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**NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC SECURITY THREAT: THE  
QUEST FOR POWER BY NIGER-DELTA AND BOKO-HARAM  
INSURGENTS 1999-2015**



**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA  
2018**

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QUEST FOR POWER BY NIGER-DELTA AND BOKO-HARAM  
INSURGENTS 1999-2015**



**A Thesis submitted to the Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government  
in fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy  
Universiti Utara Malaysia**

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## ABSTRACT

Since her independence in 1960, Nigeria's national security has never come under such threats as it is currently facing in the Fourth Republic. Nigeria went into a civil war seven years after her independence which lasted for three years but it was not as unprecedented and complex as her current war on terror. The main objective of this research is to investigate the quest for power by the Niger-Delta militants and Boko-Haram insurgents as national security threats in Nigeria's Fourth Republic from 1999 to 2015. Other objectives of the study include examining those factors that motivate the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgents against Nigeria. It also evaluates the security threats posed by these militant insurgents. This research made use of the qualitative research design, where data were generated via interview as the main primary data collection tool and content analysis. Findings of this study reveal that national security threats by the violent insurgents are complex and multidimensional in nature, ranging from socio-economic motivations such as abysmal unemployment and institutional corruption to ethno-religious and political factors such as ethnicity and political marginalisation perceived or real. It is found that governments in the past were not sincere and committed to addressing the agitations of the citizens. The militants took up arms against the government on the notion of marginalization, neglect, and social injustice. The research further reveal that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria emerges as a result of political mal-administration and the mismanagement of state resources and not otherwise as claimed by the group. The theoretical contribution of the study shows that Nigeria is currently in a troubled state due to the current waves of insurgency across the country as demonstrated by the *Frustration-Aggression* and the *Failed-State* theories in the study.

**Keywords:** National Security, Militancy, Boko-Haram, Insurgency, Niger- Delta.

## ABSTRAK

Semenjak kemerdekaannya pada tahun 1960, keselamatan Nigeria tidak pernah mengalami ancaman yang seperti mana yang dialaminya sewaktu pemerintahan Republik Keempat. Tujuh tahun selepas kemerdekaannya, Nigeria terjebak di dalam perang saudara selama tiga tahun, walaupun ianya tidak serumit dan kompleks seperti mana usaha-usaha kerajaan pada masa kini dalam memerangi keganasan. Objektif utama kajian ini adalah untuk menyiasat usaha-usaha untuk mendapatkan kuasa oleh militan Niger-Delta dan kumpulan pemberontak Boko-Haram sebagai ancaman ke atas keselamatan Nigeria sewaktu pemerintahan Republik Keempat dari tahun 1999 sehingga tahun 2015. Objektif lain kajian ini termasuklah mengkaji faktor-faktor yang mendorong militan Niger-Delta dan kumpulan pemberontak Boko-Haram menentang kerajaan Nigeria. Ia juga menilai ancaman yang ditimbulkan oleh kumpulan pemberontak dan militan ke atas negara tersebut. Kajian ini menggunakan rekabentuk penyelidikan kualitatif di mana kaedah temubual telah digunakan sebagai kaedah utama pengumpulan data. Pendekatan kandungan analisis telah digunakan dalam menganalisis kedua-dua data primer dan sekunder. Dapatan kajian ini mendedahkan pelbagai isu sosio-ekonomi, dari rasuah, tadbir urus yang buruk, pengangguran hingga ke dimensi etno-agama, seperti etnik, ideologi radikal dan peminggiran politik. Kajian ini mendapati ketidakwujudan keikhlasan dan komitmen kerajaan dalam menangani agitasi rakyat. Golongan militan telah melancarkan pemberontakan bersenjata menentang kerajaan atas dasar peminggiran dan ketidakadilan sosial. Walaubagaimanapun, tidak seperti mana yang didakwa oleh kumpulan tersebut, dapatan kajian ini mendedahkan bahawa pemberontakan Boko Haram di Nigeria telah berlaku disebabkan oleh salah tadbir urus sumber negara. Kumpulan militan Boko Haram telah mengambil peluang daripada kelemahan institusi pentadbiran di Nigeria dengan menculik ribuan rakyat negaranya dan ini termasuk 276 pelajar perempuan di Chibok yang telah mencetuskan bantahan global. Kajian ini akan memberi manfaat kepada agensi kerajaan, ahli akademik dan pegawai atasan keselamatan dalam memahami faktor-faktor penyebab kepada peningkatan pemberontakan tersebut. Sumbangan teori kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa Nigeria pada masa kini menjadi negara yang bermasalah akibat gelombang pemberontakan dan oleh itu, menguatkan lagi kesesuaian penggunaan teori *Frustration-Aggression* dan *Failed State* di dalam kajian ini.

**Kata Kunci:** Keselamatan Negara, Niger-Delta, Militansi, Boko-Haram, Pemberontakan

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My foremost thanks to the ALMIGHTY GOD, my Creator who has given me the knowledge, wisdom and the grace to undergo this study. I am indeed indebted to the Nigerian Army and the Chief of Army Staff for the rare privilege granted me to undertake this research outside the shore of the Nigerian state. My special thanks to my main supervisor Dr. Norafidah Ismail who painstakingly scrutinized this thesis sentence by sentence to ensure it meets Doctoral standards. I deeply appreciate you for giving me the privilege to tap from your wealth of knowledge and expertise on the subject matter of this study. I am also sincerely grateful to my second supervisor, Dr. Knocks Tapiwa Zengeni who brought to bear his knowledge of African politics and security on the study. I would like to express my thanks to all the senior military officers who did not only encouraged me but facilitated my release for the study. I remain grateful and loyal sirs. My profound gratitude to my mentor and someone who believes and encourages me to be who I am today, Brig. Gen. I Bauka (Rtd). Words are not sufficient enough to express how grateful I am to you sir. To all my friends and brothers who stood by me financially and morally, your efforts have gone into records. Worthy of mention also are Senator Emmanuel Bwacha, Hon. Rima Shawulu, Professor Yusufu Zoaka, Dr. Mohammed M. Wader, Dr. Uche and Dr. Victoria Masi Karatu. Others are top military officers, opinion and traditional leaders for sharing their views on the subject matter of this research. I also acknowledge these senior military officers: Lt Col Achikasim; Majors Bamiteko; Karma; Constant; Yusuf and Nkemakolam. My brothers Engrs. Saleh and Puri, Brother Shadrach Sunday, Adekunle Umar Modile (US Army Vet) and many others too numerous to mention. Finally, to my family, words are not enough to describe how much I appreciate you for being patient enough to endure my absence throughout the period of this study. Without your sacrifice, support and prayers, I wouldn't be here today. Thank you all!

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the Study

The world today is totally different from the world two decades ago. It is fast changing and is characterised by violence and insecurity with constantly evolving relationship patterns between and within states. Security challenges such as terrorism, insurrections and rebellions within states are instigated by socio-economic, political, ethno-religious and other social factors that are complex and multi-dimensional in nature. Wars, international terrorism, threats, civil disturbances, drug cartel networks, and all forms of unrests are the features that shape our world today. One core function of the state anywhere in the world today is primarily to ensure that the basic sovereign goods (welfare, peace and security) are provided for its citizens. This goes to say that, security is a pre-condition for any government to deliver on its promises to its people (Sarkesian, Williams and Cimbala, 2008; Nigerian Constitution, 1999).

Since the amalgamation of the Southern and the Northern protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 by the British Colonial power, Nigeria has not gone to war with any of her neighbours based on available records. However, Nigeria has had constant internal threats and civil disturbances (Nigerian National Security Strategy, 2011; Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008). Nigeria indeed has grappled with so many internal squabbles and civil unrest across all regions of the country. Nigeria is currently confronting about fourteen security threats nationwide the most recent is the Indigenous People of Biafra

(IPOB) being designated as a terrorist group (The Nation, September 16, 2017; Vanguard July 9, 2017).

Economically, the country depended on agriculture before the discovery of oil in 1956 at Oloibiri, Bayelsa state, south-south, Nigeria (NNPC, 2015). Prior to the discovery of oil, agriculture contributed to Nigeria's economy and was its major foreign exchange earnings. After the discovery of oil, the country's attention shifted from agriculture which used to be the main engine of the Nigerian Economy to oil and gradually Nigeria became an oil dependent nation. According to NNPC (2015; Kadafa, 2012), oil production in Nigeria accounts for about 90% of the country's foreign exchange and it further explains why agriculture became a neglected sector in generating income for Nigeria (Akpan, 2012; Izuchukwu, 2011).

This gradual shift from agriculture as the major source of foreign exchange to depending mainly on petroleum products for the same foreign exchange earnings became an impetus for the Niger Delta region of Nigeria to boast of her land being the major contributor to the country's sources of earnings. Such idea gradually became a tool for them to agitate for political and economic gains to their own benefits thereby creating the idea of resource control and ownership which put Nigeria in a tight economy situation today.

Nigeria, from 1999 has witnessed a series of conflicts within and between states but the most threatening to her national security is that of the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram conflicts. The Niger Delta conflict reflects the quest for resource control and the development of the Niger Delta region (Aaron & Patrick, 2013; Oluwaniyi,

2010). This struggle for resource control by the people of the Niger Delta started in the 1950s when oil activities started in the region. Major Isaac Adaka Boro, a Niger Delta frontline activist and his army of youth way back in the 1960s declared the independent “Niger Delta Republic” by taking up arms against the Nigerian state. This was due to the neglect and the destruction of their environment as a result of oil activities in the area by the multinationals (Forest, 2012).

The region produces the oil that is running the Nigerian economy, contributing 40 percent of the GDP, about 90 percent of total earnings and 80 percent of national gross income (Dode, 2012; Ugochukwu, Ertel, 2008). According to them, oil related problems such as gas flares and oil spills undermine the quality of the environment and its productivity which affects the local economy so negatively. The contention of the youths has been that government generates so much billions from their lands without concerted efforts to empower the locals who depend solely on agricultural products from the land polluted by oil spillage. Ibaba (2011), posits that these grievances motivated the taking up of arms by the youth against the Nigerian government and the oil multinationals for the neglect of their corporate social responsibility.

The prolonged neglect and the destruction of the Niger Delta region by successive administrations gave rise to the emergence of different militant groups in the Delta region. The militia groups were emboldened by a number of issues such as resource control politics, historical marginalization, and environmental damages through oil spillage and gas pollution (Ibaba, 2011). According to the US Institute for Peace Studies, oil spills was estimated to be 2.5 million barrels between 1976 and 2001

(Watts & Okonta, 2004). The individual militant groups were acting independent of each other until 2006 when their leaders of the groups formed a common front against the government known as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). MEND declared a total war on the multinationals on the 18<sup>th</sup> of February, 2006 and claimed responsibility of most of the attacks of the last decade (Forest, 2012:48).

MEND expanded their attacks by bombing cities such as Port Harcourt, Warri and Abuja on first of October, 2010. The feeling of the people of Niger Delta as oil producing region in Nigeria is that oil produced from the Niger Delta region is being used to develop or finance projects in other parts of the country leaving the Niger Delta area devastated and that the major ethnic groups namely the Hausa, Yoruba and the Igbo are dominating the oil industry to the disadvantage of the people of the region Ikelegbe (2006).

This is the major reflection in the Niger Delta struggle. The Niger Delta youths fought the federal government in order to draw the attention of the government and oil companies to the neglected oil-rich region (Aaron & Patrick, 2013). At the peak of the Niger Delta violence the militants brought the total production of oil in the region to 700,000 barrels per day from over 2 million towards the end of President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration. This dwindling trend of the oil output from the region continued into the administration of the late President Umaru Yar'Adua who came up with the Amnesty programme for the violent militants on the 25<sup>th</sup> June, 2009.

President Yar'Adua in his Amnesty speech admitted that the security challenges in the Niger Delta escalated largely due to near absence of development and the continuous depletion of the environment as a result of the oil activities by the oil companies. This according to him had depleted the national revenue of the nation which warranted the amnesty programme for the militant youths (Onukwugha, Agbo & Oche as cited in Leadership, 29 November, 2015). The then President Yar'Adua acknowledged the inadequacies of the past governments in addressing the issues that gave rise to the agitation, but stated that some unscrupulous elements were taking undue advantage of the genuine struggle for the development of the area to destabilise the unity, peace and security of the economic base of the nation.

The Niger Delta militants were granted Amnesty during the Late Yar'Adua's administration which led to the surrendering of their arms against the government in the Fourth Republic (Isumonah, 2012). In his efforts to address the Niger Delta crisis, President Yar'Adua not only granted the violent youths amnesty but also established Ministry of Niger Delta which was Saddled with the responsibility of addressing the core needs of the people living in the region. Details of these efforts and more would be discussed in Chapter Five of the study.

Meanwhile, Boko Haram sect, on the other hand has being in existence since 1995 based on intelligence report from former Director of Defence Information, Colonel Mohammed Yerima, who confirmed that the sect existed since 1995 under the name *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* (Taiwo and Olugbode, 2009:4). The sect had transformed from one name to the other such as Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah sect, Nigerian Taliban to Boko Haram but maintained its hardline ideology. Boko Haram sect sees

its teachings and philosophy as one that is anchored on the practice of pure Islam. In their belief or connotation pure Islam detests western education and working under secular government and this explains why the name Boko Haram came about which literally means “western education is sin” (Forest, 2012).

Boko Haram started their attacks in 2009 during President Yar’Adua’s Administration, though it was put to a stop by Yar’Adua but the sect went lull, restructured and resurfaced in 2010 when President Goodluck Jonathan took over the mantle of leadership of Nigeria as a result of the death of President Yar’Adua. As soon as President Goodluck Jonathan was elected and sworn in on 29 May, 2011, Boko Haram bombed an Army Barracks in Bauchi state killing several people, the Nigeria Police Headquarters also witnessed the first ever suicide bombing in Nigeria two weeks after. The killing of over 800 innocent Nigerians by Boko Haram after the immediate swearing in of President Jonathan left Nigeria polarised along its fault lines of ethnicity, religion, and the socio-political divides of north and south (Innocent & Ibietan, 2012). This brought to the fore the ethno-religious and political intentions of the sect which are congruent.

The Boko Haram sect and the extremist upsurge of terrorism in Nigeria has more to do with political and economic factors than religion (Neji, 2015:50). Boko Haram sect as a terrorist organisation uses Jihad as a ploy to achieve a predetermined political objective. Interestingly enough, for Boko Haram to have intensified their attacks on the Nigerian state during President Goodluck Jonathan’s regime. People from the southern part of Nigeria viewed such attacks as a conspiracy by those of northern extraction with political undertones (Okpaga, 2012). Where we also see the Boko

Haram sect attacking mainstream Muslims such as the attacks on the Kano central Mosques which over seventy percent of the people in the City are Muslims, such attacks could not be said to be religious but simply political of some sort.

There is therefore, the need to be circumspect of the needs being presented as to what both Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militants want. Moreover, there is the need to investigate their separate needs, positions and grievances that have festered for years and see how a lasting solutions can be proffered to those grievances. Fisher's conflict framework is hereby used to illustrate the two conflict scenarios in Nigeria. According to Fisher and Ury (1992), "the basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, fears, and doubts...the concerns, doubts and desires are interests". They pointed out three key concepts in conflict situations such as interests, needs and positions. To them, a position is something a party has decided upon while interest is what causes the party to so.

To address the root cause of terrorism in Nigeria, one must go beyond the public demands or positions to the interests and needs of the parties to the crises. Their needs are those demands the parties to the crises must have in order to discontinue the conflicts. Unless the root causes to the crisis are addressed, the crisis becomes intractable. It will only be laughable and total ignorance to address the terror crises in Nigeria from the public positions without taking a deeper look at what really their needs and interests are (Kelman as cited in Neji, 2014:53). The three concentric layers of the snack such as the outer, inner and the inner most layers represent the core interests and the needs of the two terror groups.

The outer or topmost layer represents contextually the positions taken publicly for all to see by the conflict parties in this instance the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram terrorists groups. The inner concentric layer represents the interests of the groups which are political leadership, economic control and justice. To the terrorists, the current political structure in Nigeria is faulty therefore, cannot provide the desired political leadership where justice, equity and fair play thrive. The innermost layer represents the core needs of the groups which to them must be met to bring satisfaction to them. Adopting this framework will enable us to go far beyond the public position of the two terror groups and puts us in a better understanding of the interests and the core needs of the groups. This is illustrate figure 1.1 diagram below.




Figure 1.1 *The needs assessment of Niger Delta Militants and Boko Haram* (Adopted from Neji, 2015)

Also, from 1999 to 2015, it was the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as a political party that ruled the country even though we have other political parties. The PDP practiced the zoning of political offices also known as rotation of power within the six geopolitical zones- the North-East, North-West, North-Central, South-West, South-East, and South-South. This was to enable the party address negative orientation such as ethnicity, sectionalism and religious imbalances within the Nigerian system since these are the major issues that divide the country. The party introduced the zoning formula to solve such issues (Awopeju, Adelusi & Oluwashakin, 2012).

However, the issue of zoning was truncated by the PDP when President Jonathan's ambition to contest for 2011 Presidential election was made known. In 1999, the ruling party, that is, the PDP zoned the seat of President to the Southern part of the country which brought in President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian, who presided over Nigeria from 1999 to 2007, then the seat was later zoned to the Northern part of the country by the same ruling party (PDP) to accommodate the North and a Muslim from 2007 to 2015. Late President Yar'Adua, a Muslim from the northern part of the country emerged the President on the platform of the PDP in 2007 and was to be president for eight years based on the party's zoning arrangement but spent about three years on the seat as president and died on the 5<sup>th</sup> of May, 2010. Acting President Jonathan then, a Christian from the south was upon the death of Yar'Adua, sworn into power as the substantive president of Nigeria (Awopeju, Adelusi & Oluwashakin, 2012).

According to a Adviser to former President Goodluck Jonathan who was removed as a result of the observation he made against the then ruling party that it was responsible for the emergence of the Boko Haram crisis. He remarked that the ruling party then

“PDP was Boko Haram and Boko Haram was PDP”. He further argued that the party got it wrong from the on-set when they zoned political position by what they termed power rotation. He blamed the party on the notion of anointing candidates for elective post for the accelerated rate of violence in the north pointing out that Boko Haram did not just emerge from the blue to be better trained, better equipped and better funded. He (Olaniyan & Asuelime, 2014) argues that Boko Haram is a clear product of the party in power which was the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

The swearing-in of Jonathan as the substantive president of Nigeria after Yar'Adua's death marked the beginning of the violent attacks in the north by the Boko Haram group through their activities such as killing and maiming of innocent lives, bombing of worship centres, destruction of both public and private properties (Agbibo and Maiangwa, 2013). These attacks became another source of threat to national security and to Nigeria's democracy in the Fourth Republic especially after President Jonathan was sworn into power from 2011-2015, being a Southerner. His constituency, the Niger Delta region saw it as an opportunity for their son to rule for eight years from 2011 to 2019. Thus, the former Niger Delta militants started agitating for Jonathan to remain in power till 2019 which clearly shows their new agitation different from their initial quest for the government to develop their land and empower the people of the region.

This has brought the Nigerian state to a situation where different socio-political groups, and ethnic nationalities are agitating for power to rule Nigeria. Of late, the Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff, General Gabriel Olonisakin on the 9<sup>th</sup> of July, 2017 in New York confirmed that Nigeria is currently in a state of war. That the Nigerian

military at the moment is confronting fourteen (14) different threats such as the Niger Delta militant groups, the Boko Haram and the Ansaru which is a splinter group from the original Boko Haram, the Biafra agitators called Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Others are the Baddo groups, the Fulani herdsmen, the Shiites movement in Nigeria and a host of others to her national security and development (Vanguard, July 9<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Thus, the quest for power by both Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militants remain the greatest threats to national security and Nigeria's fourth republic. How then can these issues ranging from ethno-religious, socio-economic, political interest, and the inordinate desires for power by these groups as threats to national security in the fourth republic be resolved?

## **1.2 Research Gap**

There are quite a number of studies on the Niger Delta crisis such as in the areas of governance and oil politics, oil and youth militancy in the Delta, environmental conflicts and oil politics, democratic governance and the dynamics of oil politics, oil and corruption by scholars such as (Adejoh, 2014; Akpabio & Akpan, 2010; Babatunde, 2010; Oluwaniyi, 2010). On the other hand, there are lots of studies on the evolution and radicalization of insurgents in Nigeria, bad governance and insurgency in northern Nigeria, Insurgency in Nigeria, terrorism and poverty, Boko Haram and religious intolerance (Bamidele, 2016; Ademowo, 2015; Suleiman & Karim, 2015; Aghedo & Osumah, 2014; Forest, 2012). These scholars have dealt so much on militancy and insurgency, bad governance, corruption, unemployment and poverty.

Similarly, there are scholarly works on causes of terrorism in Nigeria's oil-rich Delta such as oil spillage and environmental deprivation, agitation for resource control and

autonomy (Shola, 2015; Obi, 2010; Nwilo & Badejo, 2005). Others are Onabanjo and Uzodike (2012), Cook (2011), Adesoji (2010) whose works reflect on the multidimensional reasons for insurgency in Nigeria, evolution of radical Islam in Nigeria and a chronological review of radical terrorism in Nigeria respectively.

There is however, a dearth of studies on the undying quest for political and economic power by the two deadly terror groups in Nigeria. The above mentioned studies did not address the quest for political and economic power by the militants in the Niger Delta or Boko Haram insurgents in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. This therefore, is the focus of this study.

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

The incessant attacks on the Nigerian state by the Niger Delta militants in the southern part and the Boko Haram insurgents in the northern part of Nigeria since the inception of the Fourth Republic is orchestrated by their penchant for political and economic power. At the root of their struggles which this study refers to as the “quest for power” is the burning desire to take over the political apparatus as well as economic control of the state as their driving interest.

Both insurgent groups have been fighting the Nigerian state for years on the public positions which are purely different from their core needs and interests. On the surface, the Niger Delta militants claim they are fighting for freedom from marginalization real or perceived, political exclusion, economic and resource deprivation, institutional corruption, inequality and oil-induced environmental pollution. Also, the Boko Haram sect emerged on the platform of religious extremism accusing and challenging the

leadership of the Nigerian state as being corrupt, westernised and un-Islamic in running the affairs of the country.

On the surface, Boko Haram advocates that strict Sharia justice system be applied in running the affairs of the Nigerian state. However, underneath their public positions is their quests (desires, interests and needs) for political and economic control of the state. Given the socio-economic, ethno-religious and political crises experienced in the past such as the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970, the Maitatsine religious crisis of the 1980s and all the other violence in Nigeria, none of these crises ever threatened Nigeria's existence as the two militant insurgencies under investigation.

To address the root causes of insurgency in Nigeria, one must get beyond the public demands or positions to the interests, concerns, doubts, fears and needs of the parties to the crises. Their needs are those demands parties to the crises must have to discontinue the conflicts. Unless the root causes to these crises are addressed, the crises become protracted and intractable. It will only be laughable and total ignorance to address the terror crises in Nigeria from the public positions of the belligerent groups without taking a deeper look at what really their needs and interests are.

Not until the fourth republic, Nigeria had never experienced nor had such words as *insurgency* or *terrorism* in its security vocabulary. Terrorism and the war on terror are new paradigms in Nigeria's political history. This research therefore, seeks to investigate those motivational factors that have given rise to these rebellious uprisings which threaten the security of the Nigerian state and the dynamics of their self-perpetuation in recent years.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

In examining the quest for power by the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram sect, the study was able to address and proffered answers to the following questions:

1. What are those factors that motivated the attacks by Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents against the Nigerian state in the fourth republic?
2. How has the attacks by the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgents affected the national security of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic?
3. What are the possible and comprehensive strategies to be taken to resolve the quest for power by the two terror groups in Nigeria?

#### **1.5 Objectives of the Study**

The study was able to address the above research questions through the following objectives:

1. To identify and examine those factors that motivate the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram terrorists against the Nigerian state in the fourth republic.
2. To evaluate the security threats posed by the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram terrorists to Nigeria and
3. To recommend comprehensive and practical measure (model) to be taken to resolve the challenging quests for power by the Niger Delta militant group and the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria.

#### **1.6 Significance of the Study**

The significance of this study cannot be overemphasized as efforts made in bringing to an end the root causes of the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria can be applied elsewhere within the sub-region, and beyond. The study therefore, would be useful to

the policy makers and will expand the frontiers of the knowledge of national security experts who would make use of the outcome of the research as a critical contribution and an input to the national security framework. The researcher's intention is that the outcome of the study through its findings would be beneficial to the governments and would serve as a ready guide both in the short and long terms, thus helping the government achieve her overall security objectives.

The research would avail security experts the wherewithal for Situation Analysis as well as serve as a guiding tool for the policy makers in their future engagements. The study no doubt would further help in the regular and timely review of existing strategic security framework especially in the area of intelligence gathering, inter-agencies collaborations and in the area of government response or intervention.

The idea of using non-conventional strategies in the combat of insurgency as recommended in the study is an additional non-repressive approach in addressing the challenge. Strategies such as use of rehabilitated ex-terrorists to talk to and persuade those still radicalised is a major contribution of the study and one of the ways to go in addressing the security threats.

This research would also be useful to students in the fields of Strategic, Defence and Security studies, various tiers of Governments, the Private Sector, Political, Opinion, and Traditional leaders, Civil Society Organizations, Managers of national security in Nigeria, and the West African Sub-region since the Nigerian state is a key player in West Africa and indeed African politics. Furthermore, the work would contribute to

the body of knowledge and would as well strengthen and add to extant literatures in the field of strategic studies for further studies.

Theoretically, the study is of great significance given the social efficacy of the theories used in the research. Social discontent is a product of an action. The Failed-state theory for instance fits into the Nigerian Niger Delta and Boko Haram crises and it explains the core existentiality of the state. The state exist to provide political goods to its citizens and when it fails to do so, there will be a spontaneous reaction from the citizens. This is equally true for Frustration-Aggression thesis where if government fails in its obligations to the governed, they get aggressive. The study, therefore, is theoretically significant.

### **1.7 Justification for the Study**

A closer look at the issues and the problems raised in this research revealed that there is an urgent need for the study given the audacity, sagacity and the sophistication with which these terrorist groups operate. The research is vital and critical at such a time as this given the kind of determination and war tricks the insurgents bring to bear in their quest to wrest power from the government and to alter the security architecture of Nigeria. More so, there was nothing like insurgency or terrorism in Nigeria's security books fifteen years back. It has therefore, got to show that the world indeed is a global village and evolves faster than we ever think and we need to aptly put our acts together if we must beat the enemies of our common patrimony as a country.

## **1.8 Operational Definition of Concepts**

### **1.8.1 National Security**

Walter Lippman as cited in Barry Buzan's *People, States and Fear*, puts National Security thus, "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war". He further defines National security "as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad" (Buzan, 1998:16). Dyke (1966) in his words states that "National Security embodies the sovereignty of the state, the inviolability of its territorial boundaries, and the right to individual and collective self-defence against internal and external threats". As used in the context of this study, National Security is the protection and the enhancement of the cherished values of the citizens and the defence of the state against external aggression as well as the harmonious operations of the organs and institutions of the state. In this regards, it stands for the oneness of the Nigerian state against any kind of national disasters. Therefore, National Security reflects how sovereign the state is, its economic power, military might, political power, diplomacy, the belief, values and cultures of the citizens of the state.

### **1.8.2 Fourth Republic**

The Fourth Republic stands for the period covered by the study which spans from 1999 to 2015. The fourth Republic is one and a unique period in Nigerian democratic development. Since independence in 1960, Nigerian democratic governance has had several military incursions which truncated the first (1960-1966), second (1979-1983) and the third (1992-1993) republics (Larry, 1988). Between the third and the fourth republics, that is, from 1983 to 1999, there was a sixteen-year interregnum of military dictatorship. The current democratic dispensation in Nigeria which is commonly

referred to as the *Fourth Republic* started in 1999 to date. It is the longest of all the democratic periods ever experienced by the Nigerian state since her independence on October 1, 1960 without any military interference (Omodia, 2009; Omotola, 2010).

### 1.8.3 Terrorism

Terrorism is a widespread phenomenon with no single cause responsible for its outbreak across the globe. Collins (2007:298) describes terrorism as a very complex phenomenon with so many facets. No doubt, terrorism is a global concept with varied definitions dependent on whose standpoint. Terrorism is unlawful and a crime against humanity in all ramifications. However, it is a dicey concept given that there is no generally acceptable definition of terrorism even among academic experts or within government circles. In view of the divergent perception of who a terrorist is or not, Jenkins; Ganor, and Schmid (1992; 2002 & 2003) express that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter and hero.

Where terrorism is being perpetuated within a territory or a state by actors within the state, it is seen to be local or *domestic terrorism* as in the case of the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram terrorists in Northern part of Nigeria. If the actors on the other hand are from one state but are carrying out terrorist attacks in another state, it is said to be *international terrorism* as in the case of 11 September, 2001 in Washington DC and New York. According to Chalk (1996:13), terrorist attacks is a psychological warfare which is aimed at frustrating the goals of the opposition.

Lutz and Lutz (2005:7) sees terrorism as the weapon of the weak. It is a violent act and a bargaining process based on the power to hurt and intimidate as a substitute for

open use of military force (Crenshaw, 1987). Terrorism is often visited on or targeted at an audience that is bigger or wider than its victims. Conceptualised as the use of violence or threat to attack by clandestine groups to achieve certain political, ethnic or religious objectives. In the case of Nigeria, the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram sect are the two terror groups operating within and around Nigeria aiming at soft targets such as Mosques, Churches, market places, government institutions as well as international organisational outfit such as the bombing of UN building in Abuja.

As suitably defined by the United States State Department (2003), the term terrorism is a “premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”. Terrorism in Nigeria based on the foregoing is for political and socio-economic reasons therefore, the U.S. State Department definition is used here as the operational definition of the concept.

#### **1.8.4 Niger Delta Militants**

The Niger Delta militants who operate from the Niger Delta creeks and swamps are a violent group based in the south-south zone of Nigeria commonly referred to as the Niger Delta region. Niger Delta militancy is made up of different militant groups such as The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by late Ken Saro-Wiwa, The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo. Other militant groups such as The Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta, and The Martyrs’ Brigade are built around individual militants with different ethnic colorations.

The first Niger Delta militant-insurgent group to have gained global attention was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by late Ken Saro-Wiwa. MOSOP, a radical and ethnically driven militant group of the Ogoni extraction launched an aggressive campaign in 1990 against the Multinational oil giant Royal Dutch/Shell and the government protesting the degradation of their environment which was gravely detrimental to their health and means of livelihoods (Hanson, 2007).

MOSOP and other insurgent groups in the Niger Delta are primarily made up of young able-bodied men, some educated yet without gainful employment while others are illiterate with nothing to live on (Ikelegbe, 2005; Ukiwo, 2007; Watts, 2007). Their target is the oil which sustains the Nigerian Economy. In January 2006, an umbrella insurgent group The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was formed in Warri which is more or less mother of all the militant groups in the Niger Delta. MEND was formed and led by a more enlightened individuals who are sophisticated as well. It has a fluid organisational structure in terms of the flexibility of its membership.

MEND's original demand was for the federal troops to be withdrawn from the Niger Delta and Asari Dokubo who was in detention at the time it was formed be released unconditionally without further delays. A trajectory of MEND's demands reveals that they wanted full control of the natural resources extracted from the region. The MEND demanded and showed interest in the political process of Nigeria as part of their pre-conditions for peace in the Delta. Their struggle against the state is therefore premised on economy marginalization, political exclusion at the centre and total control of oil resources is also key in their interests.

### 1.8.5 Boko Haram

The Boko Haram insurgents who are operationally based in the north-eastern part of Nigeria is a violent, ideological and extremists group who launches incessant attacks against the Nigerian state. The insurgents use religion as a platform to condemn northern political leaders who live in affluence while using religion to deceive the masses and perpetuate themselves in power. The sect believes that northern politicians who perpetuate themselves in power are corrupt and are fake Muslims who are self-serving instead of seeing their political positions as public trusts. They launch their attacks against military, paramilitary formations and places such as the Churches, Mosques, Motor Parks, Market places. According to the group, their goal is to create a “pure” Islamic state that is theocratic and is governed by the Sharia law (Walker, 2012). The sect detests western cultures such as their democratic principles, civilizations and values.

*Boko* is a Hausa word which connotes book and *Haram* is an Arabic word meaning forbidden. This is transliterated to mean “western education is evil or forbidden”. The name Boko Haram is given to the group by neighbours who saw the insurgents as people who detest western cultures. However, the group named itself in Arabic as “*Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad*” which is translated as “people that are totally committed to those teachings by the prophet” (Ajayi, 2012; Walker, 2012 & Agbiboa, 2013).

The United States of America in 2013 designated Boko Haram and the Ansaru splinter group as terrorist organisations while the United Nations in 2014 saw Boko Haram as an affiliate of al-Qaeda (Campbell, 2014).

### **1.8.6 Insurgency**

Insurgency is not a new era concept especially when it is against the government of the day for some perceived inability of the government to deliver on political promises or on the ground of neglect and ideological differences. It is an uprising by dissident group against the state to topple the government of the day. According to Metz and Millen (2004), insurgency is a strategy dissidents adopt to actualise their political objectives which cannot be achieved through conventional process. It is believed that like the act of terror, insurgency is the weapon of the weak. The insurgents are not conventional in their tactics but are prepared for protracted, violent, asymmetrical and psychological warfare.

Insurgents such as the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram try as much to avoid battle scenario where they are weakest, that is, the conventional battle spaces but show up where they feel they have equal operational footing. They have mastery of familiar battle ground and the terrain (mountains, Forests, creeks, jungles, coastal swamps) over the conventional forces. Insurgents are highly as trained as the conventional troops who try to postpone or avoid decisive encounter in order not suffer severe defeat but are self-sustaining and persistent with expanded support base hoping that victory will swing in their favour with time.

At some point, Metz and Millen (2004) asserts that for insurgency to succeed, the insurgents must have direct confrontations with the regime military. This confrontations according to them can take the form of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, kidnapping and assassination of regime and top political officials and other type of asymmetrical deployments. At their emergence, the two groups were never in

anyway contemplated of becoming a national threats as they are today. Reasons being that both Niger Delta and the Boko Haram insurgents have continued to sharpen their warring skills by going for foreign training in Libya, Somalia and Yemen and of late with the ISIS in Syria and Iraq (Karmon, 2015; Shola, 2015; Ray, 2016).

### **1.9 Scope of the Study**

The scope of this study focused on the Nigerian Fourth Republic with specific period from 1999 to 2015. The scope of the study covered the period of the return of leadership of Nigeria from the reign of military dictatorship to democratic government in 1999. This study also covered the period of the Niger Delta militancy which was most threatening to the existence of the Nigerian state and its national security especially during President Olusegun Obasanjo's government 1999-2007. However, during President Yar'Adua's government, he granted the Niger Delta militants amnesty that led to the surrendering of their arms against the Nigerian State in 2009. The period under study also witnessed another violent group known as the Boko Haram sect whose attacks on the government and people of Nigeria since 2009 to 2015 (on going) threatens the security and stability of the country. The scope also dealt with the agitation of the Niger Delta militants over the political ambition of the region at the centre who threatened that former President Goodluck Jonathan who hails from the region must be re-elected in 2015.

The study selected six states out of which two were in the north eastern part of the country which is commonly referred to as the birth place of the Boko Haram sect. These states were Adamawa, Borno from the northeast zone and Kaduna from the north-west zones. Other states were Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa from South-South. The

six selected states above are the most affected across the geo-political regions where the two terror groups operate.

The two insurgent groups are not operationally based in the same geo-political zone of Nigeria. The Niger Delta militants operate in the creeks of the south-south swamps along Nigerian coastal stretch of the Atlantic Ocean while the Boko Haram is based in the north-eastern part of Nigeria with its attacks spread across the north (See Appendix B & C). The study was carried out in the six selected states above due to the volatility and the level of devastations witnessed by the two regions where these insurgents operate. Also, the selected states reflect the spread of the insurgencies especially that of the Boko Haram which touches the entire northern part of the country.

#### **1.10 Research Method**

There are three generally acceptable approaches to research design namely qualitative, quantitative and the mixed method. This study made use of qualitative method of research which is most appropriate for the discovery of issues, insights and opinion inherent in the experience of the interviewees such as the impacts of threats posed by terrorism on the national security of Nigeria. Lietz and Zayas (2010), asserts that qualitative method allows the researcher to explore the behaviour of social practices, ideas, relationship to evaluate the respondents' views on the phenomenon being considered under study. The study employed the qualitative method of research where relevant data to the research topic were sourced, examined and utilized.

The issues in this study (the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency) are purely social in nature, hence, the adoption of qualitative method of data collection

and analysis. Marshall and Rossman (2006) connotes that qualitative research is an approach that broadly studies social phenomenon. Its genres are interpretive, naturalistic and increasingly critical and they apply multiple methods of enquiry.

Furthermore, it is based on the facts that qualitative research is exploratory and its findings or results are not produced through statistical procedures and quantifications but are based on case study, historical method, ethnography among others (Creswell, 2015). Researchers in the pass such as Denzin and Lincoln (1994), confirmed the efficacy of the qualitative method in getting or collecting wider views when dealing with social phenomenon such as national security in the case of this study. This study involves an in-depth investigative

Qualitative research takes an in-depth look at a relatively small number of respondents using data collection method such as observation, interview, oral history, Focus-group-discussion, archival/document analysis and other discourse analysis (Bryman, 2007). According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), qualitative data are data collected in the form of words such as transcripts of focus groups, interview notes and answers to open-ended questions, transcriptions of video recordings, and accounts of experiences with a product from the internet...” (2013:336). The key research instrument in this study is the researcher who interviewed respondents himself where their answers or words served as the raw data for the study (Puvanesvary, 2008).

### **1.10.1 Research Philosophy**

Research philosophy, which is also known as research paradigm is defined as the belief that guides the conduct of a research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Research philosophy is

classified into two types, namely, positivist and interpretivist paradigm (Bell & Bryman, 2007). The interpretive paradigm, also referred to as constructivist or anti-positivist, is an underpinning philosophy of a German Philosopher and mathematician, Edmund Husserl from 1859-1938 (Wright, 2009).

Qualitative researchers work within the assumption of the interpretivist paradigm. The assumption of interpretivist paradigm is that, human life can be studied through interview, observation, case studies and others (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). These data generation methods used by the interpretivist are flexible and sensitive to the social issues under study. Furthermore, the interpretivist is of the view that social reality is socially constructed and subjective, with both participants and the researcher relating to know the phenomenon from the perspective of the individual. In view of the foregoing, therefore, this study adopts interpretivist paradigm to better understand the philosophy behind the conduct of the research.

### **1.10.2 Research Design**

Research Designs are “the specific procedures involved in the research process, such as data collection, data analysis and report writing” (Creswell, 2014). A qualitative research design is thought of as a rough sketch which is somehow unclear that needs to be filled by the research as it progresses (Devers & Frankel, 2000). The research design is as rough as a sketch which is only a guideline that is flexible until carried out using the research techniques. The study used narrative inquiry design in its data collection complemented by historical analysis. The study is also historical as well as descriptive in approach. Vaus (2007) sees research design as a structure which ensures that issues raised in the research questions are addressed as clearly as possible.

The research was designed with some historical connections which aimed at finding a link between events in the past and relating such events to the present realities through oral statement obtained via interviews. Nigeria, historically was doing economically well with agriculture as its main stay before the discovery of oil in the 1950s which led to Nigeria jettisoning agriculture that was the main income earner to the economy. The result of refusing to diversify the economy in the past is the militancy threatening Nigeria now. Similarly, the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 did not envisage that ethnicity and religion would be promoted above nationalism. Historical religious intolerance was also an issue in the designing of the research.

### **1.10.3 Sources of Data**

There are basically two main categories of data sources (Creswell, 2014). These are Primary and Secondary sources of data. The researcher made use of both primary and secondary sources of data. For the primary data, information were obtained by the researcher directly from the original source for investigation of the issue in the study. Such primary data sources were individual experts and stakeholders such as community leaders, lawmakers, experts in peace and strategic studies in this case. Primary data were also sourced through telephony conversation with some field commanders at the theatres of war against the insurgency. Data were obtained from the primary sources through semi-structured and unstructured interviews and evaluation of the archival records such as videos, retrieval of relevant documents both in print and online as well as observations (Willink Report, 1958).

Data from the secondary sources were elicited from the library such as newspapers, journals, Gazettes, briefings, articles, textbooks, previous studies, Bulletins,

conference papers and internet resources will be consulted as well. Others were government's publications of economic indicators, statistical abstracts, census data, company annual reports, databases, the media, etcetera (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013; Creswell, 2014).

Secondary data are data generated by someone else other than the researcher carrying out the current research.

#### 1.10.4 *Sampling Design*

Sampling designs in qualitative research are mostly purposive. This type of sampling is targeted at few respondents with in-depth and specialized views, opinions and knowledge which form a very rich data base of the social phenomenon investigated by the researcher. As noted by Sekaran and Bougie (2013), purposive sampling curtails the generalizability of the findings as obtains in probability sampling. This is due to the fact that only a sample of highly knowledgeable experts and those with the needed information were sought.

The purposive sampling design entails locating, and gaining access to individuals with the requisite wherewithal in terms of the knowledge, experience and the information that would be very useful in answering the research questions of the study. Devers and Frankel (2000) confirms that for a researcher to be able to have maximum insight into the research issues or questions, purposive sampling strategy is deployed to afford the researcher the ability to categorize or select his research issues appropriately.

The target respondents of this research were drawn from those with rooted knowledge and opinions on the research issues such as those in the academics, specialists in Defence and National Security Studies, Military commanders, Opinion and Traditional Leaders who were indigenes of both the Niger Delta and the Northeast. Participants were interviewed from the civil society groups, Community leaders from states worst hit by both the Niger Delta crisis and the Boko Haram insurgency such as Borno, Yobe, Kaduna, Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa state. Soldiers at the frontlines and some of the captured suspects in custody were also interviewed.

Many respondents were interviewed given the fact that guidelines to determine non-probabilistic sample sizes are virtually non-existent, however, a total of sixteen in-depth interviews were carried out. Based on the fact that purposive interview samples are the most readily used non-probabilistic sampling whose size typically relies on the “saturation” concept where at a point- when the seven respondent was interviewed, no new information was observed or derived from the data (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006; Hagaman & Wutich, 2017). This therefore, satisfied the principle of saturation upon which purposive or non-probabilistic sample size is premised.

#### **1.10.5 Respondent Sampling and Fieldwork Process**

The technique deployed for the collection of data during the fieldwork was basically interviews. The researcher used flexible unstructured and exploratory questions on a targeted small number of respondents with the intention of gaining deeper insight of the social phenomenon under study (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). This study used face-to-face interviews with open-ended questions being asked participants. Telephone

interviews were also made where it was necessary especially to those troops that were at the Forward Operation Base (FOB).

The interviews were conducted between April and September, 2016 in Nigeria with participants from Abuja, Adamawa, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Delta, Kaduna, and Rivers state. The participants were selected from the above states as representative of various groups with in-depth knowledge of the issues. Participants such as community/youth leaders, scholars, military commanders, lawmakers and politicians were interviewed. On the average, 40 minutes were spent on each interview. Voices were recorded and transcribed verbatim. A total of sixteen informants were interviewed. Data saturation was reached on the seventh interviewee (Creswell, 2007; Guest, Bunce & John, 2006; Mouse, 1994).

#### **1.10.6 Data Analysis**

In qualitative research, data analysis aims at uncovering and having a bigger picture of the phenomenon under study through data that have been collected. This consist of preparing and analyzing text data in transcripts for analysis (Srivastava & Thomson, 2009). Here, the analysis of data brings meaning, structure and order to a large body of data collected (Marshall and Roman, 2006). The researcher through inductive reasoning ensured that data collected were sorted and categorized reflecting the complexity of the social phenomenon being studied (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005).

Data collected during the fieldwork were coded after transcription and were structured to address the research questions. Themes and sub-themes were evolved and analyzed in line with the research questions to meet the objectives of the research. In other

words, the researcher looked for issues raised in the data that were key and events that were recurrent in the categorization of data and finally wrote report on the categories.

Data analysis in qualitative approach is a complex process. In qualitative research method, data analysis is not as easy when compared with the quantitative analysis. This is simply due to the fact that there are relatively very few well-defined and established guidelines and laid down rules for analyzing qualitative data (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). According to Merriam (1998), data analysis in qualitative research involves back and forth movement between data and phenomena that are abstract, inductive and deductive reasoning as well as descriptive and interpretive processes (1998:178). The objective of data analysis in general is to search for themes, patterns and trends in the data collected.

The researcher did not use any mechanism or device for pre-coding but adopted a method of identifying and labelling or what is called coding of data for research. This process is called content analysis and it is used when qualitative data have been collected via interviews. Miles and Huberman (1994), posits that there are three generally known steps in qualitative data analysis such as data reduction, data display and the drawing of conclusions. The first step according to Sekaran and Bougie (2013:337) is data reduction which simply is the selecting, coding, and categorizing of data while Data display is the process of presenting the data such as quotes which demonstrate a pattern in the data that are easily comprehensible by both the researcher and the reader.

### 1.11 Organization of the Study

The study is organised into six chapters and are presented as follows:

The *first chapter* of the research presents the general introduction of the study which reflects the challenges the Nigerian nation is grappling with in recent times. The most threatening of these challenges are the Boko Haram Insurgency and the Niger Delta Militancy as they affect her national security in the Fourth Republic (1999-2015). The background to the study is followed by the statement of the problem, the research questions, the objectives of the study, significance of the study, scope of the study, the research method and organization of the study.

*Chapter two* of the study focuses on literature review and the theoretical framework. The chapter presents issues such as national security, review of extant and relevant literatures on Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency. The study in this chapter is also devoted to the theoretical arguments upon which the research is built. The theories adopted for the research are the *Frustration-Aggression* theory and the *Failed State* theory. Furthermore, the chapter also examined the research framework.

The *third chapter* of the study focuses on a chequered history of the Nigerian state from its amalgamation in 1914 to date and her ethno-religious diversity as a nation. The chapter further looked at the background of the Niger Delta struggle which started as protests against the government at the centre and the multinational oil companies operating in their communities. The protests with the passage of time snowballed into violent agitation which is today known to be a full-scale militancy, the issues and politics in their agitation for resource control and self-determination. The transformation of the Niger Delta struggle into militant groups with international link

where illegal oil proceeds are exchanged for arms. The issues of environmental degradation and pollution through oil activities by the multinational oil companies. This chapter as well looked at the evolution of the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern zone of the country, its ideological background and metamorphosis from insurgency to terrorism.

*Chapter four* of the study has unravelled or focused on those factors responsible for the emergence of the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency as security threats to the Nigerian state in the fourth republic. The chapter further looked at Boko Haram in Nigeria as a serious national security threat. The new agitation by the Niger Delta ex-militants for President Goodluck Jonathan who hails from their region to remain in power as Nigerian president or Nigeria should forget about crude oil exploration and exploitation in the region as well a great threat. The study looked at the quest for political power by the Niger Delta Militant group and the Boko Haram insurgents as it affects the Nigerian national security.

*Chapter five* of the study concentrated on the evaluation and analysis of the complex security issues with threats from the two groups, threats patterns of the two violent groups not only to their operational bases in terms of the impacts of their operations to their base-regions and to Nigeria generally. The chapter further discussed the counter-measures taken by the government to checkmate the menace of insurgency in Nigeria.

*Chapter six* of this research work draws the summary of findings of the study and conclusion. Bringing to the fore key recommendations that would be taken to resolve

the challenging questions of the Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram Insurgency that has threatened the national security of the Nigerian State



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This section of the study presents scholarly viewpoints on the concept of National Security, Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram Insurgency as they threaten the security of the Nigerian state within the Fourth Republic. In considering relevant literature on the issues raised above, the research takes a look at what really these terror groups are as revealed by relevant literature in Nigeria as well as their links with other global terror groups if there are. The study looks further at what is Boko Haram, its origin, message and convictions, structure and its activities. It also looks at the Niger Delta agitations, the Nigerian state and its national security challenges. The chapter further captured the theoretical framework of the research.

#### **2.2 Literature Review**

It is a known fact that Nigeria is the most diverse, populous African nation and the seventh in the world with a population of over 182 million (US Census Bureau, 2015). Having/ housed the highest population of the Black race with the largest economy in Africa, it is only imperative that when Nigeria is safe and secured, Africa will be stable in its growth and development. Nigeria in the last fifteen years has experienced one form of security challenges or the other with the Boko Haram and Niger Delta

uprisings being the most threatening (Agbibo & Maiangwa, 2014; Aghedo & Osumah, 2014).

Security as a concept is seen as freedom from harm, anxiety, care, danger amongst others (Flexner, 1987). It depicts a state of confidence grounded on safety. Idowu (2014), contends that security implies freedom and this freedom covers such conditions where citizens especially the youths are gainfully engaged and have access to security, food, functional social infrastructure like effective means of transport, portable and hygienic water, proper health care and quality housing.

Security generally entails human survival. Collins (1998) sees security as when a state is relatively free from war and is with expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any possible war that should occur (1998:3). It is when lives are threatened that security is involved and it goes beyond direct armed violence such as war and terrorism within and between states to dangers such as environmental degradation, oil spillage and pollution, pandemics such as the recent Ebola epidemic, HIV/AIDS and other issues such as trade, diplomacy and climate change amongst others (Collins, 2007). After the Cold War, security studies took a new dimension with perspectives from different scholars on which issues need to be secured or otherwise. According to Waeber (1998), “an issue is securitised when it gets constructed into a threat”. Lippman as cited in Barry Buzan’s *People, States and Fear* sums national security up thus: National security is having the ability to withstand any possible aggression from abroad (Buzan, 1998:16).

Booth (1991) however, could not agree less when he asserts that people whether serving in government, in the corporate world or in their individual lives perceive that an issue is threatening their lives some way and respond to such issue politically, such issue should be referred to as a security issue. In an objective sense, security measures the absence of any threat to achieve values, and subjectively the absence of fear that such values will be attacked (Ullman, 1983). When aggressors both internal and external are checked by using coercive means in a persuasive way to transform hostility into cooperation that is mutual to achieve shared benefits, security is in place.

Arnold Wolfers situates security internally and externally in relation to the vulnerability of citizens (Wolfers, 1962). Citizens are vulnerably exposed to threats internally or externally when they do not feel safe and are not sure if there is the security and guarantee of their lives and properties. Threats come in different forms such as threat to individual citizen's life, threat to a community or city and the threat to a state which comes in form of insurrection or insurgency and external aggression which challenges the sovereignty of the state. Where there are clear threats to weaken the structures of the state both institutional and territorial as in the case of the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram, the national security of the Nigeria state is being challenged or threatened. The key thing in security analysis according to scholars such as Alan Collins (1998:3) is that, we are more concerned about how and what referent objects such as the state can do to survive when they are threatened.

National Security is the permanent protection and the enhancement of the cherished values of the citizens as well as the defence of the state against external aggression as well as internal insurrection or civil disturbance. When values such as the beliefs,

culture, democratic principles as well as the welfare and wellbeing of the people and their effective participation in the development process of the state are continually enhanced, the internal dimension of national security is said to be achieved.

Politically, security refers to all measures taken by the state through assigned agencies to ward off or forestall violence, crime, sabotage, conspiracy, espionage, attacks and other threats capable of undermining the sovereignty of the state (Idowu, 2014). Based on the foregoing, security in Nigerian context refers to all measures conceivable that are taken by the state against the activities of the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgency and all other violent groups operating within the Nigerian territory. As a parameter to gauge governments' performance around the globe, effective and total security is the index used today (Head and Mann, 2009).

National security as a concept traverses many fields ranging from Political Science, Strategic Studies, Military Training and Doctrine (TRADOC), Surveillance as well as Human Rights (Ehigiamusoe et al., 2013). Romm (1993) asserts that a nation is secured when it refuses to sacrifice its legitimate interest to circumvent war and is prepared for war when challenged to do so. The ability of the state to preserve its nationally cherished values against threats from both internal and external attacks is known as national security.

Wolfer (1962) expressed that the concept of national security is often misunderstood and is concurred by Carey (2000) who sees national security as elusive. It therefore, shows that the concept is a strange and new phenomenon, a subjective and relative concept rather than an objective "thing" that is tangible (Anyadike, 2013). According

to Anyadike (2013), national security is the requisite requirement for the maintenance of the survival of the state via socio-economic and political power.

To possess national security, the state needs to have economic security, environmental security, and energy security. National security threats do not emanate only from inter-states conventional foes but also from non-state actors as well who could either be domestic or international (Salehyan, 2009). Non-state actors such as terrorist groups in this case the Niger Delta Militants-Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Drug Cartel network, Boko Haram Insurgency no doubt are a great threat to the national security of Nigeria.

Braithwaite (1988) observed that national security is the “ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threat”. When citizens of a state are protected from threats and danger, and there is preservation of the core values of the citizenry, such a nation is secured (Yong, 2011). Contextually, in Nigeria, national security is about the protection and the wellbeing of Nigerians and their properties, preservation of her sovereignty and the economy, and the enhancement of her socio-cultural and political harmony. In other words, national security of Nigeria is about her total security which comprises of the three key elements of internal security, diplomacy and total Defence.

The locals hold different views as to when the Boko Haram came into existence. Scholars such as Onuarah (2010) contends that the current radical group which is today called Boko Haram first emerged under the leadership of Abubakah Lawan in 1995 under the name *Ahlulsunna Wal'jama'ah hijra*. However, common literature (Suleiman & Karim, 2015; Agbiboa, 2014; Forest, 2012; Okpaga, Chijioke & Eme,

2012) established that the group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 and that the extremist sect went lull after having some violent clashes with the Nigerian security operatives as a result of the death of their leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. However, the sect re-emerged in 2002 better trained, more equipped with more deadly attacks on the security operatives in Yobe and Borno states.

Boko Haram stands for many things to many different folks even scholars share different opinions as to what exactly it is. One school of thought translates or sees Boko Haram as a deception traceable to olden days Hausa jokes during wedding when the bride would be dressed in a disguise to deceive the would-be husband. Others trace the origin of the word “Boko” to the colonial era where it was used to connote *Ilimin* referring to western education and it was to differentiate it from the Islamic education which was termed *Ilimin Islamiyya* (Forest, 2012).

“Boko education” to them was a derogatory word used for the western style of education which was regarded of less importance (Waldek, 2011). Some others see Boko Haram as a political tool in the hands of northern politicians to destabilize the central government of former president Goodluck Jonathan whom they contested against and lost (Awopeju, Adelusi and Oluwashakin, 2012). Another school of thought did not see it that way, instead, saw it as a northern agenda or pressure group put together by some powerful individuals in the north to actualize their hidden agenda. There are controversies surrounding the date of origin and the leadership of the sect.

Suleiman and Karim (2015), lays the blame for violent attacks in the northern part of Nigeria by the activities of members of the Boko Haram sect squarely on bad

governance, corruption and selfish aggrandizement by those entrusted with leadership especially in the north. The group which calls itself as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-jihad (JASLWJ) in Arabic meaning people committed to the propagation of jihadist tradition, known as Boko Haram sees western education as evil or sin. Boko Haram and indeed other militant groups within the Nigeria state takes full advantage of vicious cycle of failed promises, corruption, unemployment, illiteracy to perpetuate their acts using the Islamic platform. In this wise, failure or absence of governance is responsible for the easy penetration and recruitment of the members of the sect.

According to Nigerian watch (Tuesday, 14 July, 2015) many of the youth recruited by the sect are not only Muslims but other non-believing youths paid by the group to the tune of \$400 monthly to carry out suicide bombing in public and worship places. This further confirms that it is not only socio-economic factors that determine terrorist attacks. Where there are checks and balances within a system, effective social welfare policy such as social security, affordable, quality and compulsory education, social security, provision of health care and employment for the youth would checkmate crimes and terrorism (Burgoon, 2006).

Similarly, Kukah (2012) submits that the socio-economic need could be the root cause of the Boko Haram insurgency. He declines to accept that the Boko Haram insurgency is a religious issue that is peculiar to the Muslim dominated north but sees it as a social condition imposed on the Nigerian society through the human needs. He further uses the human need theory of social conflicts to explain that all humans have basic needs

which they seek to meet or fulfilled and failure caused by other humans to meet these needs could lead to conflicts.

Rotberg (2004) in his view asserts that, the essence of governance is for those in the executive arms of government to deliver high quality political goods to citizens by government of all kinds. Political goods such as rule of law, security and safety, participation, human development and sustainable economic opportunities, human rights are those supplies that legitimize the government (p. 113-116). This goes to say that when governments across all levels fail to provide citizens with these basic needs, they have failed in their responsibility to the people and it would pave way for violent crimes within the society.

Ted Robert Gurr (1970) in his Theory of Relative Deprivation (RD) suggests that a widened gap between the expectations and capabilities of people would always generate discontent. The theory carefully explains how inequality and deprivation of economic and social goods brings about frustration and aggression which ultimately leads to violence among people living within the same society with the same rights. With the return of Nigeria to democracy in 1999, the expectations of the people were high having emerged from a long military dictatorship.

Democratic tenets were soon compromised by the political class and people started losing confidence in government after the first few elections in the Fourth Republic giving room for grievances and easy recruitment and radicalization of gullible youths within the north-eastern enclave which is the poorest region in Nigeria where the Boko Haram insurgency started. Poverty escalation and mass unemployment in northern part

of Nigeria with massive corruption on the part of their ruling elites fuelled the potential of recruiting the militants whom we refer to as Boko Haram today (Suleiman et al, 2015).

In affirming the above assertions, one can easily hypothesize or conclude that there is a strong relationship between bad governance in Nigeria and the rapid upsurge in the operations of terrorists in the country. Findings by scholars such as Okobiah (2002) shows that before Nigeria's return to democratic rule, basic primary education enrolment in the north-eastern part of Nigeria where the sect is rooted was well below 20% with Borno state having only 14.5% which shows a wide gap between states in the northern region and those in the south such as Lagos with over 92% primary school enrolment within the same period of 1998.

The literacy factor played a key role where the gap between the north and south in terms of educational access, quality healthcare was so wide (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2012). Available records shows that Yobe state which is one of the most affected states by the terrorist group has since the advent of the fourth republic consistently budgeted 16% of its annual income to education and 6% to the health sector. With these meagre allocations, those sectors keep deteriorating and are still not improved due to corruption and poor implementation (Chinedu & Olabimtan, 2010).

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (The Nation, 18 July, 2015), Nigeria's former President in his keynote address at the 11<sup>th</sup> Convocation Lecture of Benson Idahosa University, Benin City, posits that even if Nigeria wins the war against Boko Haram, it still needs

proper education of the masses to sustain the victory, He further asserts that unless the trend of education in the northeast is reversed, it will be a difficult task to counter the insurgency which thrives on ignorance and illiteracy. Boko Haram declared Gwoza town of Borno state Caliphate, hoisting its flag in Nigeria's territory thereby creating a "state within the Nigerian state" which is the most threatening national security challenge to the Nigerian state in the fourth republic (Punch, 25 August, 2014).

Moreover, lack of study on the alarming rate of recruitment of young under-aged children (child soldiers) by the terror groups especially the Boko Haram is a threat that needs an investigation. Nigeria needs to combine education with its military might if it must win the war against the Boko Haram insurgency. This has further emphasized on the importance of education as a leeway out of the carnage of the Boko Haram terrorism.

A larger part of the population within the Boko Haram stronghold of the northeast attribute the upsurge in the activities of the group to poor governance and corruption using religion as its platform. Information available shows bad leadership in these areas triggered and escalated the illiteracy, poverty level and unacceptable level of unemployment which leads to lack of access to the basic needs as the core reasons for the radicalization of the unemployed youths (Forest, 2012).

Though studies such as (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002, Pape, 2005) show no relationship between lack of education and terrorism, however, other studies such as (Burgoon, 2006, Freytag, Kruger, meierrieks & Schneider, 2009, Zaidi, 2010) show terrorism could be reduced through reduction of poverty. Boko Haram sect is a

grandchild of persistent rise in unemployment level among youths without correspondent efforts in addressing it. However, most frightening is the rate at which kids between ages 15 to 20 whose parents are wealthy are joining the terrorist groups. Many kids from some of the wealthiest families in northern Nigeria are Boko Haram fighters while those caught are in detention. Some of these kids such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab the under-wear bomber, whose father is one of the richest men in Africa attempted bombing a civilian aircraft that was US bound from Lagos contribute heavily in millions to finance the sect. This has again question the notion that poverty is the real cause of the Islamic militancy in northern Nigeria.

The membership of Boko Haram ranges from the almajiris (Quranic Pupils) to women, unemployed graduates, university lecturers, politicians, drug addicts, bankers, undergraduate of universities and other colleges even migrants from other countries around Nigeria. According to OKereke (2010), “these recruits were indoctrinated by Yusuf to believe that the state of hopelessness was caused by government who imposed western education and practice on them and failed to manage the resources of the country to their benefits”.

Reports in the recent past have shown that even members of the security forces and top political leaders have been infiltrated by the sect. President Goodluck Jonathan (Premium Times, January 8, 2012) admitted that members of the Boko Haram sect had infiltrated his government, the National Assembly and the Security Forces. Former commissioner of police in charge of criminal investigations in Abuja named Zakari Biu was dismissed from the force due to his role in the escape of the mastermind of

Church bombing on Christmas day at Madalla, Niger state where over forty Christian faithfuls were killed (Agbiboa, 2013, Elombah, 2012).

The composition of Boko Haram members shows that poverty is next to no reason for their radicalization. Moreover, poverty as a social phenomenon is a global issue which should not be capitalized on for all crimes though, it is also a well-established fact that many of the people get attracted to the group for socio-economic and political reasons. In his study, Salaam (2012) synchronized the Boko Haram background with the delay in western education in northern part of Nigeria. The disparity in achieving western education between the southern and northern part of Nigeria played a key role in the upsurge of radical extremism in the north.

Western education has been perceived in the north as an “anti-Islamic philosophy” used by the Christian missionaries to convert or pervert the Islamic teachings already in major part of the north before colonialism. This study further asserts that the rejection and the lackadaisical attitude of the north in embracing the western education over the time made most people from the region not prepared for employment. This scenario created not only poverty but get the youth set to be indoctrinated by the sect.

The foregoing analysis is backed by this statistics as provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) where the economic and social disparities in the northeastern part of the north that has been ravaged by the Boko Haram carnage is severe. In 2012, NBS reported that over 74% of the population in virtually all the 19 northern states live below the poverty line which is unacceptable by any standard (See **Appendix B**). In Kano alone which is the commercial centre of northern Nigeria where many industries

folded up as a result of upsurge in their costs of production, there are over three million street beggars asking for alms (Ndagi, 2012). With such a scary number of people on the streets, it is already a time bomb waiting to explode. The possibility of recruiting such a large hungry youths into insurgency is already very high (Awofeso, Ritchie & Degeling, 2003).

Isa (2010) contends that those communities taken over by Boko Haram were first and foremost taken over by poverty, lack of infrastructure and social services, educational backwardness, massive unemployed youths and dwindling fortunes in agriculture and productive base of the economy of the North. In the word of Kwaja, “religious dimensions of the conflict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes” (2011:1). Sope Elegbe, toys the same line by maintaining that poverty is primarily caused by unemployment and when unemployment is mixed with radical Islamism, which holds better life for martyrs, one can understand why the violence in the north keeps growing (Agbiboa, 2013).

Clapham attributes broadly the breakdown of the rule of law and order in most African states to basically bad governance (2004:200). Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her official visit to Nigeria in 2009 could not agree less with this view when she posited that:

the most immediate source of the disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is the failure of governance at the federal, state, and the local levels...lack of transparency and accountability has eroded the legitimacy of the government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state” (Clinton, 2009:1).

It is argued that a spirally declining economy that is exacerbated by mismanagement and official corruption would create governments that are often challenged violently or collapsed at some point. Evans concurred that “it is no accident that those countries whose economies are declining...should also be the ones experiencing the greatest amounts of violence and turmoil” (Evans, 1994).

Boko Haram claims its intention is to forestall all social injustice perpetuated in the country which they believe is brought about by corruption through the western democratic governance. They claim the only way it can be corrected is through the strict implementation and adherence to the sharia legal system. However, this is not the first attempt to advocate for the full and strict implementation of the Islamic justice system especially when it was introduced in 12 northern states in year 2000.

According to Brulliard (2010), the introduction of the sharia legal system in 12 northern states did not do much in preventing the looting of the treasuries. The failure of the elites to implement the sharia law in their day-to-day running of government and the politicization of the Islamic legal system was mainly what gave rise to the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria.

Forest (2012) alluded that grievances would always end in schisms between state and the citizens which often results in diverse form of political violence such as terrorism and insurgency. Most people in power in Nigeria act with impunity and the system works for those who are in power not for the citizens. Those in power are resistant to change which pitches them in animosity with the populace. The pain in Nigeria is not equally shared but is borne mainly by the vulnerable people. This is frustrating and

coupling with the selective application of the civil laws where the same offence would be committed by different persons but selective justice would set one free of the offence while the other faces the full weight of the same law.

Cook (2011) in his own study views Boko Haram as an upshot of numerous Islamic sects in northern Nigeria that have been in existence for long. These numerous Islamic sects before 1999 had been yearning for a state that could be governed by the strict sharia legal system which they believed could bring about their desired leadership. This was the view that gave rise to the Boko Haram insurgency. Cook further pointed out the killing of Mohammed Yusuf the leader of Boko Haram by the Nigerian Police as a turning point in their radicalization which has led to a large recruitment of many Islamic adherents into the sect.

The Boko Haram sect leader Abubakar Shekau in November, 2012 declared their support to the global jihadist extremism in Chechnya, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and all other parts of the world where jihads have been declared. The question to ask here is who then are these Boko Haram insurgents and what is their core mission in Nigeria? In leadership (2011), Boko Haram described themselves as the true warriors of Islam. They have reiterated time without number that they are Islamic warriors on religious mission of carrying out jihadist mandate based on the traditions and teachings of the Holy Prophet in Nigeria.

The group vowed never to accept any form of government aside that prescribed by the Islamic faith which is the only way acceptable to liberate Muslims. The sect never believed in any government orthodox or traditional except that based on Islamic

principles according to them. Their avowed fight against capitalism, democracy, socialism and every other forms of systems they feel contravene their ideological stance is clear. The Boko Haram sect is anti-state, anti-constitution, and anti-civilization. To them, these creations are anti-Islam and are illegal and should not be accommodated even the Nigerian government, its judiciary and military are seen by this group to be illegal institutions.

It is pretty clear from the above assertive statement by the Boko Haram sect that they are warriors with a clear mission to enthrone a pure and undiluted Islamic leadership as against the western liberal democratic system practiced in Nigeria. This declaration have they pursued and are still pursuing undermining the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the Boko Haram had been a hardliner having received instructions in salafi radicalism.

Yusuf established extremist religious centre in his hometown where poor kids from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad enrolled. Yusuf had an ulterior political motive for establishing such centre which was way beyond the teaching of the way of Islam but used the school and mosque as recruitment centres (Agbibo, 2013). Yusuf before he was captured argued that Islam was well established in their land before colonialism which came and turned it into a land of infidels (Kafir).

Furthermore, the broader ambitions of the sect is to become a key political and economic player and at the same time a global jihadist movement. In some of their key remarks, the group sees itself as an upshot of al-Qaeda which it aligns and respects. In

2009, the Boko Haram declared their support for Osama Bin Laden and promised to obey his directive till Nigeria is totally Islamized (Vanguard, 2009). Boko Haram sect has participated in fight in Mali alongside an affiliated group to al-Qaeda.

They have also gone to train and fight with the Somalian terrorist group Al-Shabaab. Being part of the global terror organization or network, Boko Haram members are currently fighting alongside the jihadists of Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the group has pledged its loyalty to al-Qaeda to fight for Islamic state in West Africa. Becoming member of the global jihad network has made the Boko Haram insurgency a stronger, better organized, trained and equipped terror organization.

Boko Haram in the past used to financially depend on donations from members. It was revealed by an arrested member of the sect in 2012 that due to its link with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), the sect has more sponsorship financially and supplies from groups in UK, Iran, and other financial sources such as Al Muntada Trust Fund and donations from wealthy individuals in the Middle East (Agbiboa, 2013). A spokesman of Boko Haram disclosed that former Governors of Kano and Bauchi states Ibrahim Shekarau and Isa Yuguda placed members of the Boko Haram sect on salary. The group also finances itself through bank robbery. It was reported by a source in Central Bank of Nigeria that Boko Haram carried out over 30 bank robberies in 2011 alone (Aziken, 2012, Leigh, 2011, Onu, 2011).

Given the spate of attacks, suicide bombings and shootings being carried out by the Boko Haram on almost daily basis around Maiduguri and other major cities unabated, the prospect for human security as well as the security of critical infrastructure is

gradually getting to a gloomy stage with serious implications on both Nigeria and the international community (Daily Post, June 8<sup>th</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017; July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Since Boko Haram terror group is now linked to the global jihadist movement and have cemented their relationship with al-Qaeda and ISIS, it therefore means the whole of Africa as a continent is under siege and not only Nigeria with the largest population and economy is threatened (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Walker, 2012; Onuoha, 2010). The terrorists in Boko Haram kitty operate with sophistication of attacks and tactical maturity in pattern similar to those in Somalia by the al-Shaabab, the al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and the ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Furthermore, what has also made the security situation of Nigeria very dicey and complicated within the fourth republic is especially the Boko Haram crisis which has lingered for over seven years unabated and without a defined trace to their supply source, sponsors and links within and outside Nigeria. The governments of the Federal Republic over the years have been relying heavily on the repressive approach by the security forces in arresting the security challenges without yielding the needed results. Odomovo (2014) argues that for insurgency to be effectively countered, heavy reliance on military repression would not do much. All out military action against insurgency is too conventional. To him, in an asymmetrical conflict as the case of the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram, 'targeting intelligence' is critical to be able to distinguish an insurgent from a neutral person.

To be able to carry out a successful counter fight against the insurgents and minimize the casualty on the side of troops, military campaigns must be done along with effective and accurate intelligence. According to Cronin (2015:91), the U.S. was able

to effectively degrade al Qaeda's core leadership both home and abroad through aggressive combination of drone strikes and Special Forces raids based on intelligence. The al Qaeda leadership since 9/11 came under the watchful eyes of the CIA, FBI for years and it is still under their surveillance.

Top and influential political class with some few security experts ill-advised former president Goodluck Jonathan with doctored intelligence just to divert billions of dollars meant for the prosecution of the war against terror in the northern part of Nigeria. In 2014 national budget, the Federal Government budgeted N968billion which is over \$3 billion to mainly prosecute the war on terror. Before the year ended, the government further borrowed \$1b for the fight against insurgency yet the fight was nowhere near the desired results (Leadership 19, 2015).

Nigerian soldiers fighting the insurgents had in the past consistently complained of no modern equipment to face the terrorists who use anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank defence and other deadly weapons such as Rocket propelled grenade launchers, low motivation of troops as well as lack of fuels sometimes to run the vehicles that convey troops. According to Yusuf Alli (The Nation, December 2, 2015), over \$2b arms procurement funds was siphoned by top political leaders of the then ruling party for private use leaving the soldiers with no modern weapons to prosecute the counter terror war.

War against terror needs to be holistic, multi-sectorial and broad-based on the "wideners" view of what security entails and not to be purely military-centric. Mathews (1989) in her view asserts that security should be expanded to include

environmental, resource and demographic issues and not to be left solely to the military. Other scholars such as Booth (1991), Ullman (1983) and Barry Buzan (1991) alluded that security issues should not be totally a military preoccupation but should be broadened to cover other issues nevertheless it must remain state-centric.

According to Buzan (1991), what is required in security is not only to include other issues in tackling security challenges but that it should be 'deepened' and broadened to ascertain what should be secured from the individuals to the global stage. Nigeria has over the years used repressive measures in fighting terrorism since its emergence in the country without much result instead, the scourge keeps increasing and expanding its operational capabilities. Based on the 'widener' principle, the Nigerian state should broaden its fight against terrorism by bringing on the table other options that are political rather than relying only on the military repression.

The Niger Delta region is the coastal swampy part of Nigeria which bears the crude oil that has been running the Nigerian economy over the years. Oil production in commercial quantity started after the discovery of oil in 1956 in Oloibiri in present day Bayelsa state, south-south region of Nigeria. Agricultural activities such as fishing, farming, production of timber, mining were the livelihoods and the predominant economic practices among the people before the discovery of oil. The Niger Delta struggle started from Oloibiri in the region where the first oil production was also achieved. According to Ogbebulu (2009), it is indeed sad to know that despite the huge oil resources exploited from the Niger Delta region covering over 80% of Nigeria's foreign earnings, 75% of the Niger Delta people are still peasants living without the basic needs of life such as electricity, safe portable water, quality and affordable health

care amongst others. Some of the damning consequences of oil exploitation in the oil-producing areas are explained below.

One of the issues of the struggle is that of gas being flared in the Niger Delta, the south-south part of Nigeria (See Appendices E & G). It is the process of burning associated gas which comes with crude oil during oil extraction (Okafor, 2011). In petroleum-producing countries where there is no sufficient investment made in infrastructure to make use of natural gas, gas flaring is used to dispose the associated gas (Justice In Nigeria Now, 2010). It is however sad to note that Nigeria as a huge gas province is also ranked the 2<sup>nd</sup> world gas flarer (Elvidge et al 2009).

The greenhouse gases emitted by Shell Company alone in Nigeria have been estimated to equate emissions from 400000 cars. It has been stressed further that gas flared in Nigeria particularly in 2007 was worth about 1.5 billion dollars (Mlilieudensie, 2010). In a report compiled by Climate Justice Program (CJP), Environmental Rights Act (ERA) and Friends of the Earth in Nigeria; (cited in Okafor, 2011), confirmed that Nigeria emitted over 34-38 million tonnes in 2002; accounting for 5% of all the industrial emissions in the country and 30% of the total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

From the Akpodiogaga and Odjugo, (2010) report, they ascertained that 28% of global emissions come from Nigerian flared gasses. ERA and CJP, (2005) affirmed that gas wasted via flaring in Nigeria is roughly put at 2.5billion cubic feet every day. This is equal to 40% of all African's natural gas consumption in 2001, while the annual financial loss to Nigeria is about US \$2.5billion (UNDP/World Bank, 2004). This act is a massive waste of the God given natural resources to the country.

The flared gas emits large amount of greenhouse gases into the air which depletes the ozone layer or reduce the quality of carbons absorbed from the atmosphere; the flaring of gas releases huge quantity of methane which accompanies carbon dioxide and it is a high global warming potential risk (CJP, ERA & Friends of the Earth, 2005).

The negative consequences of flared gas are enormous and devastating; it causes acid rain which makes the roof to rust, health wise, it leads to asthma, child respiratory illnesses which lead to premature death, chronic bronchitis, blood disorder and also one of the causes of cancer (ERA & FOE, 2008). Another catastrophic challenge is that Gas flaring also affects the fertility of land thereby reducing crop yields. (Bassey, 2008; CJP & ERA, 2005; Federal Ministry of Housing & Environment circular in 1983). For example, cassava plants in closely flared areas decrease in length, weight, starch, protein, ascorbic acid (VitC) (Imevbone & Adeyemi, 1981). The study of Orimoogunje, Ayanlade, Akinkuolie & Odiong, 2010) confirmed that okro and palm plants do not flower, thus do not also yield any fruit. Moreover, the air is equally polluted during gas flaring and oil processing and evaporation.

The impacts on the environment, human and plants are as a result of the harmful and poisonous chemicals such as nitrogen dioxides, sulphur dioxides, volatile organic compound like benzene, toluene, xylene and hydrogen sulphide, benzopyrene and dioxins which are carcinogens and are emitted through gas flaring are unquantifiable both tangible and intangible.

The continuous occurrence of oil spillage and the contamination of water has become a common issue in the south-south of Nigeria. Oil spillage impacts negatively on the

ecosystem by damaging large tracts of mangroves which are very sensitive and reactive to oil. Nigeria mangrove estimated to 5-10% have been destroyed either by settlement or oil (Okafor, 2011). Also, crops and aquacultures are affected through contamination of groundwater and oil, including water which are used for domestic purposes such as cooking, drinking, bathing etc. Offshore spills which usually are greater in size pollute the coastal environments and lead to decline in local fishing production which is the main occupation of the inhabitants and constitute 80% of the protein food in the local communities (Ibaba, 2010).

The estimated barrels which have been spilled since drilling started in 1958 in Nigeria is 9-13 million barrels and from 1970-2000, 7000 million barrels (Baird,2010). Thousands of this spill occur annually in about 2000 sites with thousands of barrels of produced water and drilling mud dumped into water ways causing the environment, land and water to be polluted. Roughly, 60% of these inhabitants depend on the polluted environment for their livelihood and other economic activities, (Bassey, 2008; Amnesty, 2009).

Apart from the pollution, they are also exposed to health hazards such as skin rash, itching eyes, loss of lives through fire outbreaks especially when pipelines are exposed due to vandalization .Major causes of the oil spillage have been summarized to be corrosion of pipelines and tankers (50%), sabotage/bunkering (28%), production operations (21%) and inadequate/non-functional production equipment (1%) (Baird, 2010).Below are some sites of spilled oil on farm land, water and some effects of spilled oil on human property.

The whole environment in the region is constantly polluted with the gas flaring responsible for air pollution, oil spillage which releases toxic chemicals into both the soil and water. These and many other issues such as corruption, bad governance, unemployment and politics of exclusion are the root causes of the Niger Delta militancy. The conflict in the Niger Delta started in the early 1990s as a result of tension between the foreign oil companies such as Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and the ethnic minority groups such as the Ijaws and the Ogonis. These and many ethnic groups in the Delta felt cheated by the activities of the oil corporations within their communities.

According to Ikelegbe (2005), the minority groups of the Niger Delta region have been agitating since the 1950s against marginalization, neglect and the politics of exclusion by the ethnic majority. The agitation snowballed into creation for separate regions for the minority groups which was rejected by the Willincks commission of the then colonial government in 1958. The emergence of oil production at commercial level in 1958 from the region raised the stakes and generated a struggle by the indigenes for the control of the oil resources. This struggle continued through the Nigerian independence in October, 1960s to the military take-over in January 1966.

The agitation and struggle for the control of the oil resources grew through the 1970s, 1980s and by the 1990s, the region was mobilized enough with a vibrant civil society, intense identity mobilization and ethnic nationalism, community activism and youth mobilization to commence active resistance. What actually started barely unnoticed had transformed into mass protest who's content of demands and strategy remained undeterred.

The agitation first resulted more extensively against the multi-national oil companies and then against the Nigerian state. The struggle which began as peaceful protests by members of oil producing communities, graduated to a regime of shutting down of oil facilities and abduction or kidnapping of oil experts, companies' staff, hijack and seizure of helicopters and boats belonging to oil corporations and even stoppage of oil production by the youths, community activists in 1997 and by 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic leadership, about 50 Shell workers had been kidnapped and some released (Arnold, 2000).

The agitators had a clear mission which was, if they were not benefitting from the oil output, then they must stop the oil production. This gave rise to the unemployed youths taking up arms violently in response to state repression and corporate violence as action to compel concessions in respect of self-determination, regional autonomy, resource control, and greater oil revenue benefits. This defines the concept of militancy in the Niger Delta where arms-small arms and light weapons are taken up against oil corporations and constituted authority in order to press home demands such as resource control, self-determination or autonomy amongst others not through the most acceptable and civilized manner.

Today, the situation in the oil producing area has spiraled out of control of the prominent militant groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, Niger Delta people's volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, Niger Delta Vigilantes Force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom. Many criminal groups have taken to the criminality in the region by taking hostage of people

such as politicians, oil workers both expatriates and locals, bunkering, oil pipeline vandalization and the hijacking of oil vessels on the high sea.

The political militant groups are still up in arms even after late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua granted the militants amnesty on 25 June 2009. Due to injustice, lack of accountability, and the pervasive unemployment rate in the region, some of the criminal cult combatants have now metamorphosed into political militant groups taking hostage and demanding for ransom and also unleashing senseless violence on rival groups in the name of Niger Delta struggle (Naagbantou, 2007).

As the devastation in the region keeps worsening, violent protests which lead to militancy keep escalating. The crisis in the Niger Delta is no doubt as a result of oppressive and exploitative activities of the multinational corporations operating in the area and the discriminative policies of governments over the years aimed at marginalizing and keeping the people under control of the central government (Egwemi, 2010). This long period of neglect of the Niger Delta region which most Nigerians refer to as the goose that lay the golden eggs for the Nigerian state is majorly responsible for all the terrorist or criminal activities that are taking place in the region today.

For the people of the Niger Delta, environmental quality and sustainability are fundamental to their overall wellbeing and development. Fishing which is key to their livelihood has been taken away from the people due to the chemical contamination of the waters. According to United Nations Development Programme (cited in Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006), more than 60% of the people in the region

depend on the natural environment for their livelihood. The environmental resource base which sustains the people through agricultural practices, fishing and collection of forest products are their sole sources of food.

The discovery, exploration and exploitation of huge oil and gas in the Delta region has had undesirable impacts on the environment (Tom-Ekine & Larinde, 2010). The Niger Delta has been reckoned to be one of the world most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystems (Nigerian Conservation Foundation, 2006). However, the host communities caught in the web of biting economic deprivation and devastating ecological degradation are resorting to unmitigated violence and intimidation to press home their demands for rapid development of their communities and their economic empowerment as well.

In the light of the above, Babatunde (2010) connotes that government's approach to the development of the Niger Delta region has not been people-centred. However, Umukoro (2014) reveals that the reasons for the inability of government to develop the Niger Delta region are such as corruption, lack of good leadership, lack of political will, mediocrity and non-participation of the people in the design of their social programmes that would benefit them. Projects that were to be completed for the benefits of the people were poorly implemented and even those projects that were completed could hardly function (Aaron & Patrick, 2013).

Isumonah (2012) in his article "Armed Society in the Niger Delta" found out that, it is the lack of development in the Niger Delta that led to the carrying of arms against the Nigerian state. He further revealed that those saddled with leadership in the region

prefer to pay influential personality within the people whom they see as threats to their personal interests rather than engage in using the public resources for the development of the communities and for public good. Resolving the socio-economic, political and environmental issues that led to the carrying up of arms against the state is paramount for any meaningful development to take place in the oil-rich area.

Several authors alluded that, the Niger Delta militants fought for the development of their region which was neglected and underdeveloped as a result of oil exploitation, non-performing government and other issues such as poor leadership, lack of accountability and transparency, poor distribution of infrastructure, corruption, oil spillage which destroyed the land and many others were the reasons that made the Niger Delta militants to fight the Nigerian government which afterwards granted them amnesty during the late President Yar'Adua's led government (Aghedo and Osumah, 2014; Akpabio & Akpan 2010).

Insurgency and Militancy as well as radicalization and terrorism as concepts only became popular in the history of Nigeria towards the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Following Clapham (1997) and for analytical convenience, the comparative mapping is looked at from the following perspectives.

North-eastern cities such as Maiduguri, Yobe, Damaturu and other major cities in the north such as Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Abuja, have been used as the operational bases of the Boko Haram terrorists. The Niger Delta militants on the other hand operate from the creeks and swamps of states like Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Edo, and Akwa-Ibom as their operational bases. One feature common to the camps by the two insurgent groups

is the economic desperation and the alarming unemployment levels of the youths recruited (Nwachukwu, 2011; Suleiman & Karim, 2015). Both Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants in these instances took advantage of prevailing poverty rate, inequality and unemployment in such locations of their emergence.

Boko Haram sect has been involved in the making of bombs, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in places such as Kaduna, Kogi, Kano and Maiduguri to aid their operations having established their factories in those locations of their bases. Furthermore, the Boko Haram have been using women and the almajiris children (Quranic pupils) for bombings with women concealing AK 47 rifles and IEDs under their hijaps or to their bodies caught by an anti-terror group at Bulabulin, Monday market Maiduguri (The Nation, 2013). Women in the Niger Delta struggle were involved in the street protests, occupation of oil flow stations for the improvement of their environmental and socio-economic conditions. However, there has not been any attempt to radicalize any woman by the Niger Delta militants.

The Niger Delta militancy stemmed from the fact that ever since the production of crude oil in Nigeria from the 1950s to date, billions of dollars have been earned but the Niger Delta region where the oil production is carried out is constantly neglected, devastated and plundered. The militant youth are driven by the desire for distributive equity and for the environment to be salvaged (Aghedo & Osumah). The oil companies make billions of dollars on a daily basis from crude sales but the people of the region are left in poverty and penury. This was exactly the root cause of militancy in the Niger Delta region.

Since the Federal Government introduced Amnesty in 2009 for the repentant militants, considerable peace and stability has returned to the region with only a few militants that are still hanging on. The Boko Haram insurgents, on the other hand launched aggressive attacks on government institutions police stations, schools, public worship centres, markets places, motor parks and many others. The Boko Haram insurgents are motivated by the belief that they are fighting a holy war against the promoters of the western civilization which is evil and anti-Islamic. The Hausa translation of the phrase 'Boko Haram' is western education is evil (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Ishaya, 2011).

According to the Borno state Governor Ibrahim Kashim Shettima, the Boko Haram insurgents are better equipped and are far more motivated than the Nigerian military (Leadership, 18 February 2014). The major similarity here is that both groups have foot soldiers that are essentially unemployed and impoverished. In addition, the Boko Haram insurgents are made of youth from different nationalities in the northern part of Nigeria such as the Kanuri nationality, Hausa, Fulani and other illegal immigrants of other countries such as Sudan, Chad, Benin, Niger, Somalia and Mauritania (LeVan, 2013; Sora, 2012). The Boko Haram insurgency also has a link with al-Qaeda and ISIS while the Niger Delta militants are majorly of the Ijaw nationality extraction and it is restricted to the Niger Delta region.

Both Boko Haram and Niger Delta groups claim responsibility of attacks through very organized and central media releases after an attacks has been successfully launched (Agbo, 2011). Their attacks are with targets though differently. The Boko Haram insurgents target both soft and hard targets such as worship places, motor parks, market places, Banks, Traditional institutions, viewing centres, security check points, public

institutions like schools, police stations, United Nations building, military and police barracks.

The Niger Delta militants target mainly oil installations, oil platforms, pipelines, oil vessels. Both groups are sophisticated in their deployment of weapons. Given the level of discipline, skills at arms and sophistication in operation by the Boko Haram for instance in their own attacks, one can only deduce that these insurgents definitely must have been trained by a more organized terrorist groups like ISIS, and al-Qaeda.

Above all, in terms of their mode of operation, the Boko Haram created a “state within the Nigerian state” with a ‘supreme’ cabinet who takes decisions, with own religious police and specialized arms such as the assault arm, medical arm, administrative and logistics amongst others. How has Boko Haram grown so sophisticated within this short period of 8 years given its religious posturing to becoming so great a threat to the national security of the Nigerian state and her neighbours?

From the foregoing review, the Nigerian state since her return to democratic rule in 1999 after many years of military rule is plagued with so many challenges that are threatening to her national unity and development. The most threatening of these challenges is the drive for power by the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents. Oluwaniyi (2010) observed that, such threats arose from the Niger Delta militants who sought for the economic recovery, emancipation and development of the oil region after 50 years of environmental degradation as a result of oil exploitation, gas flaring and chemical pollution of the environment.

The resultant effect of this damage to their environment and the ecosystem is the clamour for autonomy, resource control and immediate socio-economic improvement of the lives of the people. That citizens who are from the oil-producing areas be allowed to rule Nigeria at the centre as demanded by the Niger Delta militant leader Asari Dokubo and the consequent formation of militant groups who use violent means to express the demands of the poor oil communities (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014; Oluwaniyi, 2010).

However, literature covering militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria dwell more on the long-time neglect of the region (Oluwaniyi, 2010). There are other studies covering lack of good governance, corruption, poverty, inequality and lack of accountability on the part of leaders across all levels (Akpabio & Akpan, 2010; Forest, 2012). Other literature such as Ikelegbe (2005) sees the underdevelopment and the socio-economic woes of the oil bearing region on the 'minority status' of the people of the region since they are not part of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria. This minority connotation has brought neglect and longtime marginalization of the people of the region. Babatunde (2010) sees lack of people-oriented government approach, insincerity to the consequences of oil exploitation as being responsible for the violent uprisings in the oil producing area of Nigeria.

Scholars such as (Pape, 2005; Krueger & Malekova, 2002, 2003) seem not to agree with the view that it is poverty that causes terrorism especially in the case of Boko Haram where some of the members are children of wealthy Nigerians. Burgoon (2006) posits that where there are checks and balances, quality and compulsory education as well effective social security within a system, crimes and terrorism will be

checkmated. As can be seen above, there is no consensus on the real cause of the current security challenges facing Nigeria. The question that comes to mind is if these terrorist groups are playing the international conspiracy game in collaboration with some powerful nations or non-state actors to bring down Nigeria? Or are they internally orchestrated by powerful economic and political establishments to undermine the security of the Nigerian state, government and the citizens? As a result of lack of consensus of the real causes of the current security threats to Nigeria-be it internal or external, this study seeks to partake in the debate by offering an alternative explanation through a look at the quest for power by the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria's fourth republic as the real threat to Nigeria's national security.

Further review of scholars' perspectives on the key issues under study are presented in **Annex A**.



### **2.3 Theoretical Framework**

The emergence of violent insurgent groups in Nigeria's fourth republic (1999-date) clearly shows that there is an inherent weakness in the political, economic and other institutions of the state. Such implosions within the state as expressed by Wole Soyinka (cited in Warner, 2012:38) are clear signs that the Nigerian state is at a watershed in its corporate existence as a nation. Political development in Nigeria and her national security is at a critical stage especially where threats to state security and stability are not promptly tackled as they should but politicized to the point that violence becomes eminent. Weaknesses of the national institutions such as the police, other security

services and the various arms of government (legislature, judiciary and the executive) are exposed to security challenges that seem insurmountable.

To explain those issues that motivate the emergence of militant insurgency in Nigeria, this study made use of the following theories: The Frustration-Aggression and Relative Deprivation Theory (Dollard et al. 1939; Gurr, 2002) and the Failed-State Theory (Rotberg, 2002, 2003).

### **2.2.1 The Frustration-Aggression and Relative Deprivation Theory**


According to Gurr (1970), Relative Deprivation expresses the perceived tension between the actual value and what actors feel they should be able to achieve. He asserts that there is a “perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities” (1970:35). To Gurr, a widened gap between the expectations and capabilities of citizens would always generate discontent. The scope and intensity of Relative Deprivation determine to a very large extent the potential for collective violence.

The theory explains how deprivation of political, social and economic goods as well as inequality within the society bring about frustration and aggression which ultimately give rise to violent outburst among citizens. Deprivation takes place when value expectations is greater than value capabilities. Gurr categorizes values to include security of lives and properties, self-actualization, welfare of citizens, political inclusion and participation, economic benefits amongst others. Bad and corrupt leadership begets aggressed followership.

The frustration-aggression thesis also succinctly explains the frustration of the Boko Haram members after the killing of their founding leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Their frustration as a result of the gruesome killing of Yusuf and the arrest of hundreds of other key members elicited the subsequent violent attacks and the bombing of public places by the sect members. Gurr (1994) asserts that a group (be it religious, political or economic) is frustrated when it feels marginalized real or perceived.

It is argued that people that are with strong identity, severely impoverished, denied basic needs where other members of same society live in opulence naturally become aggressive and react violently. When people are deprived of the basic security and other necessities of life, it breeds tensions which ultimately result in violence. Based on the above, one can hypothesize that there is a strong relationship between bad governance in Nigeria and the rapid upsurge in terrorist activities in the country. Therefore, militancy, insurgency and other terrorist acts in Nigeria are largely fuelled by inept and corrupt leadership which leads to relative deprivation especially within the fourth republic. Also, where politics of domination and exclusion is played, it gives rooms for violent quest for political power and inclusion.

The theory is best explained in relation to Nigeria's national security with the aid of *Figure 2.1* below. The militant insurgents emerged as a result of the near absence of governance, corruption, lack of infrastructure, environmental pollution and political exclusion of people in areas such as the North-eastern Nigeria and the Niger Delta region which are the strongholds of the groups.



*Figure 2.1 Diagram represents the Frustration-Aggression Model of the insurgents in Nigeria (Prepared by: Researcher, 2017).*

Figure 2.1 above illustrates those factors responsible for the national security challenges confronting the Nigerian state in the fourth republic. Factors such as oil-induced pollution of the environment, bad governance, political exclusion, ethnicity, poverty, unemployment and weak institutions triggered the frustration that has brought about the violent aggression which threatens Nigerian's national security.

### **2.2.2 Failed State Theory**

According to the theory, state exists primarily to provide for citizens living within its territory a decentralized delivery of political goods such as security, infrastructure, employment, social services amongst others. The state has that responsibility and it is a must that it provides the basic legitimate needs or concerns of the citizenry within its borders (Rotberg, 2003).

According to Rotberg (2003:2), the success or otherwise of nation states depends on how effective they are in delivering the most critical political goods to their citizens. This dimension brings about distinction between strong and weak states, weak and failed or collapsed states. To Rotberg, political goods are those claims that are intangible and difficult to quantify that the citizenry make of the state. Such goods are imaginable obligations and expectations that are spontaneous in the enhancement of the social contract between the government and the citizens.

Of the hierarchy of political goods, none is as critical as human security (Rotberg, 2003:3). According to the failed state thesis, the best individuals or group can do for themselves is to purchase goods/services that will afford them maximum sense of private security. That is, individual(s) cannot easily replace private security for the general or wider collective security. That states are obligated to provide public security in order to prevent trans-border crimes, invasion, trafficking, and infiltrations as political goods. Rotberg asserts that states are to also ensure that domestic threats to the national order and social structure of the society are eliminated.

The failed state thesis further postulates that the delivery of other important political goods are equally desirable and possible only when there is a sustained national security. That citizens should be allowed the liberty to participate in the political process freely, and that such processes should be opened and fair to all (Rotberg, 2003:3). Other political goods to be supplied by the states to their citizenries are such as quality education, sound medical services, and sound infrastructural bases for quick economic development and advancement.

The state in the eyes of its loyal citizens loses its legitimacy and the loyalty of its citizens as soon as it cannot carry out the supply of the above critical political goods. The ultimate outcome of it all is that except the state realizes early to provide those desirable and necessary political goods as security, quality health care services, basic education, employment, infrastructure and other social services that will guarantee the loyalty of its citizens. Some citizens would switch their allegiance to other non-state actors, radical religious figures, militant leaders or groups who would meet those basic needs the state do not supply the citizens (Rotberg, 2003; Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho, Onapajo, 2015).

The theory notes that strong states perform well on those key areas discussed above, while it is a mixed profile for the weak states which do well in some sectors and perform abysmally in some others. States who perform weaker and weaker within those sectors especially in the security of their territories edge toward failure or collapse. The state should have the ability to regulate its economy, fight corruption and institutional discrimination. Where the state fails to put a thorough check and monitoring on internal insurgency, group grievances and discontents within its borders together with emigration, such a state is said to be a failing state (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho & Onapajo, 2015).

The Fragile States Index (FSI) which used to be called failed states index started in 2005 and has of recent consistently featured Nigeria as a state that is on the brink of collapse haven been categorized among those states that are in the ALERT zone. Nigeria ranks fourteen in 2015 and thirteen on the list of 178 states in 2017 (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho & Onapajo, 2015; Fund for Peace, 2017).

This rating by the American Think Tank (Fund for Peace) made Nigeria closer to countries that are near total collapse. There is no doubt that discontents, political instability, domestic terrorism, inadequate infrastructure, unchecked institutional criminality are a pointer to confirm that Nigeria is on the brink of becoming a failing states if drastic actions are not urgently taken. The Nigerian state is gradually keying into those attributes above that define a fragile state according to the report.

In Nigeria, there has been a grave concern by the extremely poor and the unemployed about the elites who are just about one percent of the Nigerian population but control more than eighty percent of the state resources. The common saying in Nigeria that the law is made for the poor is true to its meaning given the impunity with which the elites flout the law especially where corruption by the elites is rampant and are hardly punished.


The Nigerian political class is unaccountable, self-serving and nontransparent. Campbell (2014) argues that successive Nigerian governments haven't helped cases where a small elitist political class wields so much financial powers that detects and determines political outcomes. There is a wide sense of disenchantment within the populace and the wider majority of the citizens believe that statecraft and the implementation of most state policies are to advance the interests of the few powerful individuals (Mu'azu, 2011).

Therefore, the lingering Niger Delta issue and the persistent attacks being visited on innocent Nigerian by the Boko Haram insurgents in the North-eastern part of Nigeria are only emblematic of the gross failures of successive regimes in Nigeria. These

militant insurgents (non-state actors) who have well informed people among their members exploit the fragile fault lines of lack of trust in government, step in by availing themselves as succours to the impoverished youths and eventually get these youths brainwashed and radicalized. These violent insurgents exploit the Nigerian borders that are porous with inefficient surveillance to smuggle sophisticated weapons and small arms into the country which are used to destabilize the state (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2011).

### 2.3 Research Framework

The research framework explains the link between the theories used in the study.



**Figure 2.2** illustrates the fusion or the link between the theories of Frustration-Aggression and the Failed-State.

Given the gravity of the security challenges posed to the Nigerian state by the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram insurgents especially within the fourth republic, the two theories, that is, the Frustration-Aggression and the Failed-State theories are aptly

linked to explain the intricacy of the security crisis confronting Nigeria today. *Figure 2.2* above depicts the theories with the triggering factors. The bigger and first circle depicts the frustration of the citizens which leads to violent aggression in the society. These frustrations are expressed in the distrust between the state and the non-state forces.

The resultant effects of a frustrated citizenry are kidnapping, assassination, bunkering, and pipeline vandalization, suicide bombing, secession, illegal refining and open confrontation with the state security. Conflict theories have demonstrated over the years that when a group of individuals feel aggrieved due to marginalization which combines with group's strong identity, there would be the likelihood of an outburst of violence against its marginalization perceived or real (Maiangwa et al., 2015; Gurr, 1994).

The Nigerian state has failed her citizen in the area of lack of job creation or mounting unemployment, severe poverty, endemic institutional corruption as depicted in the second circle which altogether are the causes of disaffection or aggression within the citizenry who feel disconnected, abandoned and frustrated. These frustrated citizens find refuge and succours in either religious, social, and other non-state organizations who manipulate them to wage war against the state in the case of Niger Delta and Boko Haram.

Another example was the political introduction and implementation of Sharia in twelve northern states which caused disillusionment among the people and was only seen to be for political interest of the elite class. They introduced Sharia but did not put in

place the mechanism that would have made it work which led to the frustration of the citizens. The frustration of the citizenry here paved way for the emergence of the deadly Boko Haram where there is a gross disconnect between those in government and the governed. Failures by successive government in bringing the dividends of democracy to the citizens gave rise to the emergence of these two and other strong non-state actors who coopt the disaffected members of the society to pursue their agenda. Uzodike and Whetho (2011) establishes that there is a link between rising frustration and disillusionment with radicalization.

#### **2.4 Conclusion**

The study in this chapter has undertaken an extensive review of extant and current relevant literatures on national security, Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency. Those issues at the centre of these concepts were thoroughly reviewed to be able to have a better and wider perspectives of the concepts as they are used in the study. Furthermore, the study suitably adopted the *Frustration-Aggression* and the *Failed State* theories because of their efficacy in fitting exactly into the current security, political and socio-economic realities bedeviling Nigeria today. These theories therefore, have been able to succinctly explain the Nigerian challenges over the years that were not addressed which are today her greatest security undoing in the Fourth Republic.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Nigeria like many other African countries was colonised by the western imperialists. The amalgam called Nigeria today did not emerge from the woods but was put together by the British colonial power through the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914 (Igwarra, 2001). The different and diverse pre-colonial societies and ethnic groups who made up Nigeria today had separate political structures and distinct administrations that were operationally unique before they were forcefully coupled together through a political fiat by the imperial colonial powers under the leadership of the Colonial Governor, Lord Lugard in 1914 (Vanguard, May 11, 2012). The putting together of the northern and southern parts to form Nigeria was not as much a challenging issue left behind by the colonial power as the lack of solid foundation laid for a virile and stable country.

Prior to the putting together of the different societies that make up what is geographically called Nigeria today, there existed organised societies such as the Oyo empire, the Bini kingdom, and others such as the Igbo, Urhobo, Ijaw, Itsekiri and many others in the southern part of Nigeria. While in the northern part were empires and kingdoms such as the Bornu Empire, Sokoto caliphate, the Jukun kingdom. Other

societies that were as well organised in the central part of Nigeria (commonly called the middle-belt or North-central) were the Igala, Idoma, Tiv, Kuteb, Nupe, Epira and a host of others. The southern part of the country had early contact with the western world while northern part through the Trans-Sahara trade had early contact with North Africa Arabs. The bringing together of different empires and kingdoms by the colonial power to form Nigeria without considering their respective differences set the tune for instability experienced today in different parts of the country especially the disintegration threats being experienced by the country today (Gore & Pratten, 2003; Mustapha, 2008; Balogun, 1983). The threats of insecurity that has bedevilled Nigeria today is as a result of the complex nature of the pre-colonial societies which were forcefully put together by the colonialists. Instead of giving room for the precolonial societies to integrate naturally, the colonial power forcefully cobbled those societies together to serve the colonial government (Mgbor, 2013).

The two main kingdoms in the north then, Sokoto Caliphate established by Uthman Dan Fodio through his Jihadist movement that conquered the Hausa city states and the Bornu empire known as the Kanem Bornu empire had early contact with the Arab world and were greatly influenced by Islamic teachings (Osaghae, 1998). These Hausa-Fulani Caliphate and the Bornu Empire were well grounded in their practice of Islam before colonialism. Colonialism came with a civilization that clashed with the civilization already practised in the two most powerful pre-colonial Kingdoms (Sokoto Caliphate and the Kanem or Borno Empire) in the north. The clash of civilizations being experienced in Nigeria today such as the anti-western and extremist religious stance of the Boko Haram insurgency is of a historical significance to this study.

As a result of colonialism, Nigeria presently is a country where millions of people that are multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious co-exist (Isa, 2014). It is further argued that clash of civilizations as a result of colonialism clearly laid the foundations of the socio-political, religious as well as economic clashes in Nigeria today. These crises over the years have metamorphosed into the full security threats Nigeria is passing through today as a nation (Adetiba, 2010). Adherents of Christianity, African religions and Islam have had clashes or unrests for decades within the geographic territory as put together by the colonial powers. This is seen as an underlying cause of the current spate of terrorism in Nigeria (Isa, 2014).

The divide and rule tactics used by the Colonialists to administer the country only bequeathed to Nigeria and Nigerians a faulty federal framework which promotes regionalism and not nationalism (Omotola, 2005). That was the foundation of the ethno-religious and socio-political discontents in Nigeria today (Isa, 2014; Abraham, 1997; Ekeh, 1975). Nigeria, being one of the most recognised and influential nations on the African continent is today plagued and faced with the unsettling challenges of insurgency which has threatened not only its political processes and development but its national security and corporate existence as a sovereign state (Obafemi & Galadima, 2013).

Insurgency is not a new concept in the existence of states but date back to as old as the ancient Greek civilizations and the Roman empires who experienced uprisings, revolts and insurrections from among their subjects against the authority of the state. Insurgency and Terrorism are concepts that are as old as human civilizations. The zealotry rebellion of the first century A.D. led to the death of some powerful

collaborators of the then Roman Ruler (Gus, 2008). The principal objective of insurgency is to challenge the authority of the state and to change or put in place a new political and social orders (Obafemi & Galadima, 2013). The acts of terror in any given region or state are rooted in the historical antecedence of the human and physical environments.

The Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency are the two clear acts of terror traceable to the history of the two regions they operate. The south-south region with the vast oil resources which sustain the Nigerian economy is home to the Niger Delta militants notoriously known for kidnapping of oil workers, bunkering of oil pipelines and other related crimes that are connected to the social, economic and political systems obtained in the area. The north-eastern part of the country which is the birth place of Boko Haram insurgency is adjudged to be a breeding ground for religious extremists based on history (Hickey, 1984; Aghedo & Osumah, 2009).

Delta State former Governor, James Ibori blamed some greedy but influential persons who were sponsoring the kidnapping of persons such as oil contractors, expatriates oil staff for ransom (Omonobi & Okhomina 2003). Abduction and hostage taking of persons are common features of the volatile Niger Delta. The oil rich region is so infested with degrees of criminality and they are not only targeted at the expatriates but other stakeholders such as land developers, road users and the local oil experts as well. Ikelegbe (2005) expressed that the struggle for the control or appropriation of the proceeds of oil in the Niger Delta has witnessed a regime of violence by different armed militia gangs, cult groups who have fought their community elders and local chiefs over the sharing of compensations funds.

**Table 3.1** below shows accounts of kidnapping and abductions in the Niger Delta within the period indicated.

Table 3.1

*Selected Cases of Abductions/Kidnapping for Ransom (2002–2014)*

S/N	Action/ Date	MNC/Oil Servicing Co.	Youth Group/Ethnic Group/State	Ascertained Purpose	Outcome
1	Hostage taking of 10 workers/ April 2002	Shell	Militant Youth Gang,  Ekeremor LGA, Ijaw/ Balyesa State	Ransom Demand for NGN 3.1m.	Resulted from failure to yield to alleged frivolous demands.
2	Kidnap of staff/ June 29– July 2003	Oil Servicing Co. working for Shell	Ijaw youth militants in Bomadi/Burutu LGAs/ Delta State	Demand for NGN 25.4m	State Government Intervention/ Negotiated release after 14 days.
3	Kidnap of 14 workers/ November 2003	Chevron Texaco	Militant Ijaw youths/ Bayelsa State	Ransom demands	Intervention of State Government.
4	Kidnap of 19 oil workers	Nobel Drilling/Pros pecting.	Ijaw Militias/ Delta State	Ransom demands	Intervention of State Government.
5	Kidnap of 7 workers/ November 28– December 2003	Bredero Shaw Oil Servicing Co. (Shell)	Militant Ijaw Youths/ Delta State	Ransom demands for USD 5m.	State Government Intervention/ Negotiation.
6	Murder of 7 workers & military personnel/ April 2004	Chevron Texaco	Militant youths along Benin River area/ Delta State	--	--
7	January  11, 2006	Shell offshore E.A.oilfield	Kidnapping of four  (4) foreign workers  from an offshore platform.	Demanded for money	Militants free  hostages on January

					30 but threaten new wave of attacks.
8	February 13, 2006	Willbross	Abduction of 9 oil workers	Unconditional release of Asari Dokubo by militants	February 18 2006, 9 abducted expatriates were release
9	March 11, 2006	Saipem	Kidnapping of 3 oil workers	To extort money from the company	Released 12th March, 2006
10	June 2, 2006	Olsen Energy	Abduction of 8 oil workers	To extort money from the company	Hostages are Released days later
11	June 7th, 2006	Shell	Kidnapping of 5 south Korean contractors	To extort money from the company	Released months later
12	July 6, 2006	Shell	Kidnapping of 1 Dutch oil worker in Bayelsa state	To extort money from the company	Released 4 days later
13	August 4, 2006		Abduction of 3 Filipino oil workers	Unconditional release of Asari	Released 10 days later
14	August 24, 2006	Saipem	Kidnapping of 1 oil worker in Port Harcourt	To extort money from the company	Release 5 days later
15	October 3, 2006	Exxon Mobil	14 oil worker kidnap in Port Harcourt	Unconditional release of Asari Dokubo	All of them released on October 21, 2006
16	November 2, 2006	Petroleum Geo-services	4 oil workers	To extort money from the company	Freed on November

			kidnap in Bayelsa a state		7, 2006
17	December 7, 2006	Saipen	Kidnapping of four oil workers in their residential facility	To extort money from the company	Released 12 days later
18	January 5, 2007	Shell	Kidnapping of 5 Chinese Telecom workers	To extort money from the company	Released on January 18, 2007
19	January 10, 2007	South Korea Daewo Engineering & construction	Kidnapping of 2 oil workers	To extort money from company	Freed on January 12, 2007
20	January 25, 2007	Shell	Kidnapping of 9 Chinese oil company workers		They were released February 4, 2007
21	May 1, 2007	Saipen	Abduction of 6 oil workers		Released the next day
22	September 9, 2008	Shell	28 oil workers were kidnapped and their vessel hijacked by MEND	To extort money from shell oil company	Release after ransom was paid
23	January 21, 2009	MT Meredith	1 Romanian oil worker in Nigeria was kidnapped	Demanded for ransom	Released after ransom
24	April 16, 2009	Rotary International	One Canadian Rotary worker was abducted	Demanded for ransom	Released after ransom was paid
25	January 12, 2010	Netco Oil Company	4 oil workers were kidnapped Port Harcourt	Demanded for ransom	Released after ransom was paid
26	April 11, 2010	Total Nigeria Ltd	A Nigerian employee of Total	Demanded for ransom	Released after ransom was paid

			was kidnapped		
27	November 17, 2010	M/V C- Endeavo	3 sailors were abducted by militants	Demanded for ransom	Released after ransom was paid
28	December 17, 2012	SP Brussels	Five Indian sailor were kidnapped by MEND	Demanded for ransom from company	Released after ransom was paid
29	June 4, 2013	Chevron	4 chevron workers were kidnapped	Demanded for ransom from company	They were released after ransom was paid
30	August 17, 2013	Commission er's wife	A female civil Servant-wife of a commissioner in Rivers state was kidnapped	Demanded for ransom	Ransom was paid by the family
31	August 25, 2013	Anglican church	Anglican priest was kidnapped in Port Harcourt	Demanded for ransom	Released without money
32	February 2014	Federal government	Pa Nengite Nitabai uncle to the president Goodluck Jonathan was kidnapped in Bayelsa state	Demanded for ransom	Released after government intervention

**Source:** Ikelegbe (2005) *cited* Williams (2000); Agency France-Presse (2003); Nwamarah (2014).

### **3.2 Niger Delta Militant Trends**

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria which is today politically referred to as the south-south zone is comprised of states such as Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo and Rivers. The region produces the bulk of the oil resources which sustains the Nigerian economy since the discovery of crude oil. Prior to the discovery of oil in 1956, there had been search for the black gold by a German oil prospecting company around the south-western coastal area in 1908 which was before the amalgamation in 1914. They could not get oil until in 1956, when Shell Oil Company discovered oil in commercial quantity at Oloibiri, presently in Bayelsa State.

There was relative calm in the whole country under the colonial power before oil was discovered and agriculture was the mainstay of Nigeria. Nigerian political and social landscape changed after oil was discovered. As a result of negative environmental consequences from oil exploitation in the Niger Delta area, the people of the area at the beginning of oil production saw their environment and means of livelihood being destroyed before their very eyes without any direct and tangible returns or investment for them to be re-engaged in place of their lands taken away for oil production (Eweje, 2006).

The revolt in the Niger Delta by the youths especially youths from those communities with oil wells and installations is driven by the high level of political and socio-economic deprivation occasioned by the exploration and exploitation of oil by the oil multinationals operating in their communities. These multinational oil firms in collaboration with top government officials defy all environmental safety standards

and breach the rules guiding their operations as long as their interests and stakes are protected.

According to Oluwaniyi (2010), these deprivations that brought untold hardship on the people such as marginalization, inequality, poverty has brought with it youth militancy which started from merely community non-violent protest. Their protests transformed from petition writing to community-wide protests to full-blown militancy today where lethal weapons and small arms are now used with deleterious consequences.

Idemudia and Ite (2007) concurs with the view expressed above wondering why the oil-rich region should be so engulfed with so much violent conflicts for decades with little results instead of being one of the most developed parts of the country. Idemudia and Ite sum up their views about the violent trend in the oil delta region of Nigeria as thus:

*...that political and economic factors are the root causes of conflict in the Niger Delta, with environmental and social factors as the proximate and trigger causes, respectively. Given the nature of the relationship among the myriad factors responsible for the conflict, what is required is a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution that pursues development in the Niger Delta on the basis and principles of social, economic and environmental sustainability (Idemudia & Ite, 2007).*

Ikelegbe (2006) pointedly stressed that the crisis situation in the Niger Delta today did not come as a surprise but it came as a result of deliberate ploy to keep the region perpetually under the economic and political manipulation of the ethnic majority elites. He places the blame for the insecurity, communal crisis and militarization in the region on the door steps of the governments.

Ikelegbe (2006) further contends that the increasing and scary trend of militia and militant activities in the oil producing region was in the first place promoted by the deep resource and economic crises resulting from oil production in the area. The end-product of militancy in the region is devastative and unquantifiable to the economy, security agencies and the region as a whole. The study sees and holds loss of focus, ineffective and inefficient control as well as the infiltration of the political leaders, greed and lack of confidence in the political leadership in place as turning the protesting youths into armed and violent militants.

### **3.3 The Struggle for Resource Control and Secession**

At the root of the militancy in the Niger Delta lies the struggle for the emancipation of the ethnic minorities of the oil bearing region of Nigeria. Their struggle is anchored on self-determination and the freedom to control 'their God-given resources'. The creation of Nigeria by the colonial powers made so many ethnic nationalities within the Nigerian state minorities in relation to other ethnic groups that have larger population (Obi, 2009). Obi further asserts that the institutionalization of power and revenue sharing based on regional considerations give credence to politicization of regional and ethnic identity (Obi, 2009:114).

Based on such institutionalization of sharing of the national cake formula, those ethnic groups with minority status are at disadvantage of losing out by getting smaller share of the national resources compared with the so-called ethnic majorities such as Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba who control power and resources at the national level. Those in the minority category are ethnic groups such as the Ijaw, Tiv, Nupe, Kalabari, Efik, Ibibio, Kuteb, Jukun, Bachama, Urhobo, Itsekiri and a host of others.

After the civil war ended in 1970, oil which had taken over from agriculture as the main source of revenue to the federal government now defined the fiscal basis upon which the Nigerian state operated. The fight for the control of the oil resources of the Niger Delta did not end with the attempt by the Igbo to take over the oil fields, the federal military government through Decree No. 51 of 1969 and No. 9 of 1971 established a federal monopoly over the oil resources in order to centralise full control of the oil revenues (Obi, 2008; Ako, 2010).

For decades beginning from the 1970s, oil accounted for over 80% of revenues accruing to the federal government and 90% of foreign exchange earnings. This brought the revenue derivation principle to an ugly end where those states producing oil having their 50% 'share' of the total revenues generated from oil based on revenue allocation principle of derivation dropped to 1.5% from 1966 to 1990s (Obi, 2009; Fasano-Filho & Wang, 2002).

Criminality in the Niger Delta reached a feverish level between the 1990s and 2007. Conflicts between the oil communities and the multinational oil corporations escalated in the 1990s where the news went beyond the shores of Nigeria through the international media. Shell Petroleum Development Company has been known for its notoriety in polluting the environment through oil spillage. The clash between the oil communities and Shell in Ogoni land led to the emergence of different organised civil societies as resistant groups. Clear examples were anti-Shell oil protests carried out by the Ogoni people which was spearheaded by 'Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).

These protests were so intense and cut across the Niger Delta oil communities on a wider scale. With strong international censure or disapproval of the activities of Shell, it withdrew operations from the Ogoni land in 1993 (Groves, 2009). In 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a leader and co-founder of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) through the instrumentality of Shell was hanged by the military regime of General Sani Abacha. The killing of this Ogoni activist and eight others did not stop the agitation of the Niger Delta people against the unfriendly activities of the multinational oil companies (MOCs) especially Shell (McLuckie & Mcphail, 2000). The derivation percentage was increased from 1.5% to 13.5% when Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999. This increment was due largely to the international outcry and the continuous protests witnessed in the Niger Delta against the marginalization of the local Niger Delta communities such as the Ogonis, Ijaws, Okrika, Itsekiri who were seen as minority ethnic groups (Obi, 2009; Frynas, 2001).

The increase in the derivation was also to demobilize the activists and protesters and co-opt their leaders to the side of the government of the day in order to create an enabling environment for the oil industry to thrive. This and other efforts were made by the then democratic government to stem the tide of militancy in the region but it only yielded a negative result of more restiveness in the region. As a result, organised protests in the region gradually transformed into full militarization of the Niger Delta with kidnapping, bombing and destruction of critical oil installation across the region.

### **3.4 The International Dimension of the Niger Delta Militancy**

The United States Institute of Peace (2009) in its special report described the violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria which produces the bulk of the Nigerian oil as

bloody. The report has it that the unrest in the troubled region of Niger Delta should not be seen by the international community as a Nigerian problem alone. However, kidnapping, bunkering, car bombing and all the violent insurgency going on in the region requires international efforts since it involves not only local Nigerian oil players. Attacks against the oil industry by militants in the Delta creeks got to its peak around 2003 to 2007 and it resulted in an increase in the global price of crude (Matt, 2008).

Nigeria by its constitution has only four public refineries but has thousands of illegal refineries in the oil-rich delta whose products are not traded within Nigeria but to other parts of Africa, Europe, North America and Asia (Ikelegbe, 2006; Ugor, 2013). This stolen crude is imported back into the country through neighbouring countries such as Benin, Niger, and Ivory Coast with the instrumentality of oil importing company networks.

It is reported that several Nigerian oil importing companies, and companies registered in Switzerland, United States and other countries engage in this illicit trade of stolen oil (Insider Weekly 21 Nov 2003; Ikelegbe, 2006). Foreign nationals such as Romanians, Russians, Togolese, Burkinabe, Ivoirians, Chinese and Filipinos are being prosecuted for illegal crude oil theft. Some of these foreign nationals conspired with the youths of the oil rich delta not only to circumvent the multinational oil companies but the Nigerian state as well. (Oni, 2004).

A Nigerian Federal High court conviction of foreigners; five Filipinos, four Bangladeshi nationals for crude oil theft in 2015 was upheld on the 17<sup>th</sup> of July, 2017

by a Federal court of Appeal sitting in Lagos, on the 17th July, 2017. These foreigners were convicted and sentenced to a jail term of five years each with an option of five million Naira payable for each count. The Nigerian Navy arrested their vessel, Mt Asteris with its crews during routine patrol in Lagos while exporting stolen crude (Channel, July, 17, 2017; Vanguard, July 18<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Other foreign nationals caught siphoning crude oil into a vessel MT TECNE were one Nigerian, two Pakistanis, three Ghanaians, one Indonesian, one Beninese and two Ukrainians by the Nigerian Navy at Focados River, Delta state, Niger Delta, Nigeria. These foreigners were caught siphoning the crude oil from Shell Petroleum and Development Company platform at in Afremo. They had siphoned about 2000 metric tonnes before they were caught by the Navy (Premium Times, 26<sup>th</sup> April, 2017).

The quantum of crude oil traded illegally both locally and internationally is huge. According to the United States Institute of Peace Special Report (2009), the exact amount of crude oil stolen from Nigeria's Niger Delta daily is not known, but is put somewhere between 30,000 to 300,000 barrels per day. This is really worrisome and an inestimable loss to Nigeria to the tune of US\$100 billion from 2003 to 2008.

### **3.5 Historical background of Boko Haram terror in Nigeria**

Nigeria's return to civil rule has seen a number of security challenges connected with militancy, robbery, kidnapping, political assassinations, arms proliferation, piracy as well as ethno-religious conflicts. However, the violent eruption of Boko Haram unrest in July 2009 signaled new security challenges in the country (Afeni, 2013). Though,

the Boko Haram insurgency is a north-eastern Nigeria-based radical group, presently the phenomenon has become well rooted in Nigeria and her environs. The dreaded group has killed thousands of innocent people. Recently more than 2,000 people in Baga and surrounding villages were heartlessly put to death by the jihadist group.

Militant religiosity in northern Nigeria is traceable to the jihadist invasion of the far northern part of Nigeria by Sheik Uthman Dan Fodio (1754-1817). Sheik Uthman launched an Islamic war (jihad) against the Hausa society which according to him was ungodly and having corrupt elites. He was successful in his invasion and conquered a greater part of the north having established an Islamic Caliphate in Sokoto which was strictly governed by the sharia justice system and became the most powerful and the largest empire in sub-Saharan Africa (Hickey, 1984; Agbiboa, 2013).

Agbiboa (2013) also pointed out in his argument that the conquest and the subsequent take-over of Sokoto Caliphate by the British colonialist in 1903 resulted in a clash of civilizations and exposed the region to the corrupting influence of a secular state or power. This 'corrupting influence' of the western values brought about by the British conquest of the Caliphate ensued a sharp resistance which has lingered over the years especially the resistance to western education and modernism (Marchal, 2012; Falola, 1998).

Furthermore, the Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s in Maiduguri, Kano, Yola and other cities in the north was inspired by the conservative Islamic practice that had been deeply rooted in the region over the centuries. Spearheaded by Mohammed Marwa, from Marwa in northern Cameroon who migrated to Kano, a northern city in Nigeria,

the Maitatsine was anti-western modernization and democratic advancement which was clashing or corrupting their ideals. Falola (1984:146) describes Mohammed Marwa as a fiery Islamic preacher whose message was persuasive, charismatic and forceful. He was outright in his message against the corrupting influence of modernization on Islam and the formation of modern state.

He was opposed to many popular Islamic clerics in Kano as at the time who only drew to himself urban poor and the 'Almajirai' who were young Quranic students who earned their daily living from street begging and alms. His message denounced the elites and politicians who were seen as infidels as long as they were living in affluence and were westernized in their attitudes. This message attracted a large cache of urban poor.

The group also saw technological advancement such as wrist watches, radio, motorcycle, cars as well as bicycle and people who read books other than the Quran as evil. The extreme stance of the radical Maitatsine in the northern city of Kano brought them into a violent clash with the security operatives which led to the death of 4,177 in 1981. The Nigerian military was able to crush this uprising and their leader was killed (HRW, 2012; Lubeck, 1985).

Studies such as Agbiboa, 2013; Marchal, 2012; Falola, 1998; Aguwa, 1997 attribute the current waves of radical extremism to the teachings and radical preaching of some popular and notable religious scholars in the north such as Sheik Abubakar Mahmud Gumi (1922-1992), Sheik Ibrahim El-zakzaky. Renowned to be the most distinguished

religious scholar, Sheik Gumi canvassed for the establishment and implementation of sharia courts across Nigeria.

Aguwa (1997: 338) in his work 'religious Conflict in Nigeria: Impact on Nation Building' asserts that Sheik Gumi once declared that 'you cannot choose a non-Muslim as a leader once you are a Muslim. To Aguwa, the above declaration and other pronouncements by the Sheik radicalized many which created tensions between adherents of the two major faiths in Nigeria. Aguwa (1998) argues further that the burning of eight Christian Churches in 1982 in Kano by extremists through the instrumentation of radical ideas and teachings, signaled the genesis of religious war in Nigeria. Investigations revealed that the violence must have been caused by religious literature on Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 that were imported into the northern city of Kano was responsible for the radicalization of some Muslim youths.

Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, there has been a growing demand for the full implementation of Sharia not just across the core northern states of Nigeria such as Sokoto, Kano, Bauch, Katsina, Zamfara, Borno and others but across Nigeria. With the return of democracy in 1999 in Nigeria, the then Zamfara state Governor, Ahmed Yarima introduced sharia law in his state in 1999 when he became the executive Governor. The Governor proclaimed that whoever leads or administers a state not based on sharia principles is not a believer.

Another perspective is, the implementation of sharia in Zamfara state resonated in eleven other northern states such as Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Bauchi, and others which sparked violent protests across those states where the political sharia was implemented.

It was soon discovered that the northern politicians who themselves were professing Muslims only adopted sharia to fulfill their political campaign promises during electioneering, while themselves were living the exact contrary lifestyles which negated the principles of the sharia justice system (Forest, 2012). Based on the foregoing, there were clear feelings of disappointment among many Muslim youths which Mohammed Yusuf happened to be one. He sought for the restoration and full enforcement of the sharia law as it was before the colonial invasion of the north.

### **3.6 Meaning of Boko Haram**

*Jama'atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da'wati wal-Jihad* is the Arabic name of Boko Haram. The meaning of this in English translates to "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad." Whereas the word **Haram** in Arabic means 'forbidden,' the word **Boko** in Hausa is a corruption of the word 'book' in English. Accordingly, the term **Boko Haram** broadly denotes "Western education is forbidden or evil". The group is strongly against the westernization of education in Nigeria. Although, people of Maiduguri nicknamed it Boko Haram. Putting it another way, the word "Boko Haram" comes from a combination of a Hausa word **Boko** for book which means "western education" and the Arabic phrase **haram** metaphorically connotes "sin" (Ajayi, 2012; Ogbonna, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013).

### **3.7 Ideology of Boko Haram**

Members of Boko Haram claimed to be strong followers of Islam and advocate the imposition of its type of the Sharia form of law. By August 2014, Boko Haram established an Islamic Caliphate in Gwoza, which lies along the Cameroon border. Since then it has been marauding more lands in the northern as well as central part of

Nigeria to expand its ideological influence. With their ideology, in the name of religion, the group has killed thousands of innocent people. Therefore, according to Forest (201) Boko Haram has become a globally recognized terrorist group having proclaimed links with other terrorist groups such as Al- Qaeda especially in the Maghreb and north Africa, Al- Shaabab in Somalia, as well as ISIS.

Boko Haram believes westernization of education and politics is corrupting the minds of young Nigerian men and women. The group therefore, advocates the imposition of Islamic principles and way of life and believes that people who indulge in ideology different from theirs should be made to convert by force to Islam or face death. According to Boko Haram, western education or '*boko*' brought nothing but poverty as well as sufferings to the region and was therefore forbidden, or '*haram*' in Islam. He began peacefully in 2002 mostly preaching and speedily gained followership among disillusioned young men in the northeast until his arrest and death in 2009.

But his anti-establishment speechmaking and hints that Boko Haram was building a stash of weapons also caught the attention of the authorities (Okpaga, Ugwu & Okechukwu, 2012). According to Alozieuwa (2012), the challenge posed by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is not only about ferociousness of either its horror, or the avowed mission to impose Islamic law to the country but about the confusion regarding the exact causes of the violence.

### **3.8 The Genesis of Boko Haram Insurgents**

The most common account of the origin of the group based on media reports was that the sect was established in 2002 in Maiduguri by Mohammed Yusuf, a fiery and charismatic religious preacher. However, Boko Haram according to the intelligence

community has been present for over two decades since 1995. The group was said to have been founded by Abubakar Lawan with the name *Ahlusunna wal'jama'ah hijra* (Muslim Youth Organization) in Maiduguri, Borno state (Onuoha, 2014). The group's actions in its early years were rather 'peaceful'. Nevertheless, there were warning signs that the group was becoming more aggressive in nature through breaking of laws and orders and total disregards for constituted authorities and seeing public institutions as un-Islamic (Adegbulu, 2013; Forest, 2012). However, those warnings were not heeded by the Nigerian authorities due to negligence. Yusuf's activities mostly attracted students from poor families and was focused on creating jihadists for achieving its aim of establishing an Islamic State.

According to Johnson (2012) Boko Haram had the plan to set up a Sharia administration in Borno State under erstwhile Governor Ali Modu Sheriff. Yusuf established a religious programme that include leading a mosque and running a school where a lot of poor Muslims youths from across northern Nigeria and neighboring countries register their children (Chothia, 2012). Based on this, it can be presumed that Boko Haram was not just concerned in teaching of children from poor families. But also to entrench its political aim which was to form an Islamic nation in Nigeria, thus the group became a conscripting organization for Jihadists to suppress the Nigerian state.

Similarly, Yusuf has been labelled by Paul Lubeck, a University of California Professor who studied Muslim societies in Africa as a conservative. He further asserts that Yusuf wrongly misapplied the teachings of a fourteenth century law scholar (Ibn Tammiyyah) who spread Islamic religious laws very strictly and is regarded today as

a renown religious theorist (Johnson 2012). In his quest for puritanical pursuit and practice of religion, Yusuf derailed into heresy that has been upheld by his ruthless followers.

Some scholars are of the view that Boko Haram is a product of the Maitatsine violence of the 1980s as well as the religious/ethnic nervous strain that came in near the end of 1990s. They argue that given the time lag between the Maitatsine and the Boko Haram insurgency, as long as those socio-political and ideological conditions that gave rise to the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s remain, the Boko Haram uprising did not come as a surprise (Agbibo, 2014; Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Adesoji, 2010).



Figure 3.1 The areas where Boko Haram was active until 2016

Meanwhile, following the 2009 killing of Yusuf, along with a large number of Boko Haram members by the security forces of Nigeria, the group went lull for a period of a year. The sect resurfaced in 2010 more organized, with a more aggressive and noxious attitude, this time under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, less knowledgeable but more dangerously radicalized and deadlier compared to Mohammed Yusuf (Ray, 2016; Oded, 2015; Olaniyan, 2015). Since 2010 onward, the group has carried out several deadly attacks on the Nigerian government, the populace as well as international outfits. Many of these attacks have made headlines worldwide subsequently.

### **3.9 Boko Haram symbols**

As marks of identity and propaganda, the group uses a number of symbols, flags as in addition to printed materials. These range from guns to messages of the Holy Quran. In the sect's flag are two Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles, which are crossed, indicating the fact that the group is involved in an armed struggle to establish the Islamic State and will not abstain from using violence in achieving its goal. The open Quran symbolizes Islamic preaching. Another prominent symbol is the Islamic declaration of faith. The declaration reads "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah". The group is a strong supporter of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (also known as the Islamic State) and has recently started using its flags as one of its symbols.

### **3.10 Funding of Boko Haram**

Boko Haram has been operational since 2009 and until recently when the Nigeria Army decimated and dislodged the group, it has a large number of men and equipment

at its disposal. This highlights the fact that the group has strong finances. Mainly the group use a number of ways to fund its activities. One of the way is getting donations from local and foreign sympathizers, politicians, trafficking cocaine and other forms of drugs. It also kidnaps tourists and demands huge sums of money in exchange for their return. Other than that it is involved in bank robberies and extortion tactics (Agbibo, 2013; Walker, 2012; Forest, 2012).

According to Ikeke (2015) Boko Haram's innermost leadership is security conscious therefore, they use hard-to-track human agents to move cash around Nigeria. Similarly, the group relies on local funding sources and engages in only restricted financial relationships with other extremists groups (Onuoha, 2014; Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). In addition to other sources, there are suggestions that Boko Haram receives support from religious sympathizers within the country, which include some wealthy northern Nigerians who detest the government, although there is little evidence to support that assertion.

### **3.11 Carnages of Boko Haram**

For years Boko Haram had inflicted horrifying destruction on parts of Nigeria, particularly the North East region, but it was the notorious abduction of over 200 school girls from their hall of residence in the sleepy town of Chibok in 2014 that fascinated global attention to the Boko Haram terrorist group. Furthermore, the insurgency became even more complex when a splinter faction of the group later known as Ansaru emerged by kidnapping foreigners (Mac-Leva, 2016). The Ansaru crisis or challenge was a big crack within the sect. The Ansaru group was formed from the main Boko Haram sect due to some sharp disagreement in ideology and operation.

Those on the side of the Ansaru are against attacks on non-combatant as targets by Boko Haram. They are also against killing of fellow Muslim in their operation. However, the mainstream Boko Haram believes any Muslim who is not with them is with the disbelievers (Mohammed, 2014).

According to Ahokegh (2012) it may be very difficult to measure accurately the level and amount of destructions perpetuated by the Boko Harm in relation to lives and properties lost. However, the first target of their attack was Borno State, where series of killings were carried out. For example, on January 28, 2008, Fannami Gubio, Goni Sheriff, the ANPP gubernatorial candidate and younger brother to former Governor Sheriff, and six others were killed by Boko Haram members barely three months after the party's Chairman, Awana Ngala was murdered in his house (Ola, 2011).

Until the group extended its activities to other part of Nigeria, Borno State feel the impact of Boko Haram murderous activities for quite some time. The range of their destruction also extends to the academic institutions as some Nigerian universities were bombed causing heavy destructions and loss of human lives. The first casualty was the Gombe State University, where Akhoragbon (2012) reports the bombing and destruction of the building housing the University Senate. Next was the turn of Bayero University Kano which was bombed on April 29, 2012 (Adamu, 2012). The Nigerian media were also affected when the Abuja office of This Day newspaper was bombed simultaneously with its office in Kaduna alongside that of The Sun and Moments newspapers on April 26, 2012 killing eight persons and destroying several cars (Alli & Adanikin, 2012).




Figure 3.2 Graphical representation of civilian death in Boko Haram attacks between 2010 and 2014

Another dimension taken by Boko Haram was the kidnapping of foreigners when Shekau claimed responsibility for the abduction of a French family of seven in February 2013. That same year Boko Haram was designated a terrorist group by the US, and the following year it declared a caliphate in areas under its control. In 2013, Boko Haram targeted pupils in a series of horrific school attacks in the North East that killed dozens of boys. Later, there were reports that the group was also kidnapping girls and women with the intent of raping them or making them brides.

### 3.12 Conclusion

From the foregoing, this chapter has clearly brought to the fore the historical dimension as well as foundation upon which issues such as ethnic marginalization, resource control, self-determination and anti-westernization derive take their roots.

The chapter has also been able to expose us to the transformation of the Niger Delta struggle from peaceful protest for safe environment for the survival of the ethnic minorities in the region to the militarization of the region. The Niger Delta question today is not only a national security threat but a big issue of international discourse given the importance of the region for global energy. The chapter as well delved into the historical background of how religious extremism evolved in northern part of Nigeria today. It also X-rayed the ethnic, political and the religious environment that allowed for the evolution, development and the radicalization of the Boko Haram sect.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF NIGER-DELTA AND BOKO-HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The world over, insurgents and terrorists emerge and are motivated by certain factors which gear them towards achieving their set objectives. Some of these factors could be as a result of negligence and poor leadership on the part of government towards delivering political goods to their people as obligated by law and promised during electioneering. Insurgency could be motivated due to some lacuna or bias in the constitution of the nation which clearly favours a section of the society against the others. These and many other factors such as economic, environmental, ideological or religious as well as ethnic are capable of creating social discontent which if not checkmated degenerate into full-blown insurgency as is being currently experienced in Nigeria (Islam, 2003; Obi, 2010; Forest, 2012).

This chapter focuses on the motivational factors of insurgencies in Nigeria as reflected in the activities of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents. What are these motivating factors? These factors are such as constitutional bias, government negligence, economic factors, ethno-political, environmental, and ideological factor. The above mentioned factors are said to be the fundamental causes of insurgency in Nigeria and are therefore, dealt with in this chapter four of the research. It would help

us to understand the issues and causes of the Niger Delta imbroglio and the Boko Haram insurgents who took up arms against the Nigerian state.

## **4.2 The Motivational Factors of the Niger Delta Militancy**

The Niger Delta struggle like every other struggle where resources are involved is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with so many hard-to-explain dimensions. Based on this study the following fundamental issues were addressed as those issues that motivated the emergence and sustenance of insurgency in the Delta region of Nigeria.

### **4.2.1 Negligence of Governance**

The escalation in the conflict in the delta region within the last two decades and especially in the fourth republic has no doubt brought the oil belt of Nigeria to the international focus. Successive governments in Nigeria have failed to address the challenges faced daily by the people of the region where the main source of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings is derived from. Rogers and Hall (2003) sees governance as the manner through which allocative and regulatory means are exercised in the administration of available resources (economic, natural, social). Rogers and Hall see the political element of governance as profoundly responsible for balancing the various interests and political realities if high quality political goods must be delivered to the citizenry.

Poor governance such as bad leadership, corruption, lack of quality healthcare delivery, inadequate and poor infrastructure and insincerity on the part of political leaders leads to social and political risks, institutional failure. Such system produces

strong individuals rather than strong institutions. Analysts such as Kauffmann (1999) established a strong causal relationship between better governance and development outcomes such as lower infant mortality, higher per capita incomes, and higher literacy. He further affirmed that effective and good governance entails poverty reduction which will ultimately help the poor to help themselves.

The work of Ladan (2012) attributed bad governance (failed-state ) as the motivating factor for insurgency in Nigeria. When government neglects her role in administering social and economic justice within the system, there are bound to be disquiet within such system which would bring distrust. Where there is no delivery of high quality political goods such as security and safety of lives and properties, accountable and transparent government, adequate social infrastructure, quality and affordable healthcare system, gainful employment for the youth and the larger population.

Other political goods are sound and highly transparent judiciary for quick and just dispensation of justice as promised by the political leaders, it would engender strife which would ultimately lead to violence (Suleiman & Karim, 2015). This has created an enabling environment for insurgency to thrive in the country due to the fact that issues such as poverty, unemployment have not been well addressed within the country's governance system. More so, government itself cannot create hundred percent jobs for her citizenry, however, with the enabling law and secured environment, a vibrant private sector can bring about large employment opportunities.

Courson (2009) views government's failure in addressing equity and social justice challenge in the Niger Delta as one of the motivational causes of the insurgency in the

region. For instance, there has never been any environmental clean-up in the Ogoniland where Ken Saro Wi-wa and eight other activists were hung. Instead of amicable political resolution, these activists were summarily tried and hanged by the Military regime of General Abacha (Pilkingson, 2009; Pegg, 2000; North, 2001). According to the Niger Delta people, oil activities such as spillage and toxic chemicals which are daily released into their environment remains the trigger of the violent agitation. The Ogoni people see lack of effective governance and inadequate control over oil Multinationals as being what paved way for the violent agitation in the Niger Delta. Furthermore, when government fail in penalising erring oil corporations who circumvent their operational guidelines by conniving with unscrupulous bureaucrats to destroy the environment or fail in their corporate social responsibilities to the host communities, it engenders rift.

Marginalization in the Niger Delta whether real or perceived is as old as the agitation by the people. Many scholars such as Badmus (2010), Obi (2010), Watts (2007) and Ukeje (2002) argue that the emergence of an economy of conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta is due to long political exclusion of the people of the region and the consistent marginalization of the people. Osaghae (1995) could not agree less when he described the situation of the Niger Delta people as belonging to the ranks of the most marginalized and backward in Nigeria.

In expressing his view on marginalization of the Niger Delta region, Zoaka asserts that in a situation whereby we have failure of governance such as unfulfilled campaign promises, lack of quality schools, no good roads, unstable electricity, inadequate quality healthcare system and lack of gainful employment for the youths even those

qualified in the Niger Delta. These are some of the indicators that governance is absent at different levels especially at the Local, State and Federal governments. People are left with no other options than to engage in some unwholesome acts or they become ready-made materials for criminals to easily use to discredit the government in power. This is not far from the truth especially of the development within the Nigerian polity when many young able-bodied men and women feel excluded (frustration-aggression trap) in the scheme of things and are seen to be ordinary observers and not part of the decision making process of the state (Zoaka, April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

According to Zoaka (2016), the people have been neglected in the decision making process for too long and the violent reaction was only inevitable. Other aspects that have been neglected by the government of Nigeria over time include, tackling the poverty driven environment of the Niger Delta region. Ahokegh (2012) attributes this issue of neglecting the development of the Nigerian society in that perspective due to poverty of leadership. This could also be referred to as poor leadership crisis in Nigeria.

Good leadership should have taken into consideration the issues that affects the Niger Delta region over the years since the discovery of oil production in the region. A visionary leadership should have had implementable development plans such as 10, 20, 30 year plans in industrializing the region by building small and cottage factories, development of their human capital through establishment of advanced skills acquisition centres. These could have led to the development of the region if the good governance system was not neglected.

Again, on the issue of good leadership which promotes good governance in a given political entity, Zoaka further asserts that where the social and legitimate contract between those in government and the governed is almost absent (demonstrating or affirming the state-failure argument/theory), it breeds dissension since the government does not effectively carry the people along. Where the citizenry loss their sense of belonging, their loyalty to the government of the day would be in doubt. Therefore, the widespread disenchantment against the Nigerian state by the oil producing communities of the Delta derives from the failure and negligence on the part of the state to meet her obligations to the region (Muazu, 2011).

As echoed by Campbell (2014), the Boko Haram movement in northern Nigeria and indeed militancy in the southern region fit into both the failed-state and frustration-aggression conflict analyses as both situations are shaped by a long history of bad governance and extreme poverty. Majority of the Nigerian populace adduce bad governance as the main factor responsible for the insurgency that has engulfed the country. Describing both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram uprisings as by-products of inept administrations since the beginning of the fourth republic (1999-date). The gap between the rich and the poor keeps widening as a result of the disconnection between those in government and the governed (Eregha, 2007). Such a gap creates distrust among the led on their leaders who are seen as unpatriotic.

A clear sign of failure on the part of governments across all levels, Federal, State and Local Governments is their not being able to deliver on their campaign promises to the people. In an instance where a man calls himself a family man and is unable to meet the expectations of his children, of course such a parent will see some unkind reactions

from the children, which is not far from what is happening within the Nigerian system- be it Boko Haram insurgency or the Niger Delta militancy (Zoaka, April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016). Another view on negligence of governance is a look at the function of the state as a sovereign entity. Where it fails to perform such functions as providing adequate security for lives and properties which is its core obligation to its citizens (Rotberg, 2003). In this regard, a state fails when it ceases to perform the normal functions of a state as a sovereign entity. It fails when it loses its coercive sanctions to control through law and order, to guarantee security of lives and property within its boundaries. Once it loses that, it is on the way to failing. So there is what is called failing state and there is also a failed state (Akpa, May 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

The spate of attacks on oil facilities and other critical national infrastructure in the country is emblematic of the pervasive and sustained failure of successive governments which epitomises the state-failure analysis (Uzodike, 2012). It goes to say that governments over the years neglected their core obligation to the people. Lack of accountable and responsive state of governance in Nigeria has been the bane of the insecurity in both the Niger Delta and north-eastern regions of Nigeria (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho & Onapajo, 2012).

There are clear signs and symptoms of state failure especially where one loses its coercive power to control. One of the characteristics of a state should be the monopoly of coercive sanctions within its territorial cover. You have the military and the security wherewithal to control whichever force. The state is supreme over any other entity within the state-within its boundary or territory. Can you imagine even the Niger Delta people giving conditions to the Federal Government? If you don't do this, we will do

this or that, which means the state has lost its monopoly of power. That is what is causing the problem. It is a state failure. The state also fails when it cannot perform some of those functions like regular payment of salaries or even some regular functions of governance (Akpa, May 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

The issue of government providing quality public services to meet the demands of the citizenry is crucial as it can mitigate any tendency of violent conflict. (Rasul & Rogger, 2013) argues that there are critical areas in delivering effective public services to the citizenry. One of such areas is the effective monitoring and accountability of public service providers. Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) confirms that efficient and thorough community based monitoring of public service providers generates accountability and leads to increases in service utilizations. Such monitoring could be bottom-up or top-down in checking the impacts of corruption in public work projects (Olken, 2007; Reinikka & Svensson, 2011). With the help of Freedom of Information (F.O.I) law in place in Nigeria now, the media has a significant role to play in scrutinizing the public services provided (Berliner, 2014; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Besley & Burgess, 2002).

Furthermore, the problem of Nigeria is simply governance. Governance means the ability to administer faithfully, those services that are for the public. Let's have water running, if you vote money for water, let it be done, if you vote money for a road, let the road be constructed. You know there was this slogan during the PDP days – “PDP – share the money”. And they shared the money to the extent that they stopped sharing naira, they started sharing dollars. That's why your naira has collapsed, how can within your own country you disregard your own currency and you go and start sharing

another foreign currency, that's why the naira collapsed. There is lack of elite consensus among the ruling class. The quest for power drives the politicians to arm militia (Akpa, May 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

There is the greater need to have a cordial relationship between the government and the people through good leadership in meeting the demands of the governed. Suleiman and Karim (2015) argues that where there is negligence by the government in providing the basic needs of the people, it forms gap in social and economic equality amongst the people. Their work further argues that this gap has led to many issues such as unemployment, poverty, and lack of employment opportunities within the country. Such issues if not addressed could lead to discontent which would lead to violence within the society.

Rotberg (2004) asserts that issues such as state failure, bad governance and poverty create a linkage that provide an environment for the youths to go into militancy which may further lead to political instability of the society and the country at large. It is also clear that when the government fails to tackle these issues, the youths who are unemployed become available to be used by the politicians as thugs.

No doubt those factors such as oil pollution, high level of discriminatory employment in the mainstream oil sector and the lop-sidedness of the allocation of oil blocs as well as corruption are identified as being responsible for the widening social gap in the region and are responsible for the uprising (Obi, 2009). As observed by Abagen, there are lots of factors that explain militancy and terrorism in Nigeria, especially from the political scientist point of view. However, one should concentrate his energy on those

factors that disconnect the people from the state whether real or perceived. Those who are aggrieved as a result of neglect and abandonment by the state especially the unemployed youths resort to armed violence (Abagen, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2016).

Good governance today is one of the most discussed issues in Nigeria. It is a very “hot” topic due to the critical role it plays in the determination of societal well-being. Attainment of societal well-being, steady growth and development remain elusive until good governance is entrenched as a practice. It is indeed difficult and controversial to define good governance. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has enunciated some governance principles that are of universal recognition. These UNDP principles are categorised into five good governance subheads as identified by Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003). These principles of good governance are best explained in **Table 4.1** bellow.

Table 4.1

*The Principles Of Good Governance*

<b>Box 1: Five Principles of Good Governance</b>	
<b>The Five Good Governance Principles</b>	The UNDP Principles and related UNDP text on which they are based
<b>1. Legitimacy and Voice</b>	<p><b>Participation</b> – all men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their intention. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.</p> <p><b>Consensus orientation</b> – good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.</p>
<b>2. Direction</b>	<p><b>Strategic vision</b> – leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded.</p>

<b>3. Performance</b>	<b>Responsiveness</b> – institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders. Effectiveness and efficiency – processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources.
<b>4. Accountability</b>	<b>Accountability</b> – decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organizations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on the organizations and whether the decision is internal or external. <b>Transparency</b> – transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.
<b>5. Fairness</b>	<b>Equity</b> – all men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their wellbeing. <b>Rule of Law</b> – legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights.

Box 2: Human		Rights Principles and Good Governance
Good Governance Principles	UNDP Principles	
Legitimacy & Voice	Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression...” (Article 19)</li> <li>• Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association” (Article 20)</li> <li>• Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives” (Article 21)</li> <li>• Everyone has duties to the community...” (Article 29)</li> </ul>
	Consensus Orientation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government: this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage...” (Article 21)</li> <li>• In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (Article 29)</li> </ul>

Fairness	Equity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights..." (Article 1)</li> <li>• Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" (Article 2)</li> <li>• Whereas the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world" (Preamble)</li> </ul>
	Rule of Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whereas it is essential ...that human rights should be protected by the rule of law" (Preamble)</li> <li>• All are equal before the law" (Article 7)</li> <li>• Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal..." (Article 10)</li> <li>• No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Article 5)</li> <li>• No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property" (Article 17)</li> </ul>

Source: Graham, Amos & Plumptre (2003), Institute on Governance, Ottawa, Canada.

Former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, in his reflections on the growing global consensus on good governance posits that "good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development" (Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003). The term good governance is key to the development of any country especially those that want to achieve developmental strides in all areas of their socio-economic backgrounds.

To this end, Fagbadebo (2007) posits that good governance is the key to the development of the people and that could also contribute to the stability of the country. Whereas, bad governance and corruption could promote poverty which may breed militancy and insurgency bearing in mind that those who are hungry may take up arms against the government. The work also agrees with the fact that about 70% of Nigerians

are living below the \$1 spending per day which is known to be living in abject poverty based on the World Bank standard.

The work of Ogundiya (2010) reveals that Nigeria as the largest country in Africa whose population size is more than twice that of any other African country, is also known as one of the countries in Africa with highest level of poor people. This forms another gap which could promotes militancy and insurgency. It is also the case of the Niger Delta region where many people are still living in abject poverty irrespective of the fact that the region serves as the basis for oil production in Nigeria. Klitgaard (1998) has it that when there is no corrupt person, there will also be no poor person as the case of the people in a given society. Negligence of governance does not promote stability of the country. Obadan (1998) also views good leadership and economic development as yardstick for national development. Good governance has underlying global principles which often overlap or are at conflict with each other at some point.

The problem of poor governance can only be resolved when people-centred issues are addressed by the government through good governance especially at the grassroots. When people-centred projects are envisioned and are brought into existence at the grassroots, it would provoke patriotism and promote stability of the community or country as the case may be. There is great need for good and accountable governments at all levels of public governance. On a general note, bad governance also explains why we have constant instability in many African countries though with focus on Nigeria. Poor governance could therefore, promote poverty, unemployment of the citizenry, illiteracy, lack of basic social amenities (Akinola, 2000; Moore, 2001).

The Niger Delta question also revolves around the issue of bad governance and the weak states in the South-South region of Nigeria. There are issues such as inconsistent developmental programmes as well as lack of effective governance system within this said region (Osaghae, Ikelegbe & Olarinmoye, 2007; Akpabio & Akpan, 2010). The work of Akpabio & Akpan (2010) further explains that the people of Niger Delta can only be helped when there is effective governance system within the region since poor or bad governance stands as a great barrier to any form of governmental programme for the people even in the Niger Delta region.

Osaghae, Ikelegbe & Olarinmoye (2007) asserts that the reasons for youth's militias in the Nigeria's Niger Delta is due to poor governance mechanism in the region. When there is negligence on the part of the government in developing any region which could as well boost the economic and social welfare of the people, the youths within the said locality being frustrated (as typified by the frustration-aggression theses) could take up arms against the government. Poor governance, bad leadership and negligence on the part of the government becomes tools which could trigger the youths to take up arms as seen in the case of the Niger Delta insurgents.

Poor governance negates the yearnings of the people irrespective of the country as long as the people's needs are not met. Ugoh and Ukpere (2010) agrees that the Niger Delta region has been neglected for a long time in as much as the same region produces the country's largest source of foreign income. These communities in the Niger Delta region are said to be very poor as they suffer the challenges of lack of basic social and infrastructural facilities within the said region. These issue over time, has been

neglected resulting to inequality within the social class, as such, it gave rise to insurgency since the youths are equally affected by the menace.

Good and accountable governance as it were became stronger in Nigeria since 1999 when the military handed over political power to the civilian administration. However, the challenges of good governance became the major problem facing the Nigerian State under the civilian regime. Idemudia (2009) contests that the Niger Delta region which serves as the country's oil producing base have suffered poverty significantly without accountable and good governance since the inception of the fourth republic in 1999. The work further explains that there are different dimensions of poverty within the region which shows that governance has been absent in such area.

Negligence of governance in the Niger Delta by the government to meet the demands and yearnings of the people in the region resulted in increased poverty in the oil-rich region. As a result, the youths took up arms to fight the government of the day and that has affected the national security of the Nigerian State (Amaraegebu, 2011; Ugoh & Ukpere, 2010; Idemudia, 2009). Amaraegbu (2011), Stevens (2003) and Gelb (1988) further posit that, the neglect in the development of the region resulted to violence and national security threat knowing fully that the same oil resource which should have served as a blessing to the people of the Niger Delta became a curse.

From the theoretical (that is the failed-state) viewpoint, nation-states exist to attend to the legitimate demands and concerns of their citizens (Rotberg, 2003:2). For too long, there has been a consisting neglect of effective and responsive governance to the yearning and the aspirations of the Nigerian populace. Nigeria's ranking in the recent

past has no doubt put her in the failed-states index where it ranked thirteen on the Table (as published in Fund for Peace, 2016). Ugoh (2010) posits that the negligence on the part of the government in developing the region became a motivating factor for the youths in taking up arms against the Nigerian State.

The crisis of development of the region became an issue as seen that the place is underdeveloped bearing in mind that it serves as the resource and economic base that sustains the country. Problems such as lack of social amenities in the communities thus, provokes mind sets against the government of Nigeria. Such lack motivates the youths to be violent which could fuel a state of instability within the region. Going by this, it forms a major threat to national security.

#### **4.2.2 The Economic Deprivation**

The issues behind economic deprivation as one of the core motivational factors that gave rise to the emergence of insurgency in the Niger Delta are such as ravaging poverty, mass illiteracy, unemployment and lack of fair and equitable resource distribution (Campbell, 2014). At the heart of the Niger Delta struggle is the agitation to take ownership of the resources on their land. Other factors that enabled the violent agitation in the Niger Delta are such as ethnicity, socio-economic factors, unemployment, environmental and political factors. In addition, corrupt and inept administrations, State repression, prolonged militarism and declining legitimacy are parts of the root causes of the insurgency in the Delta region (Momoh, 2000).

The poverty witnessed by the people of the Niger delta is as a result of the consistent rise in the rate of unemployment in the land. Majority of the people in this region have

been put out of job for so many reasons. Agriculture was the general practice across Nigeria and was the main occupation of the Niger Delta people before oil. According to Eregha (2009), the farmers and fishermen in this region were thrown into joblessness as soon as oil production started in their community.

The work of Ifeka (2007) demonstrates that poverty amongst other issues has pushed the youths in the region to fight back against the government of Nigeria knowing fully well that the country's major source of foreign earnings comes from the delta region. It is clear that poverty is a key economic problem in the Niger Delta oil communities which predisposes the youths to violence both against the government and the MNCs. Idemudia (2009) views the economic conditions of the communities in the Niger Delta region as being pathetic irrespective of the fact that it is an oil producing region.

Economy plays a very crucial role not only in the case of Niger Delta Militants and the Boko Haram insurgents. Karl Marx, in his argument posits that it is the economic base of the society which determines the superstructures such as politics, customs and social interactions (Eagleton, 2002; Williams, 1973). Where the economic resources of a given region are not equitably and fairly distributed, conflict is inevitable. People would always want to manipulate collective resources for their selfish ends.

Therefore, in a situation where many, young and old are being deprived of what is supposed to be a common wealth for the good of all especially where few influential individuals control 90% of the state resources, violent conflicts are certainly guaranteed. This clearly describes *the frustration-aggression trap* the indigenes of the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria are in. When people feel deprived of their

collective resources, this of course will certainly make room for agitations and conflicts to thrive.

The Frustration-Aggression Trap as pioneered by John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, Robert Sears and O.H. Mowrer in 1939 and the theory of Relative Deprivation (RD) by Ted Gurr in 1970 suggest that a widened gap between the expectations and capabilities of people would always generate discontent. The theory carefully explains how inequality and deprivation of economic and social goods brings about frustration and aggression which ultimately leads to violence among people living within the same society with the same rights (Berkowitz, 1989; Gur, 1970).

There would definitely be some back-lashes until governments create some leveling ground that offers equality to the sharing of the resources in an amicable manner that will make people feel satisfied. There will always be discontent if people feel that they are being marginalized and denied the basic necessities of life especially where the resources are derived from their own land. Nothing insults people far more than the fact that their equality and justice is being taken away from them (Akpo, August 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

Mass unemployment became the order of the day in the Niger Delta as the release of toxic petro-chemicals into the environment do not support agricultural activities. Moreover, large expanse of farmland where oil deposits were discovered were being taken from the farmers without any tangible compensations paid out to them. The few farmers in the Niger Delta suffer unemployment not because their soil is bad but it is

due to the released of chemical oil which destroy the flora and fauna within the eco-system (Jernelov, 2010; Nwilo, Badejo, 2005).

The contamination of the environment is not only harmful to human health but also deprived the people of their means of livelihood since a larger chunk of the indigenes are uneducated peasants. This economic deprivation of the locals in the oil-rich delta without absorbing them into the mainstream oil industry set the tune for militancy in the region. Also, it has been observed that the unemployed graduates from the Niger Delta region form themselves into cult groups or criminal syndicates which serve as a huge and ready army to carry out insurgents activities in the region.

It is a well-established fact that most of the youths involved in carrying arms during conflicts are the illiterate and semi-literate who are commanded by some well-informed youths (Asuni, 2009; Duquet, 2009). Most of the youths preferred dropping out of school and taking to crimes (such as insurgency, oil theft, cult war, arms smuggling, kidnapping) than going through the stress of being educated when they know there are so many graduates out there that are not employed. The work further express that the youths needs to be gainfully employed in order not to indulge in such activities. Dr. Steve (August 12, 2016) also explains that youths unemployment creates avenue for engagement in social vices such as gang rape could also bedevil the development of the region if they are not gainfully employed.

Given Nigeria's vast oil and natural gas deposits, it remains a paradox that millions of Nigerians are poor. Nigeria's Delta region is rich in oil deposits with high foreign exchange earnings yet her people are poor. What could actually explain that? The

difference is mal-administration of the oil proceeds as a result of endemic corruption, lack of the political will and the dysfunctional nature of institutions.

Therefore, the level of poverty in the Niger Delta region is unacceptable to the people given the volume of oil that is exploited from the Delta on a daily basis. This has prompted the youths to take up arms and to demand for the control of the resources produced in the region (Okaba, 2005; Obi, 2006). Nigeria's democratic rule opened another chapter for the agitation of the control of resources by the Niger Deltans where they intend to have total control of whatever is produced in their region (Obi, 2006; Frynas, 2001).

According to Frynas (2001) as at July, 2000, the political leaders of the six states of the Niger Delta region known as the "south-south states" gathered in Edo State capital, Benin City, and fronted the resource control agenda. That there should be autonomy for the federating states to have 100 percent control of their resources in the region and to pay taxes to the Federal Government of Nigeria.

These Governors felt a time has come for them to take over the resources that belong to their states like the crude oil from the federal government. These agitations continued all through the period of President Olusegun Obasanjo's government from 1999 to 2007. Due to their intense agitation and the violence witnessed against the federal government, The vice Presidential slot was seeded to the south-south region to assuage their agitation of marginalization.

The Niger Delta people felt economically deprived since oil is derived from the region. To the people and their governments (States and Local governments), their communities and regions should have been given a priority for development over and above other regions. However, the reverse is the case as poverty remains a threat in the said region. Aaron (2005) has it that, the Niger Delta region contributes over 20 billion barrels of oil out of the 66 billion barrels which has been proven in Africa's oil reserves.

This further presents the high quantum of oil produced from the region compared to the inflows of economic benefits to the Niger Delta. To the people of the region, oil is being taken away from their land and poverty is returned to them in exchange which demonstrates the frustration-aggression scenario. This is actually a motivating factor for the youths in the region to carry up arms against the government and the multinational oil corporations operating in the area.

The grievances in the Niger Delta which led to their harsh reaction against the Nigerian state and the multinational corporations have accumulated over time. Ikyernum observed during his stay in Port Harcourt the extent of poverty and deprivation being daily experienced by the people on whose soil crude oil is extracted. To him, the current violent agitation by the Niger Delta militants predates the fourth republic (Ikyernum, April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

Niger Delta issues with the government were spearheaded by people like Major Isaac Adaka Boro and Ken Saro Wiwa who was executed by the military administration of General Abacha shortly before the fourth republic began (McLuckie, McPhail, 2000;

Boele, Fabig & Wheeler, 2001). According to Ikyernum (April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2016), the agitation which was not violent initially was to draw the government and the multinational oil corporations (MOCs) to the discussion table to address the economic challenges confronting the people. The agitators became violent as soon as they realized successive governments were not committed to the welfare and wellbeing of the people of the region.

Another dimension of economic deprivation in the Niger Delta is that of unemployment of the youths in the region. This issue of unemployment serves as a motivational factor when the demands of the youths to get job opportunities is not attended to. Edino, Nsofor & Bombom (2010) presented the issue of unemployment in their work with respect to Delta State, revealing that, some of their communities faces this same challenge of unemployment where about 90% of the youths are unemployed. Cases that reflects the challenge of unemployment therefore, serves as a bedrock for carrying arms against the government since the youths are not gainfully employed.

Ikelegbe (2001) reveals that the oil producing environment in the Niger Delta became tensed when the youths who were unemployed felt deprived amidst millions of barrels of oil resources extracted from the region on a daily basis. Therefore, economic hardship due to unemployment gives room to conflict in the region as well as places the youths on the verge of going against the government of Nigeria. Omofonmwan and Odia (2009) observes that, unemployment among other issues, serves as the motivational factors that makes the youths take arms against the government of Nigeria. It is also known that the region receives 13% derivation from the Federal

Government allocation to boost the development of the region. However, there seems to be little impact of the said issue.

For instance, presently the Niger Delta leaders are asking for resource control, that is, full control of the oil resources such as bitumen, crude oil and liquefied natural gas that are being extracted from their region (Obi, 2010; Egwemi, 2010). The big question is, what really have these states been able to do with the 13% derivation funds they have been getting from the crude oil money since 1999 to date? Taking 13% derivation from the oil money by each of the oil producing states is such a huge amount of money.

The Niger Delta states also have royalties and statutory allocations which accrue to them from the federation account on a monthly basis. The share of the oil revenue each of the states in the Niger Delta region collects is higher compared to states that are non-oil-producing (Ejobowah, 2000; Oluwaniyi, 2011). Getting to those oil producing communities, one would not find on the ground the impact of this 13% derivation. Therefore, the blame goes to the political leaders from these communities as same goes to the state institutions itself in the failure of its policies. It therefore, means that for such a large release of funds by the federal government to states which does not trickle down to the lowest part of the society, the state has failed (Ikyernum, April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

#### **4.2.3 Ethno-Political Motivation**

Politics of integration of the people within the Nigerian political system became overwhelmed when the country saw a continuous rule by the Northern hegemony while leaving the Southern and other ethnic groups and other parts of the country marginalised. As seen in the work of Kukah (1993) the issue of the Northern hegemony

became strong for the sole purpose of protecting the interest of the Northern part of Nigeria and not Nigeria as a whole. This politics of ethnicity is seen in Nigeria's leadership over time from 1960-1965 and from 1966-1976 during the military era. The quest for power as dominance in the Nigerian politics especially the continuous rule of the Hausa-Fulani hegemony shows a clear sign of how the Southern part of the country was marginalised.

This ethnic motivation is seen from the context of the marginalization of the minority ethnic groups especially those of the Niger Delta origin by the ethnic majorities who have ruled Nigeria over time. The frustration-aggression theory which is a conflict theory has shown that when a group's strong sense of identity is being combined with its shared grievances against marginalization, there are bound to be an outburst of violence (aggression) against the source of marginalization real or perceived (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho & Onapajo, 2012).

More so, in the eyes of a Niger Delta indigene, oil which is seen as the major source of revenue to the Nigerian state is not produced from the North or West where the Hausa-Fulani or Yoruba who continuous to rule comes from. Oil becomes the commodity of ethnic identity and politics. Scholars and leaders from the Niger Delta region continue to ponder on this question why the Southerners especially the Niger Delta people are not ruling Nigeria? Welch (1995) observes that, leadership of ethnicity in Nigeria is seen as the major avenue where the ethnic minorities and major group tussle for power dominance. The question the militants ask in the case of the ethnic minorities from the Niger Delta such as the Ogoni people, Itsekiri, Ibibio,

Urhobo whose land have been exploited for oil is when will they have the opportunity to rule the country Nigeria?


It is clear that the link between the three major ethnic nationalities and the federal resource ownership is inextricable. This mainly is the crux of the struggle in the oil bearing region of Nigeria where they claim their God-given resources are plundered by the major ethnic groups to develop their cities leaving the Niger Delta undeveloped. The natural reaction of the minority groups in the Niger Delta which were conferred 'minority status' by the British classification based on imposition of colonialism was to protest the taking away of their resources through the systematic and gradual destruction of their environment.

The indigenes of the Niger Delta feel that the control and plundering of the resources of the region by people from outside of the region is an 'internal colonialism' as well as ethnic marginalization (Watt, 2004; Adeola, 2000). Their demand remains that they have the right to control 'their own' oil which is in actual fact political and economic power. The 'minority status' conferred on the ethnic nationalities across the Delta and other parts of Nigeria constituted part of the trigger causes of the struggle in the Niger Delta region which over time has transformed whether criminally or rightly into full-blown militancy today (Obi, 2008).

The minority status metaphorically signifies that those in that category are somewhat second-class citizens in their own country. This is based on the fact that their populations (according to the major ethnic groups) are not in the classifications of the major ethnic groups irrespective of their natural endowments and capabilities. The

stranglehold of the majority ethnic groups ignited protests by the marginalised people seen to be the minority groups who formed their own political parties to represent their own interests. Scholars such as Obi, 2009; Sagay, 2001) view the Nigerian Civil war of 1967 as targeting the oil fields of the Niger Delta by the Igbo ethnic group.

The Igbo political elites staked a claim to the Niger Delta oil which was vehemently resisted by the federal government. The civil war was therefore, anchored on resource control and a fight for economic and political control and dominance with secession from the Nigerian state. The intense fight between the federal troops and that of the Biafra over control of the production of oil in the Niger Delta shows that oil was indeed the object of politics of revenue sharing.



Furthermore, the quest for power in Nigeria becomes the motivational factor where the diversities of the ethnic question falls into place. In all the geo-political zones in Nigeria, there are different ethnic nationalities who aspire to rule Nigeria. The question of Nigeria's leadership brought in an introduction of the zoning formula system where it could allow each of the six-geopolitical zones to govern the country after a period of time within the democratic system of governance in order to give equal representation of the people (Akinola, 1986; Orji, 2008; Obot, Chendo & Udo, 2010; Awopeju & Adelusi, 2012).

Another disturbing trend in their violent militancy is their assumption that the northern Hausa-Fulani want to be the only ethnic group to rule Nigeria. This factor also plays a vital role in understanding the issues which creates tension within the region. It is for

the simple fact that the Niger Delta region from independence in 1960 until 2010, never produced any of the Nigerian leaders who served as the president of Nigeria.

**Table 4.2** below shows a clear distinction of how the Northern hegemony marginalised the South-South and other parts of the country by creating more constituencies, local governments and states in the northern part of the country. Since democracy is a game of number, this creation ultimately favours the north during political contest and national revenue sharing.

Table 4.2

*Nigeria's Presidency 1960-2015*

S/No.	Presidency	Period of Leadership	Name of the Presidents
1	North-East	1960-1966	Tafawa Balewa
2	South-East	1966-1966	Aguiyi Ironsi
3	North-Central	1966-1975	Yakubu Gowon
4	North-West	1975-1976	Murtala Mohammed
5	South-West	1976-1979	Olusegun Obasanjo
6	North-West	1979-1983	Shehu Shagari
7	North-West	1983-1985	Muhammadu Buhari
8	North-Central	1985-1993	Ibrahim Babangida
9	South-West	1993-1993	Ernest Shonekan
10	North-West	1993-1998	Sani Abacha
11	North-Central	1998-1999	Abdusalam Abubaka
12	South-West	1999-2007	Olusegun Obasanjo
13	North-West	2007-2010	Umaru Yar'Adua
14	South-South	2010-2015	Goodluck Jonathan

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**Source:** Compiled by the researcher

**Table 4.1** above clearly shows that over the years the South-South region where the country's oil is being produced were given the opportunity to rule the country only from 2010 to 2015 since Nigeria's independence. This is a clear sign of ethnic marginalization. Considering the fact that Niger Delta is a region of minority groups who produces what sustains the nation and have contributed to the country's economic growth and development. For them to rule Nigeria only by providence in 2010 when President Yar'Adua died and the Vice President Jonathan took over power. This has created an understanding that Nigeria was predominantly ruled by a group of few especially the Northern hegemony (Kukah, 1993; Awopeju & Adelusi, 2012).

Marginalization of the south-south region, perceived or real is seen as one the reasons for ethnic struggle for political relevance by the south-south people. Given *table 4.1* above, it shows clearly how the North has dominated the political landscape of the country and has produced 11 out of its 14 leaders since independence. This creates tension among the major and the minor ethnic nationalities. Abagen in his view explains that it is a fundamental problem if one sees the ethnic nationality which he belongs as a platform to be seen as being superior to other ethnic nationalities within the same nation. Others are ethnic chauvinists who take their sentiments beyond dwelling on superficial stereotype, but see themselves as ethnic apostles of a particular ethnic group and seek to eliminate other groups (Abagen, May, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2016).

In 1999, the country felt the only way to appreciate other ethnic nationalities to be able to entrenched democratic norms in Nigeria was for the country to have a system where all other zones are equally represented in order to create a form of national integration which could promote the unity and political stability of the country. This would further promote national security and development of the country. However, where only one or two ethnic majorities dominate the political landscape, others see that as marginalization which agitates the minds of the rest nationalities. It was on this ground, Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo, a militant leader questioned the North on using threats against the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan in contesting for President in 2011 (Ezeamalu, 2013).

The quest for power by the North over the years threatened equally such desires by other geopolitical zones where they also wanted to have their fair share of the country's presidency. On this note, after the death of President Yar'Adua on the 5<sup>th</sup> of May, 2010 became the beginning of another dimension in Nigeria's political structure. History was made on May 6<sup>th</sup>, 2010. The day opened a new chapter for the South-South geopolitical zone to occupy the seat of President for the first time since the country gained her independence in 1960. As zoning was introduced in 1999, the South-West ruled from 1999-2007 and it became the turn of the Northern part of the country to take over power. As such, Jonathan's ambition for 2011 presidential elections which was legitimate under the 1999 constitution was received with threats from the Northern hegemony.

The climax of ethnic politics in Nigeria was attained when former Nigerian President, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua died on the seat. The threats and counter threats by ethnic

chauvinists such as Lawal Kaita from the north-west and Asari Dokubo from the south-south. Dr. Goodluck Jonathan's political party jettisoned their original zoning formula and adopted him for presidency but it was not welcomed by northern ethnic apostles.

Asari Dokubo blamed the ethnic riots and insurgency which wreaked havoc in the north as aftermath of the 2011 elections that saw Goodluck became the elected president of Nigeria. Dokubo remarked that Kaita who threatened that the country would be made ungovernable if Goodluck became president in 2011 was not arrested (Ezeamalu, 2013). According to Dokubo, such utterance by Kaita as "...we will make the country ungovernable for anyone who wins the presidential election other than a northerner until he is frustrated out of power" is a threat to national security from the north that was not taken seriously.

This is where the North and the South tussled for the political power in Nigeria on who to govern the country. Ezeamalu (2013) further expressed on Mr Asari Dokubo's statement that the North threatened President Jonathan's contest in 2011 as Lawal Kaita asserts that, anything short of Northern presidency in 2011, the country would be made ungovernable. As such, Dokubo from the Southern part of the country, a Niger Deltan, and of South-South geopolitical zone, also warned the North in 2013 that Jonathan was going to contest against the background of 2007-2015 zoning arraignment within the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as a political party.

*Table 4.1* above clearly shows that, until 2010-2015, there was no single leader from the South-South to have ruled Nigeria as the President both during the military and the return to democratic governance in 1999. This is where lies the thrust of this thesis

from the Niger Delta struggles point of view. The new dimension of the Niger Delta agitation for the political leadership of the country being hijacked by certain regions. To the Niger Delta people, the Nigerian political history has not done them any good. They felt they have not been fairly treated as a region and a key player who has contributed massively to the national and economic development of Nigeria.

They militants on Jonathan's assumption of power as the President, threatened to make things hard for the nation if he was not allowed to rule Nigeria considering the fact that they are the main source of Nigeria's national income. Asari Dokubo who hails from the Niger Delta is of minority Ijaw ethnic group while Lawal Kaita is of the Hausa-Fulani major ethnic group from the Northern part of the country. Both represent the minority and majority ethnic nationalities in Nigeria as well as a representation of the South and North.

The quest for power here becomes a motivational factor by the ethnic nationalities. In the case of the Niger Delta, the issue of who rules Nigeria becomes important in their new agitation. Asari Dokubo and Goodluck Jonathan being of the Ijaw ethnic nationality from the Niger Delta region see the Ijaw minority as part of the minorities whose region produces the oil that lubricate or sustains Nigeria as a nation (Aziken, 2013; Ezeamalu, 2013).

#### **4.2.4 Environmental deprivation**

The environment is the key issue on which the Niger Delta violent conflict is built. Due to extensive production and exploration of oil in the region, the environment has over the years been badly damaged. The main practice of the Niger Delta people is

agriculture which oil pollution has taken away from a vast majority of the people. The entire environment (land, sea and the air) are terribly polluted by the excessive released of toxic gas and petrochemical acid and oil into the environment.

The youths who are poorly educated with many unemployed take to militancy and other criminality such as kidnapping, hostage taking of oil workers, arms smuggling and oil bunkering as their alternative jobs. The youth being jobless engage in unwholesome criminality of militancy. The degradation of the environment is not carried out by the multinational oil companies alone but by the youths also who engage in criminal bunkering of oil pipelines which cause heavy spillage on the land (Aaron, 2005; Jike, 2004).

Environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region led to so many repercussions as seen in the struggle of the militants in region. According to Aaron (2005), the multinational oil companies operating in the region have inflicted pains on the people as a result of oil spillage which led to environmental degradation of the region. Such form of environmental degradation further led to the youths within the region to form various militant groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Egbesu Boys in order to call the attention of the government on addressing the issues. Militant groups were later established to agitate against the government of Nigeria. **Appendix F** has shown the militants with their arms set for attacks against government troops after which they dissolve into the creeks.

Increasing oil exploitation and exploration by different oil multinationals in the Niger Delta without effective management of the environment poses threat to the stability of the Delta. Omotola (2006) observed that, there were also threats to the Niger Delta environment due to the destruction of environment as a result of oil spillage. **Table 4.3** below are the key multinational oil corporations (MOC) operating in the Nigerian oil and gas industry and the years in which they were established.

Table 4.3

*Multinational Oil Corporations and Their Year of Establishment.*

S/N	Multinational Oil Corporation (MOC)	Year
1	Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd	1937
2	Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited	1955
3	Chevron Nigeria Ltd	1961
4	Texaco Overseas Nig. Petroleum Co. Unltd	1961
5	Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited	1962
6	Philip	1962
7	Pan Ocean Oil Corporation	1962
8	Bought over Ashland Oil Nigeria Limited	1973
9	Agip Energy & Natural Resources	1979
10	Statoil/BP Alliance	1992
11	Esso Exploration & Production Nig. Ltd	1992
12	Texaco Outer Shelf Nigeria Limited	1992
13	Shell Nig. Exploration & Production Co.	1992
14	Total (Nig.) Exploration & Prod. Co. Ltd	1992
15	Amoco Corporation	1992
16	Chevron Exploration & Production Co.	1992
17	Conoco	1992
18	Abacan	1992

**Source:** Evuleocha (2005), California State Univ., California, USA.

The Niger Delta region which is Nigeria's source of oil exploration and production includes Rivers State, Bayelsa State, Imo State, Akwa-Ibom State, Abia State, Cross River State, Edo State, Ondo State, and Delta State as seen in Appendix B. Ibeanu (2000) reveals that corporate social responsibility such as provision of electricity in the Bonny Island by the oil multinationals has impacted positively on the economic and social wellbeing of the people.

Celestine (2003) posits that continuous extraction of oil from the Niger Delta region without adequate corresponding care for the environment has led to the degradation of the said environment. Carrying up arms by the youths of the Niger Delta region is a spontaneous reaction anchored on the frustration-aggression analysis to the failed political system (failed-state) and a call for both the government and the multinational companies to urgently address the problems associated with the environmental degradation. Jike (2004) concurs that the issue of environmental degradation by the activities of the oil companies is pathetic and deplorable, wondering if the Delta region will ever recover its beautiful environment back.

The youths in the Niger Delta felt greatly frustrated that their land has been polluted and taken away from them without compensations or any alternative to their agricultural practice. Thus, their frustrations only support and deepen the conditions for violent aggression. What they used to get as farm proceeds in a whole year can now be gotten in one day through kidnapping and illegal oil business in response. That was how and why many of the youth took to kidnapping and militancy. To them kidnapping and other illegal activities under the guise of agitation is a more lucrative

source of income than the farming ventures. Thus, kidnapping has now become the most thriving profession in the Delta region (Eyem, August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

Omotola (2009) concurs that unfulfilled promises such as failure to meet their corporate social responsibility (CSR) to their host communities is a breach of trust on the part of the multinationals. The commitment of the oil corporations to the development and economic growth of the host communities is key to the security of their operations. To achieve this, the corporations must ensure that the welfare, security and stability of the society within which their operations are carried out are prioritized.

Therefore, it is a social, moral and ethical obligations of the companies to their hosts (Rattanaphan & Mat, 2012). Part of causes of the deep-rooted tension in the region is the inability of the MOCs to keep to their terms of the social contract with the locals. When people kept seeing the promises not being fulfilled by both the oil companies and the government of Nigeria, tension started brewing as a result. When these promises are not kept, the people become violent and their youths are forced to take up arms as obtains in the case of the Niger Delta militancy.

The work of Odoemene (2011) agrees that the people are forced to fight for their right to live in an environment that is healthy and not polluted. It is also known that the people of the Niger Delta region whose women depends on agricultural activities such as farming and fishing are totally dissatisfied with the nature of environmental degradation in the region. Obi (2008) posits that environmental security is the most primary concern of the Niger Delta people as oil exploitation by the multinationals continue to expand, the environment also continue to be depleted. The view here is

that, as long as the multinationals continuous to produce oil from the region, the environment would continue to deteriorate with the passage of time. These issues prompt the youths to fight against the authorities in power.

Akpan (2010) posits that crisis situation in the Niger Delta region actually has both positive and negative sides. The attention is more on the negative side which basically focuses on the militant activities taking place in the area due to the environmental pollution ravaging the place. The positive side is the fact that the region is one of the world largest oil and gas reserves with full global attention on it. This issue of environment is so dear to the hearts of the youths considering that much is being extracted from their land with so much more damage and life-threatening waste left behind. This is why there is a steady increase in kidnapping of oil workers and politicians in the Niger Delta region.

On issues that promote violence between the youths and the multinational in the region, Eyem concurs that the oil multinationals normally roll out list of laudable programmes as their corporate social responsibility engagement within their host communities. However, these oil companies would only state their commitment to such corporate social responsibility plans without real implementation of these stated plans. This is a common practice of the multinationals oil companies especially in the developing countries (Keith slack, 2012). The contradiction between plan and reality is said to be attributable to this simple fact that these multinationals do not always integrate corporate social responsibility into their business models.

The MOCs play smart in the fulfillment of their CSR to the developing countries and get away with it due to compromise on the part of government official and weak regulations. They will tell you they have established schools, they have built roads, they have paid out scholarships and set up skill acquisition centres. But when one takes an aggregate of the so-called interventions in the communities and looks at the standard of living of these communities, vis-a-vis the volume of oil and the wealth that is created from oil exploration, you will discover that there is a huge gap in the wealth and resources of those exploring and those who own these resources. So you will see a twin discontent on the one hand with the state and them with the multinationals.

This brings to mind that environmental deprivation is as a result of institutional and state failure. A great chunk of the blame goes to the political class from the region who act like middlemen to the centre. The center tries hard to enunciate policies that are meant to bridge that gap between the people and the state, but these efforts are frustrated by these political middlemen. This political class ensures that whatever will be carried out by the centre or MOCs in their state must pass through them and it must meet their interest if not such programme will not see the light of day (Eyem, August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

The issue of oil spillage in Nigeria has really affected the Niger Delta region. Kadafa (2012) asserts that since 1956, the country discovered oil in the Niger Delta region by the British Petroleum and since then the exploration and exploitation has been carried on for so many years. The work of Osuji and Onojake (2004) further explained that the oil spillage in the Niger Delta created serious pollution within the affected areas in the region.

The militants in the Niger Delta agitate for the government and the oil companies to clean up the spilled oil within their region. Watts (2004) concurs that militancy in the Niger Delta spread as a result of the unresolved issues which includes the environmental pollution caused as a result of the oil spillage in the said region. Aghalino & Eyinla (2009) explain in their work that the oil spillage damages the water in the region where it is not drinkable by the members of the communities. As such, oil spill is very difficult to clean up and not easily amenable for drinking. These challenges are part of what motivate the youths to fight against the government and the oil multinational companies.

It has been scientifically proven that due to the presence of heavy metals in the crude oil produced from the Niger Delta by multinational companies, such as Forcados Blend, Bonny Light and Qua Iboe Light, the water in the surrounding is heavily contaminated (Osuji & Onojake, 2004). Presence of heavy metals such as Ni, Cu, V, Pb, have been traced in as high concentration as Ni which varied from 0.53 to 18.00mg/kg, Pb from 0.32 to 0.80mg/kg, and Cu from 0.15 to 0.30mg/kg in the water due to oil spillage from extraction. These and many more toxic elements are released into both the soil and water which are depended on by flora and fauna within such eco-system. The bioaccumulation of such toxic elements in the body system results in stunted growths and pigmentation in plants and cancer in human if such water is drunk.

Appendix H shows how the rural people are waiting for Shell Company to come and put out fire caused by burst oil pipeline within the Niger Delta region. This has affected the crops, air and water and it is a serious environmental disaster for the people (World of Matter, 2013). Agbalagba and Onoja (2011) notes that, the river Niger tributaries in

the Delta region have been vulnerable to pollution in the area due to oil spillage. The river Niger which distributes into the delta region is serves as a great source of drinking water, fishing, and water transport tends to be polluted due to oil spillage.

Okonta & Douglas (2003) further affirm in Appendix H where the oil pipe burst into flame and engulfed with fire due to gas flaring which destroys the environment. Other issues includes oil spillage and dumping of waste by the oil companies. This further connotes a near collapse of the Niger Delta environment. Another angle to the environmental challenges posed by oil spillage is the contamination of underground water and oil used for domestic purposes such as drinking, cooking washing (Kadafa, 2012).

It is also observed that contaminated underground water affects aquaculture and crops. Offshore oil spills which are more massive in sizes destroy the coastal environment which the locals heavily depend on for fish production as their main source of protein (Ibaba, 2010). Furthermore, it is estimated that 5-10% of the once most beautiful mangrove in the world along the Niger Delta coastline has been destroyed either by oil spills or settlement (Okafor, 2011).

The work of Opukri and Ibaba (2008) further explained that oil spillage in the Niger Delta region affects farm produce since the crops are destroyed and the soil is also affected. There is declined in the level of production where the farmers and fishermen are both affected by oil spills. Farming is the original source of income for the rural people of the Niger Delta region before the discovery of oil from the region which became the major source of Nigeria's foreign income.

It has also been estimated that since large scale oil drilling started in Nigeria in 1958, between 9-10 million barrels (Baird, 2010). These spills occur in their thousands with over 2000 sites scattered throughout the region (Amnesty, 2009; Bassey, 2008). Oil spillage are majorly caused by production operation (21%), sabotage/bunkering (28%), non-functional production equipment (1%), tankers and corrosion of pipeline (50%) (Baird, 2010).

In the last ten years, the Niger Delta has recorded over 9,343 oil spill incidents and it is still ongoing. According to official report released by National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), there is nearly a thousand spills recorded yearly in the Niger Delta which signifies the highest rate of spills so far recorded globally (NOSDRA, 2015). On record is French oil giant Total as the latest oil company to be hit by this by the spill. The company lost up to 100,000 barrels per day which is phenomenally huge. Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in their monthly spills incidents for 2017 from January through June has the month of March with the highest records of monthly spills in 2017. This is graphically illustrated below in *figure 4.1*.




Figure 4.1 Monthly Oil Spill Incidents - 2017 (No). Source: (Shell Nigeria, 2017).




Figure 4.2 volume of oil spills / month - 2017 (Shell Nigeria, 2017).

Figure 4.2 shows the volume of spills by SPDC per month in 2017 with the month of March having the highest volume of spills. Ukiwo (2007) views the actions of the oil

multinational companies in dealing with the problem of oil spillage which is an element of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region as one of the factors that led to the widespread of the Niger Delta militants. The militant groups thus, pay attention to the problems that are affecting the region the and how they could be a voice against the activities of the multinationals and the government of Nigeria. Both the government and the oil companies are seen as the major actors to be held responsible for the environmental damages in the Niger Delta region.

#### **4.2.5 Constitutional Bias**

One clear bitterness expressed by the Niger Delta people against the Nigerian state is that the 1999 constitution handed down to the civilian regime in May 29, 1999 by the military government of General Abdulsalam is seriously skewed and fraudulent. The indigenes contend that there are countless anomalies in that constitution which according to them made the constitution anti-people. Adangor (2013), identifies constitutional defects as the main trigger for the militant agitation for resource control in the Niger Delta region. Those who crafted the current Nigerian constitution contributed in raising the level of agitation and violent struggle in the oil-rich region.

The Niger Delta people felt putting the ownership and control of the crude oil absolutely in the hand of the federal government makes the constitution to favour the federal government. As asserted by Elaigwu (2002) and Anyadike (2012), the current constitution operated by Nigeria makes the federal laws superior and paramount to those of the states. By virtue of the 1999 constitution, the resource sharing formula is skewed in favour of the federal government with over 56%, states governments take 24% while the local governments have 20% of the federation revenue (FRN, 1999).

No revenue formula has been acceptable to the three tiers of government without contention. The intergovernmental problem in sharing the federation revenue has always been the sharing formula challenges among states and regions. In the words of Omotoso, “the principal effect of overbearing lop-sidedness of the revenue sharing system in Nigeria is the continued strengthening of the position of the federal government against the continued weakening of the positions of the sub-federal levels” (Omotoso, 2010: 248). This therefore, causes the gradual stifling of the other tiers of government such as states and local governments.

Furthermore, Anyadike (2012) posits that the current constitution is defective for the simple fact that it was crafted based on population and not on the equality of states. To the southern people of Nigeria, a constitution based on the population rather than one that is based on the equality of the federating units gives many states in the north undue advantage in the sharing of the national cake over and above states in the south especially those of the Niger Delta. To the Niger Delta people, this is what is known as marginalization or tyranny of the majorities and it brings about frustration which ultimately leads to the current aggression in the region (frustration-aggression theory). A good example is that of Kano state in the northern part of the country which has 44 local governments with little revenue generated to the federation account while Bayelsa state which is an oil producing state has only 8 local governments and is contributing so much to the same federation account.

The Niger Delta militants see most states in Nigeria outside Niger Delta as parasitic and depending solely on oil money to pay salaries. This they see as a creation of the current 1999 constitution foisted on the Nigerian people by the military regime. They

have been violently clamouring for a constitutional change where states will be treated on the basis of equality (Gusau, 2012; Edo, 2010). They also see the military which brought the constitution as being controlled and dominated by the ethnic majorities in order to continue plundering the resources of the region.

Exclusive ownership of the natural resources such as oil, bitumen and gas in the Niger Delta by the federal government is same as being owned by the three dominant ethnic groups, Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and Igbo. Since these major ethnic nationalities control the federal government, they invariably manipulate the resources to their own advantage leaving the minority ethnic groups in the oil producing areas marginalised and neglected (Obi, 2010; Zalik, 2004; Sagay, 2001). Since 1999, Nigeria has had two constitutional conferences such as convened by President Obasanjo in 2005 and President Goodluck in 2014 yet nothing really has come out of such conferences.

#### **4.3 The Motivational Factors of the Boko Haram Insurgents**

Boko Haram insurgency emerged in 2002 in north-eastern zone of Nigeria as a result of some motivational factors that are favourable for their emergence. Factors giving rise to insurgencies and terrorism around the world are complex and indeed always a hard nut to crack. These factors are as divergent and overlapping as possible. In the case of those factors that motivate the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency and for analysis purpose, we shall discuss these factors as follows: The ideological; political; illiteracy; social injustice and economic.

*Figure 4.3* below shows those states within Nigeria where Boko Haram insurgence have been most active over the years of its existence.



Figure 4.3 Most active areas of Boko Haram operations. Source: Encyclopædia Britannica (2016)

The figure 4.3 above shows most of the areas that were affected by the Boko Haram insurgents in the Northern part of the country. Nigeria's Boko Haram became a threat not only to national security but international security considering their level of operations across the African countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger as well as Nigeria where is their original domain as seen on the map above. There are motivational factors to why the insurgent group has demonstrated their fight against the Nigerian State. This work further explains these motivational factors below for more understanding.

### **4.3.1 Ideological Motivation**

The key philosophical and ideological motivation of the Boko Haram group is its concerns over ‘western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the religion’s weakness’ (Sani, 2011:26). The group in its ideology opposes the core values it tags as western civilizations. Boko Haram opposes conventional banking, secular government (democracy), taxation, western education and jurisprudence. That is how the group gained its name Boko Haram meaning literally “western education is forbidden” (Onuoha, 2014). Details of this can be gotten from the historical background of the sect in chapter three of the study.

According to Nossiter (2010), Boko Haram emerged as a result of the ineptitude or failure of governance in the Twelve (12) northern states which adopted Sharia law but failed to implement it fully. Yusuf who was a conservative saw that the Sharia law adopted by the political leadership in those northern states was for their political interest with a dismal implementation of the Islamic law. The enforcement was selective and was not fully strict as it needed to be.

Yusuf’s extreme ideological stance on some of the issues raised above brought him into clashes with moderate Islamic scholars who were based in the north. Islamic scholars such as Ja’far Mahmud Adam, Yahaya Jingir and Sheik Abba Aji. For instance, in 2004 and 2007 before Sheik Ja’far was killed, he disputed with Yusuf Mohammed over Yusuf’s puritanical stance on western education which Yusuf saw as ‘Haram’. Sheik Ja’far was Yusuf’s teacher and he advocated for secular and western educations for Muslims. Ja’far argued that it was only when Muslim acquire western education, then they will effectively fight the enemy of Islam (Loimeier, 2012:149).

The work of Agbibo (2013) asserts that Boko Haram insurgents drew their ideology from the fact that pure Islam should not be mixed with western values such as democracy, western education and other values that are not rooted in Islamic traditions and teachings. The views of Onapajo and Uzodike (2012) connote that, the ideological Boko Haram's stance is focused on the teachings of the group's former leader, Yusuf Mohammed, whose belief and ideology is against western education and only a purposeful Islamization of Nigeria would be accepted by the group. Thus, it is worth fighting for the country to be Islamized.

Bwacha (July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2016) in his view on the Boko Haram ideology posits that people are just using religion as a platform to achieve their political goals. In their argument, Suleiman and Karim (2015) assert that Boko Haram indeed avows strict religious following and full implementation of the Sharia law in Nigeria. They further posit that Islam indeed was a platform or vehicle used by the insurgents to actualise their agenda of controlling the Nigerian state politically and economically. However, the group only takes full advantage of the economic and social deprivation that is prevalent in the society (frustration-aggression theory).

Dr. Gori views Boko Haram crisis as a political game in the name of religion. It is not a secret that people brought recruitment, indoctrination, extreme ideology and ethnicity into their struggle for the control of the state. This has been a driving force right from time immemorial where religion and ethnic bias are being manipulated to take advantage of fault lines especially in our Nigerian context. Where there are obvious fault lines based on our multi-plural diversity, it can be easily manipulated in order to achieve some desired motives (Gori, August 25<sup>th</sup>, 2016). This typically

demonstrates the inherent weaknesses (state-failure theory) within the institutions of the Nigerian states which are exploited based on sentiments be they ideological, ethnic or political.

Bwacha avers that what Boko Haram sect is perpetuating is not Islam but falsehood and crime against ALMIGHTY GOD and humanity. His view was corroborated by Gori who states further that Islam means peace and all Boko Haram sect is doing is un-Islamic and totally strange to the faith. Some people are using religion to profit themselves without considering that religion indeed is sacred and should not be dragged into murky water of politics. We all know what faith is.

People are ready to die for their faith. So in this context, it must be that people are ready to take the highest risk in order to see that they achieve what they want to do. So think this really is an easy tool to use in order to achieve whatever it is and this is easily used by the so called elites in order to achieve their aim. The so-called elites use religion as a platform and an easy ground to recruit and brain-wash the jobless youths by turning them into ready and dangerous tools in their hands which is obviously what we are seeing today (Bwacha, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

Some of the interviewees at the rehabilitation (or deradicalization centre) attested that their leader Mohammed Yusuf and some of the deradicalised ex-commandos of the group who are helping to deradicalised others were inspired by the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 and the Maitatsine uprisings of the early 1980s in major northern cities such as Maiduguri, Kano, Yola, and Bauchi amongst others. Also, Yusuf was trained and educated in Salafist tradition who and was able to pull his members from

across the larger Muslim society across cities in northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries (Ali, Kazon & Ibrahim, June 26<sup>th</sup>, 2016; Agbiboa, 2013; Forest, 2012).

Based on the foregoing, the motivation of those recruited and radicalized by Boko Haram is not far from those of the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s who fought for strict implementation of Sharia law across major cities in northern Nigeria. Therefore, the recruitment, indoctrination and radicalization of members to go wage war (Jihad) and if they die in the process they will make it to heaven by the charismatic Yusuf led to the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency.

#### **4.3.2 Political Motivation**

Shortly after the emergence of the Boko Haram sect, Yusuf's message became very attractive to especially the youths and unemployed graduates. Politicians were among those attracted especially in the build-up to the 2003 general elections. Politicians who sought to outwit their oppositions in the election financed the operations of several militia and religious groups as political thugs (Onuoha, 2014). Youth groups such as *Yusufiya*, *Yan Kalare* and *Sara Suka* in Borno, Gombe and Bauchi respectively were heavily armed by politicians who were contesting for Governorship election in those north-eastern states.

Former Governor of Borno state Modu Sheriff who was a candidate then employed the services of the *Yusufiya* group who were the followers of Yusuf the founder of Boko Haram. It became a deal between *Yusufiya* and Ali Modu Sheriff who promised the group a large sum of money, 50 motorcycles, appointment and implementation of strict Sharia legal justice in Borno state if they would support him to win the election.

Sheriff won the election eventually and appointed a member of the group by name Alhaji Buji Foyi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs. This was where the group started its partisan politics.

The relationship went frosty between Sheriff's government and the Boko Haram group which eventually led to their parting of ways. Yusuf became more vocal against the politicians for half implementation of Sharia for political gains (Onuoha, 2013). The commissioner was later killed by the group who continued in its search for the strict implementation of Sharia law across the north.

At the national level, the assumption among southern pundits was that Boko Haram was a northern political group set up by northern politicians to frustrate the government of President Jonathan. The south saw Boko Haram's emergence as a clandestine group that was formed after the 2011 presidential election that it lost. However, from the then ruling party's point of view, there was need for political stability of the Nigerian state from 1999 when the civilian government took over power. This informed the principle of zoning of the presidential seat between the North and the South in order to break the hegemonic factor which was perpetuated by the military administration. Zoning as the case may be, was to form fair sharing of power and principle of equity in Nigeria as it was introduced by the then ruling political party known as the People's Democratic Party (PDP) as recognized within the party's constitution (Awopeju, Adelusi & Oluwashakin, 2012).

The principle of zoning was later truncated and jettisoned by the same PDP in 2011 before the general elections which produced President Jonathan, a Christian, and Southerner as the winner of the elections over Northern candidates. The South ruled

from 1999-2007, and North was supposed to rule from 2007-2015 but the death of President Yar'Adua set in the vacuum where the Southerner filled the gap (Awopeju, Adelusi & Oluwashakin, 2012). Yagboyaju (2011) observed that the prediction of former American Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell was likely coming through giving the political permutation that was taking place in Nigeria before the 2015 elections. He predicted that Nigeria will disintegrate by 2015 due to her sharp divide along ethno-religious diversities which was affecting the stability of the Nigerian State.

In 2011 general elections, it was viewed within the intelligence community that, the political tension and attacks by the Boko Haram was due to the political climate within the then ruling party Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The principle of zoning was truncated and jettisoned by the then ruling political party, the PDP, the very moment President Jonathan indicated interest to run for the presidency in 2011 election (Ademowo, 2015; Aliyu, 2013). In view of this, Boko Haram is seen in some quarters as a creation of a powerful northern clique of the PDP to ensure that President Goodluck Jonathan did not succeed in office. To them, the zoning formula of the ruling party which should have guaranteed stability and smooth rotation of power among ethnic and regional blocs was not followed and was seen as marginalization and exclusion of some sections {failed-state theory}. To have allowed a deadly and powerful non-state actor such as the Boko Haram terror group to be formed and flourished under whatever guise shows the weakness (failed-state theory) of the Nigerian state and her instrument of checks and balances

However, if power shifts either way, one will see and hear political voices from the other side threatening havoc and running down the government at the center. The Boko

Haram is not really different from the Niger delta militants in their struggle. The north was perceived by a section of the political divides to be using Boko Haram as its own instrument to wrest political power from the south. This perception was a prevalent norm within some segments of the then ruling PDP government (Zoaka, April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

In relation to zoning and rotation of presidency, Zoaka posits that to some extent, it will reduce the insurgency, but it cannot solve the problem completely. This to him is due to the few bourgeoisies that are controlling the Nigerian politics. Individuals are responsible for these groups as their instrument of merchandise. This to Zoaka is a sign of the weakness of the Nigerian state where individuals are stronger than the state which actually should be checking their conducts through the instrumentality of its institutions (failed-state theory). As power shift among the political zones if it does not serve their interest, they will still motivate the youth to cause mayhem. Zoning of power will address and reduce to some extent the crises, in the sense that, no region in Nigeria will cry for marginalization. However, it is the cabal that is fanning the embers of violence to destroy the country when things don't go their way (Zoaka, April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

#### **4.3.3 Economic motivation**

It has clearly been noted that poverty breeds hatred, anger, envy and conflict. Poverty is believed to be the source of many of the social and economic crimes being perpetuating in the society today. Acute poverty in the midst of economic growth and opulence by the elite class leads to feelings of frustration in the society. Mistrust, violent crime such as robbery, crises and all sort of agitations are traced to economic

hopelessness in the midst of huge resources. For Nigeria to end extremism, it has to urgently address the prevalent poverty ravaging millions of her citizens. Economic deprivation is a clear sign of state failure (Both failed-state and frustration-aggression theories).

The north is the worst hit by poverty in Nigeria. Muzan rightly put it this way:

*In Northern Nigeria, where over 70 per cent of the population lives under the internationally-defined poverty line, it is easy to see how any demagogue or religious extremist can mobilize the poor and destitute as instruments for his own political goals. There is the added factor of youth unemployment, especially within the growing stratum of university graduates. When people are pushed to the lowest levels of desperation and hopelessness, they can fall easy prey to religious demagogues who offer them a sense of belonging (Muzan, 2014).*

Aro (2011) observes in his work that about half the population of Nigeria are living on less than a dollar per day despite her natural endowments. The north eastern part of the country where Boko Haram insurgence started is the poorest part of the country.

Table 4.3 shows the percentage of poverty across the six geo-political zones of the country.

Table 4.4

*Percentage of Poverty level according to Regions in Nigeria.*

North East	72.2%
North West	71.2%
North Central	67%
South West	43%
South South	36.1%
South East	26.7%

Adapted from Bureau of statistics Report, Abuja, (2012)

The statistics in the table above show that the level of poverty in the north is clearly higher with the north-east being the highest compared with those of the other regions in the country. It therefore means, the north-eastern zone of Nigeria which is the birth place of the Boko Haram insurgency is the poorest zone with over 72% poor people. It is also clear that some of the unemployed are also graduates who could not find gainful employment for a living. Rotberg argues that nation-states fail because they (these states) are convulsed by internal violence which hinder them from the delivery of political goods to the citizenry (Rotberg, 2003). The severe lack of employment opportunities in the north where even qualified graduates are jobless thereby making them cheap tools for thuggery necessitated the massive recruitment and radicalization of youth by the Boko Haram insurgence. It therefore, demonstrates that the failure of the Nigerian state in addressing the economic needs of the teeming youth brought about frustration which led to the ravaging Boko Haram violence in the country (failed-state and frustration-aggression theories).

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

The motivational factors that brought about the emergence of the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency as discussed above include negligence of governance, ethno-political, economic, environmental, constitutional bias and ideological factors. Other factors identified are corruption, unemployment which were found to be key in raising the level of frustration and discontent among citizenry leading to insurrections and violent conflicts of different shades in the land. These factors are in themselves not exhaustive but overlap sometimes.

However, it should be clearly noted that there is a difference in their pursuits. Niger Delta group seeks for the reclaim of their devastated environment. They agitate for resource control and self-determination as a result of the negative impacts of oil exploration on their material and human world. Oil resource and the environment are their key motivations of the Niger Delta militants. On the other, Boko Haram, according to the group is driven by their ideological desire for strict application of the Sharia law in northern Nigeria which is highly contested by this study.

Though, Boko Haram uses religious ideology as the platform on which its attacks are launched, this study strongly contends that Boko Haram is a political group based on its demands and statements. For Boko Haram to have challenged the secularity of the Nigerian state and contesting western civilizations and traditions as well as revealing the corruption in the Nigerian system that feeds its predatory ruling class. Also, the group established its political caliphate with the headquarters in Gwoza town, Borno, with their Shura-council and Abubakar Shekau as its Amir, having their courts and police.

This chapter therefore explains the frustration-aggression trap thus: Due to inefficiency and ineffectiveness in tackling corruption, environmental degradation, ethnic and insincerity by governments over the years in Nigeria which fail in addressing the causal factors that brought about frustration, the people of both Niger Delta and North-eastern Nigeria are trapped in frustration thereby creating a vicious chain of aggression which led to violence in those regions. To escape the frustration-aggression trap, it means those causal factors discussed above must be frontally tackled.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **EVALUATION OF SECURITY THREATS POSED BY NIGER DELTA-MILITANTS AND BOKO-HARAM INSURGENTS TO NIGERIA**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

Since the return of democracy in 1999, the security threats in Nigeria have been quite worrying as the state of her security has been deteriorating on a daily basis. Specifically, Nigeria has been bedeviled by security threats with devastating human and material losses posed significantly by Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgents. The Nigeria's Fourth Republic, which began in 1999 with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo followed by Umaru Yar'Adua, Goodluck Jonathan and current President Muhammadu Buhari has been troubled with security threats and challenges, including communal and ethno-sectarian sparks. Violence, militancy, kidnapping and bombing specifically in the Niger Delta and the abduction of women and children particularly the abduction of 276 Chibok girls by the Boko Haram insurgents in the Northeast (Peters, 2014).

#### **5.2 The Security Threats in Nigeria**

Nigeria is strategic to the global security being the most populous African country and is also strategically located in the Gulf of Guinea which is a major source of global oil (energy). Nigeria since independence has not only been a regional player but has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping in the Congo, Sudan, Yugoslavia and many

other countries for global peace and stability. However, Nigeria herself is plagued with threats from within her borders. Criminal activities such as kidnapping, ethno-religious conflicts, electoral violence, robberies, resource-based criminality, sea piracy. However, the most threatening are the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency. While the Niger Delta militancy is resource-driven, and agitation for the control of oil proceeds 100% as their platform, the latter uses religion as its platform with tactics such as suicide bombing, attacks on security formations and installations. This section of the study takes a brief look at the tactics used by the violent insurgents to defy the Nigerian security.

### **5.2.1 Tactics Deployed by the Niger Delta Militants**

The Niger Delta militants deploy such tactics as Kidnapping of both government officials and oil workers (Table 3.1), use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vandalization of oil pipelines which causes about 50% of the oil spills which pollute the environment, Oil facilities sabotage, hijacking of oil vessels on the high sea by the militants made up of different gangs and criminal groups (Dambazau, 2014, Baird, 2010).

After the granting of amnesty to the Niger Delta militants who surrendered their arms by the Yar'Adua's administration, creation of Niger Delta Ministry, increased federal allocations to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the 13% derivation funds to the oil communities, one would have expected the end of militancy in the region giving the huge expenses federal government incurred monthly in training these ex-militants.

However, the amnesty programme was only another turn of events in the region as oil vessels are being hijacked on the high sea due to high rates of sea piracy and are exchanged for small arms and light weapons for more criminal activities in the creeks (Ewetan, 2014; Cullum, 2012; Ayissi, 2005). According to Chattam House, Report (2013), The Gulf of Guinea was responsible for over 30% of sea attacks in Africa between 2003 and 2011.

In that same report, it was stated that piracy around the Niger Delta is only second to that in the Horn of Africa (Somalia) coast. Furthermore, the increase in the activities of cult gangs in the oil region especially within the Port Harcourt sub-region, where there is heavy stealing of crude oil by these cultists to the tune of 100,000 barrels per day which cost the government about \$1bn monthly loss of revenue. The current fear of the government has always been if the Amnesty programme would succeed in terms of the end-result of peace and security of the region. This is not without the fear of the amount of money that is being given to the region with little or no tangible results to show for such huge flow of money to the south-south region.

### **5.2.2 Tactics deployed by the Boko Haram Insurgents**

The second but most existential threat to the national security of Nigeria is the extremist violence being unleashed by the Boko Haram sect based in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The Boko Haram were the first group to introduced suicide bombing into Nigeria just as the Niger Delta militants are the first to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Nigeria. Boko Haram recent attacks show some sophistication of hit and run tactics where the-would-be attacker is able to beat security antics to carry out attacks on their targets. Boko Haram engages as well in coordinated multi-location

bombings and release of martyrdom videos made by the bombers. The group also deploy drive-and-shoot tactics.

Given the porous nature of Nigerian borders, Boko Haram terrorists engage in transnational trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) into Nigeria. During the Libya 2011 uprisings, weapons that were either looted from the state armoury by rebels or were released by Muammar Gaddafi. Tunnels were being made and these weapons trafficked into Nigeria and other neighbouring countries like Mali, Sudan (Onuoha, 2013).

The Boko Haram have been involved in the making of bombs, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in places such as Kaduna, Kogi, Kano and Maiduguri to aid their operations having established their factories in those locations of their bases. Furthermore, the Boko Haram have been using women and the almajiris children (Quranic pupils) for bombings with women concealing AK 47 rifles and IEDs under their hijabs or to their bodies caught by an anti-terror group at Bulabulin, Monday market Maiduguri (The Nation, 2013).

Both Boko Haram and Niger Delta groups claim responsibility of attacks through very organized and central media releases after an attacks has been successfully launched (Agbo, 2011). Their attacks are with targets though differently. The Boko Haram insurgents target both soft and hard targets such as worship places, motor parks, market places, Banks, Traditional institutions, viewing centres, security check points, public institutions like schools, police stations, United Nations building, military and police barracks. The Niger Delta militants target mainly oil installations, oil platforms,

pipelines, oil vessels. Both groups are sophisticated in their deployment of weapons. Given the level of discipline, skills at arms and sophistication in operation by the Boko Haram for instance in their own attacks, one can only deduce that these insurgents definitely must have been trained by a more organized terrorist groups like ISIS, and al-Qaeda.

Above all, in terms of their mode of operation, the Boko Haram created a “state within the Nigerian state” which (typifies state failure) with a ‘supreme council’ who takes decisions, with own religious police and specialized arms such as the assault arm, medical arm, administrative and logistics amongst others. How has Boko Haram grown so sophisticated within this short period of less than ten years given its religious posturing to becoming so great a threat to the national security of the Nigerian state? From the arguments above, it is clear that the Nigerian state is a weak state with weak institutions which are unable to tackle uprisings that are provoked by political and economic factors which the state is not being able to checkmate.

According to Folarin and Oviasogie (2014), Nweke (2014), and Onuoha (2016), the emergence of Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram has made political, ethnic and religious intolerance as well as extremism more violent and disturbing thereby posing security threats. The two most notorious threatening groups that have defied Nigeria’s security, territoriality, authority as well as unity have been the Niger Delta militant group and Boko Haram insurgency. In the same vein, Dambazau (2014), Nwogwugwu and Ayomola (2015) emphasized that presently, the most serious security threats in Nigeria are those in the category of discontent or pro-autonomy agenda, where the

violent radicalism of Boko Haram insurgency and the ferocious militancy in the Niger Delta region can be categorized.

Therefore, among others, indications reveal that the security situation is plunging and threatening in Nigeria and this can be found in the 2010 appraisal report put out by While the Boko Haram insurgency uses religion conviction as its platform to engage in such atrocious strategies as suicide bombing, organized attacks on police as well as military installations, terrifying both urban and rural communities, similar to that is the Niger Delta militancy which is resource-based, and places the control of oil found in its region as its justification, knowing that about 90 percent of Nigeria's income derives from that natural resource (Dambazau, 2014).

the Business Environment in Nigerian States. The report highlights the appalling security threats in Nigeria along with the declaration made by the then President and commandant in Chief of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan that Boko Haram insurgency has infiltrated his government (failed-state reflection).

From the foregoing, threat to Nigeria's security is real, more so that the international community has beamed its light on Nigeria as a security threat in several spheres to both locals and foreigners alike (Nwogwugwu & Ayomola, 2015; Tella, 2012). For instance, the Fund for Peace (FFP) in its 2012 report, placed Nigeria as one of the topmost 10 failed countries in Africa as well as 14<sup>th</sup> in the world for the reason of rising wave of insecurity besides prevalent violence which has strengthen the applicability of the failed-state analysis in this study (Tella, 2012). Generally, security threats and tensions have turn out to be a common experience in the post-Cold

War period (Haokip, 2013; James & Özdamar, 2005). Therefore, Nnoli (1978) describes security challenges as social occurrences linked to interaction among members of diverse ethnic groups within a socio-political system symbolizes by language and culture.

As noted by BBC (18 Feb. 2009) the security threats posed by the Niger Delta militants has even heightened to Africa sub regional security concerns. The regional water ways in the Gulf of Guinea became more and more risky for any form of business, including fishing. It has reduced the frequency of mercantile ship movement and threatened to heighten regional tensions. For instance, Niger Delta militants were allegedly conscripted in a failed attempt to overthrow President Teodoro Obiang Nguema led government of Equatorial Guinea on the 17th of February 2009 (Amaraegbu, 2011).

Meanwhile, from the 1960 Congo conflict at the time Nigeria started funding and contributing troops for international peacekeeping, the nation has sustained consistency as a regional force in both the United Nations as well as regional peacekeeping missions, accordingly contributing to world peace (Dambazau, 2014). However, Nigeria is at this time confronting serious internal security threats, the most serious ones being the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. All these security challenges undoubtedly pose some threats to the social, economic and political stability of not only Nigeria, but also of the African continent, especially the West African sub-region, where more than half the population comes from Nigeria.

In view of this, the Federal government of Nigeria through the Central Bank of Nigeria has since continuously appropriated enormous funds in the national budget for defense to tackle internal security threats in spite that it has denied capital projects in the education, health, agriculture and construction sectors the needed attention. While the Niger Delta may be one of the most resource-rich regions in the world, it however remains stalled in sequences of security threats that perpetuate underdevelopment and portend restiveness. As can be discovered through a more in-depth analysis of the Niger Delta, the problems that plague the region are multifaceted in addition to been profoundly rooted and threaten Nigeria peaceful co-existence (Taft & Haken, 2015).

The series of security threats that have so often beleaguered Nigeria and particularly the Niger Delta are aggravated greatly by the hugely uneven sharing of resources from the oil industry which are accumulated at the top and hardly ever trickle down to profit local communities. Adding to these pressures according to Haken et al. (2013) is the problem of life-threatening environmental degradation in a region that produces 60 % of natural resources of Nigeria overall source of revenue. Amplifying further, Haken et al. (2013) noted that increased social disintegration as well as long- simmering minority tensions also add coatings of complication to the security challenge in the Niger Delta.

From the second angle, it is evident that across the media, as well as in the minds of many people, Boko Haram insurgency is another source of security threats in Nigeria. Specifically, the patterns of security threats posed by Boko Haram ranges from abduction, criminality, intra-communal, inter-communal, ethno-sectarian, political,

and separatist threats and attacks (Murphy 2014). Similarly, abundant literature exists, detailing the series of security threats and major attacks of Boko Haram, since 2009.

For instance, Abimbola and Adesote (2012) cited several Nigerian newspapers in their compilation of Boko Haram attacks between July 26, 2009 and April 30, 2012. Also, Bayode (2013) provides data of 60 major Boko Haram attacks between July 27, 2009 and January 19, 2013. Boko Haram insurgency has become so rampant that it has practically become a daily affair, with the group choosing where and when to operate unhindered, killing thousands of innocent civilians in their daily walks of life and threatening the entire security of Nigeria.

In the words of Alozieuwa (2012), one of the aftermaths of the security threats imposed by the Boko Haram insurgence on Nigerian society has been the emergence of multitude of theories that endeavour to explain the motivation of the local terrorist group. Contrasting the Niger Delta militancy which preceded it, and which centered its aspiration for a separate state from Nigeria on decades of conspiratorial abandonment by the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta region.

Nweke (2014) noted that Boko Haram insurgent has refused to articulate and formally communicate its grievances, separately from its affirmed wish for the strict interpretation of Islamic Law in Nigeria. The security threats posed also grows out of the changing tactics in the operations of the insurgent. A case in point was Boko Haram terror operation, which at the outset targeted security agencies and properties as well

as personnel, has extended to include member of the public and non-government targets (Nkechi, 2013; Bamidele, 2016).

Meanwhile, the security threats can be adduced to both internal and external influences. According to Alozieuwa (2012) and Adibe (2012), the security threats alleged to have emerged within Internal actors which comprised of some discontented power elites who, having lost power, are determined to create problem for Nigeria under another leadership, as well as the administration itself, which may be funding the crisis in order to draw southern support behind the administration. In addition to the opinion (in some quarters) that Boko Haram may be a secret society created by some 'invisible hands' that are Bent on destroying the north ahead of the last election so as to prevent or weaken its bid for the presidency at that time.

On the other hand, evaluating the security threats from the angle of the external forces perspective has two dimensions. Firstly, according to Nkechi (2013), the threats portray the insurgency as part of worldwide Islamic jihad and focuses on the sect's acquaintances with international terror groups. From another perspective, the threats posed by Boko Haram was viewed as conspiratorial and an ostentatious line of attack to achieve the foretold disintegration of Nigeria by 2015.

More so, assessing the security threats further, the obvious fact that the group created a "state within a state," with its own cabinet, its own religious police force, as well as a large farm, which appealed to more and more people under its control by offering welfare aids, food, in addition to shelter make the existence of Boko Haram an issue

for concern (Nkechi, 2013), again for a reason that the source of the group's money is not clear up till the present time that the group is decimated by the Nigerian Army.

However, according to Walker (2012) Boko Haram security threats go further than just killing as the group also rob banks, cash-in-transit convoys, and successful businesses, not only in Maiduguri but also in Bauchi, where the group is belief to have made approximately 500 million naira (about \$3 million, or £2 million) from such robberies. Unfortunately, many of the individuals the group attracted were refugees from the wars over the border in Chad as well as jobless Nigerian youths. Therefore, how germane these notions and perceptions are in explaining the security threats in Nigeria posed by Boko Haram is the question to which this thesis addresses.

As noted by Sergie and Johnson (2014) the reality of security threats becomes obvious in Nigeria every time a bomb detonates in the market, when police posts are attacked and weapons stolen, banks robbed, or a village is ravaged, all of which are traceable and attributed generically in the media to Boko Haram. Meanwhile, the security threats was heighten by the ineffectiveness of security agencies. Following renewed violence in late 2010, the government has struggled to both anticipate and respond to the attacks against its own forces as well as the civilian population. According to a June 2014 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, numerous factors hinder the ability of security forces, including both military and police, to efficiently deal with the threats emanating from insurgency groups. Main and foremost is a continued lack of collaboration and coordination between different security entities, both at the national and local levels.

Elaborating this further, Taft and Haken (2015) stressed that the security threat posed by Boko Haram became pronounced due to corruption, inadequate resources and training, as well as lack of determination among soldiers, particularly from penurious areas in the Northeast, likewise compound the problem. As corroborated by the US former Secretary of State John Kerry (2016), when Nigerian President Buhari took over office as President, he inherited a military that was demotivated and underpaid. Much of the military budget was looted and found their way into the pockets of top government officials and the Generals. We got a report that 50 people including politicians stole about \$9bn which is always very difficult to prosecute (Channels TV, January 24th, 2016).

As a result of this, local communities, in self-protection, resorted to establishing their own vigilante groups to ward off incursions, together with networks of informants who try to act in an early warning capacity. In both cases, attacks against both government troops and local vigilante groups have been more and more deadly, with the families of soldiers as well as informants being targeted for retaliation.

According to Ekpenyong (2014) the suicide bomb explosion at the Force Headquarters Abuja and the sect claimed of responsibility for the bombing of the UN edifice in Abuja are the real proof that Boko Haram is a serious threat to national security. Reiterating the level of security threat posed by Boko Haram, Herald (2011) described also that the crudeness and tactical maneuvering of the group in addition to the number of deaths as well as harms at the end of every of the insurgence attack without the intervention of the police due mainly because they are ill-equipped and ill-prepared for such emergency despite the provision of billions of naira to the Nigeria Police

Force and the office of the National Security Adviser. In another instance, the apparent security threats from Boko Haram sect even after the supposed defeat is extremely much real.

Consequently, annoyance at the federal government's inability to defend her citizens as well as sustain stability has led to warning by some Christian armed movements such as Akhwakt Akwop, who said they will be constrained to hit back (Ekpenyong, 2014). Security is supreme for the survival of any nation and its citizens, the unreliable security structure with outmoded equipment and visionless approach is no longer effective and is not a good measure for the Nigerian state. This Day writes that "the atmosphere of insecurity currently inflicted on the Nation by the Boko Haram crises points to poor use of pre-emptive intelligence and a coherent strategy in the management of the security issues arising therefrom. In view of the above assertion, this paper seeks to unravel how Boko Haram has constituted itself as a national security threat to the continual and harmonious co-existence of the component nations that make up the Nigeria state.

Meanwhile, the security threats posed by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is not only about the cruelty of either its terror campaigns, or the sect's self-confessed mission to impose Islamic law on the country, but about the mix-up concerning the exact basis of the violence (Alozieuwa, 2012). Based on this evaluation, it essentially shows that Nigeria has no way out yet to the security threats. Though, in what appear to be positive turn around in the fight against Boko Haram when the new government of president Muhamadu Buhari took power, still the sect remains a serious security threat having been successfully attacking soft targets. Therefore, in order to understand the

numerous components stimulating security threats in Nigeria posed by Niger Delta militant and Boko Haram, it is worthwhile to evaluate some specific driving as well as confounding factors.

First, the high unemployment rate, predominantly among youth, in the Niger Delta has long been a major foundation of security threats as it has stimulated involvement in criminal gangs, militancy movements, as well as cult groups (Taft & Haken, 2015). Another critical security threat posed by Niger Delta insurgency was what Nigerians usually experience during elections, where powerful, local “godfathers” who are linked to specific militant groups, will often use young militant and cult members for intimidation and political thuggery. In relation to that, Haken et al., (2012) also revealed that larger criminal gangs also use younger cult members for route protection and security for their illegal oil bunkering activities.

In what appear to be one of the genesis of what metamorphoses into security threat, it has been widely recounted that oil companies, in order to secure their operations as well as provide safety for their personnel, have been known to make direct payments to cult gangs, which, from an outside perspective, can be hard to identify and differentiate. Likewise, beyond oil extortion, cultists function in several roles from bodyguards to hit men to arrangers of prostitution besides human trafficking rings. Consequently, in recent times, cults have also been associated in kidnapping and ransom syndicates (Haken et al., 2012).

Expatriating on the basis of security threat, Taft and Haken (2015) disclosed that in Nigeria, cult groups were customarily molded along indigenous lines comprising

elders and adults. Although cults exist all over the country, they are most widespread in the south, particularly the Niger Delta where they have established government of their own. Consequently, within this ever-changing social, economic and political environment over the past 20 years, cults became most rampant in tertiary education institutions. Meanwhile, some of the new dimension to security threats as painted by Amaraegbu (2011) saw to huge damage of oil installations, kidnapping of foreign (and later) indigenous oil workers, interruption of oil production and illegal oil trade or bunkering. As a country that depends on crude oil earnings as a major source of foreign exchange, disruption of oil production resulted in huge national budgetary deficits and fueling security threats.

At a number of times in Nigeria, militant groups activities which are harmful to peace of the nation has been observed as a time bomb which if not managed as well as checked will not only be a threat to Nigeria budding democracy but may be a serious security threats to the entire country (Akinyele, 2001). The militant group leaders most time believes in violence as means to settle grievances with government, other groups or even citizens and also to promotion their narrow-minded interests (Shittu, 2013). Therefore, the continuous impunity of these groups compelled a number of questions from the citizens, politicians as well as scholars. Several of these people were worried about the degree that the militant group leaders threaten the security, peace and solidity of Nigeria.

Another dimension to security threats as posed by both Niger Delta militant and Boko Haram insurgent in Nigeria is the widespread and burgeoning kidnapping trend. According to Asua (2013), the root and rise in kidnapping in the Niger Delta can be

traced to what Townsend (2008) referred to as natural resource nationalism- the predisposition to seek more shares of the proceeds from natural resources. It is also compounded by what Akpan (2010) termed accumulation politics which is the tendency for the ruling class to be involved in ceaseless accumulation of natural resource rents amassing from the region through careful act of marginalization and deprivation. Corroborating these perspectives, Akpan (2010) reiterated that Niger Delta is rich in petroleum oil and has been explored by multinational corporations and the Federal Government of Nigeria amid high incidence of poverty, absence of infrastructures and deprivations of the locals and oil communities.

Highlighting the trend, Ezeibe and Eze (2012) argued from the criminal law perspective that kidnapping is the wholesale taking away or conveyance of a person against the person's will usually to confine the person in false imprisonment without legal authority. This act may be done largely to extract ransom or in furthermore of another crime, or in connection with a child custody as a fall out of marital dispute. Similarly, Asua (2013) and Emanemua and Akinlosotu (2016) disclosed that kidnapping has, of recent, assume alarming dimension in the Niger Delta region opening up opportunities and avenues for dangerous degeneration. Its occurrence and impacts started to be felt this early 21st century, a phenomenon induced by oil resource exploration.

According to Ogonnaya and Ehigiamusoe (2013) a 2007 statistics released by Niger Delta Development Monitoring and Corporate Watch (NIDDEMCO), a non-governmental organization, shows that between 1999 and 2007, a total of 308 hostage taking incidents occurred in the region, unfortunately however, as at 2016 the trend

has reached alarming proportion. Corroborating this view, Badiora (2015) using crime review figures for four randomly selected states in Nigeria, noted that cases of kidnapping has become a serious security threat because it is consistently on the increase in Nigeria.

When the spate of kidnapping started in the creeks of the Niger Delta region some years ago, nobody believed it would become a security threat across Nigeria. For the moment, Aghedo (2015) in his study disclosed that though since 2009, about 30,000 Niger Delta militants had been disarmed and reintegrated however, the amnesty has indirectly stimulated further security threats among which are oil theft, sea piracy and ransom kidnapping.

Steadily, kidnapping particularly has even become a 'money-spinning business' for many of Nigeria's jobless youths in the South South, South East, South West and other parts of the country. Originally, it was the kidnapping of expatriates that was rampant in the South. However today, the circumstances have become so bad that "nobody is safe". Interestingly, armed robbers and other petty criminals are fast deserting their trades for the more profitable business of kidnapping. According to Mac-Leva (2016), a report by ASI Global Response on kidnapping displays that the victims of kidnapping are mainly the rich in society, politicians or their family members.

Similarly, the security threats posed by Niger Delta militants also extent to vandalism which mostly lead to loss of lives as well as properties. For Ezebi (2011) oil pipeline vandalization denotes the destruction of oil pipelines. The miscreants break the pipelines particularly the ones carrying petrol, they in turn siphon the petrol into tanks,

plastics containers as well as drums for sale in the black market. This act, it's an act of sabotage and a capital offence under the Petroleum Act and also covered by the Criminal Justice Decree of 1975". Vandalization of oil pipelines is prevalent in the Niger Delta and it is mainly conducted by the militants (Phil-Eze, 2004). Echoing the seriousness to security of Nigeria, NNPC reported that as at the year 2000, over 400 cases of oil pipeline vandalization were recorded as against 50 cases recorded in 1999 (Phil-Eze, 2004). This suggests that the act of oil pipeline vandalization has geometrically increased especially with the inception of Nigeria's current democracy (Ezebi, 2011).

The key feature that underscores and provides the reasons for the security threats being experienced in Nigeria and posed by Niger Delta militant boils down to environmental devastation that oil company activities have enforced on the lives of millions of Niger Deltans, with tacit consent of successive Nigerian governments through their non-implementation or enforcement of enacted national policies (Allen, 2012).

Taking a closer look at the concerns around the above highlighted major security threats, it is evident that they have been boosted significantly by unrestricted access to arms. The security impact of illegal small arms movement is not restricted to one region of Nigeria but majorly in the region where Niger Delta militants exists and where Boko Haram insurgence operates.

A lot of literature (UNDP, 2013; Wepundi, Nthiga, Kabuu, Murray, & Alvazzi del Frate, 2012; Ochieng Onguje, Kyalo Musoi & Otieno, 2010) on small arms revolved around their role in security threats but little focus on their linkage to those who use

them such as Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram in Nigeria respectively. For instance, with aid of small arms and improvised explosive devices alone, over 3,500 people have been killed in violence, while tens of thousands more internally displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency (Onuoha, 2013). Therefore, this study sought to establish the threat posed by the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria.

Bamidele (2016) revealed that in establishing the security threats posed by Boko Haram's activities against Nigeria, scholars' arguments have remained divided. On the one hand are academics who linked the violence of Boko Haram as a consequence of religious fanaticism, while in contrast, others consider the proliferation of small arms as well as light weapons as the vital cause.

Agreeing with the impact of arms proliferation as a cause of security threat in Nigeria, Ismail (2016) reiterated that Nigerian government need to harmonize with other African countries to fight against the spreading of arms trade in addition to providing an adequate security to Nigeria borders, sea and air ports as well as to provide a satisfactory economic policies that will discourage ostracism of masses. Restating the level of security threats being aided through borders, Onuoha (2013) said that the revelation by former Nigeria's Minister of Interior, Abba Moro, that there are over 1,499 illegal entry routes in addition to 84 regular and legal officially recognized entry routes into Nigeria, confirms the very porous state of these borders which allows prohibited transnational arms trading. In Adamawa State alone for instance, there are about 25 illegitimate routes into Nigeria from neighboring countries. Consequently

therefore, terrorists such as Boko Haram and other smugglers take advantage of this porous routes to traffic small arms as well as light weapons into Nigeria.

Furthermore, the most alarming in the explosion of arms by these Niger Delta militant groups is that these arms are not just in the hands of group leaders, but also with the violent prone youth, who constitute the majority membership. According to Florquin and Berman (2005) the Niger Delta ethnic groups in Rivers state alone are in custody of an arsenal that comprise of assault rifles (Czech SA Vz. 58, AK-47, G3, FN FAL and FN FNC), as well as light machine guns, pump-action shotguns, in addition to home-made guns. According to Isa (2005) it has been projected that there are presently about 3 million small arms as well as light weapons in the country; almost 80 per cent of which were acquired illegitimately and are in unlawful, private hands.

In another security threats prone zone, Jos Plateau State in Nigeria, Florquin and Berman (2005) worried that a field research carried out acknowledged the following arsenal as the main weapon varieties used by the ethnic groups in the protracted conflict: sub- machine guns, AK-47, double barrel shotguns, G3 assault rifles, pistols, revolvers, light machine guns, craft single- and locally made bombs.

Although the proliferation of small arms in addition to light weapons have not been addressed adequately however, there are evidence that they do contribute significantly to level of security threats Nigeria is experiencing through Niger Delta militant and Boko Haram insurgent (Wepundi, Nthiga, Kabuu, Murray, & Alvazzi, 2012). The proliferation of small arms is a multifaceted and gradually more international issue. Similarly, the problems triggered by small arms are principally regional, sub-regional

as well as internal in nature (Bedeski, Andersen, & Darmosumarto, 1998). Therefore, the most noteworthy reasons for security threats in Nigeria posed by Niger Delta militant and Boko Haram are ineptitude of security agencies, burgeoning of organized gangs, and proliferation of illegal small arms.

While the Niger Delta militancy was a struggle for justice, that of Boko Haram's has been a struggle for control of the state and superiority over the security forces (Nweke, 2014; Onuoha, 2016). Therefore, Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe (2013) deduce that what the two terrorist groups symbolize in terms of security threats with vicious abilities is frightening and such calls for attention. The reality of these security challenges between 2005 and 2015 revealed that the Nigerian State has not efficiently equipped its security agencies with 21st century equipment and that it has not given its military personnel the essential training for the much needed capacity to defend the country from the emerging security threats.

Though, since the assumption of the present government, the security agencies have lived up to expectations in tackling the security threats however much more still need to be addressed. For instance, several factors have been identified to have encouraged as well as contributed to security threats in Nigeria, there is no doubt that poor governance at all levels of authority are crucial in an attempt to explain the problem. That is why Dambazau (2014) also concludes that insecurity becomes threatening more in corrupt as well as poorly governed environments with weak institutions. Similarly, this evaluation has shown that the security of any nation cannot be guaranteed without a robust law enforcement establishment with high level of proficiency.

Therefore, to reduce security threats which Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgency posed to Nigeria as well as future threats, community policing should be reinforced and effective early warning and early response mechanisms should be established. Similarly, civic demilitarization should be encouraged where indigenous community members actively involve through diplomatic means.

### **5.3 Effects on national security: Loss of servicemen, threat of national disintegration**

Nigeria as a country has frequently found herself in the situation of confronting the conflict of religious, ethnic and political nature as well as divergence in the last 60 years (Bamidele, 2011). However, the level of threat of national disintegration as posed by the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram in recent years is unprecedented (Ahokegh, 2012). Little wonder that Igbokwu, Orhero and Akpokighe (2014) emphasizes that the emergence of Boko Haram insurgents and Niger Delta militants have battered all necessary fundamentals needed for peaceful cohabitation of a country such as Nigeria. Therefore, the objectives of Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants is to deepen discord and hostility capable of causing disaffection among Nigerians.

In the light of loss of servicemen and threat of national disintegration, an interviewee asserts that when have a group that is capable of challenging a national army and can decimate troops, you really know we have a serious threat before us as a nation. We have lost a lot of solders in the Boko Haram struggle Abagen, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2016). The insurgency has refused to go down but it is being transformed rather into a full-fledged terrorism. As of today, it crisscrosses Nigeria-Cameroon borders, Nigeria-Chad-Niger

borders around Lake Chad unhindered due to the porous nature of our borders (Onuoha, 2013; Pham, 2012).

That is the most reason the situation has lingered over time. It has even lingered longer than Nigeria's civil war. Therefore, it is clearly a national security threat and activities by such groups, if not checkmated, will lead to a fragmentation of the Nigerian state itself. As a matter of fact, Boko Haram declared a caliphate republic in Gwoza, haven held a large territories there for a while. They were in control, hoisted their flags and were even moving to have their currency and all that so, if such is allowed to happen, the Nigerian state would cease to function effectively. It also demonstrate lapses or failure of the state

No two countries can operate within each other like that, at least not in that manner. So clearly, their activities stand against the Nigerian constitution. The supreme law in Nigeria is the constitution, so, there's no meaningful or reasonable political authority that will tolerate that. If that is done, it is simply asking for the disintegration of the Nigerian state. So their activities carry a lot of security implications (Abagen, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2016).

In relation to that, according to Ayinde (2016), the former president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo raised an alarm on the activities of the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram sect claiming that the security threats posed by these groups are serious warning to the disintegration of the Nigerian nation. The gruesome attacks by these violent groups had ruptured the unity of the country therefore play a part in the increasing threat of disintegration of Nigeria. Similarly, Ahokegh (2012) emphasized

that the Boko Haram acceptance of responsibility for several bombings and snip activities in the northern and central Nigeria, is seriously placing the nation at the threshold of disintegration.

Buttressing this claim, Igbokwu, Orhero and Akpokighe (2014) disclosed that Boko Haram insurgents tend to attack non-indigenes and properties possessed by people of other faiths who are considered as foreign in those areas. On why the threats posed by these two groups should be a source of concern, Iwundu and Thom-Otuya (2013) reiterated that though every country on earth is faced with the problem of security challenges in her progression of national development however, the security challenges threatening Nigeria is capable of disintegrating the country. Recounting the experiences of Nigerians during her civil war from 1966 to 1970, Iwundu and Thom-Otuya (2013) therefore called for restraint and academic intervention in other not to cause apathy, disunity and human suffering.

The security threats bedeviling Nigeria is a serious warning to the country integration. The seriousness of the threats has drawn the attention of the United Nations as well as the United States of America that have independently conveyed deep concern on the state of affairs in Nigeria then called on Nigerians to be up and doing in handling Boko Haram and Niger Delta militant to avoid previous experience. In the past, most threat to national integration and unity of Nigeria was handled with ruthless force and coercion. For instance, Iwundu and Thom-Otuya (2013) noted that an attempt by the Igbo tribe to break away from Nigeria resulted to a civil war in 1966. Similarly, another attempt of Isaac Adaka Boro to secede the Niger Delta region from the federation landed him in jail.

The recent attempt by MASSOB frontrunner Umezurike to re-ignite the Biafran spirit landed him in jail while Nnamdi Kanu who has been leading a group tag Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is currently facing treasonable felony trial. But going by the statement credited to the Nobel Laureate Professor, Wole Soyinka, the recent security challenges posed by Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgents is already drifting Nigeria (failed-state argument) (Oderemi, 2013). In relation to this, Sahara Reporters as far back as 2012 re-echoed the suggestion by foreign security agencies that Nigeria could disintegrate by 2015. Though, the prediction did not come to fruition but all the indices that necessitated the forecast are still starring the country in the face.

#### **5.4 Government Counter-Measures and Their Effectiveness**

Successive governments in Nigeria have not been able to appreciate and adequately deal with the growing trends of insurgency in the country both in the Niger Delta and in the North-eastern parts of the country. The following are the key measures taken by the Nigerian governments in addressing the escalation of insurgency in the country.

##### **5.4.1 Government Counter-Measures in the Niger Delta**

In view of the threats posed by the Niger Delta militants and the need for solution to the restiveness in the region, Nigeria had responded by oscillating between coercion and peaceful bargaining in addressing the challenges of the region. This process of choosing between coercion and bargaining by the government in resolving the conflicts is termed “the carrots and sticks approach” (Oluwaniyi, 2010). Government policies have been back and forth, vacillating between the two alternate options in solving the insurgent crises the Delta region has witnessed over the years.

Enumerating the responses of the government over time, Omotola (2007) highlights the creation of separate federal States in the Niger Delta in 1987, 1991 and 1996, respectively. Also, Osaghae (2008) disclosed that the increase in the percentage of revenue allocation based on derivation from 1.5% to 3% in 1992 which was later raised to 13% in 1999. The emergence of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw man, as Vice-President of Nigeria in 2007 from the south-south, the first from the region to occupy such a very high political position in Nigeria. This was also a political way of dousing the tension in the region.

Similarly, Jonathan's swearing-in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in May 2010 following the death of President Umaru Yar'Adua and his subsequent election in May 2011 for another four-year term was an indication of some sort of settlement for the people of the south-south region Nigeria to assuage their agitations. The establishment of development agencies, such as Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB), Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), are all viable counter-measures towards peace and development in the Niger Delta (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012).

These counter-measures in form of development commissions were established over the years as a direct results of the recommendations of Willink Commission of 1958 to evolve strategies and advice government on how the region could be developed. The commission recommended that the Niger Delta area be assigned a 'Special Development Area' status and a development board be established for them. The first development board for the Niger Delta people was established in 1961 based on the recommendations of the Willink Commission of 1958 (Willink Commission, 1958).

NDDC has been lauded in some parts of the region for its strides in alleviating the infrastructural needs of the people, however, given the environmental challenges in the region, much is still left to be desired. Pundits and many critics see the NDDC as a platform for looting and not really an interventionist agency as intended.

Majority of the appointments into the board of Directors of this commission and other interventionist agencies are not based on competence and merit but on ‘man know man’. Contracts are awarded to outsiders and mostly to cronies and relations of those in power. Therefore, on paper one would see that NDDC has achieved a lot with billions of naira spent on fictitious projects but little or nothing on ground to show for the billions spent.

Eyem, in his view on government counter-measures and their impacts on the Niger Delta region expressed that:

*In the Niger Delta, like it is said in most cases, the constitution gives them 13% of the oil revenue; there’s a Ministry of Niger Delta affairs; there is also the NDDC but the question is where is the money going? The elites of the region should be held to answer where and what they are doing with this huge sums of money coming to the region on a monthly basis without tangible results on ground (Eyem, August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2016).*

The Niger Delta elites are part of the Nigerian elites and they control some parts of the wealth of the nation, have access to this wealth and misappropriate them as they want. Why are the Niger Delta people not asking their leaders account for the 13 percent derivation funds from the federation account? This and many more questions are not on the lips of most of the people of the region when the Niger Delta question comes up. These are some of the issues raising tension in the region. It is felt that if these

issues are looked into properly it will reduce some of the challenges facing the people, and could finally address the core agitations of the zone.

The Ministry of Niger Delta created by the administration of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in 2008 was one key strategy envisioned to fast-track youth empowerment and the core infrastructural development of the Niger Delta. The ministry was mandated from the onset to be responsible for the construction of roads, provision of social services and to execute federal projects allocated to the region. However, the creation of the ministry was received with mixed reaction especially by the militants due to the fact that they were not consulted before it was established.

To the youths it was a ruse and was regarded as being dead on arrival (Obi, 2010; Asuni, 2009). The ministry is nine years since its creation yet the agitation and concerns of the people have not in any way been addressed. This clearly shows that there is a disconnect between the government and the people in transforming policies into reality. A clear challenge confronting the government in her quest to solve the problems of the Niger Delta region is the duplication and ambiguity of the functions of the federal agencies. The Niger Delta ministry and the NDDC have overlapping mandates and functions which cause conflicts of interest and this would bring about lack of initiatives.

The amnesty is a good idea that is addressing the human capital challenges in the region already. If there is true commitment shown by government with proper implementation, it will work just as it worked under President Yar'Adua's government. The government also has to earn the trust of the people in the Niger Delta

by actually pursuing the amnesty programme without fear or favour, and there are so many questions to be asked how this scheme will be implemented. There are lot of sentiments that cannot be ruled out like ethnicity and religion when talking about Nigeria (Eyem, August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

The evaluation of State responses shows that the establishment of the OMPADEC and NDDC would have been the most outstanding institutional answers to a deepening crisis and security threats in the region. However, they remain insufficient and ineffective, typified by increasing environmental degradation, unbearable poverty, rising tension and ethnic militias, as well as general underdevelopment (Shola, 2007). The inadequacy of these responses may not be isolated from political influences, corruption, and other causal structural problems that render them superficial.

In line with the determination of President Umaru Yar'Adua who promised to address the Niger Delta conflicts following the failure of the previous administrations, he instituted amnesty to all militants, launched arms reduction, and increased the percentage of oil revenue to the Delta to 25% from the current 13%; established regulations that compel oil companies to have insurance bonds; and made the enforcement of critical environmental laws a national priority (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008). In the same vein, Vanguard (2009) wrote that Yar'Adua's administration granted amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta.

However, notwithstanding the achievements of the amnesty programme, some inadequacies were revealed among which are the fact that about 80 percent of the budget had gone on payments of consultants and contractors, with 20 per cent dedicated to rehabilitation of the ex-militants; the over bloating of the numbers of registered ex-militants; the continued detention of several militants; some of the training centers falling short of acceptable standards in addition to operating with inadequate facilities (Obi & Rustad, 2011). Consequently, according to Oluduro and Oluduro (2012) it shows that Nigerian government has not really learnt any lesson from the previous failed developmental programmes such as the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB), Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA), Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), which failed to deliver on the basis of top-down approach.

On the other hand, the idea of granting amnesty to Boko Haram has been justified against the background of amnesty granted to the Niger Delta militants. But on the contrary, the motive behind Boko Haram's violent activities is one that is difficult to identify (Alozieuwa, 2012) therefore, the moves for amnesty for the Boko Haram members may be ill-advised. Though, the stick and carrot approach tried by previous government to handle Boko Haram have failed to make a lasting impact, different approaches, including more and sustained dialogue and peaceful resolution of the crisis would not be out of place for lasting peace, more so that Malvesti (2002) concludes that reconciliation and mediation are very powerful tools for mitigating terrorism.

Currently in the Niger Delta, the Nigeria military has on-going operations code-named 'Operation Restore Hope'; 'Operation Pulo Shield' and 'Operation Crocodile Smile'.

These operations are hallmarks of response typical of developing states to quell tensions and violent agitations and protests. Maximum repression by the military in the Nigeria had not led to colossal loss of lives and properties but has consistently affected the trust of the people of the region on the government and the multinational oil corporations.

The use of force and coercion by the Nigerian state against the Niger Delta agitators only worsen the fortunes of the oil companies operating in the region. Excessive military actions such as one used by General Sani Abacha, Nigerian former head of state who hanged a renowned Niger Delta activist Ken Saro-wiwa and others (Pilkington, 2009); the invasion of Odi community in Bayelsa state as a response to the killing of Nigerian security forces by criminal gangs within the community (Omeje, 2004). Persistent increase in militant activities in the Niger Delta creeks led to increase in deployment of military troops to the Delta region to reinforce land, water and air. This reinforcement is purely for the purpose of destroying militant camps emerging in the areas such as the Gbaramatu invasion by the military due to the criminal activities of the militants in the community (Dode, 2012; Courson, 2009).

#### **5.4.2 Counter-Measures against Boko Haram Insurgency**

The re-emergence of the Boko Haram insurgence in 2010 after the death of the leader Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 took the Nigerian state by the storm. Both the government and the military were not expecting the kind organized and precise attacks that the group meted out to the affected communities. The group was thought to fizzle out immediately it re-emerged given its unorganized, untrained fighters before the killing of its leader but it has survived even the fiercest onslaught by the Nigerian and

Multi-national Joint Task Force (MJTF). Some of the counter-measures taken by the Nigerian state against the Boko Haram insurgency are expressed the following paragraphs (Onuoha, 2013).

The government tried several methods and strategies to dismantle the group since its inception but the group survived. There have been a consistent increase in the deployment of troops across states in the north-eastern part of Nigeria particularly in Maiduguri, Borno state, which is the main stronghold of the sect since the sect emerged. The Nigerian government under President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe on May 15, 2013, to bring the rampaging terrorists under checks and the full control of the military but the impact of the programme was short-lived. The insurgents deployed suicide bombings and other tactics such as use of human shield, to survive and maintain their attacks against the communities and military formations across affected states (Onuoha, 2014; Agbiboa, 2013).

President Goodluck in his recorded state of emergency speech, declared:

*What we are facing is not just militancy or criminality, but a rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups which pose a very serious threat to national unity and territorial integrity. Jonathan further stated that 'it would appear that there is a systematic effort by insurgents and terrorists to destabilize the Nigerian state and test our collective resolve (BBC News, 2013; Fox News, 2013).*

There was the carrots and sticks approach to countering the Boko Haram menace by the Nigerian state during the past administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. The government set up a presidential committee headed by Turaki, minister of Special Duties under Jonathan to dialogue with the group to know their needs. At the state level, Governor Sherrif paid the group USD 620,000 to pacify them for the killing of

their leader however, the overtures and rapprochements to the group did not address their grievances (Agbibo, 2013; Aghedo, 2012).

The Federal government offered the group Amnesty and pardon by setting up a committee headed by the then minister of special duties with all options on the dialogue table. The committee was to advise the government on the possibility of granting the group pardon as it was the case with the Niger Delta militants but the group rejected all offers for dialogue and continued their merciless attacks. President Goodluck Jonathan then changed his approach, ordered deployment of over 8000 troops to the war theatre for a direct offensive against the insurgents after offer for dialogue and reconciliation was rejected by the group (Nwankpa, 2014; Associated Press, 2013).

### **5.5 State Failure, Security Compromise and Arms Proliferations**

The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria is being considered as a dangerous and threatening security situation. The human suffering in addition to the carnages caused by small arms have alerted the international community to the Importance of confronting the proliferation, accumulation and use of these kinds of weapons by Boko Haram insurgents and Niger Delta militants. However, it could also be argued that the mounting international concern in small arms is due to the lack of political will on the part of the international community to address the fundamental causes of internal conflicts especially the Niger Delta issues (Jekada, 2005).

On the issue of state failure, Akpa observed that: It should be seen from a broader systemic point of view. State failure should not be limited to the insurgency only. Insurgency is a symptom of a more general problem- the problem of state failure. One of the symptoms of a state failure is the involuntary movement of populations across vast areas of the state, internally displaced persons (IDPs). That is what is meant by involuntary movement of vast populations, it is also its functions. The state also fails when it begins to implode: implosion means a state begins to prey on itself. If one watches some of these insurgencies, particularly Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen attacks, you find a situation where even some states are preying on themselves. The same thing happens with the Niger delta. There are state officials that are involved in bunkering with those boys, this is corruption.

There are state officials and oil workers that encourage bunkering. In fact, the horrible thing we are beginning to understand is that the immediate past government even went as far as giving contract to some leaders of the militants like, Tom Polo. The government gave them contracts to purchase arms and to protect the oil pipelines from vandalization for the Nigerian state and today it's those same arms they are using to fight the Nigerian military (Ering, 2013).

So when a state begins to prey on itself, it is also an example and symptom of state failure. The Niger Delta insurgency is symptomatic of what state failure is. The state has failed or is in the process of failing. The youths that are making noise and talking about injustice, so called injustice in our election, it has been proven by statistics that in the last decades, \$40 billion dollars have been sunk there, but where is the evidence

of the \$40 billion dollars on ground? That money can transform a smaller country into a developed haven.

There are state officials who share state money and are encouraging bunkering. These are part and parcel of the on-going sabotage against the state. Are they bigger than Nigeria? It is to tell you the extent to which the state has failed. Even the consciousness of the people as Nigerians, their nationalism, their patriotism has been reduced to that of some parochial ethnic, religious sentiments. When people steal funds and corruptly enrich themselves, they should be dealt with according to the law of the land. But because the state has lost its legitimacy of monopoly of coercive sanctions, and one of the functions of state failure is when the state loses consensus on key cardinal policies or prerogatives of the state, we are even wondering whether Nigeria should stay together as a state, this is state failure of the ruling elites, there is no consensus. If you go to America, democratic or republican, they are not talking about whether America should continue as a state. No they have gone beyond that, here we keep arguing as if it's anything. Those who steal our money don't have any problem when they are sharing the money (Akpa, May 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016).

Furthermore, the total number of ammunitions/weapons handed in by the militants totaling 1,798 rifles, 1,981 guns of various types, 70 RPGs, 159 pistols, one spear and six cannons (Agbo, 2011) are certainly low when compared with 26, 358 militants that registered for the amnesty programme. The region still retains arms and this is evident in the various attacks that have been carried out by militants even after the disarmament implementation. Therefore, the arms reduction programme needs to be taken seriously because as long as many arms are still at large, the region remains

very unsafe and at risk of reverting into violence (Joseph, 2010) which has been the situation since a new government took over in 2015.

Apart from arms, the Niger Delta crisis has been also heightened by the brazenly theft of crude oil, known as 'illegal bunkering'. According to Jekada (2005) it is also linked to corrupt and ineffective law enforcement effort, coupled with a weak judicial process. The criminal networks also enjoy backing from senior government officials and politicians, who use bunkering as a source of funds for political campaigning.

Meanwhile, the justification advanced for this was due to the state failure regarding security therefore, small arms becomes very easy to deliver, stress-free to hide in addition to the fact that they do not require wide-ranging maintenance capabilities (Christopher, 1995). Similarly, the transfers of these arms to Boko Haram usually originate from countries surrounding the Northeast, and in a situation where it is been made official, the beneficiaries of these weapons include not only governments but, increasingly the insurgents as well Achumba et al. (2013) and (Jekada, 2005).

Emphasizing the impacts of these borders on the proliferation of arms in Nigeria, Ayissi and Sall (2005) highlighted that Nigeria has 770 kilometers of mutual land border with the Republic of Benin, around 1,500 kilometers with the Republic of the Niger, 1,700 kilometers with Cameroon and 90 kilometers with Chad. Nigeria also has 850 kilometers of maritime border in the Atlantic Ocean. Specifically, much of the supply and acquisition of small arms and light weapons is legitimate trade which usually occurs among Governments or among legal entities authorized by Governments. However, according to Jekada (2005) and Ayissi and Sall (2005) most

of the arms find their ways to the hands of insurgents and militants through corrupt law enforcement and military personnel selling their weapons in addition to widespread leakages from government armouries.

Also, setups operating across many countries and other methods of transfer used for the unlawful of a variety of commodities are also used to transfer weapons. The procedures used involve smuggling, mislabeling, concealment, and false documentation. To hide financial transactions use is made of coded bank accounts protected by the secrecy laws of some financial institutions. To transport weapons, various methods are used, such as ships with bogus registration and flags of convenience (Chandre & Lamb, 2004).

Succinctly, the advent of small arms and light weapons impacts on more than just individual well-being, they normally have the potential to challenge the very existence of the state. In a democratizing polity like Nigeria, where resources tend to be limited and state capability relatively weak, small arms provide ethnic warriors with the means and power in criminal activities, and in the process strictly undermine the rule of law. Consequently, this leads to an increasing sense of insecurity as a result of lack of faith in the state's ability to provide personal protection.

### **5.6 Unsafe Business Environment to Both Local/International Investors**

The relevant issue of insecurity in Nigeria as posed by the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgents has become a source of worry and challenge to business environment in Nigeria and international investors. According to Ewetan and Ese (2014) accessible data on the level and magnitudes of insecurity in Nigeria reveals an

increase over time, which constitutes serious threat to lives and properties, hampers business activities as well as discourages local and foreign investors, all which suppresses and retards Nigeria's socio-economic development.

In relation to secured and enabling environment for investors, Zoaka agrees that:

*a good government tries to create an enabling environment so that the private sectors also helps in creating jobs, so you have lots of people who want jobs, with nothing to do. So there's a potential, there's an army of young men that can be used by criminally minded people to cause havoc within the polity, and that is what has been happening (Zoaka, April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016).*

In Nigeria just like every other democratic states, the security and welfare of the people are the crucial purpose of government. Unfortunately, government has failed on this constitutional responsibility to provide a secured and safe environment for lives and properties as well as safety for the conduct of business and economic activities (Ewetan, 2013). Accordingly, these developmental challenges include prevalent rural and urban poverty, unbearable youth unemployment, low industrial production, unstable and worsening exchange rate, inadequate physical and social infrastructure (Ewetan, 2013).

It has also resulted in economic misfortune in Nigeria through loss of oil revenue following shortfall in crude oil exports by the oil companies occasioned by disruption of oil exploration activities by the Niger-Delta militants. As noted, the consequence of the security threats in Nigeria for business and investments can be viewed from two general Perspectives according to Achumba and Akpor (2013), the perspective of potential business investment and the perspective of existing business enterprise.

There is no nation that can achieve socio-economic development in an environment of socio and physical insecurity. Similarly, according to Ewetan and Ese (2014) there is no investor whether local or foreign that will be encouraged to invest in an insecure and uncertain environment. In a globalized world, investors are not only considering high returns on their investments but also protection for their investments. Thus the alarming level of insecurity in Nigeria has made the economy unappealing to foreign investors, and this has impacted negatively on economic growth and development.

In the same vein, Ifeoma and Anagbogu, Ndubuisi- Okolo (2015) emphasized that the security threats posed by these groups have a deleterious impact on business development because security threat can be a colossal obstruction to business investment. Corroborating this development, Ujah and Eboh (2006) reported a study by World Bank on investment environment in nine African countries where it was found that 29% of business operators in Africa and 36% in Nigeria claimed insecurity as a major restraint on investment. This situation has harmful consequence of giving signal to the international community that Nigeria is not a safe and secure place and as such not suitable for investment and business activities.

Security threats is a risk factor which business owners fear and wish to avoid by transferring their businesses somewhere else. In Nigeria for instance, there is indication of some businessmen and manufacturing establishments having to relocate particularly from the North to other peaceful place (Nwagbosa, 2012). Similarly, non-indigenes especially Yoruba and Igbos living in the Northeast and other have to return to their home states before they are killed by Boko Haram (Ifeoma, et al., 2015) and in vice-versa many especially, oil companies relocating out of Niger Delta area to safer

places. In addition, some businesses move their set-ups to other countries like Ghana which is considered to be more peaceful. It is therefore obvious that national security is a vital sine qua non for corporate and economic growth of any country.

### **5.7 The IDP's and Refugees Situation Induced by the Insurgency**

Boko Haram insurgency has become a threat to global peace and security due to the fact that it induces the highest humanitarian crises in the form of rise in human casualties, internally displaced persons, refugee tragedies, food crisis and the spread of various diseases (Emmanuelar, 2015). The activity of Boko Haram has generated dismal humanitarian catastrophe in the North East region of Nigeria, with the people from Borno, Adamawa as well as Yobe States feeling the impact of the attacks the most. Multitude of citizens from these states are displaced internally and live within camps, with families in public structures.

Over the years since 2009, the actions of the Boko Haram group, has amplified the displacement of people from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in the form of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who flee to safer places within the nation and refugees escaping into neighbouring nations like Niger, Chad and Cameroun. It has been noted that majority of these persons constitute women and children (International Regional Information Networks, 14 March 2014).

Nigeria particularly according to Adewale (2016) is facing a series of interrelated economic and humanitarian crises which, if not resolved, will disrupt basic life-support systems, contribute to the worsening of already disjointed security structures and perpetuate underdevelopment. Following the predicaments of the inhabitants of

northeast Nigeria by Boko Haram, gaining access to adequate food, shelter and safe drinking water is becoming increasingly difficult for the majority of the dispersed population.

According to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA 2014) report, there have been stable rise in the number of internally displaced persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. Particularly, as at February 2016, there were about 1,525,404, 139,404 and 132,626 IDPs in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states respectively. With Maiduguri Local Government Area (LGA) in Borno state presenting the highest number of IDPs (825,234). Most IDPs currently in Yobe and Adamawa were found in Damaturu (38,086) and Michika (34,712) LGAs respectively (Displacement Tracking Matrix, Round VIII, February 2016).

Meanwhile, the attacks by Boko Haram insurgents increased intensely from mid-2014, triggering an extraordinary protection crisis in North-eastern Nigeria. The continuous attacks and killings by the Boko Haram till date, has resulted in the dislodgment of millions of IDPs who abandoned all they had and fled for safety (Fayemi & Dasyuva, 2016). Consequently, businesses and means of support are lost and in turn affected their socio-economic well-being and generated awful humanitarian consequences for them.

### **5.8 Nigerian International Image In Relation To Security Threats**

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria with its remarkable natural endowment of oil and gas was a theatre of loot, war, hostage taking, vandalization of oil pipe line and flow stations which is strategically important to the global oil supply market makes any

unrest in the Niger Delta a concern of the international community. The international image of Nigeria no doubt must be a source of concern. Etemike (2012) posits that the strategic importance of the Niger Delta to the global oil supply makes any unrest in the region a concern to the international community. More so, that the secrecy and corrupt practices in the administration of the oil sector in Nigeria always contribute in attracting international attention. In relation to that also, is the activities of the Boko Haram insurgent which assumed a dimension that promoted it to the level of terrorism, it received international response and as such painting a negative image of Nigeria (Chukwu, 2016).

The Niger Delta is a zone of demographic interest group who are minority but accounts for more than 90% of earning from oil and gas, of federally distributed revenue in Nigeria. Egborge (1999) illuminated that the region has over 10,000km of pipe lines, over 100 flow stations, 10 gas plants, 3 oil terminals, 1,500 oil-producing wells and 3 refineries. Therefore, all of these make the Niger Delta a critical region for Nigeria and the international community. Consequently, the region exemplifies political, economic and security interests internally, nationally and internationally (Etemike, 2012).

Similarly, the activities of Niger Delta militants attract international attention because of incidences such as that of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogonis who front for the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) that were arrested and executed. In addition to that was the kidnapping of foreign nationals which attracted international attention (Dienye & Morrison, 2011). In view of all these, the image of the country has been dented over the years as foreign investors would not want to risk their capital and safety to invest in the country.

## **5.9 Evaluation of Strategies used by Insurgents in Nigeria**

Crises are not uncommon in Nigeria due largely to a number of factors which are socio-political and ethno-religious in nature. Despite not new or immune to crises however, the twist in the radicalization of the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria particularly within period under review (1999-2015) is quite worrisome. Excessive use of repressive measures by the Nigerian state forces at the emerging stage of the insurgency only led to the insurgents becoming more lethally sophisticated (Osumah, 2013).

Apart from the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, there are other uprisings and agitations that are rife in other regions within Nigeria which constitute threats to Nigerian national security as well. Such groups are the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOP) in the South-east, O'odua People's Congress (OPC) in the South-west. Others are the Badoo group (Lagos-based), Shiite Movement in Nigeria (Zaria-based), Yan Sara Suka in Bauchi and Yan Kalare (Gombe-based), the Fulani Herdsmen menace across the length and breadth of Nigeria. Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff, General Gabriel Olonisakin had said in New York, USA on the 9<sup>th</sup> of July, 2017 that Nigeria is currently being confronted with 14 national security threats across the country (Vanguard, July 9<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

The two most threatening insurgent groups in Nigeria-the Niger Delta militant group and the Boko Haram insurgent group have their areas of divergence and convergence despite their differences in emergence and ideological stance. Each of these dreaded groups have their, modus operandi, sophistication, motivations, strategies, operational

or locational base, Inventiveness, international links, costs, radicalization and militarization as well as their fractionalization (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014).

#### *Location or Operational Base*

In terms of their differences, the Niger Delta militants are operationally based in the coastal belt of Nigeria particularly in the creeks of the region in states such as Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta and the navigate the terrain with the aid of speed boats. The Boko Haram is based in the northern states such as Kano, Kaduna, Yobe, Bauchi, Katsina and Maiduguri their Headquarters. One compelling commonality in their camps or bases is that majority of their fighters are drawn from among the unemployed youths lured by some promises by the groups (Nwachukwu, 2011).

#### *Motivation and Drive*

The Niger Delta radicals are driven by their desire for equitable distribution of resources and the remediation of their environment. Since the production of oil in the region, billions of dollars have been made from the sales of oil proceeds by both government and the oil multinationals yet the communities are left with poverty and environmental pollution. It was this puzzle in the Delta for so many years that has stirred up the agitation which metamorphosed into full militancy in the Niger Delta today (Obi, 2014; Aghedo & Osumah, 2014).

Their struggle all started with petition writing to legal instrument to party formation and dialogue in the 1970s. The Niger Delta struggle became bloody in the early 2000s with threats and kidnapping following. Boko Haram on the other hand emerged in the early 2000s as a group on the platform of religion with anti-government and anti-

western postures through their message and attacks. In its narratives, the group does not recognize any constituted authority but desires to form their own government throughout the sub-regions.

#### *Strategies, Targets, and Modus Operandi*

Similarly, the two radical groups share some common grounds and differences in their modus operandi as well. Both groups adopt acknowledge or claim responsibility of attacks through organized press release, videos of captured victims and through central email. Both groups have camps but adopt terrorist tactics of being mostly elusive. In their strategies, the groups launch attacks with high sophistications in weaponry and show high tactical skills at arms.

The Boko Haram insurgents target both soft and hard targets such as worship places, motor parks, market places, Banks, Traditional institutions, viewing centres, security check points, public institutions like schools, police stations, United Nations building, military and police barracks. The Niger Delta militants target mainly oil installations, oil platforms, pipelines, oil vessels. Both groups are sophisticated in their deployment of weapons. Given the level of discipline, skills at arms and sophistication in operation by the Boko Haram for instance in their own attacks, one can only deduce that these insurgents definitely must have been trained by a more organized terrorist groups like ISIS, and al-Qaeda (Agbibo, 2013; Fabiyi, 2011).

Senator Sani who is currently serving in Nigerian Senate has this to say of Boko Haram and their mode of operation.

*What makes this group very dangerous is their mobility. You cannot say this is where they are located. They operate a mobile command and no part of Nigeria is immune to their acts... It is difficult to estimate their actual number because they are not in a particular position, but I can tell you that they have high capacity to inflict lethal damage and to also carry out operations without being caught (Osumah, 2013b: 7).*

Based on the above assertion by a very senior Nigerian Lawmaker, it is clear that the Boko Haram of today is not what it used to be in the past due to its high mobility which makes it very difficult for security forces to predict and dictate its capability. This strategy of operating on the wheel by Boko Haram became more pronounced when the group was dislodged from Gwoza where the insurgents declared as its Caliphate making it more of a terrorist group than just an insurgent sect (Weeraratne, 2017; Campbell, 2014).

Boko Haram has recently created new strategies for raising financial supports from wealthy elites especially from within Nigeria and neighbouring West African states. This development has affected the vulnerable and poor citizens of the communities where the group operates. The wealthy people in this region of Boko Haram's influence send their money as supports and also sympathize with the set objectives of the sect. Moreover, Boko Haram has no access to oil money like the Niger Delta and other terrorist. What Boko Haram does to raise finances is to carve out a place of influence in most African countries within their area of influence is by depleting the finances of the poor through kidnapping and collection of ransom, intimidation and forceful dispossession.

### *Radicalization and Militarization*

The Nigerian government's response to violent insurgencies seen as threat has been that of high-handedness and maximum repression. There are heavy military presence in those regions where these groups operate. Successive governments did not see dialogue as an option but depended only on the military option, which resulted in some instances complains of abuses, excessive use of force, intimidation, battery, mass arrest, torture, beatings and killings (not substantiated).

Nigeria in the past depended solely on repressive counter-terrorist tactics which further emboldened and radicalized the militant insurgents. President Obasanjo's administration used heavy military action such as aerial bombardment as well as attacks on the communities of Odi and Gbaramatu without any option of dialogue. While President Jonathan ordered full state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe which allowed the military free hand to operate yet these measures did not put an end to terrorism in Nigeria (Courson, 2011).

However, the free hand to operate by the military resulted in what was allegedly called extra-judicial killing which have been argued to be responsible for pushing the conflicts to their current extreme radicalization. Aghedo and Osumah (2014) contends that the execution of prominent leaders of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram sects have increased violent attacks from these insurgent group in Nigeria. The cases of Ken Saro Wi-wa of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta and Mohammed Yusuf of the Boko Haram are good example of past government repression on the non-state actors that have held Nigeria to ransom over the years. Boko Haram became more violent, better organized and motivated to start suicide bombing as soon as the Deputy of Yusuf by

name Mohammad, Al Bannawi Shekau took over the leadership of the group (Sergie, 2014; Tonwe, Ojo & Aghedo, 2012). Therefore, executing only got the sect more radicalized.

### *Fractionalization*

Niger Delta has splinter or fractional groups just like the Boko Haram sect. The two insurgent groups are fractionalized as a result of various interests within the groups. LeVan (LeVan, 2013) asserts that it was due to the infiltration of MEND by criminal gangs that made it to gain notoriety (LeVan, 2013). Concurred by a Governor in a Northern-eastern state that a faction of the Boko Haram sect has its root in criminal profit while the other group is rooted in distorted Islam (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014). The Niger Delta militants have several groups within it under different commandos and militant leaders with some having ethnic colorations. The Boko Haram has two splinter groups that left the Shekau-led Boko Haram to form their own such as Ansaru and *Jama'antu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan* (Vanguard for the Aids of Muslims in Black Africa).

### *Ingenuity*

Boko Haram has been involved in the making of bombs, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in places such as Kaduna, Kogi, Kano and Maiduguri to aid their operations haven established their factories in those locations of their bases. Furthermore, the sect has been using women and the almajirai children (Koranic pupils) for bombings with women concealing AK 47 rifles and IEDs under their hijaps or plant it to their bodies. Many women and these children have been caught by an anti-terror group at Bulabulin, Monday market Maiduguri (The Nation, 2013). Women

in the Niger Delta struggle are involved in the street protests, occupation of oil flow stations for the improvement of their environmental and socio-economic conditions. There has not been any attempt to radicalize any woman by the Niger Delta militants.

Apart from the loss of human lives, Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents have dealt a great blow to the Nigerian state. The economic costs of losing so many business opportunities as a result of the groups. Also, multinationals fear of losing their personnel therefore, constantly contemplate pulling out of the Niger Delta gradually. For instance, Boko Haram ambushed Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation staff who were exploring the Nigerian side of the Lake Chad for oil and killed Forty Eight of them (This Day, 28<sup>th</sup>, 2017). The horrendous criminal attacks by both the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram insurgent groups have raised government spending in acquiring armaments and military equipment to prosecute the war on terror. Since the beginning of the war on terror, the budget for Defence has been increasing taking much from the already challenged resources of the state especially with the dwindling fortunes in the oil sector of the economy.

Boko Haram has clear international links with international groups like the AQIM, Al-Shabaab, ISIS and some violent rebels in Algeria and Mali (Osumah, 2013a). The link between the Niger Delta militants and international groups are still clandestine with oil-for-arms and money as its driving force. The groups sets up illegal refineries, scoop oil and exchange for money and arms (Ajaero & Azubike, 2010).

Behind the struggles by these groups are political and socio-economic under-tunes such as elite corruption, governance crisis, ethnic-religious motivation, poverty and others.

### **5.10 Conclusion**

As noted in the discussion in this chapter such as the evaluation of the level of security threats Nigeria as a country has been going through. It keeps sound minds wondering how Nigeria gradually and quietly slipped into insurgency and is now a part of the global map of terrorized countries. Those impacts of insurgency on Nigeria as discussed above would need to be urgently addressed to reinforce the confidence of both the citizens and the international community on the authority and the sovereign state of Nigeria.

Full security needs to return to those communities ravaged by the act of terror so that those internally displaced persons (IDPs) can return back to their communities to restart their lives. The government needs to redouble its efforts in providing infrastructure and all other assistance that will make the citizens regain full trust in their government wherever they find themselves within the country. For businesses to return fully, security has to be first and foremost guaranteed. Given the number of troops also lost to the counterinsurgency fight, it is indeed a serious national threats and the fight must be seen to be against the enemies of Nigeria as nation who are bent on disintegrating the country.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **CONCLUSION**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The Niger Delta militant group and the Boko Haram insurgents have been unarguably the greatest threats to Nigeria's national security since the inception of the Fourth Republic (1999 to date). This is as a result of the reasons for their emergence and the devastating impacts and consequences of their attacks on the Nigerian state. This concluding Chapter of the study therefore, concentrates on the summary of research findings, implications, limitations of the study, recommendations and suggestions for future research.

#### **6.2 Summary of Research Findings**

At the beginning of this study, key research questions were raised with respect to the quest for power by the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents as their activities threaten Nigeria's national security in the Fourth Republic, specifically from 1999 to 2015. In order to answer the research questions and achieve the objectives of the study, this section concentrates on the summary of research findings. The first research objective is to examine those factors that triggered the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents against the Nigerian state in the Fourth Republic.

This study was able to identify and examined factors such as negligence or bad government, oil-induced environmental deprivation, ethno-political domination as well as economic motivations which include increased poverty, loss of job or income, unemployment as being at the root of insurgency in Nigeria. Other issues identified during the research were the ideological motivations, lack of effective corporate social responsibility by the multinational oil corporations and centralised federalism through a bias constitution which result in unequal distribution of oil proceeds among the federating units.

The study reveals that there has been a gross failure of leadership and bad governance across Nigeria especially in regions worst hit by insurgency. These findings are supported by both failed-state and frustration-aggression theories. The failed-state explains the inability of the state to provide basic needs of citizens which it refers to as political goods such as security, basic infrastructure, healthcare, job opportunities as well as education. Since the Nigerian state failed in providing these primary and basic needs of her people especially the youths, the state lost that loyalty of the young ones which switched their allegiance to the non-state actors as seen typically in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies where thousands went as far as becoming terrorists. This enabled the non-state actors to comfortably fill the vacuum of the state.

The frustration arising from abysmal poverty, folding up of industries which were creating employment for the teeming youth and induced environmental degradation all serve as reasons for the aggression against the state. There has also been endemic and institutional corruption leading to lack of infrastructural development, Contract manipulations, looting and diversion of public funds, favouritism, nepotism, etc. This

finding is also supported by the failed state theory. Poor conflict handling styles by the governments, that is, maximum use of repression by some security forces especially (the police force) against Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram leader which led to his gruesome or extra-judicial death without any prosecution (Odomovo, 2014; Solomon, 2012; Onuoha, 2010). This also is explained aptly by the state failure thesis.

This research therefore, found out that on assumption of office, President Muhammadu Buhari set the ball rolling in addressing the environmental challenges of the Niger Delta region starting with Ogoni-land in Rivers state. For the very first time a Nigerian President would come out to declare that the environment be clean-up starting on the 13<sup>th</sup> of February, 2017 with SPDC providing the initial funding of \$1bn.

The federal government of President Buhari also planned to train about 2000 women within four Ogoni Local Government Areas in different skills to enable these women financial independence. Such skills are in the areas of Agriculture such as Palm oil processing, snail farming, fishery, Green housing. These skills were among those suggested to the government by the representatives of the people in the government (Vanguard February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

It was further confirmed that endemic and institutional corruption and political manipulations of the ethnic minorities by the so-called ethnic majorities in Nigeria also fanned the embers of these insurgencies in both Niger Delta and the North-eastern part of Nigeria. The scenarios in these two zones are pathetic especially where politicians will award contracts and employment only to their families and cronies while millions of competent graduates and other qualified youths are left roaming about without

employment under the same system. It was as well found out that political promises made were not kept and the people looked elsewhere for help and sustenance which led to many youth being recruited and radicalized by non-state actors with their goals and targets. This clearly demonstrates the institutional weakness (state-failure) inherent in the Nigerian system.

Findings from this work also concurred that, the Boko Haram insurgents likewise carried out massive kidnappings especially of women and children just as the Niger Delta militants. Boko Haram insurgents became more globally recognised when the group kidnapped 276 Chibok secondary school girls on the 14<sup>th</sup> of April, 2014, which was regarded as part of the inability of the state to perform her function of protecting her citizens (Khoja-Moolji, 2015; Maiangwa & Agbiboa, 2014). This was made known through the Non-Governmental Organization with the harsh tag BringBackOurGirls (Giroux & Gilpin, 2014) which sparked a global outburst against the sect.

The research also found out that, between the periods of 2009 to 2015 under study, there were many instances of kidnapping and hostage-taking by the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents such as 218 Katarko community members, about 500 people from Damasak, and the secondary school students numbering 276 Chibok girls in North-eastern part of Nigeria (Oyewole, 2015; Oke & Labeodan, 2015). The act of kidnapping of women and children by the insurgents demonstrates ineptitude or failure of some sort on the part of the state.

The study further found that the administration of President Jonathan admitted there were Boko Haram sympathizers in the government who could be passing information

to the group. This is an implosion within the state and it is therefore clear state-failure. When we have some members of the political class, the academia, public, security agencies passing on state and security information to a group that is fighting the government, such is a state betrayal and failure on the part of the state.

It was also found that lack of social justice in Nigeria especially in the Niger Delta led to the taking up of arms against the state. Lack of social justice led to social conflict which threatens peace and security of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. When the state fails in addressing social issue such as provision of social safety net which includes unemployment benefits, universal healthcare, homeless shelters, subsidised public transport within the society as a check on social vices. Without a robust social safety net which addresses the immediate needs of the unemployed, it would bring about social conflict where the youths take to arms to meet their needs which constitutes threat to national security.

The research found out that, over 40 billion US dollars were spent on the Niger Delta region in the last ten (10) years. According to Nigeria's Minister of State for Petroleum Resources, Dr Emmanuel Ibe Kachikwu, noted that, one cannot see any single meaningful development in the Niger Delta region where the militants took up arms against the government on the notion of marginalization, neglect, and social injustice (Ofikhenua, 2016). Findings again reveals that, some of the money that was supposed to be used in the development of the Niger Delta region were allegedly diverted through the payment of ghost workers as well as execution of fictitious and inflated contracts in the region (Ibaba, 2008). On paper, a lot have been achieved by successive governments but the reverse has always been the case on ground where there is nothing

to show that is commensurate to the large contract sum awarded. Therefore, institutional and elite corruption is one of the causal motivations of the insurgency in Nigeria.

The second research objective of the thesis was to evaluate the threats posed by the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgency to Nigeria. The study revealed based on its findings that both the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram insurgents are as heavily armed and trained as the state security agents which makes the counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist war difficult to be brought under control within predicted time frame (Blanchard, 2014; Nwajiaku, 2012). This reinforces the weaknesses (state-failure) within the Nigerian state

On the issue of Boko Haram war, the Nigerian government allocated billions of Naira for the security sector in order to completely obliterate insurgency in the country, however, it was found that, about N968 billion was said to have been allegedly spent on the war against the Boko Haram in 2014. Again, in the same year, 1 billion USD was borrowed and added to the above figure by the same administration to execute the war in the North-Eastern part of the country. The soldiers at the war front were still lacking weapons to face the rampaging insurgents (Leadership, September 19, 2015).

Due to lack of sincerity on the part of the government of Nigeria as found in this research, both the Niger Delta militants in the Southern part of the country and the Boko Haram insurgents in the Northern part of Nigeria took up arms against the government. Like in the case of the Boko Haram where the crisis took a violent turn

in 2009 and by 2011, both national and international media were awashed with the news of the attacks of the group on public institutions.

Institutions such as Nigeria Police Force Headquarters and the United Nations building were attacked in Abuja and that killed so many people (Omotola, 2009; Solomon, 2012; Eme & Ibietan, 2012; Sergie & Johnson 2014). It was therefore found that the Boko Haram attacks were carried out to also seek and attract global attention within the international community (Adesoji, 2010; Adesoji, 2011; Onuoha, 2012; Onapajo, Uzodike, & Whetho, 2012).

The world over, insecurity in any environment is a threat to business and investment. No big time investor would want to put his money in an unsafe environment. In this respect, findings have revealed that, with the emergence of insurgency in some major cities of Nigeria, especially in the northern where Boko Haram carried out series of Bombings such as Kano which is the industrial hub and commercial nerve of the north before colonialism is terribly affected. Other major commercial cities in the north that are affected by the insurgence are Maiduguri, Kaduna with the business climate not favourable. The national security has been challenged real or perceived in a way which makes investors sceptical about putting their money into the Nigerian economy (Nwogwugwu, Emmanuel & Egwuonwu, 2012; Okpaga, Chijioke, & Eme, 2012).

Above all, the research found that it was the penchant for power and control of the state apparatus that was the driving force behind the emergence of violent uprisings in Nigeria chief of which are the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents. Challenging the constitutional government of Nigeria to be replaced by a non-

constitutional government whether the Niger Delta or the Boko Haram by unlawful means of violence.

### **6.3 Recommendations to the Government**

Given the protracted and the intractable nature of both the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram conflicts, this research work therefore, amongst other strategies recommends Professor Edward Azar's (1990) *Protracted Social Conflict* (model) resolution to the Nigerian government in order to bring an end to the crises. Azar views protracted social conflict as one that is intractable, complex, severe as well as deep-seated and a very enduring hostility between identity groups based on cultural, ethnic and religious hatreds which persists over a period of time with irregular outbreaks of violence (Fisher, 2001: 307).

Azar isolates four major preconditions as the key sources of protracted social conflict. Such preconditions are deprivation of basic human needs, communal or identity content, state or government's role and international linkages. Basic human needs such as security, political access and participation, development and identity expression are non-negotiable and the deprivation of which would likely result in structural changes (Ramsbotham, 2008). The theory further emphasized that the deprivation of basic human needs is the underlying reason for protracted social conflict. To overcome this deprivation therefore, the Nigerian government and state must offer on a multiplicity of levels security, development and other core needs to all constituent units.

The role of the state in ending a protracted social conflict such as witnessed in Nigeria over the years is to protect citizens irrespective of identity, regulate society and to

provide collective goods. Governments at all levels must ensure that the rights of the identity minorities are not trampled on. Furthermore, protracted social conflict persists where the government is characterised by parochial, incompetent and authoritarian tendencies.

To end the crises (insurgencies in Nigeria) that the structure of governance is in such a way that all identity groups whether major or minor are equally represented without bias or sentiments. To this end, all must be given equal sense of belonging. To overcome the influence of the international powers (be it political or economic) and overcome the dominance of foreign economy, the government of the state in question (in this case Nigeria) must strive to build institutions not powerful individuals so that domestic growth can be stimulated.

As asserts by Edward Azar:

*Reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups that seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying protracted conflict leads one to conclude that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term (Ramsbotham, 2008:86).*

Therefore, based on the above assertion, in resolving protracted social conflicts such as the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram crises that have spanned years unabated with no definite solution in sight, the approach to resolving the issues should not only be resource and interest based but identity-based. The issues are complex, deep-seated and intractable, therefore, require broader approach beyond resources and interests.

Further key recommendations to the government as expatiated are thus:

### **6.3.1 Provision of Basic Infrastructure:**

There is a great need for infrastructural development in Nigeria where it could help in addressing neglected social amenities such as electricity, roads, hospitals, industries, schools, water supply, housing, and transport which are the critical components of the development of the Nigerian economy.

In the Niger Delta region, the issue of bad road network has been a problem and challenge to the people both in the urban and rural settlements. The infrastructural development looks at issues like quality and portable water for drinking which has been a challenge in the Niger Delta especially in those communities where crude oil is exploited. This is in considering of the fact that the multinational oil companies over the years tends to pollute the environment as a result of oil spillage in the region. In view of the above, the study recommends that, critical infrastructural problem in Nigeria should be addressed.

### **6.3.2 Provision of Job Opportunities**

Another problem as found in the research is that of unemployment challenges faced by the youths in the Niger Delta and the Northern part of Nigeria. The work recognised that, this problem is a nationwide issue that needs to be addressed as quickly as possible. This research work therefore, recommends that, the government of Nigeria should go into partnership with the private sector on how to create job opportunities for the Nigerian populace.

Massive economic reforms is highly recommended if Nigeria must win the war against the scourge of terrorism in her domain. This will no doubt trigger a robust intervention which will drastically address the alarming poverty level, youth unemployment and the destitutional challenges that have ravaged the country especially in the northern part of Nigeria where radical ideologues have taken advantage of to drive their recruitment process (Onouha, 2014; Cronin, 2015).

It was found that, some of the youths who engaged in the militancy activities in the Niger Delta and the Boko Haran insurgency were unemployed and as such, they lack source of income worth living a decent live in the society. In line with this issue, the research work recommends provision of job opportunities for Nigerians who are unemployed.

### **6.3.3 Protection of Citizenry**

This research work recommends urgent attention on the part of the government of Nigeria to provide effective security for the life of every citizen of Nigeria as clearly enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Const. of Nigeria, 1999). The security and welfare of the citizens of Nigeria is the core and primary responsibility of the government. In the light of this, the research work recommends that, the government should take responsibility of protecting her citizens irrespective of religious, ethnic, party and social affiliations of the Nigerian people.

### **6.3.4 National Re-orientation**

This is one dimension the research work found as a challenging factor that gave rise to militancy insurgency in the Niger Delta and Northern part of the country. The minds

and hearts of the Nigerian people irrespective of the class, faith, tribe or ethnicity, needs national re-orientation on putting Nigeria first. There is great need for patriotism and national consciousness for the development and unity of the country which would promote sense of belonging and security of the country at large. Civic education has to be on continuous basis across the length and breadth of Nigeria on what really are our collective national values. What do we cherish and stand for as a people? This will increase public trust in the institutions of government, awake the spirit of nationalism and ensure most acceptable ethical behaviour within the Nigerian society.

### **6.3.5 Containment**

There are two things needed for Nigeria to do to be able to effectively contain the menace of terrorism. That is, we have two types of containment. Type one: Nigeria must ensure that the act of terror suffered in one region must be contained within the region and does not spread to other regions of the country. Type two: Nigeria must ensure that crisis in her neighbouring nations are not allowed to spill over to Nigeria through her border. Experts attribute the wave of violence unleashed on the north-eastern part of Nigeria is due to its proximity to Libya and Sudan which have experienced different forms of extremism or the other (Krech, 2011; Agbibo, 2013; Zenn, 2014).

### **6.3.6 Provision of Enabling Business Environment:**

Hostile environment the world over, portends a sense of insecurity which scares investors from doing business in such environment. A safe and secured environment guarantees and boosts investors' confidence in an area. No Business investor local and foreign would like to put his billions in an unsafe environment. This work therefore,

recommends that the government should provide enabling business environment in all part of Nigeria where foreign and local investors can invest in Nigeria's abundant resources without having to lose sleep.

### **6.3.7 Training and collaboration of Security Agencies:**

Given the overwhelming security challenges bedeviling Nigeria today such as the kidnapping of the expatriate oil workers, criminal hijacking of oil vessels, pipeline bunkering in the Niger Delta and the devastating bombings in the Northern part of the country, the security agencies need a lot more training to be able to effectively contain these menace of terrorism.

It was revealed in the course of the research that the Nigerian security structure is grossly short-staffed across all the agencies to contain the wave of terror that has swept through the country especially within the last seven to ten years. There is a grave shortage of troops experienced by the Nigerian Army to carry out its counter-insurgency fight. Findings also revealed that the troops of the Nigerian army need more training on modern technology, intelligence gathering and how to handle modern warfare equipment especially with terrorism being a new concept within the Nigerian security circle. The military should be more motivated in terms of their welfare and that of their wards.

Likewise, modern military equipment that are technologically driven must be procured for the Nigerian military if they must win the war against the terrorists. Intelligence and interceptive devices that can track enemies' communication and supplies should be provided to enable troops to be more accurate and professional in the discharge of

their duties. The research therefore, recommends that there is the need for collaboration locally among the various security agencies given the importance of intelligence sharing and internationally with other countries that are more technologically advanced in producing security gadgets.

### **6.3.8 Political Inclusion and Good governance**

The political process in Nigeria should be more transparent, broadened and be more inclusive to accommodate all without a section being left out or disenfranchised. Also, the checks and balances on the political processes such as total independence for the electoral commission, transparent electioneering process, it will be difficult for politicians to manipulate the election results to their favour.

If the political process is strengthened, the legitimacy question on government would have been addressed and the rule of law are followed, citizens are treated equally before the law, a lot more of the insurgency would fizzle out naturally. This study recommends robust political process and reforms which will ensure transparency in the democratic processes and institutions, responsiveness and accountability in such a way that legitimacy of government would be increased across all strata.

In the long-run, to be able to effectively contain the reign of terror in Nigeria, government has to ensure a level-playing field in the political process, improved governance capacity and above all ensures that no segment of the society suffers as a result of murky politics of interest and bigotry (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho & Onabanjo, 2012).

### **6.3.9 Use of Divide and Conquer Principle**

A successful deradicalization programme can be adopted such as was in Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore where a more encouraging package that can meet the desires, dreams and needs of militants who are interested in reintegration are offered compared to what the terrorist groups promise them. In other words, Nigerian government can zero in on the mismatch between what the insurgent group offers and what these young unemployed youths are interested in (Cronin, 2015). According to Cronin (2015:96), governments in Philippines and Indonesia won great victories against al Qaeda networks in their home countries through the combination of counter-terrorism operations with building relationship-confidence with the local community, initiating deradicalization and correctional programmes with proper religious training for those in prisons.

Furthermore, since the emergence of the terrorist groups in Nigeria is more of a social-political challenge than other motivations and has lingered for years, total reliance on military repression should be minimised. Political considerations should be placed on the table as a possibility to address the menace. Also, government can employ the use of non-conventional strategy such as the use of former terrorists that have been deradicalised and rehabilitated as spokespersons and negotiating agents over local disagreements that could have triggered the grievances in the first instance to persuade and convince those terrorists that are still up in arms to lay down their arms and embrace dialogue.

In order to obliterate terrorist groups in Nigeria, all-out military actions is necessary but not sufficient in itself to wipe out terrorism. Counter-insurgency and counter-

terrorism entail full war against terrorism. It comprises a comprehensive strategy drawn up to incapacitate the enemy through the manoeuvrist appr/coach such as cutting off the enemy's supply route, tracing and hitting exactly at enemy's centre of gravity. The approach aims at defeating the will of the enemy to fight rather than his ability to do so.

A more pragmatic approach in addressing the security challenges in the country is to deal frontally with the ideological fundamentalism of the sect especially at its formative stage in an environment that encourages or enables extremism to flourish. If their communication chain or hierarchy of command is punctured through effective intelligence and environmental monitoring, their overall goals will ultimately be decimated. According to Sampson (2013), the environmental issue is crucial in understanding what actually kick-start and sustains the grievances as expressed through the tactics of the terrorists. Therefore, defeating extreme ideology can be achieved through political, economic and religious reforms.

#### **6.4 Research Implications**

Practically, the study would be useful to the Federal Government given the importance of security at the moment in the history of Nigeria as a state, the Security Agencies, Peace and Security Scholars, the Researchers and Policy Makers and Manager as well as Students in the various security-related fields.

This research having examined threats to Nigerian national security as a result of the quest for power by the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents is by all means a great theoretical, practical and methodological contributions. This research

has clearly demonstrated that there is always the need for collaboration by all organs of government to ensure a threat-free and secured state. Effective national security requires all hands to be on deck to ensure there are no breaches in no part of the system.

In terms of theoretical contribution, the two theories used in the research are instructive and have enabled the study to come up with findings that are crucial to addressing the security threats in Nigeria. Like the frustration-aggression thesis for instance, when there are frustrations occasioned by negligence of critical areas of the lives of the people, it would naturally spark violent reaction from the people. When people are deprived of economic and social goods, they become frustrated, and when frustration is sustained over a longer period, aggression sets in which will ultimately lead to collective violence. Gurr (1970) in his view postulates that where discrepancies exist between value expectation and value capabilities, it creates discontent. The larger the value discrepancy, the deeper the discontent.

It is legitimate and the responsibility of nation states to provide for their citizens the basic political goods such as security of lives and properties, healthcare, education, employment opportunities and an enabling legal environment where the rule of law thrives (Rotberg, 2012:87). Lack of transparency in the running of state affairs, poor and inadequate healthcare system, decrepit infrastructure, endemic elite corruption, unemployment and a host of other social injustice engenders spontaneous reactions that are destructive from the governed. When the state cannot meet those basic responsibilities, it loses legitimacy in the eyes of its people of whom many will shift their loyalty to non-state actors such as the case in Nigeria with Niger Delta and Boko Haram groups having large followership. These groups by law are non-existent but

have followership in thousands because they seem to be there for the people in place of the government that is self-serving.

This study is therefore, properly situated within the frustration-aggression and the state failure theories. The Nigerian fourth republic has witnessed an unprecedented upsurge of violent agitations for secession and self-determination by non-state groups across the length and breadth of the country due largely to disconnect between the leaders and the governed. Citizens especially the youth in seeking for alternative to the government, switch their loyalty to those extreme violent groups who radicalise and turn them as cheap weapons of destruction against the state.

The research also evolves practical contribution to knowledge by suggesting a number of conventional and non-conventional strategies for the Nigerian government to use as counter-terrorist measures to contain the menace of Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram insurgents.

### **6.5 Limitation of the Study**

The study was limited to and carried out using qualitative method of research whose respondents were few and purposively selected as a result of their deep-seated, in-depth and vast knowledge of the issues under study.

### **6.6 Suggestions for Future Studies**

This study was warranted based on threats posed by the violent aggressions by the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents to Nigeria's development, national security and stability, as well as threats to her corporate existence as a nation. It is suggested

that other researches can be carried out on these same phenomena of Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram insurgency and National security using other methodological approaches such as quantitative research design and mixed method.

The study further suggests that future research can be undertaken on the new threats posed by the Niger Delta Avengers Group, the secession agitation by the new Biafra agitators called Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).

### **6.7 Conclusion**

The research work at this point draws its conclusion thus. The Nigerian fourth republic began at the end of sixteen long years of military dictatorship in the country. Pundits have blamed the current security crisis in Nigeria on the military for their interruption of the democratic process of the country (Ehwarieme, 2011; Akinrinade, 2006). The Nigerian political developments over the years gave birth to the agitations that have metamorphosed into the national security threats the country is current undergoing. The Niger Delta agitation has been on for decades ever since crude oil production started in their region 1958.

The mismanagement of the proceeds from oil as well as the continued devastation of their own environment are the key issues in their agitation for resource control, self-determination and of course the new Niger Delta agitation for political and economic power at the centre. Boko Haram insurgents, on the other hand emerged in 2002 as a result of political deception in the north using religion by the politicians. The group though uses religion as its vehicle to take over power, remains a great threat to Nigeria's national security. Both the militants in the creeks and the Boko Haram

insurgents at one point or the other took up arms against the Nigerian State in order to seek for seizure of the political and economic power of the Nigerian state.

In understanding the struggle for power and economic control by the two groups which pose threats to the country's stability and security, this research found out that, series of issues served as motivations to the insurgents to fight the government of Nigeria. These issues are seen as the country's numbering problems such as the inability to protect the lives and properties of the citizenry which is the primary duty of the state. Other issues such as lack of sincerity on the part of the government in addressing the problems in the Niger Delta region and the Boko Haram attacks in the Northern part of the country.

There were motivational factors that made the two groups to take up arms against the Nigerian government. These motivational factors includes, environmental deprivation, negligence of governance, economic deprivation, ethnic motivation, ideological and socio-political factors. These issues were raised in the course of the research work which gave deeper understanding of the research work under study. The researcher observed that, if there had been good governance over the years with efficient and effective management of the collective resources of the Nigerian people which would have addressed the above issues, there would have not arisen the room for insurgency in Nigeria. Insurgency in Nigeria thrives as a result of the dysfunctional workings of organs of the state. This has brought us to the stage of drawing the research recommendations which could be used in addressing the issues found in this research work.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A

**Table 2.1**

*Summary of reviewed literature on National Security, Niger Delta and Boko Haram Insurgents*

	<b>Author/Year</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Major Objective</b>	<b>Area/ Aspect of Study</b>	<b>Methodology</b>	<b>Major Finding</b>	<b>Focus of Study</b>
1.	Oluwaniyi, O. O. (2010)	Oil and Youth Militancy in Nigeria's Niger Delta Region	The study focused on the various reasons that were responsible for the youth involvement in the Niger Delta militancy	Oil Politics and National Security	The study made use of qualitative design using interviews and review of previous literature	Youth engagement in Niger Delta militancy as a result of negligence in socio-economic development of the region and political marginalization of the people from the region	Niger Delta
2.	Akpabio, E. M. and Akpan, N. S. (2010)	Governance and oil Politics in Nigeria's Delta: The Question of Distributive Equity	The study examined the concept of governance in relation to the distribution of oil benefits and impacts on the region.	Oil Politics	Secondary data	The findings show that poor policies, lack of accountability and transparency on the part of leadership, ethnic dominance and poor infrastructural distribution to the region as reasons for the underdevelopment of the area.	Niger Delta
3.	Babatunde, A. (2010)	Environmental Conflict and the Politics of Oil in the Oil-Bearing Areas of Nigeria's Niger Delta.	The study looked at the oil-related environmental factors and oil politics in relation to the study region.	Oil Politics	The study made use of both qualitative and quantitative design through the use of interviews and questionnaires.	The study found that government approach to the development of the region was not people-centred and participatory.	Niger Delta
4.	Umukoro, N. (2014)	Democracy and Inequality in Nigeria	The study seeks to examine the extent to	Nigeria's Fourth Republic	Made use of previous literature as source of	It was found that lack of good leadership, corruption and	Nigeria

			which the Federal Government has contributed in reducing inequality in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.		data collection	mediocrity, non-participation of the people in the design of social programs to benefits them and lack of political will as reasons for the federal government to alleviate poverty and inequality within the Nigerian system.	
5.	Aaron, K. K. and Patrick M. J. (2013)	Corporate Social Responsibility Patterns and Conflicts in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Region	The study seeks to reveal the extent to the variation in CSR policy of the Oil TNC's in the Niger Delta Region in relations to the scale of Conflicts and the intensity in the region	Oil Politics	Made use of Interview and review of previous literature	The study reveals that some of the projected were poorly completed, some were thus completed but they are not functioning, and Shell as an oil company recorded more conflicts than the other oil companies under study.	Niger Delta
6.	Aghalino, S. O. (2004)	Combating the Niger-Delta Crisis: An Appraisal of Federal Government Response to Anti-oil Protests in the Niger-Delta, 1958-2002		Oil Politics			Niger Delta
7.	Odion-Akhaine, S. (2009)	Liberal Democracy, the Democratic method and the Nigerian 2007 Elections	The paper examined the needed elements of liberalism and connotes its linkage with liberal democracy considering the failures in the 2007 general elections in Nigeria	Fourth Republic	Review of content analysis	It was found among others that, there was rigging during the 2007 general elections. As such, rigged elections do not connote the true value of liberal democracy and it's rather devalue the essentials of legitimate government.	Nigeria

8.	Yagboyaju, D. A. (2011)	Nigeria's Fourth Republic and the Challenge of a Faltering Democratization	The paper examines the issues and challenges that affect the democratic desires since the return of democracy in 1999 to the period under study 2011.	Fourth Republic	Made use of descriptive and analytical for the purpose of the study	The study found out that weak institutions are manipulated by the few individuals in power, the abuse of the rule of law, manipulations of political party's constitutions in favour of the few thereby weakening the political and democratic system in Nigeria under the fourth republic	Nigeria
9.	Awopeju, A., Adelusi, O. and Oluwashakin, A. (2012)	Zoning Formula and the Party Politics in Nigeria Democracy: A Crossroad for PDP in 2015 Presidential Election	The paper examined the posed issue of power rotation known as zoning formula and the rationality of its usage during the 2011 presidential elections and the PDP's quest for the said issue.	Fourth Republic	The study made use of content analysis	It was found that, zoning was a tool for uniting the diverse nature of the political and democratic system in Nigeria since the country's historical background; thus enriched with her diverse culture, ethnicity, religious and sectional base which relates to North and South geopolitical background.	Nigeria
10	Fatai, A. (2012)	Democracy and National Identities: The travails of National Security in Nigeria	The study examines the complex challenges bedeviling the Nigeria's democracy in relations to unfolding democratic process as they affect the national security.	National Security and Fourth Republic	Review of content analysis	The findings thus reveal that, ethnicity is the major rationale in power struggle to have a representation of one's ethnic group in the control of political affairs. Thus becoming an issue when the nation is affected by the actions of the ethnic group in	Nigeria

						question resulting to threat to national security.	
11	Agbiboa, D. E. and Maiangwa, B. (2013)	Boko Haram, Religious Violence, and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria: Towards a Non-killing Approach.	The study focused on seeking an approach that would address a killing to non-killing as it relates the Boko Haram attacks on the Nigerian state so as to resolve the trend of violence.	National Security	Made use of review of previous literature	The attacks from the Boko Haram group goes beyond the bombing of Churches, Mosques and the killing of people to attacks on international Institutions such as the United Nations building in Abuja on the 23 August, 2011.	Nigeria
12	Agbiboa, D. E. (2013)	Ethno-religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria.	The work examined the ethno-religious conflicts with a view of obtaining a true national identity in Nigeria where peace and political stability would be obtainable.	National Security	Review of previous literature and analysis	Religion over the years in Nigeria has been the major source of divisional tool used in conflict. As such it reflects through ethnicity and posed division among the majority as well as minority ethnic groups.	Nigeria
13	Aghedo, I. and Osumah, O. (2014)	Insurgency in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram Uprisings.	The paper focused on the two major militancy in Nigeria in relations to solutions.	National Security and Fourth Republic	Made use of empirical data from the British Council and review of content analysis	Niger Delta militants sought their attacks on oil companies, oil facilities and military force in order to ensure their demands are been met by the government while the Boko Haram lunched attacks on the people and institutions like United Nations Building in Abuja Nigeria.	Nigeria
14	Isumonah, V. A. (2012)	Armed Society in the Niger Delta	The study seeks to examine the	Oil politics and	Extensive review of	The findings thus revealed that, lack of	Nigeria

		issues relating to control of proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Nigeria's Niger Delta.	National Security	previous studies	development of the Niger Delta Enclave led to the carrying of arms against the Nigerian government. The leaders of the states in Niger Delta rather preferred to pay strongmen to protect their personal interest rather than engage in using the public resources to develop the region. A wasteful of resources in the name of securing the region from armed gangs became the order of the day. Resolving social and political issues that led to demand for arms should be tackled by the government.		
15	Onuoha, F. C. (2016)	The Resurgence of Militancy in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Niger Delta and the Dangers of Militarization	The work examined the resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta region and its dangers on the Nigerian national security.	National Security	Review of content analysis.	It was found that President Buhari's led government registered very little success through military enforcement in the Niger Delta. As a result, the government changed her tactics in handling the Niger Delta resurgence of militancy in the region.	Nigeria
16	Dialoke, I. & Edeja, M. S. (2016)	Effects of Niger Delta Militancy on the Economic Development	The work examined a period of ten years 2006-2016 on the effects of the	National Security	Content analysis	The findings reveal that Nigerian economy depends on the oil from the	Nigeria

		of Nigeria (2006-2016)	Niger Delta crisis in relation to the country's economic development within the period studied.			Niger Delta region. The country's security within the region is threatened due to the renewed attacks in the region.	
17	Chukwueloka, C. C. (2017).	Exploitation, hardship and corruption as impediments to Development in the Niger Delta: A Study of Kaine Agary's Yellow-yellow	The study examined corruption as the cause of hardship and backwardness in the Niger Delta.	Niger Delta	Content analysis	The study revealed that the exploitation in the Niger Delta region has led to the underdevelopment of the region. This is due to corruption in many forms.	Niger Delta
18	Ray, N. (2016).	Growing Threat of Terrorism in Africa: The Case of Boko Haram	The work focused on the Boko Haram as a case study on the growing threat of terrorism in Africa.	Boko Haram Terrorism	Content analysis	The work revealed that, terror attacks in African countries not only Nigeria, are targeted on the vulnerable public. In some cases, such attacks do affect foreigners as well and not minding the class of people affected by the attacks.	Africa



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19	Aghedo, I. and Osumah, O. (2014)	Insurgency in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram Uprisings	The work focused on the two groups of militancy in Nigeria to proffer suggestions for development of the Nigerian polity where it will remain relevant to its responsibilities.	Peace and Security	The use of content analysis and empirical data from the British Council as source for analytical poverty indicative	It was found that the Boko Haram attacked the United Nations building in Abuja, in 2011, August 26 for the purpose of protesting against US in assisting Nigeria against terrorism while for the Niger Delta militants sought their attacks on oil companies, oil facilities and military force. However, both groups are basically formed as a result of poor governance.	N/A
20	Basedau, M., Pfeiffer, B. and Vullers, J. (2014)	Bad Religion? Religion, Collective Action, and the Onset of Armed Conflict in Developing Countries.	The paper search to fill the gap to which religion is connected to armed conflict	Peace and security	Quantitative research using empirical data. The work made use of Group theory.	Religious factors could be used in fueling religious and potential armed conflict, however, issues like ethnic discrimination has a religious undertone as a the gap between identities which could serves as a tool in fueling religious conflict.	The findings suggest that many challenges and opportunities for future research on the link between Religion and conflict remain.
21	Dowd, R. A. (2014)	Religious Diversity and Religious Tolerance: Lessons from Nigeria	The paper focused on subnational variation such as religious diversity	Peace and Security	Qualitative research using in-depth interviews	Religious segregation has affected religious tolerance in Nigeria	Future research would also do well to include longitudinal studies. In other words, further studies should assess whether and how changes in the religious diversity of settings affects the tolerance content preached by the

							same religious leader across time.
22	Umukoro, N. (2014)	Democracy and Inequality in Nigeria	The paper sought to examine the Nigeria's Fourth Republic in view of a democratic government and the impact of inequality which create a wide gap between the rich and the poor, thereby increasing the high level of poverty in the Nigerian polity.	Socio-political	Use of content analysis and empirical data from previous studies	It was found that the issues that gives rise to inequality in Nigeria are: the pattern of government spending as well as cost of governance in Nigeria; lack of political commitment to good governance; lack of political participation and involvement of the citizenry in the formulation as well as implementation of the policies that affects their wellbeing; corruption in different dimensions such as converting public funds to personal/private use, diversion of resources; leadership problem; this has thus neglected the bridging of inequality gap in Nigeria	N/A
22	Hill, J. N. C (2013)	Religious Extremism in Northern Nigeria Past and Present: Parallels between the Pseudo-Tijanis and Boko Haram	The paper examines both the past and present Islamic groups as Pseudo-Tijanis and Boko Haram that affect the Northern Nigeria thereby causing non-peaceful existence of the North.	Peace and Security	Use of content analysis	The Boko Haram is also allegedly linked to other groups such as Al Qaeda, and Al Shabaab which operates in Somalia. They had a sanctuary in Nigeria's bordering countries such as Chad and Niger.	N/A
23	Carl LeVan, A. (2013)	Sectarian Rebellions in Post-Transition Nigeria Compared	The paper examines the historical background of Boko Haram and	Peace and Security	Use of Content analysis and conduct of interviews	The prosecution of Mohammed Yusuf's (Founder of Boko Haram) Killers would have paved way for resolution with the Boko Haram. Again, that the Nigerian government	N/A

			its activities as well as a comparison of the Niger-Delta militants in Nigeria.			has spent nearly a quarter of the Nation's budget on security without success. However, Amnesty was given to the Niger-Delta rebels as a solution to the crisis in the Niger-Delta Region. Some politicians had also called for the same policy to be applied to the Boko Haram group for a cease-fire.	
24	Yusuf, O. H. (2013)	Harvest of Violence: the neglect of basic rights and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria	The paper examines the gap in governance which in turn promotes an environment for the youths to be recruited as insurgents.	Peace and Security	Use of content analysis. The work made use of frustration-aggression theory as well as critical theory.	It was found that poverty breeds violence, political corruption also creates rooms for violence. The government's inability to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor has promoted an environment for the youths to be recruited into the membership of the Boko Haram group.	N/A
25	Chambers, D. B. (2013)	<i>There was A Country: Achebe's Final work</i>	The work looks at Achebe's final work with respect to Biafra civil war in Nigeria and the marginalization of the Igbo people in Nigeria	Peace and security	Book review	The Achebe's final work reviewed how the Igbo has been marginalized after the 1967-1970 civil war which the former leader sought for integration of the Igbo people into the Nigerian polity via the 'no victor, no vanquished' slogan. However, the leaders have failed because of corruption and incompetent.	N/A
26	Ekwe-Ekwe, H. (2013)	The Achebean Restoration	A comprise of Chinua Achebe's work in his famous book ' <i>Things fall Apart</i> ' to review the Biafra war of 1967-1970 and the current	Peace and Security	Book Review	That Boko Haram is everywhere in Jonathan's government, from the Executive, the Legislative and to the Judiciary, as well as the Security Forces. Also the Igbo are the most affected in the attacks launched by the Boko Haram	N/A

			attacks on the Igbo's in the Northern part of the country by the Boko Haram				
27	Hansen, W. W. and Musa, U. A. (2013)	Fanon, the Wretched and Boko Haram	Examines the concept of Wretched as a tool in explaining Boko Haram's emergence in Nigeria, while relating the Fanon's perception of the European colonization and the fight for political independence of Algerian war between 1954-1962	Peace and Security	Review of extensive literatures	Nigerian national identity suffers as a result of ethno-religious weakness rather than strong national identity.	N/A
28	Agbiboa, D. E. (2013)	Ethno-religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria	To examine the Nigerian state with the view of having a true national identity within a country with persistent of ethno-religious conflict that often turned into violence	Peace and Security	Extensive review of previous literature. The work made use of social identity theory.	Religion is the major tool used in the division of the people while past leaders like Ibrahim Babangida used it in registering Nigeria under the Organization of Islamic Country (OIC) and thus undermined the fact that Nigeria is a multi-religious country rather than placing her as a single religious country. The issue of ethnicity and marginalization of minority ethnic groups remains a problem to national identity	N/A
29	Agbiboa, D. E. and Maiangwa, B. (2013)	Boko Haram, Religious Violence, and the Crisis of	To seek an approach from a killing to non-	Peace and Security	Use of content analysis. The work made use of non-killing theory.	Boko Haram attacks goes beyond killing and bombing of Churches as in the case of St. Theresa's Catholic	N/A

		National Identity in Nigeria: Towards a Non-killing Approach	killing with the view of resolving the trend of violence in Northern Nigeria			Church in Madala, Suleja Local Government Area of Niger State to attack on International Institutions such as United Nations building in Abuja on the 23 August, 2011. Many diplomats and Nigerian citizens working with the UN in Abuja were killed from that attack.	
30	Bartusevicius, H. (2013)	The Inequality-Conflict nexus Re-examined: Income, Education and Popular Rebellions	It focused on bridging the gap between inequality and popular rebellions	Peace and Security	Use of empirical data and review of previous literature. Theory of relative deprivation was used in the research work.	The study shows that people are motivated to carry arms when they are unequal in terms of lack of access to education, health facilities and as well as social services. It also includes lack of opportunity to participate in politics.	Further studies should consider controlling for the distribution of income Whenever the role of the absolute income in conflict is analyzed.
31	Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2012)	Beyond the Equator There are No Sins: Coloniality and Violence in Africa.	The study examines the issues related to violence in Africa through the periods of pre-colonial, colonial, as well as post-colonial while relating to Congo, the German colonial genocide and South African neo-apartheid.	Peace and Security	Content analysis	It was found among others, that violence in African countries emulates from differences in races, ethnicities, tribes and regions while an understanding of violence is brought into knowledge tracing the colonial, post-colonial and the understanding of violence between the capitalist and the socialist ideologies.	N/A
32	Solomon, H. (2012)	Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria	The paper examines the root causes why the present administration finds it difficult	Peace and Security	Use of content analysis	It was found that the deep problems of countering the Boko Haram attacks goes more difficult as the group has her sympathizers are right within the Jonathan's government: some in the executive arm of	N/A

			in obtaining successful counter-terrorism approach to Boko Haram's attacks on the Nigerian polity.			government, some in the legislative arm of government and as well as the Judiciary arm which becomes so difficult. It is also noted that the armed forces and as well as the police are also infiltrated by the Boko Haram and such people could be known as their sympathizers of the group.	
33	Onapajo, H., Uzodike, U. O., and Whetho, A. (2012)	Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: The International dimension	The work examines the Boko Haram and its nature of terrorism, it also seek to study the international links of Boko Haram.	Peace and Security	Content Analysis	It was found among others that, the Boko Haram has members outside Nigeria from countries such as Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Sudan. Also that the Boko Haram is worse than the Nigerian civil war 1967-1970.	N/A
34	Salaam, A. O. (2012)	Boko Haram: Beyond Religious Fanaticism	The paper examines some of the factors responsible to the youths vulnerability to insurgency in Nigeria	Peace and Security	Content analysis used	It was found that poverty, mass illiteracy, endemic corruption, unemployment, as well as socio-political marginalization are the factors which necessitated the availability of youths to engage in insurgency activities in Nigeria.	N/A
35	Isumonah V. A. (2013)	Armed Society in the Niger Delta	The paper examines the issues relating to control of proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Nigeria's Niger Delta.	Peace and Security	Extensive review of previous Literature	It was found that lack of development of the Niger Delta region led to the carrying of arms against the government. The leaders of the Niger Delta States rather preferred to pay strongmen to protect their personal interest rather than engage in using the public resources to develop the region. A wasteful of resources in the name of securing the region from armed gangs became the order of the day. Resolving social and political issues	N/A

						that led to demand for arms should tackled by the government.	
36	Magbadelo, J. O. (2012)	Defence Transformation in Nigeria: A critical Issue for National Security concerns	The paper focused on the transformation of Nigeria's defence in meeting the security challenges and the essence of securing the Nigerian state.	Peace and Security	Review of previous literature.	The need to reposition the military to meet up the current challenges in securing the country requires re-equipping the military institution and implementing the a transformed military force would help in self-guarding the nation	N/A
37	Aghedo, I. (2012)	Winning the War, Losing the Peace: Amnesty and the Challenges of Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Niger Delta, Nigeria	The paper examines the no war, no peace as related to the Niger Delta region and the programmes of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).	Peace and security	Use of content analysis	It was found that environmental insecurity, lack of Development of the region as well as human right violations were the reasons behind the Niger Delta crisis which the youths took arms against the Federal Government of Nigeria.	N/A
38	Rakodi, C. (2012)	Inter-Religious Violence and its Aftermath: Insights from Indian and Nigerian Cities	The paper seek to study the aftermath of inter-religious violence in the context of Christianity, Islam and Hinduism using two countries Nigeria and India	Peace and Security	Extensive literature review and use of data collection from previous research projects on the said subject.	It was found that inter-religious conflict occurs as result as different religious beliefs. It is then used as tool in the quest for power and resource control. This has caused destruction of properties and killing of people who are basically motivated by politicians for political gains haven known that region can serve as a tool to separate the masses. Since people with different identities stay together in complex environment.	N/A

39	Waldek, L. and Jayasekara, S. (2011)	Boko Haram: the evolution of Islamist Extremism in Nigeria	The work focuses on an overview of the Boko Haram origin, its structure and as well as their activities in Nigeria	Peace and Security	Use of content analysis	It was found that members of Boko Haram got weapons through Chad, Niger and Cameroon. They do engage in activities such as bombing, usage of suicide bombing which has to do with the use of explosive detonation. There is a need to address the deep rooted problems in ethnic and religious faces.	N/A
40	Jackson, A. (2007)	Nigeria: A Security Overview	It focuses on the role of Nigeria in regional peacekeeping and that of ECOWAS, as well as the security challenges in Nigeria.	Peace and Security	Content analysis	The ECOWAS countries suffer as a result of poor governance and weak institutions Security challenges are factored as a product of government's failure to deliver basic services, as well as corruption, unemployment, poverty, crisis between the Christians and Muslim as threat to Nigeria's security.	N/A
41	Tando, Y. (2004)	Economic Policy and Conflict in Africa	Examines the linkages between economic policy and conflict in African.	Political economy, Peace and Security	Use of Content analysis	When the interest of the African people is protected by the government, then unity can be sustained.	N/A

## Appendix B


### Comparison between North and South Poverty

10 states with population absolute poverty (Northern State)			10 states with population in absolute poverty (Southern states)	
S/N	State	%	State	%
1	Jigawa	74.1	Bayelsa	47.7
2	Kebbi	72.0	Akwa-Ibom	53.7
3	Adamawa	74.2	Cross Rivers	52.9
4	Plateau	74.1	Anambra	56.8
5	Yobe	73.0	Imo	50.5
6	Zamfara	70.8	Ekiti	52.4
7	Gombe	74.2	Oyo	51.8
8	Bauchi	73.0	Osun	37.9
9	Sokoto	81.2	Lagos	48.6
10	Borno	55.1	Ondo	45.7

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2012).

## Appendix C

Map of Nigeria showing States affected by Niger Delta Militancy




Source: [www.en.wikipedia.org](http://www.en.wikipedia.org)



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## Appendix D

### Map of Nigeria showing the states affected by Boko Haram attacks



Source: Armed conflict Location and Event Data Project Created by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex.



## Appendix E

Gas flaring in the Niger Delta



Source: [www.justiceinnigerianow.org/jinn/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/nigeria-flaring.jpg](http://www.justiceinnigerianow.org/jinn/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/nigeria-flaring.jpg)



## Appendix F

Niger Delta Militants Ready to launch an attack.



Source: Laccino (2015).



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## Appendix G

### Gas flaring in the Niger Delta



Source: [www.freedomonline.com.ng/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/gas\\_flaring.jpg](http://www.freedomonline.com.ng/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/gas_flaring.jpg)



## Appendix H

### Environmental Pollution by Burst Pipeline



Air Pollution by burst oil pipeline. **Source:** World of Matter (2013).



## Appendix I

### List of Interviewees

**Prof. Yusuf A. Zoaka.** Head, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja. 12<sup>th</sup> of April, 2016.

**Mr. Johnson Ikyernum.** Community Consultant, Port Harcourt, Rivers State. 20<sup>th</sup> of April, 2016.

**Dr. Frank Terhemba Abagen.** Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Benue State University. 3<sup>rd</sup> of May, 2016.

**Dr. Terver Akpa.** Department of Political Science, Benue State University. 30<sup>th</sup> of May, 2016.

**Hon. Emma Kwenam.** Chairman House Committee (Army), Federal House of Representatives, Abuja. 15<sup>th</sup> of June, 2016.  
Ali, Kazon and Ibrahim, Military Rehabilitation Camp, Minna. June 26<sup>th</sup>, 2016.

**Senator Emmanuel Bwacha.** Senator Representing Taraba South constituency of Taraba State, at National Assembly, Abuja. 25<sup>th</sup> of July, 2016.

**Dr. Sam Eyem.** Community Leader & Consultant, Delta State. 10<sup>th</sup> of August, 2016.

**Dr. Steve Akpo.** Department of Economics, Delta State University. 12<sup>th</sup> of August, 2016.

**Dr. Mohammed Gori.** Communication Expert, Arewa Consultative Forum (Northern Nigeria Think Tank). 25<sup>th</sup> August, 2016.

**Prof. Mohammed M. Wader.** Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja. 27<sup>th</sup> August, 2016.

**Col. Mohammed Inuwa.** Senior Lecturer, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria. A Bradford Fellow. 30<sup>th</sup> August, 2016.

**Danjuma Kabiru.** A Professor of Political Sciences, Nigeria Defence Academy, Kaduna. 2<sup>nd</sup> September, 2016.

**Col. Yomi Gbadebo.** Commander, Operation Lafiya Dole, Maiduguri, Borno State. 3<sup>rd</sup> September, 2016.

**Capt. NB Abdusalam.** A platoon commander, Operation Lafiya Dole, Yola, Adamawa State. 4<sup>th</sup> September, 2016.

**Preye Keremowei.** Leader, Ijaw Youth council, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Niger Delta 6<sup>th</sup> of Sept, 2016.

**Gambo Mohammed.** Commander, Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Maiduguri, Borno State. 9<sup>th</sup> Sept, 2016.

