht circulated through southern Thailand each year (Sommai & Pethrat, 2008, September 7; 'Tomyam' Rangnganthainapsan Ro 'Songklap' Kaditamnganpidkotmai, 2011, October 10; Ruampalangtongtin Srangkwamsampan Kap Chumchon "Ban Parek" Chadnganwankuensuyao Chaotomyumkung, 2012, August 1 – 15).

Although emigration for working in Malaysia can support the southern economy from collapsing, the Thai government watches out this situation with suspicion. The government believes that some migrant workers may have close links with insurgent groups and business owners in Malaysia who may be financial supporters in causing violent incidents. They suspect that of the Malay Muslims' restaurants are armories as well as shelters for militants who escape to Malaysia after launching attacks (Suthep Steps up Security after Attacks, 2011, February 5).

The worry about cross border workers, especially owners of Tomyam restaurants, as related to the current insurgency appeared on November 21, 2006. When the former Prime Minister General Surayut told mass media clearly that Tomyam restaurants were financial aid sources for the Malay Muslim militants to operate the insurgencies in southern Thailand (Chak 'Disease' Tueng 'Faitai', 2006, December 25). After that, cross border workers have gotten a lot of attention from Thai government and Thai media that have never happened before. Shortly after the press release of the former Prime Minister General Surayut, "Intelligence officers usually search news

and follow the movement of members of separatist groups closely" (Interview with a Police Lieutenant Colonel, 2013, December 6).

However, in recent years, the attitudes towards cross border workers in Tomyam restaurant businesses changed a lot when Yingluck Shinawatra became the Prime Minister (since 2011). At that time, several agencies of the Thai government listened to problems of workers and owners of Tomyam restaurants in Malaysia and helped them closely. The Representatives of the Malay Muslims' restaurant businesses had a chance to meet representatives of the Thai government, including the former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra during their visit to Malaysia on February 28, 2013. Entrepreneurs of Tomyam restaurants also got the coordination from the SBPAC and the Royal Thai Embassy in Kuala Lumpur to organize the Thai Tomyam Club. Instead of being an informal network in order to be an organization to operate activities with representatives of the Thai government and to be a channel for communicating with the cross border workers (Sor Nor Ror Malay Prachumklumrantomyam, 2011, October 27).

In the late 2012, the SBPAC cooperated with the Thai Tomyam Club and opened a non-formal education center for workers and their families in Kuala Lumpur. The SBPAC provided a bank loan as a source of finance from the Islamic Bank of Thailand to support restaurant entrepreneurs. In October 2013, the SBPAC opened a new office in Kuala Lumpur in order to aid the migrant workers and to improve the standards of Malay Muslims' restaurants. The SBPAC's office also served as a learning center to provide training in Thai cooking and Thai language for the migrant

workers and children of the restaurant owners (SBPAC Opens a New Office in Kuala Lumpur, 2013, October).

The important identity and selling point of the Malay Muslims' restaurants in Malaysia are Thai-ness. The attractive menu of the Malay Muslim's restaurants being popular among customers is a Thai dish, which is Tomyam. Spicy and sour soup is not a menu of the Malay Muslims but being an original Thai style food. When consideration about the naming, architecture and interior design of Tomyam restaurants, particularly big restaurants in Kuala Lumpur, it presents that owners try to name and decorate their restaurants in order to show Thai-ness, including building a value that Thai food has to be cooked by the Malay Muslim chefs.

According to Suttiporn Bunmak (2011, January – April), migrant workers can make the connection between the rural and urban economy of southern Thailand as well as their neighboring countries. He identified networks from both interpersonal relationship and groups of migrant workers based on the community origin, including expanding to other networks such as the Thai Muslims and Malaysian. It is clear that working abroad can make a lot more money than working in their hometown. Moreover, their experiences as cross border workers, especially workers in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, or other metropolises could have an influence on their worldview and cognitive orientation. It has made them question their status as migrant workers and illegal immigrants being that do not have any citizen rights in the second country. In addition, they question about their status as second-class citizens in their homeland.

180

This phenomenon may be reasonable when considering an interesting explanation about change in the rural areas in the northeastern region of Thailand studied by an American anthropologist, Professor Charles F. Keyes (2009). Keyes explains this issue to present the change of the rural society in villages in northeastern region of Thailand and changing the identity of the northeastern villagers toward the cosmopolitan villagers. In addition, he makes a link to show mass movement known as the Red Shirt being a movement that most of members are villagers in rural areas in northeastern region. The Red Shirt movement is usually condemned as lower class that is poor and loyal to Thaksin Shinnawatra's money. However, when considering seriously, the Red Shirt is a group that driven by grievance toward socio-economic inequality and political rights that they compare with elite and middle class people who live in Bangkok.

The study revealed that deep involvement in the capitalist economy changed rural society very much. One could not see that villagers were only the poor who remained deeply rooted in their cultural traditions of the rural areas. On the other hand, the rural society linked their outside experiences with villages. Such change came from their experiences with the real world and everyday life of migrant workers who moved from rural areas to work in metropolitans. This situation made them become the so called cosmopolitan villagers, who were aware of their power and ready to raise their voices against the problems between their communities and those who hold power in power relationship (Keyes, 2009).

5.3.3 Smuggling and Illegal trade

As the borderland, southern Thailand is not only a threshold for local people across the border in order to look for better economic opportunity in Malaysia, but it is also an area of international trade. That includes exports and import between Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore, and other neighboring countries. Specifically, border trade between Thailand and Malaysia in 2012 totaled up to 5,923.50 million Baht or 65 percent of the total value of international trade in goods. According to total value of border trade, Thailand's exports reached 303,019.50 million Baht while imports from Malaysia were about 212,904 million Baht. When considering official trade figure, Thailand gained a trade surplus about 90,115 million Baht (Office of International Trade Promotion in Kuala Lumpur, 2013, June).

The economic activities between Thailand and Malaysia have not only official border trade through customs formalities, but there is illegal smuggling across the Malaysia-Thailand border hidden from official view or not reported to the tax authorities in high proportion. In southern Thailand, these activities include smuggling rice, fruits, and consumer products, including drug trafficking across the border into Malaysia. Simultaneously, consumer products, cigarette and alcoholic beverages, and oil or fuel have been illegally imported from Malaysia across the border into Thailand.

In fact, illegal smuggling is a part of economic activities in several borderlands because the borderland often opens the opportunity for expansion of illegal smuggling in large or small-scale trade as some scholars explain as follows:

Whenever prosperity along the border differs leading to considerable price differences in the adjacent countries, the border may be used as an economic resource by inhabitants living nearby. Smuggling cigarettes, alcohol and fuel, illegal drugs and pharmaceuticals or the – at first glance – legal transport of commodities such as clothing or electronic devices: trading activities as the above mentioned often compensate for economic shortages that many households suffer from in consequence of difficult external conditions caused e.g. by economic crises or political transformation processes. Therefore, transborder small-scale trade and smuggling are possibilities to cope with stressful periods of biographic transition such as unemployment and poverty. At the same time, transborder small-scale trade and smuggling are an everyday border phenomenon which is part of the normal routine at many borders (Bruns & Miggelbrink, 2012, p. 11).

Though smuggling across the border is normal phenomena in the borderlands, a condition of violence caused by illegal smuggling problems depends on the capacity of the government to enforce laws (Andreas, 2013). The ongoing incidents in southern Thailand have opened a flaw for unlawful activities more easily. However, a perspective on the problem of illegal smugglings of local people is different from the Thai government's one at least about what the most serious problem is.

Among problems of all illegal border trades, the most concern of the Thai government is oil smuggling activities blamed for frequently relating to the uncertain situation in the South. A report presented that Thai police officers had evidence that the oil smugglers were Malay Muslims who supported insurgent groups or were commanded to fight against the Thai government. Besides, according to some reports, some networks of oil smuggler groups are financial supporters of the BRN-Coordinate (Kanpuantai 'Nainar' Yai Chaitaitoekhonnammantuen. 2008, May 20; Chi-kabuankarnnammantuenchuy 'Chontai', 2011, August 30; Loe-ngen, 2013, March 22; RKK – Gang Nammantuen Puantai, 2014, January 11).

Oil smuggling has been widespread in southern Thailand for a long time as other illegal products from neighbor countries have lower prices. Later, the price of gasoline and diesel in Thailand has increased very much since 2007. Therefore, this situation makes the price of oil in Thailand more different from ones of the neighbor countries. Certainly oil smuggling across the border happens more than in the past. Nowadays, the oil smuggling becomes the first illegal imported product, which has quantity up to 1-3 million liters per day (Loe-ngen, 2013, March 22; Maneepiluek, 2010, August 12).

There are two main groups of oil smugglers. The first group is a large-scale smuggling network of the major Chinese businesspersons in Pattani province and the network of local and national Thai Buddhist politicians in Songkla province. This group transports illegal oil by boats in the Thai gulf, continuing by hundreds of vehicles through the customs posts at the Thailand – Malaysia border to sell in the areas and outside area, including the Central region. The second group is a small-scale smuggling operation where the Malay Muslims transport illegal oil across the border as an ant army. They link their activities with the minor businesses in communities (Nammantuen Talak Chaidantai, 2007, October 30; Soonkhaopaktai, 2008, April 29).

In the opinions of most people as well as mass media there is a belief that the illegal smuggling in southern Thailand relates to corruption, which is a deep-rooted problem in Thai bureaucracy. Especially, the transparency of authorities in several agencies who are responsible for prevention and suppression as well as illegal trade, including security forces, both the army and the police, in the areas that have

checkpoints located in the main roads and minor roads. Actually, the asking for bribes or other things from smugglers has been common to Thai officers who perform duty in southern Thailand for a long time. Some police in Investigation and Suppression Section in the area accepted, "The amount of interests from oil smugglings was money and these interests were not only limited for the officers in the region, but they were also sent to their commanding officers in Bangkok as well" (Interview with a Police Lieutenant, 2014, March 3).

The ongoing illegal trade problem in southern Thailand is not the result of the corruption of Thai officers only. A senior excise officer who was responsible for the suppression of the oil smuggling accepted that he avoided arresting any person participating in oil smuggling activities because oil smugglers who were the Malay Muslims were not involved in insurgency groups as he explained, "They are not insurgents. They are merely businesspersons. Some people have to struggle to get enough incomes to look after their families during the unrest situation. So, we often let them continue to do their small business" (Interview with a senior excise officer, 2013, October 9).

The oil smuggling has seriously affected business operations of the oil companies and the Thai government has to lose a lot of tax-revenue from legal oil trades as neighboring countries lose benefits in the subsidy budget for the support of the domestic oil price (Maneepiluek, 2007, October 2). Moreover, smuggling is not just about the mechanics of the illicit trade that involves the market exchange, supply and demand, but it can also make a lot of money for members in the networks of oil smugglers. This underground economic activity has an important role to support the

185

local economy and builds connection and network of socio-economic power for people in the borderland (Andreas, 2013; Rovner, 2008).

Some of the Malay Muslims generally think that the smuggling of goods helps reduce their cost of living. Besides, some of them think the boundaries between legitimacy and illegitimacy while engaging in smuggling activities are blurring. Then, there are the reinterpretation and redefinitions about the ethics of smuggling activities and the underground goods consumption by rejecting legal sense. They are viewing that smuggling activities and underground goods consumption are prohibited and unlawful. Moreover, these activities present a practice of resistance against the Thai government. As Chokchai Wongtani, a lecturer in the peace studies center of Prince of Songkla University revealed the fact that "Some of the Malay Muslims intellectuals claimed that the government lacks the legitimate rule over local people, so it should not have any authority to collect tax" (Interview with Chokchai Wongtani, 2013, August 22).

Interestingly, the local people usually think that drug trafficking is the most serious problem for Malay Muslims. A survey of attitudes of the population found that they thought that the five important problems in their community were the drug trafficking, unemployment, insurgency, poverty, and having no productive land, respectively (The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), 2013: 37). A headmaster of a private Islamic school in Pattani province is concerned that drugs are harmful to the young Malay Muslims who are the mainspring of the Malay Muslim community onwards (Interview with Kamal Abdulwahab, 2013, October 10).

186

The amphetamine, an important drug, is usually smuggled across the Thai border from neighboring countries (i.e. Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia) to the Northern and Northeastern regions of Thailand and continuing to the central and southern regions. Moreover, some cough syrup trafficking is transported to southern Thailand for being an ingredient in the local narcotic cocktail drink known as the "4 x 100" which is a widespread drug among the young Malay Muslims. The shipment of drugs to southern Thailand is not easy, but it can be possible. A senior national intelligence officer accepted, "Some drugs are sold in areas because some Thai officers connive with drug trafficking and cooperate with influential Malay Muslims in areas. Most Thai authorities in these areas are not worried about the link between the drug problem and insurgencies. That is an internal security issue. According to the credible saying of an unarmed security officer, the drug problem is just the act of common criminals that is not a real insurgency problem" (Interview with Charnpich Attajak, 2013, October 1).

5.4 Chapter Summary

In conclusion, the extreme imbalance in socio-economic status between the the Thai government and the Malay Muslims provides the rational for the structural asymmetry. In order to promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims, the Thai government gave a lot of budgets. However, the efforts of government with stronger socio-economic power to solve problems cannot be successful. It is obvious that the Thai government cannot return justice to the Malay Muslims affected by abuse of power of Thai authorities. Including the government cannot solve the problem of quality of life, poverty, and socio-economic disparity between the Malay

187

Muslims and the Thai Buddhists, who live inside and outside the region. On the Malay Muslims side, they are the weaker in the structural asymmetry of socio-economic power relationships. To survive from the unrest situation, hundreds of thousands of the Malay Muslims become cross-border workers in Malaysia that most population has shared identities. While some join with illegal trade and smuggling from their neighbor country. These underground activities also undermine socio-economic power of the Thai government at the same time. In addition, there are protagonists differ of objectives and strategies of the Thai government and the Malay Muslims that cannot be quickly fixed. In the following chapter, the findings related to the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims and their impact to the conflict in southern Thailand should examine and synthesize.

CHAPTER SIX
SYNTHESIZING THEORIES AND PRACTICS OF POWER RELATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter synthesizes the theories and practices of the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. In examining the asymmetry of power relations between the conflict parties in the region, this study uses applies or utilizes asymmetry theory and other related theories namely the RAM theory, and strategic interaction theory which are useful in explaining the conflict transformation and the outcome of the asymmetric conflict between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand.

6.2 Asymmetric Interaction

In previous chapters, the researcher uses an analytical approach to present the asymmetric power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. It relies on political power, military power, and socio-economic power which are contributing factors of the current asymmetric conflict in southern Thailand. According to Womack (2006) and Stepanova (2008), the explanation of asymmetric conflict prioritize power disparities based on quantifiable parameters, which are political, military, and economic relations between the two sides, a strong and a weak actors. It is worth to note that, in the case of an asymmetric conflict in southern Thailand, the Thai government is the strong actor and the Malay Muslims is the weak actor. This section looks into the strategic interaction among the Thai

189

government (party A) and the Malay Muslims (party B). In this part, the study will consider the details of two aspects of strategic interaction – the goals and objectives, and strategies and tactics, as follows.

6.2.1 Goals and Objectives

An actor has goals and objectives derived from its understanding of its security and interests, the attainment of which is supposed to eliminate the strategic problems that pose a threat to these security and interests (Allison, 1971). With particular focus on the asymmetric power relations in southern Thailand, there are three aspects of goals and objectives of the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, which are the political goal, military goal, and socio-economic goal. In the first one, Thai government, as a rational unitary actor, has presented its strategic goals as followed.

Politically, the goal of the Thai government is to win the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims. Since the insurgencies erupted in the early of 2004, the Thai government has perceived as a serious threat to the legitimacy of the government and the national security as a whole, which is the most important goal of the government's agenda. The Thai government has used political power with implementing the non-violence or the peaceful means that is one of the measures in order to end the Malay Muslims resistance against the government. The ultimate goal of using political power is to win the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims by promote the participation of the Malay Muslims in the southern administration that, in the past, was criticized for not allowing the local Malay Muslims to participate in

governance processes. Besides, the southern administration was strongly centralized to the political authorities in Bangkok.

Evidently, it can be seen from various security policies for resolving the conflict in southern Thailand. For example, the Executive Order No. 68/2547 titled the Peace Building Policy in three Southern Border Provinces was signed on March 24, 2004. The objective is to end the insurgency rapidly and thereby to improve an environment for political, social and economic development within three years. Other similarly, Executive Order No. 260/2547 titled the Policy and Administration for Peace Building in Southern Border Provinces was signed on October 4, 2004 to enhance the administration to be having a character of integration, unity, and strength.

In March 2005, there are other related policies recommended by the NRC which was appointed by the government for formulating policies to address the concern of the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. Especially, the Executive Order No. 206/2549 titled the Peace Building Policy in Southern Border Provinces signed on October 30, 2006 is well known as Policy 206. Its main objective is "the restoration of peace and order in the SBPs by eliminating conditions associated with using violence and, conversely, promoting environment for all sectors' participation to construct reconciliation and justice that support development and sustainable peace." In line with this, this policy lays out an approach of conflicts in the area that "insurgencies in the Southern Border Provinces have complex issues and link to various aspects/dimensions. However, the real root cause comes from a demand for participation."

191

Militarily, the objective of the Thai government is to restore peace, stability, and security in the region. It aims to restore internal security and safety of the population as well as the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This ultimate goal presented in various government policies, particularly the Executive Order No. 68/2547 titled the Peace Building Policy in the Three Southern Border Provinces signed on March 24, 2004, and the government states that ending the conflict in southern region permanently is its imperative mission for national security. Moreover, the National Security Policy (2007 – 2011), offered by the NSC, pursued two priorities – internal security and stability as well as protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In 2007, the Thai government enacted a national security policy, which emphasized:

> The National Security policy is the national policy aiming to make available environment and circumstance of peace, to have immunity against problems to identify benefits and drawbacks that affect state and people's security, and to solve the root causes of threats for sustainable security, including making Thailand's developments in all aspects run smoothly. As a matter of policy, public and private sectors together with social sectors must give priority to it and use it as the framework for creating plans and projects within the mission related to security and to serve national interests in accordance with harmony and unity (National Security Policy, 2007 – 2011).

With respect to socio-economic goals, the Thai government aims to promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims. The Thai government is aware that the lack of socio-economic development in southern Thailand is a fundamental cause of the intensive insurgency in recent years. Moreover, the continuing conflict widens social and economic disparities in the region. Therefore, this has led to a growing grievance among the Malay Muslims against the Thai government. The ultimate goal of using socio-economic power set by the Thai government is to build equality focused on

192

socio-economic development programs for improving the quality of life, reducing poverty, and eliminating grievance of the Malay Muslims. According to the correct goal, the government believes that the insurgency in southern Thailand will be finally ended.

Second, on behalf of the Malay Muslims side, establishing an independent state has been the ultimate goal of the Malay Muslim separatist for many decades. However, objective to achieve an autonomous separate state may cause disagreement among sections of the Malay Muslims community which could not count on them as a unitary actor. However, based on one researcher's observation, it seems that the goal of the Malay Muslims is unclear. As stated by Wan Kadir Che Man, a Malay Muslim preeminent scholar and political activist, the goals of the Malay Muslim struggle are different in three aspects:

> Firstly, it aims to separate the Southern apart from Thailand to establish the independent Malay Muslim state that bases on Islamic and democratic doctrines. The state must be ruled by only Malay Muslims whether the ideas of government are republic or kingdom state. Secondly, the struggle is to achieve the status of local administration that can be self-determination without external interference. Lastly, if Malay Muslims cannot achieve any goals as mentioned above, they will fight to maintain their identity of Malay Muslims and protect the status of majority of Malay Muslim population in its own region (Che Man, 2004).

Even though it cannot know for sure how most Malay Muslims think about the three goals as mentioned earlier, it can briefly conclude that some degree of autonomy is a common goal of all of the sectors of the Malay Muslim community. At present, some scholars notice that the calling for autonomy and the special administrative zone that conform to cultural identity of local people is being accepted and gets more an open discussion among the Malay Muslims (Panjor, 2013, January – March).

193

6.2.2 Strategies and Tactics

The strategic interaction theory suggests that strategy is the action refers to an actor's plan to achieve its objectives. Therefore, the strategies should incorporate an actor's understanding about the relative values of its goals and objectives. As Arreguín-Toft states clearly that, "strategy should be distinguished from two closely related terms: grand strategy and tactic" (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p.30). However, strategies are not simply pieces of papers or documents but are ways of thinking about how one's organization works (Cohen, 1988). Thus, political strategies are well-designed political plans in an effort to promote and advance the political interest of any organization (Taya, 2007). According to Arrequin-Toft, "Grand strategy refers to the totality of an actor's resources directed toward military, political, economic, or other objectives. Tactic refers to the art of fighting battles… and it (tactic) all describes different points on a continuum of a given actor's means toward a single end: compelling another to do its will" (Arreguín-Toft, 2005, p. 30).

In this section, the researcher presents the strategies and tactics of the Thai government and the Malay Muslims to achieve its goals. It relies on the political, military, and socio-economic power relations as follows.

6.2.2.1 Political Strategies and Tactics

As pointed out earlier, the major political goal of the Thai government is to win the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims. The Thai government believes that these strategic goals can be achieved through enhancing a genuine political participation of the Malay Muslims in Thailand's mainstream body politic, in general, and, in

194

southern Thailand, in particular. Therefore, to win the trust and confidence of the latter, the former has to formulate or design a range of just, lasting, but workable strategies that would address the concerns and grievances of the people in the region.

Indeed, if we look at the political strategies of the Thai government, it is clear that it has used several methods in addressing the conflict in southern Thailand. For instance, on 30 April 2002, then Prime Minister Thaksin issued an Executive Order No. 123/2545 that abolished the SBPAC and put all those provinces (under the SBPAC) under the direct supervision/authority of the Thai Interior Ministry. However, Thaksin's administration failed to stop the violence in the region. It even increased the intensity of the conflict. Thus, this clearly reinforces the idea of the necessity of a new organization to be a center of the Southern administration to counter the growing intensity of current violence caused by the insurgency since January 2004. The most interesting strategy was the setting up the new agency of southern administration namely the SBPPBC. It was operating directly under the Prime Minister, and established by the Executive Order No. 68/2547 titled the Peace Building Policy in three Southern Border Provinces signed on March 24, 2004. This policy referred to His Majesty King Phumibon speech that delivered to the Prime Minister on February 23, 2004. This is guidance for the southern problem solutions which well known as the grand strategy following the King's idea "Understand, Reach out, and Develop."

Later, the Prime Minister's office under Thaksin's watch issued Executive Order No. 104/2548 signed on March 28, 2005 which formed an independent body namely, the NRC headed by the then former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun. The NRC was

assigned to search the truth of ongoing violence occurring in southern Thailand, and to make policy recommendations for the government of how to build a trust between the Malay Muslims and state officials. The report of the NRC was introduced to the public in a year after; it reflects how the Thai government lacked an effective channel for cooperation and communication between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. By this reason, the junta administration after the 2006 coup d'état led by then former Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont introduced the Executive Order No. 207/2549 to reestablish SBPAC, which had been abolished since 2003, to play an important role to end the southern problem. Up to December 30, 2010, the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act, 2010 (B.E. 2553) was issued. This bill stipulates the present-day model of SBPAC as the specific bureaucratic form that is under the Southern Cabinet (SBPDSC) head by the Prime Minister. The new SBPAC structure also enhancing the participation of people with establishing the advisory council of SBPAC comprises of 49 members who have functional representation based on the economic and social groups of communities in the region.

With respect to the Malay Muslims side, it could be said that throughout a decade of deadly asymmetric conflicts most of the Malay Muslims have not rejected any of the political process. At the level of national politics, they express their strong political will to participate in the elections by going to the polls in order to vote for their national politicians. As mentioned in the previous chapter the number of eligible voters in general elections since 2001 and the average of percentage of the Malay Muslims voter is higher than the overall average of the country. In the period of the

196

southern conflict, Thailand has faced the problem in democratization, which results from the political conflict in the country. For this reason, the cessation of electoral democracy occurred after the 2006 coup d'état is obstructing the active participation of the Malay Muslims.

It is clear that the Malay Muslims have accepted the process of democratization through election in southern Thailand. Tuan Guru Haji Ismail Sepanjang, a well-known local religious leader, explained that some principles of democracy such as human equality and justice were in accord with Islamic values. The election was the process that did not contrast with the principles of Islam. On the other hand, it was necessary for the Malay Muslim community (Yahprung, 2011, July – December). Similarly, Abdullah Abru, an associate professor of the College of Islamic Studies, Prince of Songkla University in Pattani campus and a member of the Islamic Council of Pattani Province to express his opinion that "The Malay Muslims agreed with the election because it was the process through which they could elect their representatives to inform the government of their problems. Although democratic principles were not entirely correct, it was possible that the morality of Islam could support free and fair elections and the Malay Muslims used it to force the government to respond people's needs more and more" (Interview with Abdullah Abru, 2014, March 13).

McCargo (2008) points out that the Malay Muslims have also less opportunity to participation in the Thai bureaucracy. The southern administration was criticized for being strictly centralized to Bangkok and Malay Muslims who work in positions of Thai bureaucratic system get very much less. While a lot of public servants are Thai

197

Buddhists. The implications of continued insurgency have led to discussion of problems of the strong centralization of the Thai government. It brings about the movements of self-determination in order to build a special type of local administration. There are two main local administration models proposals to change the local administration in southern Thailand. First is the Three Nakorn (three cities) which composes of two models – the Three Nakorn, Two Levels and the Three Nakorn, One Level. Second is the Pattani Mahanakorn (Pattani metropolitan administration). There are two models – the Mahanakorn – Two Levels and Mahanakorn – One Level. The proposals to change the type of local administration in southern Thailand were initiated by several parties with support from the Malay Muslims during this period and were not accepted by the Thai authorities.

It is hopeful that the decentralization that supports people's participation will be able to make the Malay Muslims trust a new type of power relationship between them and the Thai government. Besides, trying to provide a special type of local administration reflects demand for autonomy. Dr. Bukoree Yeema, an associate professor in political science at Songkla Rajabhat University, expressed his opinion that, "Many of the Malay Muslims believe that the Thai government can manage the southern administration to be better by giving opportunity for local people to play an important role in administrative structures, rather than that of bringing the government officials to govern in the area as we have seen at the present" (Interview with Bukoree Yeema, 2013, October 11).

6.2.2.2 Military Strategies and Tactics

The military strategy of the Thai government focuses on using its massive resources to achieve its military goal. Remarkably, facing with a new wave of insurgency the government has returned to use military power for rebuilding peace and order in southern Thailand. As pointed out earlier, the military goal of the Thai government is the restoration of national security in the region. During this period, the army played a very crucial and dominant role in maintaining security in the region. In fact, the national security is closely relevant to the use of military power of the government. In other word, military power is the most important measure to ensure the national security and stability as well as the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Huysmans, 2006).

If we look at the two ideal-types of strategic approaches presented by Arreguin-Toft, he simply implies that there are offense and defense attacks. Perhaps, under this condition, the strategic interactions between the Thai government and the Malay Muslim militants in southern Thailand could situate into Arreguin-Toft's theory of strategic approaches.

Out of 150,350 of the total Thai security armed personnel (i.e. composed of professional military such as soldiers and police, paramilitary forces which include: rangers and VDC and local militias, like VDV and VPV, the Thai government has assigned or deployed more or less numbering 11,189 security personnel that is roughly 7.5 percent who have been policing or enforcing laws in the region against the Malay Muslim militants. In theory, the Thai security armed personnel are under the authority and control of the Thai prime minister, but in practice the Thai army

has de facto control over them. Interestingly, despite absolute control on security laws such as the martial law, the emergency decree, and the ISA, and the army is free of any accountability against them. Therefore, any human rights violations committed by the Thai security armed forces during their policing engagement against the Malay Muslims, the former cannot be disciplined or punished over such violations committed by former. In fact, these situations provide absolute power to security personnel under the army's control to search and detain persons who are suspected of being militants. As a result, the exercise of military power causes a violation of human rights against the Malay Muslims by the army. Indeed, such an atmosphere breeds radicalism among the Malay Muslim community that led to the emergence of the several militant movements in southern Thailand. This situation was also justified to some extent by giving legitimacy to the employment of violent tactics by the Malay Muslim militants against the Thai government.

With respect to the case of the Malay Muslim militants, though there are several militant groups who are operating in the region and fighting against the Thai government's personnel. But it is clear that the BRN-Coordinate has mainly played a very dominant role in their quest for self-determination. The BRN-Coordinate has adopted the guerilla warfare, a method of warfare using hit-and-run tactics, because the militants' organizations are very weak in terms of military strength at the time of the writing of this thesis. Since they cannot confront the military might of the Thai government, the BRN-Coordinate and other militant groups have resorted to violent tactics such bombing, arson and other form of terrorism. Though the Malay Muslim militants have several training camps in the region, more specifically at Budu

200

mountain range (เทือกเขาบูโด), but they did not want to expose to the Thai military. The reason is mainly to avoid any military attack from the Thai military that would disrupt or even destroy the movements' military build-up and other efforts to strengthen their capabilities for their quest for self-determination of the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand.

With this, the BRN-Coordinate and other militant groups deliberately shied away from media attention to avoid military notice on their temporary camps situated at the Budu mountain range and were sometimes ensconced in distant villages. Indeed, at this time, the BRN-Coordinate leadership even adopted a goal that might be acceptable to the Thai government, in general, and the Thai military in particular. For instance, the BRN-Coordinate accepted autonomy as a solution to the problem of the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. This can see from the BRN-Coordinate's five demands:

1. The Thai government must recognize BRN as the only one representative of the "Patani freedom fighter" and accept that BRN is not a separatist movement, but it is a liberation organization to struggle for freedom of the Malay Muslims. Panel members of BRN who participate in the peace dialogue must be given protection by the Thai government.
2. BRN agrees to appoint the Malaysian government as the mediator when the dialogue is upgraded from "peace dialogue" to "peace negotiation" in the near future.
3. At the peace negotiation level, the ASEAN countries, OIC, and NGOs must be allowed to be witness the dialogue.
4. The Thai government should recognize the existence and the sovereignty of Malay Muslims in southern Thailand by confirming that BRN is not demanding territorial separation from Thailand.
5. BRN demands the Thai government to release all detainees and to revoke all warrants of arrest issued to the Malay Muslim militants.

The BRN-Coordinate usually used military strategy to achieve their political goals that, in the short term, forces the Thai government to accept the BRN-Coordinate's

201

status as a core of the insurgent groups. In addition, the BRN-Coordinate employed a military strategy to compel the government to accept demands that would undermine the military might of the Thai government and consequently diminish the effect of its asymmetric power relations towards the militant organizations, in general, and, the BRN-Coordinate, in particular. It seems that the BRN-Coordinate leadership believed that such military tactics would force the stronger Thai government to negotiate peaceful political settlement with the weak militant groups through the assistance of third parties, especially the Malaysian government as a facilitator.

6.2.2.3 Socio-economic Strategies and Tactics

The socio-economic strategy pursued by the Thai government has emphasized the effective usage of its resources to promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims. To achieve the country's desired socio-economic goal, the Thai government has developed a very comprehensive strategy designed to promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims, and, thereby improve the quality of life of the people in the region. By doing so, it can address one of the root causes of the insurgencies that is relative economic deprivation which tends to engender grievances among the Malay Muslim community in southern Thailand.

In particular, the Thai government has two main socio-economic strategies to attain its desired socio-economic goal as pointed out earlier. One, it aims to improve the quality of life of the Malay Muslims by focusing specifically on socio-economic development programs. This can be seen through government's 11 year budget for southern Thailand from 2004 to 2014 that is amounting 208.323 billion Baht. For

202

instance, in 2004 – 2005 budgets, the Thai government allocated more than 27,000 million Baht to government agencies in the area under the southern administrative organization (SBPPBC). The budgets were divided into three categories, namely agenda, function, and area bases. Nevertheless, almost 60 percent was allocated on an agenda base, which focused on maintaining peace and security in the region. While nearly 40 percent was allocated on a function base basically intended for local government offices at provincial level. The remaining less than three percent was used for an area base. It is important to note here that the budget for government officials' salaries, financial compensation, and the supplementary appropriation budgets (such as an agenda base which was much necessary emergency expenditure requested by other agencies during the year) were excluded (The Council of Ministers for Development of Special Zones in Southern Border Provinces, 2009, April, p. 4; Isara News Agency, 2014, January 3).

Other, strategy aims to address the grievances of the Malay Muslims, who are affected by the violence, through giving some financial compensation for the victims of human rights violation committed by the Thai security forces. Through this monetary assistance, the Thai government proudly claimed that they have uplifted the economic status of the people in the region. In this regard, former SBPAC Director Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong argued that the Thai government has never neglected the Malay Muslims. He further claimed that the Thai government is always with them (the Malay Muslims), especially in times of difficulties (Samphat Thawee Sodsong, 2012, February 22).

In general, the NESDB is an agency responsible for policy-making and planning for social and economic development in the country. At the local level, the SBPAC is an agency responsible for the implementation of the national policies in the region. It (SBPAC) works under the NESDB and is responsible for national policy decision-making as pointed out earlier. In practice, however, with its control over the ISOC the army has played a very dominate role in socio-economic development programs (e.g. the sufficiency economy program).

The Thai government believes that by implementing its socio-economic development programs in the area, these will create far-reaching implications in uplifting the socio-economic status of the Malay Muslims in the region, and thereby undermine any support or potential support by the latter for the militant insurgents against the former. However, most of the residents, more specifically, the Malay Muslims have not benefitted from the said programs because of intrinsic and endemic corruption by those regional officials.

In short, though the Malay Muslims are the weaker in the asymmetry of power relationships with the Thai government, they are not powerless at all. The Malay Muslims do not just rely on government payment, but their survival comes from the political geography of the region. It could be argued that the specific political geography of the region as the borderland between Thailand and Malaysia can strengthen socio-economic power of the Malay Muslims. With respect to the strategic interaction of the Malay Muslims, there are two strategies. First, some of the Malay Muslims have become cross-border workers. They have also worked in Malaysia, which is their neighbor country. Second, some of the Malay Muslims

participate in illegal trades and smuggling, including illegal oil trade that was smuggled from Malaysia into Thailand.

6.3 Peace Dialogue Process

Regarding the asymmetry theory, it indicates not only the nature of asymmetric conflict in power relations between two parties, but it also determines the third party's involvement in the conflict. Moreover, the essential role of third parties in many different cases of asymmetric conflict resolution. Importantly, a negotiation process often requires the support of an acceptable third party facilitating the negotiation (Zartman, 2008). Remarkably, the peace dialogue process in the southern Thailand conflict resolution by third party facilitators spread in two further directions. One is through secret diplomacy. First, the Langkawi peace talk in 2005 between the Thai government (under Thaksin's administration) and the insurgents was facilitated by Malaysian NGOs through former Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. This was followed by a series of dialogues held at Langkawi, Malaysia from November 2005 to February 2006, which was participated in by Thai security officers as well as leaders of BERSATU, BRN-Coordinate, GMP, and PULO. Discussions between both parties were held, but no progress made. The militant insurgents put forward a proposal, but it was rejected by the Thai government. With this, in February 2006, leaders of four separatist groups signed a petition letter indicating that the Thai government did not response to their proposal.

Second, in 2007, the international NGOs namely the Henri Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) used to be a coordinator in the peace dialogue

between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) during 1999 – 2002. The HDC was a facilitator that sets the first meeting between the leader of the Thai government and the leaders of the Malay Muslim separatist groups that were BRN-Coordinate and PULO. The secret peace dialogue happened during formal visits in Bahrain of former Prime Minister General Surayut Chulanon on December 10-12, 2007 (Boyce, 2007, December 16).

Third, after the 2007 general election, the PPP supported by Thaksin Shinawatra won the election and Mr. Samak Sundaravej became the Prime Minister in the early of 2008. The peace dialogue organized by the HDC occurred again in Jakarta, Indonesia on March 27-28, 2008 (John, 2008, April 10; Morrow, 2008, April 18). The representatives of the Thai government participated in the peace dialogue with leaders of separatist groups led by Lieutenant General Suraphol Phoen-aiyaka, Secretary-General of the National Security Council (NSC). This was followed by three peace talks in Indonesia, i.e. one time in Bali and two times in Jakarta in August – September 2008. It seemed that for the first meeting, the separatist demanded the Thai government show trustworthiness by amnestying some security detainees. However, there was no response from the government (Morrow, 2009, September 5; Entwistle, 2008, September 17; Entwistle, 2008, September 22).

Additionally, during this time the OIC and the Indonesian government tried to play an important role as a moderator who set up the secret dialogues between the Thai government and the Malay Muslim insurgent groups. On September 20 – 21, 2008, there was the secret peace dialogue at Bogor located in the South of Jakarta. The Indonesian government played a very important role as a facilitator. The public

206

statement of the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's representative stated that the representative of the conflicting parties achieved the agreement in the broad frame for the economic development. It is focusing on local people's demands and acceptance of diversity on cultural identity while being together under the territorial integrity of Thailand (Entwistle, 2008, September 22). Furthermore, the conflicting parties got an impression that the Indonesian government could play an important role as facilitator for the next two peace dialogues on November 2008 (Novak, 2008, September 22).

Fourth, after the DP formed a coalition government with the support of the army in December 2008. In July 2009, former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiwa began to resurrect a peace dialogue process again with coordination and support of the HDC. Until December 2009, the peace dialogue between the Thai government and BRN-Coordinate and PULO facilitated by HDC occurred in Manila, Philippines (Morrow, 2009, November 13; Griffiths, 2009, December 16).

Meanwhile, the Thai government endeavored to persuade the Malaysian government to act as a mediator in the existing conflict. Earlier, the dialogue in Bahrain, the former Prime Minister General Surayut tried to convince the separatist groups to accept the Malaysian government as the third party participating in solving the problem, but the separatist leaders rejected the Malaysian involvement that time. Later, on December 8 – 9, 2009, the Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak visited Thailand by the invitation of the Thai government. During this time, he met former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and discussed the approach to resolve the southern problem, including travelling to southern Thailand together. Moreover, the Thai

government invited the Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak to visit southern Thailand in December 2009 (Nualpian, 2013, July – September).

Then there is open diplomacy. This type of peace dialogue can be observed through the Thai government's effort to bring in Malaysia as a third party facilitator in resolving the conflict in southern Thailand. This method has gained momentum when the latter responded positively upon the request of the former to be a facilitator of the peace negotiation between the Thai government and the militant insurgents. Although the Pheu Thai Party lost all seats in the south in 2011 general election, it won in overall result of the Thai 2011 general election and, thereby Thaksin's youngest sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, became the Prime Minister. Thaksin Shinawatra and his working party saw a window to strike a peace deal with the separatist movement with Malaysia's full cooperation. In January 2012, the secret meeting between Thaksin Shinawatra and Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak was set. During the next month, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra visited Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and met Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak officially. Additionally, the meeting between Thaksin Shinawatra and 17 leaders of separatist groups was scheduled in March (Chalermsripinyorat, 2013, January – June).

On February 28, 2013, the Malaysian government played a role as a facilitator in the open initial peace dialogue process between the representatives of the Thai government and the BRN-Coordinate. The peace dialogue was held in Kuala Lumpur, which consequently led to the signing of the General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process. This vital document was signed by Lieutenant General Paradorn Pattanathabut, Secretary-General of the NSC of Thailand referred to as party A.

Alongside, Ustaz Hassan Taiba, the leader of the BRN-Coordinate who claimed to be the representative of the BRN referred to as party B. In the meantime, Datuk Mohamed Thajudeen bin Abdul Wahab, the Secretary-General of the NSC of Malaysia was referred to as the third party. On July 12, 2013, the Malaysian facilitator announced that the dialogue led to a common understanding that both parties agreed, "To demonstrate the sincerity, commitment and seriousness of both sides in finding solutions" and would endeavor to reduce violence through declaring a ceasefire for 40-day period. It covered the holy month of Ramadan, from July 10 to August 18, 2013 (Jitpiromsri, 2014, July 25; Jitpiromsri & Engvall, 2013, September 9; Chalermsripinyorat, 2013, June 19; Fears of a 'false calm' in the South, 2013, June 14).

The progress of the peace initiative process in 2013 has not only resulted from the role of the Malaysian government as the third party in the conflict, but it also came from the adjustment of the internal security policy of the Thai government. In 2012, the NSC proposed the Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Policy, 2012 – 2014 which held the principle of the peaceful means and maintained the policy of politics ahead of military to build the participation process and promote the Malay Muslims' trust in the administration of the Thai government. The new administrative policy has an objective that aims to build up circumstances promoting peace talks as the process of conflict management and guaranteeing participation of all stakeholders in the peace process. There is another objective, which aims to gain foreign support and take a role to help to set a solution for the problems. Therefore, this objective leads to accepting the role of the Malaysian government as the

209

facilitator of the 2013 peace dialogue process (The Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Policy, 2012 – 2014, n.d.; The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), 2013).

The formal peace process gained widespread support from both domestic and international communities. It also got attention from both domestic and foreign mass media. As a result, the Thai government's propaganda seems to have achieved its goals as a promoter of peace and development for its people, especially in southern Thailand. However, the Thai government shied away from the BRN-Coordinate's five demands (which the organization considered as the core of the issues) as pointed out earlier. As a result, the BRN-Coordinate used alternative media such video-sharing website that was YouTube to make known their demands to the public (Nilapat & Chalermsripinyorat, 2013). For instance, on April 26, 2013 Ustaz Hassan Taiband Abdul KarimKhalib (a representative of the BRN-Coordinate) posted a video clip in YouTube named "Pengistiharan Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani. He presented the "five demands" that was the standpoint of BRN-Coordinate for participating in the peace dialogue process with the Thai government (YouTube, 2013, April 26).

Since the five demands of BRN-Coordinate were announced through YouTube in the Malay language and translated into the Thai language by scholars and media in several versions. Therefore, there was confusion in interpretation (Wongtani, 2013, July – September). Until September 2013, the Malaysian facilitator submitted a secret document proposed by the BRN-Coordinate to the Thai government. This document gave more details of the five demands and set preconditions for the peace

210

process on behalf of the BRN-Coordinate (Shintaro, 2013, October 6; BRN demands need studying, 2013, October 7; Peungnetr, 2013, September 17).

If we look at the demands of the militant insurgent, it is understood that the BRN-Coordinate wanted to maintain its status as the leader of representative in the peace negotiation with the Thai government. Meanwhile, it also wanted to address the contentious issues surrounding the peace negotiation. If these demands considered then, the BRN-Coordinate will be recognized as a sole and legitimate representative of the Malay Muslims in their quest for self-determination. This situation will give the BRN-Coordinate equal footing in relation to the Thai government and the Malaysian government. The BRN-Coordinate can also change the southern issue from a domestic issue to an international one, which can help to balance their asymmetric relations with the strong Thai government.

In addition, the secret document identifies an offer of return for each demand if the Thai government accepts them. Some offers of return proposed by it are for example, that they will stop attacking soft targets and economic targets and stop attacking soldiers and police who work as teachers' safeguards. They also commit to a ceasefire in some selected areas, and they will fully stop military operations of the Malay Muslim militants and so forth (Peungnetr, 2013, September 17).

Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Associate Professor in political science of Prince of Songkla University, Pattani campus and a member of the Thai negotiating team believes that, "The important issue that the BRN-Coordinate emphasizes is that it does not want to separate the southern region apart from Thailand. Such demand is a claim of

211

sovereignty of the Malay Muslims over southern Thailand. That is the same as rights and freedom of Thai citizens and consistent with the constitution of Thailand. It wants the Thai government to accept these demands in principle and make them become a national agenda in the parliament" (Interview with Jitpiromsri, 2014, March 13).

Nevertheless, the peace initiative halted after these offers because the Yingluck Shinawatra's administration was faced with a legitimacy crisis over a proposed amnesty law in 2013 that aimed to release all political prisoners. But Yingluk's opponents believed that the law mainly intended to legally free her brother, former Prime Minister Thaksin, who has been in self-imposed exile since his removal as Prime Minister in 2006. They (Yingluk's opponents) believed the amnesty law proposed by the Yingluk's administration would pave the way to Thaksin's return from exile into the country. This political instability has far-reaching implications to the peace process. In fact, it has stopped completely when Thai politics fall into political turmoil. Finally, on May 22, 2014, the Thai army conducted the coup d'état and formed National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to rule the country.

There are some critics about discontinuous democratization and political turmoil in Thailand, which make for uncertainty for the future of the country. It causes negative effects for resolving the southern conflict by reducing trust in the peace dialogue process. These blocks the will of the BRN-Coordinate showing in the last proposal that they want their demands presented through the Malaysian government and have the national agenda brought into the proceeding by the parliament. There is a good sight when the junta government still gives precedence to the Malaysian government

as a facilitator who is influential in some separatist groups' decisions. That could be seen on December 1, 2014, when General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister and head of the NCPO, visited Datuk Seri NajibRazak, the Prime Minister of Malaysia consulted with each other to push the peace dialogue process in the next round.

6.4 Chapter Summary

In conclusion, this chapter synthesizes the theories and practices of the asymmetric power relations with particular application on the asymmetric relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. It concludes that identification of the asymmetric interaction is proved to be the most useful method in explaining the asymmetry of power relations in this conflict. There are three main goals of the Thai government which are to win the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims, restore the national security, and promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims. They relate to political, military, and socio-economic goals. However, the various strategies of the Thai government to achieve these goals are not very effective. While an ultimate goal of Malay Muslims is to achieve some degree of autonomy. With regard to the peace dialogue process, third parties play a very important role in the conflict resolution. There have been some positive conditions supporting the progress of the peace process. This is true when both the Thai government and the Malay Muslims accept the role of the Malaysian government as a facilitator. Nevertheless, the opently peace process has been halted by an existing political crisis in the country which caused political instability and led to the 2014 coup d'état by the army.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS

The overriding purpose of this study is to determine the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims as well as its impacts on the conflict in southern Thailand during the period 2004 - 2013. This study uses the combined theories of asymmetry to examine the power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, with particular focus on its implications on the asymmetry of power relations among the conflict parties in the region. This theoretical framework focused on the three aspects of asymmetry of power relations that included political power, military power, and socio-economic power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. The data for this study comes from both primary and secondary sources. They are analyzed using qualitative methods. The primary sources include documents, press release, security policies, speeches, and official correspondences of both conflict parties. Interviews with knowledgeable people, prominent political and/or religious leaders, as well as key stakeholders are also conducted. The secondary sources included books, journal articles, newspaper and reliable websites relating to the asymmetric conflict in southern Thailand.

The study try to provide answers to the following questions: How the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims since 2004 aided insurgencies in southern Thailand? What are the impacts of the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims on the conflict in southern Thailand since 2004? Has the Thai government responded to the conflict

in southern Thailand effectively? In addition, how can the best approach and recommendations resolve the conflict in southern Thailand? In responding to the research questions, the researcher synthesizes the empirical findings to answer the study's four research questions as follows:

First, insurgencies of the Malay Muslims had occurred for decades but the recent outbreak of insurgencies is difference from the past. The study does not conclude that identity issues are mainly cause of the recent conflict. The findings from the previous chapters show that the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims aided the insurgencies in southern Thailand since 2004 in several aspects. The insurgencies in southern Thailand originated from the conflict in the asymmetry powe relations between parties, the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. It reveals that the insurgency is a reaction of the Malay Muslim militants in order to change the status of the asymmetry power relations by amend struggle against their adversary; Thai government wants to avoid the change by any means. This is not only causes from military power relations among the conflict parties but also grounds in the extream imbalance of political and socio-economic power relations.

The study shows that the extreme imbalance in political and socio-economic statuses between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims provide the rational for the structural asymmetry. Typically, the structural asymmetry often possibly produces such situations as insurgency. The findings show that the extream imbalance of political power relations between parties, the Thai government and the Malay Muslims, reflects the structural asymmetry. The Thai government is very strong

215

because Thailand is a unitary state that is highly centralized by the central authority in Bangkok. Such strength becomes the important cause of the insurgency. The strength of the Thai government exists constantly because it does not decentralize power to the Malay Muslims, and there are inadequate representations of the Malay Muslims in Thai bureaucratic system. It reduces the Malay Muslims' political power and keeps them from participating in politics as citizens of Thailand. These conditions make the Malay Muslims mistrust the Thai government and feel alienation from the Thai government more and more. As a result, most of the Malay Muslims don't trust the Thai bureaucratic system. Since 2004, the government officers, armed or unarmed, have been heavily targeted for insurgent attack. This reflects that the insurgencies in southern Thailand are very much caused by the mistrust and grievances of Malay Muslims to the Thai government.

Similarly, the structural asymmetry in socio-economic power relations shows that the Thai government has stronger socio-economic power than the Malay Muslims in this relationship. Some facts happened in the past and still exist at present; for example, the intenseness of political discrimination makes Malay Muslims to be treating as second-class citizen. Moreover, socio-economic inequality between the Malay Muslims and the Thai Buddhists produces feeling of discontent and deep grievances, especially the young people and members of separatist movements. Such conditions cause expansion of the ongoing insurgencies in southern Thailand.

The most important cause of insurgencies comes from the asymmetry of military power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. It reveals the strategic asymmetry that often exists when the conflict parties are asymmetric in

216

terms of tactics and strategies in addressing the conflict. The findings from previous chapters show that since 2004, both parties, i.e. the Thai government and the Malay Muslims have highlighted very much on military operations for fighting against each other. Since the escalation of insurgencies in January 2004, the offensive strategy of the Thai government is the conventional attack. It arranges stronger military power to suppress the insurgents and to win the asymmetric warfare. However, the empirical facts have shown that deployment of military power under security laws causes violation of human rights against the Malay Muslims. Consequently, the government authorities' abuse of power is a reason to justify the legitimacy of using violence of the Malay Muslim militants and this situation is a condition leading to the expansion of insurgencies against the Thai government in recent years.

Second, to answer about the impacts of the asymmetry of power relations, it is necessary to point out that the extreme imbalanced power relations between the Thai government, a strong actor, and the Malay Muslims, weak actor, have contributed to the intensity of the conflict in the region. The strength of the Thai government exists constantly because it does not decentralize power to the Malay Muslims, and there are inadequate representations of the Malay Muslims in Thai bureaucratic system. Although the Malay Muslims can have a lot of representatives in local administrative organizations that is the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO), municipality, and Sub-district Administrative Organization (SAO), these organizations have limited roles in local administration and still depend on or are under the Thai bureaucratic system's control strictly. Currently, the political process set by the Thai government still has a lot of problems because of the disruption of

217

democratization in Thailand at the time of the writing of this thesis. At this point, it needs to be mentioned that conflict in the political dimension has been cause of tension. There has been a problem of high centralization for a long time and, at present; there is a disruption of democratization.

The cause of mistrust comes from Malay Muslims' lack of participation in the Thai administration process in the region. In fact, Malay Muslims who work in various positions of Thai bureaucratic system in southern Thailand have very less proportion compared to public servants who are Thai Buddhist. The Thai bureaucratic system is usually criticized for focusing on strict central administration in Bangkok.

The military power relationship of both sides has a lot of impact on the conflict in the region. Due to the current conflict from January 2004 to 2013, there were 8,540 violent incidents took place, besides 5,352 fatalities and 9,965 were wounded. The Thai government has stronger military power and exercises this power to restore national security in the area through armed security forces which consist of professional military i.e. soldiers and police, paramilitary such as the rangers and VDC (Or Sor), including local militias organized by the government known as VDV (Chor Ror Bor) and VPV (Or Ror Bor). It could be said that now security forces organized by the government have totaled up to 150,350 persons or 7.5 percent of the region's population that has about 2 millions. Furthermore, using military power by security forces is endorsed by security laws – the martial law, emergency decree, and ISA. However, the Thai government's military campaign with the security laws enforcement has causes the Malay Muslim populations were most affected and had

218

the most violations of human rights, while it could not make a prosecution with any authorities who made a mistake.

For Malay Muslim militants, the insurgency aims to increase bargaining power with the government. Using terrorist tactics makes the Malay Muslim militants around 11,189 personnel can challenge the superior military power of Thai government. The military operations taken by the BRN-Coordinate have resorted to using guerilla warfare and its related strategy of terrorism tactics that targets on security forces and unarmed civillian. Particularly, the terrorism attacks reveal their strategy by making violence in order to more balance its power in fighting against the Thai government as well as to gain mass support. It also used to achieve its political objective that is to force the Thai government to accept their political demands.

Although it is widely known that the ultimate goal of the BRN-Coordinate is the separation the southern region apart from Thailand to establish the independent Malay Muslim state, but this goal is not clear at present. It can briefly conclude that rights for autonomy in some level (as the constitution of Thailand stipulates) is a common goal of all of the sectors of the Malay Muslim community. As mentioned, this is a main request in the BRN-Coordinate's demands proposed to the Thai government through the Malaysian government as the facilitator of 2013 peace talks round.

The findings show that to promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims, the Thai government has spent a lot of budgets through various socio-economic development programs to improve the quality of life of the people in the region.

Some budgets spent for paying compensation to the Malay Muslims affected by the violence. Nevertheless, the usage of socio-economic power or economic hands out of the Thai government to improve the Malay Muslim community's socio-economic status went instead to the pockets of the corrupt elites of the community.

In addition, the poverty and inequality trends of Malay Muslims in the region have remained constant and hardly changed during this period, but Malay Muslims do not give up in the doldrums. To survive from this situation hundreds of thousands of the Malay Muslims, as people who live in the borderland, chose to take advantage of the political geographic. Many people become cross-border workers in Malaysia. Moreover, many Malay Muslims have alternatives to get some benefits in large or small-scale illegal trades and smuggling from their neighbor country. These underground economic activities are out of the control of the Thai government. In addition, they are usually seen as a part of threats to internal security and undermine the Thai government's stronger power at the same time.

Third, according to the findings from the previous chapters, there is no sign to show that the Thai government's response to the conflict in southern Thailand is very effective. This is to say that in the asymmetric conflict, it is not easy for the powerful actor to resolve the conflicts by overcoming the insurgency, though a preponderance of power that have advantage over the weak in all aspects. Since the new wave of insurgency started in early 2004, the Thai government has tried to rebuild political order in the area. Superior political power is used to win the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims. The outstanding way to solve the problems in 2004 is the Peace Building Policy which aims to build the unity of southern administration under the

220

control of the army. In fact, the political side is sometimes kept from making a decision. The phrase politics ahead of military has been used to refer to the strategy and programs for solving the southern problems that focus on the politics than military measures. In other words, the peaceful means is used instead of forceful and violent means.

Although the Thai authorities may understand correctly about the causes of problems of the insurgency that relate to the Malay Muslims' mistrust to the Thai government the solutions to the problems are wrong. Various cabinets believe that the unity of the southern administration under the Thai bureaucratic system and strong centralization can keep the Malay Muslims' trust. Then, they make an effort to support the policy to improve the southern administrative organization several times and reestablish the SBPAC during the junta administration. However, such solutions ignore the facts of problems about the existing asymmetry of political power relationship. The real reason of the Malay Muslims' mistrust is caused from lack of opportunity to truly participate in the Thai bureaucratic system of the southern administration.

At this period of deadly conflict, the army has seized the power of elected government two times; the first time happened on September 19, 2006 and the next one occurred on May 22, 2014. The coup d'état by the military comes along with the junta administration that makes continuity of bureaucratic polity in the Thai political sphere. The coup d'état opens the opportunity for leaders in the bureaucratic system and socio-economic elites to play a political role directly and exclude politicians who are people's representative of power. The coup d'état also makes discontinuous

democratization in Thailand which is very important. Therefore, it obstructs the Malay Muslims from political participation and limits their citizen rights in southern Thailand.

In regard to the military power relation, the Thai government exercises military power to keep security in the region. The army is used for controlling a state apparatus to counter insurgency. Even though the military power of Thai government is superior, it is challenged by Malay Muslim militants who are the weaker. This is to say that the army is a representation which reflects centralization of the Thai bureaucratic system with too many complex rules and procedures, but inefficient and lack of transparency in using state power. It is not beyond prediction that the military operations of armed security forces bring about the violation of human rights to Malay Muslims. Therefore, the military power of Thai government cannot rebuild security as the set goal. Superior military power becomes the obvious condition to stimulate young Malay Muslims to resist the Thai government, and it justifies the legitimacy of using violence of Malay Muslim militants.

The finding relates to the response of the Thai government in socio-economic issue reveal mistakes in the same way. In order to promote equality of opportunity for the Malay Muslims, the Thai government gave a lot of budgets. However, the efforts of government to solve problems cannot be successful. It could be said that the Thai government fails to operate socio-economic development programs to get rid of grievance that leads to insurgencies against the government. The Thai government has spent the budgets of about 200,000 million Baht throughout the past decade to solve Malay Muslims' poverty and improve the quality of life of Malay Muslims,

222

including providing compensation and rehabilitation to Malay Muslims who were affected by the region unrest. However, various groups that they do not get a good check and lack transparency, as well as participation of local people usually criticize development programs set by the central government in Bangkok and implemented by government agencies in the area.

Fourth, the findings from the previous chapters present that theories of asymmetry can explain the imbalance power between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims reasonably. In this study, the researcher proposes an analytical approach for considering asymmetric conflicts in political, military, and socio-economic dimensions. Those dimensions of asymmetry of power relations addressed in this study show a common pattern; the Thai government has used its stronger power to act on the Malay Muslims. However, the power relationships in asymmetric conflicts assume that relative power implies in the form of strategic interactions. Such analytical approach can help to understand the asymmetry of power relations between the conflict parties as well as to reveal its impacts on the conflict in southern Thailand.

Recommendations

From the above concluding remarks, this study provides several recommendations. The main recommendation is very essential for policymakers and other decision-makers in awareness about the problems of asymmetry in current power relations. The Thai government has implemented various kinds of strategy policies, which are conducive to counter the Malay Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand. However, several Thai governments' strategy policies are incompatible with the asymmetric

conflict management and resolution. This is due to the different goals, strategies, and tactics among the conflict parties. Therefore, a long process of asymmetric conflict in power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims continues to exist, as they try to fight against each other. It is apparent that the conflict in southern Thailand represents the structural plus strategic asymmetry that includes an extream imbalance in power relations between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims.

The asymmetry of power relations does not work in just one direction, but it works in a two-way direction. Then, the Thai government could not easily use its superior political domination, military power, and socio-economic capabilities to crush decisively the Malay Muslims. Besides, it is difficult for the Malay Muslims to achieve their goals. The resolution of this asymmetric conflict should not only removes the sources and causes of the problems that bring about the conflict but also necessitates the asymmetric power relations among the conflicting parties are restructured. Particularly, the asymmetry in the political, military, and socio-economic power relations becomes more balance and leads to collaborative and peaceful relationships.

The following suggestions that are imperative for improving asymmetry in existing asymmetric power relations are recommended. First, the Thai government should decentralize by enhancing political autonomy of Malay Muslims in some levels. It may decide to select a proposal on special local administration in southern Thailand from the models as describes in previous chapter. This recommendation emphasizes the decentralization process that can provide a transformation of the conflict and

change power structure in their relationship that the current conflict resolution practices do not give precedence to this. However, the achievement of the agreement for building self-determination of minority groups depends on strong political will to end the conflict among conflicting parties. In the same way, more democratic atmosphere is a factor supporting the termination of the asymmetric conflict more and more. As seen in the case of the peaceful relationships between the Indonesian government and the Aceh minority group since 2005.

Second, the Thai government should seriously consider the effects of its security forces' military operations as well as security laws enforcement such as martial law and emergency decree. The Thai government should put more effort to end its abuse of power against the Malay Muslims and should reduce its armed security forces. It should consider the possibility of the five demands of BRN-Coordinate proposed during the initiative peace dialogue in 2013 as the fact in previous chapter. The conflicting parties should be sincere in driving the peace dialogue process. This recommendation acknowledges that the negotiation process is able to transform the characteristics of asymmetric conflict to become more balance. When both sides intend to reduce military confrontation and setting the negotiation, including the involvement of the third party, it will open a chance for collaboration and joint decision-making for building peace agreement. This will lead to peaceful relationships in the near future. As seen from the success of the Malaysian government, playing the important role as the mediator in the negotiation process between the Philippine government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that achieved the peace agreement in 2014. The involvement of third parties, especially

225

the Malaysian government, should be supported as a facilitator of the negotiation process between the Thai government and the Malay Muslim militants.

Third, the socio-economic relations reflect the problem of the structural asymmetry between the conflict parties. The development programs for improving the quality of life of Malay Muslims and reduction of socio-economic disparity will be successful through promoting economic activities that local people can design and participate in. The Thai government should not determine them, and government agencies should not treat them as second class subjects. Nevertheless, the government must treat them as a citizen of the country. Therefore, the asymmetry in the socio-economic power relations should be changed to be more balance by empowering the Malay Muslims to receive a main role to change southern Thailand into a strong and peaceful community.

One of the main theoretical contributions derived from the asymmetry approach is the theory that highlights the political, military, and socio-economic power relations that are the central determining factors in the conflict between the Thai government and the Malay Muslims. In this view, the relative power of each party affects their abilities to achieve their individual goals through various specific strategies. Moreover, this study attempts to explore the asymmetry of power relations between the conflict parties. Thus, the role of the third party in conflict resolution does not be investigated adequately in this study, so this issue should be studied for future study.

In addition, this study is not only conducted at the same time of the conflict in southern Thailand, but it is also in the period of the country's political crisis.

226

Therefore, it was difficult to obtain sufficient data. However, this research may provide some information for future study. For example, researchers may consider the impact of political instability, failure of democratization, intervention by military faction, and other factors on the southern unrest. Future researchers could apply the case of the conflict in southern Thailand to study the issue of internal conflicts causing from asymmetry of power relations between a government and an insurgent group in other countries that share similar conditions with the conflict in southern Thailand. They may study these by comparing the achievements in balancing the asymmetry of power relations in some countries of the Southeast Asia such as the Philippine government and the Muslims in southern Philippines, the Indonesian government and the people in Aceh region, including the Myanmar government and ethnic minority groups.

227

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243

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Appendix A

Map of Southern Thailand

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Appendix B

List of Interviews Conducted

1. Abdullah Abru, Interview by author in Pattani province, 2014, March 13.
2. Bukoree Yeema, Interview by author in Songkla province, 2013, October 11
3. Burahanuddin Useng, Interview by author in Yala province, 2014, March 12.
4. Charnpich Attajak, Interview by author in Kedah, Malaysia, 2013, October 1.
5. Chokchai Wongtani, Interview by author in Songkla province, 2013, August 22.
6. Ekkarin Tuansiri, Interview by author in Pattani province, 2014, March 12.
7. Hadi Hamidong, Interview by author in Bangkok, 2013, November 12.
8. Ismail Ishaq Benjasmith, Interview by author in Pattani province, 2014, March 14.
9. Kamal Abdulwahab, Interview by author in Pattani province, 2013, October 10.
10. Najmuddin Uma, Interview by author inYala province, 2014, March 12.
11. Nipon Chaiyai, Interview by author inYala province, 2013, October 11.
12. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Interview by author in Pattani province, 2014, March 13.
13. A Police Lieutenant Colonel (anonymous), Interview by author in Phatthalung province, 2013, December 6.
14. Anational intelligence officer (anonymous), Interview by author in Bangkok, 2014, July 5.
15. A senior Thai officer (anonymous), Interview by author in Pattani province, 2014, March 11.
16. A Colonel (anonymous), Interview by author in Bangkok, 2014, June 17.
17. A Senior Colonel (anonymous), Interview by author in Bangkok, 2014, June 28.
18. A senior excise officer (anonymous), Interview by author in Pattani province, 2013, October 9.
19. A Police Lieutenant (anonymous), Interview by author in Songkla province, 2014, March 3.
20. A senior officer of the NSC (anonymous), Interview by author in Bangkok, 2014, July 11.
21. Cross border workers (anonymous), Interview by author in Kedah, Malaysia, 2013, October 25.
22. Malay Muslims students (anonymous), Interview by author in Bangkok, 2013, June 15.
23. Malay Muslims students (anonymous), Interview by author in Pattani province, 2013, October 9.
24. Malay Muslims students (anonymous), Interview by author in Pattani province, 2013, October 12.

Appendix C

The General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process Signed on February 28, 2013

GENERAL CONSENSUS ON PEACE DIALOGUE PROCESS

The Government of Thailand has appointed the Secretary-General of the National Security Council (to be referred to as party A) to head the group supporting favourable environment creation for peace promotion in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand.

We are willing to engage in peace dialogue with people who have different opinions and ideologies from the state (to be referred to as party B) as one of the stakeholders in solving the Southern Border Provinces problem under the framework of the Thai Constitution while Malaysia would act as facilitator. Safety measures shall be provided to all members of the Joint Working Group throughout the entire process.

Done and signed in Kuala Lumpur
On the 28th February 2013

For Party A   For Party B

(Lt. Gen. Paradorn Pattanatabut)   (Ustaz Hassan Taib)

Witnessed By:

(Datuk Mohamed Thajudeen bin Abdul Wahab)
Secretary of the
National Security Council of Malaysia

Appendix D

Briefing on the BRN's Demands by the Joint Working Group – Peace Dialogue Process (JWG-PDP) Facilitator

CONTENT

- INTRODUCTION
- FOMAT OF PRESENTATION
- DEMAND NO 1
- DEMAND NO 2
- DEMAND NO 3
- DEMAND NO 4
- DEMAND NO 5
- TIMEFRAME (by The JWG-PDP Facilitator)
- DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

GENERAL EXPLAINATION OF THE FIVE (5) BRN'S DEMANDS

1. Requesting the Government of Thailand to generally accept the five (5) demands.
2. Does **NOT** mean the Government must **IMMIDIATELY** and **FULLY** accept the five (5) demands, but to agree in principle to discuss the 5 demands <u>in details by stages</u>.
3. All the five (5) demands may be discussed thoroughly and to have joint decisions/ consensus on the details at later date/ meetings.
4. Once agreed, the demands must be brought to the Thai Parliament to be table and discussed as a **National agenda**, not an individual or certain groups' agenda.
5. If in principle the discussion on the five (5) demands can be agreed, it may pave the way for a formal and proper **Ceasefire**, and eventually to a **Peace Accord** for a lasting peace solution in the Southern provinces.

BRN'S OFFER IF 5 DEMANDS CAN BE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE AND TO BE DISCUSSED

1. Agree to meet at the next 5th JWG-PDP as agreed in the 28th February 2013 Consensus.
2. Will replace the current BRN panel members with more suitable representatives.

3. Will add new panel members to become inclusive and representing many sections and parties of the Patani Malay Community:
      i. *Head of Delegation from BRN*
     ii. *3 members from BRN (Secretary, Ulama, Youth)*
    iii. *2 members from PULO*
     iv. *1 member from BIPP*
      v. *Law Expert*
     vi. *History Expert*
    vii. *Economy and Commerce Expert*
   viii. *Expert on Social Issues (Education, Language & Culture)*
     ix. *Expert on Social Issues (Women Affairs, Elderly, Children & Disable person)*
      x. *Expert on Administration & Governance Affairs*
     xi. *Community Activist*
    xii. *Student Activist*
4. Will start dialogue on reducing militant operation.
5. Will not asking for territorial separation from the Kingdom of Thailand.

FORMAT OF PRESENTATION

- EXTRACT FROM THE ORIGINAL FIVE (5) DEMANDS
- DEMANDS IN REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THAILAND
- DETAILED EXPLANATION OF DEMANDS
- BRN'S OFFER IN RETURN
- DISCUSSION

DEMAND NO 1 "RECOGNITION OF BRN AS REPRESENTATIVE"

DEMAND NO 1: EXTRACT

1. This Peace Dialogue is between the Representatives of Patani freedom fighters, which are led by Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) with The Kingdom of Thailand based on the following:

   a) BRN is a liberation organization which represents Patani Malay nation (*bangsa*).

   b) BRN is the defender of the rights and interest of Patani Malay nation (*bangsa*)

   c) BRN as caretaker of the mission and aspiration Patani Malay nation (*bangsa*)

DEMAND NO 1: REFERENCE TO THAI CONSTITUTION B. E. 2550 (2007)

- The Government to Acknowledge BRN as the **REPRESENTATIVE** of the Patani people by giving security cover, freedom of movement, freedom of stay/ domicile, freedom for having open forums and media access as stated in the CONSTITUTION OF THAILAND B. E. 2550 (2007)

  CHAPTER III – RIGHTS AND LIBERIES OF THE THAI PEOPLE

    Part 3: Personal Rights and Liberty – <u>Section 32, 33</u>

    Part 7: Freedom of Expression of Individual and the Press – <u>Section 45, 46</u>

    Part 11: Liberties to Assembly and Association – <u>Section 63, 64, 65</u>

DEMAND NO 1: DETAILS OF DEMAND

a) **BRN IS A LIBERATION ORGANIZATION NOT A SEPARATIST MOVT**

b) Liberation in reference of struggle for Freedom:

   i.   Freedom to practice Islamic rituals and the Muslim way of life

   ii. Freedom to the rights of Justice and Law

   iii. Freedom to practice Malay culture, language & way of life

   iv. Freedom from being oppress, abuse, murder, kidnap and harass from the State related authorities or its proxies

   v.   Freedom the learn, to do business, owning properties, engage in social and community activities.

c) **BRN IS NOT A SEPARATIST MOVT** – is not demanding territorial separation from the Kingdom of Thailand

d) **All 15 BRN Panel Members are to be given immunity**

   - Immunity from Warrant of Arrest

   - Revocation of Warrant of Arrests (those relevant)

   - Security & Safety guaranteed while in Thai territory

   - Freedom of movement within the Kingdom of Thailand and for overseas trip for the purpose of peace dialogue

DEMAND NO 1: OFFER IN RETURN

- Liberation Fighters will stop operation on soft targets:
   - Unarmed civilian
   - Unarmed State official including teachers
   - Regardless of age, gender, religion and status
- Liberation Fighters will stop operation on economic targets:
   - Township area

260

- Factory, Shops and workshop
- Will take effect immediately

DEMAND NO 2 "MALAYSIA AS MEDIATOR"

DEMAND NO 2: EXTRACT

2. Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) agreed to appoint Malaysian Government is a mediator which in directly involved in this Peace Dialogue that plays the following roles:

   a) To hold the dialogue process and to ensure the success of this Peace Dialogue

   b) To obtain recognition and trust from both Patani Malay people and the international community

   c) To have an intermediary between both parties to help in resolving political conflicts in Patani

DEMAND NO 2: REFERENCE TO THAI CONSTITUTION B. E. 2550 (2007)

- BRN sees that **THE TIME HAS COME** for the Government of Thailand to jointly appoint Malaysia to become the MEDIATOR to continue the peace dialogue
- This proposal is in line CONSTITUTION OF THAILAND B. E. 2550 (2007)

  CHAPTER V – DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF FUNDEMENTAL STATE POLICIES

     Part 6: Foreign Policy – <u>Section 82</u>

DEMAND NO 2: DETAILS OF DEMAND

- Malaysia to be appointed as the MEDIATOR in the near future once the dialogue has become stable and upgraded from "**PEACE DIALOGUE**" to "**PEACE NEGOTIATION**"
- Malaysia is Thailand's neighbor and a member of **ASEAN** and **OIC**
- Will assist during the **recovering** and **rebuilding** process of Southern Thai

DEMAND NO 2: OFFER IN RETURN

- Will not carry out operations on Teacher security patrol, on condition the security cover by the military/ police are to be replaced by local volunteer <u>in stages</u>.

- Requesting the army that guard economic target to be replaced by private security guards <u>in stages</u>.

* -<u>in stages</u>: *refer to proposed timeline*

DEMAND NO 3 "OIC, ASEAN & NGO IN PEACE PROCESS"

DEMAND NO 3: EXTRACT

3. The process of Dialogue must be witnessed by the representative from ASEAN countries, OIC and NGOs which are approved by both parties; BRN and Thai government, due to the following reasons:
   a) As an effort to solve the conflict in Patani. Thus, it requires participation from Muslims as well as international community.
   b) As a norm, any dialogue and peace agreement should have witness who are mutually trusted and agrees upon by both parties.
   c) To ensure the consistency of this dialogue will be guaranteed by both parties.

DEMAND NO 3: REFERENCE TO THAI CONSTITUTON B. E. 2550 (2007)

- The Government of Thailand and BRN must jointly agree to bring in the representative from **OIC**, **ASEAN** and **NGO** to become WITNESS for the peace process.
- This is proposal is in line CONSTITUTON OF THAILAND B. E. 2550 (2007)
  CHAPTER V – DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF FUNDEMENTAL STATE POLICIES

     PART 6: Foreign Policy – <u>Section 82</u>

DEMAND NO 3: DETAILS OF DEMAND

- The involvement of ASEAN, OIC & NGO in the near future once the dialogue has become stable and upgraded from "**PEACE DIALOGUE**" to "**PEACE NEGOTIATION**"
- To provide **credibility** and **accountability** to the process
- Greatly assist the **recovering** and **rebuilding process** of Southern Thailand

DEMAND NO 3: OFFER IN RETURN

- BRN will be fully committed to all jointly agreed consensus in every

session in the future.

DEMAND NO 4 "RIGHTS OF MALAY PATANI COMMUNITY"

DEMAND NO 4: EXTRACT

4. The Thai government should recognize the existence and the sovereignty of the Malay nation in Patani homeland because of the following justifications:
   a) The roots of conflict in Patani is due to the occupation and confiscation of the rights of Patani Malay Nation.
   b) Issues of human rights and self-determination.
   c) Issues of political rights, economic justice, education, social and cultural identity.

DEMAND NO 4: REFERENCE TO THAI CONSTITUTON B. E. 2550 (2007)

- The Government of Thailand must ensure the rights of the Malay Patani Community are complied as stated in the THAILAND CONSTITUTON B. E. 2550 (2007)
  CHAPTER III – RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE THAI PEAPLE
  Part 1: General Provisions – Section 26
  Part 2: Equality – Section 30
  Part 3: Personal Rights and Liberty – Section 32, 33
  Part 4: Rights in The Administration of Justice – Section 39, 40

- The rights of Self-Determination and The Covenant Problems of Politics-Social-Culture – etc. are in reference to THAILAND CONSTITUTON B. E. 2550 (2007)
  CHAPTER III – RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THAI PEOPLE
  Part 12: Community Rights – Section 66
  CHAPTER IV: DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF FUNDEMENTAL STATE POLICIES
  Part 3: Directive Principles of State Policies in relation to the Administartion of the State Affairs – Section 78 (1), (2) & (3)

DEMAND NO 4: DETAILS OF DEMAND

A) The Thai Government must **acknowledge** the **Community of Malay Patani people**. This recognition must be tabled in the Thai Parliament.

B) BRN is **not demanding territorial separation** from the Kingdom of Thailand. This must be also tabled in the Thai Parliament.

C) The Details of this demand will be discussed thoroughly after a proper official ceasefire has been achieved/ established, and could take years.

D) The Definition of Rights of Patani Malay (*Hak Ketuanan Melayu Patani*) is:

"The Government of Thailand are demanded to acknowledge there was once a Malay Islamic Kingdom of Patani before it has become part of Siam territory in 1776. Part of the areas are now in Modern Thailand's provinces of Pattani, Narathivat, Yala & Songkhla. The history shows that once there was the existence of Patani land as a state that was administered by Muslim Malays. Therefore this factor justified the Malay Patani Community's demand that the rights of the Malay Patani People to be returned to them. This means the **Government of Thailand must acknowledge the rights of the Patani Malay Community on the Patani land** (*Hak Ketuanan Melayu Di Atas Bumi Patani*). This acknowledgement must be table in the Thai Parliament"

E) The Thai Government must give the Malay Patani Community the opportunity to administer the area by creating a Special Administrative Region within the Thai Sovereign Territory; taking the example of Bangkok and Pattaya.

Clearly this limited autonomy is within Thailand's sovereignty and not separated nor detached from Thai territory. Therefore it is still within the Thai constitution. This is what it means of **THE RIGHTS FOR SELF DETERMINATION**.

F) The details of **THE RIGHTS FOR SELF DETERMINATION** shall be discussed later thoroughly but shall include among others:

   i. Recognition of Malay Patani Community
   ii. Special Administrative Region
   iii. Special Envoy to the Thai Parliament
   iv. Governor from Malay Patani Community
   v. Administration of Thai Police deployed in the region
   vi. Quota in Government posts in the region
   vii. Qadhi and Qadhi office
   viii. Freedom of media
   ix. Sharing of State income and wealth of the region
   x. Education

DEMAND NO 4: OFFER IN RETURN

- To fully stop operation <u>in stages</u>; with the provision that the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Army Unit to be redeployed also <u>in stages</u>.
- 4th Army & Local police may be stationed in the provinces but limited

to Major Bases, not in Kampung Areas.

- BRN will terminate militant operation <u>in stages</u>.
- BRN will give full commitment to the scheduled time-frame as the terms and conditions are met.
- BRN will give agree to have an official **Ceasefire** starting **2015**.
- To **totally stop** operations prior to a proper Ceasefire Negotiation with the following schedule:
  - SONGKHLA (starting January 2014)
  - YALA (starting April 2014)
  - NARATHIWAT (starting July 2014)
  - PATTANI (starting October 2014)

DEMAND NO 5 "RELEASE OF PRISONERS"

DEMAND NO 5: EXTRACT

5. Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) demands the Thai government to release all detainers held by the Thai authority due to political reason and to abolish all warrant of arrest issued to the Patani fighters, because of the following reasons:
   a) Patani fighters are defender of their people and not the terrorists and separatists.
   b) Patani fighters are the upholder of justice and not the oppressor, tyrant, and the traitor of the Patani people.
   c) Patani fighters are peace lovers and not troublemakers and extremists.

DEMAND NO 5: REFERENCE TO THAI CONSTITUTON B. E. 2550 (2007)

- The Government of Thailand must show sincerity by releasing political prisoners and detainees in reference to the struggle of the freedom movement. The revocation of Warrant of Arrests to people wrongly accused without proof.
- There must be justice in trials, accusations, punishments and detentions in accordance to the Law as stated in the THAILAND CONSTITUTON B. E. 2550 (2007)
  CHAPTER III – RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THAI PEOPLE

  Part 3: Personal Rights Liberty – <u>Section 32, 33</u>

  Part 4: Rights in The Administration of Justice – <u>Section 39, 40</u>

  CHAPTER V – DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF FUNDEMENTAL

STATE POLICIES

Part 5: Law and Justice Policy – <u>Section 81</u>

DEMAND NO 5: DETAILS OF DEMAND

- Release prisoners/ detainees related to the Southern Thailand unrest
- Pardons for freedom fighters that have been sentenced and jailed
- Revocation on Warrants of Arrest
- Protection from "Judicial Killings" from State Instruments either directly or indirectly via proxy

DEMAND NO 5: OFFER IN RETURN

- Will be committed to proper Ceasefire and discuss about it thoroughly in states when ten (10) detainees are released and ten (10) warrants of arrest are revoked monthly until settled.
- For every ten (10) detainees and ten (10) warrants of arrest revoked, BRN will stop operation at selected Amphoe/ Area.
- BRN will identify the detainees and the government must assist in the identification process.
- BRN will give full commitment to the scheduled time-frame if the terms and conditions are met.
- To **totally stop** operation prior to a proper Ceasefire Negotiation with the following schedule:
  - SONGKHLA (starting January 2014)
  - YALA (starting April 2014)
  - NARATHIWAT (starting July 2014)
  - PATTANI (starting October 2014).