Effects of patronage system on performance of Zimbabwean States Enterprises and parastatals

The discussion of poor performance of government departments, agencies, state enterprises and parastatals (SEPs) hardly concludes without mentioning patronage as one of the major contributing factors. Arguably, the common assumption is that
patronage leads to appointing incompetent or unqualified and purely partisan agents of politicians at the expense of highly qualified, skilled, and competent candidates without political connections. Consequently, mismanagement, corruption, and poor
performance are said to be inevitable in such a scenario. Most studies, which discuss patronage and performance, focus mainly on government departments and agencies whose operating environments differ from the SEPs, hence posing a yawning gap in
empirical analyses specifically in this sector. Little attention is paid to confounding factors present in the performance equation. This study seeks to establish an understanding of the relationship between patronage and SEPs performance. The study is qualitative and is premised on primary data obtained through structured interviews of 14 key informants. The main findings are that like in any other country in the world, patronage exists in the Zimbabwean SEPs sector and that it has a significant contribution to the sector’s poor performance. The study concludes that no amount of
demonization of the phenomenon can yield any positive results unless the focus is placed on how governments can leverage the positive effects of patronage appointments and minimize the negative effects by coming up with a robust model for transparent recruitment and appointment system of public managers