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EXPLORING CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICING REFORMS IN PAKISTAN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS

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Universiti Utara Malaysia

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
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2026

EXPLORING CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICING REFORMS IN PAKSITAN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS

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Thesis Submitted to Ghazali Shafie Graduated School of Government,
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ABSTRAK

Walaupun pelbagai inisiatif pembaharuan telah diperkenalkan, pelaksanaan reformasi polis di Pakistan masih berhadapan dengan cabaran yang berterusan. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menilai secara kritikal dasar-dasar reformasi polis di Pakistan, khususnya Police Order 2002, bagi mengenal pasti faktor-faktor yang menghalang pelaksanaannya serta mencadangkan langkah-langkah bagi meningkatkan prestasi dan imej institusi polis. Kajian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif melalui analisis fenomenologi interpretatif untuk memahami pengalaman dan persepsi kepimpinan tertinggi pasukan polis. Pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui analisis dokumen dasar yang berkaitan serta temu bual mendalam dengan sepuluh orang Inspector General of Police yang pernah atau sedang memegang jawatan kepimpinan utama dalam pentadbiran polis Pakistan. Fokus kajian adalah terhadap cabaran politik, birokrasi, dan institusi yang mempengaruhi pelaksanaan reformasi dari semasa ke semasa. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa campur tangan politik dan kekurangan autonomi operasi merupakan halangan utama kepada keberkesanan reformasi polis. Pindaan berulang terhadap Police Order 2002, yang didorong oleh kepentingan politik, telah melemahkan kerangka asal reformasi tersebut dalam tempoh yang singkat selepas penguatkuasaannya. Selain itu, kajian ini mendapati bahawa kelemahan kepimpinan polis, tentangan birokrasi, amalan rasuah yang berakar umbi, mekanisme akauntabiliti yang lemah, serta keadaan kerja yang tidak memuaskan turut menyumbang kepada kegagalan pelaksanaan reformasi. Amalan kepolisan yang lapuk serta kewujudan sistem tidak formal seperti "buddy system" dikenal pasti sebagai faktor yang menjejaskan profesionalisme dan ketelusan organisasi. Berdasarkan dapatan tersebut, kajian ini mencadangkan pelaksanaan Police Order 2002 secara menyeluruh dan selaras dengan semangat asalnya, penubuhan dan pengukuhan Public Safety Commissions, serta pemansuhan pindaan yang dibuat antara tahun 2004dan 2008. Kajian ini juga mengesyorkan penetapan tempoh minimum perkhidmatan selama tiga tahun bagi IGP serta pengembalian status IGP sebagai setiausaha kerajaan bagi memastikan kebebasan kewangan dan operasi. Secara keseluruhan, kajian ini menyumbang kepada pemahaman yang lebih mendalam mengenai halangan institusi, politik dan sosio-budaya dalam reformasi kepolisan serta menyediakan cadangan dasar untuk meningkatkan prestasi dan kepercayaan awam terhadap polis di Pakistan.

Kata Kunci: Reformasi Kepolisan, Institusi, Police Order 2002, Pegawai Polis Kanan, Halangan Dalam Pelaksanaan

ABSTRACT

Despite repeated reform initiatives, the effective implementation of policing reforms in Pakistan remained a persistent challenge. This study critically evaluates police reform policies in Pakistan, with particular reference to the Police Order 2002, aiming to identify factors that have hindered its implementation and to propose measures for improving the performance and public image of the police institution. The study adopts a qualitative methodological approach, employing interpretative phenomenological analysis to explore lived experiences and perceptions of senior police leadership. Data were collected through an extensive review of relevant policy documents and in-depth interviews with ten former and serving Inspectors General of Police who have held key command positions within the police hierarchy. The study focuses on political, bureaucratic, and institutional constraints that have shaped the reform trajectory over time. The findings reveal that political interference and the absence of operational autonomy remain the most significant obstacles to sustainable reform. Frequent amendments to the Police Order 2002, driven largely by political considerations, weakened the original intent of the reform framework within a short period after its promulgation. The study further identifies weaknesses in police leadership, bureaucratic resistance, entrenched corrupt practices, ineffective accountability mechanisms, and poor working conditions as major contributors to reform failure. Outdated policing practices and the prevalence of informal networks, particularly the "buddy system," were also found to undermine merit-based decision-making and institutional professionalism. These structural and cultural challenges collectively impede the development of a service-oriented and accountable police force. Based on these findings, the study recommends enforcing the Police Order 2002 in its true letter and spirit, establishing and strengthening of Public Safety Commissions, and withdrawing of amendments introduced between 2004 and 2008. It further proposes a minimum three-year tenure for the Inspector General of Police and the restoration of the IGP's status as Secretary to the Government to ensure financial and operational independence. Overall, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of the political, institutional, and socio-cultural barriers to police reform and offers policy-relevant recommendations to enhance police performance and public trust in Pakistan.

Keywords: Policing Reforms, Institutional, Police Order 2002, Senior Police Officers, and Implementation Barriers

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IG	Inspector General of Police
DIG	Deputy Inspector General of Police
DM	District Magistrate
CM	Chief Minister
CS	Chief Secretary
RPO	Regional Police Officer
SP	Superintendent of Police
DSP	Deputy Superintendent of Police
ASP	Assistant Superintendent of Polie
NRB	National Reconstruction Bureau
SHO	Station House Officer
DMG	District Management Group
ACR	Annual Confidential Report
NPMB	National Police Management Board
NPB	National Police Bureau
PPO	Provincial Police Officer
SHO	Station House Officer

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This study seeks to explore the challenges in the execution of policing reforms in Pakistan by exploring perceptions and lived experiences of senior police officers. Pakistan was saddled with police forces that were born out of the colonial era and developed in the context of industrialized Europe. A thorough understanding of police reform and the challenges in the implementation needed to establish the reasons for the dynamism observed in police administration. This field has suffered from a lack of adequate information, data, and statistics, which has resulted in a limited knowledge base. In 2002, under the patronage of the then Government, a commission comprising of police officers, attempted to reform the force to improve public safety. However, it has not yet been exposed to the light of day. In Pakistan, the need for police reform is widely recognized, particularly considering the government's role in the administration of justice. A strong political will, bureaucratic support, and a citizen-centric approach are all required for police reform in Pakistan to be successful. The goal is to transmute the police force into a modern, proactive, and accountable law administration agency.

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It is anticipated that the knowledge generated from this study generated new insights and will help the policy makers to understand the challenges in the implementation of police reforms and suggest strategies to address those challenges. To be more precise and helpful for the audience, chapter number one commences with short introduction, followed by the background of the study and then a short introduction of Police Order 2002 presented. Prior to the presentation of scope and significance of the study, statement of the problem and methodology was discussed.

1.2 Background of the Study

Police reform has remained one of Pakistan's most persistent governance challenges since independence in 1947. Despite repeated reform efforts, the policing system continues to exhibit characteristics of its colonial origins, centralized command structures, politicized control, weak accountability, and limited community responsiveness. Contemporary scholarship increasingly argues that Pakistan's policing challenges are not simply operational (e.g., insufficient resources or outdated training) but are deeply institutional and structural, embedded in the legacy of the colonial Police Act of 1861, which prioritized regime security over citizen security (ICG, 2018; Siddiqui, 2020). This historical path dependency has produced institutional inertia where reforms introduced repeatedly but seldom implemented meaningfully.

While successive governments have acknowledged declining public trust, outdated investigative practices, resource shortages, and rising crime complexity (Sarfraz, 2018; Minhas et al., 2019), academic literature shows that reform attempts in Pakistan have largely oscillated between ad hoc managerial fixes and politically driven restructurings,

rather than sustainable institutional transformation (Abbas, 2019; Sadiq & Sohail, 2021). Reform commissions since 1951 have produced hundreds of recommendations, yet empirical studies highlight a persistent pattern of policy-practice divergence, where reforms framed at federal or provincial levels are diluted, selectively adopted, or reversed during implementation (Rizvi, 2017; Ahmed, 2020). This mismatch not only undermines reform credibility but perpetuates a cycle of weak institutional performance.

A critical examination of the post-2000 era reveals the same trajectory. The Police Order 2002 widely recognized as Pakistan's most comprehensive modern reform intended to depoliticize policing, establish public oversight bodies, and strengthen accountability mechanisms (Frankham et al., 2002; Kiet, 2021). The Police Order 2002 was officially implemented on August 14, 2002, which broadly addressed matters such as responsibilities of police officers, public safety commissions, police complaints authorities, criminal justice coordination committee, regulation, control, and discipline of police, powers to issue orders, special measures for maintaining public order and security, police responsibilities regarding unclaimed property, offences and punishments, and national police management board(Frankham et al., 2002a).

However, multiple scholars argue that its implementation remained inconsistent due to political resistance, bureaucratic rivalries, misalignment between federal and provincial authorities, and lack of administrative ownership (ICG, 2018; Javed, 2022). Provincial amendments after 2008 effectively re-centralized political control and weakened the very oversight and professionalism that the act sought to institutionalize. The resulting fragmentation has created a complex implementation landscape characterized by

institutional ambiguity, contested authority, and persistent political interference (Shah, 2021).

Recent research further demonstrates that the challenges are multidimensional. At the organizational level, outdated procedures, inadequate training curricula, weak supervisory capacity, and unintegrated information systems continue to obstruct reform uptake (Soomro & Verma, 2020). At the governance level, accountability bodies remain either non-functional or politically co-opted, creating little incentive for behavioral change (Sadiq et al., 2020).

At the institutional level, informal norms such as "sifarish" patronage networks, and political postings override formal rules and undermine professional autonomy (Hassan, 2022). These findings align with new institutionalism, which posits that formal reforms often fail when they conflict with entrenched informal norms, organizational cultures, and power structures. Thus, reforms in Pakistan cannot be understood merely as legal or administrative interventions. They represent contested institutional processes shaped by interests, incentives, and power dynamics.

This is where the core research problem emerges. Although Pakistan has a long history of police reform initiatives, there is limited empirical research that examines how senior police officers themselves perceive and experience the implementation of these reforms, why reforms fail to translate into practice, and how institutional constraints shape reform outcomes. Much of the existing literature remains descriptive, policy oriented, or legalistic, with insufficient focus on the lived experiences of police leadership and the

micro-level dynamics of implementation. This creates a critical gap in understanding the phenomenology of reform implementation how officers interpret policies, navigate political pressures, and make sense of institutional contradictions in their day-to-day responsibilities.

Therefore, a rigorous, qualitative, phenomenological inquiry is essential to surface the deeper institutional, political, and governance barriers that continually undermine policing reforms in Pakistan. By engaging senior police officers lived experiences, this study contributes to both theoretical debates on institutional change and practical discussions on reform implementation.

1.3 Statement of the problem

Police reform has remained a recurring governance concern in Pakistan, where successive governments have attempted to restructure policing through legal amendments, administrative reforms, and institutional strengthening. Despite more than two dozen commissions and committees established since independence, each mandated to modernize, depoliticize, and professionalize policing. These reform efforts have largely failed to materialize into substantive and sustained change (Soomro, 2020; Ahmed, 2021). Although the enactment of the Police Order 2002 repealed the colonial Police Act 1861 and was widely regarded as a paradigm shift toward democratic accountability, operational autonomy, and public-oriented policing, its implementation diverged sharply from its legislative intent. Over time, political amendments diluted provisions related to autonomy, public oversight, and accountability, thereby undermining the reform's transformative potential (Khan & Khan, 2020; Kalia, 2013; Javed, 2022). This persistent

gap between policy design and actual implementation continues to challenge policing effectiveness and public trust in Pakistan.

Existing literature provides extensive historical and policy-oriented accounts of police reforms, but recent scholarly work emphasizes that much of this research remains normative and legalistic, focusing on what policing should be rather than empirically examining why reforms repeatedly fail in practice (Sadiq & Sohail, 2021; Siddiqui, 2020; ICG, 2018). Contemporary studies highlight issues such as political interference, weak accountability mechanisms, and institutional resistance, yet there remains a notable absence of empirical inquiry into how the key implementer senior police officers interpret, experience, and navigate reform processes on the ground. The limited availability of qualitative or phenomenological studies restricts a deeper understanding of the micro level, lived realities shaping reform implementation within police organizations (Hassan, 2022; Abbas, 2019). This evidences a clear empirical gap in the literature.

A second gap emerges at the theoretical level. While scholars have examined colonial legacies, organizational weaknesses, and governance constraints, few studies employ an explicit institutional or new institutionalist framework to explain why reforms fail despite policy advancements. Theoretical accounts of reform implementation failure, such as institutional isomorphism, informal norms, and political-bureaucratic contestations remain underdeveloped in the context of Pakistan's policing system (Jalal, 2021; Shah, 2021). Consequently, there is limited theoretical integration that explains how formal reforms interact with informal power structures and entrenched institutional cultures during implementation.

The third gap is contextual. Most existing research examines police reform at a macro or legislative level, offering broad assessments of reform agendas but overlooking how regional disparities, political dynamics, bureaucratic hierarchies, and operational-level constraints shape reform outcomes. The absence of regionally grounded and context sensitive empirical evidence limits policy makers' ability to design actionable and realistic reform strategies suited to Pakistan's diverse provincial and district contexts (Minhas et al., 2019; UNODC, 2021).

These empirical, theoretical, and contextual gaps demonstrate the need for a focused, rigorous, and experience-based examination of policing reforms in Pakistan. Exploring and understanding the perceptions and lived experiences of senior police officers is essential to uncover how political, bureaucratic, and institutional pressures shape the everyday realities of reform implementation. Addressing this gap is critical not only for strengthening police governance and restoring public trust within Pakistan but also for contributing to broader debates on reform implementation, accountability, and institutional change in developing democracies. This study therefore aims to provide an empirically grounded and theoretically informed analysis of policing reform implementation, offering insights that hold relevance for comparative policy learning across South Asia and other emerging governance contexts.

1.4 Objectives of the research

The aim of this research is to evaluate the existing police reform policies in Pakistan in order to identify factors, which contribute to the hindrance of Police Order 2002 and

recommend changes needed to improve the image and performance of police department in Pakistan.

In particular, this research sets out to achieve following objectives:

1. To assess the major reform policies introduced by the government to improve police image and performance and to evaluate the extent to which reforms achieved their stated objectives.
2. To explore the perceptions and lived experiences of senior police officers regarding the current image and performance of police in Pakistan.
3. To examine the political, bureaucratic and institutional factors that hinder the effective implementation of police reforms from the perspective of senior police officers.
4. To identify changes that may improve police image and performance in Pakistan.

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1.5 Research questions

To answer the research objectives, this study sets the following research questions:

1. What major police reform initiatives have been introduced by the government of Pakistan to improve police image and performance and to what extent have these reforms achieved their intended outcomes?
2. How do senior police officers perceive the current image and performance of police in Pakistan?
3. What political, bureaucratic and institutional factors do senior police officers identify as hindrance to effective police reform implementation in Pakistan?

4. What changes do senior police officers suggest to improve police image and performance in Pakistan?

1.6 Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in its contribution to understanding one of Pakistan's most persistent governance dilemmas: the repeated failure of police reform initiatives to produce meaningful improvements in police performance, accountability, and public trust. Despite successive reform efforts including the widely celebrated Police Order 2002, the policing system continues to be affected by political interference, weak accountability structures, resource limitations, and entrenched institutional norms.

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Existing literature provides extensive historical and policy level analysis, but offers limited empirical insight into how reforms are understood, interpreted, and experienced by senior police officers, who occupy a critical position between policy formulation and operational execution. Through an interpretative phenomenological approach, this study addresses a major empirical gap by foregrounding the lived experiences, perceptions, and sense making of senior police officers. Theoretically, the study advances the literature by applying institutional and new institutionalist perspectives to explain how formal reform designs are reshaped by informal practices, organisational cultures, and power relations. It offers a deeper and contextually grounded understanding of reform implementation failure in postcolonial governance systems.

In addition to its theoretical relevance, the study carries significant practical and managerial implications. For policymakers, legislators, and oversight bodies, the findings provide evidence-based insights into the political, bureaucratic, and institutional barriers that undermine the effective implementation of police reforms, thereby supporting the development of more realistic, context sensitive, and sustainable reform strategies. The study highlights specific deficiencies within oversight mechanisms, organisational structures, and administrative processes that hinder reform outcomes, offering guidance for strengthening police accountability, transparency, and public legitimacy. At the managerial and operational level, the research sheds light on internal challenges related to leadership, training, resource allocation, performance management, and organisational culture. These insights can inform reforms in training curricula, leadership development, and internal accountability systems, thereby enhancing the overall capacity and responsiveness of the police force. By integrating historical context, institutional analysis, and officers lived experiences, this study not only fills important gaps in the academic literature but also produces practical recommendations with wider implications for policing reform across developing and transitional democracies

1.7 Scope of the Study

This study delimited to examining the challenges associated with the implementation of police reforms introduced under the Police Order 2002, with a specific focus on how these reforms are interpreted, experienced, and enacted by senior police officers in Pakistan. The inquiry is restricted to officers of the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) and above, as these officials hold strategic administrative and operational responsibilities and are directly involved in policy formulation, organisational leadership,

and the execution of reform initiatives. Their seniority and institutional position provide them with the depth of experience necessary to reflect on long-term reform trajectories, institutional barriers, and governance-related constraints.

Geographically, the study covers senior police officers serving in key provinces and federal level policing institutions within Pakistan, including Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Islamabad Capital Territory Police, and the National Police Bureau (NPB). These jurisdictions were selected because they represent the primary administrative and operational units responsible for implementing the Police Order 2002 and its subsequent amendments. The study does not extend to regional or specialised law enforcement agencies such as the Frontier Corps, Rangers, Anti-Narcotics Force, Levies, or private security organisations, as their mandates fall outside the scope of the Police Order 2002 and differ significantly in organisational structure and governance. The geographic focus is therefore national in scope but institutionally bounded to mainstream provincial and federal policing structures.

Methodologically, the study employs a qualitative research design using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to explore the lived experiences and meaning-making of senior police officers. This approach limits the study to in-depth, experiential insights rather than statistical generalisation. The temporal scope is confined to the period from the introduction of Police Order 2002 to the present, capturing the evolution of implementation challenges across two decades of reform attempts. The study does not evaluate crime rates, operational performance indicators, or citizen perceptions unless referenced by participants to contextualise their experiences. Similarly, the analysis does

not include comparative international reform models except where they emerge naturally in participants' narratives.

Within these defined boundaries, the study aims to generate contextually grounded knowledge that enhances understanding of the institutional, bureaucratic, and political dynamics shaping police reform implementation in Pakistan. The findings are intended to inform policymakers, police leadership, reform practitioners, and researchers engaged in strengthening governance and public sector reforms

1.8 Definition of Keys and Terms

1.8.1 Police Reform

Police reform refers to the deliberate and structured effort of any government to improve the organization, performance, accountability and service delivery of the police. It includes legislative changes, administrative redesigning and restructuring, innovations in service delivery mechanisms and reshaping the organizational culture aimed at enhancing the public trust and improved professional policing. In this study setting police reforms refer to the Police Order 2002 and all reforms initiatives taken by the government since independence of Pakistan.

1.8.2 Reform Implementation

It refers to a process through which a reform policy, law or administrative change is put into the practice within the organization. It involves translation of reform objectives into actions, procedures, institutional practices and behavioral changes. In this study reform

implementation denotes the extent to which Police Order 2002 was operationalized across the organizational, structural and governance dimensions.

1.8.3 Institutional Constraints

This refers to the bureaucratic, political, legal and administrative pressures limiting or shaping the behavior of police organization to act or not to act in a certain manner. In this study, it refers to the forces that hinders the police ability to adopt and sustain reforms.

1.8.4 Colonial Legacy

Colonial legacy refers to the historical structures, laws and procedures of policing which were inherited from the British Colonial era, particularly the 1861 Police Act. In this study colonial legacy refers to the traditional path dependency shaping contemporary policing.

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1.8.5 Lived Experiences

Lived experiences refers to the subjective interpretations, meanings and reflections of police officers in dealing with police reforms. In this study setting lived experiences refers to the understanding of the senior police officers to their lived realities of dealing with reforms, and how they shaped their meanings out of their experiences.

1.8.6 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)

IPA is a qualitative methodological approach focused on exploring how individuals interpret and make sense of their personal and professional experience. In this study IPA

guides the interpretation of officer's subjective perceptions of reform implementation challenges.

1.8.7 Police Image and Performance

Police image refers to the public perception, trust and reputation of the police as an institution in the eyes of the public, whereas performance means operational effectiveness, service delivery quality, crime prevention and responsiveness of the police. In this study both terms denote how reforms influence public trust and professional outcomes.

1.9 Organization of thesis

This thesis was organized on following lines, and it has following sections.

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Chapter One

Chapter one starts with the introduction of the topic followed by its background and the statement of the problem. Then the research objectives and research questions are offered. Finally, chapter ends with brief elaboration of methodology and organization of thesis.

Chapter Two

Though a brief literature was presented in the introductory chapter, a detailed and comprehensive literature was reviewed in chapter two. Relevant literatures on reform, administrative reform, police reform, and institutional theory has been discussed. This chapter also elaborates, how police administration changed from ancient times to the present day. It talks about the features, structures, and traits of policing in the pre-colonial,

British, and Pakistani periods. In addition, the theoretical background also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter Three

Chapter three of this study provides a comprehensive overview of the research methodology employed to investigate police reforms through the lens of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). It details the theoretical and philosophical foundations of IPA, including its roots in phenomenology, hermeneutics, and idiography, which underpin its focus on understanding individuals' lived experiences and subjective interpretations

Chapter Four

Chapter four presents the research methods utilized in this study to investigate police reforms using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). This chapter outlines the procedural aspects of the research, including the selection criteria for participants and the analytical techniques employed. It details how senior police officers were chosen as participants, the process of conducting in-depth interviews to capture their personal experiences and perceptions, and the steps taken to ensure the validity and reliability of the data.

Chapter Five

Chapter five explores the context of police reforms in Pakistan, focusing on the various reforms and commissions established since the country's independence. This chapter

provides a detailed account of the evolution of policing policies and practices over the decades, highlighting key reforms and the recommendations made by different commissions. It examines the political, social, and institutional factors that influenced these reforms, offering insight into how past efforts have shaped the current landscape of policing in Pakistan. By tracing the context of these initiatives, Chapter five sets the stage for understanding the challenges and progress in the implementation of police reforms and provides a foundational context for the study's focus on contemporary reform issues.

Chapter Six

Chapter six examines the challenges encountered in the implementation of police reforms, specifically from the perspective of senior police officers. This chapter presents a detailed narrative of the difficulties and obstacles faced by these officers as they navigate the reform process. It explores issues such as resistance to change, institutional constraints, resource limitations, and the impact of organizational culture on reform efforts. The lived experiences of the senior officers provides valuable insights into the practical and systemic barriers that affect the successful implementation of police reforms, offering a nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in driving change within the police force.

Chapter Seven

This chapter comprises of summary of the findings, recommendations to improve police image and need for the future research.

The last part of the thesis is bibliography and the annexures.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter critically reviews the existing scholarship on police reforms, public sector reform, institutional dynamics, and policing governance, with a particular focus on Pakistan. Unlike traditional descriptive accounts of policing history, this chapter adopts an analytical approach that situates the reform discourse within broader theoretical frameworks, including Institutionalism, New Institutionalism, and democratic governance. The review synthesizes global and local studies, highlights major debates, critiques methodological limitations in existing research, and identifies empirical, theoretical, and contextual gaps that this study seeks to address. The chapter concludes by linking the literature to the research problem and justifying the need for an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to explore senior police officers' lived experiences.

Pakistan had faced enormous challenges to transform the police into a people friendly and modern force like many other countries which remained a British colony. It becomes even more important for Pakistan as country, because it is in the pursuit of strengthening democracy and the rule of law (Grare, 2010a).

Plenty of literature is available on policing and its different contexts. In the majority of studies available, the researchers have discussed historical background (Kalia, 2013), structure of policing (Mastrofski & Willis, 2010a) comparative police system (de Maillard & Savage, 2012a), criminal justice system (McCulloch, 1993a), corruption and police reforms initiatives (Morgan et al., 2017a). However limited number of empirical works are available on the challenges to the implementation of policing reforms. In the proceeding chapter the existing literature on police administration and reforms have been scrutinized to define the gaps and identify the research questions with reference to challenges in the implementation of policing reforms in Pakistan. This chapter starts with the definition of reforms followed by discussion on public sector reform and varying trends of public sector reforms globally. Further, in this chapter, history of police reform in the subcontinent has been discussed thoroughly and finally theoretical lens to the implementation of reforms have been deployed.

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2.2 Key Concepts:

2.2.1 Reform

Reform is a multifaceted concept, and it is treated as noun. It also used to define changes in policy, practice, or organizations, and as a verb, "reform" refers to intended or enacted attempts to correct an identified problem (UNDP, 2004a).

Change and "Reform" are commonly used as an alternative by researchers and academicians. Few other related notions that are in practice includes "modernization", "reinvention", "reorganization", "renewal" and "innovation" (Kauzya & Balogun, 2005).

The widely accepted term "reform" means any deliberate or planned effort to bring change in any segment of administration or in the entire public sector. Yet many of the reform efforts failed to achieve desired objectives as it usually faces resistance from within the machinery of government or bureaucracy.

2.2.2 Organizational Reform

Organizational reform is a deliberate effort to restructure or reinvent the administrative structures and functions of the organization. Different scholars have defined the phenomenon of administrative reforms and diverse names attributed to this, such as reengineering, restructuring, reinventing, organizational change, administrative transformation and innovation.

Caiden was the pioneer scholar who had identified the divergence on the notion of administrative reforms among his contemporary scholars during 1960's. He was of the view that there is no universally accepted definition of the phenomenon; however, it can be applied to betterment in any of the section of the organization ranging from administrative improvement to unique solutions for specific malpractices in the administration (Caiden, 1968a). He sees reforms as a willful lure against the opposing forces, which resist the change in organization.

Administrative Reform, comprises of three interconnected properties: moral purpose, artificial transformation and administrative resistance (Caiden, 1968b). Administrative reform refers to change of broad scope and intensity in the governmental organization (Maheshwari, 1974). The organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) identified different pedals of reform i.e open government, performance budgeting and management, modernizing accountability and control systems, restructuring organizations and reallocation using market-type mechanisms for service and changing public employment (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003a).

Reforms are surely well thought out, critically examined and deliberate effort with clear objectives and goals and hence cannot happen on its own. The change is persuaded and incorporated diligently as it requires commitment, persuasion and a pledge to the improvement of systems and structures. Reforms are lot more than sequential escalation or slight amendments rather it is the ultimate commitment and effort which in totality generates the result. Administrative reform sets the tone of the organization to move in a new direction (Rouse, 2021).

Peter Aucoin was of the view that reforms cannot be implemented unless government learn from the mistakes it did in the past reform programs. He has also elaborated some prerequisites to make reforms successful, i.e will of the politicians, availability of resources, institutional support and a clear strategy. Other accompanying factors are establishment of new institutions, legislation, recruitment of new and fresh human resource and changing the organizational structure and procedure. The fruits of such reforms can only be embedded with a change in the culture and innovation (AUCOIN, 1990).

2.2.3 The need for reforms

Nothing is permanent. The best of today could be useless in tomorrow. To cope up with modern trends and meet the pace of the time, society must change accordingly. Similar is the case with the organizations whether public or private. Throughout the world, the structure and organization of governmental apparatuses need redesign, and the behavioral patterns of public servants as well require modification to meet the ever-changing demand of the society. Public sector organizations have certain limitations according to Caiden. Three of them are most prominent. Firstly, human institutions are not perfect, secondly the big public sector entities are conventional in nature and lastly, they are very lethargic to seek innovations (Metcalfe, 1993a). Administrative reform in public administration relies on these characteristics, which highlight the importance of carrying out key organizational reform actions in a suitable and appropriate manner in order to increase public service provision, administer greater liability for public servants to political leaders in power, and improve citizen access to public offices (Excellence, 2013).

As elaborated by Riggs administrative reform must deal with the "problem of dynamic balancing". The political environment, its institutional dynamics and process, not only play a role in the process of determining national goals, priorities, or choosing between competing values and allocating resources, but also in the process of developing the most effective instrument for translating these policies into successful programme realities. This is because public administration functions within a political context. As a result, the public administration's fundamental character, content, and style of functioning are greatly influenced by the political environment. In addition to this, developments in information and communication technology (ICT) as well as the pervasive role that the state plays in

managing national assets and resources, controlling the entire economy through regulation and development, ensuring a just and equitable economic order, correcting age-old social imbalances through newer forms of institution-making, and ushering in a democratic social system have thrown up new tasks for administration (Riggs, 1970a).

2.2.4 Obstacles to Reform Efforts

The dichotomy is that the countries which are most in need of administrative reform are the unable to apply it. The capacity to implement such reforms with thorough public management and elimination of ill practices of administration is generally lacking which eventually results in the form of poor management and bad governance.(Metcalfe, 1993b). Every possible hurdle is expected in public organizations against the reform efforts. Moreover, the prevailing conditions usually tends to be unfavorable. Gerald E Caiden in his book Administrative Reforms has mentioned seven widespread impediments to reforms. They include history, economy, society, geography, polity, technology, and cultural diversity (Caiden, 1968b). Fact of the matter is that the biggest hurdle to reform the organization is the organizational machinery itself as it does want to lose the control and maintains status quo and hence serves as anti-change agents.

This problem is more evident in the developing counties where public institutions lack in leadership and people are working for vested interests usually. Once the Prime minister of India had elaborated the situation of his public bureaucracy in December 1985 in following words: -

"We have government servants who do not serve but oppress the poor and the helpless who do not uphold the law, but connive with those who cheat the state and whole legions whose only concern is their private welfare at the cost of society. They have no work ethic, no feelings for the public cause, no involvement in the future of the nation, no comprehension of national goals, and no commitments to the values of modern India. They have only a grasping mercenary outlook, devoid of competence, integrity and commitment"

Apparently, the implementation of reforms is one of the main problems in almost all the developing countries including Pakistan in revamping the institutions. Furthermore, a discussion about public sector reforms and its trends around the globe will help in understanding the prevailing context of reforms in Pakistan.

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2.3 Public sector reform

Public sector reform has been a central theme in governance studies, often framed as an attempt to modernise administrative structures, enhance service delivery, and increase accountability. Foundational works by Caiden (1991), Polidano (2001), and Osborne and Gaebler (1992) conceptualise reforms as deliberate interventions in bureaucratic systems. However, contemporary scholarship criticises these early models for assuming that reform failure stems primarily from poor design rather than deeper institutional constraints (Andrews, 2020; Fukuyama, 2018).

Recent governance literature emphasises that reforms in developing and postcolonial states are profoundly shaped by informal norms, political incentives, patronage networks, and institutional legacies (Joshi & Carter, 2020). Reforms that challenge entrenched power structures tend to face resistance not because they are technically flawed, but because they threaten institutionalised interests (Mahoney & Thelen, 2020). This insight is crucial for understanding policing reforms in Pakistan, where the Police Order 2002 was technically progressive yet undermined by political, bureaucratic, and institutional dynamics.

Thus, public sector reform research must move beyond descriptive policy narratives toward theoretical explanations grounded in institutional and political economy perspectives. This study adopts such a framework to analyse police reform implementation.

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As the global recession continues to tighten its grip and change economies throughout the world, public administrators are rising to the challenge of finding novel ways to safeguard vital public service delivery frameworks and cushion the public sector reform process in the face of severe budget cuts.

There has been a lot of discussion on what constitutes "public sector reform" and how it should be implemented. According to a report published in 2006 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, "public sector reform" involves making changes to the systems and procedures of government agencies with the aim of making them more efficient (Saxena, 2013). Merging or severing public sector institutions is one example of

a structural change, whereas rethinking systems, establishing quality standards, and emphasizing capacity-building are examples of a process change (Bovis & Hu, 2017a). Governments everywhere must strike a balance between spending and outcomes to provide effective service to their citizens. More and more people are paying attention to how their government runs on all scales because they see public administration as just another facet of national activity and so hold it to the same standards as any other. Public administrations are embracing transformation in order to meet citizen aspirations and function within current financial restrictions (Tria & Valotti, 2012a).

2.4 Trends in Public Sector Reforms

Public sector reform witnessed many facets and eras, following are some trends in public sector reforms globally:

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2.4.1 Structural Reforms

States in Asia and Africa that were experiencing economic crises in the 1980s undertook Structural Adjustment Programmes as part of the Structural Reform wave. These programmes sought to address the macroeconomic and fiscal components of these states' economies. These reforms were backed by the IMF and the World Bank in an effort to cut back on the astronomical costs incurred by the government as a result of a bloated workforce that was suffocating on corruption and low productivity (J. Smith, 1994a). Duplicated responsibilities within the administrative structures have been pinpointed, and clear boundaries between the responsibilities of the federal government, other local municipalities or federal states, the business sector, and the humanitarian sector have been

established. The three most important roles of the state were identified as the provision of a conducive environment that could support the growth of the private sector; the successful decentralisation of public services; and the privatisation, commercialization, or liquidation of non-functioning and loss-making public entities (Barber, 2007).

2.4.2 Capacity Building

When issues and restrictions were seen in structural adjustment programmes, the 1990s Capacity Building Wave was established as a solution. The structural adjustment programmes over the past decade prompted this reaction. During this time period, sometimes known as Africa's "lost decade," the continent experienced a severe economic crisis due to a precipitous drop in the pricing of basic commodities (Bovis & Hu, 2017b). There was also a growing national debt, significant unemployment, a rapidly increasing population, periodic droughts, and racial and political unrest. Some scholars think that these issues have worsened because the public sector has become politicized, which has led to skewed hiring practises, an inflated workforce, institutionalized corruption, and a lack of accountability (Brendan Martin, 1997). These issues greatly affected the availability of public sector goods and services. Consequently, reforms in the public sector to boost efficiency and productivity became urgently needed. Public companies were privatized, employees were given opportunities to upgrade their skills and knowledge, the work environment was made more conducive to productivity, management structures were strengthened, and incentives to work were reinstated in the form of higher pay or more favorable working conditions (Caperchione et al., 2017a).

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2.4.3 Service Delivery Era

The Service Improvement wave, which began around the year 2000 and has continued ever since, is a global movement to reform the public sector and enhance both the availability and quality of public services in many countries. Administrative and political reforms are the driving force behind these initiatives. With the public's best interests in mind, this movement is putting a premium on management techniques including performance- and budget-based oversight, characterised by its emphasis on public participation and engagement in decision-making processes, its demand for timely results on delegated mandates from respective levels of leadership, its integration of and adoption of a multi-sectoral approach to public administration, and its hands-on professional management that bestows responsibility on managers.

Furthermore, this wave is connected to initiatives of poverty alleviation measures through the involvement of several stakeholders in the government's planned short-term and long-term development aims. One scholar claims that the service improvement wave prioritizes the disciplined, efficient, and effective use of public resources, which in turn maximizes the output of the many systems that make up the public sector (Tria & Valotti, 2012b).

2.5 Police Reform

Different scholars have varying ideas of what police reform means. Police reform seeks to improve the effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability of police forces. It also refers to a process that advances a police institution towards more accountability for its acts as well as greater respect for human rights (Mcgonigle Leyh, 2021). A reform of the police force aims to achieve this by building a force that is non-authoritarian, politically

apolitical, accountable to the community and responsive to its needs, professionally effective, and most crucially, an instrument for putting the rule of law into practice (Granér, 2017). There is no basis for making the assumption that the dynamics of police reform would remain the same over the course of time. There are a number of variations in reform patterns, which can range anywhere from gradual and long-term shifts to more sudden and significant shifts, as well as other variations in between. These shifts can also take on a number of different forms. The outcomes are contingent, which implies that they can either converge or diverge depending on the circumstances. It is possible for reforms to be successful at times, but this is not always the case (Faull, 2016a).

"Police reform is always a disputed terrain, with differing reform ideas and a diverse range of reasons of resistance to any specific reform vision," says the author (Stenning and Shearing, 2005). The reform technique employed by different countries is also dictated by the circumstances that the policing organization is confronted with at the time. If a failed state or post-conflict environment existed, reform would have demanded a total rebuilding effort (as in Kosovo, Mozambique, and Cambodia after the conflicts), for example. Following the dissolution of colonial or emerging states, a different reform initiative may be required than in industrialized states with more resources and infrastructure (Barnsley, 2011).

The idea that the actions of police have a significant bearing on the nature of government is the rationale behind making police reform a priority during transitions from autocratic to democratic forms of governance. Undemocratic administrations are easily identifiable by their use of authoritarian police (Ashby et al., 2007a). The police, as a significant

institution in civilian security governance, cannot exist without democratic control and oversight mechanism(Ball, 2010) In a centralized democratic state, the reform programs favor a centralized democratic control to ensure proper oversight over the police (Telep et al., 2008). Both these centralization versus decentralization approaches raise two questions: (a) what kind of policing is required in a democracy? How does policing (as part of the civilian security governance) impact the democratization process of the state (Ingber, 2018a)?

Otwin Marenin has suggested that a democratic police force in a democratic system is characterized by accountability to multiple audiences through multiple mechanisms (Marenin, 2018). Greater control over the police would be reflected, inter alia, by mechanisms to hold the police accountable to the budget committees of the legislature, to courts and prosecutors, to ombudsmen and oversight commissions. Non-governmental or social control of the police is also fundamental and can include such actors as the press, human and civil rights organizations and external auditors. Police reform process must address such a broad and functional accountability system, which has proved problematic in developing countries like Pakistan (Abbas, 2011).

Therefore, the police reform process, with its actors and factors, is an inherent requirement of the reform process of the state. According to Bayle:

> "Reform of police forces has been central to the reconstruction of governments whether they were emerging from authoritarianism or conflict. The dominant template of police reform is now described as democratic policing, and the encouragement of democratic police practices has become the common goal of assistance to police by the international community, whether undertaken by

> individual countries or under multilateral auspices. The assumption behind the priority given to police reform in transitions to democratic government is that what the police do critically affects the character of government. Authoritarian police are the hallmarks of undemocratic governments" (Bayley, 2001a)

Police reform is a part of the larger security sector reform. It couples with the judicial independence, prison reform and other similar reform processes that facilitate institutional solidification in building the rule by law in a transitional democratic system. The discipline, loyalty and effectiveness of the police force are vital in making the state bureaucracy apparatus usable to the transitional democratic government leaders and in permitting them "to exercise effectively their claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory" (Trends & Challenges, 2010a).

Therefore, it is significant to concentrate more attention on the police reform processes. A process to reform the police forces would impact rule of law and institutional consolidation necessary in the democratic transition and consolidation process of the state. The nature of the police reform and various challenges associated to it would signify the nature of the security governance its relationship to the establishment of rule of law in the state (Sehested, 2002a). One needs to understand that police is political by definition and in their work, police is inherently related to the political development of the state. David H. Bayley proposes that police affect political life in six important ways: by determining the players, regulating the competitive processes, defending or not defending regimes from violent attacks, covertly monitoring and manipulating political groups, advocating policy inside and outside government, and providing material aid (Bayley, 2008). This

description upholds the fact that police is functioning in an apolitical environment. Therefore, reforming police is a political will.

2.6 Early History of the Police System in India

In the proceeding section, the researcher synthesized the policing system in subcontinent, discussed early history of policing, reforms introduced by British, issues with the policing reform and administration of policing in the pre and post partition period of Pakistan.

Ancient India took over the role of the "panchayat"(local name refers to the elite of the village charged with the responsibility of making decision) and ruled over the subcontinent through two important officials, head of the village called "Grimoni", and head of the urban area was "Nagarkar", then came the rule of king "Harsha" (wardharan) who divided the entire empire into fiefdoms, he is the person who can be credited or discredited who introduced feudalism in subcontinent which still exist as powerful form in Pakistan (Sarfraz, 2018). He divided his entire kingdom into feoffs. The feudal lords ruled over their fiefdoms and paid a fixed amount of revenue to the king and king ruled over the feudal lords, various experiments were made. The police system depended on the principle of collective responsibility. It was the duty of the residents to trace culprits from within the village or through the help of the trackers that they have escaped to another village. In case of failure collective fines were imposed as compensation for the person who had lost his life and property. In India, the Zamindar was required to apprehend offenders, maintain public order, and either return stolen goods or compensate for their value, just as the Thane was required to do in Saxon England (Report of the Indian Police Commission, 1902).

The village policing system came under the management of the headman who in turn was assisted by the village watchmen.' These watchmen who were amply supported by both their families, servants and sometimes the whole village were responsible for order. It involved watching over people entering and leaving the town or looking at strangers or watching for any unusual activities. In case any theft was committed in a village, they were even expected to find the thief. When they were not able to catch the thief or recover the stolen goods, the watchmen were required to replace the goods up to the level of what they could afford and the rest of the village compensated for any shortfall.

The sultans of Delhi established a more elaborate system of policing in urban areas only and in rural areas the old system continued. But since some urban centers had become considerably populated and their existing chances of intrigue, conspiracies, rebellion, and opposition to the government therefor they established the institution of Kotwal in major urban areas. In towns, the police system was more centralised and was led Kotwal who maintained law and order with the help of a large police force. It pays to be Kotwal, because his contemporaries received meager salaries and so had to rough-shod bane collection from their people. The policing under Emperor Akbar of the Mughal Empire was not so different. Rather these functions were further enlarged by the Mughals. In rural areas they also depended on age old feudal system, whereas in urban areas they not only continued institution of kotwal, but also enlarged his function by handing over the excise department and jail to his care and control.

Some form of mutual insurance was evolved whereby citizens were promised to help each other, a way of collective responsibility which was bred in England in its mediaeval

period. Abu al Fazal in his famous book Aain-e- Akbbari has given a detail of duties a kotwal was assigned to perform. He can be compared to a modern-day commissioner of police. The office was given to prominent people belonging to good families. The pandit Javahir Lal Nehru (first Prime Minister of India) mentioned in his autobiography that his grandfather Pandit Ganga Dhar Nehru was last kotwal in Delhi in 1856 when this office was abolished. Kotwal not only exercised control over criminals but also a watch over the strangers and indulged in secret reporting also (Fraser Report, 1902-03).

2.6.1 Background of British Policing Model Introduced in India

While the indigenous police system of India was initially designed to maintain order in rural and urban settings, it eventually became ineffective due to various socio-political and economic shifts. The system, which relied on the joint responsibility of villagers, zamindars, and local watchmen, was well-suited for small, self-sufficient agricultural communities. However, as political instability and decentralization of power grew, this system began to collapse under its own weight (Sarfraz, 2018).

Corruption became a pervasive issue, with both village watchmen and higher-ranking officials such as the zamindars frequently engaging in criminal activities. They would harbor criminals in exchange for a share of the profits from stolen goods, which eroded the trust and efficacy of the local police system. This breakdown in the enforcement of justice was not merely a failure of individual actors but a symptom of the overall decay of the system. The obligations of recovering stolen property or compensating for its value were often neglected, and in many cases, fines were imposed when more severe

punishments were warranted. Extortion and violence became widespread as criminals and corrupt officials operated with impunity (Suddle, 2010).

The British colonial administration, upon assuming control of various regions, encountered a dysfunctional policing system that was unable to cope with increasing crime rates. The indigenous system, while effective in earlier, more stable periods, could no longer address the complex political realities of British India. Recognizing this, the British introduced reforms aimed at modernizing and centralizing the police force. However, the effectiveness of these reforms varied significantly across regions, and in many cases, the police system remained riddled with inefficiencies and corruption (Naz et al., 2014). The British started thinking of their own policing model to govern the subcontinent, as they lost confidence in locals after the revolt. Objective of any law of police is to maintain public order and peace, but strategy could be different.

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In England, police system was already established. They think policing is a local subject and locals know best about policing as they are having a local knowledge. In England there was no tribal and cast system so individuals were loyal to state not to their subgroups, this model was called as Anglo Saxon model, second there was a French model which was different from England. French has old monarchy, they preferred roman model of centralized policing system, in which chief executive maintain law and order and peace. The British tried a mixture of this model in subcontinent. In preceding paragraphs I have tried to present a gist of English and French models of Policing. Before the researcher discussed the British model for subcontinent, a glimpse of English and French model presented below.

2.6.2 Policing in England

In England (apart from London there was a multiplicity of Police forces. In Counties standing joint committees composed of Justices of the Peace and members of the County Council and in Borroughs watch committees composed of members of the City or Town Council were charged with the maintenance of separate forces. These committees are partly controlled by the Home Secretary, and much uniformity has been attained by regulations issued by him regarding pay and conditions of service the Home Secretary possesses appellate powers in disciplinary cases, a Chief Constable cannot be appointed or dismissed without his concurrence. He exercises a right of inspection through Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary. By the fact that the Home Office pays half the cost of each Police force, the Home Secretary has a weapon to be used in the last resort. A Chief Constable is free to follow the law and resıst any illegal demands. Once the Chief Constable of Nottingham offended members of watch committee, but the Home Secretary ruled that he had acted within his powers and refused to uphold his dismissal.

In England therefore there is a constitutional balance, neither Government nor the local committee has complete control, while the Police force is subject to disciplinary control exercised primarily by the Chief Constable and the Committee and in appeal by the Home Secretary In England all capital cases and certain other cases must be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions, an official appointed by the Home Secretary, but working under the control of the Attorney General. All indicate cases in which prosecution has been withdrawn or is delayed must be reported to him. In addition, he has the power to institute, undertake or carry-on criminal proceedings in cases which appear to him to be of importance or difficulty or which for any reason require his intervention, and a chief

Constable shall report to him with full particulars all cases regarding which director has asked for information (Police Commission Report, 1960).

2.6.3 Policing in France

Being a unitary state France, the system of administration there was much more akin to that of Pakistan. France is divided into departments each headed by Prefect, who like our Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate is the representative of the Government in his department. He was responsible for the maintenance of the order. The police is however roughly divided into two equal forces, the Gendramerie under the Ministry of Defense connected mainly with the countryside and the Surete Police under the Ministry of Interior concerned with towns having over 10,000 habitants. In the sphere of the order the Prefect issues requests to the local Gendarmerie and order to the local Suret Police. In the sphere of investigation and prosecution exterior control is exercised not by the Prefect, but by public prosecutors subject to the Ministry of Justice while the Courts of Appeal have the power (rarely, if exercised) to suspect the investigative powers of any Policemen. Hierarchic disciplinary control exists in both forces. Each force has its own mobile reserve well-armed. Thus a balance is kept first by the existence of two forces subject to different ministries and secondly by the separation of exterior control, investigation being under the public prosecutors subject to the Ministry of Justice and the maintenance of order being under the Prefect subject to the Ministry of Interior (Indian Police Commission Report, 1902).

2.7 Reforms Introduced by the British

When the British took control of the Indian provinces, they inherited a police system in disrepair. The British response to this problem varied by region, but in general, their reforms sought to retain the village policing system while improving its overall structure. One of the first changes implemented was the removal of police duties from the zamindars. In the previous system, zamindars were responsible for maintaining law and order in their territories, but many had abused this authority for personal gain. Their role was diminished, and new magistrates were appointed to oversee districts. These magistrates, in turn, supervised darogas, who were responsible for smaller subdivisions (Report of Select Committee, 1832).

The British reforms also introduced a system of rewards for capturing criminals. For example, darogas were offered a monetary reward for every dacoit they apprehended and convicted (Rashid et al., 2021a). They were also entitled to a percentage of the value of any stolen property they recovered. This system incentivized local officers to pursue criminals more aggressively, although it also created opportunities for corruption and exploitation, as officers often manipulated the system to their benefit.

In cities, the position of kotwal, which had been a key part of the indigenous police structure, was retained under British rule. However, the kotwal's responsibilities were expanded, and in many cases, darogas were appointed to oversee individual wards of cities. Over time, new regulations were introduced to formalize the organization of the police in urban areas, with the cost of maintaining the force being passed on to the inhabitants through taxes on houses and shops.

2.7.1 The Pitfalls of British Policing Methods

Despite these reforms, the British system was far from perfect. Crime rates remained high in many regions, and public trust in the police was low. The new system required a much higher standard of proof in courts than had previously been the case, which made it more difficult to secure convictions. Furthermore, British punishments were generally less severe than those imposed by the earlier local rulers, particularly for crimes like dacoity, where criminals had previously faced death or severe corporal punishment. Under British rule, these punishments were replaced with finite prison sentences, which, while more humane, were less effective as deterrents (Fraser Report, 1902).

2.7.2 Reforms by Lord Wellesley-Governor General of India

In response to the growing lawlessness, British officials made further attempts to reform the police system. Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General of India, began investigating the causes of the failures in Bengal as early as 1801. In Madras, a police committee was appointed by Lord William Bentinck in 1806 to explore similar issues, while the Court of Directors of the East India Company initiated their own investigation into police administration in 1813. These inquiries resulted in several important recommendations, the most notable being the re-establishment of the village police system. The Court of Directors emphasized that the village police was crucial to maintaining order because it was integrated into the social fabric of the country. By contrast, the professional police force introduced by the British lacked local influence and was often viewed with suspicion by the populace. In some regions, such as Madras and Bombay, efforts were made to restore the village police system to its former efficiency.

These efforts included the appointment of commissioners to oversee police reforms and the enactment of new regulations designed to formalize the role of village police officers. For example, the Madras Regulation XI of 1816 established a general police system throughout the presidency, which blended elements of the old village police system with the newer British reforms. Similarly, Bombay Regulation XII of 1827 introduced a system of police founded chiefly on the ancient usage of the country (Report of Select Committee, 1832). Despite these efforts, the British reforms were hampered by a number of challenges. In Bengal, for instance, the permanent settlement of land had resulted in the absence of the subordinate revenue establishments that were essential to the functioning of the village police system. As a result, the village police system in Bengal was never fully restored. Instead, British officials were forced to rely on the daroga system, which continued to be plagued by corruption and inefficiency.

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2.7.3 Appointment of an Inspector-General of Police in Bengal

One of the most significant reforms introduced by the British was the appointment of an Inspector-General of Police in Bengal in 1808. This marked the first attempt to introduce expert control over police administration. The Inspector-General's primary role was to gather intelligence from across the region and coordinate large-scale operations, particularly those aimed at suppressing organized crime such as dacoity. The appointment of an Inspector-General was seen as a major step forward in improving police administration. The Inspector-General, who also held the office of Magistrate of the 24-Parganas, was given concurrent criminal jurisdiction with other magistrates in the region. This allowed for more coordinated efforts in combating crime, particularly through the use of informers and spies.

The success of this system was evident in the suppression of dacoity in Bengal, where organized criminal gangs had previously operated with near impunity. By 1810, the system was extended to other regions, including Patna, Benaras, and Bareilly. Despite these successes, the use of informers and spies was controversial, with some accusing the police of collaborating with criminals for personal gain (Indian Police Commission Report, 1902).

2.7.4 Abolition of Position of IG

Unfortunately, the progress made by the Inspector-General system was short-lived. In 1829, the British government abolished the position of Inspector-General of Police, citing concerns about dual control over the magistrates and the high cost of maintaining the position. Responsibility for policing was transferred to the Divisional Commissioners, who also oversaw revenue collection and other administrative duties.

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The abolition of the Inspector-General system led to a significant deterioration in the quality of police administration. Without centralized oversight, corruption and inefficiency once again became rampant, and crime rates began to rise once more. Particularly concerning was the resurgence of dacoity, which had previously been brought under control by the concerted efforts of the Inspector-General. The Divisional Commissioners, already overburdened with their revenue and administrative duties, were unable to devote sufficient attention to law enforcement, leading to a breakdown in the policing system in many regions.

2.7.5 Report of the Select Committee of 1832

In response to these issues, the British government appointed a Select Committee in 1832 to investigate the state of police administration in India. The Committee's report highlighted the numerous flaws in the system, particularly the corruption, inefficiency, and oppression prevalent among the police subordinates. It also pointed out that the superior officers, due to the overwhelming number of responsibilities they were required to manage, were unable to properly supervise the police under their command. One of the Committee's most significant findings was the lack of uniformity in the police system across different regions of India. Each province and district operated under its own set of rules, and there was no centralized authority to enforce consistency or ensure that reforms were implemented uniformly. This lack of standardization made it difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of the police and allowed corrupt practices to persist in many areas.

Despite the Committee's recommendations, little immediate action was taken to reform the police system. However, in Bengal, a special committee was appointed in 1838 to draft a plan for improving the efficiency of the mofussil (comprehensive) police. This committee concluded that the transfer of police supervision to the Divisional Commissioners had been a mistake, as it had resulted in a lack of uniformity in police operations and a general decline in the effectiveness of law enforcement. The committee suggested a return to the centralized control of the police force under a Superintendent-General, though no immediate action was taken on this proposal (Indian Police Commission Report, 1903).

2.7.6 Reforms in Bombay

While Bengal struggled with police reform, the presidency of Bombay took more decisive action. After the annexation of Sind in 1843, Sir Charles Napier, the British governor, introduced a new model of policing based on the Irish Constabulary. This system was semi-military in nature, which was deemed necessary due to the recently conquered status of Sind. The new force was entirely separate from the civil administration, and its officers had no duties outside of law enforcement. The success of this system in Sind caught the attention of Sir George Clerk, the Governor of Bombay. Recognizing that many of the problems in the Bombay police force were due to poor oversight and lack of specialization, Clerk decided to implement similar reforms in Bombay in 1853. Under these reforms, each district was assigned a Superintendent of Police, who had exclusive control over law enforcement matters. Below the Superintendent were native police officers responsible for smaller subdivisions, such as tehsils.

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These reforms were largely successful in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the police in Bombay, though one significant flaw remained, the ultimate control of the police force rested with the judicial secretary, a situation that often led to conflicts between law enforcement and the judiciary. This issue was not resolved until 1855 when control over the police was transferred to a Commissioner of Police, who was also responsible for overseeing the prison system (Report of the Pakistan Police Commission, 1960).

2.7.7 Reforms in Madras

The province of Madras followed a similar trajectory to Bombay in its efforts to reform the police. The Torture Commission of 1855, which had been established to investigate

abuses within the police force, found widespread corruption and misconduct. The Commission's findings were damning, with one witness stating that the police were "a terror to well-disposed and peaceable people" but posed "none whatever to thieves and rogues." Another witness described the police as "the bane and pest of society" and claimed that their actions were the primary cause of much of the misery and discontent in the province.

In response to these findings, the Commission recommended a complete separation of revenue and police functions, with the police being placed under the control of independent European officers. These officers would be able to dedicate their full attention to the management and oversight of the police force, rather than splitting their time between law enforcement and revenue collection duties. The government of Madras accepted these recommendations and passed Act XXIV of 1859, which formalized the separation of police and revenue duties. Under the new system, each district was assigned a Superintendent of Police, who reported to the District Magistrate. In larger districts, two Superintendents were appointed to ensure adequate oversight. The Madras government also advocated for the appointment of a Commissioner of Police to oversee the entire province, recognizing that effective reform would require strong central supervision. These proposals were approved by the Court of Directors and led to significant improvements in police administration in Madras (Fraser Report, 1902-03).

2.7.8 Police Commission of 1860-Enactment of 1861 Act

The annexation of the Punjab in 1849 brought new challenges to British police administration in India. The region was highly volatile, and the existing policing system

was insufficient to maintain order. As a result, the British established a dual police force in the Punjab, consisting of a military branch responsible for preventing crime and a civil branch tasked with investigating crimes. This system proved to be highly effective during the Indian Mutiny of 1857, as the police played a critical role in restoring and maintaining order. However, the dual police system was also highly expensive, and by 1860, the British government in India recognized the need for reform. The Government of India appointed a Police Commission to investigate the state of police administration throughout British India and make recommendations for reducing costs while improving efficiency. The Commission's most significant recommendation was the abolition of the military police and the creation of a single, unified civil police force responsible for all law enforcement duties.

To ensure consistency and coordination, the Commission proposed that each province be placed under the control of an Inspector-General of Police, who would oversee all police operations within the region. Each district would be assigned a District Superintendent of Police, with Assistant Superintendents appointed to larger districts. The subordinate police force would be composed of Inspectors, head constables, sergeants, and constables, with Inspectors responsible for overseeing a group of police stations and head constables managing individual stations.

The Police Commission's recommendations were largely adopted by the British government and enacted into law as Act V of 1861. This Act provided the foundation for modern police administration in India, establishing a professional police force that was

centralized, organized, and capable of handling the diverse challenges of law enforcement across the country (Indian Police Commission, Report, 1902).

2.7.9 The Impact of the Police Reforms of 1861

The police reforms of 1861 marked a significant turning point in the history of law enforcement in British India. For the first time, a unified, professional police force was established across the entire country. This force was tasked with maintaining law and order, investigating crimes, and preventing criminal activity, and it operated under the direct supervision of the British government (Loveday, 2005). The creation of a professional police force had several important effects. First, it brought an end to the decentralized and often corrupt practices of the earlier policing systems, particularly in rural areas where zamindars and village headmen had previously wielded unchecked power. The new police force was directly accountable to the British administration, which helped reduce instances of local officials using the police for personal gain.

Second, the reforms improved the overall efficiency of law enforcement in India. The introduction of centralized control under the Inspector-General allowed for better coordination of police efforts across different regions, and the appointment of professional officers ensured that law enforcement duties were carried out by individuals with the necessary training and experience. However, the reforms also had some significant limitations. One of the biggest challenges was the sheer size and diversity of India. While the new police force was effective in urban centers and some rural areas, it struggled to maintain order in more remote regions. The police were often spread too thin, and their

authority was undermined by the continued influence of local elites, who resisted British control.

Additionally, the British police force was often viewed with suspicion and resentment by the Indian population. Many Indians saw the police as an extension of the colonial government, whose primary purpose was to maintain British control over the country rather than to serve the needs of the local population. This perception was exacerbated by instances of police brutality and corruption, which persisted despite the reforms (Police Select Committee, 1832).

2.8. The Evolution of the Police System Post-1861

Following the establishment of the police reforms in 1861, the Indian police system continued to evolve under British rule. Although the general structure of the force remained consistent, several key developments occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as various provincial governments attempted to address the ongoing challenges of maintaining law and order in a rapidly changing society.

In Bengal, for example, the provincial government introduced a number of additional reforms aimed at improving police efficiency. One of the most significant changes was the appointment of a Deputy Inspector-General of Police, who was tasked with overseeing the day-to-day operations of the police force in the region. This helped to improve supervision and coordination, particularly in the larger cities, where crime rates had been rising steadily. Similarly, in the province of Bombay, the police force underwent several important changes. In 1881, the position of Inspector-General of Police was reintroduced,

following concerns that the abolition of the office in 1860 had led to a decline in the quality of law enforcement. The reinstated Inspector-General was given broad powers to oversee police operations, and his office became the central authority for law enforcement in the province.

In Madras, the government introduced a number of new regulations aimed at improving the training and recruitment of police officers. These reforms were designed to professionalize the police force further, ensuring that officers were properly trained and capable of handling the complex challenges of law enforcement in the province. As a result, the police force in Madras became one of the most highly regarded in British India. Despite these improvements, many of the same challenges that had plagued the police system prior to 1861 persisted well into the 20th century. Corruption, inefficiency, and inadequate staffing remained serious issues, particularly in rural areas where the police faced immense challenges in enforcing the law. The vast size of India, coupled with its diverse population and terrain, made effective policing a difficult task, especially in remote and rural areas where local elites, landlords, and zamindars continued to wield considerable influence. This led to a situation where the police were often outnumbered and under-resourced, which allowed corruption to flourish, and crime to go unchecked in many regions (Indian Police Commission Report, 1902).

2.8.1 Issues of Corruption and Inefficiency

The reforms of 1861, while laying the foundation for a more centralized and organized police force, did not address the root causes of inefficiency and corruption. The Indian police force continued to be plagued by a lack of adequate funding and resources, which

limited its ability to effectively maintain law and order. Many officers, particularly those in lower ranks, were poorly paid and inadequately trained, which made them susceptible to bribery and other forms of corruption.

In many instances, police officers were known to extort money from local villagers, either directly through illegal fines or indirectly by demanding bribes to carry out their duties. This created a significant trust deficit between the police and the communities they were supposed to serve. Rather than being seen as protectors of the people, the police were often viewed as another arm of the colonial government, whose primary purpose was to enforce British rule rather than to uphold justice. Moreover, the colonial administration itself did little to address the widespread corruption within the police force. While senior British officials were aware of the problem, they were more concerned with maintaining control over the country than with rooting out corruption. As a result, many corrupt practices were tolerated, as long as they did not interfere with the broader objectives of colonial governance. This culture of impunity allowed corruption to persist at all levels of the police force, from low-ranking constables to high-ranking officers.

2.8.2 Police Reform in the Early 20th Century

As the 20th century progressed, the British administration began to recognize the need for further reforms to the Indian police system. The increasing frequency of nationalist protests, coupled with rising crime rates in both rural and urban areas, underscored the need for a more efficient and effective police force. Several committees and commissions were appointed to investigate the state of the police and recommend improvements.

2.8.3 Indian Police Commission 1902-03- Fraser Report

One of the most significant of these was the Fraser Commission of 1902-1903, which was tasked with reviewing the structure and functioning of the police force in British India. The Commission's report acknowledged many of the systemic problems that had plagued the police for decades, including corruption, inefficiency, and poor training. It made several important recommendations for reform, including increasing the pay and training of police officers, improving supervision and accountability, and establishing a more merit-based system for promotions.

The main recommendations of the Commission of 1902-3 were to maintain the responsibility of the District Magistrate for the preservation of law and order within his district to reject the Maharajah of Darbhanga's minority plea for the separation of the executive and judiciary. To leave watch and ward in the countryside to the village police and to lay down three main categories in the Police, first the All-India Service, second Sub-Inspectors and higher Provincial Officers, and third the inferior ranks.

That pattern with various modifications in different Provinces lasted till and after independence. The responsibility of the District Magistrate for law and order and his position as head of the Magistracy continued: the degree of subordination of the Superintendent of Police to the District Magistrate regarding internal control of the District Police varied slightly from Province to Province. In East Pakistan watch and ward in the countryside was let practically entirely to the village police and in the Punjab to a smaller extent, while in Sind no village police existed: in the N.WFP, the District Police bore a high ratio to the population, and in Baluchistan the levies policed most of the area.

The process of Indianising the All-India Service upto half was in progress and the provinces had increased the 15% of promotion to the rank of Sub- Inspector recommended by the Commission to 50% At independence practically all British members of the Al-India Service retired, leaving a large number of posts to be filled from the Provincial Service. The Civil Service of Pakistan and Police Service of Pakistan are both now recruited from graduates: immediately after in- dependence there was a common competitive examination, and now again a common examination.

The Fraser Commission also recommended the creation of an all-India police service, which would allow for greater consistency in police practices across the country. This idea was particularly important in light of the growing nationalist movement, as the British government sought to maintain control over a rapidly changing political landscape. By creating a more centralized police force, the colonial administration hoped to strengthen its ability to respond to political unrest and maintain law and order. While some of the Commission's recommendations were implemented, progress was slow, and many of the same issues continued to plague the police force. Corruption remained widespread, and the police continued to be viewed with suspicion by the Indian public. Furthermore, the growing tensions between the British government and the nationalist movement made it increasingly difficult for the police to maintain neutrality, as they were often called upon to suppress political dissent.

2.9 Other Commissions

After the Police Commission of 1902-3 certain other Committees and commissions were appointed on a provincial basis; In the Punjab we have the Lumsden Report of 1926; in

Bengal we have the Blandy Gordon Report of 1937, the Chokkidari Inquiry Committee of 1948-40. The evolution of the police system in India during the late colonial period was shaped by several significant reports and inquiries, which sought to address the systemic flaws in policing at both regional and national levels. One of the key documents in this regard was the Lumsden Report of 1926, which focused on police reforms in the province of Punjab. This report was commissioned in response to widespread concerns about the inefficiency and corruption within the police force, as well as the increasing crime rates in rural areas.

The Lumsden Report called for a series of reforms aimed at professionalizing the police force, improving oversight, and reducing corruption. Among its key recommendations were the establishment of more rigorous training programs for police officers and the implementation of stricter disciplinary measures for those found guilty of misconduct. The report also highlighted the need for better communication and cooperation between the police and the judiciary to ensure that criminal cases were handled more efficiently. Similarly, the Chokidari Inquiry Committee of 1938-40 examined the state of village-level policing in the Bengal region. The chokidars (village watchmen) were responsible for maintaining law and order in rural areas, but over time, this system had become increasingly ineffective. The Committee's report revealed that many chokidars were poorly trained and underpaid, which made them vulnerable to bribery and corruption. Moreover, the lack of proper oversight meant that village policing often went unchecked, allowing crime to flourish in rural communities. The Chokidari Inquiry Committee recommended a complete overhaul of the village policing system, including better pay, training, and supervision for chokidars. It also suggested that the village police be

integrated more closely with the broader provincial police system to ensure greater accountability and coordination. While some of these recommendations were implemented, the outbreak of World War II and the subsequent push for Indian independence meant that many of the proposed reforms were delayed or left incomplete.

2.10 The Role of the Police During India's Independence Movement

One of the key roles of the police under British rule was to maintain colonial control over India. The police were responsible for suppressing dissent, controlling protests, and enforcing laws that were designed to protect British economic and political interests. This often placed the police in direct conflict with the Indian population, particularly during periods of political unrest. The police played a central role in cracking down on nationalist movements, which sought to challenge British rule and demand greater autonomy for India. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as nationalist sentiments began to grow, the police were frequently called upon to disperse protests, arrest political leaders, and break up gatherings that were seen as a threat to colonial authority.

One of the most infamous examples of police involvement in suppressing dissent was the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919. On April 13, 1919, British troops, under the command of General Dyer, opened fire on a peaceful gathering of Indian civilians in Amritsar, killing hundreds of people. While the massacre was carried out by the military, the police played a key role in identifying and arresting protestors in the aftermath of the incident. The event became a turning point in India's struggle for independence, highlighting the brutality of British rule and galvanizing the nationalist movement.

The repressive role of the police further eroded public trust and deepened the divide between the Indian population and the colonial government. Rather than being seen as impartial enforcers of the law, the police were viewed as agents of colonial oppression. This perception was reinforced by the fact that many police officers, particularly those in senior positions, were British, while the rank-and-file officers were often drawn from the lower strata of Indian society. This created a clear power dynamic, in which the police were seen as enforcers of foreign rule, rather than protectors of the people.

The use of the police to suppress the independence movement further damaged their reputation among the Indian population. Many Indians viewed the police as collaborators with the colonial government, and their involvement in the repression of nationalist activities made them deeply unpopular. This created a situation where the police were seen not as protectors of the people, but as agents of an oppressive regime. Unfortunately the situation did not change even after the independence of Pakistan. Police used to follow same colonial practices which they used to do in the time of British. Resultantly the voices of police reforms started rising with every passing day

2.11 Police Reforms in Contemporary South Asia

Much of the literature on South Asian policing traces its origins to the Police Act of 1861, a colonial law that institutionalised a hierarchical, militaristic, and coercive policing model designed to protect the interests of the colonial state rather than serve the public (Raghavan, 2018). Most historical accounts document key commissions and inquiries, but a critical reading reveals that colonial policing fostered authoritarianism, weak local

accountability, and a culture of obedience features that persist today (Verma, 2021; Bayley, 2016).

Modern scholars argue that contemporary policing failures in South Asia are not merely operational weaknesses but manifestations of path dependence where historical institutional arrangements continue to shape current behaviours and expectations (Shah, 2021). In Pakistan, the centralised command structure, political control over police, and weak citizen oversight can be directly traced to colonial institutional logics.

Therefore, rather than treating colonial history as a descriptive backdrop, this study positions it as a critical explanatory factor for understanding why successive reforms including Police Order 2002 failed to transform policing culture.

The legacy of colonial policing continues to shape law enforcement practices in both India and Pakistan, as well as in Bangladesh. While significant progress has been made in professionalizing the police force and improving accountability, many of the same challenges that existed during the colonial period such as corruption, inefficiency, and public mistrust continue to persist. Efforts to reform the police in these countries have been ongoing since independence, with varying degrees of success. In India, the police have made strides in embracing technology, improving training, and building community partnerships. However, issues of police brutality, corruption, and a lack of public trust remain pressing concerns. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, the police continue to face significant challenges related to political interference, resource constraints, and the influence of local elites. However, the militarization of law enforcement remains a

contentious issue, as it raises concerns about human rights abuses and the potential for these organizations to operate outside the framework of regular police accountability.

2.12 Post Independence Policing Reforms

Following the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the newly formed government faced similar challenges with policing as in the time of British. Much of the colonial policing infrastructure remained in place, and the new government was tasked with rebuilding a law enforcement system that could effectively address the needs of an independent nation. Many commissions and committees were constituted in Pakistan (detailed analysis presented in chapter five) to reform and restructure the police force to make it more accountable and transparent.

2.13 Politics and Administration in Pakistan

Pakistan is a federation, with one central government that oversees the country and four provincial governments. In addition, it is home to a large number of different ethnic communities, each with its own unique culture and identity (Muhammad, 2015). The country's rich diversity not only contributes to its aesthetic appeal but also to the difficulty of its governance. As the 18th amendment in the constitution preserves the autonomy of the provinces, policing is a matter that falls under provincial jurisdiction. The physical presence of the police, and consequently their authority or control, also differs from one province to the next, in addition to the different laws that are in effect in each one (Ahmed, 2020a). There are two parallel law enforcement systems in the province of Balochistan: the police and the Balochistan Levies, with the police having control only over certain areas. Established during British colonial control, the Balochistan Levies are a force

comprised of members of local tribes. To maintain order and security in their territories, sardars (tribal leaders) contract the services of local tribesmen from the state. The salaries of the individuals working for the Levies are covered by the provincial government (Mir Sherbaz Khetran, 2017).

The province of Balochistan, which is located in the southwestern region of Pakistan and covers 46 percent of the country's total land area, is, nonetheless, the least populous of Pakistan's provinces (about 6 percent of the total population). Balochistan has the lowest rates of socioeconomic development and the weakest state institutions of any Pakistani province. After achieving independence, Balochistan's history is replete with insurgencies, rebellions, and state attempts to quell them. In the province of Balochistan, the modern Pakistani state has, in a manner analogous to that of the colonial British rulers, assisted in the maintenance of tribal systems of organization and control. When elements of the tribal leadership have attempted to assert independence or simply resisted national government actions, the Pakistani state has endeavoured to use such systems to its advantage and to bring about forcible change in the province. In other words, it has tried to use such systems to its advantage. The situation in Balochistan is still very precarious, and the province is in the middle of many violent conflicts. These conflicts include an insurgency led by Baloch nationalists, as well as sectarian violence and bloodshed connected to the anti-terror campaign launched by the United States (Ali Zaman Shah, 2017).

In terms of population, Punjab is Pakistan's most populous province. It is also the province with the highest population density, and it is quickly urbanising. The Punjabi state and all

of its institutions are exceptionally powerful (L&nwal, 2016). They are also widely dispersed across the entirety of the province, notably in the more urbanised central regions. Additionally, when it comes to socioeconomic and development metrics, Punjab leads the rest of the country. In Balochistan and Sindh, the most influential positions are still held by traditional individuals of influence (such as sardars and wealthy landowners), whereas in Punjab, the power structure is more diverse. Huge landowners rule the rural areas, but not in the traditional capacity of feudal lords; rather, they rule in their new capacities as elected representatives. Rural areas are dominated by large landowners. On the other hand, industrialists, legislators, and representatives of market and professional organisations and groups are able to exert a significant amount of influence in urban and urbanising areas (H. Batool & Afzal, 2021).

Politicians in Punjab, continue to be co-opted by the state of Pakistan, including the all-pervasive military establishment, as willing allies and providers of political legitimacy. The province plays a dominant role in Pakistan's civil-military bureaucracies, and the state continues to use this to its advantage. When compared to the other provinces, Punjab enjoys a higher level of safety and has been the target of significantly fewer large-scale attacks by extremists (Hasan et al., 2021).

In comparison to Punjab, the degree of socioeconomic development in Sindh is significantly lower, however it is higher than in Balochistan. The urban population constitutes close to half of Sindh's total inhabitants. Karachi, the most populous city in the country, is also the most populous city in the province. It is home to more than a third of

the population. The city's status as Pakistan's primary port, manufacturing hub, and commercial hub has resulted in a considerable influx of migrants from all over the country, mainly ethnic Pashtuns from the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Outside of the major cities, agricultural services continue to be the dominant economic activity. As a consequence of this, the traditional landed gentry and their friends continue to be the most influential people in the community, and they maintain their dominance over politics and society (Magsi et al., 2015).

2.14 Police Administration and structure in Pakistan

Since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, the composition and hierarchy of the country's police force have undergone several subtle adjustments. Islamabad (capital of Pakistan) is the place where most of the Pakistan's police force's command and control is located; nevertheless, provincial police forces are controlled by offices located in provincial capitals. Criminal law and procedure are both considered to be areas that are concurrently subject to the jurisdiction of both the central government and the provinces (Imam, 2011). However, the constitution that was enacted in 1973 stipulates that the legislation enacted by the central government takes precedence over the legislation enacted by the provinces in these two areas of law (Ahmed, 2020b).

The police administration in Pakistan operates within a hierarchical and centrally coordinated framework shaped by federal legislation, provincial autonomy, and complex security governance arrangements. The overall policing system is governed by constitutional provisions whereby law and order is a provincial subject, while the federal

government retains responsibility for policy guidance, standard setting, federal policing, training institutions, and inter-provincial coordination. At the federal level, the National Police Bureau (NPB) functions as the primary think-tank and policy advisory body responsible for research, reform formulation, and coordination among provinces. Provincial police forces Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan operate under the administrative control of their respective Provincial Home Departments and are headed by Inspectors General of Police (IGPs), who serve as the highest-ranking police executives responsible for strategic planning, organisational leadership, operational oversight, and resource management. Each province is further divided into regional, zonal, and district commands, ensuring decentralised operational control. At the district level, District Police Officers (DPOs) or Senior Superintendents of Police (SSPs) supervise police stations, investigation wings, and local operational units.

The police structure typically consists of specialised branches such as Operations, Investigations, Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTD), Special Branch (Intelligence), Traffic Police, Elite/Special Operations Units, and Criminal Investigation Agencies. These branches operate under Additional Inspectors General (Addl. IGPs) or Deputy Inspectors General (DIGs), reflecting functional specialization within the broader command hierarchy. While reforms such as the Police Order 2002 sought to professionalize policing through merit-based postings, operational autonomy, and separation of investigation from operations, the actual structure remains deeply influenced by bureaucratic traditions, political dynamics, and institutional culture. Additionally, urban regions such as Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad have adapted Commissionerate and Capital Territory policing models, incorporating metropolitan policing practices. Despite

structural improvements, challenges persist in terms of coordination, accountability, resource allocation, and the balance of authority between political executives and police leadership. Overall, Pakistan's police administration reflects a hybrid system influenced by colonial legacies, federal-provincial division of power, and contemporary governance reforms aimed at enhancing professionalism, accountability, and service delivery.

Different types of specialized law enforcement agencies are under federal control. Included in this group are the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the Railway Police, the National Highways and Motorway Police, the Frontier Constabulary, and the Islamabad Capital Police. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is a separate yet integral part of the police force that reports directly to the Prime Minister (Fasihuddin & Zaidi, 2017). There are four distinct federal police groups tasked with enforcing basic law and order, with this responsibility further devolved to the various provincial governments. While the federal government maintains oversight of the country's interior, the police in each province function separately and do not share information with one another. The Public Service Commission (PSC) of Pakistan is responsible for appointing senior police officials, who may then be transferred to any of Pakistan's provinces. Officers are selected through examinations administered by the Federal Public Services Commission, which is also responsible for regulating the foreign service, the District Management Group (DMG), and the customs and excise tax systems. The officers begin their careers by being appointed as superintendents of police (ASPs), a position in which they participate in specialised training over the course of two years and also work for one year with the Frontier Constabulary (FC).

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After that, the officers are deputed to any provincial police or the capital city police, depending on where they were assigned. 1861 police act stipulated that the inspector general (IG) is the highest-ranking officer in each province's police force. After the position of Inspector General (IG), the next highest hierarchical position is that of Deputy Inspector General (DIG), followed by Additional Inspector General (AIG), who both serve under the supervision of the IG (Crisis Group Asia Report N°157, 2011a). ASPs are responsible for overseeing the operations of the police force within a clearly defined region of the province that was formerly referred to as a "range," but which is now classified as a "general police area" under the Police Order. The district level is where most policing efforts are concentrated in a province. Each district is led by a superintendent of police (SP), while a senior superintendent of police (SSP) is in charge of the larger districts and province capitals. Sub-district command is handed off to ASPs and DSPs, who are both assistant police chiefs (DSPs). Instead, DSPs are promoted from inside the provincial police force, and they spend their whole careers working in the same province from which they were first employed.

Numerous police officers start their careers as rookies. All officers below the inspector rank, regardless of seniority, as well as all sub-inspectors, assistant sub-inspectors, chief constables, and constables are included here. In contrast, lower-ranking PSP officers are not officially considered to be members of the PSP officers' unit. The provincial authorities are the ones that hire the lower-ranking officers, and the scope of their responsibilities and authority is restricted to the police stations (Siddiqi et al., 2014a). In accordance with the Police Order (Police Order, 2002), the roles held by officers, their units, and their cadre have been renamed and given new titles. The IG's position, for

instance, has been renamed the Provincial Police Officer (PPO). The inspector general of each province also chooses a capital city police officer (CCPO) to oversee law enforcement in that province's largest cities. Equally, a city police officer (CPO) who has reached the rank of deputy inspector general is appointed to oversee law enforcement in each municipal area. District police officers (DPOs) are promoted from the position of senior superintendent and report directly to the RPOs in charge of their respective regions. Those in charge at the district level are vested with decision-making power (Ul & Kahlon, 2020).

Protection, access to justice, and restitution are primarily provided by the state's police force, which serves as the primary legal enforcers and embodiment of the law in the state. The activities taken by the police to identify illegal activity and bring perpetrators to the attention of the courts for the purpose of punishment are essential to the efficient operation of any criminal justice system; hence, the police force is an organization of the utmost significance (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003b).

A modern state without an effective police administration will fail to govern. Police administration should have the structure and functional competency to develop methods to thwart and interrupt offenses, with an emphasis on serious, sophisticated, and organized cyber security, cybercrime and child protection; and to fight against terrorism and violent extremism (UNDP, 2004b). There has been no change in the administration's emphasis on securing the nation's people, property, and essential infrastructure. The administration of

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law enforcement must strengthen its internal resources by establishing cooperative relationships with law enforcement agencies around the world (Faull, 2016b).

It needs to attain demonstrated leadership in delivering assigned responsibilities for a safer country. This transformation is not immune to the governance mechanism of the state. People's perceptions of the government's fairness and effectiveness, and, as a direct result of that perception, their willingness to accept the right of the state and its enforcers to govern behaviour, are strongly influenced by the level of service they receive from law enforcement officials and other agents of the criminal justice system. This includes their interactions with the police (Bayley, 2001b). Individuals are more likely to believe that their government is doing a good job when they have trust and confidence in the rules, institutions, and authorities that govern them. This also increases the likelihood that people will comply with the laws of the state.

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The contribution of a police organization in the overall functioning of a state is important to understand the role police plays for the law enforcement. It is essential for Pakistan to have a responsible, transparent, and effective police force to ensure the safety and well-being of all of its residents, as well as the nation's stability and the country's long-term growth and development.

The organogram and the ranks of the police organization in Pakistan presented below:



Organogram of Police

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Police Force Ranks in Pakistan

Ranks	Abbreviation
Constable	PC
Head Constable	HC
Assistant Sub-Inspector	ASI
Sub-Inspector of Police	SI
Inspector of Police	IP
Assistant/Deputy Superintendent of Police	ASP/DSP
Superintendent of Police	SP
Senior Superintendent of Police	SSP
Deputy Inspector General of Police	DIG
Additional Inspector General of Police	AIG or Addl. IGP
Inspector General of Police	IGP

Ranks of police from lowest to highest

2.15 Global Police Reform Models: A Comparative and Analytical Synthesis

International scholarship identifies several dominant models of police reform, including: Democratic Policing emphasizes accountability, transparency, and human rights (Bayley, 2006). Community Policing, focuses on partnership, prevention, and citizen engagement (Skogan, 2019). Rule of Law Policing, prioritises neutrality, autonomy, and legal compliance (Marenin, 2021). Intelligence led policing, uses analytics and intelligence for strategic interventions. New Public Management (NPM), policing, focuses on performance measurement and efficiency.

A thematic synthesis shows that despite differences; successful reforms depend on:

1. Merit-based, depoliticised personnel management
2. Independent oversight mechanisms
3. Strong internal accountability systems
4. Citizen-centred service delivery
5. Institutional coherence and organisational stability

Pakistan's Police Order 2002 borrowed heavily from these principles, but reforms remained largely symbolic due to resistance from political and bureaucratic actors (OECD, 2018; Sadiq, 2021). This disconnect between design and practice underscores the central argument of institutional theory: reforms fail not because they are poorly conceived, but because they conflict with existing power structures and institutional norms.

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2.16 Police Order 2002: A Critical and Institutional Analysis

Police Order 2002 has been widely regarded as a landmark reform intended to depoliticise the police, enhance operational autonomy, and institutionalise oversight. Yet literature on this reform is disproportionately descriptive. A critical reading reveals several institutional contradictions:

(1) Oversight Structures were Politically Diluted

Public Safety Commissions and Police Complaints Authorities were designed to promote transparency. However, restrictive amendments, political appointments, and bureaucratic resistance rendered them ineffective (ICG, 2019; Siddiqui, 2023).

(2) Autonomy was Limited by Executive Overrides

Although the Order sought to reduce political influence, the revival of executive control over postings and transfers undermined reform intentions (Kalia, 2013; Khan & Khan, 2020).

(3) Organisational Reforms Lacked Resource Support

The separation of investigation from operations mirrored global best practices, but insufficient training, poor coordination, and limited IT infrastructure prevented meaningful implementation (Minhas et al., 2019).

(4) Bureaucratic-Political Dynamics Hindered Implementation

Provincial Home Departments perceived reforms as encroaching on their authority, fostering institutional resistance (Sadiq, 2020; Najam, 2022).

These institutional contradictions highlight a major gap: scholars have evaluated the structure of the Order but not how the implementers (senior police officers) experience these contradictions. This study directly addresses this gap.

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2.17 Political Interference and Tenure Instability: A Critical Synthesis

Political interference is consistently identified as the most pervasive challenge in Pakistan's policing system. However, past studies rarely analyse how officers themselves interpret political pressures. A critical review shows that, political actors use police postings as tools of influence (Rana, 2021). Officers with short tenures cannot implement long-term reforms (Shafiq & Raza, 2023). Electoral politics impacts operational priorities (Siddiqa, 2020).

Yet, missing from the literature is an exploration of the lived experience of navigating these pressures. IPA is uniquely suited to fill this void, as it examines how officers "make sense" of such dynamics.

2.18 Bureaucratic Conflict and Fragmented Governance

Bureaucratic tension particularly between police leadership and Home Departments emerges repeatedly in literature, but generally as description rather than analytical interpretation. Institutional theory explains this as power preservation; actors resist reforms that threaten their control (Mahoney & Thelen, 2020). In Pakistan Home Departments historically controlled transfers, budgets, and strategic decisions. Police Order 2002 attempted to shift some authority to police leadership. Bureaucratic pushback weakened oversight structures and reversed decentralisation. Existing studies highlight the conflict but do not explore how senior police officers interpret these tensions. This study addresses this missing perspective.

2.19 Organisational Culture, Leadership, and Internal Resistance

A recurring theme in global policing research is that hierarchical, militaristic cultures impede reform (Verma, 2021; Bradford & Jackson, 2022). A critical synthesis of Pakistani literature shows that police training emphasises discipline over problem-solving. Leadership is centralised, limiting innovation. Performance systems reward compliance, not reform. Informal loyalty networks undermine meritocracy. Yet, no qualitative study explores how senior officers experience these cultural constraints or how organisational norms shape reform outcomes. This constitutes a major empirical gap.

2.20 Empirical Studies on Policing in Pakistan: A Gap-Focused Review

Existing empirical work in Pakistan remains limited in depth and scope. Survey based studies highlight resource shortages, politicisation, and lack of accountability (Minhas et al., 2019). Qualitative studies document structural weaknesses but do not explore lived experiences (Abbas, 2012). Mixed-method studies identify bureaucratic barriers but do not connect them to institutional theory (Sadiq & Sohail, 2021). Across the literature, no study uses IPA or any interpretive methodology to examine how senior officers interpret reform failure, how institutional pressures are internalised, and how implementers make sense of contradictory reform mandates. This study fills the unique methodological gap.

2.21 Summary Tables

Table 2.1: Comparison of Global Police Reform Models

Model	Core Principles	Strengths	Pakistan Limitations
Democratic Policing	Accountability, rights, transparency	Promotes legitimacy	Political interference undermines oversight
Community Policing	Partnership, prevention	Builds trust	Weak local governments; poor training
Professional Policing	Autonomy, merit	Reduces bias	Political transfers disrupt continuity
Intelligence-led Policing	Data-driven	Effective for CT	Limited IT infrastructure

Table 2.2:Institutional Barriers Identified in Literature

Barrier	Description	Key Authors
Politicisation	Postings, pressure, influence	Abbas (2012), Rana (2021)
Bureaucratic Conflict	Home Dept vs Police leadership	Sadiq (2020), Najam (2022)
Organisational Culture	Hierarchy, resistance	Verma (2021), Jackson (2022)
Resource Constraints	Training, budgets	Minhas et al. (2019)

Table 2.3:Empirical Gap in Pakistani Policing Research

Author	Method	Findings	Gap
Abbas (2011)	Qualitative	Politicisation, weak oversight	No lived experience focus
Minhas (2019)	Survey	Resource issues	Lacks theory
Sadiq (2021)	Mixed	Bureaucratic challenges	No interpretive analysis

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2.22 Linkage to research problem

The scrutiny of existing literature and reports on policing in the subcontinent, both before and after independence, highlights the critical importance of accountability, transparency, and community engagement in law enforcement (Light, 2014; Lowrey-Kinberg, 2018; J. Smith, 1994b). While the police reforms introduced during the colonial period laid the groundwork for modern policing in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the continued challenges facing these countries underscore the need for ongoing reform.

Existing literature extensively talks about multi-faceted approaches to police reform that addresses the root causes of corruption (Naz et al., 2014; Petzschmann, 2010; Rashid et al., 2021b), advocates improvement in training and professionalism (Light, 2014; Oluwanisola, 2022; Paterson, 2011; Scrivner, 1994), and suggests greater cooperation between the police and the communities they serve (Bashir et al., 2022; Corsaro et al., 2015a; Goldsmith, 2005; Maguire & Johnson, 2010; Siddiqi et al., 2014c). Despite wealth of literature available on historical evolution of police reform in subcontinent, legal and administrative framework governing law enforcement and evaluation of broader public sector reform trends in Pakistan, there remains a considerable space of an empirical study how reforms actually unfolded on ground by exploring the perspective of senior police officers. The study of political, institutional and social challenges hampering the implementation of policing reforms is critical from the lens of senior police officers. These gaps justify the need for an IPA based study that examines the lived experiences of senior police officers to explain *why* reforms repeatedly fail in Pakistan despite recurring structural redesigns. The literature clearly shows what the problems are but does not explore how practitioners understand them. This study fills that gap.

2.23 Theoretical considerations

This study adopts Institutionalism and New Institutionalism as its theoretical lenses to explain why policing reforms particularly the Police Order 2002 struggle to achieve their intended outcomes. Institutional theory is highly relevant for analysing reform implementation because it highlights how structures, norms, political interests, and historical legacies shape the behaviour of actors, and how these institutional pressures enable or constrain the adoption of new practices. In the context of policing, this theoretical approach provides a robust framework for understanding why technically sound reforms often fail in practice.

This is the best applicable theory that can be used to discover solutions to the topic that is under studied. Institutional theory, sometimes known as institutionalism, refers to the role that institutions play in determining how human conduct is constrained or empowered. An institution's role in policymaking is emphasized in institutional theory; hence, the most general explanation for how institutions effect policy output is to understand how institutions empower and limit policymakers (described through various patterns). In a nutshell, institutional theory studies the role of institutions in policymaking and explores the role of institutions (Olsen, 2015a).

Institutional theory argues that institutions formal rules, informal norms, shared beliefs, and taken-for-granted routines shape how actors behave and how policies operate (Olsen, 2015; Scott, 2015). Scott's influential framework identifies three institutional pillars, regulative (rules, laws, sanctions), normative (values, role expectations) and cultural-cognitive (shared meaning systems).

These pillars explain why institutional arrangements tend to persist and why organizational behaviour rarely changes simply through structural redesign. Within policing studies, classical institutionalism has long emphasized how formal political structures shape police authority, accountability, and professional autonomy (Crank & Langworthy, 1993). Historical institutionalism adds that past arrangements such as the colonial Police Act 1861 create path dependencies that constrain future reforms (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). Thus, the colonial legacy of centralized, executive-controlled policing continues to influence contemporary reform outcomes in Pakistan.

Institutional theory looks at deeper and more stable parts of how society works. It knows how societies, systems, values, rules, and traditions are set up and accepted as rules for how people should behave in groups and in society as a whole (W. R. Scott et al., 2015a). Different segments of institutional theory discuss how these structures are generated, dispersed, accepted or rejected with the passage of time. As far as the definition is concerned Scott (W. R. Scott et al., 2015b) is of the view that there exists no single definition of the "institution". He states that:

> Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. They are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts. Institutions operate at different levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to localized interpersonal relationships. Institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous.

Scott narrated (W. Scott, 2008) institutional theory is “a widely recognized theoretical stance that highlights rational myths, isomorphism, and legitimacy.” The basic concepts and zones of the institutional theory bring valuable recommendations for studying organization-environment relationships. It elaborates those norms, values, traditions and social behaviors tend to pressurize the institutions. The theory is based on the principle of legitimacy and it has no concern for the principles of organizational efficiency and effectiveness (Aksom & Tymchenko, 2020).

The scholars and researchers working in the field of institutional research implies that institutional environment can severely affect the establishment of official structure in an organization (Zucker, 1987). Ramsey discussed three sorts of institutional theory i.e sociological institutionalism historical institutionalism and political institutionalism. As far as the study of policy is concerned, sociological institutionalism is in pursuit of legitimization in political setups and it is concerned with the ways it generates meaning for the individuals (Ramsey, 2014b).

Traditionally, historical institutionalism places an emphasis on the ways in which scheduling, arrangements, and path dependency influence institutions, mold sociopolitical and economic behavior, and bring about change (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). In political science, rational choice theory and behaviorism were two of the major influences that led to the development of historical institutionalism. It asserts that institutions are not typically established for the aim of serving a useful function and calls for historical

research to be conducted to track the changes that led to the foundation and continued existence of policies and institutions.

Even though it is acknowledged as a theoretical school, political institutionalism has a less robust sense of its own self-identity. The assertions of political institutionalism are often positioned at the state or macro political level. Political institutionalism takes the position that the process of forming states, political systems, and political party systems has a significant impact on the political processes and outcomes (Ramsey, 2014b).

The study of political institutionalism is similar to the study of historical institutionalism, although political institutionalism came first and established the primary theoretical strain within historical institutionalism. Political institutionalism emerged as a reaction to the previously prevalent pluralist and Marxist approaches to politics, both of which presented a simplistic picture of states and other political institutions. Political institutionalism offered a more nuanced perspective. Political institutionalisms, as opposed to sociological institutionalisms, place their emphasis not on the convergence of policy between nations, but rather on the long-standing institutional disparities that exist between nations.

The awareness of the institutional environments in which departments engage is an important advance in police theory and study. Police environments and their relationship to police organizational structures and practices can be conceptualized and empirically assessed within the framework provided by a body of thought known as the "theory of institutionalized organizations". Traditional "old institutionalism" and "new institutionalism" are the primary paradigms in institutional theory (institutionalism). In

the late 19th and early 20th centuries, political science and public administration began to identify the formal institutions of government. The traditional or classical view holds that the state's operation is dependent on the structure and efficiency of political institutions in addition to economic and social factors (Mahmud, 2020). Following the conclusion of the First World War, an era known as old institutionalism began, during which time the establishment of formal institutions, such as the constitution, received a lot of attention. On the other hand, numerous social and economic issues, such as the Great Depression in the 1930s, led to the ineffectiveness of the policies that were put into place.

2.24 Institutional Frameworks in Policing Studies

Crank & Langworthy (1993) introduced the concept of sovereigns actors whose approval police organizations must secure for legitimacy (e.g., politicians, bureaucrats, judiciary, media, and citizens). Police reform implementation is shaped by how police organizations respond to, negotiate with, or become dependent on these sovereigns. Similarly, Mastrofski & Willis (2010) argue that successful police reforms require alignment between technical environments (training, resources, procedures) and institutional environments (political, cultural, societal expectations). Reforms that ignore these institutional realities tend to fail.

According to Crank and Langworthy's groundbreaking work, police reforms frequently fail because reformers fail to take into consideration the institutional environment's restricting or enabling impacts on police organizations (Crank & Langworthy, 1993a). They stated that “a police department participates with other powerful actors, called sovereigns, in its institutional environment, and it receives legitimacy from these

sovereigns. Sovereigns are those actors whose views are significant, that is, they are the entities have the capacity to affect the fundamental well-being of the organization" (Crank & Langworthy, 1993b).

Jude McCulloch in his recommendations for reforming the police were directed toward the institutional context, and they were especially concerned with ensuring that the police adhere to the rule of law. According to what they claimed, the primary objective of police reform should be the reinvigoration of law as a basis for police behavior (McCulloch, 1993b). In order to bring the police force into compliance with this standard, the performance requirements for the police force need to be completely rethought, and the behaviour of police line officers needs to be thoroughly investigated. To put it another way, there is a requirement for something that is known as "coercive isomorphism," which indicates that law enforcement authorities should be required to conform to such criteria as an obligation (Amaral et al., 2013). Another theory which helps us to develop deeper understanding of reforms within the context of policing is new institutional theory. Through the perspective of the new institutionalism theory, one can analyse the context and elements that influence policy. People's preferences are influenced by the conditions, incentives, and constraints that are created by this context, which includes both formal and informal rules, as well as culture, customs, and ideas. It is a later development of the well-known institutional theory, which investigates how institutions and rules, as repetitive patterns of actions and practices, affect the behaviors of individuals. It is one of the fundamental theoretical viewpoints In both the field of political science in general and the field of studies of public policy in particular (Mouritsen, 1994).

A fundamental movement in political science thinking occurred following World War II, as new governments and institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), were formed. To better serve the needs of the general public, formal state organizations and rule-based organizational structures have lost favor. Problems like unemployment arose when the social, economic and political institutions grew in scope. For this reason, policymakers shifted their focus away from traditional institutional frameworks towards "new institutionalism," which emphasizes the distribution of power and collaborative action through informal relationships. 'New institutionalism' as a distinct school of thought was started by two political academics (Olsen, 2015b).

Later on, scholars like Mastrofski further made development in the theory. In their work on Police reforms (Mastrofski & Willis, 2010b) they suggested that police function in both technical and institutional settings; therefore, a survey of previously published works on police reform was conducted, and the consequences of these writings were analyzed with regard to these settings. The institutional and technical contexts that each one provided came with its own unique set of challenges and opportunities for transformation. The efforts that were being put into reform needed to be linked to the distinctive characteristics of the right environment. It essentially signifies that the reforms that have been established in one region of the world may not be appropriate in another context because of the differences between the cultures and behavioral pattern of two regions. For instance, the United States of America and Pakistan have different types of policing difficulties; hence, reforms implemented in the United States of America might not be applicable in Pakistan.

2.25 New Institutionalism: Informal Rules, Power Dynamics, and Meaning-Making

New institutionalism extends this perspective by recognizing the central role of informal practices, social norms, political incentives, ideas, and internalized belief systems in shaping policy implementation (Olsen, 2015). It highlights that individuals do not merely follow formal rules; rather, they act within an institutional environment shaped by:

1. Political interference
2. Patronage relations
3. Inter-bureaucratic power struggles
4. Organizational culture
5. Leadership norms
6. Tacit expectations and unwritten rules

For policing reforms, new institutionalism provides a deeper explanation of why reforms fail even when laws change. It shifts the analytical focus from what institutions are to how institutions work in practice an essential lens for understanding the lived experience of senior police officers navigating political and bureaucratic pressures.

2.26 Operationalization of Theoretical Framework

To ensure the rigour in the study, institutionalism and new institutionalism were explicitly operationalized into analytical constructs that informed the development of interview questions, inductive coding and the interpretation of empirical themes.

2.26.1 Institutional Constructs Used in Analysis

Based on Scott (2015), Olsen (2015), and Crank & Langworthy (1993), the following institutional constructs guided the analytical process:

1. **Regulative pressures**

Laws, formal policies, rules, Police Order 2002 provisions, transfer/posting systems

2. **Normative pressures**

Professional expectations, policing culture, role obligations

3. **Cultural-cognitive pressures**

Shared assumptions (e.g., "political influence is inevitable"), unwritten rules

4. **Power and sovereignty dynamics**

Influence of politicians, Home Department, and bureaucracy

5. **Historical path dependency**

Persistence of colonial policing logic and centralization

6. **Organizational isomorphism**

Conformity to political expectations, not reform objectives

These constructs were not applied deductively at the start, rather they served as sensitizing concepts during inductive coding (consistent with IPA).

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2.26.2 How Institutional Theory Shaped Empirical Themes

The emergent superordinate themes directly reflect institutional mechanisms:

Emergent Theme	Institutional Construct
Political interference	Sovereign pressure, normative expectations
Bureaucratic conflict with Home Department	Regulative control, power asymmetry
Resource and capacity gaps	Misalignment of technical and institutional environments
Organizational culture & resistance	Cultural-cognitive pressures
Weak oversight & accountability	Deficient regulative mechanisms
Colonial legacy mentality	Historical path dependency

2.26.3 Why IPA Aligns with Institutional Theory

Institutional theory explains structures and pressures, IPA explains how actors experience and interpret them. By combining both, Institutional theory identifies the sources of constraints, IPA reveals how senior officers make sense of these constraints. This pairing is methodologically coherent because it connects Macro-level institutional environments with Micro-level lived experiences of implementers. This produces a richer, more theoretically grounded understanding of reform challenges in Pakistan.

Institutionalism and new institutionalism provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the persistent challenges in implementing police reforms in Pakistan. They explain how formal laws, informal norms, political incentives, organizational routines, and historical legacies shape the behaviour of senior police officers and ultimately

condition the success or failure of reforms. By operationalising these constructs within an IPA methodology, this study links institutional theory directly to the empirical data, ensuring analytical depth and doctoral-level rigour.

Conclusion

As discussed above that Pakistan has witnessed variety of police reform packages and seemingly none of them have been successful in reforming the police to the modern standards of efficient, people friendly and accountable police. The latest phase of police reforms i.e Police Order 2002 was seen as a ray of hope to transform the things in the right direction, however as shown in the above discussion that it lacks in its implementation, This study is in pursuit to fill in the gap by addressing the challenges in the implementation of policing reforms from the perspectives of senior police officers, which will be helpful for the policy makers to understand the challenges and build strategies to overcome those challenges in the implementation of Police Order 2002.

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CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher discussed the methodology section of the current study in detail. A brief discussion of the research objectives followed by the rationale for selecting a specific methodology to achieve the desired research objectives has been presented. One of the primary goals of this current research was to explore the challenges in implementing police reforms in Pakistan. This chapter sheds light on the research paradigm, methodology, research approach, respondents, means to collect information and analysis in detail.

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3.2 Research paradigm

Research paradigm is a fundamental framework that guides the researcher on how to select a methodology and design his research based upon the ontology (reality) and the epistemology (knowledge). These paradigms serves as a lens to view the problem under investigation. The three dominant paradigms discussed in research landscape are positivism, subjectivism (interpretivism) and postmodernism (which is also called as pragmatic or mixed methods). The positivism has its roots in objectivity and empirical

observation. This paradigm assumes that there is a single reality, and assumes it can be measured independent of human perception using structured methodologies such as surveys using statistical analysis. It is most suitable for quantitative studies. Subjectivism (interpretivism) believes in multiple realities. It relies on the lived experiences and perceptions of humans in a naturalistic setting, making it ideal for qualitative research studying human experiences, social interactions and perceptions through interviews by using thematic and interpretative analysis. While the postmodernist research paradigm takes a more pragmatic approach by combining both quantitative and qualitative approach. This paradigm focuses on the solution of the problems rather to strictly adhere to the epistemological standpoint of one specific paradigm and hence gives more liberty to the researcher.

3.2.1 Epistemological Standpoint

Research paradigms are important because they form the philosophical basis of research. Interpretive research is a research paradigm that assumes social reality is not singular or objective but is rather shaped by human experiences and social contexts (ontology) (J. A. Smith & Osborn, 2015). As a result, interpretive research proposes that social reality is best studied within its context by reconciling the subjective interpretations of its various participants (Tuffour, 2017). This can be accomplished by analyzing the data in a way that considers the various participants' perspectives (epistemology). Since interpretive researchers view social reality as being embedded within and impossible to abstract from their social settings, they "interpret" the reality through a "sense-making" process rather than a hypothesis testing process (Pietkiewicz et al., 2014). In contrast to the statistical techniques that are heavily used in positivist research, the interpretative paradigm focuses

on the meanings from the perspective of the participants by exploring their thoughts about a phenomenon they have experienced (Noon, 2018).

Considering the nature of the research, the research paradigm which suits this study is subjectivism (interpretivism). This qualitative study explores how senior police officers interpret and describe their experiences of implementing reforms, delving into the meanings they attach to their journeys. Traditionally, research on police has been dominated by quantitative methods, grounded in positivism, which was long viewed as the superior approach (Bevir, 2002). However, in recent years, qualitative research has gained increasing recognition and credibility for its ability to provide deep insights into social realities. Unlike positivism, which assumes a singular, objective truth, qualitative research embraces the idea that there are multiple realities, each shaped by individual perspectives and experiences (Ruediger Kaufmann et al., 2012). Researchers in this field focus on gathering and analyzing personal narratives, allowing for a richer understanding of human experiences. As one scholar notes, qualitative research is particularly well suited for exploring the meanings people create in relation to their lived experiences (Fletcher, 2017).

3.3 Strategy of inquiry- Qualitative approach

The rationale for adopting a qualitative research paradigm in this thesis on police reforms is grounded in the need to gain a deep, contextualized understanding of the complexities surrounding reform implementation. Police reforms, particularly in socio-politically dynamic environments, are influenced by various factors such as organizational culture, leadership perspectives, and socio-political pressures (Gutierrez-Garcia & Rodríguez,

2016). The qualitative approach is particularly suited for exploring these intricacies, as it prioritizes the subjective experiences and perceptions of key stakeholders (Knott et al., 2022), such as senior police officers and policymakers.

Unlike quantitative methods, which focus on measuring variables and generalizing findings, qualitative research allows for the in-depth exploration of how individuals within the police force understand, interpret, and navigate reforms (Fawcett, 2019). This approach is necessary because police reform is not merely a technical adjustment but involves shifts in attitudes, institutional practices, and power dynamics. Through interviews, case studies, and thematic analysis, the qualitative paradigm facilitates a nuanced investigation into how these reforms are experienced and perceived by those responsible for their implementation (Asif & Mamoon, 2018).

Furthermore, the qualitative paradigm allows the researcher to explore the complexities and resistances that quantitative measures may not capture. It provides flexibility to account for the diverse challenges and cultural factors specific to the context of policing in Pakistan, offering insights that could inform more effective, context-sensitive reforms. In sum, the qualitative research paradigm offers the most appropriate lens for capturing the lived experiences, challenges, and opportunities encountered by those involved in the reform process (Finlay, 2009).

3.3.1 Selection of suitable qualitative approach

There are various research approaches which can be used to conduct a qualitative study depending upon the research problems and objectives of study. Such approaches include,

ethnography, phenomenological, case study, normative study, grounded theory and action research. This study adopted phenomenological and interpretative phenomenological analysis approach to study the problem. The concept, justification and compatibility of this approach presented below.

3.3.2 Compatibility of IPA with the study

Phenomenology is the qualitative approach used to study the lived experiences of the individuals and understand how they make sense of their experiences and perceptions. The roots of this approach are found in the work of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidgger (Conroy, 2003). Whereas interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) is a specific approach within phenomenology that integrates the subjective exploration of experiences of the individuals with interpretative analysis (Pietkiewicz et al., 2014). Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is highly compatible with research on police reforms as it focuses on exploring how individuals make sense of their personal and professional experiences related to implementation of police reforms, IPA allows for an in-depth exploration of how senior police officers and other key stakeholders interpret and internalize the changes brought by reform efforts (Frechette et al., 2020).

IPA is designed to explore the lived experiences of individuals, making it an ideal approach for understanding the personal and professional realities of senior police officers involved in reform implementation. Police reforms often have a significant impact on the way officers perform their duties, perceive their roles, and navigate challenges. IPA's focus on subjective experience allows researchers to capture how these reforms are experienced, understood, and navigated by those directly affected (Larkin et al., 2006). In

IPA, the researcher not only gathers data about experiences but also interprets the meaning behind those experiences (M Reiners, 2012). This approach aligns well with the objectives of the study to understand the challenges in reform implementation from the perspective of senior police officers. Reforms introduced may be influenced by the prior experiences of police officers, organizational culture, and societal expectations. Through IPA, the researcher explored how these factors shape the officers' understanding and response to reforms, providing a deeper insight into both support for and resistance to change.

IPA focuses on detailed, in-depth analysis of individual cases allows for a comprehensive understanding of how reforms affect individual officers (Knott et al., 2022). Each officer's perspective may differ based on their expertise, location, experience, or personal views on reform, making IPA an ideal tool to capture these diverse, individualized experiences. This can help to identify patterns and themes in how reforms are perceived and implemented across different contexts. Police reform is deeply contextual, influenced by the local sociopolitical environment, organizational structures, and interpersonal relationships within the force. IPA offers rich, contextual insights by allowing participants to narrate their experiences in their own words (Larkin et al., 2006). This is particularly important in police reforms, where the broader institutional and cultural environment significantly shapes the process and outcomes of reforms.

Police reforms often involve such as accountability, power dynamics, institutional practices and public perception. IPA's emphasis on understanding the emotional aspects of participants' experiences makes it well-suited to explore the complexities of how police officers engage with the reforms and how these affect their morale, job satisfaction, and

views on institutional change (Finlay, 2013). IPA offers the flexibility to explore reforms from various angles, such as personal motivations, institutional challenges, or social impacts. This flexibility is crucial in the field of police reform, where the outcomes and experiences of reforms can vary widely across regions, ranks, and personal histories. IPA's depth also ensures that the study captures not just the "what" of reform experiences, but also the "how" and "why," leading to a comprehensive understanding of the reform process.

IPA's emphasis on lived experience, interpretation of meaning, and detailed exploration of individual perspectives makes it highly compatible with research on police reforms. By allowing for a nuanced understanding of how senior police officers perceive and respond to reforms, IPA offers valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities in the reform process. This approach can help uncover not only the practical implications of reforms but also the emotional, socio-cultural and institutional dimensions that influence their success or failure.

3.4 Philosophical and theoretical background of IPA

Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is a qualitative research approach deeply rooted in theoretical and philosophical traditions that shape its methodology. It focuses on exploring and understanding how individuals make sense of their personal and lived experiences, emphasizing the subjective and contextual nature of human perception. The theoretical and philosophical background of IPA is founded on phenomenology (Ruediger Kaufmann et al., 2012).

3.4.1 Phenomenology

Phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl in the early 20th century, is the primary philosophical underpinning of IPA. It is concerned with the study of subjective, lived experiences and the meanings individuals assign to these experiences (Pringle et al., 2011). Key phenomenological concepts central to IPA include:

3.4.2 Intentionality

One of the core principles of phenomenology is that consciousness is always directed towards something; in other words, experiences are always about something (J. A. Smith & Osborn, 2015). This means that when individuals reflect on their experiences, they are always engaging with a particular object, event, or phenomenon. The researcher tried to examine in this research that how senior police officers interpret their experiences and perceptions towards the political, institutional and socio-cultural challenges related to their specific roles and how these challenges have shaped their responses. The reflections of the senior police officers are important in developing the insights about the socio-cultural and institutional challenges related to police reform implementation in Pakistan.

3.4.3 Bracketing

Bracketing, or epoché, refers to the process of setting aside preconceived notions and biases to focus on the participants' perspectives (LeVasseur, 2003). This involves suspending judgments about the world to understand experiences from the participants' viewpoints (Tufford & Newman, 2012). This aspect was crucial in this study. The researcher remained conscious on his preconceived notions of institutional reform challenges, barriers to police reform implementation and governance failures. To ensure

the rigor and transparency of the data, different strategies were employed during the analysis phase such as reflective journaling peer debriefing, using direct quotes from the senior police officers. Finally, the iterative data analysis approach was used to ensure that voices of the senior police officers remain a central part of the analysis and avoid researcher's own biasness and get the insightful information on the challenges in the implementation of policing reforms.

3.4.4 Essences of Experience:

Husserl aimed to uncover the essential structures of experiences by identifying the core aspects or essences of phenomena (Lin, 2013). IPA shares this goal, seeking to distill the fundamental elements of how participants experience and make sense of specific events or changes in their lives (Neubauer et al., 2019). The essence of experience in the context of this study lies in the fact that how senior police officers navigate through the challenges of dealing with the institutional barriers and socio-political hurdles in implementing policing reforms. Evidently their experiences are shaped by colonial and historical policing frameworks, political interference and multi stake holder environment in which reforms were introduced and implemented.

3.5 Theoretical Implications for IPA

IPA's theoretical foundations underscore several core assumptions:

3.5.1 Subjectivity:

IPA acknowledges that individuals have unique, subjective experiences shaped by their personal, social, and cultural contexts. The approach values these subjective interpretations as central to understanding how people make sense of their world.

3.5.2 Contextual Understanding

IPA recognizes that experiences do not occur in isolation but are influenced by broader contexts. Researchers using IPA consider the social, cultural, and historical contexts that shape participants' experiences, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study.

3.5.3 Dynamic Interaction

The interpretative process in IPA involves a dynamic interaction between the researcher and the participants. The researcher's role is not just to collect data but to engage actively in interpreting and understanding the participants' experiences. This interaction is essential for uncovering the meanings and insights embedded in the participants' narratives.

3.6 Conclusion

The theoretical and philosophical background of IPA is deeply rooted in phenomenology. These frameworks collectively inform IPA's focus on exploring and interpreting the nuanced, subjective experiences of individuals. Phenomenology provides the foundation for understanding lived experiences, and IPA offers a lens for interpretation within context and emphasizes detailed, context-specific analysis. Together, this IPA approach enables

to provide rich, detailed insights into complex phenomena, making it particularly well-suited for research that seeks to understand the intricacies of personal and professional experiences. The purpose of this study is to investigate the challenges associated with police reforms in Pakistan, as well as to understand the issues in the implementation of such reforms. Considering the context, objectives, research questions, and phenomenon under investigation, it is understandable to employ an interpretive phenomenological research approach, utilizing qualitative research techniques in order to achieve the desired results in this situation.

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CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHOD

4.1 Introduction

This chapter details the research method adopted to explore police reform challenges as perceived by senior ranking officers, within Pakistan. This includes a description of how the participants were recruited, interviewed and interpreted using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).

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Due to the subjective nature of this complex phenomenon, a qualitative research approach was considered most suitable. By conducting in-depth interviews information was gathered and the lived experiences and perceptions of participants was explored. This method was helpful in yielding insights related to institutional challenges, bureaucratic hurdles and socio-political dynamics that may not otherwise be possible to attain with quantitative approaches. IPA was specifically selected to the data analysis as it attempts to explain how people make sense of their life and professional experience. The methods used for this study were documents review and interviews. The use of documents review and interview provides a comprehensive understanding of the challenges encountered during the implementing of policing reforms.

Review of the document enabled the analysis of legislative frameworks, policy documents, prior reports of commissions and earlier research in this field which developed a foundation to understand the systematic barriers, reform inconsistencies and historical evolution of policing reforms. Additionally, the documents review also helped in triangulation of the findings of the study. Complementing this the nuanced perspectives and lived experiences of senior police officers through interviews generated meaningful insights of institutional realities in implementing the reforms at the operational level. Likewise this approach also aligns with the interpretative phenomenological analysis which emphasize subjective and contextual understanding. The final section in this chapter focus on the manner of 'doing and conducting' research with commitment to methodological rigor. The record outlines how the interviewees were approached and interviewed, as well as showing how data was interpreted and IPA analysis conducted. It also explains ethical considerations and reliability & validation strategies adopted.

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4.2 Review of Documents

The review of documents in the context of this research on police reforms addresses one of the objectives of the study to assess the existing police reform policies adopted by the government in improving police image and performance and its achievements. Document review was focused on analyzing a range of primary and secondary sources to uncover the structural and operational challenges within the police force, as well as the efficacy of reform measures. Primary documents such as official reports by police departments and government-initiated commissions were closely studied to identify recurring themes like corruption, political interference, resource deficiencies, and accountability lapses.

For instance, reports produced by commissions mentioned below were studied which provided meticulous insights into the institutional, and socio-political problems that necessitate reforms.

1. Police Commission of 1951 under Sir Oliver Gilbert Grace
2. Police Commission of 1961 under Justice J.B.Constantine
3. Pakistan Police Commission of 1969 under Major General A.O.Mitha
4. Police Station Inquiry Committee of 1976 under M.A.K Chaudhry
5. Police Reforms Committee of 1976 under Rafi Raza
6. Police Committee of 1976 under Aslam Hayat
7. Police Reforms Implementation Committee of 1990 under M.A.K Chaudhry
8. Punjab Government Committee of 2001 under Shahzad Hassan Pervaiz
9. Focal Group on Police Reforms of 2000

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Furthermore, secondary sources, including academic papers and policy analyses, were used to contextualize these findings and compare them with international best practices. This method helps to understand the gap between the policy and the practice and enhanced the understanding of the researcher on policing reform challenges. Specifically, it identifies the patterns and solutions offered across various reform initiatives, which highlighted the systemic resistance to reform, often attributed to entrenched political interests and lack of oversight mechanisms. Judicial inquiry reports further complemented the analysis by providing case-specific evidence of police misconduct, revealing deeper issues in operational transparency and ethical policing. This comprehensive review of

documents serves as a foundational step in understanding the historical and ongoing struggles to implement sustainable police reforms in Pakistan. The findings of the document review by addressing first objective of the study discussed in detail in chapter five.

4.3 Interview

This research also utilised interviews to clarify, strengthen, and enrich the data obtained from the document review. The following outlines the steps undertaken in the process.

4.3.1 Preparation for the interview

Besides document review, interviews were conducted with senior police officers to explore their lived experiences and perceptions. Using IPA approach interviews were employed to understand the experiences, values and judgments of senior police command. The aim was to understand the intricate details of their policing experiences and to learn how and why things happened as they did. Interview provide researcher a more space to delve deeper and investigate particular subject areas which arise during conversation with senior police officers (Smith et al., 2005). The use of interviews in this study provides several key benefits. One, the researcher was able to yield rich and detailed data that mirrors the complexity of lived experiences. Further it provides the researcher with enough flexibility to enhance or modify or even change the questions during the interview. This flexibility during the interview created a research space which allowed senior officers to express; what experiences in dealing reforms mean for them and how they relate their responses to it. This is the one of the core essences of the conducting interviews using IPA.

Additionally, the researcher tried to create some connection and build a bond during interaction by allowing senior police officers to narrate their experiences the way they want to express. This dynamic is vital for facilitating frank and honest responses, particularly when questions are of a sensitive or personal nature. Simultaneously the researcher engaged in a dialogue and interaction with participants to rich data, and a detailed understanding of challenges encountered during police reform implementation. This resulted in development of a context and in-depth information for understanding the participant's world and conditions, which deepen analysis by placing experiences within their wider contexts (the detail is given in chapter six).

The use of interviews in this qualitative research using IPA resulted in certain challenges. Conducting interviews and their transcription was time consuming. But this method helped the researcher to probe lived experiences of senior police officers and understand the complex structures, generating valuable insights about their professional lives. Additionally, difficulties were faced by the researcher in gaining access to these elite police officers and execute interviews but the depth of detail rendered by these senior police officers in investigating persistent police reform challenges in Pakistan overwhelmed the difficulties.

4.4 Recruitment of Participants

Recruitment of participants was the one of the important elements in this qualitative study, especially when conducting interviews using IPA which considers the experiences lived by individuals. This study was carried out to understand the nuances of policing from the perspective of senior police officers. A well thought criterion for selection was a priori

designed to ensure the selected participants could give valuable and detailed data that, deepens the understanding of policing reforms. A purposive sampling technique was employed to come closer and enroll those respondents who are senior police officers having the familiarity of reform processes. Purposeful sampling was most suitable in this study as it helped the researcher to select those individuals who have a sound knowledge and experience of policing reforms and challenges to its implementation. The prime reason this study focused on senior police officers to collect views is that, the insightful information required to develop understanding related to the challenges of policing reforms was not possible through the perspective of lower ranked officers or individuals outside the force.

4.4.1 Criteria used in selecting participants

The criteria for selecting the participants in this study was related with the ontological perspectives of IPA, which emphasize that participant make sense of their experiences under their distinctive context. Having roots in the phenomenological framework, IPA acknowledges the subjective nature of reality and focus on the in-depth exploration of participant's world. Adhering to the IPA guidelines the participants were purposefully selected to ensure that participants provide insightful information on challenges in the implementation of policing reforms. Senior police officers, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) have a holistic view of policing operations, laws and organizational culture. The choice of senior-ranking police officers makes it possible to delve more deeply into the workings of policing organizations. These people implement policies and contribute to shaping the organizational culture and developing communication between officers.

Their perspectives can help illuminate the relationship between leadership, team work and some of the challenges in maintaining good policing. Further, the emphasis on top-tier figures was necessary to offer perspectives that are grounded in the complexities of police governance. To confirm participants have detailed knowledge of policing reforms, more than 20 years of experience was an eligibility requirement for this study. The requirement of experience of 20 years ensured senior police officers have institutional knowledge, necessary to contextualize reforms within historical and organizational dynamics. Senior police officers have insights worth learning from, in a rapidly changing world of policing and the complexity that is required to hold leadership positions. Participation in interviews demands from potential participants a true openness to be suitable for the study.

Due to the requirement of this study for its objectives in-depth knowledge and insights of the senior Police officers were crucial for understanding country-specific policing complexities. Further, they were responsible for decisions affecting how policies will be implemented, which resources will go where and what operational strategies should exist. They were witness to various policing reforms in the country and hence considered as the living proof. The study chose these individuals to sample insightful perspectives that encompass police governance dynamics as well as the leadership challenges in law enforcement more broadly.

Meeting with these top-tier officers was invaluable, as these individuals are the only ones commission to have a well-informed opinion about shifty organizational rules, challenges of operations and how external factors influence policing practices. Senior officers are frequently engaged in discussions about strategies aimed at crime prevention, community

involvement and working collaboratively with other agencies. Their ideas feed directly into the analysis, helping to frame why things work like they do in policing or molding police actions and reactions. Precisely, they are the ones who know "why" and how reforms were deigned. Interviews with such senior police officers were meant to provide additional depth and context to how various police strategies and practices affect policing in the country.

4.5 The process of approaching the participants

The criteria set out in this research to select the participants involved the inclusion of most senior police officers i.e Inspector General of Police (IGP). IGP are the at the top of hierarchy in the police organization, and in the given context they fall under the elite group of police. Conducting research with elite is quite challenging.

The researcher is working as a faculty member at a public sector university in Pakistan that has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Police Bureau, Islamabad. The National Police Bureau is the premier institution working under the federal government to steer reform efforts in the country's police forces. As a think tank on most criminal justice-related issues, the National Police Bureau was tasked with generating policy initiatives on police reform and serving as a source of information for the public. The researcher believed, this would be extremely beneficial to him in the future when it comes to data collection and acquisition of other related material (reports of police commissions). But as soon as the journey proceeded, the researcher was exposed to multifaceted challenges related to organizational politics which he didn't anticipated earlier.

To his surprise when he asked for the copy of the MOU to visit the office of the National Police Bureau Islamabad, he was told that the copy of the MOU is misplaced, and you can ask Police Bureau for the same. The researcher was shocked as he was banking on this MOU for his data collection, as it is difficult to access senior police officers generally. The researcher contacted the person concerned in the National Police Bureau regarding the provision of a copy of the said MOU, he showed his frustration and displeasure about the casual behavior of researcher's institute which has misplaced (either willfully or by mistake) the copy of the MOU, and subsequently that resulted in no progress in terms of future collaboration of researcher's university and the National Police Bureau.

The researcher then used his personal contacts in military (one of the most powerful state institutions). One of his friends who was serving as Brigadier in Pakistan army helped a lot in gaining access to one of the desired participants of the study. The Brigadier helped him in gaining access to the maiden respondent and from there onwards it was a story of 16 months in which the researcher was successful in gaining access to the top brass of police.

The professional experience in the public sector university also helped the researcher in securing access to interview senior police officers. They viewed him as a credible and reliable researcher, due to his position as a teacher and researcher in a government sector university. Specifically, one of the senior police helped a lot. The researcher established a good rapport and relationship with him at the end of the interview. He introduced researcher to his colleagues who held important senior positions in the police force.

He contacted his acquaintances to present research idea of the researcher and inquired about the possibility of arranging an in-person interview. Most people answered positively, except for three individuals who were preoccupied with their professional obligations. The researcher acquired the contact details from the maiden participant and then followed up on the interview request by expressing gratitude and requesting a meeting. The researcher contacted them via email and WhatsApp, sending a formal letter with the interview questions, protocols, and other relevant information.

Another IGP (which was contacted with reference of first participant) introduced researcher to a senior police official who willingly agreed to be interviewed. Upon arrival |`to his office, he expressed regret for not being able to engage in a conversation with the researcher due to some urgent commitments. However, recognizing the significance of study topic, he offered his assistance in an alternative capacity. The researcher promptly inquired whether he might help him get in contact with two top executives of the police. He not only reached out to them but also suggested other senior police officers. The researcher interviewed three other prominent senior IGP's who would have been hard to get otherwise. Inexperienced researchers should anticipate the unexpected and promptly seize fresh chances. Furthermore, the researcher's profile can also influence an elite individual's decision to agree to an interview based on the researcher's history, reasons, and perceived value of the interview.

In Pakistani society, a significant power distance prevails, where deference to authority is deeply ingrained. These cultural dynamic dictates that those lower in rank defer to those higher and that the younger generation show reverence to their elders. Such norms

continue to shape daily interactions, with individuals often viewing the world through the lens of status and hierarchy. During interactions, the researcher adhered to these indigenous customs, always addressing interviewees by their official titles, such as Inspector General (IGP), and employing respectful prefixes like "respected sir." Even in phone conversations and text messages, the researcher made a conscious effort to acknowledge and honor their positions of authority.

The focus of the research was on the views and insights of senior police officers in Pakistan regarding the institutional governance and challenges of police reform implementation and all these individuals possessed knowledge, perspectives, and lived experiences relevant to their context. Interviews are crucial when historical events and individuals' emotions and interpretations cannot be directly observed (Aksom & Tymchenko, 2020). Several senior police officers, both present and retired, were interviewed. These officers included the serving Inspector General of Police in different provinces and the capital territory. Few among them were part of a police reform group established by the government of Pakistan, one of them is among the senior most serving Inspector General of the Police in the country. All participants have held high positions for more than 25 years and have experience in policing reforms at national and international levels.

The large number of participants are not needed for this piece of research. Scholars have criticized the inclusion and number of interviewers. Mark N. K. Saunders and Keith Townsend, suggested that qualitative depth rather than breadth requires every interviewer to be content with six-to-nine interviews only (Saunders & Townsend, 2016). In this

research, there were two types participants which includes, one category as an incumbent Inspector-General of Police and another a retired Inspector-General. Since these people are not readily available to speak with, the researcher hoped to conduct 6–8 interviews of senior police officers but lucked out in getting access and was able to swing close encounters with ten elite police officers. The saturation level was achieved after conducting interviews with homogenous elite participants; however, the researcher continued further with two more scheduled interviews with the anticipation that it might result in yielding more information but it also generated similar sort of information.

Summary of the participants who were selected for this study is as follows: -

Table 4.1:Summary of the participants

Participant	Designation	Years of Service
P01	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	25
P02	Commandant National Police Academy (IGP)	27
P03	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	31
P04	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	34
P05	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	29
Table 4.1 Continued		
P06	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	28
P07	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	27
P08	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	32
P09	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	30
P10	Director General National Police Bureau (IGP)	33

Source: Authors' Compilation

4.6 Interview Protocol

Due to the challenging nature of top interviews, meticulous preparation was crucial. The initial step was to carefully craft the interview protocol and questions. Researchers like Gabriele Abels and Maria Behrens, suggest beginning the interview with broad inquiries

about the individual's past to encourage conversation, as people typically enjoy discussing themselves (Abels & Behrens, 2009). The interview questions were designed in alignment with research questions to explore the challenges in the implementation of policing reforms in Pakistan from the perspective of senior police officers. The interview questions were formulated through a review of police commission reports and existing literature on policing reforms which highlighted the gaps in understanding institutional, socio-political and cultural barriers to reform implementation in Pakistan. The key research question, "How do the senior police officers feel about the police image and performance of police force in Pakistan and what contributes to the hindrance of police reform implementation in Pakistan" was supported by sub-questions probing the perceptions of senior officers towards reform process, institutional dynamics and strategies to navigate these challenges. These questions aimed to unleash both the lived experiences of senior police officers and in-depth understanding of challenges shaping reform outcomes.

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The researcher started his interview questions by asking about the respondents' current role, overall responsibilities, and tasks they tend to perform as senior police officers, before progressing to more detailed inquiries. For instance, the initial inquiry frequently pertained to "your position and duties in your present employment". "How long have you been engaged in law enforcement and what are some of the significant responsibilities you have held during that time"? Some experts stress that the form and phrasing of questions can influence the responses obtained (Beamer, 2007).

Based on Margaret Desmond's suggestion to avoid using standard questions in a fixed order for all interviewees (Desmond, 2004b), the researcher created a set of questions to maintain flexibility in selecting and arranging questions for different interviewees. This approach acknowledges that certain questions may not be suitable or pertinent for some interviewees. Continuously questioning about the desired outcomes of the interview aided in defining its precise aim. This work primarily examined the challenges in implementing policing reforms in Pakistan from the viewpoint of senior police officials. Interview questions were aimed at answering the research questions. For instance, "In your opinion, what are the main factors that contribute to the hindrance of police reform implementation in Pakistan?" were included to probe political challenges. While queries related to institutional constraints were addressed by asking "In your experience, have you seen any resistance to change within the police force and if yes, what do you think is the reason behind it?" Further the researcher tried to comprehend the method, rationale, and principles guiding the implementation of police reforms.

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4.6.1 Pilot Interviews

Two pilot interviews were conducted before I proceeded with the actual interviews. Due to a lack of expertise in conducting such discussions, I interacted with two police officers recommended by a friend (serving as a Brigadier in the Pakistan Army) to enhance my interviewing skills. The individuals offered valuable recommendations. It helped improve the interview questions and ensured they were more precise and directly related to the study questions. The advice was to acknowledge respondents' ideas and stay focused. It was also recommended to ask for clarification if something remains unclear. This advice was helpful for the researcher during the conduct of the interviews.

The researcher deployed follow-up questions to penetrate surface level responses and uncover tacit knowledge. Probing with follow-up questions such as "why" and "how" allowed the researcher to delve deeper into policing insights and explore causal reasoning. For example, one police officer mentioned “political will” as barrier, a follow-up was as “why do you think that politicians resist specific reforms?” Another officer who mentioned the “socio-political resistance” the follow-up was “how did you negotiate with political leaders and other stakeholders to implement reforms despite resistance?” Such follow-up questions helped to reveal the underlying power dynamics. The researcher also took the notes during the interview to seek clarity at the end without interrupting the interviewee.

This was also advised by Aberbach, that novice researchers should conduct pilot interviews for careful evaluation before proceeding with the complete series of interviews (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). Another important step in preparation involved acquiring a more profound understanding of the interviewee's personal and professional background. Prior understanding of the interviewee’s backdrop, such as education, life history, and work, is crucial when preparing to interview someone of high status (Smith, 2006). Before the actual interview, relevant websites were researched for professional background checks and to track the recent employment positions of the interviewees.

This helped in developing a good picture of the interviewee and it became convenient to communicate and interact with them by knowing certain stuff about them and earning their trust. During an interview, one of the interviewees expressed astonishment and satisfaction upon discovering that the researcher was already well-informed about his profession and educational history. In the beginning, the researcher told him “You started

your professional career as a lecturer in quantum physics and later you joined the police service of Pakistan". This was a pleasant surprise for him as he was convinced that the researcher came prepared for the interview.

4.6.2 Actual Interviews

The interviews were conducted keeping in view the ethical considerations and guidelines established for conducting qualitative research using interviews. The researcher strictly complied with all the requirements, participants were apprised of their willing participation and their right to withdraw them from the interview at any point of time or their right to refuse to answer any question. It was also explicitly mentioned that their original identities will be protected and will not be accessible to anyone except the researcher and his supervisor, only for the purpose of this dissertation. The initial conversation began with the sending of a formal message on their whatsapp or cellular number, which were gathered from the maiden respondent who was introduced to the researcher by his friend (Brigadier in Pakistan Army).

The messages sent to the participants reproduced as under

> *"Slam respected sir.*
>
> *I am doing PhD on Police Reforms from a public sector university in Malaysia. If you allow me, I can share my research brief and questions with you. I would be honored to have your valuable time and input for my research thesis.*
>
> *Best regards"*
>
> *Shahbaz Ali Khan*
> *Assistant Professor*
> *Public Administration*
> *Islamia University Bahawalpur.*

This message was followed up by the calls both from the researcher and from the Inspector General of Police (whom the researcher interviewed earliest and established very cordial relationship) by introducing objectives of the research. Before the interview, the researcher also shared consent form, participation information sheet and interview protocols to the respondents who responded positively for the interview. The provided document details the process of the conduct of the interview. For instance the in the participant information sheet, the researcher introduced himself, the objectives of study and the benefit of having respondents in this study by highlighting their valuable contribution. Further in the interview protocols (interview protocol-Annex) the researcher mentioned the format of the interview, duration which will last from 45 to 60 minutes. The researcher also shared some questions to give the respondents a good idea about the points for discussion. Further the researcher emphasized in consent form (consent form-Annex) that he will maintain the confidentiality and the original identities of the respondents will be protected and the information gathered will solely be used for the purpose of the research.

As elaborated by Glenn Beamer, face-to-face interviews demand time and resources, but they also offer valuable opportunities for participant observation (Beamer, 2007). Conducting interviews in person, especially in the interviewee's office, enabled me to observe nonverbal cues, delve deeper into responses, and gain insights into their environment. This direct contact not only fostered trust between the interviewees and myself but also provided me with a nuanced understanding of the research questions. Sarah A. Elwood emphasized how the choice of interview location can influence the information gathered. Conducting interviews in various settings offers unique insights into

interviewees' perspectives and experiences, thereby enriching the data collection process (Elwood & Martin, 2000).

In this research, most interviews took place in the interviewees' offices, one occurred at a participant's home, and two were conducted at a café. Conducting interviews in office settings offers advantages such as tranquility, allowing both the interviewee and researcher to engage without distractions. Conversely, public places may invite interruptions from passing acquaintances, potentially affecting the quality of recordings and subsequent transcription efforts (Jenner & Myers, 2019). One of the interview which was conducted at the home of the respondent exposed the challenges related to the recording of the interview. At the time of the interview, there was a carpenter working in the house. The noise from the drill machine and use of hammer affected the quality of the recording and in the middle of the interview, the researcher requested the respondent, if he could ask the carpenter to be quite for 30 minutes, so that we could have a noise free recording, which he graciously allowed.

Securing uninterrupted time, particularly with elite interviewees, can pose challenges. Hence, specifying a convenient time and discussing suitable locations can be beneficial. Conducting interviews in participants' workplaces or personal spaces may offer unexpected insights into their perspectives and experiences (Bolderston, 2012). The selection of interview venues not only acknowledges the valuable knowledge of the interviewees but also positions them as authorities in their field. As researcher observed, the interview setting can unveil crucial insights into how interviewees shape their individual and social identities, ultimately influencing the dynamics of our interactions.

Moreover, it can mirror or alter the social landscapes within which interviewees operate, thereby impacting the outcomes of our discussions (Halse et al., 2023).

None of the interview took place in near vicinity and researcher has to travel hundreds of miles for every subsequent interview. As all of the respondents were elite and senior ranked police officers, so they were residing in provincial headquarters and capital territory. It took considerable amount of time and financial resources in reaching out the respondents. Further due to the busy schedule and commitments of the senior police officers, it took almost one and half year to completer the interviews. Despite the fact that few of the senior police officers were retired but still it was tough to get them out of their busy routine and manage the interviews. All the interviews were conducted in an informal manner and usually lasted for 45 to 60 minutes, except the two which lasted for 90 minutes approximately. Before starting any interview, the researcher referred to his interview protocols and read opening statement highlighting the objectives of the research and the valuable importance of participant's input.

Despite the fact that interviews were semi-structured, the researcher still had few predetermined questions with me to set a broader guideline. The researcher always started with some basic questions related to the background of the respondents, which include questions such as related to their designations, roles and responsibilities and experiences they had in policing. Such questions have always helped me in framing some specific questions concerning the respondent's background.

Every subsequent interview has helped in shaping questions on police reform challenges and its implementation. This approach has helped researcher broadly in the deeper and broader understanding of the phenomenon of police reforms. The researcher not only recorded the interviews digitally but also took the field notes and adhered to the interesting stories and events narrated by the respondent. Field notes helped the researcher significantly during analysis of the interviews. The interview questions were very open ended and elaborative in nature. However the researcher have always asked for deeper details and clarifications if I was unable to comprehend.

4.6.3 Ethical Considerations

During data collection, ethical clearance was operationalised through a series of structured procedures that ensured the protection and dignity of all participants as well as the safety of the researcher. Each interview was conducted only after approval had been formally secured, and the ethical protocols approved under APA guided every stage of fieldwork. Participants received a clear explanation of the research purpose, the voluntary nature of their involvement, the confidentiality safeguards, and the limits of disclosure. Written consent was obtained prior to recording. Interviews were held in secure locations selected by the participants to ensure privacy and to minimise any professional or political risk. To safeguard confidentiality, all names, designations, and identifiable references were anonymised; pseudonyms were used in transcripts; and data were stored on encrypted, password protected devices accessible solely to the researcher. Fieldnotes were taken discreetly to complement recorded material without capturing sensitive institutional details. Safety measures for the researcher included conducting all meetings within official premises or public institutional locations, maintaining regular check- ins with a designated

contact person, and avoiding interviews in isolated or unpredictable environments. Throughout the process, participants were reminded that they could decline to answer any question, pause the interview, or withdraw entirely without consequence. These combined procedures ensured that ethical principles were not only approved at the institutional level but actively upheld and implemented throughout the research process.

4.7 Analyzing Interview

The analysis of the interviews conducted with senior police officers regarding the challenges in the implementation of policing reforms in Pakistan was systematically approached using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). This qualitative methodology is particularly adept at exploring how individuals make sense of their experiences, allowing for a deep engagement with the subjective meanings that participants attribute to their lived realities (Anderson et al., 2019; Smith & Osborn, 2014). The process began with the transcription of the interviews, which were recorded verbatim to ensure that the richness of the participants' narratives was preserved. This initial step is crucial, as it allows the researcher to immerse themselves in the data, facilitating a thorough understanding of the participants' perspectives (Davidsen, 2013; Smith et al., 2017).

4.7.1 Challenges in Analyzing Interviews

The process of analyzing interviews conducted through Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) without the aid of software presents a unique set of challenges and advantages. One of the primary challenges encountered is the manual nature of the analysis, which requires significant time and effort to ensure thoroughness and accuracy.

Transcribing the interviews verbatim is a labor-intensive task, demanding careful attention to detail to capture the nuances of participants' speech, including pauses, emphases, and emotional tones. This meticulous transcription process is crucial in IPA, as it allows for a deeper engagement with the text, facilitating a more profound understanding of the participants lived experiences. However, the time-consuming nature of this task can lead to fatigue, potentially impacting the researcher's ability to maintain focus and objectivity throughout the analysis. Another challenge associated with manual analysis is the potential for bias in interpreting the data. Without the assistance of software to facilitate coding and thematic analysis, the researcher must rely on their subjective judgment to identify themes and patterns within the data.

This reliance on personal interpretation can introduce biases that may affect the validity of the findings. For instance, the researcher might unconsciously prioritize certain themes over others based on their preconceived notions or expectations, which could skew the analysis and lead to an incomplete understanding of the participants' experiences. This concern is particularly pertinent in qualitative research, where the richness of the data can be both a strength and a source of complexity in interpretation. Moreover, the absence of software tools means that the organization of data can become cumbersome. Manual coding requires the researcher to create and maintain detailed notes and charts to track themes and subthemes, which can be challenging to manage effectively. This lack of systematic organization can lead to difficulties in revisiting earlier stages of the analysis, potentially resulting in inconsistencies in how themes are defined and interpreted over time.

In contrast, qualitative analysis software often provides structured frameworks that facilitate the organization and retrieval of data, making it easier to maintain a clear and coherent analytical process. On the positive side, conducting manual analysis allows for a more intimate engagement with the data. The researcher can immerse themselves in the participants' narratives, fostering a deeper connection to the material and enhancing the interpretative process. This close reading can lead to richer insights and a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of the participants' experiences. Additionally, the absence of software can encourage a more reflective approach to analysis, as the researcher is compelled to think critically about each segment of data and its implications for the overall narrative. Furthermore, manual analysis can enhance the researcher's skills in qualitative data interpretation.

Engaging directly with the text encourages the development of analytical skills, such as identifying subtle shifts in meaning and recognizing the interplay between different themes. This hands-on approach can ultimately contribute to a more robust understanding of qualitative research methodologies and their application in future studies. In conclusion, while the manual analysis of interviews using IPA presents several challenges, including time consumption, potential bias, and organizational difficulties, it also offers significant advantages in terms of depth of engagement and skill development. Balancing these pros and cons is essential for researchers to navigate the complexities of qualitative analysis effectively. Ultimately, the choice to conduct manual analysis should be guided by the research objectives, the nature of the data, and the researcher's capacity to engage deeply with the material while remaining aware of the inherent challenges. In this case the researcher utilized both. As in the beginning of analysis, the researcher was not able to get

the Nvivo software, used for qualitative analysis. So the researcher decided to go for the manual analysis as it was also a concern to build a logical argument considering the views of the senior police officers to understand the problems in implementation of policing reforms.

Once the interviews were transcribed, the next phase involved familiarization with the data. This included reading and re-reading the transcripts to identify initial impressions and insights, a process that is essential for developing an intuitive grasp of the participants' experiences (Animawan, 2021; Memmolo & Willis, 2023). During this stage, notes were made regarding significant phrases, recurring themes, and emotional undertones that emerged from the narratives. This aligns with the IPA framework, which emphasizes the importance of the researcher's engagement with the text as a means of uncovering deeper meanings (Meaney et al., 2017; Smith & Osborn, 2014). Following familiarization, the analysis proceeded to the coding phase, where the transcripts were systematically examined for emergent themes.

This involved identifying key statements that encapsulated the essence of the participants' experiences and the challenges they faced in implementing reforms. The coding process was iterative, allowing for the refinement of themes as new insights emerged from the data (Conroy & Visser, 2013; Daenen, 2023). Each theme was then contextualized within the broader framework of the participants' narratives, ensuring that the analysis remained grounded in their lived experiences. The next step involved the development of superordinate themes, which synthesized the individual themes into broader categories that captured the essence of the challenges articulated by the officers. This process of

reflection is inherent in IPA, where the researcher oscillates between the parts (individual themes) and the whole (overall narrative) to derive meaning (Memmolo & Willis, 2023; Anderson et al., 2019). For instance, themes related to institutional resistance, cultural dynamics, and operational constraints were identified as significant barriers to reform, each contributing to a comprehensive understanding of the officers' experiences.

The development of the themes presented in this chapter were also supported by NVivo 20 (QSR International). The software enabled systematic management of data, inductive coding, theme building, and cross-case pattern identification. All themes were derived from inductive coding of transcripts, supported by NVivo's Node Tree, coding stripes, codebook summaries, and concept maps. These outputs are included in this chapter and summaries added in appendices to enhance analytic transparency. The linkage between descriptive codes, interpretative coding, subthemes, and superordinate themes follows the IPA tradition of moving between the part and the whole through iterative hermeneutic cycles. Therefore, in the final section, the researcher presented the codes, themes, subthemes and visualizations along with manual analysis to make the analysis more meaningful.

4.8 Codes, Themes, and Subthemes

Through an in-depth qualitative analysis, a number of key codes, themes, and subthemes were identified. These categories reflect the lived experiences and perceptions of the interviewees regarding the Police reforms in general and Police Order 2002 in particular,

the barriers to its implementation, and the broader political dynamics influencing police reforms.

Table 4.2: Codes and Themes

Code	Theme	Subtheme
Historical Legacy of Police Control	Historical Context & Challenges	Colonial Legacy
Resistance to Police Reforms	Resistance & Political Influence	Political Elites' Power, Bureaucracy
Political Interference	Resistance & Political Influence	Political Resistance
Lack of Leadership Commitment	Leadership & Organizational Issues	Weak Leadership
Police Officers' Perception	Perception & Service Delivery	Fear of Political Repercussions
Structural Changes in Police	Implementation of Police Reforms (2002)	Reforms Not Fully Implemented
Lack of Political Will	Lack of Political Will	No Follow Through
Police Order 2002 – Challenges	Implementation of Police Reforms (2002)	Failure of Accountability Mechanisms
Public Safety Commission	Implementation of Police Reforms (2002)	Lack of Support from Authorities
Political Elites' Influence	Resistance & Political Influence	Political Control Over Appointments

The analysis reveals five primary themes that reflect the core issues affecting the implementation of police reforms in Pakistan:

4.8.1 Historical Context & Challenges:

This theme captures the historical legacy of police control by politicians and bureaucrats, which continues to shape the current structure of policing in Pakistan.

4.8.2 Resistance & Political Influence:

The most prominent theme, highlighting the political resistance and influence that has consistently undermined police reforms.

4.8.3 Leadership & Organizational Issues:

This theme addresses the leadership failures within the police force, where senior officers have lacked the commitment or ability to enforce reforms effectively.

4.8.4 Perception & Service Delivery:

This theme examines the public perception of the police and how their image has been impacted by continued political interference and lack of accountability.

4.8.5 Implementation of Police Reforms:

The theme focuses on the specific challenges faced in the implementation of the Police Order 2002, including political resistance and the failure of key accountability mechanisms.

4.9 Subthemes and Insights

Each theme was further refined into subthemes that provided deeper insight into the specific challenges faced in implementing police reforms. Below is an overview of the subthemes identified:

4.9.1 Colonial Legacy

The historical context of police control during British colonial rule, which has shaped current practices and structures.

4.9.2 Political Elites' Power

The ongoing influence of political elites in controlling police operations.

4.9.3 Political Resistance

Resistance from politicians to grant the police independence, ensuring that they remain under political control.

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4.9.4 Weak Leadership

The failure of police leadership to assert their independence and implement reforms effectively.

4.9.5 Reforms Not Fully Implemented

Despite the promise of reforms in the Police Order 2002, many of its provisions were not fully implemented.

4.9.6 Fear of Political Repercussions

The reluctance of police officers to assert reforms due to fear of political retaliation.

4.9.7 Failure of Accountability Mechanisms

The inability of systems like Public Safety Commissions to hold the police accountable due to political interference.

4.10 Visualizations

To better understand the distribution and frequency of the themes and subthemes, i created a series of charts and visualizations. These visualizations help contextualize the qualitative data and offer a broader perspective on the participants' experiences. The word cloud above highlights the most frequently mentioned terms in the interviews. Words like "politics", "leadership", and "resistance" dominate the word cloud, reflecting the key concerns of the interviewees regarding the reform process.

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Figure 4.1:Word Cloud of Codes and Subthemes

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

Figure 4.2:Theme Distribution in Police Reform Interviews

The pie chart illustrates the distribution of key themes discussed in the police reform interviews, providing insight into the challenges faced in implementing reforms in Pakistan. The largest portion, 36.8%, is dedicated to Resistance & Political Influence, which highlights the central issue of political interference. Participants emphasized how political elites consistently undermined police reforms, fearing the loss of control over the police force. The second largest segment, 26.3%, focuses on the Implementation of Police Reforms (2002), reflecting the difficulties in enacting the reforms as intended. Despite the promises of the Police Order 2002, its implementation has been obstructed due to political opposition and institutional resistance. Leadership & Organizational Issues account for 15.8% of the discussion, revealing concerns about weak leadership within the police force, with senior officers admitting to a failure in driving reforms effectively. Lack of Political Will comes in at 10.5%, emphasizing the failure of political leaders to commit fully to reform efforts, even when plans are in place. Finally, Historical Context & Challenges and

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Perception & Service Delivery each make up 5.3%, pointing to the legacy of colonial-era police control and the public's lack of trust in a police force that is perceived as ineffective and corrupt. These themes collectively show that political resistance, weak leadership, and the failure to implement reforms are the primary barriers to meaningful change in Pakistan's police system.

The bar chart below shows the frequency of each theme, with "Resistance & Political Influence" emerging as the most dominant theme across the interviews. This is followed closely by "Implementation of Police Reforms (2002)", which indicates that participants see the lack of effective implementation as a central issue.



Figure 4 3:Frequency of Themes in Interviews

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

Figure 4.4:Heatmap of Themes and Subthemes Relationships

The heatmap presented above illustrates the relationships between the key themes and their corresponding subthemes, shedding light on the complexities and barriers to the implementation of police reforms in Pakistan. The largest association is found between the Historical Context & Challenges theme and the Colonial Legacy subtheme, indicating that the historical legacy of political control over the police continues to influence the reform process. The Implementation of Police Reforms (2002) theme is linked to multiple subthemes, including Failure of Political Parties to Implement Reform, Failure to Implement New Mechanisms, and Reforms Not Fully Implemented. These connections

highlight that, despite the introduction of the Police Order 2002, political resistance and ineffective mechanisms have significantly hindered its full implementation. The Lack of Political Will theme is closely tied to the Lack of Police Support for Reform and Fear of Political Repercussions, emphasizing how the absence of political commitment and the reluctance of police officers to support the reforms due to fear of retaliation contribute to the failure of the reform efforts. The Leadership & Organizational Issues theme is primarily connected to the Weak Leadership subtheme, underscoring how inadequate leadership within the police force exacerbates the challenge of implementing reforms. Finally, the Resistance & Political Influence theme reveals strong associations with Political Control Over Police at District Level, Political Resistance, and Political Elites' Power, indicating that political figures at various levels are actively blocking reforms to preserve their control over the police force. The heatmap thus reinforces the conclusion that political influence, the lack of political will, and leadership failures are the dominant factors obstructing meaningful reform within the police system in Pakistan.



Figure 4.5: Comprehensive Theme and Subtheme Network Map

The Network Map presented above visually illustrates the intricate relationships between the various themes and subthemes discussed in the interviews regarding police reforms in Pakistan. Central to the map are the themes of Political Influence and Resistance, which are closely associated with subthemes like Political Elites' Power, Political Resistance, Political Control Over Appointments, and Fear of Losing Position/Perks. These subthemes form a cluster, highlighting how political figures and their vested interests are critical obstacles to the successful implementation of police reforms. The map shows that political resistance is intricately tied to the Lack of Institutional Will, No Follow Through,

and Failure to Implement Reforms, underscoring the systemic issue that political actors often block or dilute reforms to maintain control over the police force.

Additionally, the Leadership & Organizational Issues theme is strongly connected to subthemes such as Weak Leadership, Weak Institutional Support for Reform, and Fear of Political Repercussions. This cluster reflects how inadequate leadership within the police force, combined with external political pressures, prevents effective reform. The map also positions Historical Context & Challenges, with the Colonial Legacy subtheme, as a separate but connected theme, suggesting that the historical legacy of colonial-era control over the police continues to influence contemporary struggles in the reform process. Furthermore, Perception & Service Delivery is linked to the theme of Fear of Political Repercussions, indicating how the public's trust in the police, coupled with political influence, hinders effective service delivery and accountability.

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Finally, the map shows the challenges in the Implementation of Police Reforms, with subthemes like Failure of Political Parties to Implement Reform, Public Disillusionment, and Failure to Implement New Mechanisms all interconnected. These connections reflect the frustration felt by participants regarding the continuous political and institutional failures that have undermined the Police Order 2002. Overall, the network map emphasizes that political resistance, weak leadership, and historical political control are the key factors that continue to block meaningful police reforms in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The researcher believed that hybrid (doing manual and analysis through software) approach has helped in better understanding of the phenomenon. Manual analysis helped in broadening the understanding of the researcher, his reflection and analysis. While the software helped the researcher to do the refinement of themes and subthemes. Finally, the analysis culminated in the interpretation phase, where the researcher articulated the findings in relation to existing literature and theoretical frameworks. This interpretative step was critical, as it situates the participants' experiences within a broader context, allowing for a richer understanding of the implications of their narratives for policing reforms in Pakistan (Davidsen, 2013; Finlay, 2011). The final analysis not only highlights the complexities of implementing reforms but also underscores the need for a nuanced approach that considers the unique challenges faced by police officers in their efforts to adapt to new paradigms of policing. In conclusion, the application of IPA in analyzing the interviews provided a robust framework for understanding the lived experiences of senior police officers in Pakistan. By meticulously transcribing, coding, and interpreting the data, the analysis by building an argument revealed significant insights into the multifaceted challenges of policing reforms, emphasizing the importance of context, culture, and institutional dynamics in shaping these experiences

CHAPTER FIVE

POLICE REFORMS IN PAKISTAN

5.1 Introduction

This chapter critically evaluates the major reform initiatives undertaken to improve police image and performance in Pakistan. Unlike chapter two that discussed the historical evolution of policing, this chapter analytically examines how reforms were designed, what they intended to achieve, what was actually accomplished, and why implementation repeatedly fell short. This aligns directly with research "What major police reform initiatives have been introduced by the government of Pakistan to improve police image and performance and to what extent have these reforms achieved their intended outcomes? The chapter draws on, policy documents, reform evaluations, and insights emerging from interviews with senior police officers. It adopts an institutionalist analytical lens to explain why reforms, despite ambitious legal and structural changes, produced mixed and often minimal outcomes

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5.2 Major policing reforms

There were multiple attempts at reforming the police force after Pakistan's independence in 1947. Many national commissions were established by successive Pakistani governments, and international committees were called to offer advice on how to best structure a new police force. However, none of them led to a change in the law. Those in power and the civil service fought against these reforms because, like the British colonial

authorities, they saw the police as a tool to be used against political opponents and the populace at large (UNDP, 2004b). Some of the important commissions and committees discussed in this chapter. The availability and access of the reports of multiple commissions formulated from time to time ranging from colonial period to pre-independence and post-independence of Pakistan was challenging. The detail was already mentioned in chapter four. Before the scrutiny of the available reports and discussion on its implementation, the researcher developed and presented a timeline to show the frequency of reforms initiatives, its objectives, success and challenges.

Table 5 1:Timeline of Police Reforms in Pakistan since independence

Reforms	Objective	Success if any	Challenges
1948: Passage of Bill in Sindh Assembly to Introduce a Metropolitan System of Policing in Karachi	Modernize the force by creating a Commissioner-led metropolitan police system for Karachi, modeled on Bombay's structure	Bill passed by the Assembly	Returned for "minor corrections" by the Governor-General's legal advisor; never notified as law due to bureaucratic resistance.
Sir Oliver Gilbert Grace Committee (1951)	Recommend fundamental structural changes to Karachi police (recruitment, transfers, compensation, etc.)	None	Strong opposition from the federal bureaucracy; all recommendations dropped.
Police Commission under Justice J.B. Constantine (1961)	Study the viability of a metropolitan policing system for Karachi after capital shift	Made no recommendation (issue no longer relevant post-Islamabad shift)	Lack of political appetite to revisit Karachi's setup.

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Pay & Services Re-organization Committee (Justice Cornelius, 1961–62)	Reorganize pay and service conditions; introduce metropolitan policing for major cities	Approved three-tier officer recruitment (PSP, Provincial, Subordinate); partly implemented	No accompanying legal framework or structural overhaul; most recommendations unheard.
Police Commission under Maj. Gen. A.O. Mitha (1969–70)	Chair a National Police Commission to survey and propose comprehensive reforms	None	Recommendations never taken up by authorities.
Reforms during Z.A. Bhutto period (1972)	Improve training, service conditions, and professional integrity as part of wider administrative overhaul	New training institutes; better service conditions; formal recognition of merit	Limited follow-through due to political turmoil and resource constraints.
Reforms during Zia Period (1977–1985)	Enforce Hudood Ordinances; embed Sharia in law enforcement through new Shariat courts	Established Shariat Appellate Benches on High Courts and a Federal Shariat Court	Abuses under moral policing mandate; politicization; weak accountability.
Police Committee under Aslam Hayyat (1985)	Amend the Police Act 1861; install metropolitan policing; insulate police from interference. Studied the implementation of all the existing reforms introduced	None	Ignored by both military and civilian leadership.
M.A.K. Chaudhry Committee (1990)	Review colonial-era structure; recommend measures to prevent executive misuse and ensure professional independence	None	Symbiotic political–police nexus remained intact; no structural change.

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Colombian Experts Group (1999)	Advise on building a neutral, democratically controlled metropolitan police for Karachi	None	Report shelved; no policy action.
UN Mission on Organized Crime (1995)	Recommend independent but accountable police; modernize city policing	None	Not translated into law or practice.
Japanese Police Experts Committee (1996)	Build citizen–police trust; guarantee neutrality and oversight; unify command; merit-based recruitment	Recommendations taken up by Good Governance Group	No legislative follow-up; political inertia.
Good Governance Group (1998)	Depoliticize police; institutionalize merit-based recruitment, transfers, training	Recommendations adopted in principle	Implementation stalled; lack of political commitment.
Focal Group on Police Reforms (2000)	Blueprint for neutral, accountable, community-responsive, professional police	Informed draft of Police Order 2002	Outdated legal framework; resource shortages; political interference.
Police Order 2002	Replace Police Act 1861; abolish dual control; separate investigation; create oversight bodies; enhance autonomy	Enactment of a new law, repealed colonial Police Act 1861 after 141 years. Introduced oversight bodies and separated functions of policing.	Diluted by 2004–06 amendments; limited commission constitutions.

Source: Author's Compilation

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5.3 Introduction of Metropolitan Policing System in Karachi-1948:

Karachi will soon have what is being called a "modern police force" thanks to the passage of a bill in the Sindh Assembly was the promise made at that time. However, resistance from the bureaucracy finally results in the bill being sent back to the assembly for "small adjustments" before it is allowed to be resubmitted. It never delivered back to the Governor General office for his accord (Sarfraz, 2018)

5.4 Recommendations of Sir Oliver Gilebrt Grace, IG Police NWFP 1951

Sir Oliver Gilbert Grace, the then Inspector General of Police, Karachi, in 1951, was immediately confronted with several challenges immediately following the country's independence in 1947, particularly those pertaining to the influx of immigrants coming from India. The situation in terms of law and order got significantly worse. The existing police force was not able to handle the developing issue effectively. In this scenario, a committee that was established under the leadership of Sir Oliver Gilbert Grace continued to investigate the situation in great depth. The committee suggested making significant adjustments to the organization of the police force that serves the city of Karachi by proposing recommendations on various items such as recruitment and selection, posting and transfers, compensation and curbing of corruption.

However, Oliver Gilbert Grace the then Inspector General (IG) of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) faced strong opposition from the local bureaucratic elite, considering him as a foreigner and not son of the soil and subsequently there was no progress that could be accomplished (Abbas, 2011). This committee suggested that the whole structure of the police department in Karachi be revamped on the pattern of the Police reforms

introduced in Madras and Bombay. However, due to the resistance from the bureaucracy, the recommendations were dropped (Amaral et al., 2013).

5.5 Police Commission under Justice J.B.Constantine 1960-61:

A commission was constituted by resolution No. F. 30/58/59 Police (I) dated 31st December, 1959 by the Ministry of Interior Pakistan (Report of Pakistan Police Commission, 1960-61) Some of the important recommendations of the commission are as under:-These recommendations were mainly focused on the structure and functioning of police organization. To enhance the maintenance of law and order, it was recommended that the judiciary remain separate from the executive to ensure impartiality. The District Superintendent of Police should be empowered to issue orders under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the preservation of peace, following consultation with the District Magistrate, if available. If the District Magistrate rejects the Superintendent's advice or rescinds the order, the Magistrate should be held accountable for any ensuing consequences. Similarly, before issuing orders under Section 144, the District Magistrate should consult with the Superintendent of Police, if available.

The responsibility for dispersing unlawful assemblies should primarily rest with the Police, while a Sub-Divisional Magistrate who intervenes assumes responsibility. The Police should retain the discretion over the means employed to maintain peace, and the existing procedure for invoking military aid should continue. The District Magistrate should have overall responsibility for maintaining order without interfering in the internal management of the Police. Furthermore, reports on the Superintendent of Police should be initiated by the Deputy Inspector-General and sent to the commissioner, who may

consult the District Magistrate if necessary. Finally, a hierarchical organization of prosecutors under the Law Department should be established to oversee investigations and prosecutions, modeled after the French system.

However, no recommendations were implemented at that time because the capital was shifted to Islamabad. Ayub Khan's police were unable to properly control public rallies at the conclusion of his administration, and they were seen as openly participating in violent conflicts with members of the public. After Ayub's resignation, it became abundantly evident that the state's existing police force required significant enhancements to maintain public safety (Kalia, 2013). Commissions have been formed to investigate the viability of establishing a metropolitan police system for the cities of Karachi and Lahore. The Pay and Services Reorganization Committee provides recommendations, but the decision-makers in the government do not take them into consideration (Grare, 2010b).

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5.6 Justice Cornelius Committee-1962

A pay and service organization committee was formulated under Justice Cornelius. This committee also recommended to establish metropolitan police system in big cities such as Karachi and Lahore, but its recommendations were not approved either.

5.7 Police Commission headed by Gen A. O. Mitha-1970

A fifteen-member commission was constituted vide Ministry of Home, Kashmir Affairs and States & Frontier Regions (Home Affairs Division), Gazettee Extraordinary Notification No. 9/15/69-BP dated 23rd July, 1969 (Report of Pakistan Police Commission 1969-70). The commission was chaired by Gen. A. O. Mitha along with three Vice

Chairmen (serving Brigadiers in Military). The Mitha Commission detailed its recommendations on all aspects of policing structure and functioning at length. This report divided its implementation span in two phases. One was referred to as "Immediate Implementation" and other as "Long Term Implementation". The recommendations include a long list and are not limited to that the Superintendent of Police at the district level should be independent from the control of the district magistrate. As the District Magistrate was responsible for maintaining peace and order throughout the district, and the Superintendent of Police served as his aide for this duty. During this time, he was under to the immediate direction, control, and oversight of a Deputy Inspector General of Police who was in command of a division. As a result, the superintendent of police was required to perform their duties while under dual control (Minhas et al., 2019). Despite a meticulous effort put forth by the 15-member commission. This report was not implemented and it gathered dust for another eight years as it was highlighted in the report of Police Commission in 1985 (Report of the Police Commission by Aslam Hayat, 1985).

5.8 G. Ahmad Report

Mr. G. Ahmad was an influential civil worker, who led a commission in 1972, Mr. Ghulam Ahmad was directed by Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (the then Prime Minister of Pakistan) on December, 21 1972 to submit a report on Police Organization and Reforms in Pakistan. Mr. G. Ahmad examined the reports submitted by the earlier Police Commissions and had discussions with the Home Secretaries of Central and Provincial Governments and submitted a detailed report on the structural and organizational aspects of Policing. He recommended to have Federal Ombudsman which was not accepted. Furthermore, issues related to police corruption, smuggling, narcotics and money offences were all addressed

by G. Ahmad. As part of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's effort to reassert authority over the bureaucracy and the military, he fired some 1,300 civil officials, including police officers, and labelled them as inept and corrupt (Siddiqi et al., 2014b). These civil servants included police officers. He further asked the government to approve the creation of the federal police force to deal with the above-mentioned issues as well as offences with inter-provincial implications relating to immigration, foreigners, and passports. As a direct result of this, the Federal Investigation Authority was founded in the year 1975.

5.8.1Reforms during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Era

The political crisis caused by East Pakistan's secession was the most serious issue facing Pakistan during the time of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. After East Pakistan broke away, Pakistan's judicial and police systems were put under enormous stress. Bhutto prioritized a more parliamentary form of administration and worked to ensure that the police and military remained under civilian control. Bhutto made an effort to implement many structural and functional reforms to achieve this goal (Crisis Group Asia Report N°157, 2011b). Bhutto's reform proposal, which included having the courts and the executioner fire any police officer for cause, was devastating. The honour and reputation of Pakistan's police force was damaged by this incident. An IG provided the following rationale for this change: "Government personnel had traditionally considered themselves servants of the state, but with the elimination of constitutional safeguards, they were changed overnight into servants of the government and of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party" (Crisis Group Asia Report N°157, 2011b). In addition, Zulrfiqar Ali Bhutto altered the way the police force was enlisted. The Central Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) cadre was disbanded and a new method of recruitment, such as Lateral Entry, was implemented.

In a system plagued by political influence, this method allowed for the direct recruitment of officers across all ranks and categories. For the most part, DSPs were hired without the involvement of the Public Service Commission's civil service exam. Police personnel chosen in this manner were ineffective, unqualified, and poorly trained, all of which brought the department's reputation down. Because of their political allegiances, the police personnel who were hired in this way did more harm to the reputation of the police force in Pakistan. There is also evidence that Bhutto utilized police force against his opponents and rivals, which lends credence to the idea that his reforms were merely political stunts.

5.9 The Zia years

Zia implemented martial law on July 5th, 1977, after Bhutto was deposed. Zia used the military to silence his opponents, including Bhutto and other leaders from rival parties. Zia encouraged the growth of madrasas across the nation and backed religious parties with authority. Therefore, his deeds are commonly attributed to the growth of extremism, namely religious extremism, in the nation (Ingber, 2018b). There is little doubt that Zia's deployment of troops to Afghanistan stoked the flames of extremism and violence in Pakistan (Abbas, 2011). Zia underfunded the police, thus they couldn't keep the peace or deal with any new security challenges that surfaced during his reign. Zia's police force had serious issues due to military meddling, a lack of sufficient training, and a lack of finances. Through the recruitment of military officers, Zia hoped to make the police subservient to the military (Crisis Group Asia Report N°157, 2011b).

5.10 Police Committee Report 1985

Government of Pakistan, vide Ministry of Interior Notification No. 15/14/85-Police, dated 24th June, 1985 appointed a Police Committee to make recommendations in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Police force (Police Committee, 1985). The committee prepared a comprehensive report on all the aspects of policing and also investigated the fate of the implementation of the previous reports and recommendations made by the police commissions. The committee made some important observations which are truly helpful in understanding the fate of implementation of policing reforms in Pakistan.

The committee regrets to observe that despite, investment of time, effort and money in the deliberation of these commissions/committees, not much positive came out of the reports. Committee noted that reports of these commissions/committees either did not receive serious and prompt attention at the appropriate level or decisions were not followed up. No action was taken on some reports for years and when they were taken up, these were examined half-heartedly and side-tracked causally. The report of Mitha Commission which worked in 1969-70 is a case in point. This commission examined all aspects of police working at length and submitted an exhaustive report in 1970. The report was examined in 1978 and decisions taken. As late as 1982, it was brought to the notice of Federal Cabinet that action on approved recommendations of Mitha Commission had not developed satisfactorily (The Police Committee, 1985). The above revelation brings out that recommendations of the police commissions were not examined for long time after submission and decisions were delayed. Considering the status of implementation of already existing reports, Aslam Hayat Police committee recommended that all such

reports be examined by the federal government within a specified time and all concerned should be given a timeline to implement the recommendations, once approved. Besides examining the existing police commissions and reports, this police committee also made recommendations to improve the policing functions, its structure and operations. One of its principal recommendations was to construct police systems in cities with more than 500,000 residents.

This committee further recommended that the Police Act of 1861, based on the outdated "rule concept" rather than a modern "service concept," is no longer suitable and requires replacement. The lateral control of the District Magistrate over the District Police is anachronistic and should be eliminated, with accountability instead shifted to people's representatives and an independent judiciary. To address the growing needs of urban policing, the Police Commissionerate System, recognized as the standard for city policing, should be introduced in cities with a population of 500,000 or more. Initially, this system could be implemented on a trial basis in one or two cities in each province. Additionally, there should be a significant increase in District and Range Armed Reserves as well as Provincial Armed Forces to enhance capacity. Police reserve contingents in the provinces should not be deployed for routine duties wherever possible. To further strengthen national security, a Federal Reserve Police force should be established immediately. Lastly, senior police officers in Basic Scale 20 and 21 should be considered for promotion to higher grades, with appropriate postings provided both within and outside their cadre to ensure career progression and effective leadership.

In 1987, as a follow-up, the Cabinet sent an official mission to India and Bangladesh to observe the various policing systems. To implement the recommendations of the police committee chaired by Aslam Hayat, it was necessary to carry out this procedure. In Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore, the delegations agreed with the Committee's recommendation for the establishment of an emergency metropolitan police system (Suddle, 2002a). Since the government was abolished in 1988, it was not possible to take any more action.

5.11 The Police under Benazir Bhutto and Sharif

Since Zia's death in 1988, political stability was not there in Pakistan. Two governments were abruptly removed from office by the military using the president's proxy's powers. However, both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif prioritized strengthening ties with the military (Rashid et al., 2021a). This political rift between two political parties and meddling of powerful into policing affairs resulted in poor policing in the country. Police were heavily politicized during the tenures of Benazir and Nawaz. The police were thus distracted from their primary duty, the upkeep of law and order in favour of serving the interests of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif (Grare, 2010b).

1989-90:

In the 1990s, the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League, respectively led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both formed and oversaw two governments during the decade, but the rivalry and political uncertainty restrained them from bringing any radical change in the police (Crisis Group Asia Report N°157, 2011b). Furthermore, political instability, poor governance and political interference in police has affected the

police as an institution and these reforms have failed to achieve objectives and generally it has failed to improve the image of the police in the eyes of general populace in Pakistan. The general image and impression of police remained unfriendly, nonprofessional and cruel (Ullah et al., 2016a).

1990

In the year 1990, a British delegation travelled to Pakistan. While there, they made a recommendation that the colonial system, which was intended to maintain the status quo through the use of "suppression and control," be entirely overhauled to fit the requirements of a contemporary country. It also suggests that major cities immediately begin implementing a policing system rather than "dilly-dallying" about it. Its suggestions were disregarded as irrelevant (Faull, 2016a).

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1995:

During its visit to Pakistan, a United Nations Mission for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice notes that "autonomous yet publicly responsible police" are "crucial to the formation of strong democratic government institutions." The mission recommends reforming the current policing system and strengthening the organisations that are responsible for law enforcement, particularly in urban settings (UNDP, 2004b).

1996:

Experts from the Japanese police force now on tour to Pakistan recommend reforms that center on "creating a relationship of trust" between residents and the police. They suggest four steps for the reform process: the establishment of an institutional structure that

guarantees "political neutrality and democratic control;" the appropriate division of responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments; the establishment of a unified chain of command; and the implementation of a merit-based system for recruiting and selecting personnel (Suddle, 2002b).

1999:

The Pakistani government invites a delegation of experts from Colombia to provide guidance on how to restore law and order in the city of Karachi, which has been rapidly deteriorating recently. The organisation suggests that the current system of policing be revamped and that a metropolitan police force that is "professionally competent, politically neutral, and democratically governed" be developed. The recommendations made in their report were not materialized (Ingber, 2018b).

5.12 Police Order 2002- Enactment of new Police Law repealing Police Act 1861

When President General Pervaiz Musharraf took over the administration of the country, he established NRB (National Reconstruction Bureau) under the chairmanship of Lt. General (Rtd) Syed Tanivr Hussain Naqvi who was given the twin responsibility of giving a new but meaningful law of the local government and draft a law for police reforms. He established two think tanks, one dealing with local government, the other with the police. The local government think tank preceded the police think tank. They had clearly told the chairman of NRB that the civil service officers in the form of Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate were the real hurdle in the establishment of meaningful local government because more often they reserved the authority of the local government.

The judicial reforms had already stripped the executive magistracy of their redundant powers of trial (Chief Justice Naseem Hassan shah decided the case as Chief Justice of Pakistan) under the constitutional stipulation separation of judiciary from executive. The committee proposed complete separation (members were the then law minister, Mehmood Ali Qsuri, constituted by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan). The government made an appeal to the Supreme Court because the high court of Sindh had ordered complete separation of judiciary from police. Government lodged an appeal against order of Sindh high court which was adjudicated upon by Justice Naseem Hassan Shah.The Supreme Court relented although it took over all powers of trial but left one or two chapter of the PPC and some local and special laws where the punishments were minor to the executive magistracy.

The credit of gen Naqvi is that he even succeeded in abolishing this concession as well which Supreme Court has given to executive magistracy unwillingly. As he was convinced that executive magistracy and meaningful and powerful local government cannot coexist. Further in 2001 amendment to CRPC was made in which the office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC), Assistant Commissioner (AC) and Executive Magistrates were abolished and in such an atmosphere local government ordinance 2001 was promulgated. Consequently, the police think tank came into action after the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and District Magistrate had been abolished. The think tank was free to frame the law in which no previous hindrances existed. They drafted Police Order 2002. The 2002 police statute borrowed heavily from the Japanese National Safety Commission's model. This was considered as one of Pakistan's most important attempts to standardize policing in the country.

Police Order 2002 was made applicable to all ranks from constable to Inspector General of Police (IGP). Administration of police under 1861 Act was nominally under control of IGP. Because at district Level there was a district magistrate who exercised direction and control over the administration of district Police and this district magistrate was not answerable or under the control of IGP. Police Order 2002 removed this dichotomy altogether. The entire police force throughout the length and breadth of the province placed under the administrative control of IGP. At the range/divisional level it conferred the total responsibility over Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), removing the role of Commissioner over him and at the district level it was placed under District Police Officer (DPO). Police officers became master of their own houses under this law.

The most important aspect of the police reforms as enshrine in Police Order 2002 that it conferred real administrative independence over the police officers. The second important reform is that Inspector General of Police was given a status of Secretary to the government. Prior to that IGP enjoyed no secretariat status, although in India they had declare that IG police in major provinces as additional chief secretary home for police affairs (departmental as well as financial). There were great objections to this proposal and ultimate decision was made that IG may be declared as secretary to government with full administrative and financial powers. This was a great achievement of police reforms which was unparalleled in the history of Pakistan which was achieved by NRB with utmost efforts.

The third glaring aspect of the police reforms is that it made a genuine effort at depoliticization of the police by introducing the concept of public safety commission at the district and provincial levels as a corporate body for exercising oversight over the police, to ensure that it did not transgress its powers and that it received due share of finances from the provincial government, that were extremely essential for undertaking meaningful policing in the district. This was a great achievement of police reforms and constituted a source of unacceptable dispensation by the politicians. It also established a system whereby elected and nominated members at the district, provincial, and national levels are responsible for monitoring police performance (Frankham et al., 2002b). As an added measure, the trial and prosecution process were standardized to increase the number of people who could monitor and hold the police accountable.

Authorities at the state and federal levels to file complaints with were also accounted for. On the other hand, police were given sufficient operational authority to allow them to be more proactive in investigating and administering crimes. Separate police divisions were created to handle certain police functions like intelligence gathering, criminal investigation, patrolling, and security (Human rights commission of Pakistan, 2011). President Musharraf encountered many roadblocks, both political and bureaucratic, during the act's development and implementation. Because of this, in 2004, changes were made to the legislation that diminished its effectiveness by vesting police with the authority of formerly neutral and independent safety commissioners.

Also, lawmakers were given back the ability to approve promotions and transfers, rendering the act useless (Grare, 2010). An Islamabad cop puts it accurately: "Most police

officers feel that, in order to safeguard their career prospects, they have little alternative but to do the urgings of their political masters" (Abbas, 2008).

Conclusion

This chapter critically analysed key reform measures aimed at improving police image and performance, especially those embodied in Police Order 2002. While the reforms introduced important legal and structural innovations, their achievements remained constrained by political interference, bureaucratic resistance, internal cultural barriers, historical legacies, and the absence of an enabling environment.

The findings directly address Research Question 1 and set the stage for Chapter 6, which present an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) of the lived experiences of senior police officers who navigated these reforms in practice

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CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING POLICE REFORMS IN PAKISTAN

6.1 Introduction

This study is concerned with the challenges in the implementation of police reforms, which met with an overwhelming number of obstacles during decades. Though the implementation of successive reforms has improved the policing structure, created new organizations such as Federal Investigation Agencies (FIA), National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and Motorway Police, yet the need and voice for policing reforms had always dominated the agenda of public sector reform in the country. The evaluation of the early police administration in India, structure of policing and reforms taken place both before partition of subcontinent and after the independence of Pakistan has set a good tone to proceed with interviewing senior police officers and understanding their lived experiences of reforms.

This study helps in developing a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of police reforms. The study setting was naturalistic and it involved the elite interviews of 10 senior police officers who have vast experience of policing and reforms throughout the country and abroad. Through the semi-structured interviews, the researcher tried to engage in a conversation with the elite police officers. The researcher derived codes, themes, subthemes and visualizations from the transcribed interviews but his focus was to

construct an argument in lieu of the lived experiences of the officers rather to go for only searching the themes out of the transcribed interviews This approach allowed him to engage in a dialogue with an emphasis on broadening the understanding the phenomenon of police reforms and challenges to its implementation. This section broadly helped researcher in understanding the challenges associated with implementation of police reforms spread over different phases, and how these reforms have shaped the police organization in response.

6.2 Reforms and institutional change

Reforms serve as catalysts for institutional change by altering existing rules, structures, and norms to improve an institution's efficiency, responsiveness, and adaptability. The process of reform typically begins with identifying issues or inefficiencies within the current system, often driven by external pressures such as technological advancements, economic shifts, political dynamics, or public demand for greater accountability and transparency. Once the need for change is established, stakeholders ranging from policymakers and leaders to employees and citizens are engaged in developing a strategy that outlines the desired outcomes and steps required to achieve them.

Implementation may occur incrementally or through comprehensive, sweeping changes, depending on the institution's context and the nature of the reform. The impacts of such reforms are multi-faceted; they can enhance operational efficiency, improve service delivery, promote innovation, and increase public trust by making the institution more transparent and accountable. However, the path to effective reform is fraught with challenges, including resistance from vested interests, cultural inertia, limited resources,

and political instability. Resistance often stems from fear of the unknown, loss of power, or discomfort with new processes, which can slow down or derail the reform efforts. Additionally, implementing reforms can be resource-intensive, requiring adequate funding, skilled personnel, and time for planning, execution, and monitoring. Despite these challenges, well-designed and effectively managed reforms can result in significant institutional transformation, creating a more dynamic and resilient organization capable of meeting contemporary demands and future challenges.

One of the primary goals of police reform in Pakistan is to transition from a colonial policing system to a democratic structure in which the police work primarily for the interest of the public and not for the interest of any particular regime or any influential group (Abbas, 2011). Therefore, as a result of the reform, the police will continue to support a democratic system that is predicated on the observance of human rights, facilitate access to justice for all individuals without discrimination, and secure the rule of law predicated on the norms of accountability, transparency, equality, and community participation.

The researcher delves deeper by constructing an argument in lieu of the lived experiences of the senior police officers to broaden the understanding the phenomenon of police reforms and challenges to its implementation

6.3 Challenges in implementing the reforms

The issue of reforming police in Pakistan is long standing and Pakistan witnessed multiple reform efforts aimed at restructuring and reorganizing police force amid voices of

corruption, police abuse, inefficiency and legal challenges. Various Commissions and Committees that have been established in Pakistan over the course of decades by various governments (including military and civil governments) could not proceed with their recommendations. The detailed analysis presented below.

6.3.1 Colonial legacy

The researcher inquired the senior police officers about specific reforms or policies implemented by the government to enhance the image and performance of the police force in Pakistan. Senior police officers viewed reforms as incremental and apprised that every subsequent reform package brought some positivity but largely the problem with the policing remained there and reforms were never implemented to its true spirit. Further they were of the view that in order to understand the landscape of reforming the police in the country from colonial era to the present situation, one must be aware of its origin and phases it has gone through. There was a legal and institutional structure in place, but it was really out of date devised for 19th century India consisting of near static villages with hardly any urbanization or industrialization, and meant principally for a colonial rule (Abbas, 2011). First, we need to go back in pre-Pakistan period and start from police act 1861. In 1857 after the mutiny British introduced the Police Act 1861. At that time, control of police was with the district magistrate/district collector. His job was tax collection, peace and order maintenance, judicial power for effective peace and order maintenance, prosecution was also part of police, which was effective at the time. This was also elaborated by P04. P04 was a top brass of police who served the police for 34 years in multiple capacities and remained Inspector General of Police. He stated that

> *This system was helpful to maintain peace and public order in the name of crown but at the same time people were also benefitting from this as they were living peacefully and only the offenders were punished and prosecuted, the mechanism they developed was effective in the given social, economic and political context and delivered effectively. (P04, Inspector General of Police)*

Different changes started appearing after partition of subcontinent in 1947. One significant was mass migration, this migration broke the cohesion which existed in society from centuries, before partition, it was rural society, and people know each and every one. Even towns were like big villages, system of neighborhood was there, and only metropolitan at that time was Lahore with a population of 5 to 10 lac. That policing system which existed before partition was tailored made in the given socio-political environment. – P04 served as the Inspector General of Police in different provinces of Pakistan and has a career spreading over 34 years. He witnessed the transformation of police during last couple of decades and had good amount of knowledge related to police operations, reform implementation and policing culture. He was of the view that the policing model of the British period cannot entirely be criticized, the fact of the matter was, it lost its relevance due to changing times. According to him the objective of any law of police is to maintain law and order, whereas strategy could be different.

P03 had similar views with P04. He also served police force for almost 30 years. Retired as Inspector General of Police. He stated that

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> What happened after 1947 is that a static society changed in result of political upheaval. Now new people started living in villages and cites, Hindu were living in towns and cities in the present Pakistan, when they were replaced by migrants, people were unaware of them, and informal institutions such as "Numberdar" established by British for informal policing and oversight lose their grip. – (P03, Inspector General of Police)

As elaborated by P03, the informal policing system of British helped police a lot in terms of police strengths, as lots of the jobs were done by non-formal assistance. British governed all the subcontinent with this system. Nubmerdar was responsible for collection of tax and he was aware of the whole village, people keep eyes on strangers, "Numberdar" was very vigilant and was serving as watch and ward. But the partition of the subcontinent that took place in 1947 has changed the socio-political fabric of the society and conventional modes of policing and laws lost their effectiveness.

Ancient India took over the role of the panchayat and ruled over the subcontinent through two important officials, head of the village called grimoni, the head of the village was grimoniu and head of the urban area was nagarkar, then came the rule of king harsha (wardharan) who divided the entire empire into fiefdoms, he is the person who can be credited or discredited who introduced feudalism in subcontinent which still exist as powerful form in Pakistan. He divided his entire kingdom into feoffs. The feudal lords ruled over their fiefdoms and paid a fixed amount of revenue to the king and king ruled over the feudal lords, various experiments were made. The police system depended on the

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principle of collective responsibility. It was the duty of the residents to trace culprits from within the village or through the help of the trackers that they have escaped to another village. In case of failure collective fines were imposed as compensation for the person who had lost his life and property.

The sultans of Delhi established a more elaborate system of policing in urban areas only and in rural areas the old system continued. But since some urban centers had become considerably populated and their existing chances of intrigue, conspiracies, rebellion, and opposition to the government therefor they established the institution of Kotwal in major urban areas. He not only exercised control over criminals but also a watch over the strangers and indulged in secret reporting also. These functions were further enlarged by the Mughals. In rural areas they also depended on age old feudal system. In urban areas they not only continued institution of kotwal, but also enlarged his function by handing over the excise department and jail to his care and control.

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Abu al Fazal in his famous book Aain-e- Akbbari has given a detail of duties a kotwal was assigned to perform. He can be compared to a modern-day commissioner of police. The office was given to prominent people belonging to good families. The pandit Javahir Lal Nehru (first Prime Minister of india) mentioned in his autobiography that his grandfather Pandit Ganga Dhar Nehru was last kotwal in Delhi in 1856 when this office was abolished.

P01 who remained Inspector General of Police in different provinces as well as the capital territory Islamabad shared his views in detail related to the history of policing in

subcontinent, promulgation of different police laws and the enactment of Police Act 1861. He stated:

> *The British after their consolidation in India tried various methods of policing but ultimately gave an enactment to the three-presidency towns of Calcutta, madras, Bombay in 1856 by the title of metropolitan police act 1856 which was applicable only in these 3 town and Malaka islands. Police in these towns were placed under the exclusive command and control of the commissioner of police and other offices of deputy commissioner assistant commissioner, inspector, constable, and head constables were created. There was no external control of magistrate/collector in these towns. In 1859 they gave another enactment called the Madras district police act of 1859 after the war of independence.*

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In this act they placed police under the exclusive control of Inspector General (IG), assisted by Deputy Inspector General (DIG), Superintendent (SP), Assistant Superintendent (ASP). Inspector, head constable and constables. There was no external control of bureaucracy over the police. This enactment was applicable to the entire length and breadth of Madras province excluding the city of madras which was already placed under the metropolitan police act of 1856. After the annexation of Awadh and Punjab, the British felt the need of an enactment which could be made applicable to these newly acquired areas, a court commission was established and the same draftsman, Professor of Law in Madras university was given a task of drafting another police act which could be more elaborate than the Madras Police Act of 1859. The draft of this act was placed before the legislative council of the governor general for approval but in the meantime a cable

came from the home government of England saying that her majesty's government had bitter experience of the revolt of native Indian sepoys against the British officers in 1857 and that some sought of control of the district officers should be placed over the new establishment of police which mainly consisted of native sepoys.

The court commission hurriedly inserted the phrase that at district level the administration of the police is rested with the superintendent of the police subject to direction and control of the deputy commissioner/district magistrate/collector. When this bill was presented in the legislative council sir Bonzie peacock who was at that time the chief justice of the Bengal and also the vice president of the legislative council, stood up and said he shall never allow the passage of this bill because it was contrary to the concept of independent judiciary as it intended to create a junction of thief catcher with the judge in the office of the district magistrate. Sir Bartel Frayer who was home member immediately perceived that bill was going to be rejected, stood up and said that he agreed in principle with the chief justice that district magistrate as head of the district judiciary has nothing to do with police but this phrase was being introduced as her majesty's government back home had acquired certain prejudices and he assured " this is purely temporary measure destined to disappear not into distant of future " the chief justice relented to this assurance and bill was passed.

The term direction and control were not defined in the law and kept open ended and led to tensions, differences disputes and quarrels between the SPs and District Magistrate. In one of the provinces, probably Bihar the District Magistrate issued a direction to SP on appointment of certain to SHO certain police station. The SP of police wrote back that he

was bound to obey the general direction which is the wording of the law not the specific direction and this posting and transfer fell within the administrative competence of sp. The dc sent this note to chief sec of the province; chief sec sent it to Viceroy. They decided that since this term has been included by the home government, therefore clarity may be sought from them as to what it meant. The secretary of state for India in England mulled this point in his counsel for a considerable period, discussed various aspects and then came to the conclusion that if they defined it in the favour of the district magistrate the SP of the police would reduce to a non-entity and if they decide it in favor of the SP, the general direction and control of dist. magistrate will become meaningless, so they wrote back that this term of general direction and control was not capable of the definition and successful working depends upon the goodwill l of the two officers. the problem stays. The dc often asserted that he was the boss, the SP was extremely allergic to conceding this point and another deleterious effect of this phrase became visible in killing the sense of leadership among the police officers, most of them were consigned to the fact they have been borne in the service for a subordinate position. They could not take decisions independently and hence the faculty of administrative independence did not develop in them.

P01 had significantly elaborated different policing models being practiced in the subcontinent, both by the locals and British. After the mutiny in 1857, the British introduced the Police Act 1861. Some interesting historical facts related to the enactment of the Police Act 1861 were revealed by P01. The enactment of this act created a tussle between the Police and the Magistrate which continued for decades and later this tussle shaped into a visible conflict between the Police and district bureaucracy.

Another IGP P07 whose career spans for more than 2 decades in the senior policy making position also mentioned about different policing models practiced in the subcontinent before separation. He narrated that

> *In 1861 we got that police model. We were a colony. The model of police for colony and free country was different. In 1843 when General Napier conquer the Sindh, he implemented a police model which he brought from Ireland, following Irish constabulary model. In 1922 major part of Ireland got independent and started reforming the police but General Napier used the same model in subcontinent. When East India Company started trading in subcontinent, they settled in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and established factories there. Policing there was based on London model of policing, different from the rest of India. They have factories here and hence they were called as factory towns and there policing was better than other cities. In those two models there was a hell of difference. London model was service oriented. Police was service organization other was suppressive.*

As highlighted by P07, the quality of policing was not same in the whole subcontinent and it was designed to serve the masters rather than a service organization. Though British were also aware about the problems and issues with the policing but as it suits their interests so much attention was not paid to this and problem start looming until the partition of the subcontinent and police became more suppressive and violator of the law. The stories narrated by the senior policing officers confirmed the overwhelming impression emerging in the literature that the policing in Pakistan is characterized by the

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colonial mindset and was far away from service delivery. Different scholars have put a good commentary on this colonial legacy of policing and established that police could not disconnect itself from the colonial mindset even after decades (reference)

Summary

This section set outs the tone to understand the need for the policing reforms, immediate after the independence of Pakistan. The senior police officers have confirmed the notion that police was a flawed organization since the inception of Pakistan and the dire need to reform the police was already there. The policing model of the British were based on the ruthless implementation of law. They had a bad experience of mutiny in the subcontinent. So, the only objective of the police was to suppress the opposing voices. One of the reasons they have no sympathy for the locals was perhaps that the British were not the natives here. Their relationship with the native people was more of a master and slave and police was a tool to keep the people in tight control.

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6.2.2 Resistance from Bureaucracy

Bureaucratic resistance refers to the willful delay or a deliberate blockade so that things remain under control (Ingber, 2018b). Bureaucrats are the individuals or the group of people into the government machinery who make policies and control the system (Kalia, 2013). For the smooth functioning of government and delivery of efficient services to its citizen, different stakeholders working in government machinery have to collaborate with each for the collective good of the society. Sometimes the situation is otherwise and the power struggle between different organs of government gets in the way. In the proceeding

section the researcher tried to understand the responses of the senior police officers regarding the reforms introduced after the independence of Pakistan and challenges with their implementation.

One of the prominent themes emerged from the analysis of the interview was the bureaucratic hurdles and resistance. Heo and Elisa have mentioned in their work about the role of civil servants. They elaborated that, civil servant sometimes ignores, subvert or dilute the directions of politicians and curb the screws tight by exhibiting red tape and bureaucratic inertia (Heo & Wirsching, 2024). In another interesting work by Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, they mentioned that resistance can be seen in variety of ways. It may be the gimmicks played by the bureaucrats to divert or sometimes, it can be seen as active obstruction (Granér, 2017).

One of the pertinent examples of this resistance is the case of Metropolitan Police Bill of Karachi. Immediate after the independence of Pakistan. Quaid-e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the founder and first governor general of Pakistan) tried to change the police laws. As he already had the experience of policing as lawyer and he used to practice in Bombay city. On august 16, 1947 in a press conference he said soon Karachi is going to have a university, secondly, we are going to have industry setup. Then he said because of more number of students and labor in the city, this system of police will not be able to cope up with strains and stresses and with the social changes. So he directed to start working on formulation of a new police law which is compatible with the needs of the newly born state. In March 1948 act was passed by the legislative assembly. This act was a replica of Madras Act and it was pretty close to the London Police Act (Suddle, 2010). The

researcher asked about this bill from P06 who worked for more than 27 years with the police in senior positions including the Inspector General of Police. He explained the fate of that law

> *After the inception of Pakistan, the draft of new police law was sent to Quaid from speaker for his approval as Quaid-e-Azam was the governor general at that time. Now the intrigue part of bureaucracy from here. His (Quaid's) private secretary was an Indian Civil Service (ICS) officer. All the community approached that officer and ask him to stop this law. As if this law gets implemented in Karachi (the capital at that time), the whole country has to follow and the things would be out of the hands of the bureaucracy and the DMG. He played smartly and put a note that "I can see there are some typographical errors which need some corrections and hence this draft is returned for corrections" the only law of its kind which is passed from the assembly but not implemented to due to non-signature and since then its DMG……*

As explained by the P06, the DMG (District Management Group) is the integral part of bureaucracy which controls the entire district and divisional administration of the country. They were so powerful and the sense of comradeship among them is deep rooted. They derail the process of formulation of the law by playing gimmicks and using delay tactics. In the meantime, the health of Quaid-e-Azam started deteriorating (as he was Tuberculosis patient) and he finally died on 11th of September 1948. The law which was passed from the legislative assembly had never been implemented as it did not have the final consent

of the Governor General and hence it was lost in the annals of the history. The passage of this law could had been a first step towards the reformation of police law in Pakistan in the very beginning. This finding also aligns with the scholarly work of Jan Boon and Koen Verhoest who deliberated that bureaucrats have fear to lose power and becoming irrelevant in the system, so they try to maneuver things in their favor (Boon & Verhoest, 2018)

The tussle of grabbing power between the bureaucracy and the police continues and gets worse day by day. The bureaucracy meddles into the affairs of the police and consider themselves as the boss. P09 an Inspector General of the Police shed light on this interference of bureaucracy into police jobs by narrating:

> *The DC (Deputy Commissioner, the head of the bureaucracy at the district level) often asserted that he was the boss, the SP (Superintendent of Police, the head of police at the district level) was extremely allergic to conceding this point, and another deleterious effect of this phrase became visible in killing the sense of leadership among the police officers, most of them were consigned to the fact they have been born in the service for a subordinate position. They could not take decisions independently and hence the faculty of administrative independence did not develop in them.*

In the opinion of the researcher, this meddling into the affairs of the police by the district bureaucracy not only deteriorated the institution of the police, but it also resulted in the shift of power into the hands of district bureaucracy which they often misused. This

conflict also resulted in poor working relationship and lack of ownership by the police officers, which devastated the concept of law enforcement in the society.

The P04 (Inspector General of Police) revealed his bitter experience with the bureaucracy and elaborated that

> *What happened to me, I was posted as IG of a province (the name of province is not mentioned due to ethical concerns to safeguard the identity of the participant). On 15th august I transferred 5 SP's (Superintendents of Police) with my signature. CS (Chief Secretary, who is the head of the bureaucracy in the province) called my DIG headquarter, he said, ask your IG to withdraw the transfer orders or otherwise we will issue our own orders. SP's refused to obey Chief Secretary and follow my orders.*
> *Consequently, after few days I was deferred in promotion board by the CS and civil services group as revenge.*

The lived experience of the P04 reveals the intensity of the conflict between the police and the civil bureaucracy. This conflict of power has its roots in colonial times. In the times of the British, even the English officers used to confront each other. The researcher comprehends that the bureaucracy was not ready to let the powers go out of their hands. As they were controlling the whole system of government, so they consider it as their inherit right to exercise the command and control over the police. Further civil servants always used to put their case as, if they let the police independent it might become more

ruthless and the violator of law. So, their advocacy of policing under the control of bureaucracy is actually in the larger interest of the public.

P05 had the similar stance about the authoritative role of bureaucracy and other powerful elites who always resisted change. He elaborated that

> *Commission was there to make recommendations, but powerful elites were not ready to change and they maintained status quo, because they were immune of the problems. These elites include politicians, local landlords, bureaucrats, military and even businessmen. They desire change but resisted to change due to their stakes.*

This elaboration by the P05 not only confirms the explicit role of the bureaucracy is resisting the change but it also sheds light on other important stakeholders. Li and Basu (Trends & Challenges, 2010b) assert that the key to the reform is to properly incentivize the key actors, whose cooperation is needed in the design and implementation process of such reform process. They further observed that a simple buy out strategy of reform may not always work. Under certain conditions, information asymmetry between the reform agents and agency to be reformed affect the process of its implementation.

I am of the view that in order to change a society we need to have a same yardstick for all the stakeholders. We cannot desire change from the police only, rather all segments of the society need to change.

P03 was also skeptical about the role of bureaucracy and consider it as a challenge in the implementation of policing reforms

After Pakistan various police commission were formed, they made recommendations, but they were allowed to gather dust. None of their material recommendations were accepted and problem stood where it was. Even an attempt was made by two members, civil service officers of Pakistan namely Aftab Ahmed Khan (General Zia period, president and chief marshal administrator) the then establishment secretary and SK Mehmood, the then Additional secretary interior (Junejo period, the prime minister of Pakistan) to introduce commissionairate system on the pattern of act of 1856 in major towns of Pakistan. They have submitted their reports after visiting India and discussing this point with the Indian officials. Despite promises, pressure of the civil servants was so strong, and it was not introduced even in one of the main urban centers of Pakistan.

P05 also elaborated that

Civil servants do not want independent police. Police Order 2002 says IGP (Inspector General of Police) is secretary to the government. It means as secretary I will initiate summary, it would be routed to finance division and it will go to through CS (Chief Secretary). It happened in beginning of Police Order 2002. I was AIGP (Additional Inspector General of Police) finance. I initiate summary, route it to CM (Chief Minister) directly rather through home department. Before that it was in the hand of civil servants. Then in 2005-06 they get the power back in violation of Police Order 2002, and it continues as of today. To answer your question directly they (civil servants) eventually managed to regain the territory which they lost in Police Order 2002 and powers of secretary to

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government were nullified. Inspector General of Police was responsible but not authorized.

The lived experiences shared by P03 and P05 are very important and are related to the significant reforms introduced during the period of General Zia (the President and Chief Marshal Law Administrator), Mr. Junejo (the Prime Minister of Paksitan) and the General Pervaiz Musharf (President and Chief Marshal Law Administrator). Pakistan is a federal form of government in which Prime Minister is the Chief Executive of the country, who operates through its cabinet members called as Ministers. Each Minister has a portfolio. Minister is the elected representative, whereas Secretary is the administrative head of the entire organization who is a government servant. When someone is secretary to the government, it means he/she is autonomous and can enjoy all the freedom under the given laws, rules and regulation of the government (provincial/federal).

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If the Inspector General of the Police is enjoying the status of the secretary to the government, he can have the autonomy and liberty to utilize resources, yet he remains answerable to Chief Minister of the province for his deeds. This could help in the optimum utilization of resources and avoid bureaucratic delays. It was the first time these demands resulted in actual police legislation in Pakistan. The Police Order 2002 was part of a whole raft of reform legislation enacted by decree under the aegis of the presidential think-tank, the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB). It represented the first major overhaul of policing legislation since 1861, and on paper at least gave Pakistan the most advanced policing legislation in the whole of South Asia. Hailed as a major milestone in governance

reform, it commanded substantial support from the donor community (Ul & Kahlon, 2020).

The Asian Development Bank committed USD 350 million to the Government of Pakistan as part of a nation-wide 'Access to Justice Support Program.' In one fell swoop, this ambitious reform agenda attempted to bypass the intermediaries of the colonial era. The Police Order 2002 and the Criminal Procedures Amendment Act 2001 abolished the executive magistracy and, with it, all bureaucratic control over policing at the local level. One bureaucrat correctly described the objective of the Police Order 2002 as the removal of authority of the DMG over all matters concerning the police (Dogar, 2009). Within one year, the military government had effectively swept away the entire colonial edifice on which the power of the bureaucracy had depended. The professionalization agenda envisaged for the police in these pieces of legislation entailed, at least in theory, a unitary command structure converging towards the center (Malik & Qureshi, 2021a). Though, it was a very good initiative taken in the Police Order 2002 to empower the Police but unfortunately it was reverted back in the amendments introduced in the Police Order in 2004.

In summary the above sections highlighted the challenges and obstacles in the implementation of reforms posed by the bureaucracy before and after the partition. The majority of the respondents have the agreement over the undue interference and unwanted role of bureaucracy in the policing affairs. The call from the police for the autonomy and independence is not something extraordinary. At the same time the concern of the bureaucracy to keep police under supervision have merits. It can be achieved through

some public oversight commissions as already suggested in the original draft of the Police Order 2002, which researcher discusses further in this chapter.

In conclusion the researcher can ascertain that the bureaucratic hurdles remain a significant challenge in the implementation of policing reforms, yet all the blame cannot be put on the shoulder of bureaucracy, the politicians being the most important stakeholders and public representatives have a huge responsibility on their part. In the following section the researcher tried to explore the role and support of politicians in reforming the police. This also emerged as one of the most pressing themes during the analysis of the interviews.

6.2.3 Political Influence and Interference:

The most prominent and commonly raised concern and issue highlighted by the senior police officers was the political resistance and influence that has consistently undermined police reforms. The role of politicians in reform has been explicitly raised in existing studies by scholars such as Andrew Goldsmith (Goldsmith, 2005) Rigs (Riggs, 1970b) and Kjaer (Kjær, 2014).

The researchers asked the P03 who served as an Inspector General of Police to share his lived experience of dealing with political interference. He narrated

> *They were most reluctant to see the police out of their political influence or control. They ensured that the police*

law relating to establishment and functioning of police safety commissions remained a dead letter.

P05 shared that

Police reforms is not a technical process (now I am wearing the UN Police advisor hat) it is a political process because it is about redistribution of powers, when we say administratively independent, operationally neutral. we mean to say that you (Chief Minister) will not interfere in my matters, it is difficult to achieve as we (Inspector General of Police) are saying to Chief Minister that you will not interfere in my matters and give me your powers. That is why it is a political process. All other things are technical. Redistribution of powers is the hardest thing to do; in the developing world nobody wants to give away power.

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P07 was very gloomy to share his views as

In this system we have corruption, no merit, nepotism. Then there is frustration. I think we have not stated the journey yet. This is the job of leadership. We have no political leaders.

The above-mentioned extracts depict the frustration of senior police officers regarding the interference of politicians in the policing affairs and validate the notion that politicians want to have the power in their hand to serve their vested interests.

Sharing his lived experience the P06 revealed that

> *Then Chief Minister Pervaiz Elahi is responsible for killing of police law. He introduced first amendment (amendment in Police Order 2002) said that in the presence of such law we cannot win and Nawaz sharif (the ex-Prime Minster of Pakistan) will come back, hearing this Musharaf (President and the Chief Marshal Law Administrator) relented. Gen Naqvi (the head of National Reconstruction Bureau) then resigned and said that you have turned the law into bad shape.*

P06 narrative explained his beliefs and experiences of dealing with the implementation of policing reforms introduced in Police Order 2002. According to P06 the Police Order 2002 was introduced to reform the police and its objective was to make police politically neutral and an independent service-oriented force but the resistance from politicians reverted back the police laws guaranteeing the police autonomy and independence. P08 also commented that

> *Pervaiz Elahi was the Chief Minister and was against the reforms, he was instigated by the Chief Secretary. Even in the time of Muharaf, he starts convincing him that local government and police are not in our control. By taking my names, he uses bad words.*

According to P08 that the reforms introduced in Police Order 2002 were not unique and in the global context. These include the best practices across the world. But the only problem in Pakistan is the political instability and vested interests of the politicians. They

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were in a fear that if they lose control over police how come they manage their political opponents as police is used as a tool to suppress the opposing voices.

P08 had the bitter experience of going against the will of the politicians. Above all the Chief Minister is a politician and the boss of the Inspector General of Police in the province, so how come one stands against his boss who has the ultimate power in the province being the chief executive. Though CM alone cannot do many things, he needs the support from the elected cabinet members but the fact is that selection of ministers and cabinet members are even not on merit and they are only there at the sweet will of party chairman and the Chief Minister. As per P08 he paid the price for his principles

> *I was in Karachi, Murtaza (the brother of the then Prime Minister) was assassinated, I told them that this happened in my time. Let me investigate this. But somehow some people (politicians) were against investigation. This went to crime branch and it failed. Then I applied for leave for 4 months and it extended to 4 years, I remained as OSD (Officer on Special Duty, a term given to officers with no posting and no portfolio).*

By referring to his particular example, P08 revealed that how politicians work in a nexus to safeguard their vested interests. His services were not utilized by any of the federal or provincial government for a period of 4 years, just on the pretext that they consider him as a trouble guy who is tough to handle.

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P08 reflections validates the impression that treatment made to him is against the principles of good governance and institutionalization. A senior officer was kept away from posting and assigning of any position for 4 long years and his badge mates and juniors were given good and lucrative assignment, just to teach him a lesion. Further he remained idle for four years, which means he was getting salary for doing nothing. This experience frustrated him.

Additionally, the government control over policing makes it difficult for police to work and they were bound to follow the political masters. It is one of the reasons that reforms were not substantially implemented (Sarfraz, 2018).

P04 was of the view that

> *Inspector General can work till the sweet will of CM, so he has to comply. When you seek favorable appointment, you have to serve their interests. Administrative independence is not an easy job, you are not able to post DPO (District Police Officer) and DSP (Deputy Superintendent of Police) on merit. How you can get the work from the people who are not men of your choice. Orders of DPO are signed by IG but in fact they are approved by CM, to issue order is the power of CM.*

P04 expressed his frustration and helplessness by stating the fact that despite being the Inspector General of the Police, they are still not able to have the team of their own choice. By taking an empathetic consideration, it is quite understandable that IG's are responsible for the policing in the whole province but still they cannot post officers in districts and divisions with their choice.

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Considering views of P04 the researcher believes that decentralization principle of governance lacks in implementation in policing sphere of Pakistan. Further this is also contrary to the principles of institutionalization and new-institutionalization. One can agree with the steering or supervisory role of the government, but meddling into the operational and administrative affairs of the police is counterproductive and it might reduce the position of IG or any officer to a non-entity.

In nutshell the political influence has always hampered implementation of policing reforms in the country. More to the fact is the political instability has added fuel to the fire. Politicians fight with each other and use police as a coercive tool to silent the opposing voices. Senior police officers have shown their frustration and discomfort towards political influence and interference in the police affairs.

6.2.4 Compromised Police Leadership & Organizational Issues:

Another important theme that emerges out of the interview analysis was the role of police leadership and their organizational capacities. Many of the participants attributed that police leadership and organizational factors are responsible for the challenges in the implementation of policing reforms. They explained that the leadership failures within the police force and lamented senior officers who lacked the commitment or ability to enforce reforms effectively.

P04 who served police in various capacities, when asked about the role of police leadership in implementation of policing reforms. He responded

> *Fault of police is more than politician. System of induction, training, posting and promotion need to reform. No law can change this. We need good human resource. - (P04)*

P04 was very blunt and critic of the role of police leadership and the inside organizational issues which for him was one of the biggest reasons hampering the implementation of policing reforms. He further added that

> *Police leadership commitment towards police order has been shaky*

These remarks about the fellow senior police officers are considerable and need further analysis. In researcher's opinion all the blame cannot be put on the shoulders of the politicians only. If the police leadership showed courage and character, it would be very difficult for politicians to maneuver the things in their favor. An experience of reform related to the implementation of Police Order 2002 was shared by P04 that

> *Police officers too were not at all comfortable with the public safety commissions as well as appointment of CCPO (Asif hayat resisted on giving grade 21 to DIG, as he feared that they will not adhere to him). IG were against public safety commissions, and they were not comfortable with the office of CCPO as they thought it will undermine their authority in big cities. At the district level DPO was against public safety commissions.*

Referring to reforms introduced in Police Order 2002, P04 elaborated the frustration and resistance of Inspector General of Police over the establishment of public safety commissions and creation of the CCPO office in big cities. This CCPO office meant that the police officer in-charge in the big cities will be working with autonomy and enjoy independence in discharge of his duties, and he doesn't need to ask IG on many issues related to police operations. This was not accepted by the IG as he thinks that his role would be discounted in big cities and CCPO will become more relevant. Another irritant for the police officers in this reform is the establishment of public safety commissions. Police officers want independence from politicians but they don't want to be answerable before the public for their deeds. Although in all developed societies police are under the corporate control of society in the form committees or commission. In USA they either report to council or mayor directly. In England they are under the control of police committee and in Japan they are under police safety commission. In UK after 200 years they followed the system of USA. Above Chief Constable there is an elected commissioner who can sack chief constable. The police committee can hire and fire chief constable. However, in 200 years there is only one such case.

P03 elaborated that

> *Our social structure is responsible. We do not differentiate between good and bad. What is the incentive to be good? Internal system regarding posting and promotion is flawed.*

> *I used to say to my colleagues that why we promote bad officers. No politician asks us to give good remarks to a bad officer. When a bad cop is there, he suits politician.*

As explained by P03 that there is no meddling into the internal management of policing or the operations of police by outsiders only with few exceptions. Mismanagement of the police force is subject to arbitrary and capricious decision making on the part of the executive authority of the state at all levels (policemen were increasingly recruited, trained, promoted, and posted without regard for merit and primarily for their subservience to people with influence and power). Accountability and transparency that aren't up to pace. Insufficiently motivating reward systems. Large-scale instances of corrupt behaviour are a contributing factor to the under-resourcing of the police and order system (Abed & Davoodi, 2000).

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When I asked P03 that why police officers do not assert? He replied

> *Police did not make them capable. How come bad officers to be given full autonomy. First there is a need to build internal accountability system. In such scenario it is disaster to give police the type independence they are asking.*

P03 was not against the autonomy of the police, rather he was skeptical about the police leadership, that they have not equipped themselves with the required skills and knowledge

needed to modernize the police force into service-oriented organization. He vowed that the compromised police leadership with absolute autonomy will add fire to the fuel and will become more disastrous for the society.

He further added that P09 narrated his lived experience regarding the implementation of police reforms related to Police Order 2002

> *(IG Saad u-tullah, khan and frontier IG opposed the appointment of CCPO and said that nobody will adhere to me, no one will invite me on lunch or dinner). At one stage Musharf agreed to the proposal presented to him at Sihala Police Training Centre, but Gen Naqvi resisted and convince Mushaarf. Saad was a hired assassin for killing of police law hired by Ch: Pervaiz Elahi the then CM. CM Pervaiz Elahi is responsible for killing of police law.*

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This interesting revelation which was also confirmed by P02

> *Musharaf got compromised and worried. Pervaiz Elahi and one General from KPK were responsible to derail Musharaf.*

Above mentioned lived experiences of P02 and P09 identifies that there was also a strong resentment over the police reforms introduced in the shape of Police Order 2002.

The interview extracts highlight how powerful actors within institutions resisted policing reforms to protect their existing positions and interests. According to new institutionalism theory, when reforms threaten established structures and power dynamics, key individuals often work to maintain the status quo (Asatryan et al., 2017). In this case, the opposition to the appointment of the CCPO and the resistance from senior figures like “Saad-ut-ullah” reflect a broader struggle to prevent institutional change. Even when reforms were initially agreed upon or legally formulated, influential actors were able to reverse decisions through internal persuasion and political influence. This behavior illustrates the concept of "path dependency," where existing systems are difficult to change because they are deeply embedded (Sehested, 2002b). It also shows "strategic decoupling," where reforms may be publicly discussed but are blocked or weakened in practice (Morgan et al., 2017b). Overall, the example shows how resistance from within the institution made it difficult to fully implement policing reforms, preserving traditional structures and practices.

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In short, the episode illustrates how entrenched power holders use institutional inertia, legitimacy narratives, and decoupling tactics to derail police reform and preserve the existing institutional logic. President Musharaf who was a military administrator and intended to transform the deeply politicized and inefficient policing system of Pakistan which was there since the time of British had to compromise and the nexus of police leadership with politicians and military blocked the road to reformation of police. This also sheds light on the intricate relationship and junction of powerful elites in the country who always joined hands with each other to safe vested interests.

P10 who served as the Inspector General of Police in different provinces of Pakistan discussed the challenges in the implementation of reforms introduced in 2002

> *"Right document, wrong time"*
>
> *Why do I say wrong time? It was the time when Pervaiz Elahi was Chief Minister. We witnessed the initial stages of the implementation of Police Order 2002. The man who has to steer this was additional IG investigation Punjab at that time. He was not a capable guy with no leadership skills. The political government was very assertive over police and not ready to give power, another big reason was the document was not followed up by National Reconstruction Bureau. No mechanism was designed for the follow up. Policing is not a federal service; province made no mechanism either. No institutional mechanism inside the police organization was constituted. Police leadership failed badly to implement.*

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According to P10, it is necessary to implement comprehensive reform. There are no "fast fixes" when it comes to police reform. An organization's transformation is a complicated and challenging process that is dependent on a variety of internal and external circumstances, some of which may be beyond the control of those in charge and some of which may be beyond their control. To ensure the safety and well-being of all residents as well as long-term national stability and development, a transparent and responsible police service is essential, particularly in the construction of a secure environment that fosters consumer and investor trust (UNDP, 2003). In researcher's point of view any new system

requires systematic progression, proper follow ups and periodic reviews. Unfortunately, the much celebrated and hailed police law was facing implementation challenges due to lack of ownership from police.

As narrated by P02 about the implementation of police reforms of 2002

> *In 2001 we changed the law of 1861 to fit in the district, and later Police Order 2002 came, we have also talked about police schools, which were never functional. It was the responsibility of the existing police command, which never fulfilled their duties. Police is not interested. I called all the IGs and said them to be serious.*

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The existing police command thinks that promulgation of Police Order 2002 was the brain child of the old gurus of policing in the country. They consider it very idealist and took it casual. They did not take the ownership and don't try to implement the changes introduced in the new police laws. Police Order 2002 was a paradigm shift in the policing of the country. It not only changed the century old law but also incorporated the modern policing practices. The lack of ownership from police was one of the fair reasons, which hampered the implementation of this law. He further added that

> *Another thing to sabotage was that initial it was decided that ASP (Assistant Superintendent of Police) to be posted at police station. But ASPS got confused.*

There were some structural and operational changes suggested in this new law which were not accepted by the existing police. ASP came from the Civil Services after passing a superior exam. They are the future leadership of police and hence became SP, DIG and IG. Their presence at the police station means that the police which has to interact with general public will be well educated and qualified. Such officers will definitely strive for the service delivery. But ASPs resisted on this and took this posting as inferior role and they were brainwashed by the crooked seniors that new police law will diminish your stature and you will be discounted to the role of a SHO (Station House Officer). ASP's were convinced that this new law is going to end the aura of police officers. Institutional and new institutional theories suggest light on this behavior that how vested powerful elite within the institution maneuver the things to safeguard their personal interests.

P05 also discussed cultural issues of the police leadership and viewed them as hindrance. He mentioned that

> *It is the psyche of our nation to talk negative. You ask them about their assets when they join service and now. You cannot do anything in police station without money. When you go to police. It is buddy system. HR of police is sitting at their homes. 25 percent of the police has to stay at police station but they are away. A matric pass sepoy is being paid Rs 40 thousand with lots of perks and privilege. Free stay and subsidize food. Compare it with private sector. They deliver nothing but complaint.*

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As DPO I used to call a monthly meeting. I used to continue it for 3 days even. I used to call all upper subordinates and ask about their performance. Have you arrested robbers, dacoits, investigation etc. 90 percent were with no output. They only have fake and bogus record to present.

As elaborated by P05, the organizational culture and other related issues of the police functioning hinder the reformation of police. He was of the view that it is the duty of the senior police leadership to change the organizational culture and they should lead by example.

6.2.4.1 Outdated policing practices

Besides the leadership and organizational issues affecting police reform implementation. Some important sub-themes also emerged from the interviews. Outdated and old policing practices was also significant factor which deteriorated police performance and resultantly police perception was not good.

P05 elaborated that

The model of policing of world is different. Urban centers cannot work on police station model. We need specializing, British has two model. Police station in rural and police division in urban. Civilian register the complaint. Then they send it to concerned office. Police need to communicate such things to government. You have to bring proposal. Every government want business.

As explained by the P05 that policing in Pakistan lags behind the world. The world has changed, so we have to move accordingly and modernize ourselves to fulfill the needs of the people.

Hossain have delineated police reform initiatives of some developed and developing countries like the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, South Africa, Bangladesh and India. Finally, he suggested some lessons from the experience of those countries which can help greatly in a meaningful police reform (Sanjay Patil, 2008)

P05 also explained that

> *Our way of policing is old age. Whole world methodology of crime control is different as of ours. We do displacement of crime by patrolling and establishing check posts. The methodology of crime control is based on intelligence and investigation. Our biggest tool of intelligence is criminal record. It is an established fact that more than 90 percent offense contains already offenders. We need technology.*
> *In Pakistan model is based on watch and ward. We need to do investigation in a modernized way.*

The P05 highlighted the intricate details of police watch and ward functions. The physical presence of police everywhere is an old concept and even not possible to achieve. One can learn from the best practices around the globe. It is the age of Information Technology

and Artificial Intelligence. Police have to embed all these modernizations into their operations.

P06 who served as Inspector General of Police and took various initiatives narrated his personal experience. He was critique of old ways of policing in the country. He mentioned some of his initiatives which he believed change the policing in the country during his tenure. He revealed that

> *I conducted empirical study through Hussan Habib Itmtiaz a very good officer. How many people came to police station on daily basis and for what purpose? The finding reveal that 90 percent of the people came for mere complaints of lost to fulfil legal requirement of insurance etc. It means our police is overburdened for the job which can easily be performed by any civilian by just making a customer service department. This can also save the 90 percent job of police mohrar (the police guy who records complaints). Further there is no computerized record keeping. Fresh graduates should be hired. No manual system can work. To cater legal requirement we need record as there is no record maintenance, the only solution is IT.*

According to P06, the police engaged itself in a job which has nothing to do with policing function. Most of the services lie in the ambit of the municipal services. This has not only overburdened the police but it also opened the doors of corruption and foul practices. Further the majority of the people living in the country are peaceful citizen who are not involved in any wrong doing, so why should they need to interact with uniform personnel.

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P09 mentioned that

> *People are humiliated in Thana (police station). They don't want to visit police station to register their complaints. You have fear of uniform and it created distance between people and police.*

As mentioned by P09 police has a very negative perception in public amid police reputation as corrupt and inept organization. This reputation is not void of merits, the stories of police abuse, brutality and corruption are widespread in media and everywhere. Police is considered to be one of the most corrupt and cruel organizations (Malik & Qureshi, 2021b). Police is considered to be the symbol of fear, not the symbol of protection in the country (Scrivner, 1994). The amount of engagement between the police and the general people in the enforcement of the law and the prevention of crime is significantly lower than what is required. Many police acts are viewed as arbitrary by the media and the general public, who are concerned about the lack of accountability for such actions and inactions on the part of the police (Mastrofski & Willis, 2010b). As the relationship between the general people and the police has deteriorated, residents prefer to avoid reporting crimes to the police because of their bad emotions toward police. (Abbas, 2011).

Several studies, including one conducted by Transparency International Pakistan in 2007 and another published the same year by the United Nations Development Programme, have found that most Pakistani households who interact with law enforcement agencies have experienced corruption, and an overwhelming majority (67 percent to 71% of those

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polled) have denied receiving necessary support from the police. The same research also found that court security officers, traffic cops, police in immigration services, and Thana are the most likely to accept bribes. These four types of police officers are especially vulnerable to corruption. These occurrences are evidence that Pakistan's police force has not been brought up to speed with the kind of modern democracy that the country is currently experiencing.(Ullah et al., 2016b). A discernible transformation in either the police or the public's image of them has proven to be difficult to achieve in recent years.

As a result, establishing legitimacy in societies where a uniformed officer is perceived as an agent of dread rather than a source of security and comfort, the police face major obstacles. It is tough to overcome mistrusting legacies, and it is even more difficult to establish a new culture of trust and dependence. The police force cannot function properly unless the public has confidence in and cooperates with them. In the eyes of many, Pakistan's police force serves as a litmus test for the changes taking place in the country's society (Corsaro et al., 2015b).

6.2.4.2 Stability of the tenure

Another important issue highlighted by the senior police officers during interview was the stability of the tenure. It was reported as a significant challenge by almost all of the senior police officers. The concept of stability of tenure means, the fixed amount of time one police officer has to command a certain position. Kim has mentioned in his premier work that tenure protection of a civil servant is one of the important factors contributing towards his job performance (Kim, 2018).

The same was mentioned by P02

> *Change is always difficult to achieve as it has resistance. The officers have less tenure and they lack in urge.*

P03 had similar views

> *We need to see, what is police performance? It is the enforcement of law without fear and favor, across the board. No politicization, no influence and you are accountable for your deeds. Now if the investigation is politicized and the arrest and release of people is compromised, where is the law? Policing fails on this litmus test. It is a huge challenge, particularly for the police leadership. But they are compromised for good postings, perks and privileges. There tenure is not stable, they remain IG till the pleasure of the Chief Minister. How come they bring change?*

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P07 elaborated that

> *No police officers is against but they don't want to say before politicians as it will displease their political masters. They have taken the professional benefits such as new ranks, promotions, perks but did not implement the law in true spirit.*

It is quite evident from the views of above-mentioned senior officers i.e P02, P03 and P07 that one of the reasons police leaderships is compromised is the stability of the tenure. If

police leadership takes a stand and says no to the unlawful demands of the politicians, they will be removed from their position as there is no stability/protection of the tenure and it is the prerogative of the Chief Minister (the Chief Executive of the province) to relinquish any IG who is not man of his choice. Further if they remain loyal to the political masters, they would be highly rewarded both in service and even after the retirement.

The researcher is of the view that, clean chit cannot be provided to the senior police officers, as IG police is always replaced from an IG police, who is the guy from the same police force. If all police leadership decides that they will not obey the unlawful orders, remain politically neutral, the space of the politicians will be narrow down, but unfortunately the situation is otherwise and politicians get the leverage of this.

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P02 mentioned that

> *The spirit of police reforms in the country is the selection criteria of IG and his tenure. If u do not ensure selection procedure and tenure rest is a story.*
> *Tenure of IG Punjab in recent times is few months. First Rao Sardar, then Ghulam Rasool was IG in the morning and not in the evening, Amir Zulfiqar for less than one month, Inam ghani for one year.*

P06 further added that

> *Reforms are not in air, not in drawing room, you need to go to basic. Trained and senior police officers should command the police. He should have guarantee of some*

> *tenure at least. You can reduce but there should be some fixed period. You need time to understand the organization. Contributing to that is another story. First year you understand, 2nd year you transform and third year you sustain your policies. I received a call one morning and said your services are no more required as IG.*

These lived experiences of P02 and P06 are significant to understand the precarious situation of the tenure of police officers in the country. It clearly means that you have to work to the pleasure of the powerful stakeholders in the country. If you dare say no to them, you will not be on your seat. All the gentlemen who were mentioned above were posted as Inspector General of Police and were removed from their position for serving few months or weeks. As suggested by P06, there should be some definite period to serve as an IG. If an IG knows that he has fixed number of years, he can strategically plan, think and act to achieve his goals. Afterwards he can be made accountable for the period he served. If there is uncertainty about his tenure as IG, how he could deliver? He will remain fearful, whether he will be the IG in the next morning or not.

P01 shared his experiences

> *It is very interesting point, I have seen in my service anyone who is serving as IG can be removed anytime. They can be removed anytime. In this country Judges have tenure, military chief has tenure even they used to be corrupt as well.*

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According to 01, the irony is that you will be relinquished in the name of governance and performance. Politicians and powerful elite holds the dictionary to define performance and governance by their own choice. The bitter truth revealed by P01 that all civil servants in the country have a protection of their tenure except the police chief.

P03 expressed his views on the same analogy

> *Politicians are not prepared to end their political weight. They want posting and transfer or their own choice; they interfere in the administration. they're responsible for cutting short the tenure of police officers. There must be a complete change of mind. Depoliticization of police can only take police when society in general stands for impartiality.*

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According to P03, the problem is quite evident. The political leadership is responsible for this chaos and non-transformation of police into a service delivery organization. Until and unless there is a change in the mindset and behavior of the society, how can you bring institutional change? Pakistani society has to undergo a major surgery. One should stand for the rule of law, justice, and impartiality. According to P03, we need to come out of the cast and creed system. Our personal and vested interests dominate our larger interests. He expressed his frustration and said that the big picture of the society needs to be changed.

P09 shared his lived experience

> *I was called by pm so I said four things in line of Police Order 2002. How long is my age? Are you ready to pay the political price? Will you interfere in my matters (he said no) Ensure Stability of tenure. He supported me publicly in media and mentioned me 5 times. Before 16 days from my removal, he appreciated me. The PM mood was very positive about reforms but still I was removed after 10 months.*

When the researcher asked the reason, he said

> *Politicians are responsible. What other factors.., It is difficult to answer but I think he wanted to give message of good governance. Chief Secretary was also a meritorious guy; we both were the choice of PM. Chief Secretary was removed after 4 months. Even things become difficult for me to continue. Good governance was his stated objective. He was happy with both of us but not willing to pay the political price.*

This is an interesting experience shared by the P09 that despite PM support and his willingness, the IG was not able to complete his tenure. It clearly reveals the dichotomy between the national interests and party interests and the stability of tenure of IG still remained as unachievable. The lived experience of several IG's have confirmed the prevalent challenges elaborated by Rashid and Bashir in existing studies (Rashid et al., 2021b).

6.2.4.3 Military and other powerful stakeholders

Themes related to the role of powerful stakeholders and military elite also emerged during interviews with the senior police officers. Given that Pakistan is a developing and democratic (though democracy is not deep rooted) society, it is reasonable to assume that the country's efforts to reform its police force should, by default, be founded on democratic culture, norms, and ideals. It is essential that the highest standards of human rights are maintained inside Pakistan's police organization if the country wants to flourish democratically, but the situation is quite grim and realities are different on ground (Asatryan et al., 2017).

P01 talked exclusively talked about the police reforms and understanding of its context

> *Police reform is very tricky. Problem is the four military governments in the country. Reforms and military government are contradictory to each other. When military does quo. First know what is quo, it is throwing away the elected representatives of the country and establishing that we are mightier than any law of the land and in fact we are the law. Most adverse effects are for bureaucracy and judiciary. Police and judges are there to uphold the law of the country, but they surrender before the martial law. If you read the book of General Shahid Aziz, he said the Musharaf (marshal law administrator) was ultimately left with fools and flatterers.*

This explanation by P01 is significantly highlighted in the existing literature (Grare, 2010b; Siddiqi et al., 2014c). Throughout the entire police reform process in Pakistan, the

military executive at the center remained firmly in control. Reforms enacted under the aegis of a military dictatorship and the bypassing of the long-standing colonial structures of governance set the tone for the ensuing conflicts over its implementation. According to P01, the idea of reforming police might be good and genuine from the military governments but to their lack of understanding the subject matter, the fruits are not availed. Further the dichotomy is this that the military rule is not justified or illegal, so military is always perceived as suppressor.

P01 further added that

> *You cannot single out police. The poisonous effect of Marshal law or the military governments is evident on all segments of society.*

As explained by P01 the whole society suffers with this political instability and military might which remained a very dominant part in the political history of Pakistan. Before 2008, there was no political government who completed its tenure and even as of today, there is no Prime Minister of Pakistan who completed its complete turn. In such scenario talking only about police reforms may be seen as a wish, far from reality.

P07 mentioned that

> *It is a multi-stake holder environment. There are two types of stake holders one who is the beneficiary and one who is losing. In Sindh and Baluchistan, there are other powerful stakeholders such as Rangers, FC and the military. If you implement Police Order 2002 such agencies will lose their*

stakes in Karachi and Hyderabad. The State is only willing to strengthen police to the extent police remain in their subordination. Police Order 2002 is a revolutionary document which make you independent.

P07 explained that Pakistan is a multi-stake holder society. With such realities and background you cannot reform the police by just talking about police only. It should be an overall reform. These debates have assumed a special urgency not only in light of the international focus on Pakistan's security sector reform but, more importantly, as a result of the rapidly deteriorating security situation, as evidenced by the rise in violent crime and widespread perceptions of increasing insecurity among the population. Much of this is blamed directly on the police reforms themselves. As a study conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the major funding agency for the reforms discussed here, stated: Of most concern, it seems that weakness in external oversight of the police have made the police less governable. The consequence is that the incidence of police excess and torture during pre-trial detention has increased markedly, along with the perception that police are unresponsive to increasing violence (Najma Sadiq et al., 2020).

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As a result, police reforms are in serious danger of being perceived as a one-way street on which the police have simply secured more resources and autonomy while becoming less accountable. (ADB, DFID & WB 2004: Overview, p. 9) Members of the bureaucracy have opposed the very ideas on which the reforms were based, because these were seen as undermining its traditional authority. The arguments about police reform overall sidestepped the entire question of the legitimacy of reform. The argument was less about

the police itself, and more about defending the long-standing practice of divide-and-rule against the intrusion of a modernizing military dictatorship and its attempts to centralize and monopolize the means of violence within Pakistan.

6.2.5 Accountability

Accountability emerged as prominent and pressing theme during most of the interviews. Besides the lack of leadership in police organizations, there are many concerning problems with the policing in Pakistan. It is necessary to reform the police force to achieve long-term human security. This is due to the fact that the police force is the most visible institution in the security sector.. As a result, it is becoming more and more apparent that the development of a professional and accountable police force that implements a new form of policing that is sensitive to the needs of local communities is absolutely necessary for the continuation of democracy and the progression of human progress.(Stergioulis, 2018). In fact, reforming current systems is more difficult than building new ones since it requires a significant shift in one's attitude and operating pattern, which is incredibly tough to do.

P05 expressed that

> *Go to any police station and ask about their performance. Wherever you go they complain about resources. Be it officers or ranks. The biggest problem in Pakistan is accountability. Unless promotion is linked with performance, you cannot change police.*

P05 explained the police practices and culture. They earn money from unfair means and take bribe and use foul means to plunder more money and benefits. It is the state of sorry that police always complaints about the resources but they never accept the mistake on their part and not distance themselves from the corrupt practices.

As stated in the Needs Assessment Report (2003), a well-designed programme based on clearly defined needs and continuing strategy evaluation might have a substantial impact on Pakistani police efficiency and effectiveness, and help the country move toward a more pro-people policing model. Pakistan is plagued by many problems which substantially affect the people. Significant issues exist with respect to law enforcement, bribery, the rule of law, and equal access to the courts (Kjær, 2014). These problems disproportionately impact the most vulnerable members of society, such as women and children. Pakistan's social and economic well-being is adversely affected by these issues.

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P07 explained that

> *Officers came from provincial services group or from federal services to province, lack in accountability behaviors. I have not seen any incompetent officer to be removed from service. The reason is comradeship or brotherhood culture. They don't write adverse ACR's (annual confidential report). The cost is to bear by the state. Our social structure is responsible. We do not differentiate between good and bad. What is the incentive to be good?*

As apprised by P07 the police officers have a soft corner about the fellow police officers and their mistakes and misuse of power is ignored or hide in the name of brotherhood (paiti bhai system). Indicators that police reform is necessary now more than ever before, include an increase in the number of media outlets and public concern about the impact of crime, the amount of social unrest, and widespread unhappiness with the criminal justice system. There is widespread belief that corruption, extortion, violence against women, and kidnapping are increasing in frequency and severity (Ali, 2020). There is also an increase in transitional and large-scale organized crime in Pakistan. These criminal activities include human trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, white-collar crime, and environmental crimes, all of which pose a significant challenge to the country's under-resourced and undertrained law enforcement agencies (R.S. Saini, 1994).

P01 narrated some intricate details

> *Accountability is the biggest factor, all officers got good ACR (annual confidential reports). Further the ideas of society change due to terrorism as well. People want elimination of criminals. Now there is no check and balance on police. Police do custodian killings. Before we had judicial inquiry threats, now there is no such things. Now we have introduced new terms, "full fry" and "half fry".*

The researcher asked what are these terms?

> *He said full fry means murder, and half fry mean torture on someone to make him paralyzed, so that he cannot move on his own during rest of his life.*

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According to P01 police is free from check and balances. They have no fear of external oversight. They are involved in human rights violation. Police knows that they are not accountable before anyone, so they have become ruthless. As a study conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the major funding agency for the reforms, stated that, it seems that weakness in external oversight of the police have made the police less governable. The consequence is that the incidence of police excess and torture during pre-trial detention has increased markedly, along with the perception that police are unresponsive to increasing violence (Najma Sadiq et al., 2020). As a result police reforms are in serious danger of being perceived as a one-way street on which the police has simply secured more resources and autonomy while becoming less accountable.

P03 shared his experiences

> *There is no accountability. There is no red entry for your poor performance. Attack on Srilankan cricket team in Lahore, is the best example and case study on accountability mechanisms in police. Anyhow what happened is. . . Police did not get up in the morning. It was promised to give presidential security and VIP protocol to Sri Lankan cricket team. SP (Superintendent of Police) did not turn up for this duty. Sarfaraz Virk (the police officer supposed to be at duty) was sleeping at that time. Police gave false statements in the inquiry. SHO (station house officer) Gulberg did not came on the duty at that day. RPG (a type of rocket launcher) of the terrorist was missed otherwise it would have been a disaster. Terrorist came on*

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liberty chowk and went back on rickshaw. Then police did eye wash.

This situation shared by P03 tells the inside working and inefficient management of the police. They were so casual in discharge of their duties and had no idea that their negligence could cause a tremendous damage to the international image of the country, which actually happened. As after the attack, no international team visited Pakistan for a decade. According to P03 the statement of the Police officials were found contradictory. Even the forensic evidence established that the cell phones of the alleged officers were receiving signals from the towers near to their homes, which validates that they were at home and not present on their duties. Despite this blunder and casual behavior, these officers were not punished or penalized by the police and still they manage to get promotions and postings when dust was settled.

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6.2.6 Security sector reform

Need for the overall security sector reform was also mentioned by senior police officers during interviews.

P10 highlighted the need of overall reform in the criminal justice system. He mentioned that

Then comes circumstantial evidence. Our court relies on eye witness. Court gives acquittal to robbers. Police has to be trained on circumstantial evidence such as forensic evidence. In Punjab we did good work. Evidence should be

collected and chain of custody should be protected. Court should be communicated that this chain is preserved. Court should consider this as primary evidence and change its mindset. Otherwise, we will not be changed.

P10 explained that, if associated systems and laws (such as the Criminal Procedure Code and other components of the criminal justice system) stay untouched, systems such as the police cannot be modified in isolation from the rest.

In researcher's opinion the effectiveness of the public-oriented police reform is also dependent on the ability of the institutions that implement it. Policymakers and political actors in the country were encouraged to bring police reform into the national agenda by Asian Society's paper "Stabilizing Pakistan through Police Reform. This report mentioned lack of equipment, technology, personnel, intelligence capability, training and mostly lack of political will in addressing the police reform issue. It emphasized on the improvement of quality curriculum for Pakistan's police training issue, adequate technological resources and updated police equipment for improving police performance (Abbas, 2012). The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) created a strategy and action plans for comprehensive police reform in their research "Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice System Reform." Legal criminal justice provisions should be translated into policies and regulations in order to facilitate greater cooperation amongst all essential actors in order to improve access to security and justice and to increase the efficiency of criminal justice along with human rights standards.

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According to Hossain (2014), a lack of proper orientation and training, misuse and abuse of police by powerful sections of society, poor accountability, organizational failure to control, and inhuman terms and conditions of their service desperately make the police ineffective and non-accountable, and a meaningful reform can bring significant progress and prosperity.(de Maillard & Savage, 2012b).

6.2.7 Negative sentiment and frustrations

Overall negative sentiment was reflected by the senior police officers during interviewees: Frustration with Political Interference: Many interviewees expressed frustration with the continuous political interference that undermines the police's ability to operate independently.

Disillusionment with Leadership: Senior officers expressed a sense of disillusionment with their leadership, who were often too weak or unwilling to assert their authority to enact reforms.

Failure of Reforms: The failure to fully implement the Police Order 2002 led to a deep sense of disappointment.

P03 mentioned

> *There is very little hope as things stand and are progressing. There is very little hope that the recent trends of over politicization visible in each and every field of administration will either subside or diminish.*

People have to live within the political control of dishonest politicians. No one care of missing person. Just imagine Supreme Court and high court are helpless. Chief Justice is helpless. Army and police does not comply the orders.

P02 narrated

I am not hopeful. It is a mess up country. Population is the biggest challenge, then bad governance, rest are the off shoots.

P07 concluded that

I don't want to spread fake hopes. Military does the same. They hide their corruption due to power. No hope.

P06 added that

We know what is wrong and how to fix, but we are not doing.

P05 said

The only hope is society stands for rule of law. Police reform can only succeed when there is a general atmosphere of rule of law. It is not an independent function. You may have any police law; it is bound to fail unless the concept of rule of law gains popularity.

Conclusion

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Major challenges for reforming Pakistani police, observed by the senior police officers are lack of political will, bureaucratic hegemony, resistance from powerful stakeholders, corruption by police personnel, malpractices and lack of police leadership commitment. The findings reveal that senior police officers in Pakistan exhibit a nuanced awareness of the deteriorating public image and operational inefficiencies of the police force, often attributing these challenges to systemic and institutional barriers. Their reflections underscore that the stagnation of police reforms stems from a complex interplay of factors, prominently including the absence of sustained political will to prioritize institutional change, coupled with the entrenched hegemony of bureaucratic structures that resist accountability and modernization. Compounding these issues are vested interests of powerful stakeholders ranging from political elites to influential groups who perceive reform as a threat to their privileges, thereby actively obstructing progress. Internally, corruption and malpractices perpetuate a culture of impunity, eroding public trust and operational integrity, while inadequate commitment from police leadership further stifles proactive initiatives for improvement. These themes are deeply interconnected, creating a self-reinforcing cycle where political indifference enables bureaucratic inertia, which in turn emboldens corrupt practices and weak leadership. Collectively, these dynamics illustrate that police reform in Pakistan is not merely a matter of policy adjustment but necessitates confronting entrenched power hierarchies and fostering a cultural shift toward transparency and accountability. Addressing these impediments demands a holistic, multi-stakeholder approach, as isolated efforts are likely to falter against the weight of systemic resistance. This analysis highlights the urgent need for structural overhauls that align institutional incentives with public welfare, ensuring reforms transcend rhetoric to achieve tangible, equitable outcomes.

The global trends being witnessed in public sector reforms were structural reforms, capacity building and more recent is the service delivery era. Reform introduced in the public sector have always been viewed from the theoretical lens of institutionalism and police as an organization has no exception to this.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter synthesizes the impact of existing reforms in changing the police image and performance over time, presenting the findings and challenges in the implementation of reforms as narrated by the senior police officers and finally the recommendations and the strategies to overcome the challenges in improving the image and performance of police. Drawing on the institutional theory and generating insights by reviewing document and conducting interviews of senior police officers, this chapter not only concluded this research project but also addressed one of the major objectives of the study to suggest some strategies to overcome the challenges and improve the image and performance of police in Pakistan. Previous chapters (five and six) set a tone to access the existing police reform policies adopted by the government in improving police image and performance and its achievements, and also discovered perceptions and lived experiences of senior police officers toward police image and performance, and factors which contributes to the hindrance of police reform implementation in Pakistan.

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In this chapter the researcher not only presented his refection on police reform challenges but also tried to summarize the key findings, it's practical and theoretical implications and suggested some strategies to improve the police image and performance in Pakistan based on the findings of the interviews with senior police officers.

7.2 Key Findings

The researcher discussed the situation of policing reforms in the country, which remains a priority of every subsequent government since the independence of Pakistan and still the need for reforming policing in the country stands at top position. An interesting fact was that, every government wanted to reform the public sector but at the end, itself become one of the hurdles in implementing such reforms. The researcher was in the pursuit of answering the important research questions i.e "What were the most significant changes adopted by the government in improving the image of police force in Pakistan and the achievement of the reform policies? How do the senior police officers feel about the police image and performance of police force in Pakistan and what contributes to the hindrance of police reform implementation in Pakistan; and finally, what are the possible changes could be suggested improve the overall police image and performance in Pakistan?

This study sets out to answer these questions by using IPA approach, critically reviewing the reports of various commissions formulated over time since the independence of Pakistan and by asking the senior police officers about their lived experiences of dealing with the challenges in the implementation of reforms, followed by the strategies to overcome the challenges and suggest improvement in the image and performance of police in Pakistan. Initially chapter two sets the tone of understanding the landscape of policing

systems and reform efforts in subcontinent and after the partition and creation of Pakistan. This was important as without having a decent knowledge of policing systems which Pakistan inherited since her independence, it would be difficult to proceed. Chapter five presented the changes and reforms introduced by successive governments in Pakistan.

Chapter six discussed at length, the perceptions and lived experiences of senior police officers of the country, whereas the strategies to overcome these challenges are discussed in detail in this final chapter. The interpretation of different phenomenon of policing discussed during the whole study helped in developing a deeper understanding and insightful information about the policing landscape of the country. Prior to the presentation of the strategies to overcome challenges, brief summary of changes introduced and lived experiences of senior police officers dealing with these reforms presented below.

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7.2.1 Reforms introduced by successive governments

Chapter five detailed the response to the first research question: What were the most significant changes adopted by the government in improving the image of police force in Pakistan and the achievement of the reform policies? Chapter five discussed the efforts to reform the policing in the country since the independence of Pakistan. It outlined the number of commissions formulated by multiple governments to reform the police. It revealed that both civil and military governments tried to reform the police but they were not able to change the big picture of policing in the country. The suggested reforms, included changes from minor to structural overhauling in the policing systems.

The findings of the study validated the existing studies which talk about the similar stuff (S. Batool & Khan, n.d.; Rashid et al., 2021b; Siddiqi et al., 2014c; Suddle, 2010). An analysis of the reform strategies and examination of the reports produced by various commissions confirm that all of the reforms were aimed at restructuring the law, redesigning of policing systems and organizational reengineering which reflected the influence of institutional and new institutional models as already discussed in detail in chapter no 2.

All the reforms were having a common objective of enhancing organizational efficacy and effectiveness irrespective of the use of model. The findings also revealed that most of the reforms introduced are of similar nature which qualifies that the previous reforms were not implemented or they had not achieved the desired objectives. The findings also revealed that every subsequent government responded to the need of the citizen for a people friendly police. Evaluation of the commission reports clarifies the repetitive nature of the reforms. This means that not much was changing on ground and the call for policing reforms remain prominent and consistent. This also testifies the proposition that most of the reforms failed to achieve its stated objectives (Baker, 2018).

Further it was ascertained that despite repetitive sort of reforms, subsequent governments view these reforms not only as a "response to public demands" but also it voiced from other important stakeholders such as politicians, legal community and police itself. Every subsequent government came into the power by criticizing the former regime, calling them to be inept, corrupt and criticized their governance mechanisms. But the irony was that once, new government (either civil or military) hold the office, they fell prey to the same

menace of corruption, bad governance and lack of accountability. Bashir mentioned in his work that many of the reforms introduced by the governments were based on changes and adjustments in the existing policing model of the country.

Though these reforms were never materialized at full, however, it created some new police jobs and organizations such as FIA (Federal Investigation Agency) and Motorway Police (Bashir et al., 2022). The findings reveal that such reforms were not aimed at improving the service delivery mechanisms, but majority were introduced by the politicians to sell the narrative of the reforms in public sector of the country not to address the fundamental problems of policing in the country.

Going further into the findings, the chapter five revealed that the only effort which resulted in changing the legal framework of policing in the country was the advent of Police Order 2002. This police order repealed the draconian Police Act of 1861 introduced by the British in the subcontinent to suppress the voices of the people and prolong their unjust rule. These findings also validated the wok o Nekokara (Nekokara, 2015). Police Order 2002 was regarded as the paradigm shift in policing in the country. It was a response to the long heard voices of institutional reforms always advocated by institutional reform theorists. The analysis of the reforms introduced in Police Order 2002 confirmed that this police law guaranteed four things; police remain politically neutral, operationally and administratively independent, publically accountable (under institutional mechanism through the establishment of police complaint authority and public safety oversight commissions, not to the politicians directly) and functionally specialized.

Administration of police under 1861 Act was nominally under control of IGP. Because at district Level there was a district magistrate who exercised direction and control over the administration of district Police and this district magistrate was not answerable or under the control of IGP. Police Order 2002 removed this dichotomy altogether. The entire police force throughout the length and breadth of the province placed under the administrative control of IGP. At the range/divisional level it conferred the total responsibility over DIG, removing the role of commissioner over him and at the district level it was placed under DPO. Police officers became master of their own houses under this law.

The most important aspect of the police reforms as enshrine in Police Order 2002 that it conferred real administrative independence over the police officers. The second important police reforms are that IG police enjoyed no secretariat status before this police law (although in India they had declare that IG police in major provinces as additional chief sec home for police officers departmental as well as financial). There were great objections to this proposal and ultimate decision was made that IG may be declared as secretary to government with full administrative and financial powers. This was a great achievement of police reforms which was unparalleled in the history of Pakistan which was achieved by National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) with utmost efforts.

The third glaring aspect of the police reforms is that it made a genuine effort at depoliticization of the police by introducing the concept of public safety commission at the district and provincial levels as a corporate body for exercising oversight over the police to ensure that it did not transgress its powers and that it received due share of

finances from the provincial government that were extremely essential for undertaking meaningful policing in the district. This was a great achievement of police reforms and constituted a source of unacceptable dispensation by the politicians.

These reforms were viewed as change in the entire policing landscape of the country. However, the review of the documents provided limited information on the success of these reforms, rather this police order was amended in 2004, 2006 and 2008, which nullified the objectives of these reforms (the detail has been discussed in chapter six). After answering the first research objective in detail, the researcher concluded several things, for instance, the need and demand of the policing reforms was always there starting from the day of independence to the present time. However, there was various types of reforms introduced over decades, some reforms were based on changing the legal framework, while other were prioritizing the functional and operational perspective of policing pertaining to social norms of society, but the strategy to introduce all these reforms were driven by political forces both in civil and military governments. The jargon of policing reforms was used by politicians as mere catchy words to gain the popularity in masses.

7.3 Lived experiences of senior police officers in implementation of Policing Reforms

Chapter 6 reported the outcomes of the interviews that were conducted with senior police officers, this section deal with the second research question: How do the senior police officers feel about the police image and performance of police force in Pakistan and what contributes to the hindrance of police reform implementation in Pakistan? Significant challenges were identified and the findings are summarized below:

7.3.1 Politics of reforms

The "politics of reforms" in Pakistan's Policing context refer to the contestation over resources, authority and narrative framing that shapes the implementing reform. The support of the politicians is of utmost importance in order to succeed the reforms. One of the most prominent challenges that appeared in the findings of the study is the political interference into the policing affairs. Despite clear technical blue prints, different provincial governments resisted policy changes and reform implementation in Pakistan. These findings go in line with the work of Abbas and Sarfaraz (Abbas, 2011; Sarfraz, 2018) who mentioned that political dynamics affected the public sector reforms and when it comes to police, the meddling into the policing matters is even rigorous. The powerful political groups and individuals exert their pressure and hence become a major hurdle in implementing of reforms. The senior police officers believed that without the support of politicians they cannot make police politically neutral, which is essential to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

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The findings of the interview validates that majority of reforms introduced were concerned about the functional part of policing and not specifically addressed the fundamental problems existed in the policing systems. Reforms were always introduced with a political motive to convince the voters that the government means business. The same can be viewed from the lens of institutionalism as rigid organizational mechanisms, historical legal framework of Police Act 1861 and bureaucratic inertia embedded within the policing system increases the difficulties implementing the reforms. Though there were number of reform efforts and commissions which suggested changes in policing system but the orthodox institutional practices and structures squeezed the flexibility required to adopt

the change. Further the lack of autonomy, non-stability of tenure of police officers, centralized decision making and political influence also played its part as a hindrance in implementing reforms (Rashid et al., 2021b).

New institutionalism expands the finding by incorporating the role of norms, informal beliefs, cultural practices which serve as the guiding pathways for the police personnel. In combination with external political influence, all such factors mentioned above become prominent impediment to reform implementation. Further the persuasive language of politicians in the public discourse to grab the public support sometimes ignores the underlying facts of the problem. In such case the reforms introduced might lack in substance. This was evidently explained in chapter six by the senior police officers. Most of the reforms were introduced by politicians by involving the bureaucrats who while sitting in their offices do some wishful thinking and build illusions to solve the problem, which has a disconnect from the situations on ground.

The finding also mentioned that majority of the reforms are made at the federal while some were made at provincial level and the implementation of these reforms badly affected by political interference, lack of police leadership, bureaucratic resistance, corrupt cultural practices and no follow up mechanisms were there. Further after the 18th amendment in the constitution of Pakistan, police were considered as a provincial subject, which means the Inspector General of the police was under direct control of the Chief Minister. This finding validates the work of Amaral and Nekokara (Amaral et al., 2013; Nekokara, 2015).

The findings of the study also penned that government also developed a vertical hierarchical relationship with the police which resulted in direct and full control over the police by the chief executive of the province and country. This idea of policing was in direct contradiction and confrontation with the concepts of institutionalism and new institutionalism which supports the autonomy of the police incumbents under the ambit of rules, regulations and laws. The government used to influence the Inspector General or any other officer of the police, as they can only continue to their job till the sweet will of the politicians. This not only tarnished the police morale but also resulted in poor performance of police that subsequently resulted in poor police image. This testifies the findings of the Ashby, Corsaro and Watson (Ashby et al., 2007b; Corsaro et al., 2015a; Watson et al., 2018) who talked about the politics of reform and consider reform as a political process.

Ironically, controlling police was not meant to control the outcome of the police reforms or to control the performance of police, rather it was about the concentration of powers into the hands of political elites. Under such circumstances, one cannot see police organization to work for the greater good of the society, rather police turned to be the stooges of the few. The senior police officers expressed their frustrations in dealing with this situation and they considered this as a challenge and meddling into operational part of policing. Political interests dominate the routine jobs of policing such as posting and transfers, promotions, punishments and rewards to the officers etc. this is against the principle of autonomy and independent command of the police organization. So much so police officers are not authorized to use their discretionary powers without the consent of political masters (detail given in chapter six).

These findings validate the work of Suddle and Nekokara (Nekokara, 2015; Suddle, 2010) in which they emphasized that politicization in policing matters is one of the major causes of poor performance. In nutshell the findings enhanced the deeper understanding of the researcher on the challenges hampering the meaningful implementation of policing reforms in Pakistan. Institutionalism and new institutionalism provide a useful lens to go into the intricate details and complex interplay of the organizational factors, both formal and informal. The reality between the stated objectives and the implementation of the reforms is the "political interest" which have distorted the fruits of true and meaningful reform. The lived experiences and perceptions of senior police officers spanning over decades have added frustration in them and they were usually not very positive and hopeful about the policing reforms in the country in near future. This study helped in broadening the understanding of the researcher by throwing light into complexities of political dynamics, historical background, outdated policing structures, bureaucratic inertia, and resistance to change from within the police and cultural norms which blocked the road to successful implementation of policing reforms in Pakistan.

7.4 Strategies to improve police image and performance

The insights generated through interviews, lived experiences and collective wisdom of the elite police officers having plenty of experience in dealing with reforms along with extensive analysis of existing literature has enabled the researcher to answer the final research question of the study: What are the possible changes that could be suggested improve the overall police image and performance in Pakistan?

The findings of this study indicate that several efforts have been made to reform the policing landscape of the country since the independence of Pakistan, multiple commissions made their recommendations but most of the recommendations gather the dust and were lost into the annals of history. This study helped the researcher to develop a deeper understanding and insight towards the challenges in the implementation of policing reforms. Considering those challenges and suggestion from the senior police officers following are suggested to improve the police image and performance in Pakistan.

7.4.1 Political will and structural reforms

Police reform is not a technical process in totality rather it is more of a political process. It is about the redistribution of the powers. It demands from the powerful political elites to be politically neutral and do not interfere into the policing affairs. This is the hardest thing to achieve. The political willingness to reform is critical as highlighted significantly by Asatyran in his featuring public sector reforms (Asatryan et al., 2017). In order to change the police image and improve performance of the police, the politicians should abstain themselves from interference into policing matters. This can be achieved by two ways; one by pursuing the normative approach, in which political parties have to make this as part of their manifesto and politicians should stand by their principles to make police an independent organization.

This is not an easy task and yet it will take a long time. The second way is to make structural changes in the laws that govern police, which makes police an independent organization in light of the principles laid down in institutionalism and new institutionalism. In the very case of Pakistan, a serious effort was made in 2002, when the

colonial police act of 1861 was repealed and Police Order 2002 was promulgated. Politicians were against this law from the very beginning (as explained in chapter six). Hundreds of amendments were made to this law within 2 years of its promulgation, which has changed the shape of this law altogether and finally it was not followed by the provinces. All these amendments should be withdrawn and Police Order 2002 should be reinstated in its original form.

The Police Order 2002 introduced many structural changes in the entire policing model of the country. It made police, politically neutral, functionally and operationally independent and accountable. This police law, if implemented in its original shape will significantly change the policing dynamics and landscape of policing in the country.

7.4.2 Stability of Tenure

This was one of the major challenges reported by the senior police officers during interactions with them. Stability of the tenure means the protection of tenure for a fixed number of years. This is very strange, how could you expect a change from a police force which is not certain that how long is the tenure of their senior command. Change and reform is not a joke. It requires a serious effort. Whoever is the IG Police, he needs some time to understand the system, and then he can bring change. After the change, comes the stage of sustainability of the reforms, while situation was found adverse in this study. The researcher recommends that there should be a stability and protection of tenure for the Inspector General of the Police and other senior officers. If government thinks that period of tenure is long, it can be reduced to 3 years but not less than this. At least an IGP should

know that he has that much amount of time to bring change in the policing, then he can be made accountable accordingly.

7.4.3 Public oversight and external accountability mechanisms

The stability of the tenure is a two-edge sword. Protecting tenure of the Inspector General of Police without ensuring the public oversight and accountability mechanisms will be kind of adding fuel to the fire. The complaints of police brutality, inefficiency, corruption and malpractices were widely reported in the work of Najam and Malik (Najma Sadiq et al., 2020; Salma Malik, 2018). The public safety commissions were introduced in Police Order 2002, but its composition and structure were quite complex. This study recommends the establishment of public safety commissions and oversight bodies at district, regional, provincial and federal level. These commission should include member of the civil society, media, legal fraternity, retired senior police officers, representative of the government and even the religious scholars. The head of the commission should be elected from the majority vote. The proceedings of these safety commissions should be publically available. Transparency should be ensured during whole procedure. The recommendations made by these commissions can be challenged in the High Court and the Supreme Court of the Pakistan, if the police officer or the government disagrees with the decision/recommendations. Powers to remove the IG police should rest with the commission by a 2/3 majority not with the government.

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7.4.4 IGP to be recognized as secretary to government

One of the notable findings of this study was the bureaucratic resistance and involvement of the bureaucracy in the policing affairs. Senior police command relies heavily on the

bureaucrats for the provision of resources needed to run the policing functions in their respective domains. This situation created a dominance of bureaucracy over police. This study suggests that the Inspector General of Police should be given the status of Secretary to the government with financial and administrative independence. This will make IGP the master of his own house. This also aligns with the broader principles of governance laid down in institutionalism and new institutionalism. This autonomy was also provided in the Police Order 2002 which eventually stripped off in the amendments introduced in the Police Order 2002.

7.4.5 Behavioral training and screening of police personnel

This is the era of service delivery. The typical and suppressive form of governments are falling across the world. Liberal democracies and neo-liberal democracies have shaped the traditional control of government. The democratic governments prioritizing the governance mechanisms with citizen rights at the top. In such scenario the traditional policing behaviors meant for suppression and based on terrorizing the people are subject to fail. This study has validated the work of Punch (Punch, 2018) in which he reported about police brutality, torture and extrajudicial killings and same was admitted by senior police officers. This study suggests that behavioral training should be introduced and people with sick mentality who feel pleasure in torture and maltreatment with citizen should be identified and removed from the service, if they fail to change their behaviors. Junior police ranks (constables, head constables, ASI etc) have frequent interaction with public. In fact they are the ones who become the face of policing. The irony of the matter is that they are least prioritized in such behavioral trainings. Changing their behavior will significantly affect police image in the eyes of public.

7.4.6 Improvement in working conditions

All the blame cannot be put on to the police. One of the fair reasons identified in this study was the poor working conditions of police officials. Police officials have long duty hours. They can be call on duty at any point of time. No mandatory leaves are there, police personnel are away from their families, had to work under extreme weather conditions, with no reasonable offices and living places. All these factors are sufficient to make any person mad. Sepoys (police officials) are usually from very humble background, mostly less educated, they cannot resist to these inhuman factors and get stressed. Their frustration and stress get increases as they cannot do or say anything to their seniors due to subordination. Eventually this results into the aggressive behavior towards general public. So this study recommends that the working conditions of the police personnel should be improved, facilities should be enhanced and then they should be accountable for any of the unlawful action.

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7.4.7 Internal accountability mechanisms

Accountability related to policing matters had been researched duly and addressed by multiple researchers (Caperchione et al., 2017b; Goldsmith, 2005; Porter & Warrender, 2009; Rashid et al., 2021b; Ullah et al., 2016a; Williams & Paterson, 2019). As discussed in chapter six, accountability measures and protocols are very weak inside the organization. In very least cases officers gets a red entry in their annual confidential report (ACR). Good officers and bad officers are not differentiated on the basis of their performance, which becomes a cause of frustration and heartburning of hardworking police officers. On the contrary good officers could become victim of the organizational

politics and may get adverse remarks in their ACR to stop their career progression. This study recommends that ACRs of the police officer should not only contain the subjective assessment, rather there should be some sort of objectivity and evidence for the good or poor performance reported. The system of reward and punishment goes side by side. The organization should distinguish between the top performers and ones who bring bad name for the organization. This will eventually improve the image of police in the public and substantially improve the performance of the police organization.

7.4.8 Introduction of KPI's

The concept of policing has changed across the world. Police being the largest stakeholder in the law enforcement paradigm is under high obligation to work for the establishment of peace and order in the society. The challenging role of police requires sophistication and standardization in all aspect of policing. This study recommends that there must be some KPI's (key performance indicators) for the assessment of the performance of police officers. These KPI's will also lead towards transparent accountability mechanisms, as police officers know that what is expected from them and what they are doing. These KPI's can be developed and adopted considering world's best practices. The world best policing models such as Japan, Scotland, and Canada etc can be adapted in this regard.

7.4.9 Use of technology

We are living in the age of technology. The policing of the country needs to align with modern technological advancement. The centralized crime database should be established to record the data of criminals and law offenders. Further the police cops dealing with public during their interaction must have a camera on their uniform to ensure the

transparency and fairness during search or investigation. This will create a check on the police personnel and he will not transgress the law and violate citizen rights. Simultaneously the modes of investigation should be enhanced by employing the modern technologies of surveillance such as installation of CCTV cameras and scanners at different places instead of physically deploying police force everywhere.

7.5 Contribution of the thesis

This study contributed in developing an understanding in the persistent challenges in the implementation of policing reforms in Pakistan. This study reviewed the historical reforms of policing in the subcontinent before partition of India and Pakistan to set the tone. It specifically reviewed the historical reform efforts and the changes in the policing of the country by analyzing the reports of commissions in a chronological order. It explored the lived experiences of the senior police officers to develop insights about challenges in implementation of police reforms and finally this study presented the strategies to improve the police image and performance in the country. The specific contribution of this study are:

1. It accessed and reviewed the reports of police commissions formed over time. Prior to this such commissions and reports were discussed in bits and pieces in multiple studies. This study has combined almost all the reports. Further these reports were not available publicly to the researchers. The reports compiled and analyzed through this study will be placed in the library of researcher's university for the access of everyone and future studies.
2. This was an elite study in which 10 senior police officers (Inspector General of Police) participated, who remained associated in the formulation, execution and

implementation of multiple reforms. Their lived experiences added nuanced perspective and developed a deeper understanding of policing reforms challenges and its implementation.

3. Finally this study advances the existing discourse on policing reforms and suggest strategies to improve policing in the country.

7.6 Recommendations for future research

This study provided meaningful insights of policing reforms challenges related to its implementation. However future researchers aiming to examine the policing reforms dynamics may benefit from expanding the scope of participants to include mid-level officers, first line police personnel, members of civil society, judiciary, politicians and journalists. This will allow a comprehensive framework to understand the challenges in the implementation of reforms. Additionally conducting a comparative study with other developing and post-colonial societies can also provide valuable insights into successful reform models and study best practices to change the policing landscape of the country. This study focused qualitative research using IPA. Future research could pursue mixed methods and follow more pragmatic approach to include surveys and statistical analysis. Quantitative data can measure the impact of policing reforms on the performance of police and its effect on crime rates. Moreover, exploring public perceptions and engaging community might help in understanding the gap between policy formulation, implementation and societal expectations.

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7.7 Researcher's learning and reflection

During the entire journey of this research, the difficulties of policing reforms implementation have become increasingly evident. Engaging with the senior police officers and document review enhanced researcher's understanding on political, bureaucratic, social and institutional barriers which have hampered the policing reforms. The research process has reinforced the significance of contextual understanding in the field of public policy, highlighting how political interference, bureaucratic hurdles and resource constraints shape the reform landscape. Additionally conducting elite study with senior police officers to understand their lived experiences have shaped the knowledge of the researcher about dealing with such influential policy makers. A disconnect was evident between the senior police command and lower ranked police personnel, which makes the senior police command immune of the problems of policing at ground or at operational level. Further the researcher changed his perception about police as the senior police officers were found concerned about the public perception and police image. The need for multi-stake holder engagement among law makers, law enforcement agencies and public was reiterated during interactions with senior officers. Finally, this research enhanced the researcher's ability to critically analyze the policies, apply theoretical concepts of qualitative research and IPA approach in practical and synthesize findings to suggest meaningful recommendations.

7. 8 Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that the persistent failure of police reform in Pakistan is not simply a consequence of weak policy design, but the outcome of deeply entrenched institutional, political, and bureaucratic mechanisms that shape how reforms are

interpreted, resisted, and ultimately implemented. Through the lived experiences and interpretative accounts of senior police officers, it became evident that political interference, bureaucratic dominance, colonial organisational culture, leadership instability, resource deficits, and accountability failures collectively operate as mutually reinforcing constraints that undermine reform sustainability. By applying the lens of institutionalism and new institutionalism, the analysis revealed that these barriers are embedded within longstanding structures of power, norms, and administrative practices that reproduce path dependency and inhibit meaningful organisational change. The findings therefore not only fill the empirical and theoretical gaps identified at the outset, but also contribute to broader debates on governance reform in developing democracies. Ultimately, the results underscore that successful police reform requires more than new laws; it demands political commitment, institutional realignment, and a recalibration of power relationships among key state actors. The insights generated through this research serve as an important foundation for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars seeking to design reform pathways that are contextually grounded, operationally feasible, and institutionally sustainable.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Summary of Participant Background

Participant	Position	Responsibility/Experience
P01	IGP	Belongs to the prestigious Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) and retired from service in after serving 25 years in different senior Police assignments within the country and abroad. He remained as Inspector General of Police at the Capital Territory Police, Islamabad and has commanded two largest and most challenging Regions in Pakistan as Deputy Inspector General. He worked with the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and formulated National Anti-corruption strategy and worked with National Police Academy and trained newly recruited Assistant Superintendents of Police (ASPs). He also served at the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and closely dealt with Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). He is also serving as the member of the Police Reform Committee (PRC) constituted by the Chief Justice of Pakistan. He has served more than six years in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations.
P02	IGP	He is from Police Service of Pakistan and served for almost 27 years. He retired from the National Police Academy as Commandant of the Academy. He has

		served 20 years in the Federal Investigating Agency (FIA), Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and Anti-corruption department. He was part of the famous Joint Investigation Teams (JIT) of Mumbai attack Case, Benazir Bhutto Murder (Ex- Prime Minister of Pakistan) Case, High treason case against General (rtd) Pervaiz Musharraf (the then President of Pakistan).
P03	IGP	He was appointed as a police officer and was sent for training to Sarda, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). He has served the police force for 31 long years. He has headed the police force in multiple roles and capacities. He retired from the Police service as Inspector General of Police from Punjab. He has been part of many Police reform commissions and committees including the famous commission tasked with the responsibility of reformation of police in modern lines, which eventually produced Police Order 2002. He is one of the seniors most police officers who is highly regarded and respected in the country. He is considered as the Guru on police reforms.
P04	IGP	He served at top bureaucratic positions such as Federal Secretary, Inspector General of Police (IG), Punjab and

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		Managing Director, National Police Foundation.
P05	IGP	He joined the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) as an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) He is a graduate of Civil Services Academy, National Police Academy and the National School of Public Policy. He has also undergone numerous professional courses within the country and abroad. He has held strategic field, staff and training assignments such as ASP, SP, SSP, DPO and RPO of various cities and regions in the country, staff assignments as AIG Logistics and Administration, DIG Investigation Lahore, Additional IG, Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) in Punjab and the Provincial Police Officer / Inspector General of Police (IGP/PPO) Baluchistan before taking up his assignment as the PPO/IGP (Inspector General of Police) in Punjab. He has also served, with distinction, as the Chief of Discipline and Internal Investigation in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). He has adopted pro-people, pro-active, community oriented, technology based

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		and intelligence led policing in Punjab. A number of technology driven projects including Police Station Record Management System, Human Resource Management Information System, Crime Monitoring and Management System, Integrated Command and Control Centre. He also initiated Complaints Management System under his command in Punjab. He was committed to serving the people of Punjab by making the Punjab Police a publically accountable, democratically controlled, politically neutral, and professionally efficient organization.
P06	IGP	He is a civil service officer and columnist in Pakistan. He served notably as Inspector General Police of Sindh, Commandant of the National Police Academy, Commandant of the Frontier Constabulary and Director General of the national National Police Bureau. He was also the Inspector General of Police of National Highways & Motorway Police. He joined The Police Service of Pakistan as Assistant Superintendent of Police, Superintendent of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police and Inspector General Police. He is still active as a security analyst and writer. He writes columns for Pakistan's largest English

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		newspaper Dawn and other newspapers of Pakistan .
P07	IGP	He is regarded as a leading police and justice sector reform specialist in South Asia. He is a visiting criminal justice expert at the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders, Tokyo, Advisor Turkish National Police, and a resource person with several national and international organizations, including United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. He is also International Director of Asia Crime Prevention Foundation, Tokyo. He is regularly invited to speak at various international conferences around the world. He was the Federal Tax Ombudsman of Pakistan. Before this, he headed the Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan's premiere civilian intelligence agency), following his stint as Inspector General Police, Sindh. He has held several key positions both at operational and strategic levels, including as Police Chief of Balochistan, Director General, National Police Bureau, Consultant in the National Reconstruction Bureau, Director General, Bureau of Police Research & Development, Police Chief of Karachi, Deputy Commandant, National Police Academy, and Director

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		(Economic Crime), Federal Investigation Agency.
P08	IGP	He hails from Punjab province. He joined Police Service of Pakistan as an ASP. He holds MBBS, MA (Management Information Systems, HRM) degrees. At the start of his career, He served as ASP UT Quetta, FC Banu and SDPO Qaid Abad and Quetta. After promotion to rank of SP, he served as SP Faisalabad, Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Rahim Yar Khan, Special Branch, Chakwal and Mianwali. After serving AIG Development and AIG Logistics, He moved to Establishment Division Islamabad. He served as CPO Faisalabad, DIG Operations Lahore, RPO Sargodha, RPO Bahawalpur. He served in the Intelligence Bureau for more than 5 years.
P09	IGP	He is a senior officer of the Police Service of Pakistan with over three decades of distinguished service at both provincial and federal levels. Early in his career he served as District Police Officer in Okara and Regional Police Officer in Bahawalpur, where he pioneered the Victim Response Officer concept and strengthened community-oriented

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		policing. He went on to head the Economic and Cyber Crime Wings of the Federal Investigation Agency and led the Supreme Court–mandated Joint Investigation Team probing the high-profile fake-accounts case. He was appointed as Additional Inspector-General of Police, and has served as Director General of the National Counter Terrorism Authority. Widely respected for his integrity, professionalism, and reform-minded approach. He brings both deep operational insight and strategic vision to Pakistan's policing leadership
P10	IGP	Over his 28-year career, he has held key leadership roles including Additional IGP of the Counter-Terrorism Department in Balochistan, Additional IGP Special Branch in KPK, Zonal Director for the FIA in KPK, Additional DG FIA at Headquarters Islamabad, and Regional Police Officer.

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		As IGP he has spearheaded the establishment of district command-and-control centers, deployed Pakistan's first AI-driven integrated security system in Peshawar's Red Zone, and launched citizen-facing "Police Jawan" and "Police Dost" mobile apps, significantly modernizing the province's policing capabilities.

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Appendix 2

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICING REFORM IN PAKISTAN FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS

Thank you sir for taking the time to meet with me. I am eager to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges faced in the implementation of policing reform in Pakistan, as seen through the eyes of senior police officers. The purpose of this interview is to gather valuable insights and perspectives on these challenges.

We will conduct the interview at a mutually convenient time, and it is expected to last between 45-60 minutes. The session will be recorded for my personal reference and to help me stay focused during the process of analysis. I would like to emphasize that the recording and transcript of the interview will be kept confidential and will only be accessible by my supervisor and myself. These materials will be used exclusively for academic purposes and any notes or excerpts from the interview will be kept confidential. After the completion of my thesis and publication of relevant research, the interview tapes and transcribed material will be destroyed to ensure their protection.

Please note that the opinions and perceptions shared during the interview are based on personal experiences and do not reflect the views of the organizations with which participants are affiliated. Before delving into the implementation issues of police reform, I will ask a few background questions to gain a better understanding of your experiences. These questions will be open-ended and I would appreciate it if you could provide examples and elaborations from your personal experiences.

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As a refresher, I would like to remind us of the history of police reform in Pakistan, starting from the period shortly after partition. This will help us better understand the changes that have taken place over time.

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Appendix 2

Interview questions research questions

CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICING REFORM IN PAKISTAN FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS

RQ1

What were the most significant changes adopted by the government in improving the image of police force in Pakistan and the achievement of the reform policies?

1. What changes has the government implemented in recent years to improve the image of the police force in Pakistan?
2. Can you describe the most significant achievements of the police reform policies in Pakistan?
3. How do you believe these changes have affected the image of the police force in the eyes of the public?
4. In your opinion, which change had the greatest impact on the improvement of the police force's image?
5. How have the police force implemented these changes in the field?
6. Have you seen any improvements in the performance of the police force as a result of these changes?

7. Do you think that these changes have been enough to fully improve the image of the police force in Pakistan?

8. What more do you think should be done to improve the image of the police force in Pakistan?

RQ2

How do the senior police officers feel about the police image and performance of police force in Pakistan and what contributes to the hinderance of police reform implementation in Pakistan?

1. How do you feel about the current image and performance of the police force in Pakistan?

2. In your opinion, what are the main factors that contribute to the hinderance of police reform implementation in Pakistan?

3. What are some of the main challenges faced by the senior police officers in improving the image and performance of the police force?

4. In your opinion, what steps should be taken to address issues of corruption and abuse of power within the police force?

5. How do you think the relationship between the police and the community could be improved in Pakistan?

6. In your experience, have you seen any resistance to change within the police force and if yes, what do you think is the reason behind it.

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RQ3

What are the possible changes that could be suggested to improve the overall police image and performance in Pakistan?

1. In your opinion, what kind of changes are necessary to improve the image and performance of the police in Pakistan?

2. What are some of the best practices or examples of police reform that you have seen in other countries that could be applied in Pakistan?

3. What strategies or solutions do you believe would help to overcome these challenges?

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To start with, following are some basic questions related to your background.

1. What is your current assignment?

2. How long have you been working in this role?

3. What was your job description?

3. Have you been part of police reforms policy making ever?

Appendix 4

Participant information sheet

Subject: **CONSENT LETTER FOR QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW**

Dear SIr,

I am Shahbaz Ali Khan, a PhD student from University Utara Malaysia, working under the supervision of Dr. Noor Azizah, Deputy Dean, School of Government, UUM. As requirement of PhD dissertation, I am conducting a study on "challenges in the implementation of policing reform in Pakistan from the perspectives of senior police officers". As part of this study, I would like to conduct a qualitative interview with you to gather your thoughts and experiences related to this topic.

The purpose of this interview is to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges related to implementation of policing reforms and solutions to it. Your participation in this interview is voluntary, and you have the right to withdraw at any time without consequence.

The interview will be recorded with your permission, and the recordings will be kept confidential and used only for the purposes of this research project. Your personal information will not be shared or published, and any identifiable information will be kept confidential.

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The interview will take approximately 45-60 minutes and will be conducted either in person or via phone/video conferencing.

If you agree to participate in this interview, please sign and date this letter. You may keep a copy of this letter for your records.

I would like to thank you for considering this request and for your time and participation. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me at email: shahbaz.ali@iub.edu.pk, 0333-6372053.

Sincerely,

Shahbaz Ali Khan
PhD Student

Participant Signature Date:

Appendix 5

Analytic Progression

Transcript Extract → Codes → Subtheme → Theme

Transcript Extract:
"Police reform is not a technical process… it is a political process because it redistributes power. No politician wants a neutral police." (P05)

Analytic Stage	Output
Initial Descriptive Codes	**political process; redistribution of power; political interference; resistance to reform; lack of neutrality**
Interpretative Codes	**power asymmetry; political capture; coercive influence; structural manipulation**
Subtheme	**Politicised Control of Police**
Superordinate Theme	**Political Interference**

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"The civil servants regained the territory they lost. IG is responsible but not authorized." (P03)

Analytic Stage	Output
Initial Descriptive Codes	bureaucratic control; loss of autonomy; IG powerless
Interpretative Codes	administrative veto; institutional dominance
Subtheme	Bureaucratic Veto Power
Superordinate Theme	Bureaucratic Resistance

Appendix 6

Compact Codebook (Titles, Definitions, Boundaries, Exemplar Quotes

Theme / Node	Definition	Boundary Notes	Exemplar Quote
Political Interference & Power Asymmetry	Influence of political actors over postings, investigations, and reform processes.	Excludes bureaucratic veto power; focuses solely on elected officials.	"No politician wants a neutral police." (P03)
Bureaucratic Dominance	Administrative control exercised by civil servants/ Home Department over police autonomy.	Excludes elected political interference.	"IG responsible but not authorized." (P04)
Colonial Organizational Culture	Persistence of hierarchical, coercive, command-and-control norms inherited from colonial policing.	Excludes leadership incompetence.	"We are still running a colonial force." (P06)
Leadership Instability & Constraints	Tenure volatility, lack of strategic continuity, and compromised leadership autonomy.	Excludes political motives, which belong under Theme 1.	"Leadership cannot plan when tenure is unknown." (P02)
Resource Stress & Operational Overload	Excessive workload, manpower shortages, outdated investigation practices.	Excludes attitudes and cultural behaviours.	"A sepoy working 18 hours becomes mentally sick." (P05)
Accountability & Trust Crisis	Failures of internal mechanisms, public distrust, and excessive force practices.	Excludes political or bureaucratic interference.	"People don't trust the police period." (P01)

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Appendix 7

Schematic Representation of Final Thematic Structure

1. Political Interference & Power Asymmetry
   - ├─ Politicised Control of Police
   - ├─ Tenure Manipulation
   - └─ Oversight Bodies Sabotaged

2. Bureaucratic Dominance
   - ├─ Bureaucratic Veto Power
   - └─ Structural Ambiguity

3. Colonial Organizational Culture
   - ├─ Hierarchical Rigidity
   - └─ Internal Resistance

4. Leadership Instability & Constraints
   - ├─ Leadership Disempowerment
   - └─ Strategic Disruption

5. Resource Stress & Operational Overload
   - ├─ Workforce Burnout
   - └─ Investigation Neglect

6. Accountability & Trust Crisis
   - ├─ Accountability Failure
   - └─ Use of Excessive Force
   - └─ Public Mistrust

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Appendix 8



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A delegation comprising Messrs M.A.K. Chaudhry, Shafiullah Khan, Z.I. Rathore, Wajahat Latif, Sh. Ziauddin Ahmad and Dr. Mohammad Shuaib Suddle and led by Mr. S.K. Mahmud, Secretary Interior went to India and Bangladesh in October, 1989. The visit gave us very useful insight into the police system of the two countries with historical experience quite like ours.

The Committee would like to place on record its appreciation for valuable assistance received from the Ministry of Interior, the Bureau of Police Research and Development, the Commandant, National Police Academy and the Inspectors General of Police of the four Provinces and the Railway Police. The Committee found Mr. Irshad Ahmed, Deputy Director, Bureau of Police Research and Development, extremely useful in organising and running its Secretariat.

SHAFIULLAH KHAN
Member

M.A.K. CHAUDHRY
Chairman.

SH. ZIAUDDIN AHMAD
Secretary

Islamabad, March 1, 1990.

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FRASER REPORT

REPORT OF THE INDIAN POLICE COMMISSION

1902-03

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POLICE COMMISSION SECRETARIAT

Rawalpindi, the February, 1970.

Dear General Peerzada,

I have great pleasure in presenting the Report of the Police Commission 1969-70 constituted by the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator vide Ministry of Home, Kashmir Affairs and States & Frontier Regions (Home Affairs Division), Gazette Extraordinary Notification No. 9/15/69-BP, dated the 23rd July, 1969.

With best regards.

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Yours sincerely,

A. O. Mitha,
Maj-General.

Lieut-General S. G. M. M. Peerzada, S.Q.A.,
Principal Staff Officer to the President and CMLA,
President House, Rawalpindi.

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To

The Minister for Interior,
Government of Pakistan,
Block 'R',
Pak. Secretariat,
ISLAMABAD.

Islamabad, the 31st July, 1985.

Subject: POLICE COMMITTEE.

Sir,

It is my privilege to submit herewith Report of the Police Committee appointed by the Government of Pakistan vide Ministry of Interior Notification No.15/14/85-Police, dated 24th June, 1985.

Your obedient servant,

M. Aslam Hayat

(M. Aslam Hayat)
Chairman
Police Committee

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REPORT

OF

THE POLICE REFORMS IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE

1990

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