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**PRIVATE SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN THE MALAYSIAN
PUBLIC SECTOR**



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**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY UTARA MALAYSIA
2024**

**PRIVATE SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN THE MALAYSIAN
PUBLIC SECTOR**



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**A thesis submitted to the Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government in
fulfilment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy
University Utara Malaysia**



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ABSTRACT

The outsourcing of private security services for government agencies is one of the government's effort to meet the security needs of the public sector's departments. However, increase in the numbers of private security services has also led to various security issues and challenges, especially in terms of provision and governance. This study aims to examine the provision of private security services in government agencies, in an attempt to establish an ideal private security governance model for the public sector. Therefore, a case study involving three organisations was carried out, which includes the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Office of the Chief Government Security Officer and the Malaysian Security Industry Association. The cross-case analysis revealed five major themes for private security governance namely shared co-governance relationship, divergence in resource management, state-centric compliance mechanism, diminished accountability and agenda transformation. A private security governance model in the context of government departments has been developed. Use of this model is recommended for layered public sector security modes. This study also suggests the formulation of a Private Security Governance Policy and the establishment of a Special Governance Agency for public sector security.

Keywords: Challenges, Public Sector Security, Private Security Services, Security Governance Model.



ABSTRAK

Penyumberluaran perkhidmatan pengawal keselamatan swasta merupakan satu usaha kerajaan bagi memenuhi keperluan keselamatan di jabatan-jabatan kerajaan. Walaubagaimanapun, peningkatan bilangan pengawal keselamatan swasta juga telah mengundang kepada pelbagai isu dan cabaran keselamatan terutamanya dari segi peruntukan dan tadbir urus. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji penyediaan perkhidmatan kawalan keselamatan swasta di jabatan kerajaan, dalam usaha untuk membangunkan model tadbir urus keselamatan swasta yang sesuai bagi sektor awam. Maka, satu kajian kes melibatkan tiga organisasi telah dilaksanakan yang merangkumi Kementerian Dalam Negeri, Pejabat Ketua Pegawai Keselamatan Kerajaan dan Persatuan Industri Keselamatan Malaysia. Analisis kajian kes silang mendedahkan lima tema utama bagi tadbir urus keselamatan swasta iaitu hubungan tadbir urus bersama, perbezaan dalam pengurusan sumber, mekanisme pematuhan yang berpusatkan negeri, kemerosotan akauntabiliti dan transformasi agenda. Satu model tadbir urus keselamatan swasta dalam konteks jabatan kerajaan telah dibangunkan. Penggunaan model ini disarankan untuk mod keselamatan sektor awam yang berlapis. Kajian ini juga mencadangkan penggubalan Dasar Tadbir Urus Keselamatan Swasta dan penubuhan Agensi Tadbir Urus Khas bagi keselamatan sektor awam.

Kata kunci: Cabaran, Keselamatan Sektor Awam, Pengawal Keselamatan Swasta, Model Tadbir Urus Keselamatan.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AADK	Agensi Anti Dadah Kebangsaan
APSA	Asia Pacific Security Association
APSC	ASEAN Political Security Community
ASIS	American Security Industry Society
CGSO	Chief Government Security Office of Malaysia
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
GLC	Government Listed Companies
ILB	Industrial Lead Body
JPAM	Jabatan Pertahanan Awam Malaysia
JPK	Jabatan Pembangunan Kemahiran
JPN	Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri
KetSA	Mineral & Geoscience Department
KWP	Ministry of Federal Territories
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOHA	Ministry of Home Affairs of Malaysia
MSIA	Malaysia Security Industry Association
NSC	National Security Council
PIKM	Persatuan Industri Keselamatan Malaysia
PPKKM	Persatuan Perkhidmatan Kawalan Keselamatan Malaysia
RMP	Royal Malaysian Police
SIA	Security Industry Association
SWISS	Selangor Wilayah Industrial Security Society
UNSC	United Nation Security Council

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The multifaceted concept of security extends from an individual need to object, organisation, society and even to a state's requirement (Jore, 2019). The neoliberalism shift urged the common good of security (Bures & Carrapico, 2018) to be commercialised (Rigakos, 2016) and privatised (Avant, 2005). The soul of security does not belong only to the government (Bryden & Caparini, 2006; Burt, 2012), it has been delegated to the private security actors in the early post-Cold war periods of the United States (Ortiz, 2007). Malaysia is no exception. Malaysia has got the splash of the neoliberalism wave and the Privatisation Policy 1985 formed.

In Malaysia, provision of security to government departments was initially the sole responsibility of the public security actors (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2016b; National Security Council, 2017; Chief Government Security Office, 2013). The highly aspired security was handed over to private hands in the 1990s (Public Accounts Committee, 2014). The enactment of the New Economic Policy 1971, Second Malaysian Plan 1971 to Fifth Malaysian Plan 1990, along with the Reagan-Thatcher Doctrine, have reduced the public sector involvement in the security industry.

The invasion of private security actors into the public sector shattered the public security actors' monopoly in security provision. The private security companies gradually began to conduct the initial role of the public security actors. As a result, the public security actors, government-appointed guards (*Jaga*, R scheme) and in-house security officers (*Pengawal Keselamatan*, KP scheme) in the security business were gradually reduced by Public Service Department (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2002, 2009).

Private security companies with an active License 2(A) under the Private Agencies Act 1971 are allowed to safeguard and secure public sector premises. The Ministry of Home Affairs legitimised the private security companies as the third protection layer in crime prevention (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010b). These private security companies' operations are regulated by public and private agencies; the Royal Malaysian Police, the Chief Government Security Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Security Council and the Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA).

In the Malaysian public sector, the Ministry of Education began outsourcing security services since 1993 (Public Accounts Committee, 2014) and remains the highest procurer of private security services (Ministry of Finance, 2017a, 2021). There were only 70 PSCs registered in 1971 when the act of private security firms was established but has grown to 270 PSCs in 2017 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017b). The proliferation of private security actors outnumbers public security actors in terms of quantity. Malaysia joined this global trend where private security providers outnumbered the public police (The Guardian, 2017).

The provision of private security in public sector invites new security concerns. It is clear that the private security actors' throne in developed countries is shaking the world (Krahmann, 2005; Holmqvist, 2005; Higate, 2012; Button & Brooks, 2016). In Malaysia, the emergence of security issues on private security actors in the public sector security has been highly refuted in parliaments (National Audit Department, 2002, 2007, 2012; Ayob, 1987; Hussein, 2010) and by Public Accounts Committee (2014). A ten-year public procurement record since 2009 exhibited that almost 21 ministries and 76 state-level sub-agencies have outsourced their security service to 411 private security companies (Ministry of Finance, 2021). These private security actors are well versed in the entire entries and exits of nationwide public agencies besides the security deficits of the public sector.

Stateman and philanthropist Nelson Mandela mentioned, "Safety and security do not just happen; they result from collective consensus and public investment. We owe our children, the most vulnerable citizens in our society, a life free of violence and fear". (Krug et al., 2002). So, this research highlights challenges posed by private security actors who are supposed to be the guardians that also can endanger us anytime. Thus, action is required from the government to comprehend the presence of private security actors in the public sector and define their territory before it runs out of control.

Provision of security for public sector for more than 20 years in Malaysia experienced multiple regulatory reformations. Despite the prerogative measures by the government, some repercussive concerns about private security actors have been constantly hitting media headlines. Oversight and governance concerns of private security actors seeks immediate intervention by both government and private security

industry. Hence, this research intended to gain insights into private security provision and governance in the Malaysian public sector. Moreover, the research embarked in developing a governance model for the benefit of private security in public sector.

1.2 Problem Statement

The rise of private security guards does not ensure provision of security in government agencies. The exponential growth of private security guards couldn't guarantee satisfactory level of security for public sector premises. The outsourcing trend of government agencies indicate vast dependency towards private security guards for safeguarding public properties (Ministry of Finance, 2021). However, the failure of the service rendered are exhibited by recurring noncompliance and audit trails. The root cause has been much associated with private security.

However, significant incidents also denote primary governing agencies fail to execute their performances upon private security companies in the country (National Audit Department, 2012a, 2013c). The incidents took place in school premises where the private security guards often being the culprits of drug abuse expose significant negligence on government oversight mechanisms. More incidents of urinal checks disclosing the drug substance expose poor recruitment strategies imposed by both government and private security industry (Penyata Rasmi Dewan Rakyat, 2017). Severe governance lag has been overriding other complications related to private security provision in public sector.

Moreover, the condition gets worse by null involvement of private security industry towards public sector's security. Public sector has been a lame entity for the industry

to sit and watch without contributing wholeheartedly towards national security measures. Private security guards are seen as a parcel of the public sector premises, however, they are not passionately serving the premises. Missing guards in action, improper clocking and guards caught sleeping during duty hours are common incidents where the providers are not in real sync with the government's interest. The provision of security for public sector is a paid service, where the deliverance of service should be up to a mark or standard established by the government. However, the vanishing standards are often distorting the image of government agencies. Sleeping guards, unattended security posts and improperly assigned guards are criticized over and over by political jargon (Penyata Rasmi Dewan Rakyat, 2010, 2019). Whoever and whatever be the cause for poor service delivery, it has to be reckoned via governance mechanisms.

The private security industry's obligation to provide the best and fit guards for the paymaster, the government agencies is partially fulfilled. Without uplifting the burden on the government in devising the perfect provision of security for public sector, the private security industry does have a mandatory role in providing the best security actors. The denial of private security companies in uplifting the guards' competency, efficiency and service delivery via proper training initiatives are often noted (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2013; News Straits Times, 2016). The role of the government as the master provider of mandatory licensing requirements and training providers is undeniable. However, the role of Private Security Industry Associations in crafting and nurturing guards' careers is vague and unnoticed. Deployment of untrained private security guards in public sector undermines the image of industry and government.

Private security guards have failed to capture the essence of the public sector's security which enhances the risk of intrusion and manipulation within government premises (Bernama, 2015; Polis Diraja Malaysia, 2016). The accusations on clocking hours edited by guards, false claims submitted to government obstruct penalties to be imposed by the government. Moreover, guards embark on protest against the government agency by locking the premise over monetary concerns (Bernama, 2019). The Malaysian Security Industry Association whom supposedly instill sense of belongingness and loyalty qualities among the guards serving in public sector agencies, joined the salary protest against government (PIKM, 2016; Berita Harian, 2022). The trivial incidents would be a massive loss for the government if accumulated over years .

Finally, private security provision has succumbed to the extent that media and mainstream constantly highlight terrorist association with private security guards (Rohaniza, Mohd & Nadia, 2017; Farik, 2017). Despite multiple efforts and regulatory impositions, private security provisions fall below the desired standard and are persistently thwarted by unresolved issues. Be it the government or the industry, both have failed to establish an emblem to guide the private security actors in public sector. Whilst adversities of private security guards have expanded from common to criminal offences and extremists aim at government buildings (Ministry of Defence, 2019; Smith, Schmallegger & Siegel, 2016), immediate resolution is required in the governance of private security guards.

1.3 Research Objective

This research endeavours to explore private security governance in the public sector, and four objectives have been formulated,

1. The first objective is to study the function and regulation of private security actors in the public sector, with a particular focus on the current provision of private security in this sector.
2. The second objective of the research is to explore the current governance structure of private security actors in the public sector.
3. The third objective of the research is to analyse the security challenges and consequences of private security in the public sector.
4. The fourth research objective aims to create an ideal private security governance model for the public sector.

1.4 Research Questions

The aspired objectives inspired this study to pose the research questions. It was assimilated that research questions are fundamental for the early stages of investigation (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and have a pivotal role in deciding the research methods (Bryman, 2007). The research questions are posed to derive the objectives of this study as below:

1. What is the current provision of private security in the public sector?
2. How is private security governed in the public sector?
3. What are the challenges from having private security in the public sector?
4. How the ideal governance of private security in the public sector should be?

1.5 Significance of Study

This study aspired to propose a private security governance model provide the benefit of this research to be conducted. The model will critically analyse the role of security providers and government, and emerging security challenges of the private security actors and governors residing in the public sector. Therefore, the model is significant to understand in-depth impact of private security private security governance in Malaysia.

Currently, the policies on private security actors sparely mention about any complications rise from governance upon public sector and private security company. Malaysian Security and Public Order Policy proclaimed any disruption of government function could have a detrimental impact on national security (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2019). Therefore, this model is significant to make parties involved curtail any disruption of public sector's security.

1.6 Scope of Study

This study scope defined in terms of context, time frame and research's population,. The research context here would be private security governance in the Malaysian public sector. Private security referred to the private security actors occupying the public sector premise. These private security actors are hired by Private Security Companies with a valid License 2(A) under Private Agencies Act 1971.

The public sector is the government agencies referred to as the ministries and agencies procuring private security for their premises through the eProcurement system (Ministry of Finance, 2017). In this study, private security companies that were present

anywhere beyond the public sector were omitted; private agencies, banks, GLCs, civil organisations and residential areas. The context is limited to regulation and governance of private security in the public sector. Exploration in tandem of governance dimensions and pluralistic mode of security provision is revealed here.

The population selected for this study are governing agencies, service recipients and security actors. The public governing agencies are the National Security Council, Chief Security Government Office, Ministry of Home Affairs, Auxiliary Police, Royal Malaysian Police, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Education. Meanwhile, the private governing agencies are the Malaysian Security Industry Association, ASEAN Political Security Community, United National Security Council, ASIS and APSA.

Besides the security governors, the public security actors such as inhouse security officers, voluntary corps and auxiliary police were interviewed to enlighten on the provision of private security. An initial selection of the population geographically was done involving the state, national, regional and global. The respondents' selection, filtrations and constraints are reported in the methodological section. The insights of this study population are necessary to explore the governance of private security and challenges associated with private security actors in the public sector.

The research time frame for private security governance would be from 1985 to 2020. Since this research focuses on a period of private security immersion into the public sector, it began with the enactment Privatisation Master Plan 1985. A systematic literature review on private security governance progressed further with qualitative

insights from respondents in enlightening the governance structure during this period. The challenges from private security in Malaysia were extended beyond context and period to provide better insights into the study matter.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

The private security provision in the public sector is approached under a narrow security governance context. Narrow governance justifies governance concerning the government or state structure (Westermeyer, 2013; Krahmann, 2008; Daase & Friesendorf, 2010; Zurn, 2008; Kooiman, 2003). Governance in this study is classified into three dimensions; governance by the government, governance with the government and governance without the government (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010).

The upper hand of government in regulating private security industry is noticed in Malaysia. However, the penetration of private governors was only noticed in recent years (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2014; Alwi, 2016). The acknowledgement of MSIA by MOHA and CGSO joined collaboration with APSA marked the tender shift to co-governance. Hence, a narrow governance lens is best suited to exploring the extensiveness of state control in regulating the private security industry.

Integration of the public sector's security and private security governance in Malaysia depicted as in Figure 1.1. Here, Ehrhart's (2013) security governance model is adapted and incorporated governance dimensions to conceptually guide the research (Figure 2.2). Ehrhart's (2013) model conceptualises European security governance into prerequisites, structure and consequences. This model maintains the three clusters in the original mode by Ehrhart (2013); prerequisite, structure and consequences.

This research attempts to consolidate the security governance dimensions within the context of public sector's security. This conceptual framework is essential to conceptualize private security governance in public sector. . Combination of public and private security actors, public and private governors within public sector with certain set of rules and norms to obey comprehended as prerequisite for the governance to occur. Variation of interest between the public and private security actors also prompt the governance to be somehow state or market centric. Hence, presence of norms, interest and agenda within the current governance structure serve as combo of prerequisite component for private security governance in Malaysia.

The abundance of actors and governors for Malaysian private security noted via their regulatory practices. Compilation of MSIA, MOHA and CGSO qualifies the criteria of pluralistic governors ((Webber et al., 2004; Ebo, 2007; Daase & Friesendorf, 2010). The dispersion of these governing agencies as federal and even to state departments complies the geographical and functional dispersion (Krahmann, 2005). Hence, the cooperation mechanism between these governors and actors in terms of training, recruitment and policy making are within the scrutiny of structural component of security governance.




Figure 1. 1 Conceptual Framework of the Study
Source: Self-developed figure based on literature review

The association of private security actors with adversities reported in media and audit reports claim the connection to governance structure, especially in terms of screening and training. Here, both CGSO and MOHA have evaluative and compliant measurements, the compliance dimensions will be addressed in this study. Further, impact caused by the presence of private security actors in public sector analyzed as the consequence component under this conceptual framework.

The conceptual framework portrays the governance responsibility of government and private security industry on the private security actors present within public sector. Hence, this conceptual framework guides the conduct of this research from literature review, methodology to analysis of this case study. Further, it illuminates the research analysis from a narrow governance context under each component and governance dimension.

1.8 Research Gaps

The systematic literature review revealed some under-researched and unexplored dimensions present as theoretical, population, methodological and knowledge gaps. The gaps within literature explored in brief aligned to research objectives of this study presented as in Appendix 5. First, apparent theoretical gaps (Miles, 2017; Muller-Bloch & Kranz, 2014) identified in prior literature are on the applicability of narrow governance theoretical models in private security governance. Prior theories explored private security governance through a democratic lens (Howe, 2012; Mustapha, 2013), self-regulation (Aarstad, 2016; Krahmann, 2016), relative pragmatism (Avant, 2016), security assemblage (Berndtsson & Stern, 2011; Klauser, 2009) and criminal justice (Bossong, 2012), which are important and worth recognition.

However, the leading private security governance literature reviewed for this research is void of these narrow governance theoretical approaches (Liao, 2012; Volinz, 2018; Krahmann, 2005, 2017; Webber et al., 2004; Ehrhart, 2013). Very little research is available on the applicability of narrow governance theory for private security governance (Westermeyer, 2013; Daase & Friesendorf, 2010). Furthermore, there is a lack of rigorous research in the prior literature on private security governance models.

Recent private security literature noted a lack of theoretical base security governance models (Aarstad, 2016; Allison & Taylor, 2017; Aziani, Favarin & Campedelli, 2020; Joachim & Schneiker, 2015; Ball et al., 2019). Meanwhile, scholars have proposed exploring these security models in other governance areas (Krahmann, 2003) and analysing the model by engaging security governors (Ehrhart, 2013). Hence, the

current conceptual framework's applicability in exploring the ideal private security governance model for the public sector would address these gaps.

Second, prior research revealed a population gap (Miles, 2017; Muller-Bloch & Kranz, 2014) within private security governance research in the Asian context. Systematic literature review indicated that studies on security governance are abundant in the European, American and African contexts (Figure 2.2). Previous conceptual-based Eurocentric case studies on security governance models (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010; Ehrhart, 2013; Stoker, 1998; Krahmann, 2003; Webber et al., 2004) lay strong fundamentals for private security literature.

Meanwhile, security governance literature in Asia covers regional security governance (Zimmerman, 2016; Banerjee, 2009; Jetschke, 2011; Caballero-Anthony, 2020; Tan, 2020; Keling, Mohamed & Suhib, 2016), democratic norms (Howe, 2017), Gurkhas (Chisholm & Stachowitsch, 2016), nontraditional security challenges (Zimmerman, 2016), good governance (Banerjee, 2009) and global governance (Howe, 2012). Very little research has been done on private security governance in the Asian context (Kim, Button & Lee, 2018). This research encompassing pluralistic public and private governors of private security in Malaysia is essential in addressing the inadequately represented Asian security governors' population gap in the literature.

Likewise, limited researchers have indulged in examining private security governance in the public sector's security context. Recent emerging studies of private security governance were mostly done on maritime security (Aarstad, 2016), airport security (Berndtsson & Stern, 2011), civil security (Liao, 2012), space security (Bures, 2016;

Alexandru, 2019), regional security (Allison & Taylor, 2017; Obamamoye, 2020; Caballero-Anthony, 2020) and global governance (Krahmann, 2017). In the United States, security governance in public sector is associated with critical infrastructure and key asset categories (Smith, Schmallegger & Siegel, 2016; Nemeth, 2017; Jones, 2007). Whereas in the Middle East, modular security provisions dominated by public governing actors were present (Volinz, 2018). In the Asian context, the studies were on nontraditional security threats (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018) and people-oriented security (Howe, 2012; Liao, 2012; Banerjee, 2009). Thus, this research would spark new insights into private security governance in the public sector in a narrow governance context.

Thirdly, a review of the literature revealed a methodological gap (Miles, 2017; Muller-Bloch & Kranz, 2014) in which the security governance model utilised in European-based security governance by Ehrhart (2013) was prescribed for further analysis with the reflection of security governors. Hence, this research stood as the explorative case study through in-depth interviews by modifying Ehrhart's (2013) security governance model in addressing this gap. Security governance literature lacks systematic review approaches observant within this literature up to date. Meanwhile, the systematic literature review approach adheres to the review protocol (Mohamed, Samsuddin & Abu Samah, 2020) utilised in this research to address this methodological gap.

Finally, knowledge gaps on challenges from private security governance limitedly addressed in the literature (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010; Kamarulnizam, 2010), which will be attempted in this research. Kamarulnizam (2010) specified governance as an emerging threat to Malaysia. Research has later emerged on the proliferation of threats

associated with private security actors (Smith, Schmallegger & Siegel, 2016; Lee, 2014; Westermeyer, 2013; Dunway, 2010; Krahmann, 2005). However, factors due to private security governance in public sector and the governance process required for a comprehensive view of private security governance. This research attempts to bridge this knowledge gap.

1.9 Operational Definition

1.9.1 Dimensions of Security Governance

The security governance dimensions are intangible common elements exhibited in the system, structure and operation of security governance. There are 20 dimensions unearthed from literature of security governance; actor, regulation, institution, state, geography, functional, objective, cooperation, compliance, decision-making, problem-solving, resource, effectiveness, implementation, threat, norm, interest, authority, power and legitimacy.

1.9.2 Mode of Security Provision

Mode is defined as particular type of provision allowed by private security in public premises. There are five types of modes in this study; Layered, Hybrid, Technology aided, Single and Human Centred.

1.9.3 Private Governing Agency

Private governing agencies are all referred as non-state governors. They are industry-based agencies in charge of regulating private security companies operating in the Malaysian public sector. At the national level, the Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA), also known as PIKM and PPKKM, is the only private governing agency recognised by the Ministry of Home Affairs. APSA and ASIS also represent

the private security industry in Malaysia. The government agencies have engaged with MSIA to set training standards for private security guards (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2007; Alwi, 2016).

1.9.4 Private Security Actor

The private security actors are also referred as non-state security actors. The private security actors are the private security guards hired by the private security companies legally licensed with the Ministry of Home Affairs, possessing or have possessed license 2(A) under the Private Agencies Act 1971 (Alwi, 2016). These actors are appointed on a contractual basis in the public sector government agencies via outsourcing practices (Ministry of Finance, 2017). The function of private security actors includes protecting government assets (Chief Government Security Office, 2013; Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2016). The private security actors are also regarded as the third line of defence of the country (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010a).

1.9.5 Private Security Company

The private security company is among the multiple private security providers listed by scholars (Wulf, 2002; Singer, 2003; Avant, 2005; Jager & Kummel, 2007; Dempsey, 2011; McCrie, 2017). Private security is regarded as a civilian (Goddard, 2001) profit-oriented industry (Hess, 2009; Schreier & Caparini, 2005). Private security companies in Malaysia operate via three category licenses, 2(A), 2(B) and 2 (A& B), under Private Agencies Act 1971. However, private security companies referred to in this study, particularly for their operation in the public sector, are defined as profit-driven civilian companies with 2(A) license under the Private Agencies Act 1971 by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Malaysia, 1971).

These private security companies in the public sector are conducting functions of protection of assets (Ortiz, 2007; Goddard, 2001), protection of physical government premises (De Waard, 1999; Cunningham, Strauchs & Meter, 1991; Elms & Philips, 2009), hired on contractual basis (De Waard, 1999; Elms & Philips, 2009; Goddard, 2001) either as armed or unarmed (Avant, 2005; Schwartz, 2011; Joras & Schuster, 2008; Burt, 2012). The private security providers in Malaysia are governed by both public and private governing agencies.

1.9.6 Private Security Governance

Private security governance in this study is defined as the process of governing private security by the public and private governing agencies. Here, private security governance is portrayed using three components; prerequisites, structure and consequences with multiple governance dimensions. The structural component reveals the actors involved in the governance process, compliance mechanisms, resource management and cooperation between governors. The underlying norms, interests and agenda for governance are regarded as prerequisite components. Meanwhile, the consequences component is composed of legitimacy and challenges associated with private security in the public sector.

1.9.7 Provision of Security

Provision of security referred to companies that provide protection, safety and security for government assets; including premises and personnel. Private security services are hired by government to safeguard these assets. In general, the study looks into the mode of provision, function and regulation of private security.

1.9.8 Public Governing Agency

Public governing agencies are defined as state governors; the government agencies regulating private security companies operating in the Malaysian public sector. The national-level public governors are the Chief Government Security Office, Ministry of Home Affairs, Royal Malaysian Police, National Security Council and Ministry of Finance. These agencies, directly and indirectly, regulate private security in the public sector.

1.9.9 Public Sector

Malaysia is a Parliamentary Democratic country with a Constitutional Monarchy (Parliament of Malaysia, 2017) that has state and federal government systems. Article 127 of the Federal Constitution supports the power disbursement between the legislative, judiciary and executive branches; monarchs' rule, yet the Prime Minister vested the power as the Head of Government (Malaysia, 1957). Thus, the public sector in this study would be referred to the entire Ministries under the executive branch, including the Prime Minister's Department bound by federal legislation. The state government would not be covered in this study.

1.9.10 Public Security Actor

Public security actors for this research are also referred to as state security actors encompassing Auxiliary Police, Inhouse Security Officers and Volunteer Corps. Auxiliary Police's mission is to provide public safety, security, as well as property and their duty as stipulated in Section 3 (3) Police Act 1967 (Royal Malaysia Police, 2020). In house security officers are in charge of comprehensive security for their personnel, physical, document and information technology (Chief Government

Security Office, 2013). Volunteer Corps assist the security forces, traffic control and community service, as well as protect federal and state government and even private properties per Act 752 (Laws of Malaysia, 2012). The Ministry of Home Affairs regarded the state actors as the first layer in reducing public crime (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010b).

1.9.11 Public Sector's Security

Public sectors include all Ministries under the executive branch, including the Prime Minister's Department and their sub-agencies nationwide. Security for the public sector for this research encompasses the comprehensive security criterion mentioned by Chief Government Security Office (2013). Public sector security extends beyond the physical premise and assets to the personnel and documentation covered by government agencies (Chief Government Security Office, 2013). Security for the public sector is provided by the Inhouse security officers, Volunteer Corps, Auxiliary Police and private security guards.

1.10 Organization of Chapter

Chapter 1 introduces the research background, problem statement, research objectives, significance of the study, scope, theory, research gap and operational definition.

Chapter 2 presents the systematic literature on security governance and pluralisation of security. The systematic literature review presents the model, dimensions, theories and variations between security governance interpretations. The private security was reviewed in terms of providers, functions and the issues raised at national and

international levels. These combined reviews sculpted the security governance conceptual framework to guide data collection and data analysis stages.

Chapter 3 presents the general blueprint of how the research is conducted. Justification of qualitative methods, research design, data collection methods and designation of interview protocol is briefly explained. The final section explains the adapted qualitative data analysis method from the coding procedures to the validation practices utilised in this research.

Chapter 4 begins with the profiling of respondents and cases. Analysis of findings organised by research questions and three case analyses. The chapter concludes with a cross-case analysis of five emerging themes on private security governance in the Malaysian public sector.

Chapter 5 briefly discusses the findings by research objective sequences where the researcher attempted to relate brief findings in regard to the literature. The chapter concludes by forming an ideal governance model for private security in the public sector.

Chapter 6 recapitulates the findings by research questions to draw general conclusions. Further, the contribution to methodology and body of knowledge is explained. Besides, the limitations of current research are also reported in this chapter. Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations for practitioners and future studies.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter endeavours to explain a systematic review of literature on Security governance, Malaysian private security industry and Governance of private security in Malaysia. The scope of security governance is approached via a systematic review method by adhering to a carefully detailed review protocol. The method begins with the search and selection strategy, data extraction strategy and synthesis strategy.

The systematic review begins with transition from government to governance, variations within security governance models and dimensions. The background studies of Malaysian private security industry begins with the role of government, security model within public sector premise and the existence of security providers. This chapter concludes with the adaptation of security governance as the conceptual framework for this study.

2.1 Systematic Review of Literature

The literature gathered for this research was systematically reviewed and backed by the traditional review of supporting literature. A systematic literature review is an alternative appraisal method to traditional review in evaluating an existing body of knowledge and research gaps (Mohamed, Samsuddin & Abu Samah, 2020). Besides, it is a systematic process from the organisation of procedures (Higgins et al., 2011) to

extensive search methods with predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria (Robinson & Lowe, 2015). Thus, the systematic review method adds transparency to the research, especially the methodological part (Greyson et al., 2019; Haddaway & Macura, 2018). The systematic review method was then adapted in this study to extensively review the evidence relevant to the research question and provide a wholesome knowledge of security governance. After that, the research gaps were addressed and the conceptual framework was initiated via this review method.

Systematic review method was adopted in reviewing the materials on security governance, the core element of this research. At the same time, a traditional approach was utilised to further elaborate the commodification of security, provision of security to the public sector and private security in the public sector. This research utilised a review protocol with an established research question, search strategy, selection strategy, data extraction strategy, synthesis method and dissemination strategy (Appendix 1).

The systematic review focused on garnering the literature on security governance with a time frame limitation from any time to 2020 and the restriction imposed on language preferences. An intensive search from 22 online databases accompanied by a reference tracking method gave rise to 188 articles utilised in this review process. The materials gathered were then reviewed by the NVivo Pro 12, computer-aided software.

Search Strategy

A systematic searching method includes identification, screening, eligibility and inclusiveness (Mohamed, Samsuddin & Abu Samah, 2020). The identification stage

in this study was initialised with the determination of search terms governance OR governing OR government OR state OR public OR private in the online databases. As indicated by Mohamed, Samsuddin and Abu Samah (2020), synonyms and word variations were assimilated to improve the search techniques throughout Ebscco Host, World Scientific, Science Direct, Cambridge Core, Sage, Project MUSE, ACM Digital Library, ERIC, Jstor, Proquest, Elsevier Scopus, Wiley Online Library, Taylor & Francis, J Gate Plus, Henry Stewart, Directory Open Access Journal, PubMed, Emerald Insight, IEEE Explore and MyCite, which involved about 54,159 materials.

Besides, the grey literature from Microsoft Academics, Google Scholar and Gen Lib were also integrated into the materials gathered (Mohamed, Samsuddin & Abu Samah, 2020). Additionally, 259 materials were gathered using reference tracking, as well as forward and backward search strategies. A total number of 58,551 materials were identified through this process. The additional materials on security, private security, the commodification of security and the provision of security to the public sector were initialised by scoping the subject expert from academic articles, reviews and conference papers from online databases, Google Scholar and websites of organisations. Reference tracking assisted the process of conglomerating the resources of these private securities all around the world.

Screening and Selection

The subsequent screening process specified the inclusion and exclusion criteria imposed on security governance materials. Reports, theses, editorials, transcribed speeches, books, book chapters, scholarly publications, case reports, peer-reviewed journal articles, conference proceedings, speeches, meetings, transcripts and

interviews were accepted for this review. At the same time, the exclusion criteria prohibited short communication, book review, editorial, conference info, encyclopedia, correspondence, website, essays, instruction guidelines, audio-video clips, company profiles, blogs, commentary, credit, news and acknowledgement notes from being included in this review. The first screening on language preference (Bahasa Malaysia and English only) and title omitted 58,075 articles. English and Bahasa Malaysia language restrictions were imposed, resulting in the omission of a few materials.

From the remaining 476 materials, 92 duplicate records were shed. The second screening eliminated 196 materials; 180 materials after the abstract and 16 after the full-text reading. Some irrelevant materials to the current research scope were omitted after reading full abstracts; critical space infrastructure (Alexandru, 2019), Neo public governance (Bao et al., 2013), critical infrastructure and national security (Bogdan, 2019), public-private partnership (Bures, 2016), new public management and contracting security (Carlos, 2010), Gurkha security (Chisholm, 2014), homeland security (Lee, 2014), security expenditure (Gupta & Sriram, 2018) and private security event database (Avant & Neu, 2019). Finally, 188 articles were retrieved from 1992 to 2020 for a systematic review of security governance. The screening and selection summary is presented in Figure 2.1.

Extraction And Synthesis

The selected materials were detailed by document type, publisher, country, study scope and insights on security governance. The retrieved information from this systematic review using the NVivo Pro 12 were coded into 177 nodes and then analysed to

produce conceptualisations on security governance, security governance models and the dimensions of security governance. The gathered information was then further synthesised to present the pattern of publications, interpretations and all the other emerging trends in security governance.

2.1.1 Pattern of Publication

The publication of security governance literature exhibited a noteworthy trend after 2000. The researchers in this field accelerated in 2010 and onwards. However, a steadily growing interest emerged after 2005 and sustained to date. Approximately, six years between 2010 to 2016 marked the golden era for security governance-related research. In terms of regional publication patterns, Europe is setting a stable trend over the years and remains top in researching security governance contexts. This is followed by America and Africa-based literature. Meanwhile, researchers in the Asian context are emerging steadily from 2007 onwards up to date. Middle East and Australia have the lowest researchers in security governance. The publication pattern of security governance literature across the region is presented in Figure 2.2.

The published studies captured via the online databases and reference tracking were predominantly journal articles. Security governance is an emerging research scope and gained much attention from scholars and has been published as conceptual papers, review articles and case studies in journals. A total of 77 articles were published from the year 1992 to 2020. The top four journals publishing security governance-related literature in descending order would be (i) European Security, (ii) Conflict, Security and Development, (iii) Cooperation and Conflict and (iv) International Peacekeeping.




Figure 2. 1 *The Systematic Searching, Screening and Selection of Literature for this research*




Figure 2. 2 Publication Pattern in Security Governance Across Regions
Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review

Books were ranked the second most literature types present but mostly centred either around international context or European based. However, books published about the Asian context emerged after 2014 (Heiduk, 2014; Zimmerman, 2016; Institute of Policy Studies, 2019). Reports from international organisations and government initiatives also enriched the security governance literature and ranked third after the books (Allan, 2010; Sotlar, 2009; Buzatu & Buckland, 2015; Bagayoko, 2010, 2012, 2019). Fewer dissertations suited to the security governance context were obtained throughout this process. The type of publications in security governance is presented in Figure 2.3.




Figure 2. 3 Type of Publication in Security Governance
Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review

2.2 Security Governance Theory

Conglomeration of security and governance gave rise to Security Governance Theory. Hence, this section briefly analyses security governance as the transformation from government to governance of security. Further, interpretations of security governance and variant strands of security governance theory explored.

Government to Governance

The government is regarded as a sovereign, centralised political authority (Krahmann, 2005) having an actual existence in terms of physicality, legality and normality (Stoker, 1998) with a top-down, hierarchical administrative structure (Rosenau et al., 1992). According to Stoker (1998), a government is related to its capacity for decision-making through formal and institutional processes to preserve the country's order through collective action. The central political authority of government is disbursed upwards, sideways and downwards (Rosenau et al., 1992).

The government's definition is not restricted by the geographical territorial but has extended its wings to the regional and global levels. Government stands as a single entity and is portrayed as a plural component at the international level (Webber et al., 2004) when multiple governments work together. At the international level, the government tends to be a vertical and non-hierarchical platform for interaction between governments (Risse 2004 quoted in Webber et al., 2004). Thus, the government's political authority surpasses its national authoritarian power, resulting in the absence of a central government at the international level (Rosenau et al., 1992).

	DEGREE OF FRAGMENTATION	
DIMENSIONS	'Government' - centralised authority	'Governance'- fragmented authority
Geographical scope	states	subnational national regional global
Functional scope	several issue areas	single issue areas
Distribution of resources	centralised	dispersed
Interests	common	differentiated
Norms	sovereignty command + control redistribution	limited sovereignty self-government market
Decision-making	hierarchical consensus formal equality	horizontal negotiation inequality
Implementation	centralised authoritative coercive	fragmented self-enforced voluntary

Figure 2. 4 Krahmann's Model from Government to Governance
(Source: Krahmann 2001,2005)

The roots of governance have been interpreted differently by scholars from multiple disciplines. Osborne and Gaebler (1995) regarded governance alongside the New Public Management perspective, which is a smoother transition to a market-oriented society. Rosenau et al. (1992) defined the multiplication of actors and stakeholders due to globalisation as raising the demand for governance (Young & Young, 1999). Meanwhile, Kooiman and Van Vliet (1993) introduced multiple actors into the concept

of governance and stressed it as a process governing their interaction between them. The Commission on Global Governance (1995) regarded governance as the wholesome way of managing public and private actors for a common purpose involving formal institutions and regimes.

Rhodes (1996) introduced governance as a change in government, a new governing method. Stoker (1998) progressed the governance term into political and economic aspects; the government's decision-making responsibility is dispersed to be inclusive of private bodies, while governance is a way of reducing the government's financial commitments. Smouth (1998) remarked on governance with the multiplied decision-making organisations. Additionally, Rosenau (2000) improvised his meanings on governance by incorporating the power dependency feature among the multiple actors through collective action in a complex governance structure. Pierre (2000) marked governance as the evolution from state-centric to transnational societies, indicating the shift to global governance.

Webber et al. (2004) explained governance as having five features; heterarchy (interaction between public-private actors), institutionalism (formal and informal), the relation between actors, norms and collective purpose. Governance is regarded as "*coordinated management and regulation of issue by multiple, separate authorities, intervention by both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements, towards particular policy outcome and bonded by discourse*" (Webber et al., 2004). Unlike the government, governance allows regulation interference at multiple levels, from the firm, industry, national and regional to the international level (Bryden & Caparini, 2006).

Krahmann (2005) defined governance in several dimensions, especially in the process of policymaking; (i) the first dimension on geographical scope manifests transition to regional, global and transnational policy-making (ii) the second dimension insinuates the proliferation of actors in functional scope (iii) the third dimension on fragmented resources, (iv) the fourth dimension demonstrate non-hierarchical, horizontal and consensual structure in decision making, (v) the fifth dimension on divergent interest and (vi) the sixth on thrive towards the collective common norm. According to Biermann (2006), governance is the approach by public and private individuals and institutions to manage their common affairs and continuing process, including formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements agreed to be perceived by people and institutions.

Governance is the transferring of the state's authority to the private sector to enhance efficiency in public administration (Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009). Daase and Friesendorf (2010) revealed governance via three dimensions; (i) Structure of Agency consisting of both public and private security actors; (ii) Mode of Cooperation implemented through network and public-private partnerships and (iii) Structure of Compliance monitored through interest alignment. Zurn (2010) utilised multiple policy actors and forms of regulations to define governance. Furthermore, governance is mentioned as a comprehensive, durable, intense level of interaction, cooperation and coordination between actors via informal and formal engagement mechanisms (Corbero & Schroeder, 2011). The government's homogenous, static stakeholders transform into a multiplied, non-homogenous and dynamic category (Ranito, 2019).

Malaysia is a Parliamentary Democratic country with a Constitutional Monarchy (Parliament of Malaysia, 2017) and the political power centralised to the federal government by Article 127 of the Federal Constitution. The Prime Minister vested the power as the Head of Government (Malaysia, 1957) with clearly defined power disbursement through the legislative, judiciary and executive branches. Until the early 1980s, the public sector's security was the sole responsibility of the government and public security actors to cater for the need for sovereign norms and national interests.

Governance for the public sector's security is deeply associated with privatisation policy and comprehensive defence (HANRUH) policy. These acts became the precursor to bringing in new actors, especially private sector engagement in the security sector (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1991; Ministry of Defence, 2010) where privatisation was contrary to nationalism (Tjiptoherijano, 2012). The public sector, which had previously been an economic growth engine, now became a facilitator to the private sector (Siti, 2008; Sarji, 1994). Public monopolies were opened for private (Wan Abdullah, 2010). In 1985, the security for the public sector was offered to be outsourced to the private sector (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1985). The emergence of both private and public in the provision and governance of private security indicates the governance structure (Malaysia, 2009).

2.2.1 Interpretations of Security Governance

The trend of security governance conceptualisation evolved over the years from structure-based to outcome-based interpretations. The earlier definitions were more interested in defining the multiple security actors and erosion of state central authority (Webber et al., 2004; Krahmann, 2003). Then, the researchers focused on the

interactions between these diverse actors in achieving common goals (Kirchner, 2006; Zurn, 2010; Avant & Sigelman, 2010). The evolution continued to merge in attributes of addressing security challenges and responsibility in providing security for people and nations (Ebo, 2007; Keith et al., 2013; Caballero-Anthony, 2020).

Table 2. 1
Interpretations of Security Governance

AUTHOR	INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE
Krahmann (2003)	"Public and private actors coordinate their interdependent needs and interests in absence of central political authority."
Bryden & Caparini (2006)	"Modes by which security is provided, managed and overseen...management of actors beyond state"
Kirchner (2006)	"Coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, public and private actors via formal and informal arrangements, structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes"
Wood & Dupont (2006)	"shape, influence conduct of individual, group, population to security objective"
Ebo (2007)	"multidimensional and multi-actor process in steering the state and society under democratic control for freedom from fear"
Adler & Greve (2009)	"System of rule coordinating, managing, and regulating individual and corporate actor in response to threats to their physical and ontological security"
Avant, Finnemore & Sell (2010)	"Delegation of power to institutions as governors in solving problems, changing outcomes."
Daase & Friesendorf (2010)	"Performed by multiple actors for security for states, social groups and individuals by pooling strength and expertise."
Schroeder (2010)	"Hierarchical and non-hierarchical, political steering and oversight mechanism ...fragmented political authority and decision-making structure... pluralised security actors with legitimate use of force."

AUTHOR	INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE
Berndtsson & Stern (2011)	“Different security actors work in close proximity with overlapping and contradictory responsibility at national, regional and global levels”
Bagayoko (2012)	“Complex amalgam of statutory and non-statutory actors and institutions”
Howe (2012)	“process where collective security generated”
Ehrhart (2013)	"Coordination with different actors in providing security in a globalised and interdependent world"
Keith et al. (2013)	"Reorganising public and private authorities, regulatory agencies and resources to manage persons, things and processes that are deemed dangerous."
Abrahamsen (2016)	“Assembled interactions and competition between myriad actors and institutions”
Ceccorulli, Frappi & Lucarelli (2017)	“Cooperation and coordination effort in addressing complex challenges at local, regional and global levels”

The interpretation of security governance has been associated with sociological and political contexts. From a sociological perspective, plurality of security actors (Bagayoko, 2012; Berndtsson & Stern, 2011; Liao, 2012; Daase & Friesendorf, 2010), their coordination mechanisms (Abrahamsen, 2016; Adler & Greve, 2009; Howe, 2012; Ceccorulli, Frappi & Lucarelli, 2017; Ehrhart, 2013) in addressing societal issues and challenges (Aziani, Favarin & Campedelli, 2020; Adler & Greve, 2009; Ebo, 2007) are often highlighted. Whereas in a political context, the interpretations are associated with the delegation of state power (Avant & Sigelman, 2010; Ebo, 2007; Abrahamsen & William, 2008), hierarchical and non-hierarchical structure (Schroeder, 2010; Webber et al., 2004; Ceccorulli et al., 2010) and fragmentation of

authority (Krahmann, 2003). Christou et al. (2010) incorporated the constructivist perspective of security governance via multiple actors.

Among these interpretations, Ceccorulli et al. (2010) provided a comprehensive view of security governance. The acknowledgement of new institutional structure, processes, structure of governance, instruments and proliferating actors are freshly quoted here (Ceccorulli et al., 2010). The presence of actors, authorities, purpose, norms as well as formal and informal structure makes the interpretation of Kirchner (2006) rich in context. Following that, Schroeder (2010) has a sensible definition of state centred view on security governance, which explains the political fragmentation of authority and force. However, the conceptualisation by Krahmann (2003) and Webber et al. (2004) incorporating security actors, formal and informal structures, common goals and interests are the early bases for the evolving security governance definitions. Some of the interpretations of security governance over the years are presented in Table 2.1.

2.2.2 Variants of Security Governance

Governance of security research in diverse contexts and regions has resulted in the emergence of variants; democratic governance, good governance, normative governance, insecurity governance, preventive governance, narrow governance, multilevel governance, private governance, global governance, regional governance, hybrid governance, network governance, security assemblage, security community, multilateral governance, self-regulation, self-governance, wide governance, substantive governance and modular governance.

The discipline of security governance has been explored from multiple paradigms and methods. According to Kamarulnizam (2010), the realist paradigm has dominated policy-making in Malaysia since early statehood. The realism concept stresses the importance of power by a nation and the equity power between parties (Holsti, 1992 cited in Keling, Mohamed & Suhib 2016). Lennox (2008) concluded that realism, institutionalism, constructivism and pluralism would be required in exploring the context of power, order, norms and the manifestation of world order in normative governance.

Westermeyer (2013) conglomerated the previous governance concepts into a proper framework and further elaborated Wide governance, Narrow governance and Normative governance. Substantive governance by Kirchner and Sperling (2017) has been further absorbed into the narrow and wide governance terms, respectively. The normative governance concept would be merged with the propositions as elaborated by Kirchner and Sperling (2017), as well as Westermeyer (2013). Hence, security governance theories related to this research can be classified into Wide Security Governance, Narrow Security Governance and Normative Security Governance (Sperling & Webber, 2017; Westermeyer, 2013).

This study is interested in the transformation of centralised state control to the governance of private security. Thus, a narrow governance approach was used for this research. The application of narrow governance for Malaysian private security remarks the utilisation for a democratic Asian country. Two prior works of literature have utilised the theory in exploring German private security actors performing intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) tasks in Afghanistan (Westermeyer, 2013) and

as a conceptual paper to brief varying government power (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010). Therefore, the conceptual frameworks designed based on review wisdom would further guide research in elaborating security governance models to clarify the research objectives. Further, governance dimensions in articulating the private security operation in government agencies are indeed a novel contribution to existing literature.

2.3 Security Governance Models and Dimensions

The emergence of security governance models set a stable pace within 20 years period since 2000, but mostly Eurocentric (Krahmann 2001, 2005; Button, 2007; Kirchner, 2007; Ehrhart, 2013; Westermeyer, 2012; Bevir, 2016). Security governance models have gained much attention from 2003 onwards and drastically improved from 2010 onwards. Many models on the governance of security have been published in the European region, followed by America, Asia and Africa in descending order. Most models were generalised for the international context without adhering to any specific region. The Eurocentric governance models have been obvious all around the world, but the Asian context is also noteworthy (Liao, 2012; Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018).

Krahmann's (2001) model of fragmentation between government and governance in exploring the European security governance is regarded as crucial for this research. Krahmann (2005) utilized the model in North America and European context; concluded that the fragmented system of government has contributed to eroded transparency, accountability control and efficiency in the region. The model discovered by Webber et al. (2004) investigate the Europeanisation and transformation of NATO. Interaction between public and private actors, structured by norms and

collective purpose, is the first three features. Meanwhile, the presence of formal and informal institutions and heterarchy are the rest of the governance features.




Figure 2. 5 Context of Security Governance Models
Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review

The security governance by Johnston and Shearing (2003) emphasises the actors, objective setting, implementation, mechanism, resources and regulations. Kirchner's (2007) model of assessing European Union stands upon functions and instruments. The objective of governance revolves around institution-building and conflict resolution, whereas persuasion and coercion are the moderating techniques used. The contribution of Kirchner (2007) could be assimilated in the context of analysing security governance policies in brief.

The structure of security governance model proposed by Daase and Friesendorf (2010) are rooted in two pillars; the policy and role of a national government. In terms of policy making and implementation, the model determines to investigate (i) the content

of policy, (ii) structure of agency, (iii) mode of cooperation and (iv) compliance mechanism. The varied role of a national government in security governance provides three basic governance modi; government, co-governance and self-governance (Zurn, 2010; Daase & Friesendorf, 2010).

Table 2. 2
Westermeyer's Security Governance Model

Policy Dimension (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010)	Governance Dimension (Krahmann, 2005)	Concern
Structure of Agency	Geographical Scope	Who are the relevant actors in today's armed conflicts?
	Functional Scope	
Mode of Cooperation	Distribution of Resources	How are military functions conducted?
	Decision Making	
	Implementation	
Structure of Compliance	Interest	Why do actors observe their obligations?

(Source: Westermeyer, 2013)

The security governance model by Westermeyer (2013) is derived based on governance theory and conceptualisation of security privatisation. This model consists of governance structure, cooperation and compliance mechanism, inspired by Daase and Friesendorf (2010) and Krahmann (2008). Westermeyer (2013) utilised the model in examining the structure of governing agencies, mode of cooperation between security actors and the compliance mechanism of German private intelligence and surveillance reconnaissance service in Afghanistan.

The contribution of Liao (2012) on six dimensions of security governance utilised in Chinese civil protection was inspired by Krahmann (2001, 2005) and Webber et al. (2004). The first dimension of security actors is geographically spread with definite

responsibilities. The evolution of authority from the top-down to bottom-up in governance is regarded as the second dimension. Third, the channel on how authority, power and hierarchy are outstripped by trust and common purpose. The form of management style is the fourth dimension, whereas model and context-specific is the fifth dimension. The final dimension refers to the scope, which is the geographical context.

Table 2. 3

Daase & Friesendorf's Comparison Modi of Governance

Dimension	Concern	Government	Co-Governance	Self-Governance
Structure of Agency	Who are the relevant actors?	State	Public / Private security actors	Private security actors
Mode of Cooperation	How is the policy carried out?	Hierarchy	Network/ PPP	Market
Structure of Compliance	Why do actors obey their obligations?	Force	Interest Alignment	Demand and Supply

(Source: Daase & Friesendorf, 2010)

The security governance model is approached from the perspective of process by Ehrhart (2013) who categorised it into prerequisites, structures and consequences. The requirement of interest, goals, norms and ideas are referred to as prerequisites for security governance. The structure of governance is divided into actors, cooperation and compliance, whereas Consequences into effectiveness and legitimacy. The framework assesses internal and external governance. Ehrhart (2013) suggested that the model requires power and legitimacy before being adapted to diverse contexts.

The decentred security governance by Bevir (2016) blossomed from the fragmented nature of the state and increasing networks between security actors. This pattern of governance is interpreted by the security actors and is closely related to the reforms in policy practices. Meanwhile, Garcia (2016) enacted a preventive security governance framework concerning technology in an international context. Hameiri, Jones and Sandor (2018) explored the politics of transforming state, scope and level of threat in Asian and African contexts. The highlights on non-traditional security issues and state transformation are the recent trends in security governance literature.

Table 2. 4

Ehrhart's Security Governance Model

Prerequisites	Structures	Consequences
Interest and Goals • Hidden agendas? • Hegemonic interests?	Constellation of actors • Who is excluded?	Effectiveness • Unintended effects? • Pathologies?
Norms and ideas • Contestation? Whose norms? • Deliberation or domination?	Mode of Cooperation • De factor hierarchies?	Legitimacy • Accountability? • Acceptance?
	Compliance Mechanisms • Coercion and control?	

(Source: Ehrhart, 2013)

The model by Ehrhart (2013) is considered comprehensive, enveloping most of the governance dimensions into prerequisite, structure and consequence. However, it still lacks several dimensions of state, regulation, institution (Webber et al., 2004), threat (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018) and power (Webber et al., 2004; Liao, 2012). Krahmann's (2005) geographical and functional concerns and Daase and Friesendorf's (2010) structure of the agency, mode of cooperation and compliance mechanism enclosed within the structure of governance by Ehrhart (2013).

Security Governance Dimensions

The review of security governance literature and the security governance models exhibited some common elements. The critically reviewed elements were tabulated into dimensions as in Appendix 5. The actor is the most prominent dimension in security governance models and literature. Security governance is associated with the proliferation of actors (Krahmann, 2005; Kamarulnizam, 2010) and diverse actors (Ebo, 2007; Bryden & Caparini, 2006; Ehrhart, Hegemann & Kahl, 2014; Zwolski, 2014).

The challenges associated with security governance is an emerging dimension that could be clustered into four variants; (i) challenges caused by governance (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010; Ehrhart, Hegemann & Kahl, 2014), (ii) challenges caused by non-state actors (Bures & Carrapico, 2018; Ebo, 2007), (iii) challenges catered by security governance (Kirchner & Dominguez, 2014; Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing, 2003) and (iv) challenges to critical infrastructure (Lee 2014; Smith, Schmallegger & Siegel, 2016).

The functionality of the governance is associated with the role of actors within security governance. Besides, governance objectives are achieved via cooperation, decision-making, implementation and compliance mechanisms. The dimensions of legitimacy, problem-solving and effectiveness have been explored less than the other dimensions. Some of these dimensions have also been incorporated into the security governance model as presented in Table 2 (Appendix 5).

2.4 Malaysian Private Security Industry

2.4.1 The Role of Government

The provision of security to the public sector, government premises and buildings in Malaysia have evolved since its Independence. This transformation has been realised through the evolution of government policies and security actors in public premises (Jabatan Perdana Menteri 1985, 1991). The provision of security, which was the sole responsibility of the government and public actors, evolved to be inclusive of private security actors (Public Accounts Committee, 2014). This remarkable transformation was explored through the pluralistic lens by many researchers (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Jones & Newburn, 1998; Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Loader & Walker, 2007), adapted for the following section to brief transformation from monopolistic to pluralistic model in Malaysian public sector.

In Malaysia, national and defence policies signify the protection of critical infrastructures to avoid geopolitical and socio-economic instability and holistic security of the nation (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2019). However, the prioritisation of Malaysian public sector as wholesome is still blurred, neither classified as critical infrastructure nor key asset. Thus, this research explores the weightage of the public sector and the justification for private security providers.

A considerable amount of literature has been published on the government's exclusive role in security provision (Bryden & Caparini, 2006; Ebo, 2007; Burt, 2012). Mehra (2012) and Lee (2014) emphasised the state's duty to protect an organisation and its people against physical threats. After Independence, the Malaysian government strengthened their public security team to withstand external confrontation (Prime Minister Department, 1965). The Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985 specified the

undeniable role of public security forces in maintaining national sovereignty (Prime Minister Department, 1981). Before 1985, security provisions has been conducted only by public security actors, *Jaga* and in-house security actors (KP) (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam 1991, 2002, 2009, 2013).

Similarly, government plays a vital role in regulating security (Tonkin, 2013). In Malaysia, the emphasis on security governance by the government is noticed via the election of a Chief Government Security Officer right after Independence (Chief Government Security Office, 2021). In 1999, the circulation of Arahan Keselamatan by CGSO became the compulsory order in governing public sector security (Chief Government Security Office, 2021). The government also coordinates the presence of multiple security actors via acts and regulations. The Ministry of Home Affairs is the head of the Voluntary Corps Department and Royal Malaysia Police that monitors voluntary corps and auxiliary police via the Police Act 1967 and Malaysia Volunteer Forces Act 2012 (Laws of Malaysia 1967, 2012). Besides, private security actors in Malaysia are regulated via the Private Agencies Act 1971 and multiple internal circulars of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Malaysia, 1971; Ministry of Home Affairs 2006, 2007, 2009).

The exclusive role of government is visioned via annual budgets allocated for national defence and security in strengthening their public security actors (Ortiz, 2007). In Malaysia, the budgets allocated for internal security for the First Malaysia Plan exceeded 138% of the previous five years term in strengthening security and defence forces (Prime Minister Department, 1965). The security budget kept increasing for the Second Malaysia Plan (First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) to focus on national building

in the public sector (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2009), marking the dimming exclusiveness of state in security provision.

The evolution of national security policies influenced the reduction of the state's monopoly in security. According to Ebo (2007), the state is withdrawing from its monopolised role in governing security. During the Third Malaysia Plan, the private sector was involved in National Development Policy (Prime Minister Department, 1976). The concept of comprehensive defense (HANRUH), first introduced in 1986 by National Security Council, aspired to include public and private actors (Ministry of Defence, 2010; Keling, Mohamed & Suhib, 2016). Hence, the privatisation move, together with the evolved national security policies, allowed the immersion of private security actors.

2.4.2 Security Model

The provision of security to the public sector can be explained in two major phases; (i) period of monopolistic provision, (ii) period of pluralistic provision. The period for security provision from Independence to 1984 is visualised by the monopolistic model. Meanwhile, the second term from 1985 to 2020 is visualised via the pluralistic model. The 27 years after Independence here are deeply associated with the emergence of two types of public security actors, In-house security actors and *Jaga*. Although another set of public security actors including voluntary corps and auxiliary corps were present during this period, they were not engaged in the public sector's security (Laws of Malaysia 1967, 1972; Malaysia, 2009). Similarly, private security actors have yet to make their entry into the public sector even though their presence is legitimised under Private Agencies Act 1971 (Malaysia, 1971).

Monopolistic Model

The monopolistic security provision began with the election of the first Government Security Officer, representing the In-house security officers' scheme (Federation of Malaya 1958; Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1991). Until 1975, the government prioritised enhancing the strength of public security actors via the First and Second Malaysia Plan (Prime Minister Department 1965, 1971). In 1976, two sets of public security actors were appointed by the Public Service Department via *Jawatankuasa Kabinet 1976* for safeguarding government premises; (i) guards (*Jaga*) as defined by the scheme D46, D45 and (ii) In house security officers regarded as *Pegawai Keselamatan, Penolong Pegawai Keselamatan, Pembantu Keselamatan* and *Pengawal Keselamatan*. Hence, multiple sets of public security actors emerged for the public sector.

Pluralistic Model

Before 1985, the sole responsibility of security provision to public departments in Malaysia was put under the public security actors. The penetration of private security actors in the Malaysian public sector's security was triggered by the enactment of the Privatisation Policy 1985 (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1985) and the concept of Comprehensive Defence (HANRUH) (Ministry of Defence, 2010). The ending phase of the New Economic Policy 1971-1990 stressed reducing public sector size and boosting privatisation (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1986). Meanwhile, the Comprehensive Defence (HANRUH) necessitates the participation of civil authorities, private sector and nongovernmental organisations (Ministry of Defence, 2019). In the early 1990s, private security was immersed in the public sector, notably in the Ministry of Education (Public Accounts Committee, 2014).

In 1991, the enactment of *Sistem Saraan Baru* revised the classification of public security actors; *Jaga* clustered under the *Mahir, Separuh Mahir & Tidak Mahir* categories, whereas the in-house security officers were clustered under *Keselamatan & Pertahanan Awam*. Besides, the scheme and salary for both actors have also been changed; (i) *Jaga* was appointed under Scheme R and (ii) *Pegawai Keselamatan, Penolong Pegawai Keselamatan, Pembantu Keselamatan* and *Pengawal Keselamatan* appointed under scheme KP (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 1991). In 2002, further revisions were made to the salary codes of these security actors (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2002). The multiple public security actors merged back into a single scheme in 2009. The R schemes became obsolete, whereas the remaining guards were absorbed into the KP scheme as *Pengawal Keselamatan* (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2009). The KP scheme has a higher hierarchy compared to the R scheme in public service.

The presence of multiple security actors in safeguarding government assets made the government revise the need for multiple public security actors. In 2009, Public Service Department merged *Jaga, R* into KP scheme (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2009). Then, the need for *Jaga* in the public sector became obsolete. At that time, two distinctive security actors were acknowledged by the government; the in-house security (KP scheme) and the private security guards (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2009). The In-house security officers (*pengawal keselamatan*) defined by the scheme (KP) were appointed for the commission of protective security function (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2009). At the moment, the voluntary corps were present as the third defence of the country and have yet to make their debut in the public sector (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1986).

Voluntary corps is the most recent public security actor hired by the public sector. Since the Fifth Malaysia Plan, the volunteer corps was recognised as the third defence of the country (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1985). Initially, the voluntary corps assisted the operation in alleviating the entry of illegal immigrants (Pendatang Asing Tanpa Izin, PATI) by the Malaysian government from 2005 to 2012 (Volunteer Department of Malaysia, 2020). However, the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2010 encouraged voluntary corps as private security guards (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010b). Additionally, auxiliary police occupy high-risk government buildings and are considered in the cluster of public security actors (Royal Malaysia Police, 2020).

In 2010, Chief Government Security Office further strengthened the public sector security model by appointing Pegawai Keselamatan Jabatan (PKJ) among top management civil servants in each government agency (Chief Government Security Office, 2022). National Defence Policy emphasises the exploitation of economic, social, political, as well as psychological resources and national assets to upgrade the capability of the nation (Abdul Razak 2009 cited in Keling, Mohamed & Suhib, 2016). The Eleventh Malaysia Plan, which emphasises empowering people, further resonates with the CGSO effort (Economic Planning Unit, 2015). Thus, the cohesion of security involving public and private security actors in enhancing the public sector's security is envisioned through the pluralistic model. The evolution from public security actors to a mixture of public and private security actors portrays the pluralistic provision model as in Figure 2.10.

The overall function of these security actors in the public sector differs from each other. From 1976 to 2002, the KP scheme was maintained for security administration, whereas the R scheme was appointed for guarding (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam 1991, 2002, 2013). KP scheme was then appointed to perform protective security functions in the public sector (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2016). Private security companies are the only private security actor in Malaysia that guard and protect government assets in public sector security (Malaysia 2009, 2016, 2017). Auxiliary police are hired by specific government agencies, primarily based on the risk condition of the premise (Royal Malaysia Police, 2020). Voluntary corps are disputed to replace the need for private security guards in certain government premises but are mainly seen to perform access control.

There are three critical views in the literature on the transformation from monopolistic to pluralistic security provision. First, the pluralistic provision of security is a sign of a weakened nation-state (Goldstein, 2012). The decay of the state's role in security is also associated with the rise of private security actors (Burt, 2012; Ortiz, 2007) and privatisation practices (Krahmann, 2010). Second, the emergence of a risk society created the pluralisation of security (Bryden & Caparini, 2006). In Malaysia, the pluralised security provision could not be much associated with the weakened nation-state and the emergence of a risk society. However, the rise of private security industry is strongly linked to the privatisation practice (Krahmann, 2010).

Third, even though private and public actors are involved in the provision of security, the public security actors are more emphasised in the pluralistic model. According to scholars, public police collectively enhance security (Fleming & Wood, 2006), while

public actors remain as anchors of security (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Marks & Goldsmith, 2006). Brodeur (2010) viewed the pluralistic model from the view of private security actors operating within the policing web. For the Malaysian context, the policies exhibit segregation of function between private and public security actors, but further review of the literature on functions might enlighten more on this.




Figure 2. 7 Transformation of Public Sector's Security in Malaysia
Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review

2.5 Security Provider

The pluralistic security model allows the co-existence of public and private security actors in the public sector. The following section further explains the functionality and regulatory mechanism of these actors.

2.5.1 Public Security Actors

There are four types of public security actors identified for the provision of security to the Malaysian public sector, (i) *Jaga*, (ii) In House security (KP), (iii) Auxiliary police and (iv) Voluntary corps as in Table 2.2. *Jaga* is the security guard, a permanent government post appointed by the Public Service Department. Since 1976, *Jaga* has

evolved in salary code and scheme classification thrice via Sistem Saraan Baru and Sistem Saraan Malaysia (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam 1991, 2002, 2013). The *Jaga* identified by the scheme R and defined by their duty of protecting public assets (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2009). The splash of privatisation has urged Public Service Department to abolish *Jaga* and absorb the remaining actors into the KP scheme (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1985; Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2009). Thus, in 2009, the *Jaga* scheme became obsolete.

Table 2. 5
The Public Security Actors in Malaysian Public Sector

Security Actors	<i>Jaga</i>	Inhouse Security	Auxiliary Police	Voluntary Corps
Recruited by	Public Service Department		Royal Malaysian Police	Volunteers
Recruitment mode	Permanent		Based on Agency Request	
Scheme	D (JKK 1976) R (SSB)	A, B, C, D (JKK 1976) KP (SSB, SSM,RSP)	KP	-
Field	<i>Kawalan</i>	<i>Pentadbiran Keselamatan</i>	-	-
Classification	<i>Mahir, Separuh Mahir, Tidak Mahir</i>	<i>Keselamatan & Pertahanan Awam</i>		-
Regulating Agency	Public Service Department	Chief Government Security Office	Royal Malaysian Police	Volunteer Corps Department
Remarks	Obsolete in 2009	Legitimised actor to safeguard government asset	-	-

Second, the in-house security actors are permanent posts recruited by Public Service Department, which has existed since Independence. The Malaysian government

appointed the first Government Security Officer from the in-house security scheme after Independence in 1958 (Federation of Malaya, 1958). The KP scheme also evolved via *Jawatankuasa Kabinet 1976*, *Sistem Saraan Baru*, *Sistem Saraan Malaysia* and *Rasionalisasi Skim Perkhidmatan* in terms of salary code, scheme and classification (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam 1991, 2002, 2013, 2016). These security officers (KP) were placed under Chief Government Security Office under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister's Department. Chief Government Security Office has the fundamental duty of advising the public departments on comprehensive security for their personnel, physical, document and information technology (Chief Government Security Office, 2013).

Third, the Auxiliary Police appointed in the government agencies are bound by the Police Act 1967. Their mission is to provide public safety, security, prosperity and perform their duty as stipulated in Section 3 (3) Police Act 1967. These public actors' functions related to security are (i) Assisting in the protection of life and property; and (ii) Protecting public property from loss or injury (Laws of Malaysia, 1967). Auxiliary police are the supportive force for 137,574 police officers (Royal Malaysia Police, 2020). Even though there are Extra Police Constables, Police Volunteer Reserves and Police Cadets, only Auxiliary Police are common in the public sector.

The functional scope of police can be seen in securing personnel and property as well as preventing losses or damages to these assets under their supervision (Laws of Malaysia, 1967). The Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) have no official legislation mainly imposed on the security of the public sector. There is limited evidence on the

common ground between RMP and the public sector on preference for placing Auxiliary Police or Police in government agencies.

Finally, Voluntary Corps are the most reason actors in the public sector, a volunteer service regulated by the Volunteers Department of Malaysia under the Ministry of Home Affairs. As of March 2017, there are 3,031,852 members appointed nationwide (Volunteer Department of Malaysia, 2020). However, their appointment is voluntary basis. The fundamental duties of the Volunteer corps stipulated in Malaysian Volunteer Corps Act 2012 (Act 752) requires the officers to (i) assist any security force, (ii) assist in traffic control, (iii) help in community service, (iv) protect federal, state government properties and to (v) preserve and protect private properties upon request.

Volunteer corps' presence was noticed since 1972 (Prime Minister Department, 1981) and is constantly acknowledged as supporting the defence layer of the nation (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1986; Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010b; National Security Council, 2020). However, the voluntary corps' favouritism as security actors was only noticed from 2010 onwards (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010b).

2.5.2 Private Security Actor

Private security actors in charge of the provision of security in the public sector are the private security guards. These private security actors are hired by private security companies whom government agencies have hired through outsourcing practices. Private security companies in this context refer to a profit-driven civilian company licensed 2(A) under the Private Agencies Act 1971 by the Ministry of Home Affairs

(Malaysia, 1971). These private security actors' penetration into the Malaysian public sector was legalised through the Privatisation Act 1983.

The General Circular on Guideline on Privatisation for Public Sector invited private sector participation in security and defence (Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1985). This outsourcing practice boosted the exponential growth of private security companies in Malaysia. In 1971, there were only 70 private security companies in Malaysia (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017b). The government has invested almost RM 4.3 billion to procure these private security actors' services in government agencies nationwide for 10 years (Ministry of Finance, 2017a, 2021).

These private security companies are subject to multiple regulations and regulators from the public and private sectors. The recruitment of private security guards in the public sector is subject to several regulations; (i) minimum wages policy in determining the salary and allowance for PSG (Federal Government Gazette 2012, 2016), (ii) contractual obligations imposed by the Ministry of Finance and (iii) security vetting requirements imposed pre and post recruitment (Ministry of Finance, 2017). As the governor of private security companies, the Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA) also regulates these private security actors via its constitution (Malaysian Security Industry Association, 2021).

Expansion of Private Security Providers

The literature views the expansion of private security providers, both the companies and guards, in two significant trends; (i) private security actors' quantity versus the public security actors and (ii) underlying reasons for private security actors' growth. First, the exceeding quantity of private security guards and private security actors

versus public security actors is a notable trend here (Bures & Carrapico, 2018; Ortiz, 2007; Mkutu, 2005; Provost, 2017; Button, 2007). According to White (2010), private security actors are more than police in industrial countries. The independent report by Guardian revealed 44 countries, including Malaysia, that have more private security actors than public security actors (The Guardian, 2017).

In the Malaysian context, the private security companies' exponential growth has been noted since the enactment of the Private Agencies Act 1971. In 1971, 70 Private security agencies have been registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017b). The number has increased from 651 in 2012 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2012b), 772 in 2013 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2013) and 800 in 2016 (Alwi, 2016; Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017c). In 2017, PSC with license 2(a) was 782. The hike was about 1% in 2018 and 2019, which then started shooting up high to 5% in 2020. In 2021, the number grew to 902 with an exponential hike of 9% of total companies from the previous years (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021).

Interestingly, a decreasing trend can be observed in the termination of private security agencies. MOHA was active in raids in early 2010; 43 PSC licenses were suspended from 2010 to 2013 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2013). Whereas in 2014, the licensing majorly suspended illegal possession of PSG, whereby 23 licenses were terminated (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2015). In contrast, the trend set has been decreasing from 2017 onwards. The licenses of 18 PSCs were terminated in 2017 amounting to 2% of total license holders, which decreased to 1% in 2018 and 2019. It then further decreased, reaching almost 0% in 2020 and 2021. From 2017 to 2021, a total number of 36 PSC licenses were suspended.




Figure 2. 8 Active and Terminated 2A& 2B License of Private Security Companies from 2017 to 2021 (Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021)

However, not all the PSCs registered with MOHA are registered with the Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA). As of May 2016, 776 PSCs operate in Malaysia, while the registration of PSCs with PPKKM increased to 795 PSCs (PPKKM, 2017). The total PSCs registered under MSIA are 895 as of March 2020 (Malaysia Security Industry Association, 2020). The regulation requires private companies wishing to participate in outsourced government contracts to be registered with MSIA. Thus, from the year 2009 to 2020, 484 private security companies were awarded a contract by the public through eProcurement (Ministry of Finance, 2021). This indicates that almost 58% of the PSCs were registered with license 2A as of 2020 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021). The total PSCs in Malaysia licensed 2A with the Ministry of Home Affairs and MSIA as of 2017 is as in Appendix 2.

The second aspect focuses on the underlying reasons for the growth of private security actors. Dempsey (2010) highlighted that increased social disorder in the United States contributed to the rise in PSC in the years 1960 and 1970. Singer (2003) mentioned that the increase in the privatised military industry was due to the global trend of privatisation and outsourcing. According to Taibl (1997), outsourcing made the security industry more compatible in the 1990s. The provision of security by the state seemed inadequate (Bryden & Caparini, 2006) and boosted the rise in private actors to accommodate more functions as demanded by the public (De Waard, 1999). According to Steenkamp (2002), public police cannot prevent crime alone. Private actors' functioning as a force multiplier with police (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2006) also induced the rise of private security actors.

In the Malaysian context, privatisation and outsourcing practices boosted the expansion of private security companies. Malaysian government embraced the Reagan-Thatcher doctrine when it announced its policy of Privatisation and Malaysian Incorporated in 1983. The Malaysian government has actively supported the idea of outsourcing (Syaripah, 2008). As reported by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Malaysia was ranked as the third most attractive destination for outsourcing after India and China (Kearney et al., 2004). From 2009 to 2020, a total number of 484 different private security companies were appointed by the federal department and agencies, as in Appendix 3.




Figure 2. 9 Procurement of Private Security Services in Malaysian Public Sector from the year 2009 to 2020 (Source: Ministry of Finance, 2021)

The Malaysian public sector has invested an enormous sum in outsourcing private security. Based on the eProcurement database from 2009 to 2020, a grand sum of RM 6,007,642,988.58 has been invested by 19 Ministries and Federal agencies (Ministry of Finance, 2017a, 2021). The Ministry of Education (MOE) has invested RM 4,299,854,030.79 for PSC and was ranked first, followed by the Ministry of Health. The trend by years indicates that the procurement of private security was at its peak in the year 2016 amounting to RM 2,261,505,720.40, followed by 2019 and 2017. The database of procurement of PSC by the Ministry is as in Appendix 4. The procurement value of private security services in the public sector from 2009 to 2020 is depicted in Figure 2.12.

Thus, private security companies are growing in quantity over the years with the increasing trend of outsourcing government agencies. All private security companies licensed 2(A) with Private Agencies Act 1971 have the eligibility to provide service to the public sector. Thus, the knowledge of private security actors about the federal

agencies in Malaysia, especially their key entry points, critical assets and security, is noteworthy. This research does not intend to measure the cost-benefit analysis by revealing the outsourcing values of private security outsourced. The entire idea of the section is to highlight the federal funds invested in employing private security actors to secure and safeguard public sector agencies.

2.6 Governance of Private Security in Malaysia

The transformation and evolution of private security in the public sector exhibited dimming government monopoly and emerging governance dimensions. The metamorphosed public sector's security from a monopolistic to a pluralistic model has invited heterogeneous actors into the security industry. The emergence of a private agency, the Malaysia Security Industry Association (MSIA), has been acknowledged by the government itself (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2007, 2010c). Further, functional and geographical dispersion among formal and informal institutions governing private security companies kept rising.

In National Security Policies, good governance has been aspired (National Security Council, 2017). The Ministry of Home Affairs controls the licensing and termination of these private security companies operating in Malaysia, assisted by special rules from the Chief Government Security Office for operation in the public sector. Recently, MSIA has been made accountable by the government for coordinating these private security companies. However, there are no regulatory guidelines issued by these growing private agencies. Even though the transition to governance is obvious in private security, the government has an indefinite role. The governance of private

security in the public sector is maintained in close vicinity of government or the public security actors.

The exploration of private security governance in Malaysia would be under the narrow governance concept and security governance model by Ehrhart (2013). The European context-based model is tailored to narrow governance with additional dimensions incorporated from the literature. The model analyses security governance as a process in three clusters; prerequisites, structure and consequences. The exploration of private security governance in the Malaysian public sector is explored in this study based on the conceptual framework in Table 2.6.

Table 2. 6
Private Security Governance Model

DIMENSION		INTERPRETATION IN SECURITY GOVERNANCE MODEL
		PREREQUISITES
Norm	collective	<i>Liao, 2012; Krahmann, 2005; Zwolski, 2014; Sperling & Webber, 2018</i>
	diverse	<i>Averre, 2010</i>
	cost efficiency	<i>Krahmann, 2005</i>
	sovereignty	<i>Krahmann, 2001, 2005; White 2018; Ceccorulli et al., 2010</i>
	democratic	<i>Ball, 2004; Sperling, Kay & Papacosma, 2003; Ehrhart, 2013</i>
Interest	common	<i>Webber et al., 2004</i>
	diverged	<i>Krahmann, 2001, 2005</i>
	hegemonic interest	<i>Ehrhart, 2013; Garcia 2016; Ortiz, 2007; Hess, 2008</i>
	market	<i>Loader, Goold & Thumala, 2015; Staff, 2016; Hoogenboom, 2010</i>

INTERPRETATION IN SECURITY GOVERNANCE MODEL		
DIMENSION		
Agenda	state	<i>Violin, 2018; Cullen, 2009; Johnston, 2014; Obamamoye, 2020; Sperling, Kay & Papacosma, 2003</i>
	market centric	<i>Krahmann, 2005; Macleod, 2015; Bislev, 2004</i>
STRUCTURE		
Actors	pluralistic governors	<i>Webber et al., 2004; Ebo, 2007; Daase & Friesendorf, 2010</i>
	functional scope	<i>Krahmann, 2001,2005; Adam, 2018</i>
	geographical	<i>Krahmann, 2005; Aarstad, 2016;</i>
	dispersion	<i>Hoogenboom, 2010; Kirchner, 2007; Jetschke, 2011; Ebo, 2007</i>
Cooperation	heterarchy	<i>Webber et al., 2004</i>
	hierarchy	<i>Liao, 2012; Bevir, 2016; Johnston, 2014</i>
	resource management	<i>Westermeyer, 2013; Keith et al., 2013; Johnston, 2014; Krahmann, 2003; Ehrhart, Hegemann & Kahl, 2014</i>
	problem-solving	<i>Krahmann, 2003; Keohane, 2001; Kirchner, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2005</i>
Decision/ policy making	hierarchy, non-	<i>De Nevers, 2010; Bevir, 2016;</i>
	hierarchy	<i>Johnston, 2014</i>
	centralised	<i>Bevir, 2016; Krahmann 2001, 2005</i>
	fragmented authority	<i>Johnston, 2014</i>
	consensus, negotiation	<i>Krahmann 2001,2005; Westermeyer, 2013</i>
Compliance	persuasion	<i>Kirchner, 2007</i>
	coercion	<i>Ehrhart, 2013</i>
	voluntary	<i>Krahmann, 2005</i>
	evaluation & feedback	<i>Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018; Daase & Friesendorf, 2010</i>

INTERPRETATION IN SECURITY GOVERNANCE MODEL		
CONSEQUENCES		
Effectiveness	unintended consequences	<i>Ehrhart, 2013; Cawthra, 2015</i>
	challenges	<i>Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018; Kamarulnizam, 2010; Daase & Friesendorf, 2010; Ehrhart, Hegemann & Kahl, 2014; Howe, 2012; Bures & Carrapico, 2018; Mustapha, 2013</i>
Legitimacy	accountability	<i>Stoker, 1998; Ball, 2004; Bryden & Caparini, 2006; Johnston, 2014; Andrea, 2004; Krahmann, 2005</i>
	acceptance	<i>Ehrhart, 2013</i>

2.6.1 Prerequisites of Private Security Governance

The three prerequisites for governing private security in Malaysia are the norm (Webber et al., 2004; Krahmann, 2001; Caballero-Anthony, 2020), interest (Krahmann, 2005; Banerjee, 2009; Bryden & Caparini, 2006) and governance agenda (Ball, 2004; Aiyede, 2015), which are explored in relation to government, adhering to narrow governance concept.

(i) Interest

The quest here is how far the interest of public and private governors is aligned with the public sector's security. Coordination of common interest is regarded as crucial for the commencement of collective purpose (Stoker, 1998; Krahmann, 2005).

Common or Diverged interest

The public security actors and public governors are set on delivering the interest of the national government. The public security actor's concerns are rooted in serving national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity (National Security Council, 2017; Ministry of Defence, 2019). The self-reliance concept of the National Defence Policy emphasises the protection of national interest (Ministry of Defence, 2010). Self-reliance requires the involvement of the public and private sectors as well as the community within the defence mechanism of the country (Ministry of Defence, 2010). The Defence White Paper stressed that the preservation of national interest is essential for preventing conflicts (Ministry of Defence, 2019).

MSIA is the only private governor of private security. The private agency, MSIA, has the accountability for training the private security guards as required by MOHA (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2007). The profit-making private security companies are obliged to the contracting agencies via contracts. First, the quest here is about the shattered nationwide private security companies' unanimous alignment with MSIA's interest. Second, a diverse interest between public governors and private security actors due to noncompliance reports raised in audits.

Interest Alignment

This research attempts to reveal how governors with diverse interests are aligned to serve a collective purpose. First, this research addresses to what extent the government is aware of the diverged interest between these public and private governors. Second, this research enlightens whether private security governance is biased upon

government, industry actors or in a balanced equilibrium. Third, it reveals how the government align these diverse interests for security governance's collective purpose.

(ii) Norm

In Malaysia, national-level policies are pillared by good governance and democratic values (National Security Council, 2017). The resemblance of these norms reflected in policies of private security is to be explored. Voluntary Corps have their principles aligned with securing local security, peace, well-being, harmony, unity of community and solidarity of all races (Volunteer Department of Malaysia, 2020). Royal Malaysian Police have a fundamental duty towards preserving law and order, peace and security, crime prevention, prosecution and intelligence (Laws of Malaysia, 1967). Meanwhile, security officers enforce their concern for the protection of national assets and secrets, which are the common shared responsibility of the public sector (Chief Government Security Office, 2020).

At the regional level, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) posture Malaysia's tremendous involvement in safeguarding its national interest (National Security Council, 2017). ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting serve as a regional platform for consensus collaborated actions in the field of defence and security.

MSIA core values in Malaysia are also aligned from a commercial angle but are somehow tied to good governance and moral obligations towards the country (Malaysia Security Industry Association, 2021). The commercial-based private

agency's good governance concern is subtle compared to the sovereignty and national integrity of public agencies. The Malaysian government also aspires the acceptability and agreeability among government agencies essential for policies to be implemented (Ministry of Defence, 2019). However, there is a lack of evidence on the consensus from private security actors in the public sector striving for the collective purpose or national interest.

Collective or diverse norms

Public governors have differential interests in their governing scope. The Ministry of Finance regarded its scope to cost efficiency (Ministry of Education, 2015), MOHA regarded compliance to security standards (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010d), while CGSO seeks the public sector's security concerns to be obeyed (Chief Government Security Office 2013, 2020). The parliamentary oversight and concerns on this matter revealed the discrepancies in norms within this private security industry. The emergence of non-traditional threats (Ministry of Defence, 2019), proliferation of private security actors (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017b) and the threat of a new governing structure (Kamarulnizam, 2010) have influenced the national security and defence policies. The cost-efficient perspective is still emphasised by the Ministry of Finance, but other norms such as human security and accountability are being instilled in part of national policies (Ministry of Defence, 2017; National Security Council, 2017).

Collective responsibility

Malaysian defence norms promote self-reliance to be achieved by reducing the dependency on foreign aid (Ministry of Defence, 2019). The policies enacted by the

government always support the preservation of national sovereignty. The public sector, defined as critical infrastructure, is also showered with extensive protective measures to uphold geopolitical and socio-economic stability (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2019). Hence, it is noted that the distribution of resources and security expertise to the private sector is the least option by the Malaysian government as it contradicts the self-reliance concept. Private security companies provide professionalised service for a fee, doubted to meet the demand and norms set by the government agencies. Contradictory norms of public and private security actors and agencies would lead to the performance of collective responsibility weakened (Krahmann, 2003). The question here is which superior norm is reflected in action and implementation.

(iii) Agenda

The agenda-setting phase shapes the structure of private security governance. First, this research enlightens whether the goals are pre-set before the governance structure. Second, this section highlights whether the goals are set under the hegemonic interest of the state (Adler & Greve, 2009; Ehrhart, 2013) or driven by market interest (Hoogenboom, 2010; Staff, 2016). Third, the extent to how far these goals are interpreted in the governance structure through decision-making, policy-making, compliance and cooperative dimensions is also explored.

2.6.2 Structure of Private Security Governance

The structure of private security in governance is elaborated in terms of actors, cooperation, decision making and compliance.

- (i) Actor

Geographically Dispersed Governors

The literature revealed that governors of private security are dispersed geographically at national, regional and global levels (Krahmann, 2005). The public governors or the agencies are the organisations that belong to the national government of Malaysia, comprising the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Royal Malaysian Police and Chief Government Security Office. The regional-level governance of private security is moderated by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), ASEAN Political Security Community and ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) (National Security Council, 2017) accompanied by the UNSC at the global level.

Private governing capacity for the Malaysian private security industry has been granted to MSIA only at the national level. MSIA currently functions to boost the skill and competency of the guards. The regional and global private governance structure is limitedly documented (Chief Government Security Office, 2013). Besides, at regional and global levels, not many traces are noticed about the private governors. Thus, this research aims to explore the multiple private security governors in Malaysia, present as the actors or as an institution in national, regional and global contexts, who have been directly or indirectly, formally or informally governing the industry.

Functional Segregation of Governors

The functional scope of the National Security Council and Ministry of Defence are on comprehensive defence and security, as well as striving to safeguard the country's sovereignty (Ministry of Defence, 2019; National Security Council, 2020). Besides,

Chief Government Security Office specifically focuses on security protection specialised for the public sector and engages the entire civil service to obey their requirement through audits. CGSO overarches the public sector by the fundamental security instructions to be adhered to by entire government departments. The Ministry of Home Affairs oversees granting license 2(A) for operation as private security companies under the Private Agencies Act 1971 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2020).

On the other hand, the Royal Malaysian Police has its eyes on public safety, security, and crime prevention. The private security guards appointed by these private security companies are subject to approval by Royal Malaysian Police under the same act (Malaysia, 1971). The repetitive audit complaints on private security companies in the public sector are addressed by the Ministry of Finance through its circular on the Private Security Service Contracts Template for the Public Sector (Ministry of Finance, 2017). The Ministry of Education ranked as the top procurer of private security services has also issued some regulations for the contractual obligations of private security companies (Ministry of Education, 2015).

At the regional level, ADMM and ARF the member countries' sovereignty by addressing security and defence issues, while the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has focused on regional security in alignment with economic cooperation (Ministry of Defence, 2010). United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has expressed its interest in countering the non-traditional security threats and repeatedly notified Malaysia in addressing terrorism (United Nations Security Council, 2020). Their trend is almost similar to the global approach whereby the proliferation of new actors and

terrorism threats are the main concerns raised on Malaysia by the UNSC (United Nations Security Council, 2020).

The inclusiveness of private agencies into private security governance is still at an early stage in Malaysia. Malaysian Security Industry Association (previously known as PPKKM) is the only national-level private agency acknowledged to represent the private security actors in governing private security in Malaysia. PPKKM is an NGO established in 1980 for the welfare of private security companies operating in Malaysia (Malaysian Security Industry Association, 2020). The recognition of MSIA by public agencies was granted by the Ministry of Home Affairs owing to their shared responsibility in training the private security guards (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2007).

There was not much trace of private security governors at the regional and international levels. Even though the presence of the Asia Pacific Security Association (APSA) was recognised by CGSO, there were no consequent activities or recognised events on their part recorded to the governance of private security so far (Chief Government Security Office, 2013). At the international level, there is a lack of evidence of the authorised private agency's influence on the Malaysian private security industry. The only private agency at regional level, APSA, is interested in boosting the security resources for the professionalism of the private security industry. Multiple governing expertise as spelt in the regulations and acts are further analysed to figure out whether the functions are segregated or colliding in any terms.

(i) Cooperation

The structure of private security governance is explained in terms of cooperation between governors and government, in resource management and implementation (Daase & Freisendorf, 2010; Krahmann 2003, 2005).

Resource management

The Ministry of Finance acts as the main anchor for establishing the contract management properties of private security in the public sector (Ministry of Finance, 2017). The fundamental responsibility for national defence and security policy-making lies within the scope of the Ministry of Defence and National Security Council (Ministry of Defence, 2019; National Security Council 2017, 2020). CGSO has imposed regulations for security protection of the public sector through the enforcement of the Security Instructions (Chief Government Security Office 2013, 2020). Licensing of the private security companies in Malaysia is held by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2006, 2010c).

Royal Malaysian Police has been involved in the vetting of private security guards before the approval of licenses to private security companies (Malaysia, 1971). The Ministry of Education designed internal circulars and regulations for efficient contract management of the outsourced private security services in its subagencies nationwide (Ministry of Education, 2015). Professionalism and training of private security guards have been the primary role of MSIA (Malaysia Security Industry Association, 2021). APSA is a voluntary association of security practitioners and providers establishing their security resources for increased professionalism at the regional level (APSA).

Besides, MOHA remains the main regulatory institution of Private Security Companies in Malaysia (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010d).

Implementation

This research reveals how government rely on public and private governors for the implementation of policy. The recent policy on Essential Services by National Security Council has required Voluntary Corps, Royal Malaysian Police and Armed Forces to conduct security functions during Movement Control Order (National Security Council, 2020). Again, MOHA relied upon MSIA for the conduct of training on basic skills, supervisory skills, cash on transit and Nepalese security guards (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2007). The designed government policies require the private agency's cooperation in implementing them.

(ii) Decision Making

The structure of private security governance between diverse governors is explored in the decision-making dimension. First, the decision-making is examined whether it is done in a centralised or fragmented manner between governors. The proportion and authority of the public agencies are beyond the private agencies in the governance of private security. The circulars directly revolving around the licensing and regulation of private security companies are issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. However, the governance practice in designing the private security contracts template by the Ministry of Finance should be explored whether or not it involved the private agencies' perspective.

Second, decision-making in private security governance is explored on whether it is horizontal or vertical. MOHA included MSIA in its circular as acknowledging private agencies' contribution to the governance of private security in 2007 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2007). The inclusion of multiple agencies, MOE, MOH, Banker's Association, CGSO, PPKKM and RMP in designing the Circular on Private Agencies 4/2010 on Regulation on Management of PSC is a noticeable horizontal negotiation between the multiple actors in governance (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d).

Third, the decision-making attempts are figured out to be done on consensus or negotiated between governors. The ASEAN Regional Forum serves to resolve the dispute among regional countries (Keling, Mohamed & Suhib, 2016; Ministry of Defence, 2019). Malaysia has also signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1997 (Ministry of Defence, 2010). Moreover, the emerging cooperation between governors in private security of Malaysia at national, regional and global levels of problem-solving is explored in this study.

(iii) Compliance

The diverged interest and norms of public and private security actors influence the compliance of private security governance in Malaysia. A detailed interview would reveal whether compliance with private security governance is done by coercion (Westermeyer, 2013; Sperling & Webber, 2017), persuasion (Kirchner, 2007) or voluntary by the governors (Krahmann, 2005). Contract management is among the mechanisms for aligning the differential interest of public and private security actors in governing private security (Krahmann, 2005).

The continuous effort and action by the government (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2009; Ministry of Education, 2015, 2016; Public Accounts Committee, 2014) resulted in the designation of a Standard Template of PSC for the Public Sector in Malaysia (Ministry of Finance, 2017). The presence of private security in the Malaysian public sector bonded by contracts and the reporting mechanisms have also been rectified under the new circular by the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance, 2017).

2.6.3 Consequences of Private Security Governance

This framework explores the unintended consequences and threats that emerge from the security governance process (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010; Ehrhart, Hegemann & Kahl, 2014; Howe, 2012; Mustapha, 2013).

(i) Challenges

The nature of challenges to Malaysia has transformed from state survival and sovereignty towards transboundary and uncertainty (Kamarulnizam, 2010). Malaysia, which is defined by its mainland territory in Southeast Asia and Eurasia and maritime borders by the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific, is exposed to challenges, uncertainties and risks (Ministry of Defence, 2019). The colonisation by Portuguese (1511-1641), Dutch (1641-1795, 1818-1825), British (1795-1818) and Japanese (1941-1945) until the establishment of Federation of Malaya on 31st August 1957 as a sovereign state remarked the traditional military challenges imposed to the country (Ministry of Defence, 2019). Even after Independence, the Indonesian Confrontation on 13 May 1969, ethnic conflict and territorial infringements shook the nation.

According to the Ministry of Defence (2019), non-traditional threats are unpredictable and transboundary, which require cooperation from other countries. Since Independence, Malaysia has undergone multiple threats (Nathan, 2008 cited in Keling, Mohamed & Suhib, 2016) and engaged in various mechanisms to alleviate these hazards. Challenges faced by Malaysia differ slightly in the view of the National Security Council and the Ministry of Defence. Internal challenges addressed by National Security Policy 2017 would be fragile national unity, democratic issues, illegal immigrants and refugees, territorial claims, terrorism and extremism, cyber threats, natural disasters, crises, transnational crimes, uncertainties in energy security, pandemic, food security issues and proliferation of arms (National Security Council, 2017).

However, the Ministry of Defence (2019) emphasised non-traditional security threats as they are more capable of affecting national interest and security into (i) Terrorism and extremism, (ii) Cyber threats, (iii) Maritime threats, (iv) Proliferation of weapons for mass destruction; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear explosives and (iv) Natural disasters. Globalisation, proper communication and transportation, as well as weak and porous state territories contribute to these emerging threats (Ministry of Defence, 2019).

Challenges by private security guards

The reliability of PSC has also been highlighted in the Malaysian context (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2006, 2010a; Hussein, 2010). The reliability of private security guards (Avant, 2005) reported in audits (National Audit Department, 2013; Public Accounts Committee, 2014) in terms of security screening (National Audit Department, 2005)

have been addressed by the government (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2006, 2017; Ministry of Finance, 2017).

In Malaysia, non-traditional security threats in the forms of terrorism, extremism, cyber threats, maritime threats and proliferation of weapons for mass destruction are believed to shatter the national interest (Ministry of Defence, 2019). The private security companies' business-oriented mentality has been exposed when PPKKM silently supported their security guards for a strike against government offices due to delayed payment (Meor & Kalbana, 2018).

Kamarulnizam (2010) elaborated that the governance process is an emerging challenge to national security. The dimension of security challenges associated with the emergence of these private security actors in the public sector is further analysed in this study since related studies are limited. In addition, the non-traditional security threats defined in policies are general without particularly focusing on these private security actors in the public premise.

Challenges to the public sector

The criticality of the public sector to these transnational threats is painstakingly admitted by the government. Terrorism in Malaysia has been associated with Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jamaah Islamiah (JI) who are well known for their several suicide attacks in the Philippines and Puchong (Ministry of Defence 2010, 2019). These extremists are back in the Southeast Asian region after their Syria and Iraq attacks, which have their eyes on public religious spots, entertainment hubs and primarily on the government (Ministry of Defence, 2019). Seven ASG terrorists

disguised as private security guards have been detained (Rohaniza, Mohd & Nadia, 2017), while the militants camouflaged as security guards (Farik, 2017). This research intends to explore the security challenges to the public sector concerning these private security actors (private security companies) occupying the premise.

(ii) Legitimacy

On top of that, this study examines the acceptance of the governors and the agencies from national, regional and international levels by the Malaysian government. Among the public agencies, the Ministry of Home Affairs tend to have a raising hand over Chief Government Security Office, but both are legitimate in coordinating the private security industry in the public sector. MSIA, as the only legitimate private agency in the governance structure, tend to manage these private security providers, but the degree of governance compared to public agencies is subject to investigation.

2.7 Conclusion

The problem statement of this study seek for serious attention on private security governance in literature. This chapter through the systematic literature review process has progressed into the localisation of research gaps; population gap, methodological gap, theory application void gap, empirical gap, practical knowledge gap and knowledge gap (Miles, 2017; Muller-Bloch & Kranz, 2014). The localised research gaps on private security in the public sector have been presented in a parallel manner, whereas private security governance has been presented sequentially within this chapter.

The utilization of systematic review process has resolved the Empirical Gap present within security governance literature. The systematic review process has identified the limitations of private security in the public sector. The conceptual model from Ehrhart (2013) from European-based conceptual papers would be empirically tested in the Asian context, also provide the benefit for Empirical Gap fulfilment. Moreover, the scarce academic writeups on private security provision based on Security Governance theory further nourished by this research.

This study has contributed in bridging the gap related to provision of private security in public sector context. Further, the position of government agencies is clustered as critical infrastructure in the American context (Smith, Schmallegger & Siegel, 2016; Nemeth, 2017; Jones, 2007). However, there is no visible labelling for the public sector as critical infrastructure in Malaysia, while private security is not seen to be obliged to any tighter regulations. Therefore, this lack of private security in the public sector is to be addressed in this research.

Further, the population gap existed for private security guards for Asian context has been complemented as well. The regulation of private security guards in public sector which has been limited addressed also would be fulfilled by this study. The private security governors in Malaysia, MSIA and APSA are addressed in policies. However, their legitimacy and authority in private security governance are contextual to Malaysia and represent the Asian context.

The branches of security governance identified lesser contribution on private security governance. This research will be a great contribution for Private Security Governance, particularly focus on private security guards. The extent of private security actors as governors and legitimised actors are addressed in depth by this research. Commencement of research from this particular point of view would expose the acceptance of private security actors, incorporation of governance within security, as well as the emerging formal and informal interactions among security governors.

The common issues and challenges tied around the private security actors, private security governance in Malaysia are reconciling the practical knowledge gap. Even though security issues and challenges of private security actors are abundant in security governance, the concentrated issues of them within government agencies are lacking. Outcomes and consequences of having private security governors are subject to investigation, since the challenges in this context are yet to be revealed in Malaysia. This research outcome would benefit for refining policies related to private security governance.

Governance mechanism by state centred country as Malaysia in narrowed governance perspective comfort the practical knowledge gap. The conglomeration of governance dimensions of private security guards enriches the Theory of Security Governance. Further, establishment of Private Security Governance Model contributes in development of Security Governance Theory. Additionally, the model has been upgraded with additional security governance dimensions that were present within the literature and associated with the Malaysian private security industry.

The utilization of multiple governance dimension in public sector's context bridge the theory application void gap. In Malaysia, the research on private security governance is in its infancy. This research could contribute to the emerging Asian context in security governance. The transformation of a conceptual framework into data collection instruments is explored in the methodological section.



CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This section justifies the selection of a qualitative case study for this research in terms research design. A systematic literature review on security governance revealed that most publications are qualitative, which further carved the methodology of this research. Detailed attention was given to the employment of participants, sample framing and drafting of interview protocols. Limitations of the methods, data collection and constraints faced during the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak are also briefly explained here. Finally, the chapter concludes with data analysis method and computer-aided software utilised in this research.

3.2 Research Design

The researcher aims to comprehend the security provision, governance and challenges associated to private security. A research process or research design seems essential to a study for answering research questions while carefully illustrating the steps to be taken at every stage of investigation (Saunder, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009; Cooper & Schindler, 2008; Creswell & Clark, 2007; Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005; Gerson & Horowitz, 2002). Hence, the research design for this multiple case study was constructed in six phases.

In the first phase, the research objectives were identified and inquiries were probed on how and why the problems are associated with private security governance in the public sector. The research scope was defined soon after the research gap was captured from the systematic literature practice in phase two. A conceptual framework is also resulted from a systematic literature review. In the third stage, the methodological concerns were addressed to suit the interpretive paradigm. The cases, boundaries and context were established before indulging in data source selection. Identification of primary and secondary data sources, and well-planned data collection procedures adhered to the interview protocol and comprehensive transcription protocol. The data analysis plan was formed at this phase with detailed coding procedures, thematic analysis and utilisation of NVivo.

Phase four began with the coding practices; code landscaping, code mapping and second-cycle coding for each case. The chapter reported the intracase analysis and emerging patterns from the findings. The cross-case reports contributed to emerging themes at this stage. The final section recapitulated research findings and generated generalisations whereby limitations of the study, recommendations and contributions of the case study are mentioned. The summary of the explorative multiple case study design is presented in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3. 1 Research Design and Linkages between Chapters
Source: Self-developed figure based on the research design of this case study

3.2.1 Qualitative Research Methodology

The primary objective of this study is to examine the real-life context (Creswell, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Yin, 2003) to probe a more in-depth understanding of research questions (Long & Johnson, 2000) into the less researched subject matter (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Therefore the study uses qualitative methodology.

3.3 Research Method

Affiliated with qualitative methodology, the case study method was adapted for this research. First, case study methods revolve around how and why questions, without having control over behavioural events but focus on contemporary events (Yin, 2018).

In terms of research questions, the case study is apt for them. Second, case studies are utilised to gather evidence and real-life knowledge from multiple sources (Yin, 2003) over a period of time (Stake, 1995). Even though, case studies have been criticised for being biased (Stake, 2010) and hard to generalise (Yin, 2009), the researcher sticks to this method to comprehensively explore private security governance for an intended period via in-depth investigation.

3.3.1 Case Study

This research complied with the components of the case study research design (Yin, 2003, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994). First, the researcher attempted to answer how private security is governed in the public sector by both public and private governing agencies. Second, the researcher intended to understand the experience of these public and private governing agencies to address the purpose of the study (Yin, 2009). Additionally, the establishment of a conceptual framework for this research was also deemed essential for a rigorous case study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Fourth, the presence of a unit of analysis is vital for a case study (Yin, 2009). Here, governing agencies are addressed as the cases.

Next, the case of private security governance in the public sector could not be considered without the context (Yin, 2003), the public sector and more specifically the government departments. It is under these settings that the governance process occurs. Sixth, the emerging themes from research findings are linked to the research questions probed in the early research process (Yin, 2009). Finally, proper coding procedures followed by thematic analysis for this research assist in interpreting the findings (Yin, 2009).

This research explores holistic multiple case studies with literal replication strategies. There are varieties in case studies (Meyer, 2001); (i) holistic single case study with a single unit of analysis, (ii) embedded single case study with multiple units of analysis, (iii) holistic multiple case studies with each exclusive case and (iv) embedded multiple case studies with multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2018). The commencement of multiple case studies sought to describe the similarities or rivalry of results with replication strategy (Yin, 2003). Multiple case studies are more convincing due to their strength in generalisation and ability to provide vigorous outcomes (Remenyi et al., 2005; Yin, 2003).

Besides the reliability of this method, the time consumption for conducting this type of case study is regarded as a disadvantage (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Multiple case studies could also deter the researcher's attention and affect the quality of the case study overall (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Wolcott, 1995). The private security governance process by three governing agencies is an exclusive case, which is individually analysed via intra-case analysis. By cross-case analysis, the researcher came out with convincing generalisations on governance dimensions. Case replication strategy assisted the researcher to distinguish similarities and rivalries between the governing process of public and private governors.

This research has a purpose guided by a conceptual framework but lacks propositions. Propositions formed from the conceptual framework determine the data collection and direction for the case study (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1995). Thus, it is admitted that propositions may not be present in exploratory holistic case studies due to a lack of prior knowledge and experience in the field (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Hence,

this research was conducted as an explorative case study for Malaysia. Even though the study of private security governance is revelatory in the Malaysian context, it did not suit the single case design as it explores multiple cases related to the public and private governing agencies in Malaysia. This study was not approached via the explanatory case study as it is not sought to explain the presumed causal links (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2003).

Context of Study

The context of this study determines the boundary of what and what will not be covered within this research (Baxter & Jack, 2008). This case study is wrapped within the context of the Malaysian public sector's security. According to Yin (2018), holistic case designs are suitable in absence of logical subunits or the underlying theory is holistic, but should not be too holistic or abstract. Even though the underlying security governance theory is quite extensive, the boundary set for cases within the public sector's security assists to maintain the context of this study.

The boundary set for the cases here involved period of analysis and context of study. Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) emphasised the presence of boundaries for cases. The boundaries of cases are defined in terms of time and place (Creswell, 2003), context and definition (Miles & Huberman, 1994) by time and activity (Stake, 1995) and breadth and depth (Baxter & Jack, 2008). This holistic case study focuses on government organisations outsourcing private security for their premise.

Cases could be focused on (i) people, personal or individuals (Patton, 2002; Swanborn, 2010; Yin, 2018), (ii) structure, program, organisation (Patton, 2002;

Swanborn, 2010; Yin, 2018), (iii) the society, communities (Swanborn, 2010; Yin, 2018) and even (iv) responsibilities (Stake, 2010), relationships and partnerships (Yin, 2018). The cases selected in this study are the public and private governing agencies of private security in the public sector visualised in a case position matrix as in Figure 3.2.




Figure 3. 2 Case Positioning Matrix

Source: Self-developed figure based on case screening of this study

The replication logic for this multiple-case study is based on literal replication rather than theoretical replication (Yin, 2018). According to Yin (2018), replication logic justifies the selection of two or more cases for a multiple-case study. Literal replication is deemed suitable for two or three multiple cases with straightforward theory (Yin, 2018). Furthermore, replication strategies can enhance the trustworthiness of case studies (Yin, 2018).

Cases were selected for this research via literal replication strategy, whereby the cases adapted the same context but by engaging a variety of governors. This study did not utilise theoretical replication as it aims in producing contrasting findings and may involve more than three cases (Yin, 2018). Due to the complexity of the theoretical

replication methods and time constraints, the researcher sticks to the literal replication strategy in replicating the case for this study.

The level of analysis constructed from national to organisational is in interconnected frames. The analysis of the private security governance set at the national level was further divided into sectors; public and private. Further, the organisation level extended from national to state level. According to Galleta (2013), analysis of data at multiple levels improves the trustworthiness and consistency of the meanings derived while discovering the contradictions within it. Furthermore, this multiple-level analysis of data is seen as a triangulation method for improving trustworthiness (Galleta, 2013). Adapting these insights, the public governing agencies, private governing agencies, public security actors, private security actors and service recipients became the selected units of analysis.

3.4 Sampling

This research has adopted purposeful sampling for the selection of respondents (Patton, 2002; Maxwell, 2005; Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). A combination of stratified (Patton, 2002) and snowball sampling (Babbie, 2012; Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014; Merriam, 2009) were utilised. Chain referral helped in finding formal and informal governors and actors that are hardly traceable via the literature search in Malaysian private security governance. Random probability sampling would not suit the purpose of this research as it seeks insights into the governing process by governing agencies and not merely anyone from the organisation.

First, purposeful sampling was applied to select respondents. The initial purposeful sampling involved 41 informants from public governing agencies, private governing agencies, public security actors, private security actors and service recipients to obtain a rich, descriptive for the case (Merriam, 2002). During data collection phase, another 13 were referred to by the key informants via snowballing sampling (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). Here, the researcher's selection bias has also been double-verified through snowball sampling. A total of 19 respondents were omitted during data collection due to respondents' unwillingness to participate, inability to provide rich data and other limitations due to the pandemic outbreak. Finally, 34 informants were selected for this multiple-case study as in Appendix 6.

Second, the selection of cases for this multiple-case study was done via purposeful sampling and screening set in two phases. The initial selection captured 20 agencies to represent the cases as the governors based on their association with private security in the public sector. At the first screening, this number was reduced to 9 cases. First, six agencies were reduced as they were not the actual private security governors for the Malaysian context; ASIS, Voluntary Corps, SWISS, the State Legislative Assembly, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education. Second, another five agencies were removed for being unresponsive and dormant; CSCAP, UNSC, SIA, APSA and SEARCCT. The second screening phase further reduces four more agencies for their unwillingness to participate; the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, NSC and AADK. Finally, ASEAN and Royal Malaysian Police were excluded for not being able to provide rich data for this case study. The final cases selected for this multiple-case study were MOHA, CGSO and MSIA as in Figure 3.3.




Figure 3. 3 Two Staged, Purposive Case Screening Procedure
Source: Self-developed figure based on the case screening procedure

The consideration of informants for this multiple-case study had been under minimal requirements for the sample size of qualitative interview participants (Creswell & Garrett, 2008). Nonetheless, there were exceptions as Yin (2009) regarded the typical criterion for sample size in the qualitative study as irrelevant. Whereas Glaser and Strauss (1967) insisted on the limit up to the arrival of a saturation point from participant feedback. On the other hand, Creswell (2013) introduced a new concept of purposeful maximal variation for participant selection. Initially, Creswell (2008) agreed that participants from 5 to 25 are acceptable for qualitative research. Thus, the participants would comprise a total of 34 participants from both public and private agencies as in Table 3.1.

The sampling procedure has been much impacted by the Covid 19 pandemic outbreak. According to Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014), one cannot study everyone doing everything through research. The conduct of research on the entire governors from national, regional and global contexts would be time-consuming, especially in times of pandemic outbreak. The chosen samples here were best considered after multiple approaches to these governing agencies and have the capability in clarifying the research objectives. The covid-19 pandemic outbreak has heavily impacted the

sampling process. Some critical national agencies, such as the National Security Council, Ministry of Defence and Royal Malaysian Police, were hardly cooperative due to their busy schedule during the pandemic outbreak.

3.4.1 Case Study Respondents

The selection of informants for this research was clustered into primary and secondary informants. It included individuals representing the (i) public governing agencies, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs and Chief Government Security Office and (ii) private governing agency, namely Malaysian Security Industry Association, which is considered the primary informant as they are capable of enlightening the cases. A total number of eight primary informants were interviewed in this research through semi-structured in-depth interviews. The primary informants were interviewed in their respective organisations, which was convenient and comfortable for them. However, the Vice President cum executive member of the private governing agency was interviewed via Zoom.

Further, 26 secondary participants from other public and private governing agencies, public security actors, private security actors and service recipients were interviewed. The participants were interviewed in-depth and approached via open-ended interviews distributed via google form or personal mail. Due to limitations from the pandemic outbreak, informants wrote their responses. Whereas the State Legislative Executive Member was interviewed via the Google Meet platform. The other members interviewed were prescribed via snowballing strategy by these primary and secondary informants.

Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Since the researcher attempt to gain a wholesome perspective of the cases of governing agencies, several inclusion and exclusion criteria were imposed before the recruitment of respondents as in Table 3.1, besides the establishment of the boundaries of the cases (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The primary inclusion criteria for this research would demand the informants to be from public governing agencies, private governing agencies, public security actors, private security actors or service recipients associated with provision of private security in the public sector.

Table 3. 1
Selection Criteria for Informants

No	Informants	Selection Criteria
1	Public Governors	
	(i) MOHA * <i>Security & Public Order Division, IPSOM</i>	(i) Key person
	(ii) CGSO * <i>Deputy Office (Policy), Physical and Technical Security Division, Critical Infrastructure Division</i>	(i) Key person
	(iii) MOHR * <i>State Executive Legislative Member</i>	(i) Key person
	(iv) MOF * <i>Government Procurement Policy</i>	(i) Key person
	(v) APSC	(i) Key person
2	Private Governors	
	(i) MSIA * <i>Secretariat, Vice President, State Chairperson</i>	(i) Key person
	(ii) ASIS * <i>Malaysian and Singapore Chapter</i>	(i) Key person
3	Public Security Actors	
	(i) Auxiliary Police * <i>Crime Prevention & Community Safety</i>	(i) Key person
	(ii) Voluntary Corps	(i) Key person

No	Informants	Selection Criteria
	* Prisons, Anti-Drug & Civil Volunteer, Volunteers Department of Malaysia (RELA)	
	(iii) In House Security Officers	(i) Key person
	*Putrajaya Federal Government Complexes Administrative	(ii) Has engaged with private security guards
4	Private Security Actors	
	(i) Private Security Companies	(i) Registered with Private Agencies Act 1971 or (ii) Has prior experience providing private security service to a government department or (iii) referred by MSIA, ASIS
5	Service Recipient	
	* Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health	(i) Key person in Procurement Division
	* Ministry of Federal Territories, Minerals and Geoscience Department, State Education Department	(i) Key person administrating private security companies

Second, for each category, the person should be a key person to provide rich data on private security and associative knowledge. Third, the selection of public security actors required here involved those who can provide comparative information between public and private security actors and have prior experience working with private security guards in the public sector. Fourth, the private security actors who participated in this study were those with valid Private Security Companies and have provided private security services to the public sector.

The participants for this interview were invited via formal email targeted to the organisations with the attached research details and interview questions. Each participant who took part in this research responded out of their willingness and abided

by the informed consent form. The informants were given the flexibility to not respond to questions if seemed sensitive or unsuitable. Besides, ample time was allocated for the informants to respond. However, the informants from the Ministry of Defence, National Security Council and Ministry of Defence were omitted after being approached many times and a minimum waiting period of six months. The informants who did not belong to these categories were excluded; (i) not directly or indirectly involved in the governing process, (ii) not being the private security service provider or the service recipients and (iii) not belonging to the public or private security actors.

3.5 Data Collection Procedures

The data collection phase for this research was designed in consideration of the case study method. According to Yin (2010), data collection activities for case studies are divided into four types, (i) interviewing, (ii) observing, (iii) collecting and examining and (iv) feeling. This research adapted interviewing and document reviewing as the data collection methods, digesting the requirement of settings for various data sources. The interviews for this research were in the form of (i) semi-structured in-depth interviews that were mostly done face-to-face or via online meeting platform, and (ii) open-ended interviews circulated via Google Forms and emails requesting write-in responses.

The semi-structured interviews here do not stick totally to scripts, since the researcher reacts based on the mental framework set and did not display uniform behaviour to all participants (Yin 2010). Reviewing relevant documents, archival records and policies were done before interviews to ensure the researcher has a base in maintaining a healthy flow of conversation with the governors (Yin, 2010). The

consideration of ethics during the data collection process was emphasised by the researcher.

3.5.1 Ethical Consideration in Data Collection Procedures

The nature of study is sensitive issue concerning public sector's security. Hence, some ethical concerns were emphasised in conducting this qualitative research. First, the interview protocol with the set of interview questions was submitted to the ethical committee. Due to the absence of an ethical committee at the university, the set of questions was sent to the respective organisations and agencies for their concern before interview sessions. Second, the researcher began to book interview sessions with responding organisations only after getting the approval from Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government. Third, the researcher submitted the research invitation letter and informed consent letter to the targeted informants. Interview sessions only took place after the respective ministries and agencies granted consent.

Fourth, the interviewer assured maintenance of confidentiality of the informants' details in the transcription details, as well as in quoting them in the data analysis section (Bryman, 2007; Thomas, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Each interviewee was assigned pseudonyms and specific labels as defined in the transcription protocol. Fifth, the researcher ensured voluntary participation of the informants without any compulsions by requesting them to sign the consent form as in Appendix 8. Sixth, the researcher obeyed the informants' request in omitting certain context delivered during the interview session, which have been bracketed as confidential.

3.6 Interviews

Interviews represent the interaction between a researcher and interviewee aimed at addressing research inquiries (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Qualitative interviews were chosen as the primary method of data collection to align with the research paradigm (Yin, 2010). Denzin (2017) categorized interviews into structured, unstructured, and semi-structured formats. In structured interviews, the interviewer follows a scripted questionnaire without providing additional information (Conrad & Schober, 2008, as cited in Denzin, 2017). Conversely, in relatively unstructured interviews, the interviewer primarily listens and asks questions to clarify the interviewee's input (Denzin, 2017).

Semi-structured interviews, prevalent in social sciences, offer flexibility beyond a scripted questionnaire to elicit responses from various perspectives (Denzin, 2017). While conceptual frameworks are shaped by literature reviews, interview questions may be partly structured beforehand, necessitating the researcher's adaptability in probing informants (Leech, 2002). Consequently, semi-structured questions were employed for in-depth interviews, while structured questions were distributed via online platforms.

Yin (2018) distinguished case study interviews into prolonged, shorter, and survey formats. Prolonged interviews, lasting over two hours, were conducted either in one session or multiple sessions with key informants (Yin, 2018). Although this study's key informants were interviewed in a single session, follow-up clarifications were made through post-interview online messaging. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, over the telephone, and online (Denzin, 2017; Yin, 2010). Despite a preference

for face-to-face interviews, pandemic restrictions necessitated online interviews via Zoom and Google Meet, aligning with an in-depth interview approach (Weiss, 1994) utilizing semi-structured questions (Denzin, 2017).

Interview durations typically ranged from 45 minutes to an hour, with some prolonged interviews exceeding two hours. While Bryman (2007) suggested 45-minute interviews as typical, Jalil (2009) advocated for 45 minutes to an hour. Short case study interviews lasted an hour, featuring carefully crafted open-ended questions and adherence to interview protocols (Yin, 2018). Thus, the study's semi-structured in-depth interviews followed case study interview patterns.

This research employed interviews to explore respondents' knowledge of Malaysian private security governance (Denzin, 2017). The exploratory nature favored semi-structured interviews over survey interviews and closed-ended questions (Yin, 2010, 2018). Advantages included extracting undocumented historical events, observing informant gestures for transcript comprehension, and clarifying ambiguity at flexible times and locations.

However, interviewer bias was inevitable, mitigated by screening questions through respondents' ethical committees. Pandemic-related delays led to rescheduling face-to-face interviews, necessitating written responses through email and Google Forms. Face-to-face interviews with key informants occurred later due to travel restrictions imposed by the pandemic.

3.6.1 Interview Process

The interview process for this case study consisted of 10 phases. The researcher developed a chronological timeline and conceptual framework on security governance dimension to explore this case. The third step was developing the first draft of interview protocol guided by the four research objectives of this study. The first draft of the interview protocol was submitted to Associate Professor Samihah Khalil, a senior lecturer from the Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government, University Utara Malaysia. The researcher amended the interview protocol and content of the consent form as per the expert's concern. Due to the absence of ethical committee during pandemic as been informed by the university, the interview protocol was sent to respective organisations for revising interview questions.




Figure 3. 4 Phases of Data Collection via Interview

Source: Self-developed figure based on interview stages done by this case study

Sixth, potential informants were identified via one phased screening process. One phased approach involves extensive screening of each candidate who is the perfect pick as a case, whereas the two-phased applies to a large number of candidates (12 or more) (Yin, 2018). The participants for the interview were selected from the public and private governing agencies, public security actors, private security actors and

service recipients; Ministry of Home Affairs, Royal Malaysian Police, Volunteers Department of Malaysia, Chief Security Guards Office, Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA), Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health.

Seventh, the interview process continued by seeking approval from informants for conducting interviews. Approval for required data sources and vetting of interview questions were done during this phase by the informants' organisations. Here, the researcher has to do a declaration of consent form and some briefings on the interview process. Since the identification of participants varies from the top management, middle managers and operational levels (Jalil, 2009), the interview questions were modified appropriately to gauge the participants' valuable insight into the subject matter.

Eighth, the mode and medium for the interview were decided together with the informants based on their availability and convenience. Finally, the commencement of semi-structured interview was done. The onset of each interview was inclusive of a few minutes of briefing periods (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). Follow-up questions were formulated on the spot to facilitate reaching saturation with each participant. Here, the researcher did a closure statement and inform the participants regarding the possibility of follow-up sessions. A total number of 15 semi-structured in-depth interviews and 19 open-ended written responses were conducted. Post-interview reflective memoing was employed to capture the essence of the interview setting and ambience besides the recorded files.

The researcher as an instrument evolved throughout the research (Merriam, 1998) and interview questions were refined after each interview session. The entire interview process from the development of interview questions up to the post-interview transcription was documented in an audit trail.

3.6.2 Interview Protocol

Before conducting the interview session, the interview protocol is usually designed by the researcher, which further guides them on the questions to be asked (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). Roulston (2010) provided guidelines to draft interviews for qualitative studies by carefully analysing the purpose, conception, implication, analytical methods and relation of the researcher to the participants studied. The interviewer adheres to a carefully designed interview protocol following the desired objectives of study without deviating from the theoretical contribution.

The interview protocol template laid out by Asmussen (1995) has generously enlightened the researcher to form the Interview Protocol. The interview protocol for this study was divided into three major categories; (i) Participants were briefed before the interview on the purpose of the study and rights of participants, (ii) Participants voluntarily signed the Research Consent Form, (iii) Participants were assured that their identity would be set as anonymous and the interview begins. Yin (2018) mentioned that the interviewee's permission is necessary before the interview could be recorded.

A preliminary email was sent to the potential respondent's organization to invite them to participate in the study. Besides, background information of the participants and the organisation they adhered to were documented. The interview protocol designed for this research is as in Appendix 7. The formulation of open-ended interview questions was formed for gaining authentic responses from the informants and not to impart the researcher's preconceived ideas to them (Patton, 1990).

Yin (2018) proposed five levels of questions to be posed during interviews; (i) Level 1 questions are verbalised to the interviewee, (ii) Level 2 would be about the case in a line of inquiry, (iii) Level 3 to figure out pattern across multiple cases, (iv) Level 4 questions request information beyond the case study evidence and (v) level 5 would be normative questions on policy recommendations and opens up for conclusions beyond the narrow-studied scope.

The interview questions were designed on levels 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Yin, 2018). The first and second research questions probed the current provision of private security and how it is governed in the public sector examined with level 1, 2, and 3 questions. Level 4 questions are posed to gain clarity on challenges associated with private security actors in Malaysia. Inevitably, level 5 questions were required to answer the fourth research objective, which intended to figure out the ideal governance structure for private security in the public sector.

The interview questions in the protocol were divided into three sections. The first section of the interview questions was structured to elicit responses for the first and second research questions. The second section of the interview questions was aimed

at deriving informants' views on the third research question. The multidimensional approach enlightened the fourth research question. Interview questions were restructured, rephrased, subtracted, added and even translated into the Malay Language in certain cases based on informants' feedback and convenience. The researcher reviewed the interview session and approached the informants in need of additional information regarding the research.

3.6.3 Transcription Protocol

The transcription of interviews for this research strictly adhered to a transcription protocol in Appendix 9 (Wellard & McKenna, 2001; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). According to Hollway and Jefferson (2000), the data converted from audio recording into text data involve the process of transcription. The transcription protocol consists of ten subsections to define the transcribing terms; text formatting, labelling, transition scheme, type of transcription, content, inaudible information, overlapping speech, confidentiality and sensitive issues, storage of recording and review of accuracy. Each interview session was uniquely identified based on the designation of (i) interviewee; public governor, private governor, public security actor, private security actors and service recipient, (ii) time and location of interview held, (iii) informants identification, (iv) indication of beginning and end of interview and (v) detailed time span format.

The transcription format placed importance on the type and content of transcription. First, the researcher adhered to the contemporary way by transcribing the whole interview (Creswell, 2014; Stonehouse, 2019). The whole transcription here comes in the form of verbatim transcription (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006; Stonehouse, 2019). Even though verbatim transcripts are time-consuming (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006;

MacLellan, 2004; Bryman & Bell, 2011), they allowed the researcher to understand and familiarise herself with the research inputs. These verbatim transcripts corresponded with field notes and nonverbal behaviours contribute to the reliability, validity and veracity of qualitative data collection (MacLean et al., 2004; Seale & Silverman, 1997; Wengraf, 2001; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006).

Second, the transcription format was done in a naturalised way whereby every utterance is captured. Here, the researcher took the role of transcriber with no separate entities appointed (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). Oliver, Serovich and Mason (2005) mentioned that captured intricacies of spoken language in the transcription may obfuscate the substance of interview. Transcription process of this study is tedious as it processes words, gestures, types of words, breaks, and interruptions and provides a detailed view of the interview (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). All the nonverbal cues, spoken words, utterances and body language were integrated into the transcription (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006).

Since the level of transcription contributes to the level of analysis later on (McLellan, MacQueen & Neidig 2003), vocalisations and language factors are comprehensively addressed in the protocol. The involuntary vocalisations such as coughing during the interviews have been sometimes meaningful and most of the time meaningless (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005), but are transcribed as well. Similarly, many non-verbal communication cues observed and jotted during the interview are also transcribed (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). The transcription protocol also necessitates the transcription of response tokens, such as Hmm, Uhm, yeah appeared throughout the interview (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005).

Next, the transcription protocol emphasises language concerns. Any language problems and truncated pronunciations are transcribed in a naturalised way. Slangs, idioms and even geoethnic accents are captured in this transcription much as possible to not lose the original meaning (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). Interviews in this study were thus not translated into English, but maintained in the original bi-language (Jugder, 2016). The interviews were coded in the native language by NVivo to not lose the original meaning; however, transliteration was done in parentheses in English (Jugder, 2016). Even the unintelligible segments and grammatical errors were transcribed naturally (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). Further, the practice of gisted transcripts was done partially for removing the sensitive, personal and confidential statements by informants (Stonehouse, 2019).

The reviewing practice of accuracy for these interviews was done via NVivo software, which was relistened for proofreading the transcript (Stonehouse, 2019). The transcription synchronisation feature in NVivo with the original media file assists in ensuring the transparency and trustworthiness of the transcription process (Stonehouse, 2019). Here, any kind of recording failure is addressed as poor audio quality or missing audio content (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). To make sure the precision of transcripts (Rubin & Rubin, 2012), the audio was repeatedly listened to three times (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). Even though the researcher spent an enormous time transcribing and relistening (Stonehouse, 2019), the researcher benefited from the process by getting familiarised with the interview throughout the transcription process and rechecking for accuracy (Jugder, 2016). Then, member-checking practice was implied in the research, whereby the informants checked their transcripts.

Table 3. 2

Description and Example of Anonymity of the Informants Utilized in this Research

TYPE INFORMANT	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLE
Public Governing Agency	The pseudonyms of “SGA” represent the word “Public Governing Agency”, the public governors; and the “0X” refers to number of interview session	SGA 01, SGA 02, SGA 03... SGA 08
Private Governing Agency	The pseudonyms of “NSGA” represent the word “Private Governing Agency”, the private governors; and the “0X” refers to number of interview session	NSGA 01, NSGA 02...NSGA 05
Public Security Actor	The pseudonyms of “SA” represent the word “public security actor”, the voluntary corps, inhouse security office and the auxiliary police; and the “0X” refers to number of interview session	SA 01, SA 02, SA 03
Private security Actor	The pseudonyms of “NSA” represent the word “private security actor”, the private security companies; and the “0X” refers to number of interview session	NSA 01, NSA 02... NSA 11
Service Recipient	The pseudonyms of “SR” represent the word “service recipients”, the government agencies have contracted private security companies; and the “0X” refers to number of interview session	SR 01, SR 02.... SR 06

Finally, the storage of interview folders is also essential for this case study. Interviews conducted for this research were digitally recorded and transcribed using NVivo software. The interview data was stored in the NVivo database. However, the storage of interview data was kept without attaching the name of participants in the data analysis software and also in the storage folder; informants were specially labelled and named as in transcription protocol. Whereas in the report, the pseudonyms were assigned to label the informant’s details in Table 3.2. The application of a pseudonym

before storage and coding processes adheres to the researcher's promise of confidentiality maintenance as in the consent form (Galletta, 2013).

3.6.4 Reflective Memos

Analytical memoing was practised for this research to jot down the post-interview reflections (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). According to Saldana (2013), analytical memoing is a practice whereby the researcher reflects on cases, the portion of interview which is absent in transcripts. Whereas Galletta (2013) related the memoing practice to the research objectives and the personal interactions that occurred with the informants during the interview.

The reflections captured via the analytical memoing were inclusive of dilemmas faced methodologically and ethically during the interview. The difficulties with probing questions due to the conceptual lacking of Malaysian context were overcome by structuring the questions before the interview session. The methodological reflections pre- and post-interview due to the pandemic outbreak and omission were also noted.

The reflective memos contributed to the data collection and data analysis stage. First, reflections helped the researcher to maintain distance and be better disciplined in later interviews (Jackson & Bazeley, 2019). The researcher reflected on occasions of interruptions such as; "Why didn't I let him finish his statement", "What was I thinking", and "What was the purpose of interruption", which enlightened her unjust acts and the space where she should have let the informants articulate their view. The interviewer's probes and interference were reduced in follow-up interviews since they were noticed as high in transcriptions.

Second, the momentum of researcher during the interview and the places where the researcher stammered and complicated the posed questions were also reflected (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). Third, the interviewer's statements were carefully analysed to not be biased against the public governing agencies despite the researcher's professional background. Fourth, via reflective memoing, the researcher was able to identify that the semi-structured questions were insufficient to probe the private governing agency's perspective. The interview questions posed were more on the policy and public governance based on certain contexts. However, the informants were probed up to saturation via follow-up interviews.

Fifth, these reflections jotted in memos were beneficial during data analysis stage as they assisted in analysing certain deeper issues (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). Finally, the reciprocity was improvised throughout the interview process. According to Jackson and Bazeley (2019), reciprocity refers to the researcher's attention to the participants' response and the awareness of when and when not to interrupt. These reciprocity skills were reflected through reflective memos done post-interviews. The reciprocity groomed over the interview processes and reflective memos has contributed to it.

3.7 Secondary Data Sources

The data source for this study was from both individuals and organisations in enlightening the governing process of private security in the public sector (Yin, 2018). The data sources from individuals were gained in the form of in-depth and open-ended interviews. Whereas organisation data sources were obtained in the form of policy documents and reports associated with the governing agencies. Semi-

structured interviews targeted elite groups, while document collection was derived from various data forms. Interviewing involves verbal data, while document analysis deals with data from printed material and archival records (Yin, 2010). Interviews and document reviewing gave rise to text data. Optically scanned documents were also further converted to text data.

Potential data sources captured via interviews and document reviews were clustered into primary and secondary. The interviews conducted and the verbatim transcripts were the primary data sources. The secondary data sources for this research included archival data, laws and circulars, government, news sources and documents from websites. These data were collected through manual library search, computerised search as well as bibliographic search. The summary of data collected for this case study is presented in Table 3.3.

A case study database has been designed for this research by systematically organising the data from multiple sources. The researcher was aware of the immense management and analytical efforts to handle an overwhelming amount of data (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) emphasised the importance of organising data sources in improvising the reliability of the case study. Assimilating these dangers, NVivo was utilised to organise these data into a proper database. Further attributes were assigned to these classified data sources, including the source detail, time and date of collection.

Table 3. 3
List of Data Collected

DATA	SOURCE	DATA COLLECTED
Primary	Interviews	i. Audio interviews conducted by researcher; 7 informants from Public Governing Agency (SGA), 3 interviews from Private governing agency (NSGA), 2 public security actors (SA), 3 service recipients (SR) - o 178 pages of verbatim interview transcript for SGA - o 153 pages of verbatim interview transcript for NSGA - o 63 pages of verbatim interview transcript for SA - o 48 pages of verbatim interview transcript for SR ii. Open-ended interview done via survey; 2 informants from SGA, 3 informants from NSGA, 1 informant from SA, 10 informants from NSA, 3 informants from SR
Secondary	Archival Data	i. Information about private security services retrieved from Hansards, national archives ii. Audit queries raised about private security services in Auditor General Report and Public Accounts Committee Report
	Laws	i. Information about private security retrieved from Malaysian Laws, Acts and Acts
	Government policies	i. Information about private security retrieved from government policies from Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Finance, National Security Council, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defence, Public Service Department, Prime Minister Office, ASEAN, UNSC
	News	i. Published articles, news, speeches of private security
	Websites	i. Published reports by private governing agencies ii. Blogs, letters, pamphlets retrieved from website

The researcher maintained the case study database by knowing its importance (Wickham & Woods, 2005). Data sources in case studies are converged to facilitate a holistic understanding (Baxter & Jack, 2008) and enhance data credibility (Patton, 1990; Yin, 2003). Here, the researcher converged the data obtained from interviews and document reviews during the analysis process. The convergence of these data

sources adds credibility to the findings (Baxter & Jack, 2008), and assists in further enlightening the cases.

Reviewed Documents

The documents reviewed for this study were both public- and private-based; official documents, policies, acts, circulars, standards, training manuals, company profiles, press releases, newspaper articles, archival materials, Hansards, journals and reports. According to Hollway and Jefferson (2000), documents reviewed by qualitative research could be public or private; meetings, official memos, public domain records and archival materials are public documents, whereas personal diaries, journals, emails and notes are private materials.

Most of the documents were retrieved through online browsing (Bowen, 2009). Certain documents were accessible to the researcher only through the informants after interview sessions. Some of the documents were also gained from the manual library search. Even though the document reviews facilitate accessibility to rich data (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009), some obtained documents were incomplete due to their confidentiality nature (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).

3.8 Triangulation

Data and methodological triangulation strategies were adopted in enhancing the trustworthiness and credibility of this case study. There are several types of triangulation; data triangulation (Patton, 2015; Merriam, 2002), investigator triangulation (Patton, 2015; Merriam, 2002), theory triangulation (Patton, 2015) and methodological triangulation (Patton 2001, 2015). First, the extraction and analysis of

multiple data sources for this case study is data triangulation (Patton, 2015; Merriam, 2002). Interview transcripts, reflective analytical memoing, Hansards, news, laws, circulars, reports and even personal blogs indicated the data triangulation strategy of this research.

Second, the methodological triangulation observed in this case study was justified via the multiple data collection methods applied. According to Golafshani (2003), triangulation of methods; semi-structured, open-ended interviews and document reviews give rise to diverse construction of reality. Plus, the immense number of documents analysed in this case study added rationale to methodological triangulation (Bowen, 2009). However, this research did not apply the investigator and theory triangulation strategies.

3.9 Trustworthiness

According to McAlister et al. (2017), maintenance of trustworthiness and quality is considered the best practice in a qualitative study. The measures in strengthening trustworthiness were applied throughout this research. Saldana (2012) encouraged strategies to enhance trustworthiness applied during the coding and analysis stage in a qualitative study. First, the transcription synchronisation featured in NVivo with the original media file assist is a means to ensure transparency and trustworthiness of the transcription process (Stonehouse, 2019). Second, the appointment of multiple cases is also a strategy for enhancing trustworthiness. Third, the researcher formed the review protocol and conducted a systemic literature review.

Fourth, the adaptation of interview protocol and transcription protocol also enhanced the trustworthiness of the collection and analysis phase. Fifth, trustworthiness was exhibited via the designation and conduct of the case study research itself (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The formation of research questions, selection of case study type, sampling strategy, sampling appropriateness, management of data and analysis plan contributed to the credibility of this study (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Sixth, credibility and trustworthiness could be enhanced via member checks and peer review processes (Merriam, 2002). Thus, the informants were allowed the check their transcript and quote utilised in this research as in Appendix 10.

Table 3. 4
Tactics to Ensure Quality and Trustworthiness of this Research

Test	Tactics used in this research	Phase
Construct Validity	• Triangulation of data sources (Patton 2002, 2012; Yin, 2018) • Key informants review draft of case study report (Yin, 2018)	Data Collection Data Analysis
External Validity	• Replication logic (Yin, 2018) • Verbatim transcript with nonverbal cues (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006)	Research Design Data Analysis
Reliability	• Case study protocol established (Yin, 2018; Patton, 2001; Syed & Nelson, 2015) • Case study database in NVivo (Yin, 2018) • Context free view of interview data with pseudonym identification (Syed & Nelson, 2005) • Verbatim transcripts (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006)	Research Design Data Collection Data Analysis
Credibility	• Member checks (Merriam, 2002) • Critical self-reflection via analytical memoing (Merriam, 2002) • Audit trail in data collection phase (Merriam, 2002)	Research Design Data Collection

Test	Tactics used in this research	Phase
Rigor	- Research design and data analysis plan (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Saldana, 2012) - Reflection and reciprocity during interview (Davies & Dodd, 2002)	Data Collection
Trustworthiness	- Transcription synchronization with NVivo (Stonehouse, 2019) - Multiple cases (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014) - Literature Review Protocol, Interview and Transcription Protocol - Research design of case study (Baxter & Jack, 2008) - Member checks (Merriam, 2002) - Critical self-reflection via analytical memoing (Merriam, 2002) - Data analysis plan (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Saldana, 2012) - Thick and rich description of case (Merriam, 2002)	Data Collection Data Analysis Reporting

Seventh, all other measures in enhancing validity and reliability attempted in this research were associated with its trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Mishler, 2000). Eight, the critical self-reflection strategy employed by the researcher during each post-interview session via analytical memoing contributed to enhancing the credibility and trustworthiness of this study (Merriam, 2002). Next, the researcher provided an audit trail for the research design for data collection phase, which enhanced the credibility of this study (Merriam, 2002). Finally, the researcher has provided a thick and rich description of the cases and context (Merriam, 2002). Trustworthiness also could be enhanced via inter-reliability measures (McAlister et al., 2017). However, this study did not apply inter-reliability for this research as it

involved only one researcher. The tactics employed by the researcher in enhancing trustworthiness, validity, rigour, reliability and credibility are summarised in Table 3.4.

3.10 Validity

The researcher has adhered to some validity procedures to minimise the weaknesses of data collection methods utilised in the case study. Schreier (2012) emphasised that validity checks are equally important as reliability checks. Case studies may occupy three types of validity tests; construct validity, internal validity and external validity (Yin, 2018). According to Yin (2018), external validity is achieved through analytic generalisation and statistical generalisation. For this multiple-case research, replication logic was employed (Yin, 2018). Besides, verbatim transcripts integrated with nonverbal cues also contribute to the reliability, validity and veracity of qualitative data collection (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006).

Construct validity for this research was achieved through triangulation in data sources and evidence (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2018). The researcher's preconceived ideas were able to influence the data collection and were believed to have been undermining construct validity. The inclusion of Hansards, circulars, reports, interviews and news converged in deriving the themes. Internal validity tests are suited only for explanatory and causal case studies (Yin, 2018). The utilisation of key informants' cooperation in reviewing the report was attempted to increase the construct validity of this case study as in Appendix 10 (Yin, 2018).

Here, member checking was employed by asking key informant respondents to review on report findings (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014; Saldana, 2017). The insights were mainly used for accuracy (Rowlands, 2021) before being reflected in memoing. During member checking, original audio file was provided with the interview transcript upon request by respondents to ease the checking process (Stonehouse, 2019). The synchronised transcription method using NVivo is regarded to enhance the trustworthiness of this research (Stonehouse, 2019). Meanwhile, the member-checking procedure reconfirmed researcher's promise in maintaining respondents' degree of confidentiality in research. The portrayal of respondents' responses and identification is exposed via the member-checking process (Gubrium & Holstein, 2012; Rowlands, 2021).

Patton (2014) identified that triangulation could be done in data, investigators, theory and methodology. Considering the limitations of the research in terms of time, funds and accessibility, this study has adapted triangulation in data sources. Investigator triangulation was neglected since the recruitment of external evaluators would be cost-incurring. Validity in qualitative research has been inclusive of rigour, reliability and trustworthiness (Davies & Dodd, 2002; Golafshani, 2003). Rigour in qualitative research has been associated with reflexivity (Davies & Dodd, 2002), which could be correlated to analytical memoing practice in this research.

3.11 Credibility

The credibility of the researcher in conducting this case study is exposed in several ways. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), credibility is an essential quality for qualitative research. Credibility threats in qualitative research could be overcome via

(i) data triangulation (Merriam, 2002; Yin, 2009), (ii) member checks, (iii) peer review practice, (iv) reflexivity, (v) audit trails and (vi) engagements (Merriam, 2002).

First, the data analysis plan inclusive of first- and second-cycle coding with a thematic analysis approach for improving the credibility and trustworthiness of this case study (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Saldana, 2012). Second, the research design of case study itself promoted credibility of this research (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Finally, the self-reflection strategy via analytical memoing and provision of audit trails for data collection phase also enhanced the credibility of this study (Merriam, 2002).

3.12 Reliability

The researcher took some measures in enhancing the reliability of this case study. Reliability is essential to claim that a case study is a proper one (Golafshani, 2003). Qualitative researchers face challenges in proving the reliability of their studies (Nili, Teta & Barros, 2017). Reliability of qualitative study is generally seen to be weak (Golafshani, 2003) and impossible to be achieved (Merriam, 2009). According to Patton (2001), a systematically conveyed research process validates and makes a study more reliable. Reliability could be measured in terms of consistency of the research process and instruments across multiple assessments (Syed & Nelson, 2015).

First, the case study database for this research was saved with NVivo software. This database is a compilation of data sources, interview transcripts, coding and analysis (Yin, 2018). Second, the reliability of the coding system was achieved via the context-free view of the data (Syed & Nelson, 2015). Personal information was removed while

pseudonym identification was assigned to the interview transcript before the analysis phases.

Third, the full transcription of interviews in verbatim format also made this study reliable (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). Inter coder reliability is a recent strategy; a systematic process whereby the coding is done by independent coders evaluated (Nili, Teta & Barros, 2017; McAlister et al., 2017; Syed & Nelson, 2015). However, it was not adapted for this research due to fund limitations. Reliability is also seen as interrelated with validity and trustworthiness. The combination of these reliability measures with validation, credibility and trustworthiness strategies enhanced the overall quality of this case study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006).

3.13 Data Analysis

There are various data analysis plans prescribed by researchers (Galletta, 2013; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006; Jackson, Paulus & Woolf, 2018; Bernadette et al., 2012). The plan by Galletta (2013) focuses on the theoretical base leading the coding patterns. Halcomb and Davidson (2006) approached the analysis pattern inclusive of reflective journaling and content analysis patterns. Meanwhile, the analytical plan proposed by Silver and Lewins (2014) is a high-level guide to thinking, but not a method of analysis.

The first two levels of the five-level QDA method by Silver and Woolf (2020) were partially used for this research. QUAGOL is a systematic way of qualitative data analysis process of interview data but was not used for this research (Bernadette et al., 2012). Certain portions of the methods were adapted for the analytical plan for this

research such as rereading interviews and coding processes (Bernadette et al., 2012). The formation of the analytical task in this context was based on conceptual framework and research questions.




Figure 3. 5 Data Analysis Stages for this Case Study
Source: Self-developed figure based on the data analysis plan of this study

The data analysis plan for this research comprised three major phases; data transcription, data coding and data synthesis as in Figure 3.5. For the first phase, verbatim transcriptions, open-ended interviews, documents extracted and the analytical memos were organised systematically. Prior to this, the interviews were listened to repeatedly and checked for accuracy at this stage (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). The reflective memos jotted during post-interviews consisted of the researcher's deep thoughts on data collection and analytical processes (Jackson, Paulus & Woolf, 2018). The data sources for this case study were saved in NVivo software (Galleta, 2013).

The second phase consisted of five stages, which began with the assignment of attributes to the data sources. Besides, the classification of cases was addressed in this phase. Next, the researcher set the stage for coding (Galletta, 2013), guided by a conceptual framework. Intra case analysis strategy clustered the interviews to produce a meaningful order of storyline. The second cycle coding further captured the patterns and the inter-case analysis. The cross-case analysis here is essential in capturing the similarities and differences between the cases in interpreting multiple private security governors in Malaysia (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014; Yin, 2018).

The third phase in the analytical plan involved the data synthesis stage, where the researcher generated initial themes retrieved from the findings (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006; Galletta, 2013). The researcher was aware that the emerging themes, categories and nodes are out of the researcher's interpretive capability and could vary depending on researchers (Nili, Teta & Barros, 2017; Bernadette et al., 2012). The reflective part of the researcher also refined the initially generated themes. NVivo was employed in this research to briefly analyse and code the inputs systematically, as well as generate thematic diagrams and visual graphics. The final section, data synthesis, disseminated the research findings as themes and visualisations for report writing.

3.13.1 Thematic Analysis

This research utilised thematic analysis as it is recognised as a method itself (Joffe, 2012; Jugder, 2016; Braun & Clarke, 2006) along with several reasons as follows; (i) it encompasses the elements of reflexivity (Braun & Clarke 2006, 2019), (ii) provides good fit between the data and the analytical claim (Bowen, 2009), (iii) the data could be related to the research purpose (Braun & Clarke, 2006), (iv) the emerged themes

can assist in narrating the case study of private security governance (Daly, Kellehear & Gillsman, 1997; Judger, 2016) and (v) it can conceptualise the findings to security governance theory (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

According to Braun and Clarke (2006), “thematic analysis is poorly demarcated, rarely acknowledged yet widely used in qualitative analytic method”. However, there were some limitations and challenges faced during the practice of thematic analysis in this study. First, too many themes popped up at the initial stage (Braun & Clarke, 2006), from almost 41 and then reduced to 16 at a later stage. Second, few overlapping themes were noticed during the initial integration stage of themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). However, the researcher did not encounter much issues in mismatches between data and analytical claims, less interpreted data and poorly named themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The six-step framework by Braun and Clarke (2006) was adapted for this research. First, the researcher familiarised herself with the data sources and spent ample time reading and re-reading to figure out the chunks of data. The researcher acted as an instrument to analytically read the data sources. Second, the researcher produced semantic codes and latent codes from this case study. Semantic codes are extracted from the direct conversation of informants as in the transcript (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Whereas the codes emerged via reflexivity of the researcher, the underlying assumptions of the informants captured via synchronising the audio interview file to verbatim transcripts are regarded as latent codes.

The third step began with the generation of themes. At this stage, the researcher has already landscaped a total of 4480 codes by four research questions into 185 patterns, guided by 13 dimensions of security governance (Braun & Clarke, 2006). At this stage, the formation of themes was carefully done based on interpretive knowledge without any biasness. The patterns merged to form a total of 41 themes by research questions. Fourth, the initially generated themes reflected over and over by the researcher gave rise to 16 diverse themes. The researcher then filtered the themes by their suitability, quality and interconnection with the datasets and codes.

Next, the researcher defined the emerging themes and named them accordingly. The top 5 themes were identified, which guided the narration of the case study on private security governance. Finally, the reports produced from emerged themes. The findings of the analysis were related to the research questions. Moreover, 110 codes which do not belong to the research objectives of this case study were omitted. Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software is acknowledged for its assistance in the data analysis of qualitative studies (Patton, 2002). Hence, NVivo was used for data analysis due to its convenient usage in the literature review and interview transcription process.

3.13.2 Coding Procedures

The coding practice for this case study has included two major phases; the first and second cycles of coding (Saldana, 2012). According to Saldana (2012), a generic approach for first-cycle coding for case studies analysis may include attribute coding, structural coding, descriptive coding, In Vivo coding, initial coding and value coding. The combined data sources consisted of 275 files classified into 14 subcategories

before being assigned attribute codes. Even though attribute coding is seen as a data management technique (Saldana, 2012), the practice in this study also assisted in data analysis. These classified files were clustered under the respective case folders and again assigned case classification attributes.

First-cycle coding continued with structural, In Vivo and initial coding methods (Saldana, 2012). The structural codes were guided by the conceptual framework and governance dimensions identified within the literature. The active coding stage by the researcher began with major initial coding incorporated with In Vivo codings. The researcher attuned coding to respondents' language and perspective (Saldana, 2012). After the first cycle of coding, this study progressed to code landscaping to produce categories (Saldana, 2012). The code landscaping was done with the assistance of NVivo where these codes were organised into sub-codes and sub-sub codes.

The second cycle of coding for this research engaged in deriving patterns and their relationship in constructing themes (Saldana, 2012). Patterns here are regarded as the recurred categories interrelated to ideologies (Lawless & Chen, 2018), commonalities and contrasting dimensions of data (Galletta, 2013). According to Hatch (2002), patterns can be clustered by similarities, differences, frequency, sequence, correspondence and causation. Hence, the categories for this case study were further synthesised into 185 patterns by research questions (Galletta, 2013).

After the second-cycle coding, the patterns merged in forming themes. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), themes can be merged via inductive or deductive ways. For this case study, the themes emerged with a hybrid of top-down and bottom-up

approaches. The conceptual framework and key dimension of security governance theory indeed assisted in a deductive realisation of themes. However, the inductive categories that emerged from the data sources also contributed to the structuring of themes.

The initial state generated 16 themes encompassing 11 security governance dimensions. Theme development for this study was conducted manually by incorporating patterns from NVivo visualised under Tableau software. Visualisations of the patterns via Tableau software have eased the identification of the most grossing themes across multiple cases and research questions. Via focusing strategy, the top five themes were extracted by references and case sources coded (Saldana, 2012). Due to the importance of a database of codes for analysis (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; Brooks et al. 2015; Miles & Huberman, 1994), a codebook from initial to progressive stages was maintained for future reference.

3.13.3 Analysis with NVivo

This research utilised NVivo for the literature review and data analysis (Fielding, Lee & Lee, 1998). There are multiple computer-assisted data analysis software available for qualitative research such as AnSWR, ATLAS.ti, C-I-SAID, CDC EZ-Text, Ethnograph, HyperRESEARCH, QCA, NVivo, NSD-IST, Text Smart and win MAX (Patton, 2002). However, this software does not analyse data but is a medium to analyse the data (Azeem, Salfi & Dogar, 2012).

NVivo is considered a capable analytical tool involving a large sum of interview data, text data and even image data (White, 2017). Thus, it is suited for this case study as it contains audio files and text data from multiple sources. Plus, NVivo is also able to create a literature archive (Azeem, Salfi & Dogar, 2012). This feature is beneficial in sustaining the case study database for this research. Further, the transcription synchronisation feature of the NVivo allows the research to relisten to the interviews while synchronising it to the verbatim transcripts (Stonehouse, 2019).

NVivo has been beneficial through multiple data analysis stages; data management and visualisations. The assignment of attributes and classification for data sources was made easy under this software, which is regarded as essential for the later analysis stage. Moreover, the coding process for this research was done in the native language in NVivo to not distort the original meaning of the respondents (Jugder, 2016). Visualization features eased this study to analyse emerged patterns by attributes. Meanwhile, the Word Cloud features, chart coding and cluster analysis greatly assisted in report writing.

3.14 Reporting of Data Summary

The reporting mechanism for this multiple case study research is inspired by the convergence model of multiple sources of evidence (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2018). According to Yin (2018), non-convergence would derive different findings for each different source, which would lead to multiple conclusions. Here, data sources from interviews and documents were analysed into codes, clustered into categories, related via patterns and presented as merged themes. First, the findings were presented as case-by-case analysis. Then, the cross-case analysis was conducted before finalising the

themes. Hence, the researcher communicated the findings into themes and composed this dissertation (Saldana, 2012). The report writing adhered to APA formatting and citations.

3.15 Limitation on Data Collection

The pandemic outbreak has significantly affected the physical movement of the researcher to most of the locations and premises to conduct the case study research nationwide. The collection of data from all the service recipients nationwide is time-consuming. There are many regional organisations involved in governing the private security industry. However, due to the limitation of time and the pandemic outbreak, these regional and global governing agencies were hard to be reached.

3.16 Summary

This chapter has outlined the methodology and method for this research anchored by the research paradigm. The ontological paradigm for interpretivist study stressed that there is no single reality. Thus, a case study was conducted involving a collection of data from multiple sources to understand the governance of private security. The multiple data collection methods are suited for the rationale of qualitative methodology. The interpretivism approach makes the research value-laden and biased.

According to APA 7th edition, methodological integrity strengthens research. This research attempted to enhance methodological integrity via interview transcript review process, triangulation of data sources, member check procedures, display of data findings into tables and diagrams, reflexive memoing practice and rich description of

findings. This chapter concluded with the strategies to reduce biasness by enhancing the trustworthiness, validity and reliability of the findings



CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This section presents the qualitative findings derived from in-depth interviews with five types of informants involved; the public security actors, private security actors, public governing agencies, private governing agencies and service recipients. Relevant data obtained via systematic literature review, documents review and observation during data collection were analysed simultaneously. The findings of this research are presented following the research questions. Before that, the profile of respondents is presented by the informants and organisation.

Findings of the first research question are presented as the provision of private security in the public sector encompassing three dimensions; function of private security, mode of provision and regulation. For the second research question, case analyses were made on private security governance from two public governing agencies; the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), Chief Government Security Office (CGSO) and one private governing agency; Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA).

The challenges associated with private security in the public sector are addressed by the third research question. The fourth research question presents five major recommendations for an ideal private security governance encompassing governance

dimensions. The top five themes emerged on private security governance as a result of cross-comparison between research findings. A cross-case analysis is presented at the end of this section to validate the themes derived from private security governance in Malaysia.

4.2 Profile of Respondents

The following section briefs on the five respondent categories. The profile of the respondents selected for this research is presented in Appendix 11.

4.2.1 Public Security Actors

A total number of four state security actors were interviewed for this research; two informants representing the Volunteer Corps; one representing the Auxiliary Corps and one informant representing In-House Security Officers (KP). Three informants were interviewed in-depth, whereas one informant provided write-in responses. Selection of these public security actors was based on two main criteria; (i) key person involved in the provision of security in the public sector, and (ii) job-related engagement with private security companies in the public sector. The perspective of public security actors is crucial to obtain a holistic view of the provision of private security in the public sector. Here, pseudonyms are used to represent the Public Security Actors as SA 01, SA 02 and SA 03.

4.2.2 Private Security Actors

The private security actors for this research were selected based on three criteria; (i) private security company licensed 2(a) under Private Agencies Act 1971, (ii) have previous engagements in provision of security for the public sector and (iii) proposed

via snowballing by MSIA and ASIS. Out of the ten informants who responded via google form platforms, four informants neither have active license 2(a) under MOHA nor were registered under MSIA. The private security actors consisted of 28% of the total informants, as their insights are valuable for exploring the research objectives. Pseudonyms of NSA 01, NSA 02 and NSA 03 were used to represent the private security actors.

4.2.3 Public Governing Agency

The public governing agencies comprise informants representing government organisations; the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), the Chief Government Security Office (CGSO), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), National Security Council (NSC), Ministry of Defence (MOD), Ministry of Human Resource (MOHR), ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) and United Nation Security Council (UNSC). Due to poor response and also not being directly involved in the governance of private security, MOD, NSC and UNSC were removed from this study. Whereas, the APSC has declared not to have any direct or indirect governance on private security governance at regional level.

A total number of nine informants were interviewed under this section; two from MOHA, three from CGSO, one from MOF, one from RMP, one from APSC and one from MOHR. The public governing agencies were addressed with pseudonyms SGA 01, SGA 02, SGA 03 and so on. Out of these, six were face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews, one conducted over the telephone and two submitted their write-in responses. Respondents for MOF were purposely selected to give insights on government procurement policy pertaining to private security companies in the public

sector. The State Executive Legislative Member holding the portfolio of Health and Human Resource EXCO was interviewed from the MOHR perspective.

Table 4. 1

Organisational Profile of Public Governing Agencies (presented as cases)

Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA)	
Sector	Public
Year of Establishment	1959 (https://www.moha.gov.my/index.php/ms/sejarah-ringkas)
Type of Service	Licensing of PSC Enforcement on PSC Training of PSG
Region of Service	National (inclusive state level)
Key Divisions	Security & Public Order Division Compliance & Enforcement Division Royal Malaysian Police (department under MOHA)
Chief Government Security Office (CGSO)	
Sector	Public
Year of Establishment	1957 (https://www.cgso.gov.my/en/info-cgso/sejarah-cgso/)
Type of Service	Policy making for private security operation in public sector Enforcement on private security providers in public sector
Region of Service	National (inclusive state level)
Key Divisions	Deputy CGSO (Policy) Physical and Technical Security Division

The governance of private security was explored through two public governing agencies cases; the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Chief Government Security Office. Even though several essential divisions are available under MOHA and CGSO, only related divisions were highlighted as in Table 4.1. Under MOHA, Compliance and Enforcement Division, as well as Security and Public Order Division have the direct governance function for these private security companies. Whereas, the Physical and Technical Security Division, CGSO directly govern the private security companies occupied by government agencies.

4.2.4 Private Governing Agency

The private governing agencies are private organisations that directly or even indirectly govern private security companies in Malaysia. Initial identification involves Asia Pacific Security Association (APSA), the Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA), the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), Malaysian Chapter, Security Industry Association (SIA), South East Asia Regional Centre Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT), Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and Selangor Wilayah Industrial Security Society (SWISS). Due to poor response rate, SIA, SEARCCT, APSA and CSCAP were removed from this context. Three informants were interviewed in a semi-structured and in-depth way, whereas three responded in writing.

Table 4. 2
Organizational Profile of Private Governing Agency (presented as case)

Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA)	
Sector	Private
Year of Establishment	1980
Type of Service	Provision of association membership for PSC Training of PSG Monitor code of ethics and professional practice for PSC
Region of Service	National (inclusive state level)
Key Divisions	President Office Secretariat Public Relations Bureau Zone Chairperson

Among these governing agencies, APSA and ASIS have no direct affiliations with private security governance in the public sector. Moreover, they are not legitimised by the government as the representative of private security providers. MSIA is the only government-recognised private governing agency (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2007). MSIA is also known as PIKM. Previously, it was named PPKKM. The organisational

profile of MSIA is displayed in Table 4.2. The informants for the private governing agencies are addressed as NSGA 01, NSGA 02, NSGA 03 and so on.

4.2.5 Service Recipients

The service recipients are the government organisations that have outsourced their security to private security companies. Altogether, 19 Ministries and federal government organisations have outsourced private security services nationwide from 2009 to 2020 (Ministry of Finance, 2017a, 2021). Selection criteria for the service recipients were based on the top two highest procurers of private security services in terms of cost; the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Health (MOH). A total of three informants were interviewed face-to-face, representing the Procurement Division of MOE and MOH. Besides, three informants from the Ministry of Federal Territories (KWP), the Mineral and Geoscience Department (KetSA), as well as State Education Department (JPN) gave their write-in responses for this study. Three informants were from national-level operations, whereas three were from the state level.

4.3 Provision of Private Security in the Public Sector

The first research questions deals with provision of private security which covers function, mode of provision and regulation of private security. Provision of private security refers to protection, safety and security for government premises, which is inclusive of premises and personnel. Hence, first research question has been more focussed on the revelation of private security associated with the prerequisite and structure of governance.

4.3.1 Function of Private Security

The function of private security has been associated to the dimension of Actor, Agenda and Resources. This study reveals ten major functions of private security in the public sector; (i) enhancing safety and security, (ii) protection of property, (iii) perimeter security, (iv) access control, (v) protection of personnel, (vi) prevention of crime, (vii) incident reporting, (viii) armed guarding, (ix) investigation and (x) protection of information. The classification of these private security functions clustered by primary and secondary data sources is presented in Table 4.3.

At the first rank, establishment of security agenda by private security is to enhance the safety and security of the public sector. However, SA did not agree with this fact. Governing agencies believed PSC was the third line of defence serving the purpose of deterrence by showing off force. Besides, the PSC's role as a security advisor and in providing a safe and conducive environment has been agreed upon by SR as well.

“Sebagai third line defence, dia memang memberikan sumbangan kepada keselamatan ah, apa nasional la” (SGA 03)

The function of provisions observed via primary data sources emphasises more conventional function such as perimeter security, protection of property and access control. Secondary data sources do not support private security in conducting investigations and are in charge of the protection of information. Protection of information is the least attended function by private security in the public sector.

Next, private security for the protection of property and perimeter security was agreed upon by all types of respondents. Here, the protection of physical assets could be in

the form of buildings, premises and personnel. Associated with private security, private security guards commonly perform an access control function. The function of private security did not show many transformations from its early establishment. For public security actors, PSC serves the purpose of mere protection of premises. Whereby, service recipients agreed that PSC enhances the security of the public sector premises.

According to governing agencies and private security actors, private security functions in the public sector are decided mostly by service recipients followed by public governing agencies. However, it is also observant that private governing agencies believe that private security performs more function than agreed by NSA, SGA and SR. In primary data sources, NSA and NSGA gave the most inputs, but SGA and NSGA mentioned more variation on private security functions. Hence, the findings revealed the demands for variant functions to be provided by private security in the public sector.

Table 4. 3

Private Security Functions in Public Sector

Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

Functions	Informant Category					Secondary Data
	SGA	NSGA	SA	NSA	SR	
Enhance Safety & Security	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Protect Property	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Perimeter Security	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Access Control	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Protect Personnel	✓	✓		✓		✓
Prevent Crime	✓	✓				✓
Incident Reporting	✓	✓		✓		✓

Armed Guarding	✓		✓
Investigation		✓	✓
Protect Information		✓	✓

Hence, the security agenda established for the private security actor in the premise have been portrayed in this study as the functions. The government require conventional security agenda of the public sector be performed by these private security guards. In certain instances, private security actors favoured for protection of information and investigation. But, they are not provided or equipped equivalent resources to perform such agenda. It is apparent that government decides the agenda and function of private security with the existing resource factors.

4.3.2 Mode of Private Security Provision in Public Sector

The further probation into provisional mode of private security associated to Actor, Agenda and Resource dimensions. The immersion of private security actors into the public sector has long transformed the monopolistic mode of security by public security actors. The pluralistic mode is the initial evident for the transformation of Actor dimension. Even though the current provision represents pluralistic mode, five particular modes emerged from findings; layered security, hybrid mode, single mode, technology-aided protection and human-based security.

The analysis of these models is mainly based on primary data sources. Limited secondary data sources recognise layered security and technology-aided protection models. The layered security mode is prominent in government agencies, followed by hybrid, technology-aided protection, single mode and human-based security mode in descending order as in Figure 4.1. The security agenda of the government accompanied

by the resource distribution between the government and the private security industry evident within these reported modes of provision.

Mode 1: Layered Security

Layered mode specifies the existence of distinctive layers; inner and outer, sensitive and less sensitive areas. NSA is reserved for the provision of security in the outer layer, common and less sensitive areas. The public sector's security dignifies the role of public security actors to inhabit the core, inner and risky premise. Hence, the agenda is to place the private security in secondary position to the public security actors. Layered security mode has been well recognised by public governing agencies, followed by private and public security actors. Segregation of security function between SA and NSA is observed in layered mode.

Model 2: Hybrid Mode

Hybrid modes have been associated with a combination of public and private security actors in the public sector. This model is equally recognised by SGA and NSA. Segregation of security function between SA and NSA is observed in hybrid mode. This mode again evident of Actors are a big consideration in security provision. Moreover, the reason for having both public and private security actors has been tied upon security agenda of the premise. Besides, the resources from both public and private security actors are considered in hybrid mode.

Model 3: Technology-Aided mode

Technology-aided provision modes include drone technology, watchman clock, CCTV and alarm system. Technically, the Resources are the major concern here which

decide the mode of provision. The trend reveals that this model is highly recognised by NSGA and NSA, followed by SGA and SA. This indicates the private security actors have advantage in terms of resources. However, SR shows limited concern about the presence of technology in private security provision in the public sector. This is due to the cost limitations and agenda setting by the government by prioritizing physical security personnel.

Model 4: Single Mode

Single Mode of provision demand only NSA relevant for private security provision in the public sector. This mode is favoured in context where public sector's security visioned as simple security agenda which could be catered by private security actors alone. However, it is notable that this mode is recommended by security actors, NSA followed by SA. The complexity of security agenda of public sector has been the duty of the governing agencies to set. Hence, SGA and NSGA limitedly agree to this mode.

Model 5: Human-Centred Mode

The human-centred mode requires only security personnel for the provision of security. It is the least recognised mode but acknowledged as relevant by SGA and NSGA. The governing agencies preferences on security actors are much associated to the security agenda of the premise. Governing agencies feel the security actors are adequate resource for public sector's security.

The analysis of the data sources revealed that the SGA have the best idea of private security governance mode in the public sector. SR seemed to have the least knowledge about the security provision mode on their premise. Meanwhile, NSA seemed to have

a better knowledge of private security governance mode than NSGA and SA. For SGA, layered security mode is their preference followed by hybrid. Technology-aided protection mode was paid little attention by SGA. In contrast, NSGA has placed importance on technology-aided protection mode, whereby layered and hybrid comes next. NSA agreed to the notion that only human-based security is no more relevant in the public sector. Whereas SR assumed that the private security governance model in the public sector is merely layered and hybrid.

Hence, the private security governance model in the public sector are decided based on three Agenda; (i) criticality of premise, (ii) protective security notion of CGSO and (iii) security agenda of premise. The data revealed that SGA and SA have a better vision of deciding provision mode in the public sector compared to NSGA and NSA (Figure 4.1). SGA emphasis is placed on criticality of the premise and protective security agenda in government agencies. On the other hand, SA feels that provision mode should be done based on the security agenda of the service recipient agency.




Figure 4. 1 Mode of Security Provision in the Public Sector
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

Further, five major trends were observed in provisional mode in the public sector. First, there is segregated function between SA and NSA, clarifies the resource distribution. Second, the optimal usage of both SA and NSA is made possible by utilising the proper mode. The optimal utilization of Actors and Resources to resonate the Agenda is certainly important. Third, technology-aided provision mode is easily adaptive by younger generations. The resource management and training enhances with this perspective.

Fourth, certain modes reduce dependency on physical private security guards. Finally, governing agencies believe that the technology-aided provision mode provides a better platform than physical guarding. The collaboration of resources and refinement of security agenda finetune the need of security actors. However, the provision mode is prerequisite. Careful considerations on security agenda accompanied with selected security actors suit the need of public premise. However, the resources provided by both public and private security actors are noteworthy before precisely depicting the perfect mode for the premise.

4.3.3 Regulation for Private Security in Public Sector

Regulation has been absorbed into Agenda for the context of this study, even it stands out as notable dimension of security governance. Here, four types of regulation for provision and governance of private security in the public sector were revealed; Specific Regulation, Overarching Regulation, Agency Internal Regulation and Supplementary Regulation. For the context of this study, regulations are visioned aligned to the Agenda and Compliance dimensions. The derivation of regulation by governing agencies are attempts to enforce compliance to the Agenda of security.

Specific regulations directly related to PSC operation in the public sector are designed by the SGA, NSGA and NSA. Most of these regulations are designed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Overarching regulations serve as the basic pillars in terms of national policies for the operation of PSC in Malaysia. Agency Internal regulations are designed by the Service Recipients mostly for PSC operation on their premise. Here, the Ministry of Education designs most of these regulations. Finally, Supplementary regulations are mostly associated with the recruitment of PSG in general.




Figure 4. 2 Type of Regulations for Private Security in Malaysia
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

There are a few trends highlighted by current regulations on private security. First, these regulations are state-centric and mostly executed by public governing agencies. Mostly, SGA expects PSC to comply with SGA-imposed regulations, which are also agreed upon by NSGA in certain contexts. The regulations by private security actors and agencies are less concerning to respondents. Second, there is a centralised licensing procedure for private security companies by the government. Government

agenda in controlling the private security actors through state regulations achieved here.

Third, current regulations gravitated toward resource management and compliance mechanism of private security. Provision of security carefully positioned with the pillar of prerequisite and structure dimensions of governance model. Resource management and compliance mechanisms are set out in the regulations. Fourth, private security is required to have mandatory registration with PIKM for their operation in the public sector. The equilibrium between government and the private security industry via this involvement of private governing agencies in regulatory practices.

The acknowledged regulatory trends for private security in Malaysia are pillared by the national agenda. Fifth, the period from 2011 to 2020 is considered a peak time for the enactment of these regulations, which associated to compliance pressures to national standards. Sixth, specific regulations are mostly mentioned in primary and secondary data sources, especially the PK 4.3 2017, Private Agencies Act 1971, Arahan Keselamatan and Akta Kawasan Larangan Dan Tempat Larangan. Seventh, it is obvious that NSA and NSGA have limited knowledge of the circulars enacted by CGSO, except on the Akta Kawasan Larangan dan Tempat Larangan.

Finally, government agency protective security concerns are majorly recognised by SGA. Hence, NSA seems to have limited knowledge of operating regulations in the public sector. The notable regulatory practices in Malaysia are often initiated by the public governing agencies, leaving less room for the industry intervention. Moreover, the government agencies set up regulatory practices to enhance compliance towards

the national agenda. The state centred agenda is noted and obvious within these regulations.

Table 4. 4

Type of Private Security Regulation in Malaysia

TYPE	BY	DETAILS	FUNCTION
Agency Internal Regulation	SR	- Garis Panduan Bon Pelaksanaan 1 2013 - GP Penilaian Prestasi Kontraktor 8 Jan 2013 - Pekeliling Perolehan 1 Tahun 2011 - Pekeliling Perolehan 2 2019 - SP Ketua Pengarah Kesihatan 14 2002	- PSC in public sector (contract management)
Overarching Regulation	SGA	- Dasar Keselamatan dan Ketenteraman Awam 2019 - Pelan Strategik KDN 2021-2025	- Governance of private security - Enforcement on private security
	NSGA	- MSIA Constitution	- PSC authority to act - PSC code of ethics - Disciplinary action on PSC
Specific Regulation	SGA	- Akta Kawasan Larangan Tempat Larangan - Arahan Keselamatan	- -PSC operation in public sector - -PSC in public sector - Holistic protective security - Security layer knowledge for PSG
		- PAP 1 2006	- Licensing of PSC - MSIA coordination - PSC operation - Recruitment of PSG - Security resources
		- SPAP 1 2006	- Recruitment of PSG
		- PAP 1 2007	- Licensing of PSC - MSIA coordination - Training of PSG - Uniform for PSG
		- PAP 1 2009	- Uniform for PSG
		- PAP 1 2010	- Licensing of PSC
		- PAP 2 2010	- PSC in crime reduction - SA appointment as PSG
		- PAP 3 2010	- Licensing of PSC

TYPE	BY	DETAILS	FUNCTION
		- PAP 4 2010	- Licensing of PSC - PSC Liability - PSC function - Recruitment of PSG
		- PAP 1 2017	- Licensing of firearm
		- PK 4.3 2017	- Contract - Recruitment of PSG - PSC operation in public sector
		- Private Agencies Act 1971	- Licensing of PSC - PSC Liability - PSC function - Recruitment of PSG
	NSGA	- Pelan Tindakan Pembaharuan Industri PKK	- Firearms in SA premise - SGA governance - Training of PSG by SGA
	NSA	- PSC Security Manual	- PSC operation in public sector
	Supplementary Regulation	- Akta Imigresen 1959/63	- PSG recruitment
		- Akta Pendaftaran Negara 1959	- PSG recruitment
		- NSC SOP COVID	- PSC operation during MCO
		- Perintah Gaji Minimum	- PSG recruitment (salary)

4.4 Governance of Private Security

The second research questions deals with governance of private security using three case studies; Chief Government Security Office, Ministry of Home Affairs and Malaysian Security Industry Association. Each case exhibited varying themes on governance dimensions presented in Appendix 12.

4.4.1 Chief Government Security Office

The case analysis of the Chief Government Security Office generated 1462 codes, which clustered under five most mentioned dimensions; Actor, Cooperation, Compliance, Agenda and Resource Management as in Figure 4.3. The respondents for

this case in descending order were the Public Governing Agencies, Private Governing Agencies, Public Security Actors and Service Recipients. The themes generalised for this case were mostly from primary data sources, especially from the public sector.




Figure 4.3 The Top Five Governance Dimensions of Private Security by CGSO
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

First, CGSO case respondents disclosed the presence of heterogenous actors in private security governance. These claims were further supported by the three trends visible; (i) actors from the public sector are higher than the private sector, (ii) hybridity present in governance and security provision and (iii) governing actors are geographically

dispersed. Here, the respondents felt that the public governing agencies are more relevant compared to the private governing agencies, whereas private security actors are more relevant compared to public security actors. Also, service recipients were regarded to have more governance roles than private governing agencies.

Second, cooperation between actors was deemed crucial in private security governance. This cooperative structure falls into four major sub-themes in descending order; (i) formal, (ii) collaboration, (iii) hierarchy and (iv) interdependent. Actors are accustomed to the formal mode of cooperation, which inclusive of consultations, meetings and follow-ups. Public governing agency felt that CGSO provides indirect consultations to the private security companies based on three criteria, (i) PSC serving to government, (ii) by request only and (iii) mediated via the service recipients. He claimed that,

“Ok (strong intonation), for, untuk private security guard actually we consult ape... I mean, beri perkhidmatan kepada kerajaan, kalau tak beri perkhidmatan kepada kerajaan kita takde takde takde bagi consultation la.” (SGA 01)

Collaboration is realised in two ways; (i) collaboration between public governing agencies and (ii) collaboration between public and private governing agencies. However, SGA informants felt that collaboration between CGSO, MOHA and RMP is seemingly more crucial than with the MSIA. Collaboration with NSGA here is mainly required only for training grounds; the claim is supported only by NSGA respondents. The mode of cooperation also revealed the presence of hierarchy. The public governing agencies have better authority than the private sector. Moreover,

some sort of interdependency was noticed between governing agencies, but both claims were from public governing agencies.

Third, compliance was the most mentioned form of governance dimension. The compliance mechanism here consists of monitoring, contract management, evaluation, auditing, inspection and enforcement. The respondents for this particular dimension were public security actors, private governing agencies, private security actors, service recipients and public governing agencies in ascending order.

“For government I think better the assessment and evaluation tu done by government.” (SGA 02)


Evaluations done by CGSO are regarded as confidential and limited to circulating between service recipients and public governing agencies only. Monitoring mechanisms are done by the public security actors and service recipients via surveillance and self-monitoring methods. However, it was noticed that the monitoring capacity of CGSO is limited here. The service recipient claimed that,

“KP yang kita nampak di hospital, dia yang akan memantau perkhidmatan private punya company because di hospital on the ground tu tak banyak pun KP, yang ada so satu hospital mungkin ada beberapa KP sahaja la” (SR 02)

The governing process here is considered a strict compliance method where penalties are imposed for non-compliance. Public security actors representing the CGSO impose high penalties for noncompliance that occurs in the contract. Further, the security vetting function by CGSO for private security operators is different from other public

governing agencies. The evaluation reports are further redirected to CGSO, resembling the form of total control by the state governing agency.

The fourth dimension portrays private security governance to have a diverse purpose. The respondents by percentage coverage were mostly from the public than the private sector, with major primary data sources. However, the state-centric agenda was far more obvious compared to the market-centric. The state-centric agenda of CGSO was observed via training modules, security vetting process, policy-making events, analysis of challenges and PSC ratings. The agenda of CGSO also seemed to analyse compliance for PSC rating purposes and challenges. The public and private governing agency informants felt that,



“So, the perspective to give them the exposure of the protective security the layered security we have in government agency” (SGA 02)

“As far as CGSO is concerned, they’re looking primarily at protective security, protection of government, buildings, government institutions “(NSGA 06)

Fifth, fragmented resource management was noticed within private security governance. Resources for private security governance here are clustered as the equipment, technology and budget. In a centralised structure, resource management is decided by CGSO for public and private security actors’ resources, but it is claimed only by public sector respondents.

“Kalau you tanya CGSO it is ok, dia memang service provider, dia akan bagi di mana dia akan beri perkhidmatan, di mana perkhidmatan itu tidak boleh yang non government” (SA 02)

Fragmentation occurred among public governing agencies between public and private governing agencies, especially in training and recruitment. Hence, this case acknowledged the hybrid mode of actors governing private security in the public sector. However, the domination of public security actors is heavily felt in governance. Likewise, formal cooperative methods and compliance mechanisms are favoured by CGSO. Even though diverged purposes and fragmented resources were noticed among heterogenous actors, the agenda steadily stood by the state.

4.4.2 Ministry of Home Affairs

The case analysis of the Ministry of Home Affairs on the private security governance process generated 1530 codes. The five major dimensions mentioned here included; Actor, Agenda, Compliance, Cooperation and Resource Management. The respondents for this case in descending order were the public governing agencies, private governing agencies, public security actors, service recipients and private security actors. For this case, bulky secondary data sources were obtained from public data sources, interviews, reports and regulations.




Figure 4.4 The Top Five Governance Dimensions of Private Security by MOHA
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

Actors for private security governance revealed four major themes; (i) heterogenous actors, (ii) hybrid structure, (iii) diverse functionalities and (iv) geographical dispersion. Multiple actors are involved in resource provisions during engagements, compliance mechanisms and licensing processes. The hybrid structure of public and private security actors was noticed in compliance mechanisms, training provisions and licensing procedures. Royal Malaysian Police remained a strategic actor in private

security guards' training. Meanwhile, actors were noticed to be geographically dispersed in enforcement practices, whereas centralised in conducting training and licensing practices.

“Certified Security Guard yang ditempatkan di 14 premis ah latihan polis yang itu kerjasama KDN, PDRM dan juga MSIA, kita buat di Pulapol dan sekolah latihan SLKM, Sekolah Latihan, SLK, bawah PDRM juga la, Pusat Latihan PDRM di seluruh negara” (SGA03)

“The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), being the custodian of the Private Agencies Act, 1971 and the regulator that issues licenses to security companies” (NSGA 05)

Second, state-centric agendas lead the way in training, policy-making, compliance and licensing practices. Market-centric agendas are visible in event management, policy-making and compliance mechanism in a subtler way. The collective purpose observed here is based on compliance with state-centric objectives. Enforcers from public governing agencies, service recipients and private governing agencies tend to comply with government regulations such as Private Agencies Act 1971 and MOHA circulars. Hence, MOHA's perspective of governing agenda is steadily state-centric.

“Pada pandangan saya, syarikat kawalan keselamatan swasta perlu mengikuti arahan yang ditetapkan oleh Kementerian Dalam Negeri dalam melantik pengawal keselamatan mereka” (SA 03)

The Compliance dimension exposes three major trends; (i) strict compliance methods, (ii) multiple compliance mechanisms and (iii) centralised mechanisms. Public governing agencies impose strict compliance in licensing, security vetting and

recruitment processes. Also, service recipients impose strict penalties for noncompliance.

“The police, they will talk about are they screening each and every private security guard, whether they have any criminal background or not.” (SGA 04)

Multiple compliance mechanisms include contract management, enforcement and evaluation. Contract management checks on Ministry of Finance regulations and contracts. Enforcements are mostly done by public governing agencies towards government regulations. Evaluations are usually conducted in the form of audits, feedback mechanisms and peer evaluation methods, which are mostly circulated in a limited and confidential manner.

Fourth, cooperation was observed as collaboration, formal, hierarchy and interdependent. Collaborations were observed within public and private governing agencies, especially in training private security guards. Cooperations were mostly noticed to be in a formal manner. MSIA was noticed to be reporting and responding to MOHA on crucial matters pertaining to private security industry programs. Despite the indication of hierarchy, the interdependency between governors was also noticed within this context.

“Betul, biasanya sebarang keputusan dasar ataupun ah rancangan dan juga program yang akan dibuat oleh MSIA dia akan dapatkan pandangan KDN terlebih dahulu” (SGA 03).

Resource Management emphasises the training of private security guards and the company's management. The resources addressed in this case are in the form of technology, personnel and equipment. Technological resources are referred to as Electronic Security Industry Management Systems (eSIMS) and the security networks provided by service recipients for private security operations. Personnel resources involve physical capacity in the form of enforcement officers, auditors and private security guards.

The analysis of private security governance by the Ministry of Home Affairs agreed with a hybrid mode in the governance structure. The case also acknowledged diversity dwells in agenda-setting phases. Hence, it can be concluded that even though dispersed resources are present, formal cooperation and strict compliance mechanisms uphold the state-centric agenda of governance.

4.4.3 Malaysian Security Industry Association

The case analysis of Malaysian Security Industry Association (MSIA) derived 857 codings clustered under nine security governance dimensions; Actor, Authority, Cooperation, Resource Management, Compliance, Agenda, Interest, Legitimacy and Norm. The respondents for this case in ascending order were the service recipients, public security actors, private security actors, public governing agencies and private governing agencies. Two trends were noted for this case, (i) primary data sources exceed secondary sources and (ii) private sector inputs are higher than the public sector.

First, MSIA acknowledged the presence of pluralistic actors, hybrid structure and fragmented functions between actors in private security governance. Multiple actors are noticed in cooperation, training, monitoring and compliance mechanisms. Hybridity was observed in conducting training, monitoring and licensing, where both public and private governing agencies have designated duties. MSIA acknowledged the fragmented function of governors, especially in training. MSIA and MOHA exist within a co-governance structure on training provisions. Similarly, in licensing, MOHA requires MSIA mandatory membership for private security companies.

Second, the MSIA case revealed fragmented authority in private security governance. In terms of coding percentage, responses of private governing agency's authority were higher than the public. Both public and private security actors claimed that PIKM requires better authority in training private security guards.

"Sebenarnya saya... tak nafikan kan la memang PIKM dia ada buat training untuk dia orang punya anggota-anggota." (SA 01)

"PIKM in basically has the same, the power to craft, training modules that is relevant for the industry, not only for the security company but also to the security personnel." (NSGA 01)

This case reported overlapping authority between governing agencies in designing modules for training. Further, the MSIA case also demonstrated the hierarchical structure due to commercial interdependence within governance. Hierarchies within the governance structure are crucial in conveying the MSIA headquarters' message to the members of the state. The responses on fragmentation, overlapping and hierarchical authority were derived from private security actors.

“Peranan MSIA ini (raised tone), peranannya ialah untuk membantu kepada mana-mana syarikat-syarikat kawalan keselamatan yang berada di dalam zon Perak, di bawah chairman MSIA” (NSGA 02)

Third, the MSIA case marked collaboration and engagement as the frequent mode of cooperation. The collaboration of MSIA in governance is mostly coordinated by MOHA. Next, engagements were seen as formal and informal. Formal engagements are in the form of meetings between MSIA with SGA and clients, whereas informal engagements are between members of MSIA.

Fourth, the top three compliance mechanisms were regarded vital for this case; contracts, inspection and implementation practices. Two types of compliances were noticed here; strict and soft. Penalties are referred as strict compliance by the non state actors. MSIA governance exhibits a more soft compliance structure. Private security companies' compulsory registration to MSIA and security screening of PSG by PSC are considered to be done in as subtler way than the public governing agencies. Also, the MSIA committee, in directing and disciplining the private security company, is mellow compared to public governing agencies. Even though these voluntary mechanisms are still young, they serve as a controlling element for private security governance.

“We have to or not penalty will be imposed.” (NSA 08)




Figure 4.5 The Most Mentioned Private Security Governance Dimensions by MSIA
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

Fifth, resource management indicated a variety of resources, recruitment strategies and training provisions. The resources in governance are in the form of budget, equipment, personnel, regulation and expertise. The recruitment criteria for private security guards range from minimum wage policy, screening recruitment and career advancements. MSIA's role in crafting training modules acknowledges the fact of expert resources. In terms of training, facilitations by the Royal Malaysian Police and immersion of MSIA slots showed fragmented and dispersed resources.

“PIKM merupakan satu-satunya agensi yang diiktiraf oleh KDN untuk mewakili dan dia orang pun telah dapat sebagai ILP la, untuk terlibat dalam pembuatan modul dan juga standard, di bawah JPK” (SGA 03)

“At the moment is being run at the PULAPOL, PDRM. So PDRM is like the main training, the main trainers, and then MSIA only got like one or two slot to explain about the industry.” (NSGA 01)

Hence, the case of MSIA recognised pluralistic actors in private security governance. The role of MSIA is mostly acknowledged in the coordination of training. Even though MSIA is the Industrial Lead Body, the training is kept centralised under one roof by the state. MSIA collaborations and engagements are mostly assisted by public governing agencies. Soft compliance mechanisms by public governing agencies and actors are valued lesser than the state approaches. A more market-centric agenda sustained amidst hybrid governing agencies is also a unique theme noticed in the MSIA case.

4.5 Challenges associated with Private Security

The third research question deals with challenges associated with private security in public sector. Challenges are defined as adversities, risks and uncertainties that arise as a consequence of private security governance. The third research question produced 1212 initial coding clustered into 28 patterns associated with security governance dimensions as in Figure 4.6. These dimensions observed in descending order were Legitimacy, Resource Management, Compliance, Cooperation, Risks, Norm, Interest, Agenda, Authority, Actor and Regulation.




Figure 4.6 Challenges associated to private security
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

The insights for this research question were gained from primary data sources compared to secondary data sources. Many responses were gained from public governing agencies followed by private governing agencies and private security actors. Responses on the challenge's dimension based on respondent category are presented in Appendix 12. Hence, these challenges were further clustered into four major variations; challenges to the public sector, challenges to the private security industry, challenges by private security and challenges by governance.




Figure 4.7 Top Five Challenges Associated with Private Security in Public Sector
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the most affected governance dimension where strong and multiple claims emerge on accountability and licensing controversies of private security. Four claims on the unaccountability of private security guards were seen associated with (i) criminal records, (ii) reliability issues, (iii) information leaks and (iv) terrorism associations. The criminal offences by private security guards are mainly associated to be in duty crimes and gangsterism links. MOHA has refuted this claim on private security guards association with gangsterism. However, supporting sources from

Royal Malaysian Police on the offences by private security guards from 2017 to 2020 confirmed the allegation. Similarly, other public governing agencies admitted that private security guards have been involved in crime.

“tohman la yang pasal gangster apa semua, tapi tak dapat dibuktikan.” (SGA 03)

“Pecah amanah, turut bersekongkol dengan penjenayah melakukan jenayah pecah rumah ...kebocoran maklumat terperingkat, pecah masuk dan sebagainya.” (SGA 06)

“Dari segi kesalahan penggunaan senjata api... IC palsu selalunya ... Senjata api, IC palsu, diorang akan salahguna.” (SGA 08)

Reliability concerns about private security guards were raised due to the misuse of firearms by private security guards and liability on them in sensitive areas. Further, manipulative behaviour of private security companies and guards in reporting mechanisms and identification documents did further damage. Private security guards with knowledge of public sector access control made them potential informers and a source of challenge to the nation. Even less mentioned, the terrorist remarks on private security guards are totally unneglectable.

In terms of licensing, most repeated concerns were raised on franchising practices. The MSIA have a strong objection to the practice of franchised security companies' licenses. Besides, private security operators with expired licenses and illegal operators tend to roam freely. Easy license renewal terms combined with licensing agencies' integrity issues can crumple the entire governing process. Illegal private security guards and companies are common concerns raised by governing agencies. Illegal

private security guards exceed the unaccountability and licensing concerns in terms of coding coverage, even ranked lowest in coded files.

“The main challenge to MSIA is errant members who violate the regulations particularly “franchising” their license to unscrupulous individuals and hiring of illegals as security guards who often “sell” their services cheaply.” (NSGA 05)

Resource management was the second vulnerable dimension of private security governance. Four concerns raised here included resource provision, training, recruitment and turnover. Resource provision has been challenging due to limited resources, outdated resources, budget concerns and overlapping provisions. Limited resources are associated with supervision capacity and resources of public governing agencies.

“ We don’t engage any CGSO, they just give their ideas because they don’t have resources.” (SR 01)

“So you gunakan pengawal keselamatan swasta dengan teknologi, teknologi lebih tinggi sebab you nak maintain, you nak update, you nak kena tukar sebab dia wear and tear.” (SGA 07)

Pertaining training, lack of training for the public sector’s security irrelevant and inadequate training modules, certification of training and cost factors are common concerns. The claims by private governing agencies supported the claim.

“In my opinion, the private security guards hired by government agencies are not professional. Most of the security guards are not properly trained to be professional protection officers. Even though

basic security training is being provided by the private security companies, they are not really well trained as training cost them money.” (NSGA 04)

The recruiting criteria for private security guards by private security companies have been unstandardised and low in terms of academic and salary qualifications. This makes private security guards’ career prospects dimmed, thus pushing it as a last resort job. Eventually, this increases the turnover rate of private security guards.

“Sekarang ni masalahnya bila tengok on the ground kadang-kadang pengawal keselamatan yang dipilih tu macam, tak berapa sesuai pun sebenarnya.” (SR 02)

In terms of compliance, contract management, weak evaluation, penalties, private governing agency management and multiple layers of enforcers are common concerns. These concerns are mostly raised by both public and private governing agencies. Contract management issues have been noticed to be highly rooted in the noncompliance of private security actors. In addition, the renewal period of contract, unclear contract terms, improper contract management and selection are associated with complications rooted in public governing agencies and service recipients.

Weak evaluations here allied to screening private security guards, compliance rating by public governing agencies and training evaluative methods. The security screening period, the absence of real-time feedback in eSIMS system and the first screening stage by PSC have highly raised complaints. The CGSO ratings on private security guards and companies were given less priority for the betterment of service. The lack of training evaluative systems for private security guards is also among the concerns raised.

Monitoring shortages are associated with the capacity of public security actors, service recipients and private security companies. The audit reports revealed that fewer penalties were imposed on the non-compliances committed by private security guards. However, respondents viewed that private security companies are burdened by high penalties imposed. Finally, private governing agencies with a conflicting interest in managing their private security companies further complicate monitoring.

Fourth, cooperative structure was weakened by the absence of direct engagement, lacking commitments, reduced engagements, and tensed cooperation between actors. Cooperative challenges were mostly claimed by private and public actors. Lack of direct meetings observed between public governing agencies and private security actors. Private security actors were detected to be less committed to the duty scope. Engagements between service recipients and private governing agencies have been reducing over the years.

Tensed cooperation between public and private security actors complicated private security governance. The constant pressure was imposed by public security actors on private security guards. Ignorance of service recipients on regulations further complicates and adds stress to the governance structure.

Fifth, private security governance is further complicated by existing risks in the public sector. Most responses were gained from secondary data sources from public governing agencies and primary data sources from public security actors. These risks were associated with physical threats, cyber threats and dynamic threats. Physical threats are those inflicted on the public sector in the form of thefts and robberies. Even

though these man-made risks are caused mostly by outsiders, some public governors felt it could be associated with private security guards in the public sector.

Cyber threats to the public sector are closely tied to social media and physical technology devices used in security provisions. The public sector is subject to sabotage and firewall tracking, among others. Dynamic threats are non-traditional security threats recently addressed in secondary data sources, especially in policies. However, not much concerns were raised by respondents directly on these threats. Public sector security is indeed tough to handle as it is a complex amalgamation of physical and information security, which is constantly exposed to traditional and emerging security threats.

Issues associated with agenda were categorised into four main clusters; (i) lack agenda setting, (ii) collective purpose dimmed, (iii) public governing agency's dominancy and (iv) hidden agenda. Here, no agenda is being set for the governance of private security. MSIA's way of doing business as usual, service recipients' less concern for security and weak public governing agencies reporting mechanisms are signs of a lack of agenda-setting for private security governance.

Further, the collective purpose was weakened due to the lack of private governing agencies' involvement in policymaking. The government's lack of sensitivity to private security industry operations also diluted collective purpose. Even the NSA agree to that fact that MSIA is not doing for the industry. Whereas, NSGA felt they should be allowed to voice out for the industry.

The domination of public governing agencies in policy-making without giving a proper space for private governing agencies affected governance. NSA felt that the government is not giving due value to their opinion in policy-making. The political interferences in licensing and enforcement practices revealed the hidden agenda in private security governance. The inability of governing agencies in addressing political influences complicates the private security governance process.

Seventh, the issues jeopardising the private security governance norms were clustered into four major patterns; compromised quality, discipline issues, image and integrity. Public governing agencies strongly commented on the issues related to quality. Quality of security service has also been associated with the pricing structure. Besides, private security service quality also tends to vary in urban and rural territories.

Noncompliance related to discipline of private security guards has been repeatedly noticed in the public sector. Manipulation of clocking records and private security guards linked to drug abuse were often noticed within the public sector. The image of the private security industry was jeopardised by private security guards' etiquette. NSGA agreed to improper dressing remarks, and came with a strong claim almost 90% of existing guards are unfit to be in service.

Eight, differentiated interest was present between actors in private security governance. The private governing agency is towards the commercial aspect; the government tends to be cost-sensitive rather than prioritising security concerns. These diverged interests that weakened the governance structure were gained from primary data sources. Private security companies elected to be the management of MSIA indicated a conflict of interest present within a private governing structure. However,

MOHA felt that this conflicting interest is not a disadvantage but for the betterment of their service.

Preferences of public security actors by service recipients jeopardised the relevancy of private security to the public sector. Similarly, private security actors' preferences to work with public security actors are noteworthy here. Complaisant of private security companies and MSIA's heavy reliance upon government contracts are also hindrances to governance.

Ninth, issues related to authority included limited authority, hierarchy among public governing agencies, conflicting authority and bureaucracy. Limited authority here is felt by not only private security guards and service recipients but also public and private governing agencies. MSIA is just seen as a mediator between public agencies and private security companies. The presence of hierarchy between public governing agencies here is obvious when it comes to licensing matters. CGSO cannot interfere directly in licensing matters even if they have severe remarks on private security companies' performance in the public sector.

Conflicting authorities were felt between public and private governing agencies. MSIA has been legitimised as an Industrial Lead Body in charge of training their private security operators. Also, training initiatives were held by CGSO for private security guards without any alliances with MSIA. Similarly, multiple enforcing layers within MOHA complicate the practical tackling of gangsterism issues pertaining to private security guards.

Tenth, issues revolving around actors exhibited four major trends; private governing agencies' weak role, lack of private governing agencies, replacement of public security actors and growth of private security actors. Private governing actors have a weak role; for instance, MSIA functions are unclear and still dependent on the government. Even though ASIS and APSA are present, only MSIA has been acknowledged in the structure so far, indicating a lack of private governing agencies.

Further, the act of substituting private security actors with voluntary corps and other public security actors was objected to by respondents. The unsuitability of the public security actor's core to perform the private security guards' duty is strongly emphasised by the public governing agencies. Here, the exponential growth of private security actors is of concern.

Finally, regulatory challenges also hindered optimal private security governance. The private security guards felt the presence of competition act that prohibits the private governing agencies from fixing a floor rate for service provisions in the public sector. Moreover, the acts on security provisions still tend to be incomprehensive. The government domination of policy makings related to private security operations indirectly obstructs private security self-regulatory endeavours.

The current governance structure addressed some of the complications via three mechanisms; (i) security vettings, (ii) complaint management and (iii) training. Security vetting is aimed at reducing challenges associated with private security guards by verifying their backgrounds. Complaint management mechanism is facilitated by public and private governing agencies; MSIA, MOHA and CGSO. Private security guards are trained by governing agencies to tackle emerging challenges. However,

current endeavours are not comprehensive enough to cater for the emerging challenges revealed by respondents.

The analysis of this research question deserves further visualisation on three major grounds; (i) challenges associated with the governance process, (ii) challenges caused by private security actors and (iii) challenges associated with the public sector's security. Hence, an exhibition on these three grounds is presented in Table 4.5. The trend revealed that these challenges are mostly linked to the governance of private security. However, the challenges incurred by the private security actors are noteworthy, as they impact the public sector's security.

Table 4.5

Challenges Associated To Governance, Private Security And Public Sector
(Source: Self-derived based on the findings of this study)

No	Security Governance		Challenges Associated To		
	Dimension	Sub Dimension	Governance	Private Security	Public Sector
1	Legitimacy	Criminal records	●	●	●
		Reliability concern	●	●	●
		Licensing	●	●	●
		controversies			
2	Resource Management	Resource provision	●	●	●
		Training	●		●
		Recruitment	●	●	
		Turnover		●	
3	Compliance	Contract management	●	●	
		Weak evaluations	●		
		Monitoring shortages	●		
		Less penalties	●		
		NSGA management	●		
4	Cooperation	Absence direct engagement	●		
		Lack commitment		●	●

No	Security Governance		Challenges Associated To		
	Dimension	Sub Dimension	Governance	Private Security	Public Sector
		Reduce engagement	•		
		Tensed cooperation	•		•
5	Norm	Quality	•	•	
		Discipline issues	•	•	•
		Image		•	
6	Interest	Differentiated interest	•	•	
		Conflict of interest	•		
		Preference	•		•
		Complaisant	•		
7	Agenda	Risk in public sector		•	•
		Lack agenda setting	•	•	•
		Collective purpose	•	•	
		SGA dominance	•		
		Hidden agenda	•		
8	Authority	Limited authority	•		
		SGA dominance	•		
		Hierarchy	•		
		Conflicting authority	•		
9	Actor	NSGA weak role	•		
		Lack NSGA	•		
		Growth of PSC	•		
10	Regulation	Competition Act	•		
		Security provision act	•		
		Policy making	•		

Hence, it can be noted that the issues raised on private security governance in the public sector comprise almost all dimensions of the security governance model incorporated with new subdimensions. The issues associated with private security in the public sector have been highly associated with the Structural core of governing process. Even though legitimacy is the only dimension under the Consequence section of the governing model, the raised concerns were top-notch on this. A new

subdimension, risk in the public sector, has been incorporated into the agenda-setting dimension. The interrelation of these dimensions is presented in Figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8 The Interrelation of Challenges in Private Security Governance
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

4.6 Ideal private security governance for the public sector

The fourth research questions deals with formation of ideal private security governance for public sector. These viewpoints in the form of 550 codes were clustered according to security governance dimensions presented in descending order; Resource Management, Norm, Compliance, Actor, Regulation, Agenda, Legitimacy, Authority, Interest and Cooperation. The coding was mainly extracted from primary data sources of the public and private sectors. Secondary data sources were mainly academic publications. The major responses to these recommendations were from public

governing agencies, followed by private governing agencies visualised in Appendix 12.

First, recommendations suggested resource management improvised under four major concerns; recruitment of private security guards, training and type of resources provided. The recruitment of private security guards needs major revision in terms of (i) recruitment criteria, (ii) salary improvisations, (iii) recruiting agencies, (iv) recruitment standard operating procedure and (v) career path.

Recruitment criteria require private security guards appointed by public security actors with proper educational backgrounds and minimum induction who are screened before an appointment. Both public and private governing agencies are required to relook into private security guards' salaries. SA propose improvements on recruitments shall be made within private security services in the country. Further, a private governing agency is required to be in charge of the recruitment and career development of these private security guards by setting the standard SOP.

The improvisations raised by public sector actors urged training quality to be improved with proper collaboration between service recipients, public governing agencies, private governing agencies and private security companies. Further, MSIA aspired to monopoly training for private security guards in future. The requirement for additional resources for private security operations should be in the form of security equipment, physical guards and the government's financial assistance to private security companies. Thus, in future, the dependency towards manpower might decline with improvised technology.

Second, improvements were suggested in five major norms; professionalism, image, proactiveness, loyalty and good governance. Respondents required MSIA to be a professional body that can boost the private security industry's professionalism. Moreover, MSIA is required to be more proactive in improvising the private security industry's image. Respondents also demanded that private security guards be more loyal to government agencies in future. Finally, good governance is required for better management of the private security industry.

The third improvisation is required in terms of compliance for an ideal state with contract revision, evaluation mechanism and strengthening enforcement. Responses for this category were mostly gained from public data sources. Revision of contracts, improvisation of evaluation mechanisms and enforcement fell on public sector actors, especially on service recipients and public governing agencies. Further, strict compliance is still favoured for an ideal state. Moreover, respondents urged that star ratings are applied to private security companies by public governing agencies. Thus, compliance mechanisms are to be improved by public sector actors.

Dimension of actor requires revision on functions and governing agencies. MSIA must transform to be more professional and steadily grow as an institution, whereas private security guards are expected to be skilled and knowledgeable. Moreover, public and private governing agencies are expected to have better segregation of functions.

The need for additional governing agencies was well accepted and objected to by respondents. This special governing agency or extension of a special unit to govern private security is required to be from public or private security. However, some felt that the current governing agencies are sufficient if their functions are properly

assigned. Besides, the revision of private security actors' capacity in the public sector was also recommended by respondents. Meanwhile, the idea of consortium practices for private security companies to be applied in Malaysia was somehow objected to by some respondents.

“Since Malaysia already have CGSO (Chief Government Security Officer), I believe they should be managing it together with the Police.” (NSGA 04)

Fifth, regulations on private security in Malaysia are aimed to cater for the need of the future private security industry. Thus, regulations are aspired to be business-friendly to allow private security companies to prosper. This would need the amendment of the Private Agencies Act and abolishment of competition act within public procurement in future. Thus, public governing agencies should facilitate the changes and bestow authority on private governing agencies in the Private Agencies Act. Private governing agencies need to pave the way from state-centric regulations to self-regulation of the industry.

In terms of agenda, respondents requested it to be more market-centric. The business-friendly government policies and benchmarking practices aspired to boost the private security industry. However, state-centric security standards required for government agencies should also be considered. For this, public security standards should be aligned with growing technology-based security resources.

Seventh, efforts suggested legitimating the private security industry via licensing practices, certification of private security guards and adaptation of good practices in regulations. In the future, licensing of private security companies should be strictly based on performance evaluation and market surveys. A second licensing should be granted by CGSO to private security companies for their operation in the public sector. Not only private security companies, but private security guards also need some sort of certification from an external body.

Eighth, private governing agencies should lead the way for the private security industry in proposing policies and security-related technologies. The government should delegate power to MSIA and discontinue the current trend of being spoon-fed by the government. Meanwhile, private security guards should be empowered to better cooperate with other public security actors in the public sector. The function of public governing agency should be in monitoring with MSIA as a more authorised party for leading the private security industry.

“Saya bersetuju syarikat swasta ni diperkemaskan, diberi kuasa yang lebih untuk membantu pihak.” (SGA 08)

Concerning interest, efforts should be taken to meet government interest. The security aspects should be prioritised more than cost-saving and profit-seeking behaviour. Further, all attempts should be made for reducing conflict of interest, especially within private governing agencies. Even though major responses were favoured upon meeting government interest, the private agencies still require the government to understand the industry concerns.

Finally, MSIA should collaborate more with other private governing agencies in Malaysia, which is further nourished by dialogue sessions arranged with private security companies. Besides, the public and private governing agencies' collaboration should be enhanced in future. Nevertheless, the government is still required to give financial assistance to private security providers to boost the industry. However, this private agency's dependency on the government was mentioned much lesser compared to aspired self-regulatory practices.




Figure 4.9 Top Five Improvisations for an Ideal Private Security Governance
 Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

The fourth research question revealed ideal governance requiring improvisations in terms of the recruitment of private security guards and functions of the governing actors. Moreover, contracts should be revised, evaluation mechanisms need to be improvised and enforcement practices must be strengthened. More market-centric approaches should be adopted for enhanced professionalism in the private security industry to also be reflected in business-friendly regulations. Further, a special governing agency for managing private security companies is required for coordinating training, recruitment and better alignment of interests from the public and private sectors.

4.7 Cross-Case Analysis

This section further analyses the private security governance and the emerging themes via cross-case method; themes that emerged from MOHA, MSIA and CGSO were merged. These themes were then cross-analysed with the themes generated for the third and fourth research questions as in Figure 4.11. The interpretation of these extracts is explained in two sections ; (i) Private security governance in the public sector, and (ii) Emerging themes.




Figure 4.10 Emerging Themes of Security Governance Dimensions
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

4.7.1 Private security governance in the public sector

The private security governance elaborates on current governance patterns, issues associated with governance and improvisations that need to be made, which are visualised in Figure 4.10. Understanding private security governance in the Malaysian public sector requires three parts of analysis; prerequisites, structure and consequences.

The first section, Prerequisites, consists of four dimensions; Agenda, Authority, Interest and Norm. The incorporation of authority elements in the prerequisite section is considered relevant as it decides the flow of the entire governance process. Further, the incorporation of subdimensions of regulation and risk under agenda assists in better visualisation of the entire governing process. The second section comprises four dimensions; Actor, Compliance, Cooperation and Resource Management. The third section, Consequences, consists of two dimensions; Legitimacy and Challenge. The challenge is a newly incorporated dimension into this model.

Prerequisite 1: Norm

The first prerequisite discloses that serious attention is needed to improve the professionalism, image and proactiveness of the private security industry. Concerns are raised on disciplinary issues and compromised quality of private security operations in the public sector. In current practice, norms such as transparency, public credibility and trustworthiness, collective security and public sector security are repeatedly mentioned in descending order, especially in primary data sources.

Prerequisite 2: Agenda

The second prerequisite exposes that the current private security governance comprises diverged agendas. However, state-centric agendas are more often reported than market-centric. Even the collective purposes aimed by governance here are biased toward the state. Even though not many issues were brought up concerning authority, concerns have been raised about physical and cyber threats to the public sector. Thus, agenda-setting should be inclusive of risks in the public sector. In future, private security governance agendas aspired to be more market-centric. Thus, suggestions were made to enact more business-friendly regulations and facilitate self-regulations.

Prerequisite 3: Interest

The third prerequisite explains that differentiation of interest, preferences and conflicting interests is raised by apprehensions among respondents. Further, current governance reveals that differentiated interest exceeds the collective purpose of governance. These differentiated interests include profit, cost, competency and security. Even though the current system support interest alignment strategies exist, suggestions were made to further enhance them.

Prerequisite 4: Authority

The fourth prerequisite reveals that current private security governance consists of fragmented authority than centralised. The private governing agency's authority is valued almost similarly to the public governing agency's authority. Thus, the prerequisites of private security governance in Malaysia could be elucidated as, (i) a mediumly emphasised section by governors, (ii) less risk and issues associated and (iii) medium-level improvement required for further enhancement.

Structure 1: Actors

The first structure discovered heterogeneous actors present for governing private security in the public sector ranging from public governing agencies, private governing agencies, public security actors, private security actors and service recipients. Second, the hybrid structure could best picturise the Malaysian public sector's private security governance, which is reflected mainly in training and compliance mechanisms. Third, these multiple actors are geographically dispersed. There are not many issues associated with the governors of private security. However, the functionality of these actors was demanded to be improvised in the future.

Structure 2: Compliance

The second structure unearths the current compliance of private security is maintained via three main mechanisms; contract, enforcement and evaluations. Strict compliance is preferred over soft and voluntary approaches. However, trepidations were felt about contract management and weak evaluation methods. The respondents proposed revision of contracts, improvisation of evaluation methods, strengthening enforcement capacities and implementing strict compliance for future private security governance.

Structure 3: Resource Management

The third structure suggested improvements to be made for the recruitment of private security guards, training and the type of provided resources. Currently, technology-based resources are mentioned more than personnel and equipment. Even so, resources are seemed to be dispersed due to the presence of multiple governors. Training of private security guards gained much attention from governors compared to recruitment

in the current system. However, concerns about the training and recruitment of private security guards were also heavily raised.

Structure 4: Cooperation

The fourth structure indicates that collaborations and formal engagements are the most common cooperation mechanism for private security governance. Not many improvisations were proposed for this dimension. However, the absence of direct engagement between multiple actors in governance and less commitment were cooperative weaknesses highlighted by this study. The structure of governance is the most condensed part with dimensions and themes. It is also the section in focus for current private security governance in the public sector. However, the structure needs much attention in the future as diversifying concerns raised for improvisations.

Consequences 1: Legitimacy

The first dimension of consequences unearthed the intimidation of legitimacy of private security governance in the public sector. Responses piled up on two major facts; (i) private security guards are not accountable and (ii) private security companies' licensing issues. Even though the current governance structures justify the accountability of these private security guards and companies are verified via security screening, licensing and training, respondents still seek improvements. The licensing practices are expected to be state centred, strict and may be even doubled in the future.

Consequence 2: Challenges

The second dimension challenge, reveals the entire unintended consequences of private security governance in the public sector. This dimension is pervasive and associative with every other dimension in the governance model. The prominent issues were from legitimacy, resource management, cooperation, compliance and agenda of private security governance. The consequences section is the least condensed in the security governance model but possesses the most raised concerns. However, not many improvisations are targeted for threat management and legitimation purpose. The current governing process is less concentrated in this particular section.

4.7.2 Themes

After complete analysis of four research questions, researcher took additional step in generating common themes discussed by the respondents. Patterns derived from second research question via cross-case analysis incorporated with patterns from third and fourth research questions., as in Figure 4.11. Hence, five major themes were captured to illustrate the process in depth; anchoring co-governance relationships, diversified resource management, growing state-centric compliance, concern on accountability and transforming agenda.

Anchoring Co-governance Relationship

The public security actor has been holding down the growth and direction of the private security industry in Malaysia. Multiple governors ranging from public governing agencies, private governing agencies, public security actors and even service recipients are present within the structure. Even though this multiplicity could be referred to as hybrid governance, state dominance is still observed within the co-governance structure. Public governing agencies are seen as leaders in resource management,

compliance mechanism and licensing strategies. Meanwhile, private governing agencies follow the lead in resource management, whereas service recipients be in the second rank for compliance mechanisms.

In terms of functionality, these governors have distinctive governing functions. However, the conglomeration of public and private governors is seen in the coordination of training for private security guards, thus steadily growing the co-governance pattern. The weakness of the private governing agency functionality is expected to be addressed by improvising the professionalism of MSIA. Moreover, current governors are geographically dispersed since they are not reporting under one roof and the same authority. In addition to that, the establishment of a special governing agency or enhancing current governors is suggested for the betterment so that functional clarity of governors would be gained.

Diversified Resource Management

This study detected a strongly developing aspect of management among private security actors. Evidence pointed toward two major mechanisms; training and recruitment. The first mechanism is the training of private security guards. Current governance structures are more concerned with Certified Security Guards' training, which is being managed by public and private governors. Currently, the public governing agency anchors it, while private governing agencies act as coordinators. CGSO and MSIA are investing in training facilities for training private security guards. However, MSIA obtained the Industrial Lead Body certification for training purposes. Meanwhile, many concerns were raised regarding the training insufficiency among

private security guards. Thus, collaborative mechanisms between public and private governing agencies are expected to be sustained in training private security guards.

In terms of recruitment, the current government does not place much importance on the practice. The private security actors are recruited directly by private security companies and strictly vetted by public governing agencies via eSIMS. Meanwhile, the private governing agency does not have a role in recruiting and vetting private security guards. This study unearthed multiple suggestions for MSIA to take the lead in proposing career prospects, recruitment criteria and salary improvisations. This study illuminated the distinctive role of public and private governing agencies in the recruitment and training of private security guards.

Growing State-Centric Compliance

Among multiple compliance mechanisms adopted by governors, contract management, enforcement and evaluation have been ranked as the top three mechanisms. Contract management is pioneered by public governing agencies and coordinated well by service recipients. However, many issues emerged concerning the private security actors' noncompliance, public governing agencies and service recipient-rooted difficulties. In future, this mechanism needs revision by public governing agencies and service recipients.

Enforcement, being the second-ranked mechanism, is currently moderated by private governors and public governors. Self-enforcement methods pioneered by these private agencies are not much concern with the future. The strengthening of enforcement is aimed at public security actors, service recipients and public governing agencies' enforcement teams. Evaluation, being the third-ranked mechanism, is currently led by

public governing agencies, giving little room for private governing agencies. However, evaluations by both public and private governors are seen as weak. A more comprehensive eSIMS and state-centred compliance mechanisms were preferred by respondents to curb the weaknesses.

Besides these mechanisms, current compliance is considered strict with the collaboration of public governors and service recipients. Private governance is highly associated with soft and voluntary ways. However, recommendations urged strict compliance as the current system seems to lack control. Hence, the move towards strict compliance is in favour of private security governance. The domination of public sector actors, public governing agencies and service recipients led the way for contract management, enforcement and evaluation hints at the state-centred approaches.

Concern of Accountability

The endeavours on sustaining the legitimacy of private security providers were observed insufficient in upholding the accountability of private security actors. The current legitimization practices of private security are pioneered by public governing agencies via security screening, licensing and training. Legitimacy, being the less concerned section of the current governance, hailed much concerns from respondents. The accountability of private security guards and private security companies is being jeopardised by emerging security concerns.

The private security guards' heavy association with criminal records and terrorism links made the public doubt their accountability. Besides, the proliferation of illegal private security guards and offences committed in the public sector raised reliability

concerns. The franchising practices of expired licenses and compromised, easy renewals deteriorated the accountability of private security companies. Second, licensing for private security operations in the public sector and certification of private security guards from external bodies are fruitful remedies to curb diminishing accountability. Legitimacy concerning improvisations requires the collaboration of public, private and independent governors.

Transforming Agenda

Private security governance in the public sector currently has diversified agenda that works for a collective purpose. Even though this diverged mode supports the presence of public and market-centric agenda, the state-centred purposes are dominantly seen. Similarly, collective purposes are also biased toward state-centred governance. State-centric agenda can be seen in abundance in training and policy making. Whereas market-centric agenda is observed in professionalism of the private security industry.

The current governance is alleged to have state dominancy, where the collective purposes get dimmed. Meanwhile, issues were raised regarding no valuable agenda set by private governing agency's governance. Hence, the respondents suggested that agenda should be more industry-friendly to be reflected in policymaking. Further, respondents viewed that regulations aimed at benchmarking and standardising the private security industry should be drafted. This transformation in agenda-setting phase, which occupies the prerequisite stage of the governance process, would demand market-centric agenda in the future. The transformation of government-centred agenda to market-centric visions is indeed a high leap of the current co-governance structure.




Figure 4.11 Comparison of Themes Generated on Private Security Governance
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

This section presents the interpretation and discussion of the research findings based on four research objectives; provision of private security in the public sector, private security governance, challenges associated with private security in the public sector and ideal private security governance. Detailed discussions are provided on the research findings with existing literature, similarities, differences and novelties addressed under each section. Here private security governance model for the Malaysian public sector is attempted by incorporating the current structure, challenges and recommendations.

5.2 Research Objective 1: Provision of Private Security in the Public Sector

State Centric Regulations

The regulatory frameworks revealed that the government still controls the private security industry in Malaysia, thus reaffirming the claim by previous research on the autonomy of the state being maintained despite proliferating private security companies (Johnston, 2014; Hoogenboom, 2010; Krahmann, 2003; Kempa et al., 2002; Leese, 2015; Loader & Walker, 2004).

The Malaysian regulatory framework differs from Europe whereby the state's sovereignty is transferred voluntarily to institutions and involuntarily to the market (Sperling, Kay & Papacosma, 2003). Here, government regulations are majorly imposed via the public governing agencies than private governing agencies. The agency-level regulations seem to be much lesser compared to the specific regulations imposed by public governing agencies. Agency-level regulations exist despite the state and self-regulations (Diphoorn, 2016).

Currently, licensing has been well-emphasised by the Ministry of Home Affairs via a centralised licensing procedure at the national level. Similarly, in literature, state regulations are meant to legitimise private security companies (Ghebali, 2006; White, 2018; Ortiz, 2007; Spearin, 2014) and private security guards (Singh, 2005; Schreier & Caparini, 2005). In Malaysia, regulations are gravitated toward resource management and strengthening compliance mechanisms.

Beyond the centralisation initiative by the government, the private security companies with their licenses operating in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor have their sublicenses and operating addresses in other states. The claim by Singer and Biason (2004) on the relevancy of national regulations in regulating private security companies in weak states with their headquarters in the US, Britain and South Africa supports the current scenario in Malaysia.

Private security companies are required to have mandatory registration with MSIA, before their allowed operation in the public sector. This practice is indeed applaudable following the trend of developed countries (Diphoorn, 2016). It is somehow similar to

South Africa but differs in terms of security personnel context. According to Diphooorn (2016), all personnel within the private security industry are required to be registered with PSIRA and any noncompliance to PSIRA's legislation will be charged with penalties.

Private governing agency's role in Malaysia is at an initial stage. The self-regulation by MSIA is only employed via the constitution and exhibits a more voluntarily enforced code of conduct. There is no sign of collaboration with any international code of conduct observed in the Malaysian private security industry. The MSIA constitution is a stand-alone enacted policy by MSIA to combine and made their members abide by it. Thus, the current self-regulation by the industry is yet to be at par to conduct sectoral governance and fill the gaps overlooked by the national and international governments (De Nevers, 2010; Burt, 2012). The ultimate decision-making on private security industry is still under the Ministry of Home Affairs' terrain.

The regulation of private security provisions in the Malaysian public sector has exhibited government authority above the private governing agencies. The public governing agencies remain to have the upper voice and decision-making power besides providing unified leadership and guidance to the private security industry. In the area of regulations where substantial and heavy prerogative lie, all aspects of governance; compliance, norm, legitimacy, resource management, agenda setting and authority are set by the public agencies.




Figure 5. 1 Private Security Regulation Gravitated to Public Governing Agencies
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

Conventional Function of Private Security

The second trend observed in this study is on the function of private security provision in the public sector. First, the function of private security in the Malaysian public sector remains conventional. Private security guards are appointed in the public sector mainly for the protection of property (Goddard, 2001; Wulf, 2002; Hess, 2009; White, 2010; Lalonde, 2010; Chief Government Security Office, 2013; Bures, 2016; Nemeth, 2017), perimeter security (Singh, 2005), access control (Elms & Philips, 2009; De Waard, 1999) and protection of personnel (American Security Industry Society, 2000, 2008).

Second, the function remained status quo even though they have been acknowledged as the third layer of defence absorbed into total security workforce in Malaysia. Their initial role in protecting the premise has been maintained over the years. Their functions are still drafted by the public governing agencies, public security actors and service recipients. Hence, it can be assumed that the private security function in the public sector does not much expand beyond physical protection (De Waard, 1999).

The conventional role of the private sector is maintained in practice even though the public sector's security requires more than physical protection.

Third, the voice of transforming functions of private security is observed in the public sector. Along with that, private governing agencies and private security actors felt that they are covering more functions in the public sector rather than spelt in contracts. Private security actors' dependency on crime prevention is least mentioned, but safeguarding information is emphasised by Chief Government Security Office. In the United States and the United Kingdom, private security is harnessed for risk and crisis management (Elms & Philips, 2009), which is a far future for private security guards in Malaysia. The assignment of government industrial security as prescribed by ASIS (2000) is something that is yet to be realised in Malaysia.

Evolving Security Provision Mode

The third trend affirmed the evolution of private security provisions in the public sector. First, layered security provisions are observed in the public sector, whereby the private security actors are placed in less risky and less sensitive areas within the premise. Hence, the private security actors would have their specified zonal coverage within the public sector premises. The multilayered approach (Abrahamsen, 2016), multilevel governance (Bagayoko, 2010, 2012) and multicentered governance (Aarstad, 2016; Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018) differs with this mode, as their view on the governing perspective. Whereas, layered provision mode is the context of private security in the public sector.

Second, the presence of public and private security actors popularised by the concept of hybrid security is noted in Malaysia. The presence of private security actors here was acknowledged as market actors (Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing, 2003) and private security actors (Bagayoko, Hutchful & Luckham, 2016). Even though regulations do not spell the hybrid term, in reality, it is what took place in the public sector.

Third, the technology-aided mode invites immersion in technology-oriented surveillance methods. The dependency of service recipients on private security for technology resources such as CCTV and alarm reaffirmed technology dependency in a hybrid structure (Schroeder, Chappuis & Kocak, 2014). Surveillance-oriented security technologies (Ball, 2018) have been incorporated into private security contracts for the public sector. Also, public and private governing agencies in Malaysia are in preference toward technology-incorporated security systems (Johnston & Shearing, 2003).

Transforming private security provision with the inclusion of technology surveillant methods are expected to be in line with the retainment of private security actors' relevancy. Private security actors expect that they would stay relevant with the progressing technology surveillance; the human-centred provision mode maintained with drone technologies. However, technology surveillance security systems' concern to reduce dependency on human security guards is supported by literature (Singh, 2005). Hence, the model of security provision in the Malaysian public sector is currently layered and hybrid with the incorporation of technology.

5.3 Research Objective 2: Private Security Governance in Public Sector

The effectiveness of the private sector industry in delivering public and private goods is not to be taken lightly. The regulations on private security have flourished from 2011 onwards owing to the government's rising concern for this industry. Multiple claims and issues on the private security industry refuted in parliaments made the government look into rising complications and draft regulations to govern these private security actors. Multiple governors and their responsibility had risen from the authority granted to them via Circulars.

The second research objective aspired to explore the current governance of private security in the Malaysian public sector. Despite the multiple themes that rose from individual cases, the cross-case analysis has exposed these five as the most grossing themes that are worth a discussion: (i) anchoring co-governance relationship, (ii) diversified resource management (iii) growing state-centric compliance mechanisms, (iv) concern of accountability and (v) transforming agenda.

Anchoring and Co-governance Relationship

The first theme on growing co-governance is associated with the structural component of security governance model with explicit details on the presence of heterogenous governors and a hybrid structure. The revelation of heterogeneity of governors has been extensively spelt by previous studies. The governors in previous studies were often addressed as actors (Kircher & Sperling, 2006; Krahmann, 2005; Ebo, 2007). Here, the actors include public security actors, private security actors, public governing agencies and private governing agencies.

Even though the term hybrid is not practised to address these actors, the combination of the public and private governors in governing structure supports the hybrid nature (Krahmann, 2005; Gill, 2006). However, the hybrid nature of private security governance does not include the institutions (Cross, 2016), civil societies (Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing, 2003) and external actors (Schroeder, Chappuis & Kocak, 2014). For Malaysian case, element of state referred to the government and the public governing agencies (Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing, 2003) here is acknowledged in the form of public governing agencies.

This study explored the heterogeneity among actors in relation to other security governance dimensions in depth. In Malaysia, hybrid governors are present in compliance mechanisms and training elements, which reaffirm the practice in Europe and Africa (Diphorn, 2016; Bossong, 2012; Krahmann, 2003). However, these heterogeneity couldn't be generalized for decision making and power related context (Krahmann, 2003; Webber, 2014).

The public and private security actors and governors in this study also exhibited a geographically dispersed structure. Even though the private security governance structure here does not go far beyond the national territory, it is still segregated into states (Loader & Walker, 2004; Bevir, 2016; Tholens, 2012). The Malaysian private security governance has not been extended to transnational (Mueller & Hochmueller, 2017; Zwolski, 2014), subregional and regional (Sperling & Webber, 2018), global and international (Krahmann, 2005; Ceccorulli, Frappi & Lucarelli, 2017; Hollis, 2010; Zwolski, 2014).

Even though not many concerns were raised about the heterogeneous actors, the need for improvement is still there. The transforming role of public governing agencies with limited responsibility has been observed in earlier governance structures (Abrahmanssen, 2008; Dupont, 2004). In the Malaysian context, however, the urge is placed upon improving the functional context of private governing agencies. As Adam (2018) mentioned, the hybrid structures results in overlapped functions between actors, which is noticed in the training of private security guards in Malaysia. In support of this, a special governing agency with clarified governance roles between actors is demanded in the future.

Diversified Resource Management

The second theme exhibited that technology provisions are dispersed, as partially supplied by the private security actors and partially by service recipients. Malaysia embraces technology-assisted surveillance mechanisms and their efficiency for security (Keith et al., 2013; Klauser, 2009), which move forward to drone technology. However, the current Malaysian scenario is not up to the extent of replacing human security with cyber security. Thus, cyber security's impact on the dilution of public and private security boundaries is an avenue yet to be plunged by Malaysian private security (Bures, 2016).

Next, training for private security guards, Certified Security guards, has been conducted in collaboration with public and private governing agencies. The agency-level regulation on training is regarded to have the most impact on private security guards (Diphooorn, 2016). The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health have

published regulations for contractual purposes but are not specified for training, but not expected to have more impact than public governing agencies.

The contractual security service in the public sector necessitates private security guards to undergo training set by public governing agencies. However, the training requirements are not those beyond minimum state requirements (Mccrie, 2017). In Malaysia, neither public governing agency nor service recipient, offers any incentive to these trained private security guards, except for some private security companies that offer at their own willingness. Incentives has to be practiced in future to boost private security guards and opt for better security knowledge (Mccrie, 2017).

Further, the diversification also extended to the recruitment strategies. In Malaysia, employment screening of private security guards is conducted by the state governing agencies (Al-Mulla, 2018; Maahs & Hemmens, 1998; Singh, 2005). Moderation of recruitment of private security guards via eSIMS reaffirmed the public governing agency's surveillance method. However, private agencies still have fewer roles compared to the public. Thus, more avenues are demanded for private governing agencies in the future to train and recruit private security guards.

The licensing strategies and enforcement practices by public governing agencies received backlash due to political interferences. Minimal requirements were imposed for the training and recruitment of personnel and board of directors in the private security industry (Schreier & Caparini, 2005). Now, certain requirements are seemed fundamental for private security guards in terms of recruitment and training but have not been extended to the entire industry actors.

Growing State-Centric Compliance

The third theme revealed the top three of the most compliant mechanisms, namely the contract, enforcement and evaluation. Among these mechanisms, contract is the most common method where service recipients control the private security via the public governing agency imposed regulations. It is indeed utilized as a normative tool in private security governance (Krahman, 2005). Loader, Goold and Thumala (2015) exerted that contractual mechanism poses a weakness of inconsideration of public values and commitments outside the contract. The scenario slightly defers to the Malaysian private security governance, whereby the contractual obligations are met by the private security companies and service recipient's demands being entertained by private security guards.

Currently, enforcement mechanisms of private security have been dominated by public governing agencies. The private governing agencies have imposed some self-enforcement strategy, which is being less noticed and not concerned about the future. Bagayoko (2012) stated that the self-enforcement strategies are much voluntary, which is true for Malaysian private governing agencies. This study aspires for the enforcement of public governing agencies, public security actors and service recipients to be further strengthened.

Malaysian private security governance does not seem to be tied to such international protocols yet. The current regulation imposes enforcement from the public governing agencies, even though multiple enforcement team works on the ground. Hence, the Malaysian case is unique as it doesn't tied up with international private security protocols and norms. However, to be aligned to certain kind of international standards

to boost private security industry professionalism indeed required for Malaysia. However, this big step shouldn't be allowed to dilute the state centred culture and interest.

Next, the evaluation mechanism for private security in Malaysia has been pioneered by public governing agencies with the least role imparted to private governing agencies. Daase and Friesendorf (2010) mentioned that evaluations are means to analyse possible challenges within a structure; which has been practised via security screening of private security guards in Malaysia. The evaluation mechanism for private security guards in Malaysia has been in the form of security vetting, auditing and evaluative feedback mechanism from service recipients. However, the evaluation linked to agenda setting and peer review mechanisms are unfamiliar to the Malaysian context (Aarstad, 2016; Bossong, 2012)..

The compliance mechanisms for private security governance are preferred to be strict. It was revealed from this study's findings that soft and voluntary compliance mechanisms (Krahmann, 2003) are not much preferred. Hence, the self-enforcement practices by private governing agencies have not gained much popularity (Bossong, 2012). Since, Malaysia demands strict enforcement by public governing agencies, service recipients and even public security actors, flexible and voluntary compliance mechanisms definitely not in near future (Bereneike, 2020; Liao, 2012).

Concern of Accountability

The fourth theme resembled the legitimacy dimension, the consequence section of the security governance model. The current concern raised about the private security

actors are; (i) accountability of private security guards and (ii) licensing of private security companies. The recent accountability issues concerning private security guards undeniably detrimental to national security (Bruce, 2009). Current regulatory practices in sustaining accountability of private security guards have to be relooked.

Private security guards' criminal records are serious concerns for public sector's security. Beside the common civil offences, private security guards are alleged to be engaged with terrorist associations. These allegations negatively influence the reliability and accountability of private security guards. Current screening methods for recruitment of private security guards indeed an attempt to enhance accountability of these actors. However, recurrent concerns raised on guards' accountability contributes to irreversible damage to the image of private security actors.

In licensing practices, franchising and illegal operations contribute to accountability concerns. Even though currently there is statutory control of licensing (White, 2010), illegal operators crumple the liability of private security providers. Beside the national control via public governing agencies, mushrooming franchising practices are on rise. Besides, Malaysia is alleged to have easy license renewal terms. Unlike European countries, Malaysia is not extended beyond national licensing regimes (Krahmann, 2016).

Transforming Agenda

The fifth theme revealed that the diverged agenda is present within the private security governance in Malaysia. Multiple actors and diverged purposes have been associated with the governance of security (Sperling & Webber, 2014). The diverged agenda in

Malaysia is also due to the presence of public and private security actors in the governance structure. Even though diversity is present in agenda-setting, it tends to be more state-centric. State-centric agenda is seen as the realist approach (Cullen, 2009). Singh (2005) opined that state-centric approaches are practised even when the government is at distance.

The contracts made to meet and secure the collective interest of both public sector and private security companies. However, the collective purpose be more state-centric especially in compliance mechanisms. Despite the current state-centric agenda, the concerns raised incorporate the risks present in the public sector, as well as physical and cyber threats. However, these are limitedly noted in documented materials. The priority of these security concerns should be addressed in comprehensive governance structures in the future.

The current state-centric agenda aspired to be more business-friendly and market-centric in the future. The transformation phase is noted within private security governance in Malaysia. The rise of private security actors in neoliberals concerns (Cullen, 2009) are paving the way for Malaysia in the future. The near future of security governance just has a glimpse of private governors' agenda to be incorporated into the governance structure. Unlike European, self-regulation and people's interest are not familiar to Malaysian private security as for now.

5.4 Research Objective 3: Challenges Associative to Private Security

A comprehensive understanding is essential to grasp the patterns of challenges, adversities, issues, and risks related to private security governance. These challenges

stem from two primary sources: (i) challenges instigated by private security actors and (ii) challenges arising from the security governance process itself. Challenges are then associated to security governance dimensions as in Figure 5.2, and five most vulnerable governance dimensions are examined further in this section.




Figure 5.2 Challenges associated to Security Governance Dimensions, Public Sector and Private Security Industry
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

The first dimension indicates that the accountability of private security guards is compromised by criminal offenses, reliability concerns, information leaks, and associations with terrorism. Private security companies are profit-oriented businesses, and their economically motivated roots give rise to accountability deficits (Bryden & Caparini, 2006). Placing private security guards in outer layers and less risky perimeters minimizes concerns related to cyber threats. Nevertheless, existing cyber security policies within the country are deemed sufficient to address this concern at present.

The manipulative reporting behaviour exhibited by private security firms, wherein records are falsified to maximize financial claims from the government. This phenomenon contributes to excessive financial claims by private security companies, which ultimately results in losses for the government. Such financial discrepancies impede the government's ability to achieve cost efficiency. Furthermore, the compromised accountability of private security guards compromises the quality of service rendered to the government.

The study also acknowledges the existence of crimes and gangsterism associated with private security guards. Given that private security guards have been targeted by terrorist associations (Lee, 2014), this issue warrants serious consideration. The tarnished reputation of unaccountable private security actors undermines the overall image of public sector's security. The alarming allegations of terrorism have been observed in several cases in Malaysia, yet have not received significant attention from the government. Compromising operations within the public sector premises, is a threat to national security.

In the Malaysian context, several licensing controversies have come to light, including issues surrounding franchising, expired licenses, illegal operations, and lenient license renewal terms. Singer and Biason (2004) identified diverse geographical locations of private security headquarters and operational sites in countries such as the United States, Britain, and South Africa, which are attributed to operational weaknesses within private security companies. Similarly, in Malaysia, licensing is granted at the state level, allowing sub-operations in other states through branch offices. This decentralization weakens monitoring mechanisms, resulting in poor service delivery and disruptions in public premises' operations.

Emerging challenges to Malaysian private security governance include franchising issues and easy license renewal terms, challenging the industry's integrity. Licensing requirements have been observed to meet stringent bureaucratic standards (Klein & Hemmens, 2018; Hurst, 2011). The lack of accountability and reliability among private security guards further undermines the industry's reputation, diminishing its market value and hindering potential growth.

Moreover, this study commonly addresses issues related to resource provision, training, recruitment, and turnover of private security guards. As highlighted by Krahmann (2003) and Sperling and Webber (2017), limitations in government resources have raised concerns, with insufficient and outdated resources and overlapping provisions compromising the level of security delivered to government agencies. This scenario echoes in Malaysia, where resource limitations persist, hindering the public sector's ability to keep pace with technological advancements and security demands.

Furthermore, the presence of both public and private security actors leads to overlapping provisions in the public sector, resulting in manpower wastage and leaving grey areas of security unattended. Supervisory capacities and resources of state governing agencies are also limited, loosening compliance mechanisms and compromising public sector security. Malaysian case can't agree with scholars on private governing agencies have better insight into training and industry guidelines, as lack initiation observed from their side.

The turnover of private security guards is another concern, attributed to factors such as lack of belonging, job security, training, career advancement opportunities, and low salaries. In Malaysia, high turnover rates are associated with low commitment among private security guards, inadequate career prospects, and remuneration. If unaddressed, these trends could threaten the sustainability of the private security industry, resulting in losses for both the government and the industry in terms of recruitment costs and training investments.

Third, the compliance mechanism within the private security sector presents several notable challenges, including issues related to contract management, weak evaluation methods, imposition of penalties, and conflicting interests among private governing agencies. Despite the potential of contracts to enhance compliance, weaknesses in this area pose risks to public sector safety. Temporary feelings of security among private security guards toward safeguarded properties often result from renewal periods and contractual terms lasting only two years.

Weak evaluative methods also contribute to a compromised compliance structure. The evaluation of private security guards, ranging from employment screening to public governing agency assessments, poses a growing concern in Malaysia. Confidence in public sector security, often vested in vetted Malaysian personnel disguised as private security, is undermined when penalties are weak and employment screening lacks rigor. Such vulnerabilities erode public confidence in the private security system, potentially jeopardizing security over time.

Furthermore, the presence of private security companies acting as representatives of private governing agencies within the current governance framework presents a conflict of interest. Ideally, security governors should remain neutral entities, unaffected by direct incentives experienced by industry players. However, MSIA rooted from private security companies, which is a barrier to achieving a self-regulated industry.

Additionally, compliance with human rights standards, a factor less emphasized in Malaysian public sector private security governance, has been addressed in multiple studies. The neglect of human rights concerns can lead to exploitation of private security guards in the workplace, resulting in extended hours, poor wages, and lack of career advancement opportunities. The provision of incentives, as suggested by Bossong (2012), to boost compliance rates is absent in the Malaysian context, further impacting the morale and professionalism of private security guards.

Fourth, the cooperative dimension within the governance structure faces numerous challenges, characterized by lack of engagement, limited commitment, and strained cooperation among actors. Reduced engagement between service recipients and private governing agencies, coupled with a lack of direct engagement between public governing agencies and private security actors, exacerbates cooperative troubles. The weak affiliation between public and private sectors undermines the effectiveness and reputation of security provision, hindering efficiency in the long run.

Fifth, risks within the Malaysian public sector, spanning physical, cyber, and dynamic threats, including non-traditional security threats, pose significant challenges. The proliferation of private security actors, as highlighted by Krahmann (2005), contributes to the emergence of non-traditional security issues. However, regulatory frameworks in Malaysia have yet to adequately address these evolving challenges, resulting in compromised security requirements for private security and critical infrastructure protection.

Moreover, a lack of agenda setting observed in the governance structure, particularly concerning private security requirements, hampers industry growth and weakens its position in the transnational market. Political interference in licensing and enforcement practices further complicates compliance mechanisms, potentially leading to compromised services in the public sector. The media's role in exposing hidden agendas and political interference underscores the need for transparency and accountability in governance practices. In conclusion, addressing these challenges at the governance stage could mitigate their spread to the public sector, thereby able to restore public trust in the private security industry.

5.5 Research Objective 4: Ideal Private Security Governance

Aligned with the fourth research objective, this research attempted to propose ideal private security governance for the public sector. Several dimensions were placed with much emphasis for the enhancement of security governance in Malaysia; resource management, norms, compliance, actor and agenda setting. The first dimension requires improvisations to be made particularly in the recruitment and training of private security guards.

Recruitment is required to be revised to have better recruiting criteria, salary improvisations and a career path. The recruitment phase has been emphasised as a stage of surveillance (Diphoorn, 2016), whereby recruitment is done based on minimal requirements and set criteria (Schreier & Caparini, 2005). Wages and recruitment (Hobbs et al., 2003; Brookes, 2007; Bruce, 2009) and hiring veteran guards (Singer, 2011) are concerns raised on recruiting private security guards. As such, improvisations on recruiting criteria in Malaysia do not limit themselves to minimal requirements and salary improvisations but seek better career plans which are lacking in the current structure.

Moreover, a special recruiting agency is preferred in the future for the recruitment of private security guards. Bryden and Caparini (2006) have put forth the claim on additional bodies to oversight private security companies, but not really into isolating the recruiting task of private security guards to be handled by a separate agency. The need for recruiting agencies for private security guards in the public sector is meant to mediate between the government and private security companies, as well as to provide suitable personnel as per both parties' requirements.

The training aspects are expected to improve especially in terms of quality. Many concerns were raised about the training and professionalism of private security guards by scholars (Singh, 2005; Button, 2008; Crawford & Lister, 2006; Bryden & Caparini, 2006). Hence, the current pertaining issues on private security guards in Malaysia are expected to be resolved by having better quality training. In Malaysia, private governing agencies are expected to lead the training of their private security guards. As Krahmann (2005) stated, the industry has better knowledge of regulating the training of private security. In this context, private agencies are expected to provide better training to upskill their guards.

The second dimension, Norms, serves as the prerequisite for governing processes and improvising better security governance. The current scenario embraces norms that tend to be more state-centric; transparent (Ball, 2004), trustworthy (Krahmann, 2005), collective security (Sperling & Webber, 2018), public credibility (Tholens, 2012; Bryden & Caparini, 2006) and public sector security (Bossong & Rhinard, 2013). The ideal governance requires improvisations on more market-centric norms aiming to enhance the private security actors and agencies; professionalism, image and proactiveness.

The professionalism of private agencies is expected to be heightened, as the current state of MSIA is not satisfactory to govern the private security industry. Beeson and Bellamy (2008) also alleged that the security sector in South East Asia suffers from a lack of professionalism. Heiduk (2014) stated that Security Sector Reforms placed a prominent place for professionalism in the industry. Hence, the private agencies aspired to be more professional and reconstruct a better image to fit into the ideal

governance structure. Besides, MSIA is expected to be more proactive in rectifying issues pertaining security industry to lead the way. Proactiveness has been seen in the security industry for the prosecution of cybercrime (Bures & Carrapico, 2018) and multilateral peacebuilding operations (Kirchner, 2007).

Third, the compliance dimension should be revised in terms of contract, evaluation, enforcement and rating. Cottier (2006) stated that contracts can improve compliance capability. As such, the current contract is expected to be revised to be in an ideal state for government and industry players. Further, the evaluation mechanism, which is seen as a resource itself (Bagayoko, 2010), is expected to be improvised for ideal conditions. Aarstad (2016) observed the linkage between evaluation and governing objectives. Even though the current governance structure lacks these defined governing objectives, this idea supports having a refined evaluation tool for Malaysia.

Private security companies are required to be rated in the future based on their capability and performance via Star Rating practices. These rating practices are pioneered by the public governing agency and welcomed by private security actors as well. Even though, in Malaysia, there are no incentives offered by the public and private governing agencies for better compliance, the proposed star rating practices could benefit the industry players to rank their level and excellency (De Nevers, 2010).

The current state-centric enforcement is anticipated to be strict with improvised capability. Strict enforcement is seen as contrary to voluntary, self-enforcement practices (Bossong, 2012). Even though a hybrid structure is noticed within private security governance with public and private actors, enforcement practices are preferred

to be held in control of the public governing agencies. Thus, a strict enforcement approach justified the government's control of its governing process.

The fourth dimension requires improvisation on governing agencies. The current governing agencies have to be revised with an isolated agency to be assigned for better governance of private security. Bryden and Caparini (2006) have long stated that the provision of additional bodies to oversight private security companies is the best practice to deter undue influence. Similarly, particularly for the private sector, public agencies are required to be monitored by special governing agencies. This could be achieved by revising the current function of governing agencies. Meanwhile, the private governing agencies are expected to be institutionalised.

The fifth dimension, regulation, put forth the claims on regulatory enhancements and authority restructuring. Hence, a private governing agency is expected to lead the private security industry towards transforming market-centric agenda. This ideal condition requires the amendment of the Private Agencies Act with proper delegation of power to MSIA. So, fragmentation of authority is required between public and private governing agencies for ideal governance structure (Webber, 2017; Liao, 2012).

In terms of regulation, the ideal structure prefers business-friendly regulation. Hence, abolishment of the competition act can be the first step towards a more market-centric regulatory structure. In the future, the MSIA would need more authority and ground for enacting self-regulations for the industry. Self-regulations are seen as voluntary codes of conduct pioneered by private security actors (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010). Loader, Goold and Thumala (2015) mentioned that the market has a moral

responsibility in regulating the private security industry. As such, MSIA's lead to drafting market-friendly regulations would be ideal.

The emerging themes from this research in the current governance context and ideal condition are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The current governance of private security resembles a more state-centric context, except for the actor dimension, which portrays the presence of a hybrid structure. Whereas the aspired ideal governance favours a balanced ratio between state and market-centric conditions. The prerequisites and structural part of ideal governance favour more inclusion of private governing agencies, except for compliance. Either in ideal or current governance, the legitimacy and compliance are set to be state-centric in the Malaysian governance context.

Taking into account the analysis of the current governance, challenges and conditions, a security governance model was proposed for the Malaysian public sector. The proposed model is inspired by Ehrhart (2013), which places the governance process into three major sections: Prerequisites, Structure and Consequences. The proposed governance model extends the original idea by incorporating findings, which are dimensions and subdimensions revealed through the case analysis and are presented in Table 5.1.

The prerequisite section has been incorporated with an additional dimension of authority. Authority has been extensively studied in the security governance context (Bevir, 2016; Liao, 2012), yet was not associated with the governance process model. Norms present within private security governance have been segregated into market-centric and state-centric, which are fundamental to be addressed at the initial stage of

security governance. Even though the complaisant and preferential issues are lightly addressed, they are capable of stirring up conflicting interests in the governance of security. Complaisant and preferences are fresh sub-dimensions that are hardly mentioned in the literature.




Figure 5.3 Private Security Governance in Public Sector within State and Market Centric Continuum
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

Two sub-dimensions were incorporated into the agenda-setting dimension; risks in the public sector and hidden agenda. Both subdimensions are novel to existing security governance models. The risk subdimension combines the possible challenges present within the public sector, physical, cyber and dynamic required before governance objectives are set. The political interference was addressed under the new sub-dimension of hidden agenda, whereby any undue influence on agenda setting could be realised.

The Structure section of the model incorporated multiple subdimensions; turnover under Resource management; contract, rating and penalty under Compliance and tensed cooperation under Cooperation. The Actor dimension recognises multiple governors present (Webber et al., 2004; Bevir, 2016; Liao, 2012) in reality for the public sector's security. Under the multiple compliance mechanism, contract, rating and penalty are something novel gained through this case study findings. Star rating practices here are viewed as alternatives to existing practices of offering incentives (Mccrie, 2017).

The security governance model overall is enhanced with the incorporation of issues; compromised quality, hidden agenda, risk, conflicting interest, conflicting authority, turnover, overlapping resources, tensed cooperation and licensing controversies. The conceptual framework places risk, challenges and uncertainties to be studied under the efficiency dimension of Consequences. However, since these issues cut across various dimensions and are present in all the stages of the governing process; prerequisite, structure and consequence stage, they could not be placed statically in the consequence section.

Practically, this security governance model applies to the public sector context. The dimensions of actors, cooperation, authority, compliance, interest and agenda have been adapted into this current model. However, the dimensions to study the state-centred government, force, demand and supply have been neglected as it does not fit to explain the public sector's security in the Malaysian context.

The incorporation of governance dimensions mentioned by Krahmann (2005) has been utilised in constructing this model with the omission of decision-making and implementation dimensions. Johnston and Shearing (2003) proposed a model of the structure of governance, which highlights the actors, process, resources, agenda, authority and mentalities. This model incorporated most dimensions of security governance except for the mentalities present. Threats and uncertainties were initially measured by the effectiveness dimension (Ehrhart, 2013). However, the current model has merged these challenges and issues arise under each dimension.

Several dimensions associated with security governance were omitted in this security governance model, as it has been customised to suit private security governance in the public sector. Implementation has been a standalone dimension proposed by Krahmann (2005) and Liao (2012), which has been least mentioned in this study. The institution is another dimension repeatedly mentioned by Webber et al. (2004), Kircher (2007) and Westermeyer (2013), but does not fit the study context. Policymaking (Kircher, 2007) and Problem-solving (Garcia, 2016; Kircher, 2007) dimensions were not much captured by this case study. Further, the research findings did not spell much on state building (Kirchner, 2007; Westermeyer, 2013) and Power (Webber et al., 2004).

Table 5. 1
Comprehensive View of Ideal Private Security Governance in the Public Sector

PREREQUISITES	STRUCTURE	CONSEQUENCES
NORMS • Diverged Norms <i>State centric norms: trustworthiness, integrity, collective security, transparency</i> <i>Market centric norms: professionalism, proactiveness, etiquettes</i> • Compromised quality <i>Discipline</i>	ACTOR • Multiple governors <i>State governing agency, Non state governing agency, Service recipient, State actor, Non state actor</i> • Hybrid <i>Security actors, Governors of security</i> • Geographical dispersion • Functional dispersion	LEGITIMACY • Licensing** <i>Licensing authority, Multiple licensing, Strict licensing, Licensing controversy: franchising, easy renewal, expired license</i> • Accountability <i>Security actors, Governing agencies, Verification process: security screening, training, licensing</i>
AGENDA SETTING • Single agenda <i>State centric, Market centric</i> • Multiple agenda <i>Diverged agenda, Collective purpose</i> • Risk** <i>Risk in public sector: Physical threat, Cyber threat, Dynamic threat</i> • Hidden Agenda** <i>political interference</i>	RESOURCE MANAGEMENT • Resource Type <i>Technology, Personnel, Equipment</i> • Resource Provision <i>Limited provision, Obsolete, Budget concern, Overlapping provision</i> • Recruitment • Training <i>training modules, certification, training inadequacy</i> • Turnover**	
INTEREST • Differentiated interest <i>commercial interest, government interest: cost sensitive</i> • Collective interest • Conflicting interest <i>governing agencies, preference issue**, complaisant**</i> • Interest alignment	COMPLIANCE • Multiple mechanism <i>Contract management**, Evaluation: security screening, Rating**, Enforcement, Penalty**</i> • Compliance mode <i>Strict compliance, Voluntary compliance, multi level enforcement</i>	
AUTHORITY • Authority channel <i>Fragmented, centralized, hierarchy</i> • Mode of authority <i>Limited, dominancy, bureaucracy</i> • Conflicting authority	COOPERATION • Cooperation method <i>Collaboration, Engagement</i> • Cooperation mode <i>Direct, Indirect, Formal, informal</i> • Tensed Cooperation	

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary and conclusion derived from this case study to explore private security governance in the Malaysian public sector. The first section recapitulates the findings of the case study aligned with the research objectives. The second section illuminates the contributions made by this research to the body of knowledge. Next, the study proposes recommendations for practitioners and future studies. Finally, the chapter exposes the limitations while conducting this research.

6.2 Recapitulation of Findings

First Research Objective

The private security guards' functions are conventional and maintain the status quo as in 1990s even after they were declared as the third layer of defence of the country. However, the transformation voices are present to merge crime prevention. The aspiration to handle Crisis management security consultation and government industrial security in developed countries far beyond reach for now as total control of the functions remains plotted by the state. Current regulations for private security are mostly gravitated toward resource management and strengthening compliance mechanisms. Malaysia is still at the initial stage of self-regulation. Here, private security actors demand the upper hand in regulating their industry, especially in training. Public governing agencies dominate via regulation, especially the Ministry

of Home Affairs as the license issuer for the private security industry. Agency-level regulations are drafted carefully not to overrule the state.

Nonetheless, the mode of security provision in the public sector has undergone substantial changes. Here, the Chief Government Security Office has been implementing layered security for the public sector premises, whereby private security guards are often placed at the outer perimeter and less risky areas. The immersion of private security actors transformed the monopolistic mode into a hybrid state where both public and private security actors combinedly provide the public sector's security. Technology-aided modes are seen on the rise with the assimilation of alarm, CCTV and drone technology. Despite the demands for transforming technology demand for security provision, private security actors are expected to be relevant and human-centred security mode cannot be compromised.

Second Research Objective

The second research question on current private security governance in the public sector revealed five major themes derived via the cross-case analysis method; (i) anchoring co-governance relationship, (ii) diversified resource management (iii) growing state-centric compliance (iv) concern of accountability and (v) transforming agenda. The first theme revealed government anchors the governance of these governors. Hybridity has been fundamental in governance, especially in decision-making, power relations, training and compliance mechanism. Although private governing agencies aspired to improve functionally, the stronghold of public governing agencies also progresses over the years.

The second theme revealed the diversified resource management within the private security structure, especially in terms of resource provision, training and recruitment strategies. Currently, the throne is in the hand of MOHA in conducting Certified Security Guard training and eSIMS vetting even though it is a collaborative effort between public and private governing agencies. The third theme observed a growing state-centric compliance mechanism in the current governance structure. Self-enforcement strategies have been voluntary. However, MSIA's role in compliance is unknown and it is something to be cringed upon. The hold of the state on the private security industry is indeed concrete in the structure of governance.

The fourth theme disclosed the downfall of private security companies' accountability is pernicious to national security. The liability concerns are further raised by the infringement of rules and crime offences performed by the private security guards. Even though, MSIA attending to the damage control via online reaches; the attempts are trivial beside the disfigured image of the private security industry. Hence, here again, the state pulls the strings to reduce the blemishes through more state-centric measures. The fifth theme discerned state-centric agenda eventually flourishes to allow private security actors' vision for a collective purpose in security governance. Malaysian government leads and guards to achieve collective purposes. Even though the transformation at this point is minute, this ideal condition is something bound to blossom via collaborations between public and private security actors.

Third Research Objective

The third research question revealed sources of challenges into two main categories; (i) caused by the private security providers and (ii) caused by the governance process.

Meanwhile, the impacts of these challenges are to both the public sector and private security industry. The confederation of challenges with security governance dimensions as in Figure 5.1 exposes these are much associated with legitimacy, resource management, compliance, cooperation and agenda setting. First, the legitimacy of private security actors is jeopardised by accountability and liability issues such as criminal offences, information leaks, terrorism and licensing controversies. Illegal operations and mushrooming franchising practices crumple licensing accountability of private security companies.

Second, poor resource management system, lack of trained private security guards, irrelevant training modules issues, low esteemed private security guard career image, inadequate career improvement opportunities and low wages, sap the strength of the private security industry. Third, compliance with state-centred regulations has been alleged to be a mess with unclear contract management practices, weak evaluation, imposition of penalty and conflicting interest. Fourth, cooperative issues arise between actors and governors distort private security governance. Tensed cooperation between security actors and governors further aggravates the cooperative structure within governance.

Fifth, feeble agenda setting, which is the oblivion of risks in the public sector, also weakened security governance. In most scenarios, governing objectives are just pillared by contract documents and state regulations. Hence, the collective purposes to be attained by the heterogenous actors within the structure have been dimmed. The study unearthed that adversities caused by the governance processes are more than those directly imposed by the private security guards. The slam on the private security

industry is equivalent to the impact faced by the public sector. Challenges that affect the public sector's security consist of government servants, physical premises nationwide and the public visiting these premises. Since emerging challenges of private security actors and vulnerabilities of government premises are of great concern, the need for remedy via security governance becomes essential.

Fourth Research Objective

The fourth research objective hunt for ideal private security governance for the Malaysian public sector. The proposed model (Table 5.1) consisted of three major components; Prerequisite, Structure and Consequence, sculpted based on current governance structure and the associative challenges. These sections are composed of nine security governance dimensions; Authority, Norm, Interest, Agenda, Actor, Resources, Cooperation, Compliance and Legitimacy.

The ideal private security governance model aspires to the equilibrium maintained between the public and private sectors in terms of authority, interest, actors and cooperation between them. Unlike the current state-centric condition, the agenda, resource management and norm of security governance are aspired to be market-centric. However, the public and private sectors agreed that the compliance and legitimacy portion of security governance is handled by the state. In terms of resource management, improvement is required in recruitment and career development plans for private security guards.

The image of MSIA needs to be refreshed to boost the private security industry in this country. Further, the empowerment of private security actors via star rating and mutually beneficial contracts is yearned for in an ideal governance state. On top of that, MSIA has to be institutionalised to better the private security industry. More business-friendly regulations and market-centric agenda should be aspired to further nourish the private security industry. In summary, the proposed ideal governance model honours every dimension of governance by alleviating the possible challenges to dignified private security governance.

6.3 Contributions of Study

This research makes a valuable contribution to methodology, practice and knowledge. Methodologically, a systematic literature review for security governance literature across multiple online databases is a contribution. The enactment of review protocol, data extraction, analysis and dissemination methods of security governance literature is fresh in enlightening the security governance dimensions. The systematic literature review has to be continually used for security governance as to groom the knowledge base for related literature. Theoretically, this research findings furnished the scarcity of knowledge via the private security governance model. The comprehensive view merges the public sector's security and governance dimensions.

For practitioners, both government and private security industry would be benefitted by the proposed model; the public sector's security is in a layered state not explicitly stated in any existing regulations. Hence, this model opens up about the placement of private security guards in government agencies. So, it will be a guidance for those government agencies wish to outsource these private security guards for their premise.

This model applicable when hybridity occurs in terms provision of security and governing agency. Clarity on private security actors' function in government agencies would be well defined for the hiring government agencies as it is established in this model.

For enforcers, especially the governing agencies, this model provides comprehensive view on aspects of governance. The conflicting enforcement roles could be lessened via the proper segregation of duties among enforcement agencies. Function of public and private governing agencies could be well established with the assistance of governance dimensions. The comprehensiveness of current governance mechanism by each governance agency could be measured internally. Regulatory and compliance measures by governors could be set aligned to governance objectives.

For policy makers, the model provides the base and ground to revise the existing policies pertaining private security actors in public sector. Every governance dimension incorporated with existing challenges be set the platform for policy makers to craft comprehensive policies. The existence of multiple governors allows them segregate the duties accordingly, and easily distinguish grey area and conflicting roles. The role of hybrid security actors present within a premise also made well known for policy makers. Establishment of security agenda prioritized by this model enlighten the guidance of policy making processes.

For service providers, this model enlightens both public and private security actors about their job description and territory with government agencies. Public security actors, such as Auxiliary police and Voluntary corps may define their territory well

and avoid any kind of conflicting duties with private security guards. Private security actors will be aware of their limitations and boundary within public premise. Moreover, both security actors are also informed about their employment methods, monitoring agencies, regulating firms, resource provisions and cooperative efforts towards public sector' security.

The study has able to raise a critical matter. For layered security framework of private security governance for state centred countries, a proper guideline is required. Here, the private security actors are placed in external perimeter and non-critical zone; not allowed in sensitive and risky areas. The model enlightens the fact that private security actors are not granted full trust in provision of security in state centric conditions. Further, issues revolving private security provision and governance in public sector are further explorable fields in depth. The balance between public and private governing agencies in terms of governance function could be measured via existing dimensions as variables. Further, it opens up for deeper exploration in private security governance researchers.

In summary, government centric private security governance model has to be relooked and adopted in Malaysia. Another perspective has been added to this study by engaging challenges to security governance dimensions as the sources and impacts. Further, this study also unravelled the challenges of private security within the public sector. Moreover, this model could serve for developing or improvising policies and programs for private security providers in the public sector.




Figure 6. 1 Private Security Governance Model for Layered Public Sector's Security
Source: Self-developed figure based on the findings of this study

6.4 Recommendations of Study

This research proposes recommendations for practitioners and future studies focusing on governing agencies and policy. Whereas for future studies, private security governance models and expansive studies are suggested.

6.4.1 Recommendations for Practitioners

Private Security Governance Policy for Public Sector

The current scenario of private security governance in the public sector is dispersed with multiple regulations. Even though state-centric regulations exist, multiple

governors with split functions also exist. Private security in the public sector should obey these multiple regulations imposed by public governing agencies, private governing agencies, service recipients and the private security actor manuals. Hence, this study recommends the enactment of a wholesome policy on Private Security Governance in the public sector.

This suggestion can be proposed to the governing agencies of private security in Malaysia, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Chief Government Security Office and the Malaysian Security Industry Association. Even though cooperation and commitment challenges do exist between these agencies, the lead should be preferably in the hand of the Chief Government Security Office due to its ownership of the public sector's security. This initiative is a step forward to optimise private security governance in the public sector by considering the proliferating issues.

The implementation of this policy is not to overrule the existing Private Agencies Act 1971 but to uphold the existing policies in fulfilling the security governance dimensions of public and private governors. This Private Security Governance Policy shall complement the layered and provisional mode of the public sector's security and cover the security governance dimensions; agenda setting, norms, actors, resource management, compliance, legitimacy and challenges.

The suggested policy begins with the agenda-setting phase, where the prerequisites of norms and interests to be sustained in the governance process are incorporated at this stage. MSIA's proactiveness in polishing the professionalism of private security actors should be prioritised, in addition to the public governing agency's established norms.

By considering the transforming nature of security provisions, the proposed agenda can be set on drone technology incorporations and enhancement of the market-centric agenda. Careful consideration is recommended for filtering the hidden agendas, political interferences and existing risks within the public sector before finalising the governance agenda.

Next, the policy should consider the rising co-governance structure with due importance to the public and private security actors and governors. All actors involved should be clearly stated of their territory in terms of geography, functionality and authority. It is recommended that emphasis be placed on governing function of MSIA with a better authority granted via the policy. Besides, the policy shall clearly define the function and authority of the Special Governing Agency assigned to monitor private security in the public sector. Further, the recruiting agency for private security actors either to be assigned as a separate unit or extended function of MSIA should be mentioned in this policy.

Resource management would be the third element within the Private Security Governance Policy for the public sector. As the reliance on technology resources is on the rise, the policy shall mention the resources as well as their providers to deter limited and overlapping provisions. Then, the training of private security guards is mentioned in this policy with improvised relevant training modules for the public sector. The crafting of training modules should also include the public and private governing agencies and service recipients. The policy should address MSIA's refurbished role not only in the recruitment of private security guards but also in the career development of these private security actors.

The policy should also mention state-anchored compliance mechanisms with improvised enforcements by MSIA. Public governing agencies' enforcement should be intensified with the capacity constraint recommended to be overcome by legitimised public security actors and service recipients appointed on behalf of public governing agencies. A solid evaluation system, incorporating eSIMS, contracts and CGSO manual assessment on private security guards should be initiated by this policy to assign star ratings for private security providers. This policy should complement the existing contractual obligations by having additional mutual beneficiary clauses for both government and industry. Hence, this policy will overcome the weakness observed in terms of contract terms and evaluation methods.

The policy recommended addressing the legitimacy constraints faced by private security actors, as well as public and private governing agencies. The licensing controversies, franchising issues and multiple licensing patterns are suggested to be imposed with terminative penalties. The refurbished role of CGSO as the Governing Agency of the Public Sector's Security should also be emphasised via the policy and that their hierarchy and authority in governing private security in the public sector should be spelt deliberately. The revised role of MSIA either as an institutionalised body or enhanced with better authority on governing their private security actors should be spelt out in this policy. The Policy on Private Security Governance in Public Sector is recommended to complement the existing law and regulations from the government and the industry to further enhance the governance of private security.

6.4.2 Recommendations for Future Studies

The current scenario delimits the exploration of private security governance and the public sector's security in a single context. The private security governance model has three major components; prerequisite, structure and consequences. Under component, there are related governance dimensions that initiate the comprehensive view on regulating private security companies. The comprehensive view of the private security governance in the public sector in state-centric governance layered mode incorporated with challenge dimension is recommended to be applied in states with similar traits as Malaysia. This model may guide researchers on private security for the less risky and outer perimeter of government premises.

The study recommends a security governance model to better understand private security governance in the public sector. The policymaking processes in future should be aligned with the security governance model with proper emphasis right from prerequisites to consequences. The proposed security governance model has recommended agenda setting, norms, interest and authority flow addressed in the prerequisite state. The structure proposed to view the actors, cooperation, resource management and compliance mechanisms within the security governance structure. Third, the consequences section proposed to measure the legitimacy of the governance process via licensing and accountability practices.

The proposed model has incorporated the risks to the public sector's security before the agenda-setting phase. By integrating challenges and issues under each governance dimension, the uncertainties that may arise within the security governance process could be noticed earlier. Since the public sector's security is in hybrid nature with both

public and private security actors, the security governance in the public sector warrants further research. The security governance model for public and private security actors in the public sector could complement this research in better visualising the governance of the public sector's security.

The expansion of functional and geographical context may consume more time and financial commitments but is worth the value as it could give two holistic views; public sector's security governance and private security governance in Malaysia. The geographical expansion should consider nationwide private security companies and service recipients' population to better comprehend private security governance. In terms of function, the exploration of private security governance should include not only the public sector but also the private sector. The respondents and informants are suggested to be from the private sector to better comprehend the private security governance in Malaysia.

Refurbishment of Private Security Governance Agency

Second, this study proposes that the government consider the refurbishing role of Private Security Governance Agencies. Considering the functional territory of existing governing agencies, a collaborative effort and mutual understanding between MOHA, CGSO and MSIA become crucial. The establishment of a new agency is a laborious task. Alternatively, the government can consider refurbishing the role of CGSO. A separate entity of CGSO with the inclusion of both public and private governors is necessary to conduct this role. By doing so, repercussions from other governors, especially when they hand over their accountability, are to be expected.

Hence, this Private Security Governance Agency has to be legitimised to conduct agenda-setting for private security in the public sector. The representative from both government and industry players may help in better deciding the norms and interests of both parties before setting the governance agenda. Further, the agency should delineate the authority of the multiple governors of private security in the public sector. This agency may oversee multiple compliance mechanisms by public and private governing agencies in the public sector. Further, this agency may superintend the consequences, uncertainties, risks and challenges associated with private security in the public sector.

Moreover, the government may consider legitimising MSIA via Private Agencies Act 1971 or additional legislation to better govern their private security guards. The institutionalisation of MSIA to manage the recruitment and training of private security guards is aspired to enhance the private governing agency's role in security governance. Recruitment and quality of private security guards are suggested to be the responsibility of MSIA, followed by private security companies and should not burden recipients as in the current scenario. Besides, MSIA should be empowered to craft career plans for private security guards to eradicate the current weaknesses in career development opportunities.

6.5 Limitations of Study

This study has several limitations. The first limitation of this study is that the findings do not explain the public sector's security governance. This study is construed to private security governance only but closely associated with the public sector's security. Here, this study does not discuss the other public security actors within public

sector security. The provisional model of security in the public sector focuses only on private security actors and does not consider the presence of other public security actors within the same premise. Therefore, this study suggests the exploration of private security governance in the public sector in consideration of the public sector's security governance in the future.

The second limitation is in the criteria of respondents who participated in this study. The respondents of the service recipients category were only selected from the highest procurers of private security companies. The public sector agencies who do not opt for private security services for their premises were not interviewed in this study. Similarly, the private security actor respondents are among the private security companies with license 2(a) PAA 1971 who obtained government contracts. Therefore, it is beneficial to include the unsuccessful private security companies in securing government contracts and the government premises who did not opt for private security for their premise as they might provide new insights into understanding private security governance.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1:

REVIEW PROTOCOL

Background (Rationale)	:	Governance of security, Security Governance
Research questions	:	i. What is governance of security / security governance? ii. Who are the governors of private security? iii. What are the dimensions of security governance? iv. What are the security governance models? v. What are challenges associated to security governance?
Search strategy	:	<i>Initial search</i> – scoping study by subject expert <i>Subsequent analysis</i> – specify search period & terms - search academic articles, reviews, articles in press, and conference papers in digital bibliographical databases - grey literature - Google Scholar, websites of organization
Search terms / Keywords	:	Governance OR governors AND security Initial Search : governance OR governing OR government OR state OR public OR private
Resources Databases	/ :	Scopus (European), Jstor, Web of Science (American), PubMed, ERIC, IEEE Explore, Science Direct, Directory of Open Access Journals DOAJ, JStor, ISI Web of Knowledge Grey literature : Google scholar , Microsoft Academic, MyCite Others: organization website, online reports
Selection strategy	:	Manually search Forward search (Snowballing technique): studies that have cited initial identified studies Backward search: from reference lists of initial identified studies

Inclusion criteria	: Language : English, Bahasa Malaysia only Focus : paper focused in governance of security Research Design: Conceptual, quantitative, qualitative, empirical nature Type of related article: Report, Thesis, editorial, transcribed speeches, book, book chapter, scholarly publication, case report, Peer reviewed Journal article, conference proceedings, , speech, meetings, transcript, interview Publication Date : anytime to 2020
Exclusion criteria	: Language: All other language Research Design: Type of related article: short communication, book review, editorial, conference info, encyclopaedia, correspondence, website, essay, instruction guideline, audio video clip, company profile, blog, commentary, credit, news, acknowledgement, notes
Data extraction strategy	: Data Extraction Table - Pattern of publication (by year) - Publication type - Scope of study
Synthesis strategy	: (i) Conceptualization on security governance (ii) Dimensions of security governance (iii) Security governance model
Dissemination strategy	: Part of thesis (Literature Review)

APPENDIX 2

PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES REGISTERED WITH MALAYSIAN SECURITY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (PIKM) WITH LICENSE 2(A) PRIVATE AGENCIES ACT AS OF 2017

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
1	1 SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
2	3S PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
3	A & M SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
4	A.I.M.S SECURITY SDN BHD	X
5	A.K PROTECTION SYSTEMS SDN BHD	X
6	A5 SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
7	AA COMMERCIAL SECURITY SDN BHD	X
8	ABAB SAFEGUARD (M) SDN BHD	X
9	ABADI BERSATU SECURITY SDN BHD	X
10	ABY SEKURITI SERVIS SDN BHD	X
11	ACME SECURITY SDN BHD	X
12	ACTIVE FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
13	ACTIVE NETWORK SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
14	ADAZA SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	X
15	ADMIRAL SECUREGUARD SDN BHD	X
16	ADVANCE PROTECTION & SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
17	ADVANCED PROTOCOL SECURITY SDN BHD	X
18	ADVANCED SECURITY NETWORK SDN BHD	X
19	AE SECURITY SYSTEM SDN BHD	X
20	AERO GUARDS PROTECTION (M) SDN BHD	X
21	AFRA SERVICES SDN BHD	X
22	AHM CONSULTANCY & SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
23	AHS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
24	AKAR SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
25	AL-AMAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
26	ALFA DELTA TECH SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
27	ALIFYA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
28	ALLIED SECURITY SDN BHD	X
29	ALPHA GUARD SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
30	ALPHA MULTI FORCE SDN BHD	X
31	ALPHA SECURITY NETWORK SDN BHD	X
32	ALPHA-FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
33	AMAN NETWORK SECURITY SDN BHD	X
34	AMECHANUS GUARD FORCE SDN BHD	X
35	AMG ARMOUGUARD (M) SDN BHD	X
36	AMIGIE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
37	AMITY ELITE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
38	AMWAJ SECURITY SDN BHD	X
39	AMZ SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
40	ANGKASA MAJU SECURITY SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
41	ANGKASA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
42	ARCA SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	X
43	ARENA WIRAJAYA SDN BHD	X
44	ARIES SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
45	ARMOUR SECURITY SYSTEMS (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD	X
46	ARMOURED PROTECTION & INVESTIGATION SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
47	ARROW GUARDS SDN BHD	X
48	ARROW SHIELD SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
49	ASAS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
50	ASD SECURITY SDN BHD	X
51	ASIA ACTIVE SDN BHD	X
52	ASIA FORCE SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
53	ASIA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
54	ASIAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
55	ASLI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
56	ASRAS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
57	ASSET MANAGEMENT & PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
58	AT GUARDS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
59	AURA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
60	AVIOSUPPORT CORPORATION (M) SDN BHD	X
61	AWARA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
62	AWIN SECURITY SYSTEMS SDN BHD	X
63	AXIS SUPER FORCE SDN BHD	X
64	AYS PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
65	AYU EDISI SDN BHD	X
66	AZAM ARMADA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
67	AZIMAT SECURITY SDN BHD	X
68	BAKTI PUSAKA WATAN ENTERPRISE SDN BHD	X
69	BARAKAH ELITE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
70	BCT SECURITY SOLUTIONS SDN BHD	X
71	BDM SECURITY SDN BHD	X
72	BERANI GUARD SDN BHD	X
73	BERKAT MAKMUR SECURITY SDN BHD	X
74	BERKAT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
75	BERN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
76	BERTAM SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
77	BESTARI GUARD FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
78	BGS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
79	BIZ-GUARDS CORPORATION SDN BHD	X
80	BLACK FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
81	BLACK GOLD SECURITY SDN BHD	X
82	BLUE BERET SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
83	BLUE I CORPORATION SDN BHD	X
84	BLUEFORCE SECURITY SERVICE (M) SDN BHD	X
85	BORNEO SECURITY CENTRE SDN BHD	X
86	BRAVE ABLUTIONS SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
87	BRAVEFORCE SDN BHD	X
88	BRAVO SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
89	BRILLIANT SECURITY SDN BHD	X
90	BRINKS CORPORATION SDN BHD	X
91	BUKIT HIJAU SECURITY SDN BHD	X
92	BUMI WARISAN MAJU SDN BHD	X
93	CAKRA WIRA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
94	CAPVEST SECURITY SDN BHD	X
95	CARDIGAN GUARD SDN BHD	X
96	CAREMAN SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
97	CAT EYE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
98	CEMERLANG PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
99	CEMERLANG SEKURITI (M) SDN BHD	X
100	CEPAT PANTAS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
101	CF SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
102	CHERAS CORPORATION SDN BHD	X
103	CHIEF FORCE SDN BHD	X
104	CIA PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
105	CIMBERANI SDN BHD	X
106	CISCO (M) SDN BHD	X
107	CITY SQUAD SECURITY & INVESTIGATION SDN BHD	X
108	CLASS A SECURITY SDN BHD	X
109	COBRA FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
110	COHERENT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
111	COINAGE SDN BHD	X
112	COMMITTED SECURITY SDN BHD	X
113	COSMO FORCE SDN BHD	X
114	COUGAR SECURITY SDN BHD	X
115	COUNTERFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
116	CPP SECURITY SERVICES SDN.BHD	X
117	CRSYTALGUARD SECURITY SDN BHD	X
118	D MARD SERVICES SDN BHD	X
119	D U SECURITY SDN BHD	X
120	D'HAK SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
121	DARUL MAKMUR SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	X
122	DAYA INTELEK SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
123	DAYACOP SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
124	DE APEX FORCE SECURITY & CONSULTANCY SDN BHD	X
125	DEFENCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
126	DELTA FORCE SECURITY SERVICES & CONSULTANCY SDN BHD	X
127	DELTA MIGHT SECURITY SDN BHD	X
128	DELTA ZEEFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
129	DERIGUOUR SECURITY SDN BHD	X
130	DEUMA FORCE SDN BHD	X
131	DEXTFORCE SDN BHD	X
132	DG SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
133	DHI KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
134	DI KAYU SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
135	DIGISTER VISION SDN BHD	X
136	DINMAT SECURITY SDN BHD	X
137	DIVISION SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
138	DKKM SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
139	DMJ SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
140	DNS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
141	DOFFIN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
142	DOS PRIMA SECURITY & SERVICES SDN BHD	X
143	DUTA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
144	E2S SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
145	EAGLE 999 SDN BHD	X
146	EAGLE EYE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
147	EAGLEGUARDS SDN BHD	X
148	EAST WEST SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
149	EASYWAY SOLUTIONS (M) SDN BHD	X
150	EAZA FORCE (M) SDN BHD	X
151	EFFICIENT PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
152	EFFICIENT SECURITY SDN BHD	X
153	EHSAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
154	ELITE DEFENCE SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
155	ELITE GUARD SDN BHD	X
156	EMDELL SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
157	EMPIRE EAGLE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
158	EMPIRE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
159	ENFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
160	EPC SECURITY SDN BHD	X
161	ERA KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
162	ERT SDN BHD	X
163	ESPRIT SECURITY SDN BHD	X
164	ETIKA KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
165	EXACT SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
166	EXCELLENT SECURITY NETWORK SDN BHD	X
167	EXPERT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
168	EXPOAM SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
169	EX-SERVICES SECURITY SDN BHD	X
170	FALCON EYE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
171	FALCON FORCE SDN BHD	X
172	FASK SECURITY SDN BHD	X
173	FAST TECH SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
174	FATEH SECURITY SDN BHD	X
175	FIRST ALLIED SECURITY SDN BHD	X
176	FORCE 77 SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
177	FORCE ONE PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
178	FORCEONE SECURITY SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
179	FREIGHTWATCH G PATAMOTOH SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
180	FWA GRAYS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
181	G.GARUDA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
182	G.T. SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
183	G15 SECURITY SDN BHD	X
184	GAGAH PERKASA SECURITY SERIVCES SDN BHD	X
185	GALAXYFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
186	GALLANT GUARD SERVICES SDN BHD	X
187	GEMILANG ZAMRUD SDN BHD	X
188	GEMINI FORCE SDN BHD	X
189	GENERAL SECURITY GUARDS SDN BHD	X
190	GENUINE FORCE SDN BHD	X
191	GERAK PADU SECURITY SDN BHD	X
192	GERBANG KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
193	G-FORCE SECURITY SERVICE SDN BHD	X
194	GLOBAL FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
195	GLOBAL GUARD SERVICES & SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
196	GLOBAL ONE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
197	GLOBAL PROTECTION & SERVICES SDN BHD	X
198	GLOBAL PROTECTION PARTNERS SDN BHD	X
199	GMP KAISAR SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
200	GNC SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
201	GNT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
202	GOLDEN EAGLE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
203	GOLDEN TRIANGLE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
204	GUARDA SECURITAS SDN BHD	X
205	GUARDEYE RESOURCES SDN BHD	X
206	GUARDIAN SECURITY CONSULTANTS SDN BHD	X
207	GUARDS & ESCORTS SERVICES (SARAWAK) SDN BHD	X
208	GUARDS INCORPORATED SDN BHD	X
209	GUARDWELL SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
210	GUNMA GUARDFORCE DS SDN BHD	X
211	GWENKENS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
212	HAWK PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
213	HAZNI PROTECTIONS & PREVENTIONS SDN BHD	X
214	HBG SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
215	HBT FORCE (M) SDN BHD	X
216	HDZ MAJU SECURITIES SDN BHD	X
217	HELIOUS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
218	HIFORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
219	HORNET SECURITY SDN BHD	X
220	IBA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
221	IBIS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
222	IC SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
223	I-CARE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
224	I-HAWK SECURITY CONSULTANT SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
225	IMAN SEKURITI SDN BHD	X
226	IMBARA FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
227	INAS SECURITY SERVICES AND CONSULTANCY SDN BHD	X
228	INDAH GEMILANG SEKURITI SDN BHD	X
229	INDAH SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
230	INDASIA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
231	INDEPENDENT GUARDING SERVICES SDN BHD	X
232	INLAND SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
233	INNOVATIVE FORCE (M) SDN BHD	X
234	INSIGHT ALLIANCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
235	INTAKE EIGHTEEN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
236	IN-TEAM SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
237	INTELLIGENT GUARD SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
238	INTELLIGENT SECURITY SYSTEMS SDN BHD	X
239	INTRA HARTA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
240	IPOH SECURITY SDN BHD	X
241	IRIS INTELLIGENCE ALLIED SDN BHD	X
242	ISO HITEC SECURITY SDN BHD	X
243	ISS PROTECTION (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD	X
244	J & R STANDARD SDN BHD	X
245	JAFILA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
246	JANZ FORCE SDN BHD	X
247	JATI FORCE SDN BHD	X
248	JATI WIRA KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
249	JAYAPADU BERSATU KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
250	JAZ SECURITY SDN BHD	X
251	JERAI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
252	JK SECURITY SDN BHD	X
253	JKL SECURITY SDN BHD	X
254	JORDAN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
255	JS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
256	JSC SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
257	JTL SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
258	JUARA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
259	JUTA WAJA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
260	K & K SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
261	KALIBER SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
262	KAMI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
263	KANI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
264	KARISMA CERGAS (M) SDN BHD	X
265	KAWAL HIKMAH SDN BHD	X
266	KAWAL WIRAMAS SDN BHD	X
267	KAWALAN ASAS JAYA SDN BHD	X
268	KAWALAN DELIMA SDN BHD	X
269	KAWALAN DETIK EVOLUSI SDN BHD	X
270	KAWALAN GARUDA ENTERPRISES (M) SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
271	KAWALAN ISBA SDN BHD	X
272	KAWALAN JEBAT SDN BHD	X
273	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN ANUGERAH SDN BHD	X
274	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN BG SDN BHD	X
275	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN BUMI JAYA (M) SDN BHD	X
276	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN DAMAI SDN BHD	X
277	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN EX-SERVICES-25 SDN BHD	X
278	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN IKHLAS SDN BHD	X
279	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN PERKASA SDN BHD	X
280	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN PRESTASI MEWAH SDN BHD	X
281	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN SANUBARI SDN BHD	X
282	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN SDN BHD	X
283	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN SENTRAL (M) SDN BHD	X
284	KAWALAN LUMAYAN SDN BHD	X
285	KAWALAN MENTARI SDN BHD	X
286	KAWALAN PERTIWI SDN BHD	X
287	KAWALAN PERWIRA (M) SDN BHD	X
288	KAWALAN SERI GADING SDN BHD	X
289	KAWALAN WARISAN RANTAU SDN BHD	X
290	KAWEKAWA SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
291	KAYANGAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
292	KEKAL PAHLAWAN SDN BHD	X
293	KELISA TUAH KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
294	KEMAS KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
295	KEMUNCAK SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
296	KENANGA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
297	KENARI KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
298	KENYALANG SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
299	KESELAMATAN RESAKSA SDN BHD	X
300	K-FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
301	KHALIB SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
302	KHIDMAT JULUNG SDN BHD	X
303	KNIGHT FORCE SDN BHD	X
304	KNIGHT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
305	KONSULTAN KESELAMATAN NADZARI SDN BHD	X
306	KOP SECURITY AGENCY SDN BHD	X
307	KOR SECURITY SDN BHD	X
308	KPD SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
309	K-PROTECT SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
310	KRIS KAWALRAPI SDN BHD	X
311	KRISTAL SECURITY SDN BHD	X
312	KSD GLOBAL SECURE GUARDS (M) SDN BHD	X
313	KUALA SELANGOR SECURITY SDN BHD	X
314	KUKUH PADU SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
315	KUKUH SAGA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
316	KURNIAWAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
317	LABOUR SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
318	LAMBORDA SECURITY SYSTEM (M) SDN BHD	X
319	LASHKAR ELITE SDN BHD	X
320	LEA JATI SECURITY SDN BHD	X
321	LEADER GLOBAL HERITAGE SDN BHD	X
322	LEGASI SENADA SDN BHD	X
323	LIBERTY FORCE SDN BHD	X
324	LISTEN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
325	LOCVEST SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
326	MAGNA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
327	MAGNUS FORCE SDN BHD	X
328	MAHA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
329	MAHMOOD SECURITY (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD	X
330	MAJOR SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
331	MAMPAN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
332	MARKSMAN FORCE SDN BHD	X
333	MARKSMEN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
334	MARSHAL GUARD ONE SDN BHD	X
335	MARTIAL SECURITY SDN BHD	X
336	MARVEL SECURITY SDN BHD	X
337	MASTER GUARDS (M) SDN BHD	X
338	MASTER PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
339	MAX FORCE SERVICES SDN BHD	X
340	MAXGUARD SECURITY & SERVICES SDN BHD	X
341	MAXHIS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
342	MAXVEC PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
343	MBF PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
344	MEGA SAFE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
345	MEGATECH SECURITY & INVESTIGATION SDN BHD	X
346	MEGAWORLD SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
347	MELAWATI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
348	MENARA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
349	MERANTI G FORCE SDN BHD	X
350	MERBUK INDAH SERVICES SDN BHD	X
351	METRO SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
352	METROPOLIS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
353	MEY PERKASA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
354	MFB SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
355	M-FORCES SECURITY SDN BHD	X
356	MHS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
357	MICROTECH SECURITY SDN BHD	X
358	MILLENIUM PATRIOT SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
359	MINDRACE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
360	MIRAGE PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY & SERVICES SDN BHD	X
361	MITRAFORCE (M) SDN BHD	X
362	MK SECURITY SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
363	MN MILLENIUM SECURITY SDN BHD	X
364	MOTIF KUASA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
365	MOZA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
366	MRA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
367	MS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
368	MSB GLOBAL SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
369	MSB SECURITY SDN BHD	X
370	MT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
371	MUAZ FORCE SDN BHD	X
372	MUHAFIZ SECURITY SDN BHD	X
373	MUHIBBAH SECURITY SDN BHD	X
374	MUKTAFIN PROTECTIVE SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
375	MULTI MERIDIAN SDN BHD	X
376	MUS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
377	MUTIARA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
378	MVD INTERNATIONAL SDN BHD	X
379	MW SECURITY SDN BHD	X
380	MYSTAR SECURITY SDN BHD	X
381	N.R KAWALAN NETWORK SYSTEMS SDN BHD	X
382	NAA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
383	NAF SECURITY & SERVICES SDN BHD	X
384	NAIM SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
385	NASHKAWI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
386	NATIKA SECURIFORCE SDN BHD	X
387	NATION PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
388	NATION SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
389	NEKAD SECURITY SDN BHD	X
390	NELANG SECURITY SDN BHD	X
391	NEOSECURITY SDN BHD	X
392	NERING SECURITY SDN BHD	X
393	NEW GENERATION FORCE (M) SDN BHD	X
394	NEW HEMISPHERE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
395	NEWSTAR PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
396	NHS NATIONWIDE SECURITY SYSTEM SDN BHD	X
397	NICO SECURITY SYSTEMS SDN BHD	X
398	NK HIGHTECH SDN BHD	X
399	NORTH BORNEO SECURITY SDN BHD	X
400	NOVA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
401	NUMEREX FORCE SDN BHD	X
402	NUSANTARA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
403	NUZUL SERVICES SDN BHD	X
404	OCEAN KINABALU SDN BHD	X
405	ONE FIVE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
406	ONE M SECUREFORCE SDN BHD	X
407	ONE MISSION SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
408	OP SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
409	OPTIMAL SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
410	OPTIONS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
411	ORBIT FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
412	ORION RIGEL STARS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
413	OSG SECURITY TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
414	PALMARA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
415	PANGLIMA BAYU SECURITY SDN BHD	X
416	PANGLIMA SAKTI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
417	PANJI ZAMAN SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
418	PANTAS SECURITY & INVESTIGATION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
419	PARADISE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
420	PARAFORCE SDN BHD	X
421	PEACE SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
422	PENGURUSAN HARTA PELITA SDN BHD	X
423	PENTAGON PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
424	PERFECT TRACTICAL RESOURCES SDN BHD	X
425	PERISAI BERNAS (M) SDN BHD	X
426	PERISAI SEPADU SECURITY SDN BHD	X
427	PERKASAFORCE SDN BHD	X
428	PERKHIDMATAN BINTANG KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
429	PERKHIDMATAN KESELAMATAN LAKSAMANA (M) SDN BHD	X
430	PERKHIDMATAN TEGUH SDN BHD	X
431	PERTAMA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
432	PERTIWI DAGANG SECURITY SDN BHD	X
433	PERUSAHAAN ISHAM SDN BHD	X
434	PHOENIX NOBLE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
435	PLATINUM 2 SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
436	PLATINUM SECURITY SDN BHD	X
437	PORTRAY SECURITY SDN BHD	X
438	PRIMA PERKASA SECURITIES AND SERVICES SDN BHD	X
439	PRIMA PLATINUM SDN BHD	X
440	PRISM PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
441	PRISTINE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
442	PRODAC ELITE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
443	PROFESSIONAL SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
444	PROFORALL SECURITY SERVICES & CONSULTANCY SDN BHD	X
445	PROGRESSIVE ALLIED SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	X
446	PROGRESSIVE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
447	PROMASTER TEAM SDN BHD	X
448	PROPERTY PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
449	PROZAS SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
450	PUSAKA BIRU SDN BHD	X
451	PYRAMID SECURITIES (M) SDN BHD	X
452	PYROFORCE SERVICES SDN BHD	X
453	QC PROTECTION & INVESTIGATION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
454	QUADRANT ELITE FORCE SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
455	QUALITY GUARD SERVICES SDN BHD	X
456	QUEBEC SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
457	RADZFORCE CORPORATION SDN BHD	X
458	RAFFLES FORCE (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD	X
459	RAHMAT BERNAS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
460	RAKEBA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
461	RAM GUARD SERVICES SDN BHD	X
462	RAMLI SECURITY SDN BHD	X
463	RAPID SECURITY SDN BHD	X
464	RATUSAN PAKSI SECURITY SDN BHD	X
465	REALFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
466	RED ANGEL SHIELD SDN BHD	X
467	RED BERET SECURITY SDN BHD	X
468	RED CHANNEL SECURITY SDN BHD	X
469	RED EAGLE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
470	REDFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
471	REDLAND SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
472	REDZA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
473	REELIANCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
474	REGAL GUARDFORCE SDN BHD	X
475	REGENT SECURITY SDN BHD	X
476	REKAL JAYA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
477	RESQ FORCE SDN BHD	X
478	REVENUE ICON SECURITY SDN BHD	X
479	REZEKI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
480	RHM INDAH KAWALAN SDN BHD	X
481	RICHFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
482	RICHWORLD SECURITY SDN BHD	X
483	RISGUARD SDN BHD	X
484	RKN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
485	RKN SMART SDN BHD	X
486	RL KAWALAN PRO SDN BHD	X
487	RONIN SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
488	ROSCOM SECURITY SDN BHD	X
489	RZ FORCE SDN BHD	X
490	RZ SECURITY SDN BHD	X
491	S.A.S SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	X
492	S.P SECURITY SDN BHD	X
493	SAFE FORCE (M) SDN BHD	X
494	SAFE TEAM (M) SDN BHD	X
495	SAFEGUARDS G4S (SABAH) SDN BHD	X
496	SAFEGUARDS G4S (SARAWAK) SDN BHD	X
497	SAFEGUARDS G4S SDN BHD	X
498	SAFRA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
499	SAGA EMAS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
500	SAGA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
501	SAMARA SECURITY SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
502	SARI SECURIFORCE SDN BHD	X
503	SASTANIS SDN BHD	X
504	SATRIA PERKASA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
505	SAUJANA CIPTA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
506	SAZA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
507	SEAGULL FORCE SDN BHD	X
508	SEAGULL PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
509	SEALAND ELITE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
510	SEBIRO SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
511	SECOM (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD	X
512	SECURE GUARDS SDN BHD	X
513	SECURE SHIELD SECURITY SDN BHD	X
514	SECUREFIRST SECURITY SDN BHD	X
515	SECURICOR (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD	X
516	SECURIDO GUARD SERVICES SDN BHD	X
517	SECURIFORCE SDN BHD	X
518	SECURIGHT SDN BHD	X
519	SECURIGOLD SDN BHD	X
520	SECURI-PRO PROTECTION & SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
521	SECURITEAM PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	X
522	SEDIA TEKNIK SDN BHD	X
523	SEDIKAWAL (M) SDN BHD	X
524	SEJAHTERA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
525	SEKAWAN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
526	SEKURITI AZGAN SDN BHD	X
527	SELAT TEBRAU SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
528	SEMASA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
529	SENTINEL SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
530	SERI KOLEK SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
531	SETIA KAWAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
532	SETIA PRIMA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
533	SETIA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
534	SHAPADU SECURITY SDN BHD	X
535	SHELTER SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
536	SHERIFF SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
537	SIERRA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
538	SIGMA MASTER SDN BHD	X
539	SILENT GUARDIAN SDN BHD	X
540	SILVER PROTSEC SDN BHD	X
541	SILVER SHIELD FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
542	SIMDO SDN BHD	X
543	SIME SURVEILLANCE SDN BHD	X
544	SINAR SURIA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
545	SINCERE PROGRESS SDN BHD	X
546	SISTEM KAWALAN SEKUTU SDN BHD	X
547	SMART FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
548	SN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
549	SOVEREIGN MARITIME SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	X
550	SPECIAL SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
551	SPN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
552	SPYRUS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
553	SRI LANANG PROTECTIVE SDN BHD	X
554	SRI WAJA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
555	SS SECURITIES SDN BHD	X
556	SSH GLOBAL SECURITY SDN BHD	X
557	STAR SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
558	STORM SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
559	STRATEGIC ALLIANCE GUARD SDN BHD	X
560	STRATEGIC SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
561	STRATEGY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
562	SULIMI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
563	SUPERIOR PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
564	SURIA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
565	SWACK SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
566	SWIFT EAGLE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
567	SWIFTFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
568	SYARIKAT HUSSAIN CHIK SDN BHD	X
569	SYARIKAT KAWAL N.S SDN BHD	X
570	SYARIKAT SECURITY BEKAS POLIS (M) SDN BHD	X
571	SYMPHONY GUARDFORCE SDN BHD	X
572	T.A.T ELITE PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
573	T.S SIDI GUARDFORCE SDN BHD	X
574	TAB SECURITY SDN BHD	X
575	TAMINGSARI GUARD FORCE SDN BHD	X
576	TASMMA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
577	TC SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
578	TEAM GUARDS SECURITY SDN BHD	X
579	TEGUH GUARD SDN BHD	X
580	TENAGA KAWALAN KESELAMATAN SDN BHD	X
581	TERAJU FOKUS SDN BHD	X
582	TERAS GUARD SDN BHD	X
583	TIME GUARD SDN BHD	X
584	TM FORCE (M) SDN BHD	X
585	TOK CINDAI FORCE SDN BHD	X
586	TOP SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
587	TOUGH SECURITY SDN BHD	X
588	TUAH GUARD (M) SDN BHD	X
589	TUNAS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
590	UC SECURITY SDN BHD	X
591	ULTRABEST SS SDN BHD	X
592	UNIGAYA PROTECTION SYSTEM SDN BHD	X
593	UNITY FORCE SDN BHD	X
594	UNIVERSAL GUARDS SDN BHD	X

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	LICENSE 2A
595	UNPROFOR SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
596	VALIANT FORCE SDN BHD	X
597	VERITAS SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	X
598	VERSATILE PROTECTION SDN BHD	X
599	VIRTUAL GUARD SDN BHD	X
600	VISION SECURITY SDN BHD	X
601	VISTA SECURCO SDN BHD	X
602	VITAL 6 SECURITY SDN BHD	X
603	WALID SECURITY SDN BHD	X
604	WARDAH SECURITY SDN BHD	X
605	WARISAN PERKASA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
606	WARISAN SECURITY RESOURCES SDN BHD	X
607	WARISAN TEGUH SECURITY SDN BHD	X
608	WARISAN WIRA SECURITY SDN BHD	X
609	WAWASAN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
610	WIJAYA KESELAMATAN SDN BHD	X
611	WINNING FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
612	WIRA CORPS SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
613	WIRA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
614	WIRA SELATAN SECURITY SDN BHD	X
615	WIRA SEPADU SECURITY SDN BHD	X
616	WISDOM PEAK SDN BHD	X
617	WOMO SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	X
618	WORKFORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	X
619	X-C COMMAND SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X
620	XECURETRONIX SDN BHD	X
621	YUSOF & CHEW SDN BHD	X
622	ZAFA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	X

APPENDIX 3

TOTAL AWARDED CONTRACT BY PUBLIC SECTOR FOR PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES FROM 2009 TO 2019 (RETRIEVED FROM GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM, 2021)

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
1	1 SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	4
2	3S PROTECTION SDN BHD	3
3	A.I.M.S. SECURITY SDN BHD	1
4	ABADI BERSATU SECURITY SDN. BHD.	3
5	ABY SEKURITI SERVICES SDN BHD	2
6	ACTIVE NETWORK SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	3
7	ADAZA SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	3
8	ADVANCE PROTECTION & SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	3
9	ADVANCED PROTOCOL SECURITY SDN BHD	6
10	AE SECURITY SYSTEM SDN BHD	9
11	AFRA SERVICES SDN BHD	6
12	AHM CONSULTANCY & SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	12
13	AHMAD SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
14	AL-AMAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN.BHD	2
15	ALIFYA SECURITY SDN BHD	5
16	ALLIED SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
17	ALLSAFE GUARDS SDN BHD	3
18	ALPHA GUARD SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	7
19	ALPHA SECURITY NETWORK SDN BHD	4
20	AMCOP SECURITY RESOURCES SDN BHD	2
21	AMECHANUS GUARD FORCE SDN BHD	1
22	AMIGIE SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
23	AMITY ELITE SECURITY SDN BHD	4
24	AMZ SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
25	ANGKASA MAJU SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
26	ANGKASA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
27	ANIRASS GAYA SECURITY SDN BHD	5
28	ARCA SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	1
29	ARCHER'S SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.	1
30	ARENA WIRAJAYA SDN BHD	2
31	ARMOURED PROTECTION & INVESTIGATION SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.	5
32	ARROW SHIELD SECURITY SDN BHD	8
33	ASAS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
34	ASIA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
35	ATURWAJA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.	2
36	AURA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
37	AWARA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.	8
38	AYS PROTECTION SDN BHD	5
39	AYU EDISI SDN BHD	2
40	AYU EDISI SDN. BHD.	1
41	AZAM ARMADA SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
42	BAKTI PUSAKA WATAN ENTERPRISE SDN. BHD.	1
43	BB KAWALAN SDN BHD	4
44	BDM SECURITY SDN BHD	2

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
45	BERANI GUARD SDN. BHD.	1
46	BERKAT MAKMUR SECURITY SDN BHD	1
47	BERTAM SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
48	BERTAM SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
49	BIZ-GUARDS CORPORATION SDN. BHD.	1
50	BLACK FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	3
51	BLUEFORCE SECURITY SERVICE (M) SDN. BHD.	1
52	BRAVE ABLUTIONS SDN BHD	4
53	BRILLIANT SECURITY SDN BHD	1
54	BRINKS CORPORATION SDN. BHD.	1
55	BT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
56	BUMI WARISAN MAJU SDN BHD	2
57	CAPVEST SECURITY SDN. BHD.	3
58	CAREMAN SECURITY (M) SDN. BHD.	1
59	CEMERLANG PROTECTION SDN BHD	6
60	CET DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD	1
61	CF SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	3
62	CIA PROTECTION SDN. BHD.	3
63	CIMBERANI SDN BHD	1
64	CISCO (M) SDN BHD	5
65	CITY SQUAD SECURITY & INVESTIGATION SDN. BHD.	2
66	COBRA FORCE SDN BHD	9
67	COHERENT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
68	COHERENT SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
69	COINAGE SDN BHD	7
70	CRYSTAL GUARD SECURITY SDN BHD	2
71	CRYSTALGUARD SECURITY SDN BHD	1
72	D MARD SERVICES SDN BHD	4
73	D U SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
74	DAYACOP SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	13
75	DELL SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	4
76	DELTA FORCE SECURITY SERVICES & CONSULTANCY SDN. BHD.	19
77	DELTA MIGHT SECURITY SDN BHD	1
78	DERIGUOUR SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
79	DEUMA FORCE SDN BHD	7
80	DINMAT SECURITY SDN BHD	1
81	DINMAT SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
82	DIVISION SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
83	DJ PROTECTIVE CONSULTANCY SERVICES SDN BHD	3
84	DMJ SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
85	DNS SECURITY SDN BHD	3
86	DOS PRIMA SECURITY AND SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
87	DSK SECURITY MANAGEMENT SERVICES SDN BHD	1
88	DURA GUARD FORCE & CONSULTANCY SDN BHD	5
89	DYNAMIC GUARDFORCE SDN BHD	10
90	E2S SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	6
91	EAGLE 999 SDN BHD	2
92	EAGLEGUARDS SDN BHD	1
93	EAST WEST SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	3
94	EHSAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
95	ELITE DEFENCE SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	1
96	ELITE GUARD SDN BHD	3

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
97	ELITE GUARD SDN.BHD.	1
98	ERA KAWALAN SDN BHD	2
99	EXCELLENT SECURITY NETWORK SDN. BHD.	4
100	EXPERT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	15
101	FALCON FORCE SDN BHD	2
102	FASK SECURITY SDN BHD	6
103	FATEH SECURITY SDN BHD	2
104	FIRST ALLIED SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
105	FORCEONE SECURITY SDN BHD	3
106	FORMGATES SECURITY PROTECTION SDN BHD	2
107	FREIGHTWATCH (G) PATOMOTOH SECURITY SDN BHD	5
108	FREIGHTWATCH G PATOMOTOH SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
109	FRONT LINE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	11
110	FULLFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
111	FULLFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
112	G. GARUDA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
113	GAGAH PERKASA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
114	GELOMBANG ZAMRUD SDN. BHD.	1
115	GEMILANG ZAMRUD SDN BHD	1
116	GENERAL SECURITY GUARD SDN. BHD.	1
117	GENUINE FORCE SDN BHD	5
118	GERAK PADU SECURITY SDN BHD	1
119	GLOBAL FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	13
120	GLOBAL PROTECTION & SERVICES SDN.BHD	1
121	GLOBE SECURITY SERVICES SDN.BHD.	1
122	GMP KAISAR (M) SDN. BHD.	1
123	GMP KAISAR SECURITY (M) SDN. BHD.	1
124	GNT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
125	GOLDEN EAGLE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	5
126	GUARDEYE RESOURCES SDN BHD	2
127	GUNMA GUARD FORCES DS SENDIRIAN BERHAD	1
128	HAJWINGS SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
129	HAWK PROTECTION SDN. BHD.	2
130	HAZNI PROTECTION & PREVENTIONS SDN BHD	3
131	HBT FORCE (M) SDN. BHD.	5
132	HDZ MAJU SECURITIES SDN. BHD.	3
133	HORNET SECURITY SDN BHD	4
134	IBA SECURITY SDN BHD	8
135	IBIS SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	7
136	IC SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	5
137	I-CARE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
138	IMAGE SECURITY & CONSULTANCY SDN BHD	2
139	IMAN SEKUARITI SDN BHD	4
140	INAS SECURITY SERVICES AND CONSULTANCY SDN. BHD.	14
141	INDAH GEMILANG SEKURITI SDN BHD	1
142	INDASIA SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	8
143	INNOVATIVE FORCE (M) SDN BHD	3
144	INTAKE EIGHTEEN SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
145	INTELLIGENT GUARD SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
146	INTELLIGENT SECURITY SYSTEMS SDN BHD	1
147	INTELLIGENT SECURITY SYSTEMS SDN. BHD.	1
148	INTRA HARTA SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
149	IPOH SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
150	IRIS INTELLIGENCE ALLIED SDN BHD	1
151	ISO HITEC SECURITY SDN. BHD.	5
152	JAFILA SECURITY SDN.BHD.	3
153	JANZ FORCE SDN. BHD.	1
154	JATI FORCE SDN BHD	2
155	JATI WIRA KAWALAN SDN BHD	2
156	JAYAPADU BERSATU KAWALAN SDN BHD	3
157	JAYAPADU BERSATU KAWALAN SDN. BHD.	1
158	JAZ SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
159	JERAI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
160	JERAI SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
161	JRA ELITE SDN BHD	1
162	JSC SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
163	JTL SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	5
164	JUARA SECURITY SDN BHD	3
165	JW KAWALAN SDN. BHD.	11
166	K & K SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
167	KANI SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
168	KAWAL HIKMAH SDN BHD	1
169	KAWAL WIRAMAS SDN. BHD.	8
170	KAWALAM MENTARI SDN BHD	1
171	KAWALAN DELIMA SDN BHD	2
172	KAWALAN DETIK EVOLUSI SDN BHD	1
173	KAWALAN ISBA SDN.BHD	1
174	KAWALAN JEBAT SDN BHD	4
175	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN ANUGERAH SDN. BHD.	9
176	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN BG SDN. BHD.	2
177	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN DAMAI SDN. BHD.	3
178	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN IKHLAS SDN BHD	1
179	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN SANUBARI SDN BHD	3
180	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN SDN BHD	3
181	KAWALAN KESELAMATAN SENTRAL (M) SDN BHD	5
182	KAWALAN MEGA SDN BHD	5
183	KAWALAN MENTARI SDN BHD	1
184	KAWALAN SRI SETIA SDN. BHD.	1
185	KAWALAN WARISAN RANTAU SDN.BHD.	2
186	KAWEKAWA SECURITY (M) SDN. BHD.	1
187	KELISA TUAH KAWALAN SDN BHD	2
188	KEMAS CIPTA SECURITY SDN. BHD.	6
189	KEMAS KAWALAN SDN. BHD.	1
190	KEMUNCAK SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
191	KENARI KAWALAN SDN BHD	2
192	KENYALANG SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	1
193	KESELAMATAN KASPOLITE SDN.BHD.	1
194	KHALIB SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
195	KHIDMAT JULUNG SDN BHD	1
196	KHIGHT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
197	KNIGHT FORCE SDN. BHD.	4
198	KNIGHT SECURITY SERVICES SDN . BHD.	1

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
199	KNIGHT SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
200	KPD SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
201	K-PROTECT SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN.BHD	1
202	KRIS FORCE (M) SDN. BHD.	1
203	KRIS KAWALRAPI SDN BHD	1
204	KRISTAL SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
205	KUALA SELANGOR SECURITY SDN BHD	1
206	KUALA SELANGOR SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
207	KUDA MERAH SECURITY SDN.BHD	1
208	KUKUH SAGA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
209	KURNIAWAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	4
210	LAMBORDA SECURITY SYSTEM (M) SDN BHD	1
211	LEA JATI SECURITY SDN BHD	1
212	LEO FORCE AND SERVICES SDN BHD	1
213	LIBERTY FORCE SDN. BHD.	1
214	LIBSYS SOLUTIONS (M) SDN. BHD.	1
215	LOCVEST SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
216	M.S. ALLY PHARMA SDN. BHD.	1
217	MAC SECURITY CONSULTANT SDN BHD	4
218	MAGNA SECURITY SDN BHD	16
219	MAHA SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
220	MAHMOOD SECURITY (MALAYSIA)SDN.BHD.	3
221	MAJOR SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
222	MALFORCE SDN BHD	1
223	MAMPAN SECURITY SDN BHD	2
224	MARKSMEN SECURITY SERVICES	5
225	MARSHAL GUARD ONE SDN.BHD	3
226	MASTER GUARDS (M) SDN BHD	7
227	MAXVEC PROTECTION SDN BHD	3
228	MEGATECH SECURITY & INVESTIGATION SDN. BHD.	1
229	MELAWATI SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.	1
230	MENARA SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
231	MENARA SECURITY SDN. BHD.	11
232	MERANTI G FORCE SDN BHD	5
233	MERBUK INDAH SERVICES SDN BHD	3
234	METRO SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	11
235	METROPOLIS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
236	MICROTECH SECURITY SDN BHD	8
237	MILLENIUM PROTECTION SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
238	MINDRACE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	3
239	MN MILLENNIUM SECURITY SDN BHD	8
240	MOZA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	14
241	MOZA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.	1
242	MRA SECURITY SDN BHD	5
243	MS MORISON SDN BHD	2
244	MSB GLOBAL SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	1
245	MUAZ FORCE SDN BHD	5
246	MUHAFIZ SECURITY SDN BHD	3
247	MUHIBBAH SECURITY SDN BHD	7
248	MUKTAFIN PROTECTIVE SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	1
249	MUTIARA SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
250	N.R. KAWALAN NETWORK SYSTEMS SDN. BHD.	2
251	NAIM EQUITIES SDN. BHD.	1

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
252	NATION PROTECTION SERVICES SDN BHD	4
253	NELANG SECURITY SDN BHD	5
254	NERING SECURITY SDN BHD	2
255	NEW GENERATION FORCE (M) SDN. BHD.	3
256	NEW HEMISPHERE SECURITY SDN BHD	2
257	NEWSTAR PROTECTION SDN BHD	4
258	NICO SECURITY SYSTEMS SDN. BHD.	1
259	NORTH BORNEO SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	5
260	NOVA SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
261	NUSAPUTRA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	6
262	NUZUL SERVICERS SDN.BHD	10
263	OLINUS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	5
264	ONE FIVE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
265	ONE M SECUREFORCE SDN BHD	4
266	ONE MISSION SECURITY SDN. BHD	4
267	ORALIX SDN. BHD.	1
268	PAMGLIMA SAKTI SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	3
269	PARADISE SECURITY SDN BHD	1
270	PARADISE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
271	PARAFORCE SDN BHD	5
272	PERISAI BERNAS (M) SDN BHD	11
273	PERISAI BERNAS (M) SDN. BHD.	1
274	PERISAI SEPADU SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
275	PERKASA FORCE SDN BHD	3
276	PERKHIDMATAN KESELAMATAN LAKSAMANA (M) SDN. BHD.	2
277	PERTAMA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.	1
278	PERTIWI DAGANG SECURITY SDN BHD	4
279	PERUSAHAAN ISHAM SDN BHD	9
280	PORTRAY SECURITY SDN BHD	2
281	POWER SECURITY CONSORTIUM SDN. BHD.	1
282	PRIMA PLATINUM SDN. BHD.	1
283	PRODAC ELITE SECURITY SDN BHD	5
284	PROGRESSIVE ALLIED SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	2
285	PROGRESSIVE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	6
286	PROMASTER TEAM SD. BHD.	3
287	PROZAS SECURITY (M) SDN. BHD	5
288	PYRAMID SECURITIES (M) SDN. BHD.	1
289	PYROFORCE SERVICES SDN BHD	4
290	QUALITY GUARD SECURITY SDN BHD	6
291	RADZFORCE CORPORATION SDN. BHD.	2
292	RAHMAT BERNAS SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	3
293	RAM GUARD SERVICES SDN BHD	1
294	RAMLI SECURITY SDN BHD	1
295	REALFORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
296	RED ANGEL SHIELD SDN BHD	2
297	RED BERET SECURITY SDN BHD	3
298	RED CHANNEL SECURITY SDN BHD	6
299	RED EAGLE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
300	REDLAND SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
301	REGENT SECURITY SDN BHD	1
302	REGENT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
303	RHM INDAH KAWALAN SDN. BHD.	1

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
304	RICHWOLD SECURITY SDN BHD	6
305	RIJAL SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
306	RISGUARD SDN BHD	2
307	RL KAWALAN PRO SDN BHD	3
308	RONIN SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.	1
309	ROSCOM SECURITY SDN BHD	7
310	RZ SECURITY SDN BHD	1
311	S.A.S. SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	1
312	S.P. SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
313	SAFE FORCE (M) SDN BHD	4
314	SAGA EMAS SECURITY SDN BHD	4
315	SAGA SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	3
316	SARI SECURIFORCE SDN BHD	1
317	SASA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
318	SATRIA PERKASA SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
319	SAZA SECURITY SDN BHD	3
320	SEAGULL FORCE SDN BHD	1
321	SEBIRO SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
322	SECUREFIRST SECURITY SDN BHD	4
323	SECURIFORCE SDN BHD	6
324	SECURI-PRO PROTECTION & SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
325	SEDIKAWAL (M) SDN. BHD.	9
326	SEJAHTERA SECURITY SDN BHD	12
327	SELAT TEBRAU SECURITY SERVICE SDN BHD	3
328	SERI KOLEK SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	5
329	SETIA KAWALAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
330	SETIA PRIMA SECURITY SDN BHD	2
331	SEVEN FORCE SDN BHD	4
332	SEVEN FORCE SDN. BHD.	1
333	SHELTER SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
334	SHELTER SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	4
335	SIERRA FORCE SDN. BHD.	1
336	SIERRA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
337	SIGMA MASTER SECURITY SDN. BHD.	4
338	SILENT GUARDIAN SDN. BHD.	1
339	SILVER PROTSEC SDN. BHD.	3
340	SILVER SHIELD FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	1
341	SIMDO SDN. BHD.	1
342	SINAR SURIA SECURITY SDN BHD	2
343	SISTEM KAWALAN SEKUTU SDN BHD	2
344	SM SECURITY (M) SDN. BHD.	3
345	SMART FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	5
346	SOLID FORCE SECURITY SDN. BHD.	2
347	SPECIAL SQUAD SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
348	SPLENDID TACTIC SDN BHD	3
349	SRI LANANG PROTECTIVE SDN BHD	1
350	SRI MAHLIGAI SECURITY SDN BHD	2
351	SRI MAHLIGAI SECURITY SDN. BHD.	1
352	SRT-EON SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	5
353	STAR CMS SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
354	STAR SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
355	STARSKY SECURITY AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR SDN. BHD.	1
356	STORM SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
357	STRAITS FORCE SECURITY (M) SDN BHD	1
358	STRATEGIC ALLIANCE GUARD SDN BHD	4
359	STRATEGIC SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
360	STRATEGY SERVICES SDN BHD	5
361	SUN SECURITY SERVICES SENDIRIAN BERHAD	1
362	SUPER FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	19
363	SUTERA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
364	SWORDFORCE SDN. BHD.	2
365	SYARIKAT KAWAL N.S SDN BHD	1
366	SYARIKAT KAWALAN SERI PADANG SDN BHD	8
367	SYARIKAT PERKHIDMATAN KESELAMATAN PAHLAWAN SDN BHD	3
368	SYARIKAT SECURITY BEKAS POLIS (M) SDN. BHD.	4
369	SYKT PERKHIDMATAN KESELAMATAN PAHLAWAN SDN. BHD.	4
370	SYMPHONY GUARDFORCE SDN BHD	7
371	T MART SECURITY SDN BHD	4
372	T.S. SIDI GUARDFORCE SDN. BHD.	2
373	TASMMA SECURITY SDN BHD	5
374	TEAM FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	2
375	TEGAS SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	2
376	TERAJU DEKAD SDN BHD	3
377	TERAS PADU SECURITY SDN.BHD	1
378	THE MILLENNIUM TERRITORY SDN BHD	2
379	TIARA FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	6
380	TIME GUARDS SDN BHD	2
381	TOP GUARDS SECURITY & CONSULTANCY (TGS) SDN. BHD.	23
382	TOP GUARDS SECURITY & CONSULTANCY(TGS) SDN. BHD.	1
383	TRI-ZEN SECURITY SERVICES SDN.BHD	1
384	TUNAS SECURITY SERVICE SDN BHD	5
385	TZ SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	4
386	ULTRABEST SS SDN. BHD.	1
387	UNIGAYA PROTECTION SYSTEMS SDN. BHD.	1
388	UNITED SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	4
389	UNIVERSAL GUARDS SDN BHD	4
390	V-GLOBAL SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
391	VIRTUAL GUARD SDN BHD	5
392	VISI L.A SECURITY FORCE SDN BHD	1
393	VIVA CERAH SDN. BHD.	1
394	WALID SECURITY SDN BHD	2
395	WARISAN PERKASA SECURITY SDN BHD	6
396	WARISAN TEGUH SECURITY SDN BHD	3
397	WATCHMAN SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
398	WAWASAN PADU SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	2
399	WD GEMILANG SDN BHD	1
400	WINNING FORCE SECURITY SDN BHD	5
401	WIRA SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1
402	WIRA SELATAN SECURITY SDN BHD	5

NO	PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	TOTAL CONTRACT
403	WISE STAR SECURITY SDN BHD	4
404	WORKFORCE SECURITY SDN. BHD.	4
405	X-C COMMAND SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	6
406	XCEED SECURITY SDN. BHD.	4
407	YAKIN OMEGA SDN BHD	2
408	Z & Z FORCE SDN BHD	4
409	ZB SECURITY SERVICER SDN.BHD	7
410	ZINS SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	1

**Top Five Private Security Company Awarded Government Contract From 2009
To 2019 (Retrieved From Ministry Of Finance, 2021)**

PSC	TOTAL CONTRACT VALUE (RM)	PSC	TOTAL CONTRACTS AWARDED
DELTA FORCE SECURITY SERVICES & CONSULTANCY SDN. BHD.	104,580,210.4	TOP GUARDS SECURITY & CONSULTANCY SDN. BHD.	23
MRA SECURITY SDN BHD	92,620,240.36	SUPER FORCE SECURITY SERVICES SDN. BHD.	19
MOZA SECURITY SERVICES (M) SDN BHD	55,581,065.01	DELTA FORCE SECURITY SERVICES & CONSULTANCY SDN. BHD.	19
KAWALAN KESELAMATAN ANUGERAH SDN. BHD.	54,343,153.45	MAGNA SECURITY SDN BHD	16
EXPERT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	49,218,975.19	EXPERT SECURITY SERVICES SDN BHD	15

APPENDIX 4

PROCUREMENT DATABASE FOR PRIVATE SECURITY IN PUBLIC SECTOR BY MINISTRIES IN MALAYSIA (RETRIEVED FROM GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM, 2021)

NO	FEDERAL MINISTRY/ AGENCIES	PROCUREMENT VALUE (RM)												
		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL (RM)
1	Prime Minister Department	1,796 ,799. 76		5,077 ,132. 54	17,66 3,550 .80	16,64 4,057 .50	62,06 5,251 .10	24,26 6,764 .20	25,13 4,650 .55	32,55 0,716 .24	14,01 3,672 .30	43,53 7,387 .80	503,1 59.80	243,253, 142.59
2	Ministry of Agriculture And Agro Based Industries		853,2 21.60		1,654 ,251. 27					781,6 61.81	395,2 86.00			3,684,42 0.68
3	Ministry of Communication and Multimedia				621,9 60.00									621,960. 00
4	Ministry of Defence								899,9 08.20			923,5 78.85		1,823,48 7.05
5	Ministry of Education	100,8 35,90 3.20	3,272 ,918. 00	44,35 1,644 .80	142,1 98,75 5.00	11,16 6,439 .60	259,3 94.88	613,1 19,11 2.00	1,950 ,651, 262.4 3	490,6 22,81 7.85	131,3 17,04 1.00	477,3 28,53 8.60	334,7 30,20 3.43	4,299,85 4,030.79

NO	FEDERAL MINISTRY/ AGENCIES	PROCUREMENT VALUE (RM)												
		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL (RM)
6	Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change						1,030,303.20			942,277.25				1,972,580.45
7	Ministry of Federal Territories						1,054,080.00		1,228,987.20	953,321.60				3,236,388.80
8	Ministry of Finance		1,114,044.00	2,080,160.88	5,363,408.00	3,210,889.58	3,819,051.15	1,566,679.20	7,664,872.98	7,314,485.80		34,671,069.96		66,804,661.55
9	Ministry of Health		304,387.10	47,947,601.90	51,900,240.50	47,643,821.60	89,027,207.70	71,406,269.33	232,954,253.41	174,982,311.68	245,148,715.00	168,436,514.52	7,096,427.95	1,136,847,750.69
10	Ministry of Human Resources					773,274.24		79,517,904.60	8,738,483.00	13190.64		215,316.00		89,258,168.48
11	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment					1,403,946.72		2,253,993.28	2,683,761.50	182,496.10		1,126,730.00	837,282.42	8,488,210.02

NO	FEDERAL MINISTRY/ AGENCIES	PROCUREMENT VALUE (RM)												
		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL (RM)
12	Ministry of Transport		634,722.50		11,082,042.00							2,272,097.00		13,988,861.50
13	Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development			2,022,424.00			7,124.80	126,284.16		1,507,334.00		157,356.55	12,104.35	3,832,627.86
14	Ministry of Youth and Sports				10,185,615.00		9,808.80			8,280,171.00		4,044,996.86		22,520,591.66
15	Ministry of Tourism and Culture		655,286.40	919,800.00	726,356.52	4,425,174.12	1,559,104.80		9,516,798.22	4,650,211.94		4,045,529.86		26,498,261.86
16	Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperatives and Consumerism			715,388.40		2,086,530.20				1,103,517.00	1,866,532.00			5,771,967.60
17	Ministry of Higher Education			3,478,230.14	1,080,584.10	2,604,784.80	1,828,830.84	8,562,370.08	5,641,546.15	10,498,118.50				33,694,464.61

NO	FEDERAL MINISTRY/ AGENCIES	PROCUREMENT VALUE (RM)												
		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL (RM)
18	Ministry of Home Affairs			7459 313.9 4	0	4934 8.56	3992 487	5073 848.5 8	1639 1196. 76	2855 283.8 4		1716 000	98300 .16	37,635,7 78.84
19	Ministry of Rural and Regional Development		692,2 76.00	1,847 ,760. 00	665,7 60.00	1,063 ,392. 00				2,562 ,147. 20	1,024 ,298. 35			7,855,63 3.55
GRAND TOTAL		102,6 32,70 2.96	7,526 ,855. 60	115,8 99,45 6.60	243,1 42,52 3.19	91,07 1,658 .92	164,6 52,64 4.27	805,8 93,22 5.43	2,261 ,505, 720.4 0	739,8 00,06 2.45	393,7 65,54 4.65	738,4 75,11 6.00	343,2 77,47 8.11	6,007,64 2,988.58

Universiti Utara Malaysia

APPENDIX 5

PRIVATE SECURITY LITERATURE

Figure 1

Publication Pattern on Private Security

(Source: Self developed figure based on literature review)




Figure 2

Scope of Private Security Literatures

(Source: Self developed figure based on literature review)




Figure 3
Function of Private Security Providers from 1991 to 2020
(Source: Self developed figure based on literature review)




Figure 4
Private Security Guard versus Public Police
(Source: The Guardian, 2017)




Figure 5

Issues Related to Private Security Industry In Literature

(Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review)




Figure 6
 Typology of Private Security Providers
 (Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review)




Table 1
Interpretations of Private Security Company
(Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review)

AUTHOR	DEFINITION OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY
Task Force on Private Security (1976)	"Self-employed individuals and privately funded businesses provide security-related service to specific clientele for a fee to protect person, private property, interest from varied hazards."
American Security Industry Society (2000)	"Nongovernmental, private sector practice of protecting people, property & information, conducting investigations, and otherwise safeguarding an organisations' assets, which may be performed for an organization by an internal department (Proprietary security) or by an externally hired firm (Contract security)."
Goddard (2001)	"Registered civilian company specialising in providing commercial contract services to domestic and foreign entities with the intent to protect personnel and humanitarian and industrial assets within the rule of applicable domestic law."
Avant (2004)	"Corporate endeavours that perform logistic support, training, security, intelligence work, risk analysis."
Ortiz (2007)	"PSC for profit, to protect business premise, public building, residential area."
Hess (2008)	"Profit-oriented industry provides personnel, equipment, procedures to prevent losses."
Govender (2015)	"Effort by individual/organisation to protect asset (people, property, business right, information, company image, operational strategy, contract, agreement & policy) from loss /harm."
Smith, Schmalleger & Siegel (2016)	"Private sector practice by individuals & organisations, of providing security-related means or services, to protect and preserve persons, property, interests, information, and environments to allow for the continued conduct of needed activities within the organisation to society, without disruption from varied adversaries or hazards, for compensation."

Table 2

Dimensions within Security Governance Models

(Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review)

No	Security Governance Dimensions	Interpretation of Dimensions (Authors)
1	Actors	Constellation of actors (Ehrhart, 2013) Non-state group (Garcia, 2016) Executor of governance (Button, 2007) Diverse public-private (Webber et al., 2004; Bevir, 2016; Liao, 2012)
2	Compliance	Coercion, control (Ehrhart, 2013) Coercive, persuasive (Kirchner, 2007) Peer evaluation (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018) Structure of compliance (Westermeyer, 2013)
3	Cooperation	Hierarchies (Ehrhart, 2013) Norms fill cooperation problem (Garcia, 2016) Interaction by norm (Webber et al., 2004) Network (Bever, 2016) Negotiation (Liao, 2012) Mode of cooperation (Westermeyer, 2013)
4	Decision making	Horizontal, negotiation, inequality (Krahmann, 2001) Fragmented, negotiation, inequality (Krahmann, 2005) Objective focus of governance (Button, 2007) Fluid actors in Central decision-making (Bever, 2016)
5	Effectiveness	Unintended effect, pathology (Ehrhart, 2013)
6	Functional	Order & security (Garcia, 2016) Single issue area (Krahmann, 2001) Military, political, social, environmental (Krahmann, 2005) Mode, process of gov, technology, mentality (Button, 2007) Socio-political, social, political economy (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018) Model context specific (Liao, 2012)

No	Security Governance Dimensions	Interpretation of Dimensions (Authors)
		Government, co-governance, self-governance (Westermeyer, 2013)
7	Geography	Global legal political architecture (Garcia, 2016) State, regional, global, subnational (Krahmann, 2001, 2005) Decentred, changed boundary civil & state (Bevir, 2016) Scope at national, regional, global (Liao, 2012)
8	Implementation	Fragmented, voluntary, self-enforced (Krahmann 2001, 2005) Flexible, soft management style (form) (Liao, 2012)
9	Institution	Institution building, institution for civil society (Kirchner, 2007) Formal, informal (Webber et al., 2004) Financial institution (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018)
10	Interest	Structure of agency (Westermeyer, 2013) Hidden agenda, hegemony (Ehrhart, 2013) State's interest (Garcia, 2016) Differentiated (Krahmann, 2001,2005) Collective purpose (Webber et al., 2004)
11	Legitimacy	Accountability, acceptance (Ehrhart, 2013)
12	Norms	Contest, deliberation / domination (Ehrhart, 2013) Fill policy gaps (Garcia, 2016) Self governmentt, market, Limited sovereignty (Krahmann, 2001) Limited sovereignty, cost efficiency, coalition of willing (Krahmann, 2005) Norms for interaction (Webber et al., 2004) Mutual trust, joint vision (Liao, 2012)
13	Policy	Assurance, prevention, protection, compellence (Kirchner, 2007) Policy network (Bevir, 2016) Model is context specific (Liao, 2012)

No	Security Governance Dimensions	Interpretation of Dimensions (Authors)
14	Authority	Heterarchy (Webber et al., 2004) Politics of state transformation (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018) Declined hierarchy (Bevir, 2016) Direction as top down, bottom up, horizontal (Liao, 2012)
15	Problem-solving	Preventive security governance, control / prohibition (Garcia, 2016) Conflict resolution, interstate conflict (Kirchner, 2007) Issue-based wide governance (Westermeyer, 2013)
16	Regulation	International (Garcia, 2016) Designing and nature of regulation (Button, 2007)
17	Resource	Dispersed (Krahmann, 2001) Fragmented among public, private actors (Krahmann, 2005) Information sharing, capacity building (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018) Technology for future arms (Garcia, 2016)
18	State	State building (Kirchner, 2007) State transformation, cross state boundary (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018) Reject as material object, fragmented state (Bevir, 2016) State power (narrow) (Westermeyer, 2013)
19	Threat	Level, scope, actors, non-traditional security (Hameiri, Jones & Sandor, 2018)

Table 3
 Systematic Literature Review for Security Governance
(Source: Self-developed figure based on systematic literature review)

Gap for Research Objective 1: Provision of Private Security for Public Sector
Security governance in the public sector is the ultimatum of this study. Hence, attention required to know in details facts related to public sector premise and its surrounding nature. The scope which is not well defined in the literature bridges the gap for this study to be conducted in public sector in Malaysia. Particular attention given to public sector in terms of criticality of the premise, key asset, critical infrastructure, restricted or unauthorized premises. First, apparent gap present in terms of public sector context. None of the identified literature generally comprehend public sector premise as a whole set of reality with combination as both restricted and non-restricted premise. Only, portions of public sector premises are mentioned in literatures. Scope of governance within maritime security noted by Aarstad (2016), but it couldn't be generalized for entire public sector premise. The conduct semi structured interview methodology by Berndtsson and Stern (2011) explored the friction between public and private actor within European Airport Security context. The governance criteria within security assemblage structure of airport security can't be fully adapted for public sector. The literatures on public sector as restricted premise often comprehend the criticality of the premise. Paasche (2012) focused on the governance of security in policing landscape, where he also analysed on private governance. However, the conduct of this study is finely structured around policing landscape, but tied around security governance dimensions such as regulation and norms. Here, the context of public space and security by Paasche (2012) varies with this study's context. The duration of private security governance also provide room for exploration. Lui (2020) has proposed good governance and security sector reform features for oversight and accountability during pandemic Covid 19. The elements of governance dimensions have been essential for moderation of private

security actor but the context is limited for pandemic period; but the study failed to address the other governance dimensions.

Second, the population gap for private security actors in Asian context is observed within the literature. Beeson (2019) has explored the geographical context of Southeast Asia but the scope retained to civil-military relations; the literature couldn't complement the context of private security in Southeast Asia. Tan (2019) has contributed much to the ASEAN security governance, by defining regional cooperation. Plus, security multilateralism concepts have been popularized by Tan (2019). However, the broader context of the literature at the regional level didn't focus in depth about private security. There is a void about private security actors in ASEAN context, which will be complemented by this research.

Sperling and Webber (2014) have analysed security governance from an actor-centred way. Even though the literature is about European regional security, the analytical perspective of Sperling and Webber (2014) guided the outlook of this research. The private security governors' focus on conflating security governance in public sector is inspired by Sperling and Webber (2014). Security governance in Asia by Destradi (2014) has covered regional security of India in terms of policy-making. The risk concerns raised at domestic and regional layers are assessed for policy making of the country. Another significant literature for Asian context would be the work of Frohlich and Loewen (2018). The focus of the literature shifted towards regional security architecture moderated by the European Union and ASEAN. Hence, a grasp of total ASEAN context of private security governance is not addressed here.

Third, regulation of private security guards in public sector also noted to be limitedly researched. regulation of private security guards on recruitment by the state for United States has focused towards the police not private security (Klein & Hemmens, 2018). Similarly, security transformation and state legitimacy raised by Guzik (2013), focus towards the authority of the state. Yet, the literature does not specify in detail the transformation of private security. Diphorn (2016)

has put forth the private security actors as surveillors, and the governance process as surveillance. The qualitative methodology adapted in enlightening the governance of private security actors in surveillance type activities. The scope of this literature didn't mention about public sector's context, rather deviated towards functional territory of private security actors.

Hutchinson and O'Connor's (2005) inhouse security much associated to the inhouse security officers (KP Scheme) as declared in this study. Hutchinson and O'Connor (2005) have explored the regulatory boundaries and autonomy zone of these in house security officers versus the police scheme. The exploration of private security actors done in this research is much similar to Hutchinson and O'Connor's (2005) framework in terms of regulatory and authority dimensions. However, Hutchinson and O'Connor (2005) placed much emphasis on risk management for mass private property context.

Another interesting study in United States covered particularly on regulation of private security; extensively on private detectives, investigators and locksmiths (McCrie, 2017). The coverage of private security industry by McCrie (2017) didn't particularly address the private security companies. The regulatory practice were focussed on employment screening and alarm installation, failed the capture the wholesome regulatory context of private security. A qualitative study by Joachim and Schneiker (2015) placed NGO as the subject and object of governance, where the locus of this study diverted from private security actors.

Fourth, the research on private security actors from Security Governance has been moderate especially for public sector context. International theory from realist perspective by Hofmann and Schneckener (2011) pointing the cluster of armed actors within conflict environment context, didn't specifically segregate between public and private actors. The scope of conflict environment been subjective in this matter, and do not refer or relatable to public sector alone.

Schreier and Caparini (2005) approach in visioning multiple actor's role in security provision using security governance perspective much focussed on state

institutions. The study deviate from this study's scope of research as definition of international relation perspective more devoted in distinguishing state coordination and control over security. International theory define the private security actors as non state actors, and public security actors as state actors. Hence, an unbiased governance perspective required for this research without association to international context.

Gap for Research Objective 2:

Private Security Governance

Governance is a major field encompasses multiple dimensions. For the conduct of this study, governance has been only associated to security. Abundant literature in the field of security governance observed via systematic literature review suffice the need of literatures. Security governance has been established itself as a branch of governance on its own, with adequate research materials. Governance of security research in diverse contexts and regions has resulted in the emergence of variants; democratic governance, good governance, normative governance, insecurity governance, preventive governance, narrow governance, multilevel governance, private governance, global governance, regional governance, hybrid governance, network governance, security assemblage, security community, multilateral governance, self-regulation, self-governance, wide governance, substantive governance and modular governance.

The dominance of literatures noted in regional governance (Obamamoye, 2020; Caballero-Anthony, 2020; Ceccorulli, Frappi & Lucarelli, 2016; Liao, 2012; Jetschke, 2011; Kirchner, 2007; Kirchner & Dominguez, 2014; Lopez-Lucia 2015, Webber et al., 2004; Olonisakin, 2004), Global Governance (Kirchner, 2007; Adler & Greve, 2009; Kavalski, 2008; Schroeder, 2010; Heinemann-Grüder & Grebenschikov, 2006; Sperling, Kay & Papacosma, 2004), Private security governance (Abrahamsen, 2008; Bryden & Caparini, 2006; Aziani, Favarin & Campedelli, 2020; Obamamoye, 2020; Hoogenboom, 2010; Kim, Button & Lee, 2018; Ebo, 2007; Leese, 2015; Staff, 2016) and Multilevel Governance (Aarstad, 2016; Bachmann, 2012; Bagayoko, 2010; Ceccorulli, Frappi & Lucarelli, 2016; Merand, Hofmann & Irondelle, 2010; Hameiri, 2018).

Systematic literature review on security governance has allowed the researcher to form a research gap matrix. The matrix identified the least studied branch of security governance. Out of twenty notable variants of security governance, modular governance (Volinz, 2018), Multicentred governance (Hoogenboom, 2010), Narrow security governance (Krahmann, 2005, 2008), Preventive Security Governance (Garcia, 2016), Substantive governance (Sperling & Webber, 2017) are least studied branches. The least explored variants be the prospects for future exploration.

Despite multiple security governance literatures, private security guards from Narrow Governance perspective seems lacking within literature. The literatures are heavily associated to International Relations theory. Cullen (2009) has briefly explored multi-disciplinary security governance under International Relations theory. Cullen (2009) has mentioned about hybrid security network between public and private, but concerns were more on state authority, geographical and functional territory, and coercive compliance mechanisms. The author's address in International Relation theory prompt to seek the variation of state power, whereas the current research need more focus between governors within national context.

Security governance literature under International relations theory expanded to include the NGOs into security governance (Petrova, 2018). The author has also merged democratic governance within international relations. So, conglomeration of state power and humanitarian norms was highlighted by Petrova (2018). The authority of state identified as the cause of asymmetry between state and non state actors in partnership (Johnston, 2014). This study reveal the power, authority and hierarchy dimension in security governance, but still visioned within the International Relations theory.

Security Sector Reform being a heavy branch within the literature. Security sector reform (SSR) given political economy with the utilization of International Relations theory for African context briefly studied by Abrahamsen (2006, 2016). In Southeast Asian context, the transformation from policy to practice via

Security Sector Reform has been normative, static and incomplete (Heiduk, 2014). The strong normative culture couldn't be generalized for this study as Malaysia not spelled to be a part of SSR. However, structural impediments and obstacles caused by the actors in policy process visualize challenges stirred by governance structure and multiple actors within governance process. This eventually opens up for the dissemination of analysis for the third research question of this study.

SSR for Philippines address the modernization and revisioning of national policies focussed on military context (Layador, 2014). SSR also has been explored with presence of policing practices. Community Based Policing initiatives in Indonesian context speaks about legitimacy of state security actors, and didn't focus on private security actors (Tholens, 2012). The reformation of national policies and laws pertaining private security in Asian context not being this research's context. The partnership between government, industry and civil society in reforming private security companies has been explored by Burt (2012). SSR concerning the public security actors by Mustapha (2013) also grasped the democratic perspective. This study explore only public and private actors, and do not involve the civilian perspective. So, SSR in democratic perspective seen as future aspect for Malaysian security governance.

The security sector governance set up based on democratic pillar of norms and regulation which have been initiated by Banerjee (2009) insufficient in terms of governance dimensions required for private security actors in public sector. Cottier (2006) has approached private military security company on humanitarian context. Percy's (2012) also focus on regulation of private military security companies for humanitarian aid again consort the democratic governance theory. Multilayered security community in regional architectures of Africa for peace making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding addressed as crucial element in security governance (Moolakattu, 2010), but the emphasis was not towards the private security industry.

The studies on security governance in International Relations tend to focus on limited governance dimensions, which isn't sufficient to explore the governance of private security in public sector. The base for this research was not attempted in democratic or international relations context, as it never intends to lose any governance dimensions as comprehended by narrow governance. Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) has indicated the governance influence on local government performance, but didn't explain in terms of narrow governance perspective and other governance dimensions.

Regional and Global Governance are also widely addressed within literature. Regional governance approached via interstate governance mechanism within America by complying to most security governance dimensions (Horwitz, 2007). The noteworthy work of Horwitz (2007) pillared by the democratic values and concerns. Similarly, Howorth (2012) studied on intergovernmentalism in European context. Regional governance in South East Asia with diverse political and economical background captured by Sperling and Webber (2014), briefly talks about shared victory and commonalty flows within the region. Similarly, ASEAN security governance pillared by norms and achieved via cooperative action between countries (Jetschke, 2011). The literature on Asian security governance talks about general perspective without deeply diving particularly to the business of private security actors. Moreover, the research context prompt to enlighten the individual state capacity without jeopardizing the regional unity.

Global governance context by Lopez-Claros, Dahl and Groff (2020) examines the power relation within multiple governance level. The focus exerted on global constitutionalism and measurement of deviant state behaviour is a broader context which couldn't be adapted for national level governance of private security. This study only focus on national level governance, and didn't focus on power relation alone. Kirton (2005) has emphasized the G8 system as the global security governor. Informal mechanism within global security governance visioned under International Relations by (Prantl, 2006), didn't focus governance at national level. Keynesian mode of public governance speaks governance from

above and below (Lea & Stenson, 2007). This could be an advanced stand to link between global and national context.

Transgovernmental networks and security architecture in European context are beyond the national territory (Hollis, 2010). The evolution and advancement of security governance in European region cant be assimilated to Malaysian context, as such architectural visionary of private security governance not widely mentioned in literature. Modular security provision by Volinz (2018) also focussed on the state security actors. The ethnographic case study provided multifaceted reality on regulation of these additional state actors, but didn't mention about private security actors. Again, state power in transnational policy making studied for the European context by Merand, Hofmann & Irondelle (2010), utilized the social network analysis model.

Second, the moderation of private security actors by the governing agencies for a country with undeniable national control over private entities less observant within literature. The moderation between state and international NGO has been explored under transnational governance context (Avant, 2016) beyond state centred governance. Also, state centric Hobbesion concept highlighted by Bryden and Caparini (2006) highly related to transnational and democratic accountability. This study intends to explore the regulation of private security actors by both public and private governing agencies. The transition from a state centric to human centred governance have been addressed again by Howe (2010, 2012, 2017), which reveals on good governance and normative aspects in East Asian context. The deviation of the literature on democratic governance emphasizes more on human security, lack explanation of a state centred narrow governance perspective (Howe 2012, 2017).

The concerns raised at regional context for European Union (Button & Brooks, 2016; Button, 2020; Ceccorulli et al. 2010; Ceccorulli, Frappi & Lucarelli, 2016) and ASEAN (Caballero-Anthony, 2020) lack explanation on national context on moderation of private security actor. Security sector governance focus on balance of power between state and civilian, emphasized the role of civilian

control bodies on governance in West Africa (Bryden & Chappuis, 2015). The civilian control over private security guards not explored for the context public sector's security, which restrict it to be adapted for this research. Hence, a gap found within literature on how private security actors are moderated in a state centric governance structure.

Third, literatures lack on comprehensive view on how private security guards being governed in public sector. The research by Bradley (2016) attempted for policy oriented research; focus on norms, leaving room for other governance dimensions to be explored. This study particular focus on one of the governance dimensions, policy making of the entire governance process. The moderation of hybrid actors under new public management theory seeks more administrative accountability, but has loose hold on compliance or resource management practices (Dupont, 2005).

Zwelethemba model utilized for two main agenda; (i) capture the trends and challenges in local context, and (ii) pursue top down and bottom up simultaneously to reform regulatory framework (Kempa et al., 2002). Here, the effort by Kempa et al. (2002) to detect challenges and aimed at reforming network governance somehow absorbed into this research for third and fourth research objective.

Kirchner's earlier research focused on security functions and three governance dimensions in policy making (Kirchner & Sperling, 2006). The concept is similar to this research where the public sector's security and governance dimensions are visioned for private security actors. However, Kirchner's latter works have shifted in establishing European Union as autonomous security actor in regional governance (Kirchner & Sperling, 2007; Kirchner & Dominguez, 2014). The advancement of European security governance literatures couldn't be somehow associated to the Malaysian context.

Surveillant assemblage practiced in Geneva International Airport clearly explore the interaction and mutual interdependencies between public and private actor

(Klauser, 2009). Security assemblage and liberal security governance approached for airport security context (Leese, 2015; Lippert & O'Connor, 2003). First, security governance here attempted in airport security context, not directly representing public sector's security. Second, the security function does not specifically define private security actor. Third, surveillant and security assemblage couldn't be assimilated to security governance dimensions.

Valverde (2008) contributed to a Jurisdiction scale model in governance, particularly distinguish the governance in terms of object, subject and mode. However, the jurisdiction presupposed on the analytical scale of an institution encompassed towards civilizations theory, does not serve as a good fit to study private security context. Private Military Security Companies abiding the democratic norms at domestic, industry and international level signify the norm element within security governance (Hurst, 2011). The comprehensive actors captured in compliance towards democratic norm isn't sufficient to comprehend the total private security governance in public sector, contextually and theoretically.

The model by Loader, Goold & Thumala (2015) is a combination of communalizing and civilizing model rooted in economic sociology background. The security visioned as commodity and non commodity within democratic circle, isn't the focus of this research. The norms tied around democratic values and economic sociology couldn't pillar the ground of governance of private security for Malaysian context.

Fourth, conglomeration of multiple governance dimensions for private security actors are limitedly addressed in the literature. Webber et al. (2004) vision on security governance with multiple governance dimensions benefit the progress of this research. The literature has enlightened on the multiple governors, multiple security actors and mode of cooperation. But the European based literature didn't dwell into the context of public sector's security, leaving room to further research. However, the revelation of pluralistic actors in provision of security and governance is an important perspective adapted in this research. In

later years, Sperling and Webber (2017) have enlightened on three strands of security governance; normative, empirical and substantive. None of the strand by Sperling and Webber (2017) be a good fit to explore this research.

Krahmann has produced rich literature on security governance, the comparison between (i) government and governance, (ii) the classification of governance dimensions, (iii) the proliferation of challenges due to rise of non state actors and (iv) self regulations (Krahmann 2001,2003,2005, 2016, 2017). The vision by Krahmann in establishing governance dimensions in close comparison with government features lay proper foundation for this research.

The regulation of private security actors in Nigeria by Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps conducted via in depth interview and multistage sampling methods (Adebayo & Aderinto, 2018). The study is regarded comprehensive; captured most of the governance dimensions such as resource management, compliance, norms and legitimacy, but still not extensive for a comprehensive view of how private security actors' governed. Three pillar model concerns about few governance dimensions; interest, norm, agenda (Stiernstedt et al, 2021.). The model somehow not sufficient to explore private security in public sector context as it highlights about limited governance dimensions. Envall and Hall (2016)'s strategic partnership as the new form security governance emphasizes on community in Asian context, couldn't elaborate on multiple governance dimension within the process.

**Gap for Research Objective 3 :
Challenges of Private Security Actors**

The attention to private security actors is not much of a concern for Malaysia. The required benefits of privatization and monetary benefits to the industrial players are much detected. Much appreciation to Western scholars for deriving the root of private actors and revealed tonnes of mishaps associated to them. Even though the defined pattern in the literature can't be absorbed to Malaysian context, some of the concerns have been in this country as well.

First, the concern of private security actors in national context seems lacking. This study would bridge the gap of the undefined complications caused by private security actors in Malaysia. Impact of public and private network to key political and normative issues, but measured in a global context for Africa setting (Abrahamsen, 2007). Sperling and Webber (2018) has approach securitization as collective setting in guarding against challenges. Here, European Union itself addressed as an security actor. The endeavours made in European context on challenge management has been lacking for Asian context. Further, private security actor for public sector's context and their challenge association for Asian also seem lacking.

Second, security issues related to private security guards not explored in relation to narrow governance perspective. Allison and Taylor (2017) has raised up concerns non traditional security issues but on regional context with allowance of ASEAN and democratic norms. Similarly, Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov (2006) raised governance of international agencies by democratic standards. The governance of non state actors by Allison (2017) and Heinemann-Grüder (2006) are inclined towards more people oriented approach couldn't serve the need on narrow perspective. Shared security governance measure partnership between Europe and Russia in avoiding conflict of order (Averre, 2016). The inter country intervention in conflict management beyond the narrow context.

Multilayered security governance approach has attempted to tackle crisis management and peace consolidation in Africa (Bachmann, 2012), but the attention given on institutional context. Ebo (2007) stood a step further by labelling the private security actors with criminal networks as insecurity actors. Grajales (2017) has attempted the security governance in political perspective, whereby the institutional framework preserved despite efforts to counter insurgency. This study has emphasized the hazard associated with private security actors but focus more on normative governance perspective. Hence, the concern of private security association with terrorism and criminal networks, justify the need and essence of third research question.

Third, the challenges often measured and identified in the literature do not directly represent the private security guards. The private security actors are not being involved in most governance studies. Population gap present in this research is a practical scenario as well. The challenges by Italian mafias via criminal organizations has been beyond the function of private security actors (Aziani, Favarin & Campedelli, 2020).

Anyang (1998) approach for conflict resolution were based on good governance. The conflict here was not associated to private security industry, but the writeup is a crucial one for security governance literature. Monaghan (2013) has mentioned about insecurity management actors at transnational level, and ways in curbing terrorism. However, Monaghan (2013) didn't specify the private security companies or actors as the part of working groups; concern was placed on prisoners.

Aydinli (2010) describes insecurity governance from a realist perspective. Here, cooperation between police at transnational level brought to light, yet fail to capture the sub state relationship between public and private security actors. Challenges approached in a global security context by Hameiri, Jones and Sandor (2018) more interested in monetary and financing rooted challenges. Nontraditional security governance by Zimmerman (2016) for Asian regional governance discloses from the aspect liberalisation and democratisation. The literature has enunciated the nontraditional in terms of insecurities and governance matters, but does not specifically address the private security guards.

Iwuoha (2019) has raised concerns on counter terrorism effort at transnational context, but didn't closely associate the adversities to private security actors. Crime control by Gurinskaya and Nalla (2018) have focussed on criminal and non-criminal justice regulatory tools, but didn't detail on private security actors. So, the linkage between private security companies with the criminal offences remain unexplored here. The rise of militia groups, association to terrorism and national security has been raised by Olasunkanmi (2016). The Nigerian context of study on downfall of democratic norms and rise of challenges by militia

couldn't comprehend the total jeopardises caused by the private security actors. The roots of Olasunkanmi (2016) established with democratic theory.

Fourth, limitation of issues associated to private security guards and public sector's security observed within literature. The concerns pertaining criminality, wages, training and accountability concerns in Britain have been raised against private security actors (George & Watson, 1992). However, the concerns are not accurately representing those associated to public sector's security but mentioned in a general context. Transnational security governance by Zwolski (2014) address the security risks under International Relations. The security risks highlighted here are noteworthy, yet the direct affiliation of them to private security actors and public sector's security been a missing link.

Even though Aiyede (2015) didn't mention as SSR, the usage of Military Reform here mainly to deal with contemporary challenges. The challenges covered here again not directly associated to the public sector's context or private security actors. However, Aiyede (2015) made good attempt in addressing the threat management by public actors. The approach has been ingested for exploring threat management for this research.

Gap for Research Objective 4:

Private Security Governance Model

First, a governance model for the private security actor in public sector is a notable gap in literature. The private security industry isn't new to Malaysia. Governance of these actors have been ever since the enactment of Private Agencies Act 1971. Their debut into public sector also has been welcomed by well defined Privatization Policy. However, almost 25 years of successful implementation of private security to public sector premise have been only supported by contractual act. A massive period it is for a complete look over the policies and complications revolving private security actors.

Model initiated for African Security Sector Reform as network policy model emphasize on security partnership between state and non state actors in fragile state (Abrahamsen, 2016). The model by Abrahamsen (2016) measure the competitive nature between public and private security actor, which is not yet a concern for Malaysia. The interaction between non statutory actors and institutions visualized as power hierarchies in Security Sector Reform (Bagayoko 2010, 2012, 2016) does not specifically address the private security actors. Hence, the model on multilevel governance didn't specifically focus the private security actors.

Zwelethemba Model steadily stood by democratic norms which pronounce social control in weak states of Africa (Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing, 2003), didn't acknowledge the multiple governors presence in security. Politics of private security in nodal governance measured via anchored pluralism model focus on state centric political norms and domestic security of United Kingdom (White, 2018). This specific model by White (2010) couldn't visualize the co governance pattern by public and private governing agencies. Nodal governance specifically used for explaining the state security actors, focusing on authorities and legitimacy (Sanjurjo, 2017). Hence, the model is not a suit for exploring private security actors.

Second, the broken link between international norms of private security industry and Malaysian private security industry is obvious within literature. The international norms present within Montreux Document, ICoC which outline the emerging private threats, challenges and opportunities serve as basic guideline for the compliant countries (Buzatu & Buckland, 2015). The norms set by this international guidance yet to bind the governance of private security actors in Malaysia, nor visible in any published regulation of public or private governing agencies. Norms on Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and norms set on governing PMSC for Czech Republic, USA and Africa couldn't be suited for national context (Boggero, 2019).

Only at regional level, APSC blueprint has been for regional governance for implementation, resource management, and feedback mechanism (ASEAN, 2015). However, the direct link for private security industry not spelled out even in APSC Blueprint. Policies which have been enacted to combat terrorism in European context (Bossong, 2008, 2012) provide a platform for Malaysia to incorporate such practice as well. Liao (2012) model for Chinese civil protection address the collective action for security policy making with governance dimensions.

This study aims to contribute to security governance model and bridge the theoretical gap for the national literature. Besides, this model be the benchmark for derivation of policies associated to private security industry in Malaysia. Ehrhart (2014) studied security governance as a concept for European regional governance, but failed to adapt it empirically to any particular context. Hence, European based model adapted with improvised governance dimensions gained from literature. This model guide the deliverance of Private Security Governance Model for public sector.

APPENDIX 6

SELECTION AND SCREENING OF INFORMANTS

Table 1

Selection and Screening of Informants

(Source: Self developed figure based level of analysis of case study)

No	Informants	Purposive Sampling (Sample Size)	Snowballing Technique (Sample Size)	Screening	Actual (Sample Size)
1	Public Governors (* initial identified informants not to be reflected as the cases) * national level governors (i) MOHA (ii) CGSO (iii) MOHR (iv) RMP (v) MOD (vi) NSC (vii) Court (viii) AADK (ix) MOF * public level governor (i) State Executive Legislative Member * regional level governors (i) APSC (ii) SEARCCT * global level governors (i) SIA (ii) UNSC	3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1	2 3 1 1 1 1 1	2 3 1 1 1 1 1
2	Private Governors (* initial identified informants not to be reflected as the cases) * national level governors (i) PIKM (ii) ASIS (iii) APSA	2 5 3		3 3	2 2

No	Informants	Purposive Sampling (Sample Size)	Snowballing Technique (Sample Size)	Screening	Actual (Sample Size)
	(iv) SWISS		1	1	
	* public level governors				
	(i) PIKM	1			1
	* regional level governors				
	(i) CSCAP	1		1	
3	State Actors				
	(i) Auxiliary Police	1		1	
	(ii) Voluntary Corps	2			2
	(iii) In House Security Officers	1			1
4	Private Actors				
	(i) CEO	1			1
	(ii) Director / Executive Director	1	2		3
	(iii) General Manager /Manager	1	3		4
	(iv) Executive/ Operation		2		2
5	Service Recipient				
	* national level government agency				
	MOE	1			1
	MOH	2			2
	Ministry of Federal Territories	1			1
	* public level government agency				
	State Education Department	1			1
	Minerals and Geoscience Department Malaysia	1			1
	Total Informants	41	13	20	34

Figure 1
Context and cases for multiple case study
(Source: adapted from Yin, 2018)




Figure 2
Level of analysis for private security governance in public sector
(Source: Self developed figure based level of analysis of case study)



APPENDIX 7

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

	GHAZALI SHAFIE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT UUM Kolej Undang-Undang, Kerajaan dan Pengajian Antarabangsa Universiti Utara Malaysia 06010 UUM SINTOK KEDAH DARUL AMAN MALAYSIA	 Tel: 604-928 7751/7752 Faks (Fax): 604-928 7799 Laman Web (Web): www.gsgg.uum.edu.my

Reference No.UUM/COLGIS/GSGSG/P-30
Date: 21 September 2020

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Sir/Madam,

DATA COLLECTION FOR PHD

This is to certify that **VIGNESWARY PRANAVA RASAHUGAN (Matric Number: 903889)** is a full time Phd student at Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia.


She needs to collect data for her Phd research thesis in order to fulfill the requirements of her Phd programme.

We duly hope that your organization will be able to assist her in getting the necessary information and give her permission to collect the data for her Phd research thesis.

Thank you.

"KNOWLEDGE, VIRTUE, SERVICE"
"KEDAH AMAN MAKMUR- HARAPAN BERSAMA MEMAKMURKAN RAKYAT"

Yours faithfully



(MOHD SUKRI OTHMAN)
Senior Assistant Registrar,
Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government
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Tel: 04-9287752/ fax:04-9287799

Universiti Pengurusan Terkemuka
The Eminent Management University

PROTOCOL FOR INTERVIEW

—

- These interview questions are designed to elicit response from participants: policy makers, policy implementers, public agencies, private agency, public security actors and private security actor.
- I am obliged if these interview questions are subject to be reviewed by respective Ethical Committee (either University/Ministries/organizations) if necessary, prior to oral interview session.
- Prior to interview, I'll submit Permission Letter for Data Collection from the University, Set of Interview Questions, and Consent Form to the respondent's department to book the interview slot.
- Further, interview options provided due to restrictions on pandemic outbreak as below:
 - (i) face to face or
 - (ii) virtual / online session either via Webex/Google Meet/videocall/etc. or
 - (iii) written answer.
- I would approach through phone calls or meet up for further clarifications on the matter.

A. EXPLAIN

- Confidentiality of interview
- Anonymous quotations may be used in published reports.
- The interview will last for up to an hour.
- A shorter follow-up interview will be scheduled for in future
- Explain the purpose of the interview as defined in consent form.
- Ask if interviewee have any questions.

[Note: The above took approximately 5 minutes per interview.]

B. START INTERVIEW

- Set of interview questions selected to respondents category.
- Start session by asking interviewee questions from Part I to Part IV.
- End section of interviewing after confirming with the interviewee.

- Conclude the session by asking interviewee something like:
“How able were you to express your views and opinions during the interviews?”

C. END INTERVIEW

- Ask if interviewee has anything else to add and thank interviewee for participation.
- Inform the interviewee on necessity for follow up interview or to review written report.
- Arrange date and time for follow-up telephone or online interview.

Part I: Background Information

(Note to interviewer: If candidate hesitates before answering these questions, simply explain that these are for record-keeping purposes only and will not be used to identify responses. If further resistance is encountered, skip those items that are considered offensive.)

Name :

What is the highest level of education you have obtained?

What is your current job title?

How long have you worked in this position (e.g policy)? Years:

Months:

How long have you worked for this organization? Years: Months:

Part II: Public and Private security Actors (In Provision of Security)

(Public Security Actors referred to RELA, Police, Auxiliary Police, Security Officers (KP) ;

Private Security Actor referred Private Security Guards;

Public Sector referred to government agencies)

What is the function of security in public sector? What are to be protected?

Currently, who are the providers of security to public sector? What are their functions?

Initially there were only public security actors in for provision of security to public sector. Now, private security guards are there too. What is your opinion on this transition?

What are the government agencies that have only public security actors for their security?

What are the government agencies that have only private security actors for their security?

Why do some government agencies have both public and private security actors for their security?

How different are the security service offered by public and private security actor?

Do we need both public and private security actors for public sector's security in Malaysia?

Do you think private security guards relevant in public sector? Why, why not?

What should be the function of private security actors in public sector?

What should be the function of public security actors in public sector?

How prepared are the public security actors in addressing the security challenges?

What are their resources and expertise?

How prepared are the private security actors in addressing the security challenges?

What are their resources and expertise?

For Policy Makers

Do private security actors contribute to national security agenda of the country? (If yes) how?

What are the special considerations for deciding the private security actor's role in public sector?

For Policy Implementors

Do you prefer public or private security actor for public sector's security? Why?

In your opinion, whom should be responsible for provision of security to public sector? Public or private security actor? or both?

How do public and private security actor work together in public sector? How should it be in future?

For Public & Private Security Actors

Do you agree for public sector's security totally provided by public security actors?

Why? What are the challenges?

Do you agree for public sector's security totally provided by private security actors?

Why? What are the challenges?

Why do we need both public and private security actors in public sector?

Part III: Security Challenges

*(Security challenges referred to security challenges, impacts and issues;
Public Agencies referred to MOHA, MOD, MOF, NSC, RELA, Police, CGSO;
Private Agency referred Persatuan Industri Keselamatan Malaysia, PIKM)*

What are the impacts due to governance of private security by public agencies?

How do governance of private security by PIKM (private agency) affect public sector's security?

What are the challenges in governing private security in public sector?

What are the challenges caused by private security guards in public sector? How do you manage?

What is your opinion on the security challenges versus benefits derived from having private security guards in public sector?

Of the impacts you just listed, please rank the five most important. Rank the challenges by probability of occurrence, scope of challenge, intensity of challenge and object targeted for attack.

For Policy Makers

Are these security challenges mentioned above considered during policy making? (policy making for governance of public sector's security)

What is your opinion on the current security challenges addressed in national security and defense policies? Are all challenges addressed?

What are security challenges anticipated from private security guards? How ready are you to face these challenges?

How are the challenges by private security guards monitored at national, regional and international level?

For Policy Implementors

What security issues do you face while dealing with private agencies? How are these issues tackled?

For Public Security Actors

What are the security issues you face when working together with private security actors? How do you manage?

For Private security Actors

What are the security issues you face when working together with public security actors? How do you manage?

How difficult it is for you adhere to adhering to public sector's security norms?

What are the challenges? How do you manage it?

Part IV: Governance of Private Security

(Governance of private security referred to governing private security guards in the public sector)

Who governs private security in public sector? How do they differ in their expertise?

What are the public and private governing agencies at national, regional and international level?

Who decides the role of public / private agencies in governing private security? How it is decided?

Do the public and private agencies have different governance scope and functions? How does the private agency complement the public agencies in governing private security guards? How significant is their role?

Will there be new governing agencies for private security formed? Why it is required?

In future, whom do you think should govern private security in public sector?

What are the challenges in governing the private security actors in public sector?

How do public and private agencies cooperate in governing private security in public sector?

How do public and private agencies cooperate in implementation of private security policies?

What are the similarities and differences between public and private agency, in term of their governing resources? In term of their governing expertise?

Would you rely on private agency for training of private security guards? Why?

Do involvement of both public and private agencies necessary in designing policies for private security?

What are the policies available for private security in public sector? Are the private agencies involved in all the policy making process? Why, why not?

Are the current policies on private security done consensually between public and private agencies?

How do public agencies assist in implementing private security policies?

How do private agencies assist in implementing private security policies?

How the international policies affect governance of private security in Malaysia?

Why should the private security in public sector governed by both public and private agencies? What is the national interest preserved? What are the norms adhered by both agencies?

To what extent both public and private agencies comply to this interest and norms?

How to make sure both public and private agency comply to these interest and norms?

How the private agency aligns its interest to public sector? What are the challenges?

Are the current public and private agencies sufficient to address the security issues?

Is there any model for governance of private security in public sector? Why, why not? Who should be designing it?

What are the strengths / weaknesses of current governance structure?

Do our country need a new security governance model for public sector? Why and why not?

What is the ideal governance model for public and private agencies to work together? Why is it important?

For Policy Makers

How private security is governed at regional and international level?

How do the regional and international governing agencies (ex : APSA, UNSC) influence the governance of private security in public sector?

How are the private security policies designed? Are they based on any theory, concept or research?

Are the policies created have special consideration for private security in public sector? Why, why not?

What are the special considerations before designing private security policies for

public sector?

For Policy Implementors

Are the current governing agencies for private security guards in public sector sufficient? Why, why not?

What are the challenges faced in implementing private security policies in public sector?

To what extent do public agency assist in implementing private security policies?

To what extent do private agency assist in implementing private security policies?

Between public and private agency, whom do you depend more in governing private security guards?

For Public Agencies

What are the formal and informal public agencies involved in governing private security in public sector?

To what extent public agencies dependent upon private agencies for policy implementation?

For Private Agencies

What are the formal and informal private agencies involved in governing private security in public sector?

Do private agencies have any governance model at national, regional and international level?

To what extent private agencies dependent upon public agencies for policy implementation?

PROTOCOL FOR FOLLOW UP INTERVIEW / REVIEW REPORT

- Listen to recording of previous interview, report and review notes.
- Call interviewee.
- Check that the time is convenient for the interviewee.
- Confirm interviewee's agreement for call to be recorded.
- Turn on recording device.

Explain

- Purpose of the interview to follow-up previous interview
- To get an evaluation and comments on the interviews / report.
- Ask if interviewee have any questions.

[Note: The above took approximately 5 minutes per interview.]

Start interview

- Start with comments and review on interview / report.
- Ask if interviewee has any suggestions for improvisation.

End interview

- Thank interviewee for participation in the research
- Confirm that they will receive a copy of our final papers.

APPENDIX 8

CONSENT FORM

My name is Vigneswary Pranava Rasahugan (vigneswary.phd@gmail.com), a Doctoral student in Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government, Universiti Utara Malaysia. I am conducting a thesis research entitled “Governance of Private Security in Public Sector: Case Study of Malaysia. Dr. Samihah Khalil @ Halim, Associate Professor of College of Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government is the Responsible Research Supervisor, from Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government, Universiti Utara Malaysia.

About My Research

This research study is designed to explore the governance of private security in public sector/ government departments. The aim of this research is to explore the provision of security by public and private security actors, security challenges associated in having private security actors in public sector’s security, and governance structure of private security in Malaysian public sector.

My study uses semi-structured interview and documents review. The participants of this study consist of policy makers and policy implementors respective government and private agencies, responsible in governance of private security in public sector. You have been selected as one of the key participants of this study based on your expertise and job position in agencies relevant to this research. I am asking the permission to record the interviews for transcribing and analysis. All interviews would only be used for the purpose of this research only.

This study will not have any challenge, grief, or discontent impact to the participant because it is done on a sane adult, professional, and voluntarily agree to be interviewed on the research topic. By signing The Consent Form prior to interview indicates that you can terminate the interview, or withdraw from the study without any forfeiture. In this study, the participation is voluntary and no remuneration or whatsoever is involved.

Signature of Researcher,

Date :

Participant's Statement

I have been completely enlightened on the above research being carried out. The purpose and procedure of the study are obvious. My voluntary comment in participating in the interviews will have contribution to enhance the understanding on the sense of urgency in the organization.

I am solidly acknowledge that my particular and opinion, whether it is direct or indirect quotes, any written responses to either initial or follow-up questions, will be incorporated into various writing by the researcher, including this Dissertation, and articles, or in a book that results from this study. I have had an opportunity to ask the researcher questions and I have secured satisfactory answers to any question that may have arisen.

I explicitly give permission to record, and utilize direct or indirect quotes from the interviews which are part of this study. The researcher has my permission to retain any and all data gathered during the initial interviews, or subsequent interviews, phone conversations, or writings, that we may have in the future; data will be retained at least three years. I understand that I will be free to temporarily stop the interview, or to completely withdraw from the study at any time without forfeiture.

Participant 's signature

Date:

APPENDIX 9

TRANSCRIPTION PROTOCOL

A. TEXT FORMATTING

The transcriber shall transcribe all individual using the following formatting:

- i. Font Arial, size 12, Spacing 1.5
- ii. One-inch (2.54cm) top, bottom, right, and left margins
- iii. All text shall begin at the left-hand margin (no indents); Entire document shall be left justified
- iv. Interviewer's interventions in bold
Example : **I: How do you feel in those circumstances?**
R01: What do you mean? I don't understand?
- v. Header: identification of the interview, the interviewer, and the transcriber
Example : **INT01 SGA01**
- vi. Footnote: page numbers
Example : 1 of 20
- vii. Indicate the beginning and end of interview; double space should precede this information.
Example : ##### BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW #####
END OF THE INTERVIEW

B. LABELLING FOR INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW

- i. Transcript shall include the following labelling information left justified at the top of the document:

Participant ID: **R01**

Interviewee Category: Public governing agency/ Private Governing agency/Service Recipient /Public Security Actor /Private Security Actor

Department: Ministry xxx

Location: State

Date of Interview: dd/mm/year

Interviewer ID: **I**

Transcriber: **T1**

- ii. The transcriber shall insert a single blank line between the file labelling information and the actual interview transcription.
- iii. Source IDs shall begin with designation of type of respondents followed by the individual's two-digit identification number.

Example: SGA01 / PGA01/ SA01/NSA01

SGA = public governing agency / governor

NSGA= private governing agency / governor

SA = public security actor

NSA = private security actor

SR = service recipient of private security services

C. TRANSITION SCHEME

- i. Linear

Example: I: What is your opinion about nursing training on intervention in obesity?

R01: It is an area where, unfortunately, there is not so much training.

D. TYPE OF TRANSCRIPTION

i. Naturalized

Example: But in terms of motivation, really, and openness to change habits and do something that requires sacrifices (interruption – phone rings but the call is ignored) I’m sorry. Hum... Overall, they are not very motivated to do this (pause). They want (laughs gently)

E. CONTENT

i. Audiotapes shall be transcribed verbatim (i.e., recorded word for word, exactly as said), including any nonverbal or background sounds (e.g. laughter, sighs, coughs, claps, snaps fingers, pen clicking, and car horn).

ii. Nonverbal sounds shall be typed in parentheses, for example, (short sharp laugh), (group laughter), (police siren in background).

iii. Observed respondent’s behaviour during interview typed in parentheses

Example: This is the proof (showing document to interviewee)

iv. When interviewee emphasizes the speech, the statement is underlined.

Example: It indeed ends up being an epidemic (strong intonation / increased tone) both nationally and internationally

v. If interviewers or interviewees mispronounce words, these words transcribed with correct word shall be typed in parentheses, with slash placed.

Example: I thought that was pretty pacific (/specific/), but they disagreed.

vi. Imitated tone of any dialogue by interviewer or interviewee, placed within inverted commas.

Example: The officer actually asked , “ How would you do that?”

vii. The spelling of key words blended or compound words, common phrases, and identifiers shall be standardized across all transcripts.

Example: Enunciated reductions (e.g., betcha, cuz, 'em, gimme, gotta, hafta, kinda, lotta, oughta, sorta, wanna, coulda, could've, couldn't, coudn've, couldna, woulda, would've, wouldn't, wouldn've, wouldna, shoulda, should've, shouldn't, shouldn've, shouldna) plus standard contractions of is, am, are, had, have, would, and not shall be used.

viii. Filler words and interjections shall be transcribed.

Example: hm, huh, mm, mhm, uh huh, um, mkay, yeah, yuhuh, nah huh, ugh, whoa, uh oh, ah, and ahah

ix. Word or phrase repetitions shall be transcribed. If a word is cut off or truncated, a hyphen shall be inserted at the end of the last letter or audible sound.

Example: he wen- he went and did what I told him he shouldn've

x. Any pronounced words by interviewer or interviewee in dragged tone transcribed with two ellipses.

Example: Actually, the officer. tried to replace, but..

F. INAUDIBLE INFORMATION

i. The transcriber shall identify portions of the audiotape that are inaudible or difficult to decipher. If a relatively small segment of the tape (a word or short sentence) is partially unintelligible, the transcriber shall type the phrase "inaudible segment." This information shall appear in parentheses.

Example: The process of identifying missing words in an audiotaped interview of poor quality is (inaudible segment)

ii. If a lengthy segment of the tape is inaudible, unintelligible, or is "dead air" where no one is speaking, the transcriber shall record this information in parentheses. In addition, the transcriber shall provide a time estimate for information that could not be transcribed.

Example: (Inaudible: 2 minutes of interview missing)
Yes, exactly! Of course (unintelligible segment) are a third!

iii. When transcriber unsure about what the person is saying, the information recorded inside parentheses

*Example: It's not just a matter of facilitation, isn't it? And of
?(capacity)? but lack of knowledge!*

G. OVERLAPPING SPEECH

i. If individuals are speaking at the same time (i.e., overlapping speech) and it is not possible to distinguish what each person is saying, the transcriber shall place the phrase "cross talk" in parentheses immediately after the last identifiable speaker's text and pick up with the next audible speaker.

Example: (cross talk)/ (overlapping speech)

ii. Pauses If an individual pauses briefly between statements or trails off at the end of a statement, the transcriber shall use three ellipses. A brief pause is defined as a two-to five second break in speech.

Example: briefly loses...a train of thought or...

iii. If a substantial speech delay for more than five seconds, the transcriber shall use "long pause" in parentheses.

Example: (Long pause) other times, he or she is waiting for additional

H. CONFIDENTIALITY AND SENSITIVE ISSUES

i. If an individual uses his or her own name during the discussion, the transcriber shall replace this information with the appropriate interviewee identification label/ naming convention.

Example: Ana thinks that I don't know about the disease

- ii. Omitting or removing data/ information, replacing them with codes, changing words, or eliminating them

Example: (Removal of sensitive content / removal of personal statements)) thinks that I don't know

I. STORAGE OF RECORDINGS

- i. When the recordings were not being transcribed, the recordings stored in safe locked folder, with access to the interviewer only.

J. REVIEWING FOR ACCURACY

- i. The transcriber/proof-reader shall check (proofread) all transcriptions against the recordings and revise the transcript file accordingly.
- ii. Each recording is listened by interviewer to three times against the transcript before it is finalized.



APPENDIX 10

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT REVIEW

A Sample Request for Interview Transcript Review and Member Check

10/1/22, 2:41 PM
Mail - VIGNESWARY PRANAVA RASAHUGAN - Outlook

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT REVIEW AND MEMBER CHECK PROCEDURE

VIGNESWARY PRANAVA RASAHUGAN <vigneswary_p@gsgsg.uum.edu.my>
Sat 10/1/2022 2:41 PM

Good Day Madam,

First of all, I would like to thank you for contributing valuable insights for my research, **Private Security Governance in Malaysian Public Sector**, which helped me to progress to reporting stage. For your information, your inputs have been much quoted in my report (in pseudonym ID). Hence, I seek your assistance to briefly go through your contributions in my research and the way I interpreted those quotes according to my research objective. Thus, I have attached the interview transcripts inserted into report for your kind attention

(Note : full verbatim transcripts are used for analysis purpose, but it won't be attached to the final thesis, and will only be submitted to University and panel of reviewers upon request).

Please feel free to comment on any part of the report writing. The attached portion is a fraction of final draft, and your valuable feedback would be helpful in enhancing the final report. Your assistance in maintaining the confidentiality of this report is greatly appreciated.

Thank You

Sincerely,

Vigneswary Pranava Rasahugan
Matric 903889
Doctoral Student of Universiti Utara Malaysia
(Security Governance)
H/P : 010-5660722
Email : vigneswary.phd@gmail.com

Respondent	Verbatim Quotes in Report	Interpretation of related findings and responses
SGA 03	<i>Certified Security Guard yang ditempatkan di 14 premis ah latihan polis yang itu kerjasama KDN, PDRM dan juga PIKM, kita buat di Pulapol dan sekolah latihan SLKM, Sekolah Latihan, SLK, bawah PDRM juga la, Pusat Latihan PDRM di seluruh negara</i>	These actors are geographically dispersed especially in enforcement practices, and centralized in conducting trainings. In terms of functionalities, trainings are the most common functions majorly dictated by state governing agencies.
SGA 03	<i>" Tapi syarat utama sebelum ah ambil pengawal keselamatan majikan wajib satu dia kena pergi ke JPN untuk buat thumbprint, biometrik untuk pastikan warganegara , selepas lulus biometrik baru dia boleh apply untuk tapisan keselamatan, kebanyakan kes-kes tapisan keselamatan ah, kena ada segelintir yang melibatkan pengawal keselamatan haram ah, warganegara asing , haram maksudnya tanpa permit yang sah, ataupun dah, dah expired"</i>	The Compliance dimension rank as the third most mentioned by MOHA case respondents expose three major trends; (i) strict compliance methods, (ii) multiple compliance mechanism and (iii) centralized mechanism. Strict compliance observed majorly in compliance mechanisms conducted by state governing agencies and service recipients. State governing agencies impose strict compliance in licensing, security vetting and recruitment processes. Service recipients impose penalty for noncompliances. Soft compliance noticed in this case mainly revolved around non state governing agencies mechanism. Private security company compulsory registration to PIKM and security screening of PSG by PSC are considered done in as subtle way than the state governing agencies. The data sources for soft compliances are mostly obtained from private sector data sources.

APPENDIX 11

PROFILE OF CASE RESPONDENTS

Table 1

Profile of Interview Respondents (Public Security Actors)

Informant	Gender	Ethnicity	Department	Division	Level	Job Position	Location
SA 01	Male	Malay	CGSO	Putrajaya Federal Government Complexes Administrative	State	Operation	Putrajaya
SA 02	Male	Malay	MOHA	Prisons, Anti-Drug & Civil Volunteer	National	Director	Putrajaya
SA 03	Male	Malay	MOHA	Volunteers Department of Malaysia	National	Manager	Putrajaya
SA 04	Male	Malay	RMP	Crime Prevention & Community Safety	National	Assistant Manager	Kuala Lumpur

Table 2

Profile of Interview Respondents (Private Security Actors)

Informant	Gender	Ethnicity	Location	Job Position	Possession of License 2(A) PAA 1971
NSA 01	Male	Chinese	Kuala Lumpur	Director	Present
NSA 02	Male	Indian	Negeri Sembilan	Operation Manager	Present
NSA 03	Male	Malay	Selangor	General Manager	Present
NSA 04	Male	Indian	Selangor	Managing Director	Present
NSA 05	Male	Malay	Sarawak	Manager	Absent
NSA 06	Male	Indian	Kuala Lumpur	Director	Absent
NSA 07	Female	Malay	Selangor	CEO	Present
NSA 08	Male	Indian	Kuala Lumpur	Manager	Present
NSA 09	Male	Malay	Sarawak	Engineer	Absent
NSA 10	Male	Chinese	Sarawak	Senior Executive	Absent

Table 3
Profile of Interview Respondents (Public Governing Agencies)

Informant	Gender	Ethnicity	Job Position	Department	Division	Location	Level
SGA 01	Female	Malay	Top Management	CGSO	Deputy Office	Putrajaya	National
SGA 02	Male	Malay	Director	CGSO	Critical Infrastructure	Putrajaya	National
SGA 03	Male	Malay	Director	MOHA	Security & Public Order	Putrajaya	National
SGA 04	Male	Indian	State Legislative Member	MOHR	EXCO Health & Human Resource	Perak	State
SGA 05	Female	Malay	Director	ASEAN	APSC	Putrajaya	National
SGA 06	Male	Malay	Manager	MOHA	IPSOM	Putrajaya	National
SGA 07	Male	Malay	Director	CGSO	Physical & Technical Security	Putrajaya	National
SGA 08	Male	Malay	Asst Manager	RMP	Crime Prevention & Community Safety	Kuala Lumpur	National
SGA 09	Male	Malay	Manager	MOF	Government Procurement Policy	Putrajaya	National

Table 4

Profile of Interview Respondents (Private Governing Agencies)

Informant	Gender	Ethnicity	Job Position	Department	Level	Location
NSGA 01	Female	Malay	Vice President	PIKM	National	Kuala Lumpur
NSGA 02	Female	Malay	Zone Chairperson	PIKM	State	Perak
NSGA 03	Male	Malay	Manager	ASIS	Regional	South East Asia
NSGA 04	Male	Chinese	Chairman	ASIS	National	Kuala Lumpur
NSGA 05	Male	Malay	Manager	PIKM	National	Kuala Lumpur
NSGA 06	Male	Malay	Top Management	PIKM	National	Kuala Lumpur

Table 5

Profile of Interview Respondents (Service Recipients)

Informant	Gender	Ethnicity	Job Position	Department	Level	Location
SR 01	Male	Malay	HOD	MOE	National	Putrajaya
SR 02	Female	Malay	HOD	MOH	National	Putrajaya
SR 03	Female	Malay	Assistant Manager	MOH	National	Putrajaya
SR 04	Female	Malay	Manager	JPN (MOE)	State	Perak
SR 05	Male	Malay	Assistant Manager	KWP	State	Putrajaya
SR 06	Male	Indian	Manager	KetSA	State	Perak

APPENDIX 12

FIGURES OF CASE ANALYSIS

Figure 1
Private Security Functions in Public Sector




Figure 2
Themes generated for private security governance by CGSO




Figure 3

Themes generated for private security governance by Ministry of Home Affairs





Figure 4

Emerging themes from case of Ministry of Home Affairs



THEME PIKM		DIMENSION / THEMES
		ACTOR AGENDA AUTHORITY COMPLIANCE COOPERATION INTEREST LEG... NORM RESOURCE
GEOGRAPHY		
MULTIPLE ACTOR, PLU..		
DIVERGED PURPOSE		
STATE CENTRIC		
FRAGMENTED		
NSGA AUTHORITY		
STATE AUTHORITY		
CONTROL		
PENALTY		
STRICT COMPLIANCE		
FORMAL		
INFORMAL		
OVERLAP		
CONFLICTING INTEREST		
INTEREST ALIGNMENT		
ACCEPTANCE		
CODE OF CONDUCT		
COMMITTED		
COURAGE		
EXCELLENCY		
HONESTY		
INTEGRITY		
PROFESSIONALISM		
PUBLIC SECTOR SECUR..		
TRANSPARENCY		
VALUE FOR MONEY		
CENTRALIZED		
RECRUITMENT		
TYPE		

[illegible]

Figure 7
Emerging themes of challenges associated to private security governance



Figure 8
Challenges dimensions coded by respondent's category




Figure 9

Recommendations on private security governance by respondent's category




Figure 10

Emerging themes for future private security governance in public sector



Figure 11

Response from Chief Registrar Federal Court on Private Security Guards statistics

REQUEST FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASE STATISTICS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS IN MALAYSIA

You forwarded this message on Wed 6/9/2021 2:32 PM

Translate message to: English | Never translate from: Malay

BK Bahagian Komunikasi Korporat <komunikasikorporat@kehakiman.gov.my>
To: VIGNESWARY PRANAVA RASAHUGAN
C: Ahmad Terrudin Bin Mohd Salleh <terrudin@kehakiman.gov.my>; Azhaniz Teh bin Azman Teh <azhaniz@kehakiman.gov.my> +1 other

Tue 6/8/2021 4:08 PM


PEJABAT KETUA PENDAFTAR
Office of the Chief Registrar
MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA
Federal Court of Malaysia

ISTANA KEHAKIMAN
PREINT 3
62506 PUTRAJAYA
Laman Web: <http://www.kehakiman.gov.my>
Telefon: 03-89873130
Faksimili: 03-89873130

Tuan,

Dengan segala hormatnya Bahagian ini telah diarahkan oleh YBrs. Tuan Ketua Pendaftar Mahkamah Persekutuan Malaysia untuk merujuk kepada perkara di atas.

2. Bahagian ini mengambil maklum akan permohonan tuan untuk mendapatkan statistik-statistik tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, setelah semakan dibuat dengan Bahagian Pembangunan Strategik dan Latihan Pejabat Ketua Pendaftar Mahkamah Persekutuan Malaysia, dukacita dimaklumkan bahawa statistik kes sivil dan jenayah berkenaan *Private Security Guards/ Security Companies* seperti dipohon tiada dalam simpanan.

3. Segala kesulitan adalah amat dikesali dan selamat maju jaya diucapkan.

Sekian, terima kasih.

"PRIHATIN RAKYAT: DARURAT MEMERANGI COVID-19"

"BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA"

tt

BAHAGIAN KOMUNIKASI KORPORAT
Pejabat Ketua Pendaftar
Mahkamah Persekutuan Malaysia
Istana Kehakiman
62506, PUTRAJAYA

...

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Figure 12
Complaint Statistics for Sub Sector of Private Security
(Source: Ministry of Human Resource Malaysia)




Figure 13
Crime Associated to Private Security (*Kategori Jenayah Kekerasan*)
(Source: Royal Malaysian Police)




Figure 14
 Crime Associated to Private Security (*Kategori Jenayah Harta Benda*)
 (Source: Royal Malaysian Police)

